THE TRUE

INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM

OF THE

UNIVERSE:

WHEREIN

ALL THE REASON AND PHILOSOPHY OF ATHEISM IS CONFUTED,
AND ITS IMPOSSIBILITY DEMONSTRATED,

WITH A TREATISE CONCERNING

ETERNAL AND IMMUTABLE MORALITY.

BY

RALPH CUDWORTH, D.D.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED,

THE NOTES AND DISSERTATIONS OF DR. J. L. MOSHEIM,

TRANSLATED BY

JOHN HARRISON, M.A.

WITH A COPIOUS GENERAL INDEX TO THE WHOLE WORK.

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

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BOOK I.

CHAPTER IV.

XX. We now pass from the poets of the Pagans to their philosophers. A modern writer,[1] concerning the religion of the gentiles, affirmeth this to have been the opinion of very eminent philosophers, "That even all the minor gods of the Pagans did exist of themselves from eternity unmade, they giving many reasons for the same." But how far from truth this is, will (as we conceive) appear sufficiently from the sequel of this discourse. And we cannot conclude otherwise, but that this learned writer did mistake that opinion of Aristotle and the latter Platonists, concerning the eternity of the world and gods, as if they had therefore asserted the self-existence of them; the contrary whereunto hath been already manifested. Wherefore we shall now make it unquestionably evident, by a particular enumeration, that the generality of the pagan philosophers, who were Theists, however they acknowledged a multiplicity of gods, yet asserted one only self-existent Deity, or a universal Numen, by whom the world and all those other gods were made. There being only some few Ditheists to be excepted (such as Plutarch and Atticus), who, out of a certain softness and tenderness of nature, that they might free the one good God from the imputa-

[1] He means Edward Herbert Baron of Cherbury, who, in his celebrated work De Religione Gentilium, cap. 14. p. 228. thus writes: At quid si a se ipsis existentiæ Deo summo coæternæ fuerint? quod ita esse, non infimi subsellii philosophi multis rationibus contendentes videre passim licet, "But what if they were self-existent and co-eternal with the supreme God? there being eminent philosophers every where to be met with who maintain by many arguments that this was the case."

tion of evils, would needs set up, besides him, an evil soul or demon also in the world, self-existent, to bear all the blame of them.[1]

And indeed Epicurus is the only person that we can find amongst the reputed philosophers, who, though pretending to acknowledge gods, yet professedly opposed monarchy, and verbally asserted a multitude of eternal, unmade, self-existent deities; but such as had nothing at all to do, either with the making or governing of the world. The reason whereof was, because he would by no means admit the world to have been made by any mind or understanding. Wherefore he concluded:

Naturam rerum, haud divinâ mente coortam,*

"That there was no God the δημιουργὸς or framer of the world." But nevertheless, that he might decline the odium of being accounted an Atheist, he pretended to assert a multitude of gods unmade and incorruptible, such as were unconcerned in the fabric of the world. Wherein first it is evident, that he was not serious and sincere, because he, really admitting no other principles of things in his philosophy, besides atoms and vacuum, agreeably thereunto, could acknowledge no other gods than such as were compounded out of atoms, and therefore corruptible. And thus does Origen declare the doctrine of Epicurus, not indeed as he pretended to hold it, but as, according to the tenor of his principles, he must have held it, had he really asserted any gods at all:† Οἱ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου θεοὶ, σύνθετοι ἐξ ἀτόμων τυγχάνοντες, καὶ τὸ ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ συστάσει ἀναλυτοὶ, πραγματεύονται τὰς φθοροποιοὺς ἀτόμους ἀποσείεσθαι, "Epicurus' gods being compounded of atoms, and therefore by their very constitution corruptible, are in continual labour and toil, struggling with their corruptive principles." Nevertheless, if Epicurus had in good earnest asserted such a commonwealth of gods, as were neither made out of atoms, nor yet corruptible; so long as he denied the world to have been made by any mind or wisdom (as we have already declared) he ought not to be reckoned amongst the Theists, but Atheists.[2]

Thales, the Milesian, was one of the most ancient Greek philosophers, who, that he admitted a plurality of gods in some sense, is evident from that saying of his cited by Aristotle:[3] Πάντα θεῶν πλήρη, "All things are full of gods." But that, notwithstanding, he asserted one supreme and only unmade or

[1] Of all these we have several times spoken at great length already.

* Lucret. lib. 3. [Ver. 15.] † Lib. 4. cont. Cels. p. 169.

[2] On the religion of Epicurus see our remarks above on ch. 2. sect. 2.

[3] De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 8. p. 17. tom. 2. opp. The same saying of his is quoted by Cicero, De Legibus, lib. 2. cap. 11. p. 3353, tom. 9. opp. Add Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 1. segm. 27. p. 18.

self-existent Deity, is also manifest from that other apothegm of his in Laërtius:[4] Πρεσβύτατον πάντων ὁ Θεὸς, ἀγέννητον γάρ, "God is the oldest of all things, because he is unmade." From whence it may be concluded, that all Thales' other gods were generated, and the offspring of one sole unmade Deity.[5]

Pherecydes Syrus was Thales' contemporary, of whom Aristotle in his Metaphysics[6] hath recorded, that he affirmed τὸ γεννῆσαν πρῶτον ἄριστον, that the first principle from whence all other things were generated, was the best or an absolutely perfect being; so as that in the scale of nature, things did not ascend upwards from the most imperfect to the more perfect beings, but on the contrary descend downwards from the most perfect to the less perfect. Moreover, Laërtius informs us,[7] that this was the beginning of one of Pherecydes' books, Ζεὺς μὲν καὶ χρόνος εἰς ἀεὶ, καὶ χθὼν ἦν, "Jupiter, and Time, and the Earth, always were." Where, notwithstanding, in the following words, he makes the earth to be dependent upon Jupiter; though some reading Κρόνος here, instead of χρόνος, seem to understand him thus, that Jupiter and Saturn, really one and the same Numen, was always from eternity. However, there is in these words an acknowledgment of one single and eternal Deity.[8]

[4] Lib. 1. segm. 35. p. 21.

[5] On the religion of Thales I have already discoursed at length, on ch. 2. sect. 20. If Thales had left us accurate definitions of the words he makes use of, we should be able at this day to judge with more certainty of his religious opinions. But we are nowhere informed, what he meant by Θεὸς and Θεοί. He has defined God, indeed, to be a nature μήτε ἀρχὴν ἔχων, μήτε τελευτήν, "having neither beginning nor end," according to the testimony of Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 1. sect. 36. p. 22. But this definition is too vague, and is equally applicable to eternal matter as it is to the supreme Deity, whose existence is pointed out by reason. Nor is that better which is given here: "God is unmade and the oldest of all;" which would be willingly adopted by all those who are anxious to refer the origin of things to matter, to the exclusion of a God.

[6] Lib. 12. cap. 4. p. 446. tom. 4. opp. I have already treated largely of this passage above.

[7] Lib. 1. segm. 119. p. 76.

[8] According to the authority of Clemens Alexandr. Stromat. lib. 5. p. 676. Pherecydes expressed himself in all that he left on record on divine matters in an abstruse and recondite style, and concealed his opinions in obscure words; which is proved to be the case both by passages quoted from him in Clemens and by the very exordium of his work as given in Laërtius. However, this very exordium will enable us, if not clearly to understand, at least to form some conjecture respecting, his opinion on the origin of things. Jupiter, time, and the earth, he says, existed from all eternity. I grant, that Jupiter is here the supreme and first cause of all things, omnipotent and all-wise: nor will the words which follow permit us to think otherwise. But to this Jupiter he first makes time, then the earth, to be equal. In affirming that time existed along with God from all eternity, he would appear to have held the stars and heavenly bodies, by whose annual courses ages are formed, to be also eternal. Nor if this were his opinion, which I consider probable, would he be the only one who thought so. But there are some who suppose a certain time to have existed, before that time was, which is produced by the conversion of the world: and as it is uncertain, whether Pherecydes held this opinion, nothing can be decided upon. It is more certain, however, that this man associated eternal matter with his God. For this, beyond doubt,

Pythagoras was the most eminent of all the ancient philosophers, who, that he was a Polytheist as well as the other Pagans, may be concluded from that beginning of the golden verses (though not written by him):

> Ἀθανάτους μὲν πρῶτα θεοὺς, νόμῳ ὡς διάκεινται,
> Τίμα, καὶ σέβου ὅρκον· ἐπειθ' ἥρωας ἀγανούς·
> Τούς τε καταχθονίους σέβε δαίμονας, ἔννομα ῥίζων.

Wherein men are exhorted, in the first place, to worship the immortal gods, and that accordingly as they were appointed by law; after them the heroes, and last of all the terrestrial demons. And accordingly Laërtius[9] gives this account of Pythagoras' piety: Τιμὰς θεοῖς δεῖν νομίζειν καὶ ἥρωσιν, μὴ τὰς ἴσας, "That he conceived men ought to worship both the gods and the heroes, though not with equal honour." And who these gods of Pythagoras were, the same writer also declareth: Ἥλιόν τε καὶ σελήνην καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀστέρας εἶναι θεούς, "That they were, in part at least, the sun, and moon, and stars."

Notwithstanding which, that Pythagoras acknowledged one supreme and universal Numen, which therefore was the original of all those other gods, may partly appear from that prayer in the golden verses, which, whether written by Philolaus or Lysis, or some other follower of Pythagoras, were undoubtedly ancient and agreeable to his doctrine.[10]

is that χθὼν, which he asserts to have existed for ever along with Jupiter. To this he adds: Χθονίη δὲ ὄνομα ἐγένετο γῇ, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῇ Ζεὺς γέρας δίδοι, "And the earth was called χθονίη, after Jupiter conferred honour upon it." A specimen of the obscure phraseology affected by this philosopher. If the words signify anything, the following, unless I am mistaken, is their purport. That the supreme Deity ordered and disposed that rude mass which existed from eternity, and gave to it the form it now has: after which it was called the earth. I might discourse at greater length on this subject, and explain the doctrine of Pherecydes more copiously, were I disposed to transfer into these pages what is related of him by Clemens: but I fear I may appear to many to have been already too prolix. [Consult Beausobre, Orig. de Manich. p. 327. who treats largely of Pherecydes. The whole of his philosophy is expounded differently from what it usually is by Warburton, Divine Legation of Moses, tom. 1. p. 437. See especially Heine's Dissertation on Pherecydes, Histoire de l'Academie des Sciences, Berlin An. 1747. p. 303. which however contains many inaccuracies.]

[9] Lib. 8. segm. 33. p. 514. Herewith compare segm. 23. p. 506. of the same book. The passage of Laërtius which follows occurs segm. 27. p. 509.

[10] These verses v. 61. 62. occur in the poems usually termed *golden*. In my opinion the following translation expresses the sense more accurately than the one here given:

> O Jupiter, multis certe malis homines liberares,
> Si omnibus indicares, quali quisque genio utatur.

As to the learned Doctor's statement, that these golden verses contain the substance of the doctrine professed by Pythagoras, I willingly agree with him, if it be understood of his external doctrine, which he concealed from no one and taught publicly to all. But this philosopher, as is well known, had another secret and hidden doctrine, which he explained only to select disciples, of whose capacity and fidelity he had assured himself: and I deny that this is contained in these verses, as I hope I shall easily prove by and by to any one who is disposed to think otherwise. See Porphyry only, Vita Pythagoræ, p. 39.

Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἠ πολλῶν τε κακῶν λύσειας ἅπαντας·*
Εἰ πᾶσιν δείξαις, οἵῳ τῷ δαίμονι χρῶνται·

Jupiter alme, malis jubeas vel solvier omnes:
Omnibus utantur vel quonam dæmone monstra.

Upon which Hierocles thus writeth:[1] Τὸν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς ἔθος ἦν τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις τῷ τοῦ Διὸς, καὶ Ζηνὸς, ὀνόματι σεμνύνειν· δι' ὃν γὰρ τὸ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ζῆν, τοῖς πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει, τοῦτον δίκαιον ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνέργείας ὀνομάζεσθαι, "It was the manner of the Pythagoreans to honour the maker and father of this whole universe with the name of Dis and Zen, it being just, that he, who giveth being and life to all, should be denominated from thence." And again afterwards: Τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ὄνομα σύμβολόν ἐστι, καὶ εἰκὼν ἐν φωνῇ δημιουργικῆς οὐσίας, τῷ τοὺς πρώτους θεμένους τοῖς πράγμασι τὰ ὀνόματα διὰ σοφίας ὑπερβολὴν, ὥσπερ τινὰς ἀγαλματοποιοὺς ἀρίστους, διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων, ὡς δι' εἰκόνων, ἐμφανίσαι αὐτῶν τὰς δυνάμεις, "This very name Zeus is a convenient symbol or image of the demiurgical nature. And they who first gave names to things, were, by reason of a certain wonderful wisdom of theirs a kind of excellent statuaries; they, by those several names, as images, lively representing the natures of things." Moreover, that this Pythagoric prayer was directed to the supreme Numen and king of gods, Jamblichus thus declares in his Protreptics:[2] Ἐν δὴ τούτοις μία μὲν ἀρίστη παράκλησις εἰς τὴν θείαν εὐδαιμονίαν ἡ μεμιγμένη ταῖς εὐχαῖς καὶ ἀνακλήσεσι τῶν θεῶν, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ βασιλέως αὐτῶν Διός, "Here is an excellent exhortation of these golden verses to the pursuit of divine felicity, mingled together with prayers and the invocation of the gods, but especially of that Jupiter, who is the king of them." Moreover, the same might further appear from those Pythagoric fragments,[3] that are still extant; as that of Ocellus Lucanus, and others, who were moralists, in which as gods are sometimes spoken of plurally, so also is God often singularly used for that supreme Deity which containeth the whole.

But this will be most of all manifest from what hath been recorded concerning the Pythagoric philosophy, and its making a monad the first principle. It is true indeed, that the writer, De Placitis Philosophorum, doth affirm Pythagoras to have asserted two substantial principles self-existent, a Monad and a Dyad; by the former of which, as God is confessed to have been meant, so the latter of them is declared with some uncertainty, it being in one place interpreted to be a demon, or a

* Salmas. Præf. in Tab. Ceb. Arab.
[1] Comm. in Aurea Carmina, p. 200. ed. Needhami.
[2] Cap. 3. p. 10. ed. Arcerii.
[3] They are published by Dr. Tho. Gale in his Opuscula Veter. Moral. et Mytholog. Amstel. 1688. 8.

principle of evil:[4] Πυθαγόρας τῶν ἀρχῶν τὴν μὲν μονάδα θεὸν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς φύσις, αὐτός ὁ νοῦς· τὴν δ' ἀόριστον δυάδα δαίμονα, καὶ τὸ κακόν, &c., "Pythagoras' first principle is God and Good, which is the nature of unity, and a perfect mind; but his other principle of duality is a demon or evil." But in another place expounded to be matter:[5] Πάλιν τὴν μονάδα καὶ τὴν ἀόριστον δυάδα ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς· σπεύδει δὲ αὐτῷ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον καὶ εἰδικον (ὅπερ ἐστὶ νοῦς ὁ θεὸς), ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ παθητικόν τε καὶ ὑλικὸν (ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρατὸς κόσμος),* "Pythagoras' principles were a monad and infinite duality; the former of them an active principle, mind or God, the latter passive and matter." And Plutarch in some other writings of his declares, that the first matter did not exist alone by itself dead and inanimate, but acted with an irrational soul; and that both these together made up that wicked demon of his. And doubtless, this book, De Placitis Philosophorum, was either written by Plutarch himself, or else by some disciple and follower of his according to his principles. Wherefore this account, which is therein given of the Pythagoric doctrine, was probably infected with that private conceit of Plutarch's, that God and a wicked demon, or else matter, together with an irrational soul, self-existent, were the first principles of the universe. Though we do acknowledge that others also, besides Plutarch, have supposed Pythagoras to have made two self-existent prin-

[4] This passage occurs De Placitis Philosoph. lib. 1. cap. 7. 881. But the learned Doctor is wrong in supposing that the two passages which he here adduces are contradictory to each other, and that in the former Plutarch has not expressed his meaning sufficiently clearly on the dyad of Pythagoras. There is no contradiction between the two. In the former passage Plutarch states, that the dyad of Pythagoras is a demon and evil: but adds, what is here omitted: Περὶ ἣν ἐστι τὸ ὑλικὸν πλῆθος· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁρατὸς ὁ κόσμος, "Which is surrounded with the mass of matter. And this is the visible world." Consequently in this passage he makes the duad of Pythagoras to be matter, in which is concealed a certain wicked and disorderly soul. In the latter again he asserts this dyad to be matter or the visible world. In both therefore he expressly declares the dyad of Pythagoras to be rude and unformed matter: but in the latter he adds, that this matter is animated, and imbued with a certain living but irrational nature. Agreeably to Plutarch's opinion, then, wherever he mentions matter, we are to understand it, not as inanimate, but endowed with a certain irregular and disorderly life; to which opinion, as we have before sufficiently demonstrated, he was much wedded, although after the manner of the academics he came to no positive decision. Compare his book De Iside et Osiride, p. 370, where he explains the doctrine of Pythagoras in the same way. Who is ignorant of its being the custom of the best writers, to name only one of those things which they conceive to be eternally associated together, and at the same time to leave the other to be understood? Plutarch therefore is not to be found fault with, because, having once decided that there perpetually exists in matter an evil mind or demon, which cannot by any means be separated from it, he in some other passage mentions matter alone, and does not at the same time speak expressly of the demon which he supposed to be connected with it. Indeed, this very observation almost leads me to the conviction, that Plutarch himself is the author of the book, De Placitis Veterum Philosophorum, written, though it be, in any thing but neat order, and not always according to strict accuracy and truth.

* Lib. 1. cap. 3. [P. 876. tom. oper. 2.]

[5] [Beausobre finds fault with this opinion, Hist. de Manich. p. 32. not.]

ciples, God and matter, but not animate, nor informed, as Plutarch supposed, with any irrational or wicked soul.

Notwithstanding which, it may well be made a question, whether Pythagoras by his Dyad meant matter or no; because Malchus or Porphyrius, in the life of Pythagoras, thus interprets those two Pythagoric principles of unity and duality:* Τὸ αἴτιον τῆς συμπνοίας καὶ τῆς συμπαθείας, καὶ τῆς σωτηρίας τῶν ὅλων τοῦ κατὰ ταυτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος, ἓν προσηγόρευσαν, καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἓν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἓν τοιοῦτον ὑπάρχει, ἡνωμένον τοῖς μέρεσι καὶ συμπνοοῦν, κατὰ μετουσίαν τοῦ πρώτου αἰτίου· τὸν δὲ τῆς ἑτερότητος καὶ ἀνισότητος καὶ παντὸς τοῦ μεριστοῦ καὶ ἐν μεταβολῇ καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἔχοντος δυοειδῆ λόγον καὶ δυάδα προσηγόρευσαν, "The cause of that sympathy, harmony, and agreement, which is in things, and of the conservation of the whole, which is always the same and like itself, was by Pythagoras called unity or a monad (that unity, which is in the things themselves, being but a participation of the first cause:) but the reason of alterity, inequality, and inconstant irregularity in things, was by him called a Dyad." Thus, according to Porphyrius, by the Pythagoric Dyad is not so much meant matter, as the infinite and indeterminate nature, and the passive capability of things. So that the Monad and Dyad of Pythagoras seem to have been the same with Plato's πέρας and ἄπειρον, his "finite" and "infinite" in his Philebus; the former of which two only is substantial, that first most simple being, the cause of all unity, and the measure of all things.[6]

However, if Pythagoras' Dyad be to be understood of a substantial matter, it will not therefore follow, that he supposed matter to be self-existent and independent upon the Deity, since, according to the best and most ancient writers, his Dyad was no primary but a secondary thing only, and derived from his Monad, the sole original of all things. Thus Diogenes Laërtius tells us,[7] that Alexander, who wrote the successions of philosophers, affirmed he had found in the Pythagoric Commentaries, ἀρχὴν μὲν τῶν ἁπάντων, μονάδα· ἐκ δὲ τῆς μονάδος, ἀόριστον δυάδα, ὡς

[6] This passage of Porphyry occurs in his Vita Pythagoræ, p. 47. ed. Kusteri. But I have again and again stated it as my opinion, that the junior Platonists, to whose sect Porphyry belonged, are not to be trusted when expounding the dogmas of the old philosophers, inasmuch as they for the most part interpret all ancient doctrines agreeably to their own principles. And as regards this explication of the Pythagoric numbers in particular, I hold it to be altogether foreign to the meaning of the philosopher. For he referred the nature of things to numbers, or had recourse to numbers in explaining physical matters; but I find no record in ancient writers of his having defined moral doctrines or metaphysical notions by numbers. Porphyry on the contrary connects the whole system of numbers as taught by Pythagoras, with those metaphysical subtleties, which abound so plentifully in the books of his master Plotinus. But, to confess the truth, the accounts given by ancient authors of the Pythagoric numbers are so full of obscurity and inconsistency, that in my opinion, musicians, butchers, cooks, gardeners, or any others, might, if so inclined, find the elements of their respective arts in them.

* P. 203.

[7] Lib. 8. segm. 25. p. 507.

ἂν ὕλην τῇ μονάδι αἰτίῳ ὄντι ὑποστῆναι, "that a Monad was the principle of all things, but that from this Monad was derived infinite duality, as matter for the Monad to work upon, as the active cause." With which agreeth Hermias,[8] affirming this to be one of the greatest of all the Pythagoric mysteries, that a Monad was the sole principle of all things. Accordingly whereunto, Clemens Alexandrinus cites this passage[9] out of Thearidas, an ancient Pythagorean,* in his book concerning nature: Ἀ ἀρχὰ τῶν ὄντων, ἀρχὰ μὲν ὄντως ἀληθινὰ, μία· κείνα γὰρ ἐν ἀρχᾷ τέ ἐστιν ἓν καὶ μόνον, "The true principle of all things was only one: for this was in the beginning one alone." Which words also seem to imply the world to have had a novity of existence or beginning of duration. And indeed, however Ocellus Lucanus writes, yet that Pythagoras himself did not hold the eternity of the world, may be concluded from what Porphyrius[10] records of him, where he gives an account of that his superstitious abstinence from beans: Ὅτι τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς καὶ γενέσεως ταραττομένης, καὶ πολλῶν ἅμα συνηνεγμένων καὶ συσπειρομένων καὶ συσσηπομένων ἐν τῇ γῇ, κατ' ὀλίγον γένεσις καὶ διάκρισις συνέστη, ζώων τε ὑμοῦ γενομένων, καὶ φυτῶν ἀναδιδομένων, τότε δὴ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς σηπεδόνος, ἀνθρώπους συστῆναι καὶ κυάμους βλαστῆναι, "That at the beginning things being confounded and mingled together, the generation and secretion of them afterwards proceeded by degrees, animals and plants appearing; at which time also, from the same putrified matter, sprung up both men and beans."[1]

[8] Irrisione Philos. Gentilis. sect. 16. p. 225. Πυθαγόρας καὶ οἱ τούτου συμφυλέται . . . παραδιδοῦσιν ἄλλα μοι δόγματα, ὥσπερ μυστήρια, καὶ τοῦτο δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ ἀπόῤῥητον τὸ, αὐτὸς ἔφη, ἀρχὴ τῶν πάντων ἡ μονὰς, "Pythagoras and those of his sect. . . . . teach other opinions, as mysteries, and also this great and hidden one, he himself said, unity is the first principle of all things."

[9] Dr. Cudworth does not cite this passage as it stands in Clemens, but as it is given by Eusebius, Præpar. Evangel. lib. 5. cap. 24. That this Thearidas was a disciple of Pythagoras is inferred from Jamblichus' Vita Pythagoræ, cap. 36. p. 214. where Θεωρίδης Metapontinus is numbered among the hearers of Pythagoras.

* Strom. 5. p. 611. [p. 728. edit. Potteri.]

[10] Vita Pythagoræ, p. 43. ed. Kusteri.

[1] In explaining the Pythagorean numbers, and investigating their import, it would be easy, were I so disposed, to launch forth into a lengthened and ingenious discussion. But I am deterred by the example of so many men far more learned than myself, who, I perceive, after long and eruidite labours have produced nothing beyond very uncertain conjectures. Jo. Meursius, who in his book De Denario Pythagorico, has collected most of the passages of the ancients respecting these numbers, will convince any one that nothing can be more obscure than the whole subject, and consequently that to spend much time or study in exploring it is the part of a man who makes an unprofitable use of his leisure. I shall therefore content myself with a few observations which I consider may be of assistance to those who wish to read to some advantage the present disputation of Dr. Cudworth. 1. The doctrine of Pythagoras himself ought, I think, to be well distinguished from the sentiments and opinions of his disciples, who, beyond all controversy, have foisted not a few things upon their master, which never entered that philosopher's mind. For as Pythagoras committed nothing to writing, and did not openly declare his mind on all subjects, it followed, as might naturally be expected, that each interpreted his philosophy according to his own fancy, and attributed whatever he himself regarded as truths, to the authority of Pythagoras. That

Pythagoras is generally reported to have held a trinity of divine hypostases; and therefore when St. Cyril[2] affirmeth Pythagoras to have called God ψύχωσιν τῶν ὅλων κύκλων, καὶ

this was the case is shown even by the signal want of unanimity among his disciples, who although very often altogether at variance, nevertheless all appeal to Pythagoras, and cease not to ring their Αὐτὸς ἔφα in our ears. Pythagoras himself was especially devoted to geometry and the mathematical sciences. See, besides many others, Jamblichus, De Vita Pythagoræ, cap. 26. p. 96. cap. 29. p. 134. &c. Hence he described and defined the elements of natural philosophy by geometrical signs and figures, as men generally are wont to apply the art they most understand and follow, even in other sciences. In what manner he did this we may learn from the Timæus of Plato and Chalcidius' Commentary thereon. Add what Macrobius has written in Somnium Scipionis, lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 28. and of the moderns what Herbert of Cherbury, among many others, has said on this subject, De Religione Gentilium, cap. 10. p. 89. &c. He was not content, however, with seeking for geometrical proportion in the nature of things, but supposed that the parent and author of nature had regard also to arithmetical proportion. Wherefore, as in numbers the progression is gradual from that which is simple and one to that which is compound and consists of many, so also in this universe he imagined all things to have flowed from one simple nature, and by gradual increase to have become farther removed from that first simplicity: moreover, that all the classes of nature's works, and also the whole of nature, are contained in the number ten, as being the most perfect. Hence the labour devoted by him to the contemplation of nature was directed to this alone, to show in the first place in what manner all other things were made from one, so that the composition continually increased; and secondly to prove, that the architect of nature nowhere proceeded beyond the number ten. By way of a specimen, the better to understand the latter of these, read, and not only read, but digest, the remarks of Jac. Thomasius on the Antichthon of the Pythagoreans in Observation. Halens, t. 4. obs. 19. p. 373. For my part I should not place much value on this system of philosophizing on nature; nor does Pythagoras seem to me to be any better than a musician or a clockmaker who should attempt to accommodate physical science to the precepts of his art, which every one would at once pronounce to be absurd and preposterous. But we are not here inquiring, what sort of a philosopher Pythagoras was, but what was meant by his numbers. Now what bodies and natural things Pythagoras designated by numbers, I consider neither to be known by any one at the present day, nor indeed to have been known by those who formerly delighted in the name of Pythagoreans; who, being ignorant of their master's true meaning, transferred those numbers some to metaphysical, others to moral, and others to I know not what other subjects, and, entangled in endless subtletics and verbal niceties, betrayed their own ignorance by their disputes and dissensions. That this may not appear strange and incredible to any one, I shall briefly show what I observe is not generally known, that, properly speaking, the philosophy of Pythagoras perished with Pythagoras himself, and that those who after his death wished to be regarded as Pythagoreans were scarcely half Pythagoreans, being the followers of this man in name rather than in reality. That the discipline of Pythagoras, his system of instruction, and every thing else connected therewith, were lost to the world at the same time with himself, and revived by no one afterwards, will not be doubted by those who pay even moderate attention to ancient authors. I shall only speak, therefore, of his philosophy, and shall show by the testimonies of the Pythagoreans themselves, that but a slender report of this survived him. Lysis, one of his own scholars, in an epistle to Hipparchus, written after Pythagoras' death, and still extant, signifies his unwillingness to communicate to any one the precepts of his master, and shows at much length that those who called themselves followers of Pythagoras did not represent even the shadow of his disciples. This epistle has been published by Dr. Tho. Gale among others, Opuscula Veterum Mythologica, p. 736. At such a low ebb was the philosophy of Pythagoras not long after his death. What, therefore, do we suppose befell it afterwards? This is made pretty apparent by Porphyry in his life of

[2] Contra Julianum, lib. 1. cap. 30. But Cyril interprets this saying of Pythagoras differently from the learned Doctor, whose explication, obviously at variance with the Greek words, as given by Cyril, will I fancy, be assented to by no one.

πάντων κίνησιν, "the animation of the whole heavens, and the motion of all things;" adding, that God was not, as some supposed, ἐκτὸς τᾶς διακοσμήσεως, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ ὅλος ἐν ὅλῳ, "with-

Pythagoras, p. 52. where he confesses that at the decease of the first disciples of Pythagoras, the whole of his philosophy perished, a very few remnants alone having been preserved in the memory of some individuals. I shall cite some of his words: Τῆς δὲ συμφορᾶς οὕτως κατασχούσης τοὺς ἄνδρας, συνεξέλιπε καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἄῤῥητος ἐν τοῖς στήθεσιν ἔτι φυλαχθεῖσα ἄχρι τότε, μόνων τῶν δυσσυνέτων παρὰ τοῖς ἔξω διαμνημονευομένων· οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ Πυθαγόρου σύγγραμμα ἦν, "When the men were overwhelmed with this calamity, the science also perished along with them, hitherto kept concealed in their breasts, except some few things difficult to be understood, which the auditors of exterior admission retained in the memory. For no writing of Pythagoras was in existence." Porphyry immediately adds, that after the death of Pythagoras his surviving scholars, Lysis, Archippus and others, took every precaution to prevent any of his precepts from becoming public. Therefore, if we are to believe him, all the interior and secret philosophy of Pythagoras died along with himself, nor has any portion of it come down to us except what those whom he did not admit to the mysteries retained by heart, and did not themselves understand. And there can be no doubt at all, that what he taught concerning numbers and the whole of physical science belonged to this interior philosophy. From which we may understand how little hope remains to us of recovering the true form and nature of this lost doctrine. But I shall now give another passage of Porphyry's from the same Life, p. 49. which clearly proves that not only the Pythagorean philosophy generally, but in particular his doctrine concerning numbers perished along with himself: Ἡ μὲν δὴ περὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν πραγμάτεια τοιαύτη τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις· καὶ διὰ ταύτην πρωτίστην οὖσαν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ταύτην συνέβη σβεσθῆναι, "Such was the use of numbers with the Pythagoreans, and on account of this being a sort of first philosophy it so happened that the philosophy itself perished." Porphyry subjoins other reasons, why this species of philosophy was lost, which I now pass over. If the philosophy of Pythagoras perished on account of the doctrine of numbers, which was its ground-work, being mostly neglected, who, I ask, will deny the philosopher's opinion concerning these numbers to have also perished? Wherefore Jamblichus, in the fourth century after Christ, boasted of having restored to light the philosophy of Pythagoras, hitherto neglected and enveloped in thick darkness, De Vita Pythagoræ, cap. 1. p. 2. ed. Kusteri. Such being the facts, it must be manifest with what truth we stated that there is no reason why any one should bestow much time and labour upon the investigation of these mysteries, and that the later Pythagoreans, who are relied upon as authorities in this question, are unworthy of the slightest consideration. That the exterior discipline of Pythagoras is for the most part known to us, I admit; but the interior we are obliged to form our judgment of from a few words of certain authors, who were themselves unacquainted with it.

II. To come to Pythagoras' *monad* and *dyad* in particular, the written accounts extant in ancient authors respecting these numbers, may themselves even be taken as a proof, that those decide the most wisely who rank the whole of this science of numbers among the things obliterated by time. Not a few of the ancients consider the *monad* of Pythagoras to be God, and the *dyad*, matter, out of which God created the world. Some of these have been cited by the learned Doctor: but many more might be brought forward, if necessary. Consult J. Meursius' book above mentioned, and to the authors adduced by him add among others, Philo Judæus, De Legibus Specialibus, p. 805. and Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 8. segm. 25. p. 507. 508. Neither is the thing altogether destitute of probability, especially if Pythagoras be supposed to have regarded matter as animated with a certain spirit; which, according to some passages of the ancients, would appear to have been the case. For there seems to have been nothing absurd in comparing matter, which is pervaded by a certain spirit, with the number two, and the mind itself, which digested and disposed this rude matter, with the monad or unity. But if we are to believe others not inferior in age, learning, or intelligence, we shall perhaps be disposed to conclude that what the philosopher called a monad, was rude and ill-digested matter, from the modification of which were produced first the four elements, and afterwards all other bodies. We shall adduce some evidence of this. Hermias, Irris. Philos. Gentil. sect. 16. p. 225. says: Ἀρχὴ τῶν πάντων ἡ μονάς· ἐκ δὲ τῶν σχημάτων αὐτῆς καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀριθμῶν τὰ στοιχεῖα

out the fabric of the world, but whole in the whole," this seems properly to be understood of that third divine hypostasis of the Pythagoric trinity, namely the eternal Psyche. Again, when God is called in Plutarch,[3] according to Pythagoras, *αὐτὸς ὁ νοῦς*, "mind itself," this seems to be meant properly of his second hypostasis; the supreme Deity, according to him, being something above mind or intellect. In like manner when in Cicero,[4]

γίνεται, "Unity is the beginning of all things; and from the figures and numbers of this the elements are formed." What can a monad be but matter, if the beginnings of things are produced from its various figures? Nicomachus Gerasenus, in Photius, Biblioth. cod. 187. p. 462. after saying that the Pythagoreans held the *μονὰς* to be *ὕλη in a certain way* (*πῶς*), thus proceeds: *Πάντα χρήματα μιγνὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς, καὶ πανδοχεὺς λοιπὸν, καὶ χωρητικὴ, καὶ χάος, σύγχυσις, σύγκρασις, ἀλαμπία*, "That the same in truth mingles all things, and afterwards receives and contains all, and is chaos, confusion, commixture, darkness." Which words, as must be obvious to every one, can only apply to the first matter, from which all other things flowed. Nor to confess the truth, does this opinion appear to me to be absurd or improbable, especially if we are to form our judgment of the philosophy of Pythagoras from the precepts of his followers, particularly Empedocles. What should hinder us from calling that one matter from which all other things emanated, a monad, if we make up our minds to employ numbers on physical subjects? From this one matter proceeded first the dyad, namely, the two primary elements, water and air. From the concretion of water, the earth was gradually produced: from air sprung fire. Thus we have the quaternary number, which Pythagoras, according to the testimonies of many, laid down as the number of the elements. Now, which of the two opinions is to be preferred, I would fain learn from those who fancy themselves to be very sagacious in exploring the doctrines of the ancients. But most assuredly, if they wish to be guided by truth and reason, they will confess that no one at the present day is able to dispel these doubts and difficulties.

III. The learned Doctor's arguments to show that Pythagoras subjected matter to God, or derived it from the divine essence itself, appear to me to possess little weight. The passage of Alexander, in Laërtius, is too obscure to admit of any thing certain being elicited from it. If it proves any thing, it is this, that Pythagoras placed the so-called dyad below the monad. But it does not explain what he meant by monad and dyad. The saying of Hermias, which we have just noticed, is altogether foreign to the point, the monad, according to it, being the matter from which the elements were generated. The meaning of the passage from Thearidas cannot be decided upon with any certainty, owing to its extreme concisenes; neither is it clear, whether this man was expressing his own sentiments, or those of Pythagoras. But the statement of Porphyry, which is the last quoted, if true, is so far from clearing and exculpating Pythagoras, that it shows him rather to belong to those, who suppose men and animals to have been produced, like the plants, from putrid matter, without any assistance of the Deity; which opinion trenches closely upon the gravest impiety towards God. Let us own the truth. We are not at this day in a condition to estimate the whole of the science and discipline of Pythagoras and other philosophers from a few scattered words of ancient authors. As regards Pythagoras especially, the accounts handed down respecting him are so conflicting, and so various and ambiguous, that any one endowed with even a moderate share of talent, might be able to find in them the precepts and principles of all the philosophers that ever existed. To-day, Pythagoras will appear a Cartesian, should any one of that school so desire; to-morrow, should another not grudge the labour, he will pass over to the school of Gassendi; from which again Spinoza and his party will presently drag him forth, and prove him to have belonged to themselves. Such is the weakness of mankind: what it is permitted us to know, we pass by and disregard, while those things which are shrouded in impenetrable darkness, and as it were, in eternal night, although not at all concerning us, we watch over with intense anxiety and labour, as though they were the riches of Attalus.

[3] De Placitis Philos. lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 881. This explication also, together with all that is here brought forward, will with difficulty be assented to.

[4] De Natura Deor. lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 2895. tom. 9. opp.

Pythagoras' opinion concerning the Deity is thus represented: Deum esse animum per naturam rerum omnium intentum et commeantem, ex quo animi nostri carperentur, "That God was a mind passing through the whole nature of things, from whom our souls were, as it were, decerped or cut out;" and again: Ex universa mente divina delibato esse animos nostros: this in all probability was to be understood also either of the third or second divine hypostasis, and not of the first, which was properly called by him τὸ ἓν and μόν and "Monad;" and also, as Plutarch[5] tells us, oodness itself." Aristotle[6] plainly affirmeth, tha ancient theologers amongst the Pagans made ἔρ o be the first principle of all things, that is, the s nd we have already showed, that Orpheus was or. when ἔρως πολυτερπὴς and πολύμητις, "delight at which is not blind, but full of wisdom and c by him to be αὐτοτελὲς and πρεσβύτατον, "self- he oldest of all things," it is plain, that he suppos hing less than the supreme Deity. Wherefore since Pythagoras is generally affirmed to have followed the Orphic principles, we may from hence presume, that he did it in this also. Though it be very true that Plato, who called the supreme Deity τἀγαθὸν, as well as Pythagoras, did dissent from the Orphic theology in this, and would not acknowledge Love for a name of the supreme Deity; as when in his Symposion in the person of Agatho he speaks thus: Φαίδρῳ πολλὰ ἄλλα ὁμολογῶν, τοῦτο οὐχ ὁμολογῶ, ὡς Ἔρως Κρόνου καὶ Ἰαπετοῦ ἀρχαιότερός ἐστιν· ἀλλά φημι νεώτατον αὐτὸν εἶναι θεῶν, καὶ ἀεὶ νέον, "Though I should readily grant to Phædrus many other things, yet I cannot consent to him in this, that Love was older than Saturn and Iapet; but on the contrary I do affirm him to be the youngest of the gods, as he is always youthful." They who made Love older than Saturn as well as Iapet, supposed it to be the supreme Deity; wherefore Plato here on the contrary affirms Love not to be the supreme Deity or Creator of all, but a creature; a certain junior god, or indeed, as he afterwards adds, not so much a god as a demon, it being a thing which plainly implies imperfection in it. "Love (saith he) is a philosopher, whereas θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι, ἔστι γὰρ, no god philosophizeth, nor desires to be made wise, because he is so already." Agreeably with which doctrine of his, Plotinus[7] determines, that Love is peculiar to that middle rank of beings called souls: Πᾶσα ψυχὴ,

[5] De Placitis Philos. lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 881.

[6] Metaphys. lib. 1. cap. 4. p. 267. tom. 4. opp. See ch. 3. sect. 18. and what we have there remarked.

[7] De Bono et Uno, Ennead. 6. lib. 9. cap. 12. p. 768. Compare the same Plotinus in a specific treatise, De Amore, Ennead. 3. lib. 5. p. 291.

'Αφροδίτη· καὶ τοῦτο αἰνίττεται καὶ τὰ τῆς 'Αφροδίτης γενέθλια, καὶ ὁ ἔρως ὁ μετ' αὐτῆς γενόμενος· ἐρᾷ οὖν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσα ψυχὴ θεοῦ, ἑνωθῆναι θέλουσα, ὥσπερ παρθένος καλὴ πρὸς καλὸν ἄνδρα· ὅταν δὲ εἰς γένεσιν ἐλθοῦσα, οἷον μνηστείαις ἀπατηθῇ, ἄλλον ἐρξαμένη θνητὸν ἔρωτα, ἐρημίᾳ πατρὸς ὑβρίζεται, &c. "Every Soul is a Venus, which is also intimated by Venus' nativity, and Love's being begotten with her: wherefore the soul being in its right natural state loves God, desiring to be united with him, which is a pure, heavenly and virgin love; but when it descends to generation, being courted with these amorous allurements here below, and deceived by them, it changeth that its divine and heavenly love for another mortal one: but if it again shake off these lascivious and wanton loves, and keep itself chaste from them, returning back to its own father and original, it will be rightly affected as it ought." But the reason of this difference betwixt the Orpheists and Plato, that the former made Love to be the oldest of all the gods, but the latter to be a junior god or demon, proceeded only from an equivocation in the word Love. For Plato's Love was the daughter of Penia, that is, poverty and indigency, together with a mixture of Πόρος, or "riches;" and being so as it were compounded of plenty and poverty, was in plain language no other than the love of desire, which, as Aristotle affirmeth, is μετὰ λύπης, "accompanied with grief and pain." But that Orphic and Pythagoric love was nothing else but πόρος and εὐπορία, "infinite riches and plenty, a love of redundancy and overflowing fulness, delighting to communicate itself," which was therefore said to be the oldest of all things and the most perfect, that is, the supreme Deity; according to which notion also, in the Scripture itself, God seems to be called love, though the word be not there ἔρως, but ἀγάπη. But to say the truth, Parmenides' love (however made a principle somewhere by Aristotle[8]) seems to be neither exactly the same with the Orphic, nor yet with the Platonic love, it being not the supreme Deity, and yet the first of the created gods; which appears from Simplicius[9] connecting these two verses of his together in this manner:

Ἐν δὲ μέσῳ τούτων δαίμων, ὃς πάντα κυβερνᾷ,

αὐτὴν καὶ θεῶν αἰτίαν εἶναί φησι, λέγων,

Πρώτιστον μὲν ἔρωτα θεῶν μητίσσατο πάντων·

'In the midst of these elements is that God which governeth all things, and whom Parmenides affirmeth to be the cause of gods, writing thus: God first of all created Love, before the other gods."

[8] Physic. lib. 1. cap. 2. 3. p. 446. tom. 1. opp. Add Metaphysic. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 269.

[9] Comment. in Aristotelis Physica, p. 152. ed Græc Aldinæ.

Wherefore by this love of Parmenides is understood nothing else, but the lower soul of the world, together with a plastic nature, which, though it be the original of motion and activity in this corporeal world, yet is it but a secondary or created god; before whose production, necessity is said by those Ethnic theologers to have reigned: the true meaning whereof seems to be this, that before that divine spirit moved upon the waters, and brought things into an orderly system, there was nothing but the necessity of material motions, unguided by any orderly wisdom or method [illegible] is, by love) in that confused and floating chaos.[10]

But Pythagoras, [illegible] d not only call the supreme Deity a Monad, but [illegible] or Tetractys: for it is generally affirmed, that [illegible] himself was wont to swear hereby: though Porp[illegible] iblichus and others, write that the disciples of P[illegible] e by Pythagoras, who had delivered to them [illegible] Cabala of this Tetractys. Which Tetractys als[illegible] verses is called πηγὴ ἀενάου φύσεως "the fountain of the eternal nature," an expression, that cannot properly belong to any thing but the supreme Deity. And thus Hierocles:[1] Οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὃ μὴ τῆς τετρακτύος, ὡς ῥίζης, καὶ ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται· ἔστι γὰρ, ὡς ἔφαμεν, δημιουργὸς τῶν

[10] That the Pythagoreans attributed great power and importance to the ternary number, and asserted all things to be compounded of three, is shown both from many other passages of ancient authors, collected by J. Meursius, in his Denar. Pythagoric. cap. 5. p. 35. and especially from the clear testimony of Aristotle, De Cœlo, lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 610. tom. 1. opp. But I am ignorant, I own, where it is made to appear, that this sect together with their master ranked God also among those things which are comprised in these, nor do I understand upon what foundation the Pythagorean trinity rests for its support. If what most ancient authors inform us of be true, that the reason, why so much importance was attached in this school, to the ternary number, was, because all things have a beginning, middle, and end, we must exempt the Deity from this class of things, to which the triad is sacred, inasmuch as he is without beginning, middle, and end, and is wholly simple and one. As to its being stated that Pythagoras was a disciple of Orpheus, and that Orpheus acknowledged three persons or natures in God, this with me has very little weight. For, supposing Pythagoras to have borrowed his precepts from the Orphic poems; which, however, I consider to admit of dispute, although Jamblichus, De Vita Pythagoræ, cap. 21. p. 127. and others forbid us to doubt it; what is advanced on the subject of the three principles of Orpheus, is, as I have already shown above, so lame and unsatisfactory, that few wise men will be found to assent to it. No greater value do I attach to the testimonies of the junior Platonists, who are wont also to number Pythagoras among the patrons of their three principles. If we are to abide by their authority, we must confound the whole of the doctrines of ancient philosophers, whom they are accustomed to force into their own camp and to make the unwilling champions of their own principles. I pass over what is here advanced respecting the Orphic and Platonic love. For I have already bestowed some attention upon the subject, ch. 3. and, to confess the truth, regard the whole of the accounts on this subject, met with in ancient authors, who neither agree among themselves nor in all instances understand their own meaning, as resembling idle and visionary trifles rather than the opinions and precepts of philosophy. In explaining and elucidating which matters, were a wise man to expend much labour, he would be acting like those who undertake to turn dust into gold, or who construe the words of the sick into infallible oracles.

[1] Comment. in Aurea Carmina Pythagoræ. p. 170. 171.

ὕλων, καὶ αἰτία ἡ Τετρὰς, Θεὸς νοητὸς, αἴτιος τοῦ οὐρανίου, καὶ αἰσθητοῦ Θεοῦ, "There is nothing in the whole world, which doth not depend upon the Tetractys, as its root and principle. For the Tetrad is, as we have already said, the maker of all things; the intelligible God, the cause of the heavenly and sensible God," that is, of the animated world or heaven. Now the latter Pythagoreans and Platonists[c] endeavour to give reasons why God should be called Tetras or Tetractys, from certain mysteries in that number four, as for example; First, because the Tetrad is δύναμις δεκάδος, "the power of the Decad," it virtually containing the whole Decad in it, which is all numbers or beings; but the bottom of this mystery is no more than this, that one, two, three, four, added all together, make up ten. Again, because the Tetrad is an arithmetic mediety betwixt the Monad and the Hebdomad; which Monad and Hebdomad are said to agree in this, that as the Monad is ingenit or unmade, it being the original and fountain of all numbers, so is the Hebdomad said to be, not only παρθένος, but ἀμήτωρ, "a motherless," as well as "virgin number." Wherefore, the Tetrad lying in the middle betwixt the ingenit Monad, and the motherless virgin Hebdomad; and it being both begotten and begetting, say they, must needs be a very mysterious number, and fitly represent the Deity. Whereas indeed it was therefore unfit to represent the Deity, because it is begotten by the multiplication of another number; as the Hebdomad therefore doth not very fitly symbolize with it neither, because it is barren or begets nothing at all within the Decad, for which cause it is called a virgin. Again, it is further added, that the Tetrad fitly resembles that which is solid, because, as a point answers to a Monad, and a line to a Dyad, and a superficies to a Triad, (the first and most simple figure being a triangle;) so the Tetrad properly represents the solid, the first pyramid being found in it. But upon this consideration, the Tetrad could not be so fit a symbol of the incorporeal Deity, neither as of the corporeal world. Wherefore these things being all so trifling, slight, and fantastical, and it being really absurd for Pythagoras to call his Monad a Tetrad; the late conjecture of some learned men amongst us[3] seems to be much more probable, that Pythagoras' Tetractys was really

[2] This applies principally to Hierocles, in whose commentary on the golden verses, the explications of the tetrad, which follow, are propounded.

[3] He means Jo. Selden and Theoph. Gale, who maintained this opinion, the former De Diis Syris Syntag. 2. cap. 1. p. 209. 210. and the latter in a learned book, entitled, The Court of the Gentiles, or a Discourse touching the Original of Human Literature, Oxon. 1672. 4. par. 2. lib. 2. cap. 8. p. 147. Perhaps also the same was held by other British writers, whose works have not reached us. Dr. Henry More, a learned friend of Dr. Cudworth's, in the Append. ad Defensionem Cabbalæ Philosoph. Sam. Andreæ Oppositam. cap. 2. p. 124. neither wholly rejects nor adopts the opinion, but takes, as it were, an intermediate station between the advocates of the respective sides.

nothing else but the Tetragrammaton, or that proper name of the supreme God amongst the Hebrews, consisting of four letters or consonants. Neither ought it to be wondered at, that Pythagoras (who besides his travelling into Egypt, Persia, and Chaldea, and his sojourning at Sidon, is affirmed by Josephus, Porphyrius, and others, to have conversed with the Hebrews also[4]) should be so well acquainted with the Hebrew Tetragrammaton, since it was not unknown to the Hetrurians and Latins, their Jove being certainly nothing else. And indeed, it is the opinion of some philologers,[5] that eve Verses themselves, notwith-

[4] Of this opinion are ma ng whom will be found, Hugo Grotius, Observat. ad lib. 1. De Ve ianæ, p. 72. and J. Alb. Fabricius, Biblioth. Græc. lib. 2. cap ippose Pythagoras to have derived whatever true doctrine he id divine things from the Jews. To omit others, Dr. Cudworth' l, Dr. Henry More, in his Cabbala Philosophica, and his defen as left no stone unturned, in order to establish the truth of this , equally talented and erudite, have proved by no mean argume e is to be placed upon the accounts respecting Pythagoras' inter See J. Alb. Fabricius, ibid. p. 450. who takes the same view. passage of Hermippus, in Josephus, which is principally relied on by those who are of the opposite opinion, the learned J. Le Clerc has suggested, that Josephus erroneously read Ἰουδαίων for Ἰδαίων, Not. ad Grotium de Verit. Relig. Christ. p. 72. and in my opinion, not without probability. At all events, it is certain that Pythagoras sojourned among the Idæans in Crete, on which, consult J. Marsham, Canon Chronic. sæc. 10. p. 256.

[5] Their opinion, however, has been criticized at some length by Dr. Hen. More, Append. ad Defensionem Philos. Cabbalæ, cap. 2. p. 125. &c. whose words, as eminently illustrative of this subject, it will not be amiss to quote. Thus, then, he writes: Interea loci non abs re fore puto, eos Philologos aggredi, quorum meminit eruditus auctor Systematis mundi intellectualis, qui juramentum in disticho Pythagorico per Tetractyn sive Tetragrammaton fieri statuunt, hoc est, per Jehovam, nomine Dei pro ipso Deo posito juxta illud Rabbinorum dictum: הוא שמו ושמו הוא, *Ipse nomen suum est, suumque nomen ipse*: ac si sensus istorum verborum:

Ναὶ μὰ τὸν ἀμετέρᾳ ψυχᾷ παραδόντα τετρακτὺν
Παγὰν ἀενάου φύσεως,

hic esset: per Tetragrammaton sive Jehovam, qui communicavit se ipsum sive fontem æternæ naturæ nostris animabus, quippe secundum doctrinam Pythagoricam ex mente divina carptis et delibatis. Ad Philologos igitur istos respondeo. Primo tinnulum istud reciprocumque Rabbinorum dictum, sensu politico et forsan magis arcano mysticoque intelligendum, perperam heic et quasi obtorto, quod aiunt, collo, ad fœdissimam solœcismum grammaticum defendendum vel invitum trahi. Neque enim illud dictum Rabbinicum sensu grammatico accipiendum est ad absonas excusandas ἀσυνταξίας, sed ad significandum, ubi nomen Jehovah alicui personæ imponitur, non esse inane nomen in Scriptura, sed rem ipsam subesse: ut, ubi angelus fœderis et dux Israëlitarum Jehovah dicitur, Jehovam ipsum isti personæ subesse innuit, ac re vera fuisse Christum animamve Messiæ æterno Logo conjunctam esse, &c. Ut omittam, nomen et rem, vocari et esse idem frequenter apud Hebræos significare, adeo, ut ex communi isto linguæ Hebraicæ idiotismo dictum illud Rabbinicum multis in locis exponi possit: quem tamen idiotismum omnes syntaxios leges irritas facere, nemo sanus statuerit. Deinde, quod et supra monui, ne Tetragrammaton quidem, multoque minus Tetractys, est nomen Dei, sed Jehovah: adeo ut demirari satis nequeam horum oscitantium Philologorum, qui tam incondita et male cohærentia insomnia orbi litterato propinant, nec Tetractyn sive Τετράδα, perinde atque reliquos numeros Pythagoricos, symbola esse permittunt; (ut certe Hierocles eo loco, urbi ait; Ἔστι γὰρ δημιουργὸς τῶν ὅλων καὶ αἰτία ἡ τετρὰς, θεὸς νοητὸς, &c. symbolum pro re signata ponit) sed propria nomina volunt esse, immo res ipsas, quorum tantum symbola sunt sive repertoria μνημονευτικά: quum luce profecto clarius sit, Tetractyn

standing the seeming repugnancy of the syntax, it is not Pythagoras, that is sworn by, but this Tetractys or Tetragrammaton; that is Jovah or Jehovah, the name of God being put for

non esse nomen Dei, sed Tetragrammati repositorium dumtaxat, uti et aliorum mysteriorum, quorum sit idoneum symbolum. Ac proinde, quomodo, (ipse nomen suum est, suumque nomen ipse) quum Tetractys nomen ipsius non sit, nedum ipse Deus, crassum illum solœcismum excusare possit, ego quidem nequaquam video. Tertio, si (*παραδόντα*) essentiæ divinæ animabus humanis communicationem sive *μετάδοσιν* significare debuisset, vocabulum *μεταδόντα*, non *παραδόντα*, adhibitum fuisset, quum usitatissima vocis *παραδοῦναι* significatio ad doctrinam mysteriorumve traditionem pertineat: quo sensu non ego solum, sed alii plerique omnes hoc in loco accipiunt. Quarto, si *παραδόντα* idem heic sonet, atque *μεταδόντα*, et (*παγὰν ἀενάου φύσεως*) ipsam divinam essentiam indigitet, nostris animabus, quippe ex mente divina carptis et delibatis, communicatam, id quidem admodum durum paradoxum est, et doctrinæ Pythagoricæ omnique sanæ sapientiæ contrarium. Dum enim animos nostros ex mente divina carptos esse ac delibatos supponit, mentem divinam supponit discerpibilem, ac proinde, corpoream, adeo ut Philologi isti, qui huic sententiæ favent, philologia multo plus pollere videantur, quam solida ratione aut acumine philosophico. Quinto denique plena formula juramenti Pythagorici sic est:

> Οὐ μὰ τὸν ἀμετέρᾳ ψυχᾷ παραδόντα τετρακτὺν
> Παγὰν ἀενάου φύσεως, ῥίζωμά τ' ἔχουσαν,

quemadmodum reperitur apud Sextum Empiricum,* passimque apud alios scriptores: nec probabile est primitus plenum non fuisse distichon; (nisi monostichon solummodo fuerit) cujus igitur sensus hic foret secundum istos Philologos:

> Non per Tetractyn, qui animæ nostræ communicavit
> Fontem æternæ naturæ, radicemque habentem.

Qui sensus plane mancus est et imperfectus, quum plenus et nativus sensus sit, idemque noster:

> Non per eum, qui animæ nostræ tradidit Tetractyn,
> Fontem perennis naturæ radicemque habentem.

Hic sensus plenus est, concinnus et perspicuus: alter vero, præterquam quod mancus, falsus est præterea. Neque enim fons æternæ naturæ, Deus utique ipse, radicem habet, unde pullulet, set radix ipsa est rerum quidem omnium. Atque hæc breviter ad confutandam hanc absonam opinionem dictorum Philologorum operæ pretium putabam afferre, quum eruditissimus vir, ad alia properans, eam tantummodo proponere contentus esset, confutationem vero illius ipsi visum sit prætermittere; quippe quam forsan vix dignam confutatione putavit, præsertim si cum simplici nostra juramenti Pythagorici interpretatione conferatur, "Meanwhile it will not, I consider, be foreign to our purpose, to notice those philologers mentioned by the learned author of the Intellectual System of the Universe, who decide that in the Pythagoric distich it is the Tetractys or Tetragrammaton that is sworn by, that is Jehovah, the name of the Deity being put for the Deity himself, according to the rabbinical saying: 'He is his name and his name is He,' as though the meaning of the words in this distich were this: 'By the Tetragrammaton or Jehovah, who hath communicated himself or the fountain of the eternal nature to our souls,' as being according to the Pythagorean doctrine carved and culled out of the divine mind. To these philologers therefore I reply. In the first place, this jingling and reciprocating saying of the rabbins, which is to be understood in a political and probably in a more hidden and mystical sense, is here erroneously and forcibly dragged in to defend the foulest grammatical solecism. For this saying is not to be taken in a grammatical sense to excuse harsh *ἀσυντάξιαι*, but to signify, when the name Jehovah is applied to any person, that it is not in scripture an idle name, but that the thing itself is understood by it: as, where the angel of the covenant and the leader of the Israelites is called Jehovah, it implies that Jehovah himself was the person understood, and that it was in reality Christ or the soul of the Messiah combined with the eternal Logos, &c. setting aside, that the name and the thing, to be called and to be, with the Hebrews frequently mean the same;

God himself, according to that received doctrine of the Hebrews, שמו הוא הוא ושמו, "that God and his name were all one;" as if the meaning of those words,

> Ναὶ μὰ τὸν ἀμετέρᾳ ψυχᾷ παραδόντα Τετρακτὺν
> Παγὰν ἀενάου φύσεως,——

were this: "By the Tetragrammaton or Jovah, who hath communicated [himself or] the fountain of the eternal nature" to our human souls; for these, according to the Pythagoric doctrine,

according to which common idiom of the Hebrew language, that rabbinical saying is in many places to be explained. And yet no sensible man will say that this idiom does away with all the laws of syntax. Secondly, as I have hinted above, not even the Tetragrammaton, much less the Tetractys, is the name of God, but Jehovah: so that I cannot sufficiently admire the carelessness of these philologers, who propose such ill-concocted and inconsistent conceits to the literary world, and do not permit the Tetractys or Τετρὰς, like the other Pythagoric numbers, to be symbols (as Hierocles at least, in the passage, where he says: 'The tetrad, or intelligible God, is the framer and cause of all things,' &c. puts the symbol for the thing signified); but will have them to be proper names, nay, things themselves, of which they are merely the symbols or mnemoneutic repositories: it being as clear as noon-day that the Tetractys is not the name of God, but only the repository of the Tetragrammaton, as also of other mysteries, of which it may be the appropriate symbol. And, therefore, how the saying, 'He is his name and his name is He,' inasmuch as the Tetractys is not the name of God, much less God himself, can excuse this crude solecism, I am at a loss to know. Thirdly, if *παραδόντα* had been intended to mean the communication of the divine essence to our souls or *μετάδοσις*, the word *μεταδόντα*, not *παραδόντα*, would have been used, as the most common signification of the word *παραδοῦναι* relates to the teaching or imparting of mysteries, in which sense not I alone, but almost all others, understand it in this passage. Fourthly, if *παραδόντα* here signifies the same as *μεταδόντα*, and *παγὰν ἀενάου φύσεως* implies the divine essence itself, communicated to our souls as being delibations of the divine mind, this is altogether a harsh paradox and repugnant to the Pythagorean doctrine and to all sound wisdom. For, by supposing our souls to be carved and cut out of the divine mind, it supposes the divine mind to be divisible, and therefore corporeal; so that the philologers who favour this opinion seem to excel much more in philology than in sound reason or philosophical acumen. Lastly, the full form of the Pythagoric oath is as follows:

> Οὐ μὰ τὸν ἀμετέρᾳ ψυχᾷ παραδόντα τετρακτὺν
> Παγὰν ἀενάου φύσεως, ῥίζωμα τ' ἔχουσαν,

as it is found in Sextus Empiricus and every where in other authors: nor is it probable, that in the first instance it was not a complete distich (unless it were only a monostich): the sense of which therefore according to these philologers would be this:

> 'By the Tetractys, who hath communicated to our soul
> The fountain of the eternal nature, and having root.'

Which is obviously lame and defective. We translate as follows:

> 'By him, who hath imparted to our soul the Tetractys,
> The fountain of the eternal nature and having root.'

This sense is full, compact and clear; but the other, besides being defective, is also false. For the fountain of the eternal nature, or God himself, has no root, from which he springs, but is himself the root of all things.——Thus much I have thought it worth while to advance in confutation of the absurd opinion of the philologers above mentioned, as the learned Dr. Cudworth contented himself with simply noticing it in passing without stopping to refute it; considering it probably as unworthy of confutation, especially when compared with our simple interpretation of the Pythagoric oath."

were said to be ex mente divina carptæ et delibatæ,[6] i. e. nothing but derivative streams from that first fountain of the divine mind.[7]

[6] The words are Cicero's, De Natura Deor. lib. 1. cap. 11. p. 2895.

[7] If I had much leisure and was willing to consume it to little purpose, I might here commence a long disputation on the Pythagoric Tetractys; might enumerate the vast variety of opinions of learned men respecting it; might comment, as it would be easy to do, upon each of these; and lastly, might advance new conjectures of my own, or, if so disposed, confess the whole subject to be so perplexed and intricate, as to be altogether incapable of explication. But there are grave reasons to dissuade me from this. For why unnecessarily feed my readers with empty air? I shall content myself with a few observations, from which wise and learned men will perceive, that many, perhaps insuperable, difficulties are to be cleared away, before any satisfactory conclusion can be arrived at on this question. I. Those who are desirous of becoming acquainted with the various opinions of the learned on the quaternary number of Pythagoras, may consult Jac. Thomasius, De Exustione Mundi Stoica diss. 21. p. 251. &c. Jo. Meursius, Denar. Pythagoric. cap. 6. p. 45. &c. Theod. Marcilius, Not. ad Aurea Carmina Pythagoræ, p. 345. &c. Luc. Holstenius, Observationes ad Porphyrii Vitam Pythagoræ, p. 28. Henr. More, Append. ad Defensionem Cabbalæ Philosoph. cap. 2. p. 122. &c. J. Fr. Hombergk, De Themide seu Ortu Legis Æternæ, p. 148. &c., and many others, whom it is unnecessary to enumerate. Any one who contemplates so many discordant opinions, will be led by the very inconsistency of learned men to conclude, that the truth here lies at the bottom of a well and cannot easily be drawn out of it.

II. Learned men are right in supposing, that there is nothing from which we shall be better able to ascertain, what this Tetractys or quaternary number was, or to what it was applied by Pythagoras, than the Pythagorean oath, in which the Tetractys was appealed to. Hence those who handle this subject are accustomed to direct their chief efforts to the explication of this oath. But, if I may be allowed to measure the capabilities of others by my own, there are many things to prevent this from being accomplished successfully and without risk of error. In the first place, it is uncertain, how the two verses which contain this oath are to be read. For ancient authors do not exhibit them in the same form, but are incredibly at variance with each other: on which, besides the writers above mentioned, see J. Alb. Fabricius, Notæ ad Sextum Empiricum, p. 332. And who will arrogate to himself the possession of such critical acumen as to think himself qualified to sit in judgment on this controversy, and to determine upon the reading that is to be adopted? For my part, on well considering the matter, I avow my inability to come to any conclusion; nor should I wish to be arbiter in the dispute for example, whether in the first verse ψυχᾷ, as some of the ancients have it, or γενεᾷ, or στέρνοισι, as in Julian, or σοφίας, the reading of Jamblichus, or ζωῆς, that of Methodius, is to be preferred. Nor is the discord less among modern scholars, or more likely to be put an end to, as to the manner in which the words are to be construed and distinguished. Who therefore will be able to settle the meaning of verses, the true reading of which, no less than their construction and distinction, will be subjects of controversy so long as men shall be found willing to engage in it. For suppose us to have reasonable grounds for expectation, that some acute explorer may clear his way out of these critical and grammatical questions, still other and those not slighter difficulties will arise. First of all, it must be ascertained, whether the Pythagoreans swore by the Tetractys itself, or by him who communicated the Tetractys to souls. Whether you take the one or the other of these opinions, you will be able to support it by high ancient authorities. And Jac. Palmerius, I remember, spent much labour upon the solution of this question, Exercitat. ad Græcos quosdam Auctores, p. 228. while Ludolph Kuster, on the other hand, Not. ad Jamblichi Vitam Pythagor. p. 127. considers it to be a matter not worth entering into; because the Pythagoreans were accustomed to swear as well by the Tetractys as by its inventor. Nor do Luc. Holstenius, Not. ad Porphyrii Vitam Pythagor. p. 28. and Theod. Marcilius, Ad Aurea Carmina, p. 344. much dissent from this opinion. For my part, however, there is, I conceive, as much difference between swearing by the Tetractys and by the inventor of the Tetractys, as by the sun and by God who made the sun; nor can I well understand, how the two can be associated together, or both have place in the verses containing this oath. But

Wherefore we shall now sum up all concerning Pythagoras in this conclusion of St. Cyril's:* Ἰδοὺ δὴ σαφῶς, ἕνα τε εἶναι λέγει τὸν τῶν ὅλων Θεὸν, καὶ πάντων ἀρχὴν, ἐργάτην τε τῶν αὐτοῦ

I will be liberal, and grant that there is a period put also to this controversy: not even so will all things be plain. If we assent to those, who suppose the Pythagoreans to have sworn by the inventor or author of the quaternion, we shall have again to consider who this inventor was, God or Pythagoras. The former appears more probable, and is the view taken by many very grave authors, both ancient and modern. But it is rejected by almost the whole of those, who commented formerly on the Pythagoreans and their institutions: by Sextus Empiricus, by Hierocles, and many others: who indeed all agree, that the followers of Pythagoras swore by their master. It certainly seems ludicrous, and altogether foreign to the character of wise men, such as those were desirous of appearing, for mortal to swear by mortal, the disciples by their defunct master. But nothing, it may be said, is too gross and absurd for those sometimes to be guilty of, who affect the reputation of superior wisdom. Nor would I venture to determine this dispute, as I am unable to say which side has the balance of testimony in its favour. But come, let us suppose some one able to find his way out of these difficulties also, and a new controversy will then start up, which I doubt whether any one will speedily decide. Haste, ye philologists and grammarians, and consider, what meaning we are to attach to the phrase: to impart the Tetractys to the soul. It is capable, I observe, of two significations. First: to imbue the soul with the doctrine of the Tetractys, whatever this may be. And this exposition is adopted by not a few, the most learned Dr. Hen. More especially. Secondly: to impart to the soul four properties, virtues, or affections: to which opinion, again, a long train both of ancients and moderns are favourable. Which of the two interpretations is the true one, I confess myself to be ignorant; nor in my opinion do those know, who espouse either the one or the other, however anxious they may be to appear to know. If there were any one who could divest our minds of all doubts on this point also, he would still be exposed to new queries, and be asked, what were those four virtues or affections of the soul, or what that doctrine of the Tetractys said to be communicated to souls. On this there are as many opinions as there are heads, and we may as soon expect an agreement among clocks as among those, who have consumed their leisure on this question. Another dispute will arise upon the words παγὰν ἀενάου φύσεως. It is doubtful, whether they are to be referred to him who sent the Tetractys into souls, or to the Tetractys itself. Either can be done consistently with the laws of grammar, and each opinion finds its supporters among learned men. For myself, I remain undecided, not feeling myself influenced by the arguments of either party. Such are the difficulties besetting the opinions of those, who make the Pythagoreans to have sworn by him who imparted the Tetractys to the souls of mortals; difficulties of which I do not find, nor perceive that others more ingenious than myself have found, any solution. Nor again will there be less to perplex us, if we adopt the view of those who consider this sect to have sworn by the Tetractys itself. For not only here also will the chief part of the questions I have just enumerated unceasingly torture us, but we shall moreover be unable to distinguish, in the vast variety of conjectures, what is the nature of that Tetractys which was held so sacred by the Pythagoreans. One affirms it to be God, another the Hebrew name of God, a third the soul of the world, a fourth the first elements of things, a fifth four affections of the soul, and so on. Neither does any one of them bring forward a single argument to justify an unhesitating assent, but all on the contrary follow the phantasms of their own minds alone, and indulge in the vaguest surmises. This discussion I have thought proper to pursue to somewhat greater length, in order to add weight to what I advanced a little above, that the whole doctrine of numbers, as taught by the Samian philosopher is lost; and at the same time to warn learned men not to grow old in the investigation of subjects so involved in uncertainty, or to suppose themselves to know more than they really do; errors which are wont to bring much contempt, as well upon literature and the arts, as upon their professors.

III. As to the conjecture in particular of Selden, Cudworth, and others, that the Tetractys is the name of Jehovah, which consists of four letters, it has already been handled sufficiently by Dr. More in the passage above quoted. In very recent

* Con. Jul. lib. 1. [P. 30.]

δυνάμεων, φωστῆρα καὶ ψύχωσιν, ἤτοι ζωοποίησιν τῶν ὅλων καὶ κύκλων πάντων κίνησιν· παρῆκται δὲ τὰ πάντα παρ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι κίνησιν λαχόντα φαίνεται, "Behold we see clearly, that Pythagoras held there was one God of the whole universe, the principle and cause of all things, the illuminator, animator, and quickener of the whole, and original of

times also Jo. Fr. Hombergk, De Themide, p. 155. &c. has repudiated it, not to speak of Jac. Thomasius, Georg. Horn and others. It rests solely upon the opinion of those, who suppose Pythagoras to have conversed with the Jews, and to have imbibed their doctrines. From which opinion if all credit and authority be withdrawn, as I have above shown to have been done by learned men, the conjecture itself falls to the ground at the same time.

IV. Lest, however, any one should complain that I am qualified to confound every thing and to depreciate the labours of learned men, but unable myself to drag truth from its hiding-place, I shall now expound my own view of this oath and claim for myself the last place among conjecturers and diviners. In the first place I assume, what Jamblichus in his Theologumena Arithmetica, p. 20. has left on record, that Empedocles was the author of this oath. This Empedocles believed the whole nature of things to consist of four elements. His verses, in which he explains this doctrine, are well known, beginning as follows:

Τέσσαρα τῶν πάντων ῥιζώματα πρῶτον ἄκουε,

"In the first place hear of four roots of all things."

See Plutarch, De Placitis Philosoph. lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 828. Now this doctrine had been handed down from his master Pythagoras, who is likewise said to have referred all things to four elements. See Diogenes Laërtius. lib. 8. segm. 25. p. 508. And these very elements or principles of things the disciples of Pythagoras were accustomed to call Tetras or Tetractys; which is proved as well by many other things as by these verses preserved by Proclus from the hymn of the Pythagoreans, Comm. in Timæum Platonis, lib. 2. p. 96. and lib. 3. p. 155:

Τετράδ' ἐπὶ ζαθέην, ἣ δὴ τέκε μητέρα πάντων
Ἄτροπον, ἀκάματον δεκάδα κλείουσι μὲν ἁγνήν,

"Till the divine Tetrad existed, which brought forth the mother of all things, Immoveable, unwearied: they call her the sacred Decad."

The sense is plain: that from the four elements was produced the whole nature of things, which resembles the perfect number or Decad. Empedocles held, moreover, that there is a double soul in man, the one sentient and percipient, the other rational, as we have copiously shown above on ch. 1. sect. 24. The sentient and percipient soul he supposed to have been compounded by God out of the four elements, and hence to be enabled to perceive all those elements placed externally to it. See what we have observed on ch. 1. sect. 14. If all these things be combined and diligently examined together, it will, I conceive, become very probable, that the meaning of this Pythagorean oath was as follows: "We swear by the God, who gave to us a soul, compounded and formed of the four elements, by which we see, perceive, and distinguish all things; which Tetras of elements is the fountain of eternal nature and the alone cause, from which all other things flowed." Certainly if we conclude the Τετρακτὺς in these verses to be the four elements, we shall best understand the meaning of the words, πηγὴν ἀενάου φύσεως. For, that the Pythagoreans so termed the four first principles of things, is manifest from the passages adduced. Nevertheless, the junior Pythagoreans, I consider, erroneously supposed this oath to pertain to Pythagoras, by whom the Tetras, or doctrine of the Tetras, was first invented. I arrogate nothing, nor do I favour myself so far as to wish every one to adopt this conjecture. I am certain, however, that it is no less probable than the rest of those advanced by learned men on the subject. Let each one enjoy his opinion; for we are not disputing upon a matter of vital importance.

motion; from whom all things were derived, and brought out of nonentity into being."

Next to Pythagoras, in order of time, was Xenophanes the Colophonian, the head of the Eleatic sect of philosophers, who, that he was an assertor both of many gods and one God, sufficiently appears from that verse of his before cited, and attested both by Clemens Alexandrinus,[8] and Sextus the philosopher.

Εἷς Θεὸς ἔν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος,

"There is one God, the greatest both amongst gods and men." Concerning which greatest God, this other verse of Xenophanes is also vouched:[9]

Καὶ ἀπάνευθε πονοῖο νόου φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει,

"That he moveth the whole world without any labour or toil, merely by mind." Besides which, Cicero[10] and others tell us, that this Xenophanes, philosophizing concerning the supreme Deity, was wont to call it, ἓν καὶ πᾶν, "one and all," as being one most simple Being, that virtually containeth all things. But Xenophanes' theosophy, or divine philosophy, is most fully declared by Simplicius out of Theophrastus, in this manner:* Μίαν δέ τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἤτοι ἓν τὸ ὂν καὶ πᾶν, καὶ οὔτε πεπερασμένον, οὔτε ἄπειρον, οὔτε κινούμενον, οὔτε ἠρεμοῦν, Ξενοφάνην τὸν Κολοφώνιον τὸν Παρμενίδου διδάσκαλον ὑποτίθεσθαί φησιν ὁ Θεόφραστος· ὁμολογῶν ἑτέρας εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίας, τὴν μνήμην τῆς τούτου δόξης· τὸ γὰρ ἓν τοῦτο καὶ πᾶν τὸν Θεὸν ἔλεγεν ὁ Ξενοφάνης· ὂν ἕνα μὲν δείκνυσιν ἐκ τοῦ πάντων κράτιστον εἶναι· πλειόνων γάρ φησιν ὄντων, ὁμοίως ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν πᾶσι τὸ κρατεῖν· τὸ δὲ πάντων κράτιστον καὶ ἄριστον, Θεός· ἀγέννητον δὲ ἐδείκνυεν——καὶ οὔτε δὲ ἄπειρον, οὔτε πεπερασμένον εἶναι· διότι ἄπειρον μὲν τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὡς οὔτε ἀρχὴν ἔχον, μήτε μέσον, μήτε τέλος· περαίνειν δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ πλείω· παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὴν κίνησιν ἀφαιρεῖ, καὶ τὴν ἠρεμίαν· ἀκίνητον μὲν, &c., "Theophrastus affirmeth, that Xenophanes the Colophonian, Parmenides' master, made one principle of all things, he calling it one and all, and determining it to be neither finite nor infinite (in a certain sense) and neither moving nor resting. Which Theophrastus also declares, that Xenophanes in this did not write as a natural

[8] Stromat. lib. 5. p. 714. from whom Eusebius quotes this verse, Præpar. Evangel. lib. 13. cap. 13. p. 678. But the learned Doctor is wrong in saying, that it occurs also in Sextus, having been misled by Hen. Stephanus, who states so in his Poësis Philosoph. p. 36. Ægid. Menagius, Comm. in Diogenem Laërtius, p. 400. has through a lapse of memory fallen into the same error, erroneously attributing Clement's own words to Sextus, with whom nothing of the kind is to be found.

[9] But this let others try to find, who have plenty of leisure; as I have in vain looked for it in many ancient authors, including the remains of the poems of Xenophanes collected by Hen. Stephanus in his Poës. Philosoph. p, 35. &c.

[10] Academ. Quæst. lib. 4. cap. 37. p. 2315. tom. 8. opp.

* In Aristot. Phys. p. 5. 6.

philosopher or physiologer, but as a metaphysician or theologer only; Xenophanes' one and all being nothing else but God. Whom he proved to be one solitary being from hence, because God is the best and most powerful of all things; and there being many degrees of entity, there must needs be something supreme to rule over all. Which best and most powerful being can be but one. He also did demonstrate it to be unmade, as likewise to be neither finite nor infinite (in a certain sense); as he removed both motion and rest from God. Wherefore, when he saith, that God always remaineth or resteth the same, he understands not this of that rest which is opposite to motion, and which belongs to such things as may be moved; but of a certain other rest, which is both above that motion and its contrary." From whence it is evident, that Xenophanes supposed (as Sextus[1] the philosopher also affirmeth) God to be incorporeal, a being unlike to all other things, and therefore of which no image could be made. And now we understand, that Aristotle[2] dealt not ingenuously with Xenophanes, when from that expression of his, that God was σφαιροειδὴς, or "spheriform," he would infer, that Xenophanes made God to be a body, and nothing else but the round corporeal world animated; which yet was repugnant also to another physical hypothesis of this same Xenophanes, ἀπείρους ἡλίους εἶναι καὶ σελήνας, "that there were infinite suns and moons;" by which moons he understood planets, affirming them to be all habitable earths, as Cicero tells us.[3] Wherefore,

[1] I have no doubt of the name of Sextus being again put by mistake, as nothing of the kind is to be met with in this author. Dr. Cudworth ought to have said Clemens, the only ancient author that I know of, who informs us that Xenophanes taught, ὅτι ἀσώματος ὁ Θεός, Stromat. lib. 5. p. 714. Which statement of his, however, Dr. Potter censures in his notes, intimating that it is at variance with Sextus' opinions of Xenophanes. I shall state by and by my own view of this matter.

[2] He is here, no doubt, alluding to what Aristotle says in his book De Xenophanes Zenone et Gorgia, cap. 4. p. 843. 844. which, although properly referring to Zeno, will at the same time apply to Xenophanes, who entertained similar sentiments on this matter. Add however, regarding Xenophanes in particular, Metaphys. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 270. tom. 4. opp.

[3] Who, Academ. Quæst. lib. 4. cap. 39. p. 2319. tom. 8. opp. informs us, that Xenophanes held "the moon to be inhabited." He speaks of one moon only, and not, as the learned Doctor supposes, of several. Lactantius attributes the same opinion to this philosopher, Divin. Instit. lib. 3. cap. 23. p. 368. On the other hand, Plutarch, De Placitis Philos. lib. 2. cap. 24. p. 901. and Stobæus, Eclog. Physic. lib. 1. cap. 56. relate, that he asserted many suns and moons. These seem to be conflicting statements; and any one, if so disposed, might enter into a controversy, as to which opinion is the more probable. But with all due deference to the learned men, who have canvassed the doctrines of ancient philosophers, the opinion of Xenophanes on a plurality *of* suns and moons, like most of the dogmas of the old physiologers, has not as yet been properly explained or understood: for when this is known, it will be evident that both statements are in accordance with it, and that he both asserted one sun and moon and an infinity of suns and moons. I will explain, what were the views entertained by this philosopher. Xenophanes supposed, then, that the light which we call the sun is not a permanent and self-existent body, or, to speak more clearly, a *substance*, but an *accident*, a changeable thing, quickly produced and as quickly perishing; in short, a sort of natural phenomenon or cloud, which is at one time col-

as Simplicius resolves, God was said to be σφαιροειδὴς or spheriform, by Xenophanes, only in this sense, as being παντοχόθεν ὅμοιος, "every way like and uniform." However, it is plain,

lected together and at another again dispersed and dissipated. This is shown by the express words both of Plutarch and Stobæus: the latter, Eclog. Physic. lib. 1. p. 55. the former, De Placitis Philosoph. lib. 2. cap. 20. p. 889. Xenophanes, says Plutarch, taught that the sun consists, ἐκ πυριδίων τῶν συναθροιζομένων ἐκ τῆς ὑγρᾶς ἀναθυμιάσεως, συναθροιζόντων δὲ τὸν ἥλιον, ἢ νέφος πεπυρωμένον, "of fiery particles collected from moist exhalation, which form the sun or a fiery cloud." The same is most clearly stated by Origen in his Philosophumena, cap. 14. p. 96: Τὸν δὲ ἥλιον ἐκ μικρῶν πυριδίων ἀθροιζομένων γίνεσθαι καθ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν, "That the sun is produced each day from small fiery particles collected together." He imagined, therefore, moist vapours to ascend each night from the earth and waters into the middle region of heaven, sufficient to produce that light which is said to be the sun's. He supposed, no doubt, that these moist vapours in ascending upwards become continually more rare and subtile, so as to lose all moisture and assume the nature of fire and light: and that this accumulated mass of corpuscles endures for a certain time and by the action of nature is again scattered and dissipated: whereupon the day disappears, and what we call evening succeeds. Hence, being asked his opinion respecting the setting and eclipse of the sun, he hesitated not to reply, that the sun in an eclipse totally perishes. Xenophanes, says Plutarch, De Placit. Philos. lib. 2. cap. 14. p. 900. asserted that an ἔκλειψις, or "eclipse" of the sun, is caused, κατὰ σβέσιν, "by its extinction:" ἕτερον δὲ πάλιν πρὸς ταῖς ἀνατολαῖς γίνεσθαι, "for that a new sun," so I interpret his words, "is always produced as often as one rises." The same Xenophanes, Plutarch adds, in order to give some weight to his opinion, affirmed that there was a time when the sun was absent for a whole month, and that at another such great darkness suddenly took place, as to turn day into night. We are recording, certainly, a very pleasant and enlightened view of natural philosophy: but nothing, I am convinced, can be too ludicrous or absurd to have entered the head of some one or other of the physiologists of former times. For no other reason he denied, as the same Plutarch informs us, the revolution of the sun round the earth, maintaining it to be a light every where diffused, although various. Now Xenophanes, being imbued with this opinion, could not help affirming in a certain sense the existence of innumerable suns. In the first place, he supposed that a new sun was produced every day, and that there were as many suns as days. Secondly, as in his opinion the vapours of the whole globe contribute to the production of this great luminary and these vapours vary according to the variety of the lands from which they arise, so he must necessarily have believed, for instance, the Spaniards, the Gauls, and the Parthians, to be respectively warmed by different suns, and, although there is a certain continuation of light and heat, still, that this light and heat is not every where of the same kind, but made up and composed of different particles. Therefore, he maintained, not so much that there are a multitude of suns or self-existent stars, as that one luminary is variously produced each day, having various parts, and that the portion of the sun which shines upon us is differently constituted from that which illuminates Asia. That nothing here is invented, the words of Plutarch clearly demonstrate: Πολλοὺς εἶναι ἡλίους καὶ σελήνας κατὰ κλίματα τῆς γῆς, καὶ ἀποτομάς, καὶ ζώνας, "That there are many suns (said Xenophanes) according to the different climates, sections, and zones of the earth." It is now apparent, I think, in what manner Xenophanes could assert the existence both of one and of many suns. It was, in his opinion, one sun, because the whole infinity of parts of this light, which we denominate the sun, were joined and connected together; at the same time, it was manifold and various, because each region itself produced the portion of the light which it used, and therefore had its own sun. However, if what Laërtius has recorded, lib. 9. sect. 19. p. 558. be true, that he maintained an infinity of worlds, his doctrine of many suns will admit, I own, of a different interpretation from this. But it is manifest from Plutarch, that he ascribed many suns to the world which we inhabit: which he must have done in the manner I have stated. His opinions on the moon are not equally clear. Plutarch, ibid. lib. 2. cap. 25. p. 901. informs us, that he held the moon to be νέφος πεπιλημένον, "a condensed cloud." From which he would appear to have entertained the same notion of the moon as of the

that Xenophanes asserting one God, who was all, or the universe, could not acknowledge a multitude of partial, self-existent deities.[4]

sun. But how he could suppose such a condensed cloud to be habitable, is not easy to make out. Perhaps he distinguished between the moon itself and its light, and imagined the moon to be earth, like our own globe, and the light surrounding the moon to be a cloud consisting of vapours. As to the learned Doctor's considering it to be plain even from this opinion of Xenophanes respecting many suns, that Aristotle did that philosopher injustice in saying, that he held only a corporeal God, I confess this is not sufficiently clear. For I cannot see what should prevent him, who holds the existence of many suns, from denying, that there is any other god besides this the visible world.

[4] As the religion and piety of the ancient philosophers generally are matters of controversy among learned men, so also are they at variance as to the opinions of Xenophanes on God and divine things. Already in former times, Jo. Aldobrandinus, besides others, Not. ad Diogenem Laërtium, p. 558. ranked him among the enemies of God; supposing him to have believed in an infinity of worlds, like Anaximander, and as many gods, and, therefore, to have made no distinction between God and the world. With much greater acuteness and ingenuity has he been attacked in our own times by Pet. Bayle, who brings his whole intellectual powers to bear, in order to prove, that Xenophanes was no better than Bened. Spinoza, and did not distinguish nature from the parent of nature, Diction. Histor. et Critiq. tom. 4. art. Xenophanes, not. b. p. 2886. And the authority of this able writer has so weighed with many, J. Fr. Buddeus, J. Christ. Wolf, Val. Ern. Loescher, and several others, that they have not scrupled to brand this philosopher as an Atheist. Among whom the learned Wolf, Not. ad Origenis Philosophumena, p. 98. censures our author by name on this very account, that he has judged so favourably of Xenophanes. Nevertheless, the learned Jac. Fr. Reimmann dissents from men so eminent, and, Histor. Atheismi, sect. 1. cap. 30. sect. 2. p. 203. brings forward various arguments, although not all of equal force, to prove Xenophanes to have professed a better philosophy, than is commonly supposed. And the illustrious scholar J. Alb. Fabricius, Not. ad Sexti. Empir. Pyrrh. Hypotyposes, p. 59. thoroughly purges him of the charge, asserting point-blank, sensisse Xenophanem, Deum esse mentem æternam, unam et immutabilem, nec generatione obnoxiam nec morti, sed vivam, rationeque ac sensu pollentem usquequaque semper fuisse, et futuram semper, sibique per omnia similem, "that Xenophanes believed God to be eternal mind, one and unchangeable, subject neither to generation nor death, but having always been and always about to be in perfect possession of life, reason, and sense, and like to itself in all things." To confess my own opinion, Xenophanes is not a man about whose principles there is occasion for much dispute. For, as we may learn from his verses in Sextus Empiricus and others, he himself determined upon nothing as certain, but held all things to consist in opinion, which may mislead and deceive us, and consequently did not wish what he advanced to be looked upon as truths. See Sextus, lib. 7. Contra Mathem. p. 379. But those who think thus do not hesitate frequently to change their opinions, and adopt sometimes one thing and sometimes another, according as they are affected in mind or influenced by the senses. However, as some notice is taken by ancient authors of his doctrines, I shall briefly declare my own opinion respecting them. To form our judgment of these doctrines from Simplicius, as the learned Doctor here does, I consider to be unsafe, as the sect to which Simplicius belonged usually made it their chief study to re-model the dogmas of the ancients agreeably to their own notions. The whole dispute, therefore, must be decided upon other testimonies, on which greater reliance can be placed. According to these, then, Xenophanes' sentiments neither appear to have been of that impious character, which would warrant his being classed among the predecessors of Spinoza, nor, on the other hand, so sound and pious, as to evince any very close approximation to the precepts of Christianity. In the first place, he sneered at the public religions of his own time and openly avowed, that nothing could be more absurd than the common fables concerning the gods, as exhibited in the poems of Homer and Hesiod: of which ample proof is afforded by his verses in Diogenes and Clemens Alexandr. Secondly, he held the universe to be eternal, therewith associating mind, likewise eternal, but conjoined with matter and diffused through the whole mass. This eternal mind is the god of Xenophanes. Sextus Empiricus, lib. 1. Hypotypos, cap.

Heraclitus was no clear, but a confounded philosopher (he being neither a good naturalist nor metaphysician), and therefore it is very hard, or rather impossible, to reconcile his several opinions with one another. Which is a thing the less to be wondered at, because, amongst the rest of his opinions, this also is said to have been one, that contradictories may be true;[5] and

33. p. 59. Ἐδογμάτιζε δὲ Ξενοφάνης——ἓν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τὸν θεὸν συμφυῆ τοῖς πᾶσι, "Xenophanes taught, that the universe is one, and that God is in all things." The same clearly appears from Aristotle's book, De Xenophane, Gorgia, et Zenone, cap. 1. and 2. Now, to show the truth of what we have just advanced respecting the religion of Xenophanes, two things in his Deity must be considered separately. In the first place, he supposed this Deity or eternal mind to have nothing in common with matter and to bear no resemblance to mortals, either as regards body or soul. This is shown both by the verses of Timon, in Sextus as above quoted, p. 59. in which he tells us that Xenophanes asserted "God to be altogether soul," and by a passage of Xenophanes himself in Clemens Alexandr. Stromat. lib. 5. p. 714. in which he openly declares, that God resembles neither the soul nor body of men. Of those which are supplied by Diogenes Laërtius on this subject, I say nothing. And this opinion, if I am not mistaken, separates him from Spinoza, who dreams of men, both as respects soul and body, being parts and members of God, and is perpetually confounding mind and matter. Secondly, he held that this mind was conjoined from all eternity with matter, in which, like a workman, it controls and perfects all things, and that it will always be associated with it. That such was his opinion is clear from every thing which he is said to have taught on the nature of things, as being one, immutable, and eternal. This dogma separates him by a wide interval from those, who entertain that notion of the Deity which reason points out; and classes him in the sect of the Stoics, from whom however, in physical subjects, he totally differed. It remains for me to reply to those who may ask: I. What did he mean, then, by asserting God to be "of a spherical form," σφαιροειδῆς? II. Did he suppose God to be secrete from all body, or, as Clemens says, ἀσώματος? To begin with the latter, I consider that we can hardly decide any thing upon this subject, as it is unknown to us, how Xenophanes defined *mind* and *body*. That he clearly distinguishes that eternal mind from the gross and rude matter, of which this universe of things, as well as our own bodies, is composed, is unquestionable. But it cannot escape the notice of those, who peruse ancient authors with attention, that those natures which they held to be free from all corporeal concretion, were not, on that account, necessarily regarded by them as simple and pure mind, such as those which we call spirit. What most of the ancients call ἀσώματον, is nevertheless matter, although that the most subtle, as is clearly shown in the example of the Stoics, who abstracted their God from all body and yet asserted him to be fire. And the same opinion, it is very probable, was entertained by this philosopher, as he held that universe which he calls God to be infinitely extended and also to possess a spherical form. As regards the first query, although there are not wanting reasons for supposing, that Xenophanes meant this to be understood not physically, but figuratively, and called God spheriform, in order to express his extreme equability and perfection, still I am led to think otherwise, from the fact, that no one of the ancients has so interpreted this word; on the contrary, we read, that this spherical form of God was opposed by him to the form of men. Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 9. segm. 19. p. 558. tells us, that he asserted, οὐσίαν θεοῦ σφαιροειδῆ, μηδὲν ὅμοιον ἔχουσαν ἀνθρώπῳ, "the substance of God to be spherical, and to have nothing in common with man." He therefore contrasted what he considered the true with the false form of the Deity: averring that the human form was falsely attributed to God, and that his true figure was spherical. Now, this opinion would have been any thing but in keeping, if he had opposed a physical and real form, such as that of man, to a metaphysical and figurative one, namely, perfection. Wherefore, I suspect, that Xenophanes supposed the universal nature of things to be of a globular or spherical form. And as he imagined the whole of this sphere to be animated by God and every where full of the Deity, it was consistent with such dogma, that he should suppose the essence or nature, pervading this sphere, to be itself also spherical.

[5] Who has recorded this of Heraclitus, is to me, I confess, unknown: nay, I doubt whether there is any thing of the kind extant. He was wholly devoted to physical

his writings were accordingly, as Plato[6] intimates, stuffed with unintelligible, mysterious nonsense. For first, he is affirmed to have acknowledged no other substance besides body, and to have maintained, that all things did flow, and nothing stand, or remain the same; and yet in his epistles (according to the common opinion of philosophers at that time) doth he suppose the præ and post-existence of human souls in these words: Τάχα καὶ ψυχὴ μαντεύεται ἀπόλυσιν ἑαυτῆς ἤδη ποτὲ ἐκ τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου τούτου· καὶ σειομένου τοῦ σώματος ἐκκύπτουσα, ἀναμιμνήσκεται τὰ πάτρια χωρία, ἔνθεν κατελθοῦσα περιεβάλλετο ῥέον σῶμα τεθνειὸς τοῦτο, ὃ δοκεῖ, &c., "My soul seemeth to vaticinate and presage its approaching dismission and freedom from this its prison; and looking out, as it were, through the cracks and crannies of this body, to remember those its native regions or countries, from whence descending it was clothed with this flowing mortal body; which is made up and constipated of phlegm, choler, serum, blood, nerves, bones, and flesh." And not only so, but he also there acknowledgeth the soul's immortality, which Stoics, allowing its permanency after death, for some time at least, and to the next conflagration, did deny: Δύσεται τὸ σῶμα εἰς τὸ εἱμαρμένον, ἀλλὰ οὐ ψυχὴ δύσεται· ἀλλὰ ἀθάνατον οὖσα χρῆμα, εἰς οὐρανὸν ἀναπτήσεται μετάρσιος· δέξονται δέ με αἰθέριοι δόμοι, καὶ πολιτεύσομαι οὐκ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλ' ἐν θεοῖς, "This body shall be fatally changed to something else; but my soul shall not die or perish, but being an immortal thing, shall fly away mounting upwards to heaven; those ethereal houses shall receive me, and I shall no longer converse with men, but gods." Again, though Heraclitus asserted the fatal necessity of all things, yet notwithstanding was he a strict moralist, and upon this account highly esteemed by the Stoics, who followed him in this and other

studies, as is evident even from the testimony of Sextus Empiricus, lib. 7. contra Mathem. p. 371. while moral and dialectic subjects, to which this dogma pertains, were in a great measure neglected by him. The learned Doctor, I do not doubt, had in his mind this precept of his: Τὰ ἐναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπάρχειν, "that contraries are about the same thing;" which is discoursed of at large by Sextus, Hypotypos. lib. 1. cap. 29. p. 53. But this is a physical precept, and does not mean that "things entirely opposite can be true at the same time." Consult J. Alb. Fabricius, Notes on Sextus, and God. Olearius', diss. 2. De Principio Rerum Omnium ex Mente Heracliti, sec. 6. p. 862. in Stanley's Historia Philosophica.

[6] The passage of Plato respecting Heraclitus here alluded to is, I suspect, the one occurring in the Sympos. p. 321. in which however he is not censuring this obscure philosopher.

[7] This and the following passage occur in Heraclitus' Epistle to Amphidamas, in the Epistol. Græc. published by Eilh. Lubin, Heidelb. 1601.8. p. 54. 55. But I confess I attach no importance to these epistles of Heraclitus. They are the forgeries of some one, who made it his business to introduce Heraclitus as full of Platonic principles, to which however he was a stranger, and obtained his materials from the accounts given in Laërtius of this philosopher's sickness and death. If there were no other proof of this, it would be sufficiently evident from the clearness and perspicuity of these epistles; a virtue which Heraclitus was so far from affecting, that he on the contrary received a surname from the obscurity of his ordinary style.

things; and he makes no small pretence to it himself in his epistle to Hermodorus:[8] Καὶ ἐμοόγε πολλοὶ καὶ δυσχερέστατοι ἆθλοι κατώρθωνται· νενίκηκα ἡδονὰς, νενικήκα χρήματα, νενίκηκα φιλοτιμίαν, κατεπάλαισα δειλίαν, κατεπάλαισα κολακείαν· οὐκ ἀντιλέγει μοι φόβος, οὐκ ἀντιλέγει μοι μέθη· φοβεῖταί με λύπη, φοβεῖταί με ὀργή· κατὰ τούτων αὐτῶν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐστεφάνωμαι, ἐμαυτῷ ἐπιτάττων, οὐκ ὑπ' Εὐρυσθέως, "I have also had my difficult labours and conflicts, as well as Hercules; I have conquered pleasures, I have conquered riches, I have conquered ambition; I have subdued cowardice and flattery; neither fear nor intemperance can control me; grief and anger are afraid of me, and fly away from me. These are the victories for which I am crowned, not by Eurystheus, but as being made master of myself." Lastly, though Heraclitus made fire to be the first principle of all things, and had some odd passages imputed to him, yet notwithstanding was he a devout religionist, he supposing that fiery matter of the whole universe, animantem esse et Deum, "to be an animal and God." And as he acknowledged many gods, according to that which Aristotle[9] recordeth of him, that when some passing by had espied him sitting in a smoky cottage, he bespake them after this manner: Introite, nam et hic dii sunt, "Come in, I pray, for here there are gods also:" he supposing all places to be full of gods, demons, and souls: so was he an undoubted assertor of one supreme Numen, that governs all things, and that such as could neither be represented

[8] In Lubin's Epistol. Græc. p. 50. &c. But I hold this epistle in the same estimation as the one he is said to have written to Amphidamas. It is the production of some one, who was pleased to supply his genius with matter for exercise, and not of the philosopher whom we are speaking of. Dr. Cudworth, however, makes two observations respecting Heraclitus, which seem to me to require some notice. I. He supposes Heraclitus' opinion respecting fate to be inconsistent with his zealous devotion to the exposition of moral doctrines. But this inconsistency will vanish, if that be true which God. Olearius, so deeply versed in such subjects, has shown to be very probable, that the εἱμαρμένη or fate of Heraclitus was God himself, the maker of the universe, Diss. de Igne Rerum Omnium Principio ex Mente Heracliti, sect. 13. p. 853. and Diss. de Rerum Genesi ex Mente Heracliti, sect. 5. p. 860. II. He states that Heraclitus was a strict moralist. To me, however, this appears to be very far from the truth. He almost exclusively devoted himself to the investigation of physical subjects, and scarcely touched upon ethics; a fact that led some formerly to inquire: Εἰ μὴ μόνον φυσικός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἠθικὸς φιλόσοφος Ἡράκλειτος, "Whether Heraclitus was only a physical or also a moral philosopher," as Sextus Empiricus informs us, Adv. Mathemat. lib. 8. p. 371. I am aware that the Stoics were reproached by Cicero, and perhaps by others, with having chosen Heraclitus for their guide in their exposition of physical matters; but I know of no ancient author, who has recorded, that the moral precepts inculcated by them were also borrowed from the doctrine of Heraclitus. Neither would this passage from the epistle to Hermodorus, if it were genuine, prove Heraclitus to have bestowed much time and labour upon the illustration of ethics. For he, who boasts of having triumphed over his own vices, is not necessarily to be ranked on that account among moral philosophers. It is one thing to treat of, set forth, and expound moral doctrines, and another to resist and master one's own vicious propensities.

[9] De Partib. Animalium, lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 481. tom. 2. opp.

by images, nor confined to temples. For after he had been accused of impiety by Euthycles, he writes to Hermodorus in this manner:[10] Ἀλλ' ὦ ἀμαθεῖς ἄνθρωποι, διδάξατε πρῶτον ἡμᾶς τί ἔστιν ὁ θεός, ποῦ δ' ἔστιν ὁ θεός; ἐν τοῖς ναοῖς ἀποκεκλεισμένος; εὐσεβεῖς γε, οἳ ἐν σκότει τὸν θεὸν ἱδρύετε;——ἀπαίδευτοι, οὐκ ἴστε, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι θεὸς χειρόκμητος, οὐδὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς βάσιν ἔχει, οὐδὲ ἔχει ἕνα περίβολον· ἀλλ' ὅλος ὁ κόσμος αὐτῷ ναός ἐστι, ζώοις καὶ φυτοῖς καὶ ἄστροις πεποικιλμένος, "But O you unwise and unlearned! teach us first what God is, that so you may be believed in accusing me of impiety: tell us where God is. Is he shut up within the walls of temples? is this your piety to place God in the dark, or to make him a stony God? O you unskilful! know ye not, that God is not made with hands, and hath no basis or fulcrum to stand upon, nor can be inclosed within the walls of any temple; the whole world, variegated with plants, animals, and stars, being his temple?" And again: Ἆρ' οὐκ εἰμὶ εὐσεβὴς, Εὐθύκλεις, ὃς μόνος οἶδα θεόν; ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἱδρυσθῇ θεοῦ βωμὸς, οὐκ ἔστι θεός; ἐὰν δὲ ἱδρυσθῇ μὴ θεοῦ, θεός ἐστιν; ὥστε λίθοι θεῶν μάρτυρες· ἔργα δεῖ μαρτυρεῖν, οἷα ἡλίου· νὺξ αὐτῷ καὶ ἡμέρα μαρτυροῦσιν· ὧραι αὐτῷ μάρτυρες, γῆ ὅλη καρποφοροῦσα, μάρτυς· σελήνης ὁ κύκλος, ἐκείνου ἔργον, οὐράνιος μαρτυρία, "Am I impious, O Euthycles, who alone know what God is? is there no God without altars? or are stones the only witnesses of him? No; his own works give testimony to him, and principally the sun; night and day bear witness of him; the earth bringing forth fruits, declares him; the circle of the moon, that was made by him, is a heavenly testimony of him."[1]

In the next place, Anaxagoras the Clazomenian philosopher comes to be considered, whose predecessors of the Ionic order (after Thales) as Anaximander, Anaximenes and Hippo, were (as hath been already observed) Materialists and Atheists; they acknowledging no other substance besides body, and resolving all things into the motions, passions, and affections of it. Whence

[10] These and the words soon after following are extant in the same epistle to Hermodorus, in Lubin's Epistol. Græc. p. 50. of which I have just expressed my opinion.

[1] Upon the philosophy of Heraclitus I have already discoursed above, on ch 3. sect. 28. and on the Digression concerning a Plastic Nature, sect. 6. to which I have at present nothing further to add. As Heraclitus, even when living, was considered so obscure by most men, that they despaired of being able to ascertain his meaning, nor were those more enlightened on the matter, who in former times read his books, it certainly would be bold and self-conceited in us at this day to take upon ourselves to unravel the whole of his discipline from the very scanty portions of it now remaining, involved as these are in obscurity. On which account, I cannot agree with those who make Heraclitus to have been guilty of inconsistency, and to have advanced many contrary theories. For whether this be the case or not can only be known, when the whole tenor of his philosophy is thoroughly understood, which at this day is impossible. I coincide in the opinion of Cicero, who, De Natura Deor. lib. 3. cap. 14. p. 3067. says: Heraclitum, quoniam, quid diceret, intelligi noluit, omittamus, "Let us pass over Heraclitus, as he was unwilling, that what he said should be understood."

was that cautious advice given by Jamblichus:* Προτίμα τὴν Ἰταλικὴν φιλοσοφίαν, τὴν τὰ ἀσώματα καθ' αὑτὰ θεωροῦσαν, τῆς Ἰονικῆς, τῆς τὰ σώματα προηγουμένως ἐπισκοπουμένης, "Prefer the Italic philosophy, which contemplates incorporeal substances by themselves, before the Ionic, which principally considers bodies." And Anaxagoras was the first of these Ionics, who went out of that road; for seeing a necessity of some other cause, besides the material (matter being not able so much as to move itself, and much less if it could, by fortuitous motion, to bring itself into an orderly system and compages;) he therefore introduced Mind into the Cosmopœia, as the principal cause of the universe; which Mind is the same with God. Thus Themistius,† speaking of Anaxagoras: Νοῦν καὶ θεὸν πρῶτος ἐπαγαγόμενος τῇ κοσμοποιΐᾳ, καὶ οὐ πάντα ἀνάψας τῆς φύσεως τῶν σωμάτων, "He was the first (that is, among the Ionic philosophers) who brought in Mind and God to the Cosmopœia, and did not derive all things from senseless bodies." And to the same purpose Plutarch in the life of Pericles: Τοῖς ὅλοις πρῶτος οὐ τύχην, οὐδ' ἀνάγκην, διακοσμήσεως ἀρχὴν, ἀλλὰ νοῦν ἐπέστησε καθαρὸν καὶ ἄκρατον, "The other Ionic philosophers before Anaxagoras made fortune and blind necessity, that is, the fortuitous and necessary motions of the matter, to be the only original of the world; but Anaxagoras was the first, who affirmed a pure and sincere Mind to preside over all." Anaxagoras therefore supposed two substantial self-existent principles of the universe, one an infinite Mind or God, the other an infinite Homoiomery of matter, or infinite atoms; not unqualified, such as those of Empedocles and Democritus, which was the most ancient and genuine atomology; but similar, such as were severally endued with all manner of qualities and forms, which physiology of his therefore was a spurious kind of atomism. Anaxagoras indeed did not suppose God to have created matter out of nothing, but that he was κινήσεως ἀρχὴ, "the principle of its motion," and also τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς αἰτία, "the regulator of this motion for good," and consequently the cause of all the order, pulchritude and harmony of the world: for which reason this divine principle was called also by him, not only mind but good; it being that which acts for the sake of good. Wherefore, according to Anaxagoras, first, the world was not eternal, but had a beginning in time; and before the world was made, there was from eternity an infinite congeries of similar and qualified atoms, self-existent, without either order or motion: secondly, the world was not afterwards made by chance, but by Mind or God, first moving the matter, and then directing the motion of it

* Symb. 36. p. 159. [Potius in Orat. protrept. ad philosoph. p. 159. edit. Arcerii.]
† Crat. 15. [P. 317. edit. Harduini.]

so as to bring it into this orderly system and compages. So that νοῦς was κοσμοποιὸς, "Mind, the first maker of the world," and νοῦς βασιλεὺς οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ γῆς, "Mind, that which still governs the same, the king and sovereign monarch of heaven and earth." Thirdly, Anaxagoras' Mind and God was purely incorporeal; to which purpose his words recorded by Simplicius are very remarkable:* Νοῦς μέμικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι· ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτὸς ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐστίν· εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἦν, ἀλλὰ τέῳ ἐμέμικτο ἄλλῳ, μετεῖχεν ἂν ἀπάντων χρημάτων, εἰ ἐμέμικτο τέῳ· ἐν παντὶ γὰρ παντὸς μοῖρα ἔνεστιν· ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐμοὶ λέλεκται· καὶ ἀνεκώλυεν αὐτὸν τὰ συμμεμιγμένα, ὥστε μηδενὸς χρήματος κρατεῖν ὁμοίως, ὡς καὶ μόνον ἐόντα ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ· ἐστί γὰρ λεπτότατόν τε πάντων χρημάτων, καὶ καθαρώτατον· καὶ γνώμην γε περὶ παντὸς πᾶσαν ἴσχει· καὶ ἰσχύει μέγιστον, "Mind is mingled with nothing, but is alone by itself and separate; for if it were not by itself secrete from matter, but mingled therewith, it would then partake of all things, because there is something of all in every thing; which things mingled together with it, would hinder it, so that it could not master or conquer any thing, as if alone by itself: for Mind is the most subtile of all things, and the most pure, and has the knowledge of all things, together with an absolute power over all." Lastly, Anaxagoras did not suppose a multitude of unmade minds, co-existent from eternity, and so many partial causes and governors of the world, but only one infinite Mind or God, ruling over all.[1]

Indeed it may well be made a question, whether or no, besides this supreme and universal Deity, Anaxagoras did acknowledge any of those other inferior gods, then worshipped by the Pagans? because it is certain, that though he asserted infinite Mind to be the maker and governor of the whole world, yet he was accused by the Athenians for Atheism, and besides a mulct imposed upon him, banished for the same; the true ground whereof was no other than this, because he affirmed the sun to be nothing but a mass of fire, and the moon an earth, having mountains and valleys, cities and houses in it; and probably concluded the same of all the other stars and planets, that they were either fires, as the sun, or habitable earths, as the moon; wherein, supposing them not to be animated, he did consequently deny them to be gods. Which ungodding of the sun, moon and stars, was then looked upon by the vulgar as nothing less than absolute atheism; they being very prone to think, that if there were not many understanding beings superior to men, and if the sun, moon

* In Arist. Phys. lib. 1. fol. 33. c. 2.

[1] The subject of Anaxagoras and his philosophy, if we except B. Jo. Schmid in a specific dissertation published at Jena, has been discussed the most copiously and acutely by P. Bayle, Diction. Histora. et Critique, tom. 1. v. Anaxagoras, p. 104. &c. after whom I have no remark to offer.

and stars were not such, and therefore in their language gods, there was no God at all. Neither was it the vulgar only, who condemned Anaxagoras for this, but even those two grave philosophers Socrates and Plato did the like; the first[2] in his apology made to the Athenians, where he calls this opinion of Anaxagoras absurd; the second in his book of laws, where he complains of this doctrine as a great inlet into atheism, in this manner:* Ἐμοῦ καὶ σοῦ, ὅταν τεκμήρια λέγωμεν, ὡς εἰσὶ θεοὶ, ταῦτα αὐτὰ προσφέροντος ἥλιόν τε καὶ σελήνην, καὶ ἄστρα καὶ γῆν, ὡς θεοὺς καὶ θεῖα ὄντα, ὑπὸ τῶν σοφῶν τούτων ἀναπεπεισμένοι ἂν λέγοιεν, ὡς γῆν τε καὶ λίθους ὄντα αὐτὰ, καὶ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων φροντίζειν δυνάμενα, "When you and I endeavouring by arguments to prove, that there are gods, speak of the sun and moon, stars and earth, as gods and divine things, our young men presently, being principled by these new philosophers, will reply; that these are nothing but earth and stones (senseless and inanimate bodies) which therefore cannot mind nor take notice of any human affairs." Where we may observe these two things; first, that nothing was accounted truly and properly a god amongst the Pagans, but only what was endued with life and understanding. Secondly, that the taking away of those inferior gods of the Pagans, the sun, moon, and stars, by denying them to be animated, or to have life and understanding in them, was, according to Plato's judgment, then the most ready and effectual way to introduce absolute atheism.

Moreover, it is true, that though this Anaxagoras were a professed Theist, he asserting an infinite self-existent Mind to be the maker of the whole world, yet he was severely taxed also by Aristotle and Plato, as one not thorough-paced in theism, and who did not so fully as he ought adhere to his own principles.[3] For whereas, to assert Mind to be the maker of the world, is really all one as to assert final causality for things in nature, as also that they were made after the best manner; Anaxagoras, when he was to give his particular account of the phenomena, did commonly betake himself to material causes only, and hardly ever make use of the mental or final cause, but when he was to seek and at a loss; then only bringing in God upon the stage.† Socrates'[4] discourse concerning this in Plato's Phædo is very well worth our taking notice of: "Hearing one sometimes read (saith he) out of a book of Anaxagoras, ὡς νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, "That Mind was the order

[2] Or rather Plato in the Apology of Socrates, p. 362.

* De Leg. lib. 10. p. 886.

[3] Herewith compare what Dr. Cudworth has written on the same subject above, Digress. on Plastic Nature, sect. 6. together with our own remarks.

† P. 97. Steph.

[4] This, however, is not Socrates' own discourse in Plato, but merely the sum and substance of what he there says at much length.

and cause of all things, I was exceedingly pleased herewith, concluding, that it must needs follow from thence, that all things were ordered and disposed of as they should, and after the best manner possible; and therefore the causes even of the things in nature (or at least the grand strokes of them) ought to be fetched from the τὸ βέλτιστον, that which is absolutely the best. But when afterwards I took Anaxagoras' book into my hand, greedily reading it over, I was exceedingly disappointed of my expectation, finding therein no other causes assigned but only from airs, and ethers, and waters, and such like physical and material things. And he seemed to me to deal, just as if one having affirmed, that Socrates did all by mind, reason and understanding, afterward undertaking to declare the causes of all my actions, as particularly by my sitting here at this time, should render it after this manner; because, forsooth, my body is compounded of bones and nerves, which bones being solid, have joints in them at certain distances, and nerves of such a nature, as that they are capable of being both intended and remitted: wherefore my bones being lifted up in the joints, and my nerves some of them intended and some remitted, was the cause of the bending of my body, and of my sitting down in this place. He in the mean time neglecting the true and proper cause hereof, which was no other than this; because it seemed good to the Athenians to condemn me to die, as also to myself most just, rather to submit to their censure and undergo their punishment, than by flight to escape it; for certainly otherwise these nerves and bones of mine would not have been here now in this posture, but amongst the Megarensians and Bæotians, carried thither ὑπὸ δόξης τοῦ βελτίστου, by the opinion of the best; had I not thought it better to submit to the sentence of the city, than to escape the same by flight. Which kind of philosophers (saith he) do not seem to me to distinguish betwixt the true and proper cause of things, and the cause sine qua non, that without which they could not have been effected. And such are they, who devise many odd physical reasons for the firm settlement of the earth, without any regard to that power, which orders all things for the best (as having δαιμονίαν ἰσχὺν, a divine force in it;) but thinking to find out an Atlas far more strong and immortal, and which can better hold all things together: τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ δέον, οὐδὲν ξυνδεῖν καὶ ξυνέχειν· Good and fit, being not able, in their opinions, to hold, or bind any thing."

From which passage of Plato's we may conclude, that though Anaxagoras was so far convinced of Theism, as in profession to make one infinite Mind the cause of all things, matter only excepted; yet he had notwithstanding too great a tang of that old material and atheistical philosophy of his predecessors, still hanging about him, who resolved all the phenomena of nature

into physical, and nothing into mental or final causes. And we have the rather told this long story of him, because it is so exact a parallel with the philosophic humour of some in this present age, who, pretending to assert a God, do, notwithstanding, discard all mental and final causality from having any thing to do with the fabric of the world; and resolve all into material necessity and mechanism, into vortices, globuli, and striate particles, and the like. Of which Christian philosophers we must needs pronounce, that they [illegible] good Theists as Anaxagoras himself was, though s[illegible]ied by Plato and Aristotle; forasmuch as he did [illegible]t God to be the cause of motion, but also the [illegible]tor, and methodizer of the same, for the producti[illegible]onious system of the world, and therefore τοῦ εὖ [illegible]ν, "the cause of well and fit." Whereas these u[illegible] latter, and only admitting the former, will nee[illegible]ven and earth, plants and animals, and all thin[illegible]n this orderly compages of the world, to have resulted merely from a certain quantity of motion, or agitation, at first impressed upon the matter, and determined to vortex.[5]

XXI. The chronology of the old philosophers having some uncertainty in it, we shall not scrupulously concern ourselves therein, but in the next place consider Parmenides, Xenophanes' auditor and a philosophic poet likewise, but who conversing

[5] That Descartes and his disciples are here glanced at, will be obvious to every one at all acquainted with these matters. How far we are to assent to the learned Doctor will I think be evident from what we have observed above on the Digression on Plastic Nature. As to the rest, the whole of what is here argued respecting the philosophy of Anaxagoras seems to me to be somewhat foreign to the question which our worthy author had proposed, whether or no Anaxagoras, besides the one supreme Deity, acknowledged also many other gods, or worshipped the deities of the Athenians? Dr. Cudworth touches, indeed, upon this question, and seems inclined to agree with those who affirm this, but he afterwards dismisses it altogether without coming to any conclusion; which, however, was necessary for his purpose. The same thing he had done before in the case of Xenophanes. His object is to show, that those who formerly worshipped a plurality of gods, nevertheless at the same time acknowledged one supreme Deity. He ought, therefore, to have shown that Xenophanes and Anaxagoras, whose examples he wishes to avail himself of in this matter, sacrificed both to one and to several gods. In my opinion, neither Xenophanes nor Anaxagoras paid any attention to the deities of the vulgar, especially of the Athenians, acknowledging no other God, except that divine mind which they supposed to govern all things. I should not, however, deny it to be possible, that Anaxagoras, who believed one mind to preside over all things, may have supposed other inferior minds to have proceeded from this supreme mind and to have been appointed by the most high God to the administration of human affairs. But I do not think the same of Xenophanes. I know that this philosopher himself in the verses, which are still extant, makes mention also of gods: nor am I ignorant of its being stated by Cicero, De Divinatione, lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 3111. tom. 9. opp. unum Xenophanem, quum Deos esse diceret, divinationem funditus sustulisse, "that Xenophanes alone, although asserting the existence of gods, altogether rejected divination." But these gods of Xenophanes, I fear, were merely portions of the universe, destitute of life and reason, whom he improperly designated by the name of gods, or such gods as those of the Stoics, which did not differ from the supreme God himself.

much with two Pythagoreans, Amenias and Diochœtes, was therefore looked upon as one, that was not a little addicted to the Pythagoric sect. That this Parmenides acknowledged many gods, is evident from what has been already cited out of him; notwithstanding which, he plainly asserted also one supreme, making him, as Simplicius tells us, *αἰτίαν θεῶν*, "the cause of all those other gods," of which Love is said to have been first produced. Which supreme Deity Parmenides, as well as Xenophanes, called, *ἓν τὸ πᾶν*, "one that was all," or the universe; but adding thereunto of his own, that it was also *ἀκίνητον*, "immoveable."[6]

Now, though it be true, that Parmenides' writings being not without obscurity, some of the ancients, who were less acquainted with metaphysical speculations, understood him physically; as if he had asserted the whole corporeal universe to be all but one thing, and that immoveable, thereby destroying, together with the diversity of things, all motion, mutation, and action; which was plainly to make Parmenides not to have been a philosopher, but a madman: yet Simplicius, a man well acquainted with the opinions of ancient philosophers, and who had by him a copy of Parmenides' poems, (then scarce, but since lost) assures us that Parmenides dreamt of no such matter, and that he wrote, *οὐ περὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ στοιχείου, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος*, or, *περὶ τῆς θείας ὑπεροχῆς*, "not concerning a physical element or principle, but concerning the true Ens, or the divine transcendency:" adding, that though some of those ancient philosophers did not distinguish *τὰ φυσικὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπὲρ φύσιν*, "natural things from supernatural;" yet the Pythagoreans, and Xenophanes, and

[6] I do not know it to be the case that Parmenides alone, and not Xenocrates also, asserted that *one* which he called *all* to be at the same time *ἀκίνητον*, or "immoveable." Indeed, I am almost inclined to believe that the whole of the sect commonly called Eleatic was imbued with this dogma. Nor am I without authority for such opinion. Aristotle, in his book, De Philosophia in Eusebius' Præparat. Evangel. lib. 14. cap. 17. p. 756. says expressly: *Τοιαῦτα γάρ τινα πρότερον μὲν Ξενοφάνης, καὶ Παρμενίδης, καὶ Ζήνων, καὶ Μέλισσος ἔλεγον, ὕστερον, δὲ οἱ περὶ Στίλπωνα καὶ τοὺς Μεγαρικούς· ὅθεν ἠξίουν τὸ ὂν ἓν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἕτερον εἶναι, μηδὲ γεννᾶσθαί τι, μηδὲ φθείρεσθαι, μηδὲ κινεῖσθαι τὸ παράπαν*, "For Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus first asserted these doctrines, and afterwards Stilpo, and the Magarensian philosophers. These supposed, that that which exists is one and that which does not exist is different; and that nothing is generated or corrupted, or in short, moved." I would not deny, however, that there was some difference between the opinions of Xenophanes and Parmenides on this subject and that they did not both call the first principle of all things immoveable in the same way. For Parmenides and Melissus are stated in Aristotle, Sextus, and other ancient authors, to have taken away motion altogether from the nature of things; an opinion which I do not see to have been attributed by any one to Xenophanes. It is usual with most of the ancient authors, few of whom examined the dogmas of the early sects with a due degree of diligence, to represent those, whom they observe to have made use of the same expressions, as entertaining similar opinions: whereas, sometimes those who employ the same terms very widely differ in their sentiments. For, every one who has devoted any attention to the matter must be aware of the utter poverty of almost all languages in expressing the notions and speculations of the mind. Hence, it comes to pass, that we are frequently compelled to designate different ideas by the same words: by which many, who consider things only superficially, are led into the gravest errors.

Parmenides, and Empedocles, and Anaxagoras, did all διακρίνειν, "handle these two distinctly," καίπερ τῇ ἀσαφείᾳ λανθάνοντες τοὺς πολλούς, "however, by reason of their obscurity, it was not perceived by many;" for which cause they have been most of them misrepresented, not only by Pagans, but also by Christian writers. For, as the same Simplicius informs us, Parmenides propounded two several doctrines, one after another; the first concerning theological and metaphysical things, called by him ἀλήθειαν, "truth;" the second concerning physical and corporeal things, which he called δόξαν, "opinion." The transition betwixt which was contained in these verses of his:

Ἐν τῷ σοι παύω πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα
Ἀμφὶς ἀληθείας· δόξας δ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείους
Μάνθανε· κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων.

In the former of which doctrines, Parmenides asserted one immoveable principle; but in the latter, two moveable ones, fire and earth. He speaking of souls also as a certain middle or vinculum betwixt the incorporeal and the corporeal world, and affirming that God did τὰς ψυχὰς πέμπειν ποτὲ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ἐμφανοῦς εἰς τὸ ἀειδὲς, ποτὲ δὲ ἀνάπαλιν, "sometimes send and translate souls from the visible to the invisible regions, and sometimes again, on the contrary, from the invisible to the visible." From whence it is plain, that when Parmenides asserted his one and all immoveable, he spoke not as a physiologer, but as a metaphysician and theologer only. Which indeed was a thing so evident, that Aristotle[7] himself, though he had a mind to obscure Parmenides' sense, that he might have a fling at him in his Physics, yet could not altogether dissemble it. For when he thus begins, "There must of necessity be either one principle or many; and if there be but one, then must it either be immoveable, as Parmenides and Melissus affirm, or else moveable, ὥσπερ οἱ φυσικοὶ, "as the Naturalists or Physiologers;" he therein plainly intimates, that when Parmenides and Melissus made one immoveable the principle of all things, they did not write this as Physiologers. And afterwards he confesses, that this controversy, whether there were one immoveable principle, does not belong to natural philosophy, but to some other science. But this is more plainly declared by him elsewhere,[8] writing concerning Parmenides and

[7] Physic. Auscultat. lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 446. tom. 1. opp.

[8] De Cœlo, lib. 3. cap. 1. p. 668. I consider these three passages of Aristotle, however, to be insufficient to exculpate Parmenides and not be of such weight as to induce us to believe that his *one* and *all* was a nature altogether separate from this universe and that motion, which according to the concurrent testimony of all writers he denied, was not the motion of the universe, but some other. I. As to Aristotle's here opposing physiologers to Parmenides and Melissus, this amounts to nothing. For by physiologers Aristotle means those ancient philosophers before Socrates, who had occupied themselves exclusively with the investigation of physical

Melissus after this manner: Εἰ καὶ τ' ἄλλα λέγουσι καλῶς, ἀλλ' οὐ φυσικῶς γε δεῖ νομίζειν λέγειν, τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἄττα τῶν ὄντων ἀγέννητα καὶ ὅλως ἀκίνητα, μᾶλλον ἐστὶν ἑτέρας καὶ προτέρας, ἢ τῆς φυσικῆς ἐπισκέψεως, "Though it be granted that Parmenides and Melissus otherwise said well, yet we must not imagine them to have spoken physically. For this, that there is something

things and neglected all other departments of science: to which number neither Parmenides nor Melissus belonged. This is evident from innumerable passages of the Stagirite, of which I shall quote only one, Metaphys. lib. 2. cap. 7. p. 276. Οἱ μὲν οὖν καλούμενοι Πυθαγόρειοι ταῖς μὲν ἀρχαῖς καὶ τοῖς στοιχείοις ἐκτοπωτέρως χρῶνται τῶν φυσιολόγων, "Those called Pythagoreans employ the first principles and elements in a more remote sense than the physiologers." Here the philosopher contrasts the physiologers with the Pythagoreans, and in doing so, acknowledges at the same time, that the latter taught concerning the elements and first principles of things, that is, performed the part of physiologers. His books of physics and metaphysics are full of similar passages. Hence, I consider we ought not to listen to Sextus Empiricus, who, lib. 10. adv. Mathemat. cap. 2. p. 641. affirms that Melissus and Parmenides were called ἀφύσικοι by Aristotle, ὅτι ἀρχὴ κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἡ φύσις, "because nature is the principle of motion," which these philosophers did away with. This conjecture is too far-fetched and repugnant as well to the general tone of Aristotle's writings. II. Nor does Aristotle's confession that the question: "whether there be one immoveable principle or not," does not properly belong to natural philosophy, more effectually assist the cause of Parmenides. For he who refers this controversy to some other science than physics, by no means confesses at the same time, that those who hold something to be immoveable, inculcate correct notions of the nature of this immoveable and abstract it from physical subjects. Aristotle supposed physical science to be conversant solely about those things which fall under our senses; which endure but for a certain time, and then perish; which, in short, have motion or at least, seem to us to have it; and entertaining this opinion, it was natural for him to consider speculations respecting things which are eternal, more general, and altogether removed from the senses, as belonging to some other discipline. It will be worth our while to hear the philosopher himself, Metaphys. lib. 6. cap. 1. p. 347. 348. tom. 4. opp. Εἰ δὲ τί ἐστιν ἀκίνητον καὶ ἀΐδιον καὶ χωριστὸν, φανερὸν, ὅτι θεωρητικῆς τὸ γνῶναι, οὐ μέντοι φυσικῆς γε· περὶ κινητῶν γάρ τινων ἡ φυσική·———ἡ μὲν γὰρ φυσικὴ περὶ ἀχώριστα μέν, ἀλλ' οὐ ἀκίνητα, "But if any thing is immoveable, and eternal, and separable, it is evident that the knowledge of this belongs to speculative and not to physical science: for the latter is of certain things which are moveable.———For physical science treats of things inseparable, but not immoveable." Hence, all speculations respecting the heavens and the world, which the Stagirite held to be eternal, he separated from physics, and either treated of separately, or referred to metaphysics. III. It will be evident, therefore, in the third place, what construction ought to be put upon the passage in which he grants that Parmenides and Melissus otherwise discoursed well, but denies them to have spoken physically. Aristotle himself, it is notorious, maintained, that there is something eternal and immoveable, namely God. Hence, he could not but generally applaud those philosophers, who in like manner asserted one eternal and immoveable principle. But in doing so, he does not intimate what it was that Parmenides held to be immoveable, or acknowledge him to have entertained correct notions respecting it; on the contrary, in other passages, especially Physic. lib. 1. and Metaphys. lib. 1. he notices, and at the same time, censures his opinion. Not to be unjust, however, I will confess that there is a passage in Aristotle overlooked by Dr. Cudworth, in which the philosopher seems to intimate, that Parmenides' doctrine was such as the learned Doctor supposes it to be, Metaphys. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 270. tom. 4. opp. Παρμενίδης μὲν ἔοικε τοῦ κατὰ λόγον ἑνὸς ἅπτεσθαι· Μέλισσος δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην· διὸ καὶ ὁ μὲν πεπερασμένον, ὁ δὲ ἄπειρόν φησιν εἶναι αὐτό, "For Parmenides seems to have treated of one according to reason, Melissus of one according to matter; wherefore the former asserts it to be finite, the latter infinite." But setting aside that Aristotle proposes this only as a conjecture, the passage is most obscure; nor is it clear what he meant by one κατὰ λόγον, and one κατὰ ὕλην. Of the opinion itself of Parmenides we shall speak by and by.

unmade and immoveable, does not so properly belong to physics, as to a certain other science, which is before it."

Wherefore Parmenides, as well as Xenophanes, his master, by his one and all, meant nothing else but the supreme Deity, he calling it also immoveable. For the supreme Deity was by these ancient philosophers styled, first τὸ ἓν and μονὰς, "a unity and monad," because they conceived that the first and most perfect being, and the beginning of all things must needs be the most simple. Thus Eudorus, in res their sense: Ἀρχὴν ἔφασαν εἶναι τῶν πάν τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῶν ὄντων πάντων ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγε ἓ εἶναι τὸν ὑπεράνω θεὸν, "These ancients affi e, or unity, was the first principle of all; ma l as other things, being derived from it; tl his one that highest or supreme God, who d Syrianus, to the same purpose:[10] Οἱ θεῖοι ἐ Θεὸν ἔλεγον, ὡς ἑνώσεως τοῖς ὅλοις αἴτιον, καὶ καὶ πάσης ζωῆς, "Those divine men called God the One, as being the cause of unity to all things, as likewise he was of being and life." And Simplicius concludes, that Parmenides' ἓν ὄν, "one Ens," was a certain divine principle, superior to mind or intellect, and more simple:* Λείπεται οὖν τὸ νοητὸν πάντων αἴτιον, δι' ὃ καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἐστι καὶ τὸ νοεῖν, ἐν ᾧ πάντα κατὰ μίαν ἕνωσιν συνῃρημένως κατείληπται, καὶ ἡνωμένως, τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ Παρμενίδειον ἓν ὄν, "It remaineth, therefore, that that intelligible, which is the cause of all things, and therefore of mind and understanding too, in which all things are contained and comprehended compendiously and in a way of unity, I say, that this was Parmenides' one Ens or Being."

In the next place, Parmenides, with the others of those ancients, called also his ἓν ὂν, τὸ πᾶν, "his one Ens or first most simple Being, all, or the universe;" because it virtually contained all things, and as Simplicius writes: Πάντα διακεκριμένως ἐμφαίνεται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, "All things are from this one distinctly displayed." For which cause, in Plato's Parmenides, this one is said to be, ἐπὶ πάντα πολλὰ ὄντα νενεμημένον, "distributed into all things, that are many." But that Parmenides by his ἓν τὸ πᾶν, "one and all," or "the universe," did not understand the corporeal world, is evident from hence, because he called it ἀδιαίρετον, or "indivisible," and as Simplicius observes,† supposed it to have no magnitude; because that which is perfectly one, can have no parts.

[9] Comment. in Physicam. Aristot. p. 39. ed. Græc, Aldinæ.

[10] These words the learned Doctor no doubt extracted from a manuscript of Syrianus' Comm. in Libros. aliquot. Metaphysic. Aristot. For this commentary has not yet been published in the Greek.

* F. 31. Gr. [Comment. in Physic. Aristotel.] † In Phys. fol. 17. 2.

Wherefore, it may be here observed, that this expression of ἓν τὸ πᾶν, "one being all," hath been used in very different senses: for as Parmenides and Xenophanes understood it of the supreme Deity, that one most perfect and most simple being was the original of all things; so others of them meant it atheistically, concerning the most imperfect and lowest of all beings, matter or body, they affirming all things to be nothing but one and the same matter diversely modified. Thus much we learn from that place of Aristotle's in his Metaphysics:* Ὅσοι μὲν οὖν ἕντε τὸ πᾶν καὶ μίαν εἶναί τινα φύσιν ὡς ὕλην τιθέασι, καὶ ταύτην σωματικὴν καὶ μέγεθος ἔχουσαν, δῆλον, ὅτι πολλαχῶς ἁμαρτάνουσι, "They who affirm one to be all in this sense, as if all things were nothing but one and the same matter, and that corporeal and endued with magnitude, it is manifest that they err sundry ways." But here is a great difference betwixt these two to be observed, in that, the atheistical assertors of one and all (whether they meant water or air by it, or something else) did none of them suppose their one and all to be immoveable, but moveable: but they, whose principle was one and all immoveable (as Parmenides, Melissus, and Zeno) could not possibly mean any thing else thereby, but the Deity; that there was one most simple, perfect, and immutable Being incorporeal, which virtually contained all things, and from which all things were derived. But Heraclitus, who is one of those, who are said to have affirmed ἓν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, "that one was all," or "that the universe was but one thing," might possibly have taken both those senses together, (which will also agree in the Stoical hypothesis) that all things were both from one God, and from one fire; they being both alike corporeal Theists, who supposed an intellectual fire to be the first principle of all things.

And though Aristotle, in his Physics, quarrels very much with Parmenides and Melissus, for making one immoveable principle; yet in his Metaphysics himself doth plainly close with it, and own it as very good divinity, that there is one incorporeal and immoveable principle of all things, and that the supreme Deity is an immoveable nature:† Εἰπερ ὑπάρχει τις οὐσία τοιαύτη, λέγω δὲ, χωριστὴ καὶ ἀκίνητος, ὅπερ πειράσομαι δεικνύναι, ἐνταῦθα ἂν εἴη που καὶ τὸ θεῖον, καὶ αὕτη ἂν εἴη πρώτη καὶ κυριωτάτη ἀρχή, "If there be any such substance as this, that is separate (from matter, or incorporeal) and immoveable (as we shall afterwards endeavour to show that there is) then the divinity ought to be placed here, and this must be acknowledged to be the first and most proper principle of all." But lest any should suspect that Aristotle, if not Parmenides also, might, for all that, hold many such immoveable principles, or many eternal,

* Lib. 1. cap. 7. [P. 274. tom. 4. opp.] † Lib. 6. cap. 1. and Lib. 13. cap. 7.

uncreated and self-existent beings, as so many partial causes of the world: Simplicius assures us,[1] μὴ γεγονέναι δόξαν πολλὰς καὶ ἀκινήτους τὰς ἀρχὰς λέγουσαν, i. e., "that though divers of the ancient philosophers asserted a plurality of moveable principles (and some indeed an infinity) yet there never was any opinion entertained amongst philosophers, of many, or more than one immoveable principles." From whence it may be concluded, that no philosopher ever asserted a multitude of unmade, self-existent minds, or in[illegible]s, as co-ordinate principles of the world.

Indeed Plotinus s[illegible] that Parmenides in his writings, by his τὸ ὄν, [illegible] frequently mean a perfect mind or intellect, the [illegible]e entity (according to him) below that which und[illegible] mind, though incorporeal, was likened by him to [illegible]e it comprehends all within itself, and because it [illegible]t from without, but from within): but that whe[illegible] his "On" or "Ens" one, he gave occasion thereby [illegible]rel with him, as making the same both one and many; intellect being that which contains the ideas of all things in it. Wherefore Parmenides' whole philosophy (saith he) was better digested and more exactly and distinctly set down in Plato's Parmenides, where he acknowledgeth "three unities subordinate, or a trinity of divine hypostases:"* Ὁ παρὰ Πλάτωνι Παρμενίδης, ἀκριβέστερον λέγων, διαιρεῖ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὸ πρῶτον ἕν, ὃ κυριώτερον ἓν· καὶ δεύτερον ἓν πολλὰ λέγων· καὶ τρίτον ἓν καὶ πολλά· καὶ σύμφωνος οὗτος καὶ αὐτός ἐστι ταῖς Τρισίν, "Parmenides in Plato, speaking more exactly, distinguishes three divine unities subordinate; the first of that, which is perfectly and most properly one; the second of that, which was called by him one-many: the third of that, which is thus expressed, one and many. So that Parmenides did also agree in this acknowledgment of a trinity of divine or archical hypostases." Which observation of Plotinus is, by the way, the best key, that we know of, for that obscure book of Plato's Parmenides. Wherefore Parmenides thus asserting a trinity of divine hypostases, it was the first of those hypostases, that was properly called by him, ἓν τὸ πᾶν, "one the universe or all:" that is, one most simple being, the fountain and original of all. And the second of them (which is a perfect intellect) was, it seems, by him called, in way of distinction, ἓν πολλὰ or πάντα, "one-many" or "one all things;" by which all things are meant the intelligible ideas of things, that are all contained together in one perfect mind. And of those was Parmenides to be understood also, when he affirmed, that all things did stand, and nothing flow; not of singular and sensible things, which, as the

[1] In Physic. Aristot. fol. 17.
* En. 5. lib. 1. c. 8.

Heraclitics rightly affirmed, do indeed all flow; but of the immediate objects of the mind, which are eternal and immutable: Aristotle himself acknowledging, that no generation nor corruption belongeth to them, since there could be no immutable and certain science, unless there were some immutable, necessary and eternal objects of it. Wherefore, as the same Aristotle* also declares, the true meaning of that controversy betwixt the Heraclitics and Parmenideans, Whether all things did flow, or some things stand? was the same with this, Whether there were any other objects of the mind, besides singular sensibles, that were immutable? and consequently, whether there were any such thing as science or knowledge which had a firmitude and stability in it? For those Heraclitics, who contended, that the only objects of the mind were singular and sensible things, did with good reason consequently thereupon deny, that there was any certain and constant knowledge, since there can neither be any definition of singular sensibles (as Aristotle[2] writes), nor any demonstration concerning them. But the Parmenideans, on the contrary, who maintained the firmitude and stability of science, did as reasonably conclude thereupon, that besides singular sensibles, there were other objects of the mind, universal, eternal and immutable, which they called the intelligible ideas, all originally contained in one archetypal mind or understanding, and from thence participated by inferior minds and souls. But it must be here acknowledged, that Parmenides and the Pythagoreans went yet a step further, and did not only suppose those intelligible ideas to be the eternal and immutable objects of all science, but also, as they are contained in the divine intellect, to be the principles and causes of all other things. For thus Aristotle declares their sense:† Αἴτια τὰ εἴδη τοῖς ἄλλοις, and again, τὸ τὶ ἦν εἶναι ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ εἴδη παρέχονται, τοῖς δὲ εἴδεσι τὸ ἕν, "The ideas are the causes of all other things; and, the essence of all other things below is imparted to them from the ideas, as the ideas themselves derive their essence from the first unity:" those ideas in the divine understanding being looked upon by these philosophers as the paradigms and patterns of all created things. Now these ideas being frequently called by the Pythagoreans "Numbers," we may from hence clearly understand the meaning of that seemingly monstrous paradox or puzzling Griphus of theirs, that[3] Numbers were the causes and

* Met. lib. 4. c. 5. [P. 298. tom. 4. opp.]

[2] Metaphys. lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 272. t. 4. opp. Aristotle, however, does not give this as his own but as Plato's opinion, from which he himself dissents.

† Met. lib. 1. c. 6. [P. 273. tom. 4. opp.]

[3] Metaphys. cap. 6. 272. On the Pythagorean numbers I have already said as much as any one need know who is willing to be guided by his reason. The opinion here adopted by the learned Doctor, that the numbers of Pythagoras and the ideas of Plato did not differ from each other, has not a great while ago been set forth and

principles of all things, or that all things were made out of Numbers; it signifying indeed no more than this, that all things were made from the ideas of the divine intellect, called Numbers; which themselves also were derived from a monad or unity: Aristotle somewhere[4] intimating this very account of that assertion, τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς αἰτίους εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις τῆς οὐσίας, "that Numbers were the causes of the essence of other things," namely, because τὰ εἴδη ἀριθμοί, "the ideas were numbers." Though we are not ig[illegible] Pythagoreans made also all the numbers within [illegible] be symbols of things. But besides these two div[illegible] already mentioned, Parmenides seems to have [illegible] third, which, because it had yet more alterity, for [illegible] e was called by him, neither ἓν τὸ πᾶν, "one th[illegible] all;" nor ἓν πάντα, "one-all things;" but ἓν καὶ [illegible] and all things:" and this is taken by Plotinus t[illegible] l Psyche, that actively produceth all things, in [illegible] l, according to those divine ideas.

But that Parmenides,* by his one-all immoveable, really understood nothing else but the supreme Deity, is further unquestionably evident from those verses of his cited by Simplicius, but not taken notice of by Stephanus in his Poesis Philosophica, of which we shall only set down some few here.

Ὡς ἀγένητον ἐὸν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν,
Οὐδέποτ' ἦν, οὐδ' ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν
Ἓν συνεχές· Τίνα γὰρ γενεὴν διζήσεαι αὐτοῦ;
Αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δέσμων,
Ταυτὸν τ' ἐν ταυτῷ τε μένον, καθ' ἑαυτό τε κεῖται &c.

In which, together with those that follow, the supreme Deity is plainly described as one single, solitary, and most simple being, unmade or self-existent, and necessarily existing, incorporeal and devoid of magnitude, altogether immutable or unchangeable, whose duration therefore was very different from that of ours, and not in a way of flux or temporary succession, but a constant eternity, without either past or future. From whence it may be observed, that this opinion of a standing eternity, different

defended by the eminent scholar Jac. Brucker, in a long and erudite comment, which is extant in J. Geo. Schelhorn's Amœnitat. Litterar. t. 7. p. 173. [Beausobre also approves of it, Hist. de Manich. p. 393.] I have no objection to their assenting to this opinion, if they think proper; but to myself there seems to be a vast difference between the notions or ideas of things and numbers, nor can I sufficiently clearly perceive any resemblance between the two. But in subjects so obscure, nothing admits of being decided upon with certainty.

[4] Metaphys. lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 272. But in this passage Aristotle is as usual so intricate and obscure, that I consider I should hardly be able to discharge the office of interpreter without great loss of time. Let him, therefore, as having been unwilling to be known to every one, lie concealed in his own darkness.

* In Arist. Phys. fol. 7. et 17. et. 31.

from that flowing succession of time, is not so novel a thing as some would persuade, nor was first excogitated by Christian writers, schoolmen or fathers, it being at least as old as Parmenides; from whom it was also afterwards received and entertained by the best of the other pagan philosophers; however it hath been of late so much decried, not only by atheistical writers, but other precocious and conceited wits also, as nonsense and impossibility.[5]

[5] On the opinion of those who, like most of our theologians at this day, exclude all succession from the notion of eternity, and on the antiquity of that opinion, a more convenient opportunity will I hope be afforded me of discoursing in the sequel. Most assuredly they are mistaken, who deny it to have been entertained prior to the fifth or sixth century. I much doubt, however, whether Parmenides was favourable to it; neither do the verses of his here quoted place this beyond controversy. But of this elsewhere: at present I consider it necessary to offer some observations on the philosophy of Parmenides, to show how far we ought to assent to what is here eruditely and ingeniously argued by the learned Doctor. He strains every nerve in order to prove that Parmenides was free from all impiety towards God and that those, who supposed the one immoveable principle introduced by this philosopher to be this whole universe of things, were guilty of the greatest injustice towards him. [Brucker, Ep. ad Zimmermann. clears him from the charge of atheism.] The same opinion has been advocated by many other distinguished and learned men, amongst whom it will be sufficient to mention the author of the Ars Cogitandi, par. 3. cap. 19. p. 246. Pet. Gassendi, opp. t. 1. p. 206. Mich. Mourgues, in his book intitled Plan Theologique du Pythagorisme, p. 16. Ren. Vallinus, Ad Boëthium de Consolatione Philos. p. 72. who have no doubt of Parmenides having entertained sentiments equally wise and sound as those of Christians. But these are opposed by others not inferior in ability and learning, who maintained that Parmenides philosophized on God and divine things in the same manner as Spinoza, and consequently did away with all religion, Pet. Bayle, Diction. Histor. et Critique, lib. 4. v. Xenophanes, not. b. p. 2887. Jo. Fr. Buddeus, Thes. de Atheismo et Superstit. cap. 1. sect. 19. p. 60. and the illustrious Nic. Hier. Gudlingius, whose long and ingenious commentary, in which he endeavours to establish the atheism of Parmenides, is extant in Gudlingianor. par. 15. p. 372. Among these some also take a middle course, and neither accuse nor exculpate Parmenides; who have not long ago been joined by the most erudite Jac. Fr. Reimann, Historia Atheismi, sect. 1. cap. 30. sect. 3. p. 205. 206. If we could fearlessly put faith in Plotinus and Simplicius, who have been brought forward by Dr. Cudworth as leading authorities in this question, Parmenides would easily come out of the ordeal acquitted of all infamy. To these might be added Proclus, who says much in his praise, and copiously discusses his philosophy, Introduct. in Theologiam Platonic. lib. 1. cap. 7. &c. p. 15—45. But as this class of men is known to have measured the philosophers of antiquity generally according to their own peculiar views, I am wont to be slow in assenting to their statements; nor do I think I am wrong in doing so. Besides, it is impossible to elicit from his poems, or rather fragments of poems occurring here and there in Galen, Clemens, Sextus, Simplicius and others, any thing certain or satisfactory; as they are wonderfully obscure and mere detached and disconnected scraps, of which no one will easily determine the true meaning. I should almost say the same of Plato's dialogue entitled Parmenides. For it is not certain, whether Plato has recorded the real opinions of this philosopher or, as in the case of Socrates, supplied him with his own sentiments; nor is the sense of many things propounded in this dialogue at all apparent. Which being the case, if we wish to ascertain the doctrines of Parmenides, the only recourse left for us is to compare the not very numerous accounts given of them by ancient authors and, having done so, to determine by probable conjecture, what amount of piety or impiety towards God is to be attributed to him. Before all things we ought to bear in mind what is manifest from the testimonies of those whom I shall name by and by, that the philosophy of Parmenides was twofold, one regulated by the senses, the other by reason and judgment; the latter certain and subject to no doubt, the former owing to the infirmity of the senses fallacious and variable: of which the former might not improperly be denominated *physical*, and the

It is well known, that Melissus held forth the very same doctrine with Parmenides, of one immoveable, that was all, which he plainly affirmed to be incorporeal likewise, as Parmenides did:

latter *metaphysical*. See, besides Diogenes, Eusebius, Præpar. Evangel. lib. 1. cap. 8. p. 23. and especially Plutarch, Advers. Colotem, p. 1114. &c. t. 2. opp. who shows plainly that some had but imperfectly understood this philosopher's doctrine. To the former philosophy belong the whole visible universe and all its vicissitudes and changes; in short, all things that are subject and exposed to the senses. Whatever, therefore, in his precepts, as handed down by ancient authors, treats of things which can be felt, seen, or touched, pertains altogether to this philosophy; which if learned men had attended to, they would have escaped many difficulties and controversies in the investigation of this question. His assertion, therefore, of two first principles of things, *water* and *fire*, or as Plutarch says, ibid. p. 1114. τὸ λαμπρὸν καὶ τὸ σκοτεινὸν, or as Plato and others, *earth* and *fire*; his hypothesis that men are procreated by the power of the sun; and all that which, according to Plutarch, he inculcated respecting the heavens, the moon, and the stars, are to be referred this department of his philosophy. Nor, if I am not wholly mistaken, does what he is stated to have taught concerning God, pertain to any other. Parmenides, says Cicero, De Natura Deor. lib. 1. cap. 11. p. 2895. commentitium quiddam coronæ similitudine efficit; Stephanem appellat, continentem ardore lucis orbem, qui cingit cœlum, quem appellat Deum, "Parmenides makes a certain imaginary thing resembling a crown; he calls it *stephane*, a continuous orb of fervid light, which surrounds the heavens and which he calls God." What sort of God this is, is manifest, namely, a most subtle fire, surrounding and encompassing the whole world; to which it is very doubtful whether Parmenides ascribed mind and reason. That God with him was that which is most excellent in the nature of things, and which generates and produces all things therein, is, I conceive unquestionable. And this he considered to be fire, which he frequently speaks of as being the maker and framer of all. Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 9. segm. 22. p. 561. Δύο τε εἶναι στοιχεῖα, πῦρ καὶ γῆν, καὶ τὸ μὲν δημιουργοῦ τάξιν ἔχειν, "That there are two elements, fire and earth, and that the former has the office of framer or architect." Add Origen, Philosophumena, cap. 11. p. 87. and others. But fire, as every one must allow, pertains to sensible things; therefore there can be no doubt that the God of Parmenides ought to be referred to this part of philosophy. Moreover the reason why he called this all-producing nature *stephane* or crown, although it has afforded various matter for disquisition to learned men, appears to myself to be by no means intricate or recondite. Parmenides comprised his philosophy in a poem, in which he almost invariably designated things by the names of others instead of expressing them by their own. There is extant in Sextus Empiricus, lib. 8. adv. Mathemat. p. 392. &c. a tolerably long fragment from his book on Nature, in which he calls the mental appetites *horses*, reason a *demon*, and the eyes *Helian virgins*. It is not strange, therefore, that he should also have designated the god he professed by a similar name, and should have denominated him a *crown*, as the greatest of ornaments.

I would have no one believe, however, that Parmenides was so absurd and irrational as to consider all things falling under the senses as mere phantasms and fictions of the senses, or to maintain that there is no motion, and that nothing really is produced or destroyed, but merely appears so to us. If he had held such a notion, he would have been unworthy the name of a reasonable being. I am aware, indeed, that Aristotle, Sextus, and others, have so interpreted his opinion. Colotes in Plutarch accuses Parmenides of having denied the existence of fire, water, κρημνοὶ καὶ πόλεις, "a precipice and cities," and of having ranked the whole nature of things among the ravings and illusions of distempered minds. Nor is he differently understood by Aristocles in Eusebius, who, in opposition to him, maintains the existence of motion. In our own times, Pet. Bayle has revived the accusation, Diction. Histor. et Critiq. voc. Xenophanes, t. 4. p. 2837. Il falut donc, says he, among other things, qu' ils (la secte Eleatique) soutinssent, que la nature demeuroit toujours la même, et que les changemens qu' elle soufre ne sont que des illusions de nos sens et que des pures apparences, "They (the Eleatic sect) must therefore have maintained, that nature remains always the same, and that the changes it undergoes are only the illusions of our senses and mere appearances." But he has long ago been defended by Plutarch, who, Adv. Colotem, p. 1113. &c. clearly shows, that Parmenides, in teaching that all visible things consist in and depend

Καὶ ὁ Μέλισσος ἓν ἐόν φησι, δεῖ αὐτὸ σῶμα μὴ ἔχειν, εἰ δὲ ἔχει πάχος, ἔχοι ἂν μόρια,* "Melissus also declared, that his one Ens must needs be devoid of body, because if it had any crassities

upon opinion, meant simply to inculcate the doctrine of Heraclitus and so many others, that the whole of nature is perpetually flowing, and has no stability; and, on the contrary, that the things which reason contemplates and comprehends are alone certain and constant. And that such was the fact is, in my opinion, placed beyond all controversy by his very philosophy on physical things. Parmenides not only discoursed of physical things, but also of their first causes and origin, and traced the nature of things to its elements. But this he would not have done, if he had supposed that we dream and are deceived by the senses, and that nothing that we seem to see in reality takes place. For what man in his senses, I ask, investigates the causes and reasons of a thing, which he believes to have no existence? Let us suppose Parmenides to have believed, that nothing whatever is produced, but merely seems so to us, and at the same time to have inquired into the cause of things which are produced, and after exploring the whole to have decided that fire is the maker and contriver of all things, would not this be the height of madness? That which does not exist can have no cause; consequently, if none of those things which we imagine to take place, really do take place, fire could not be laid down as the cause of them. Besides, Parmenides philosophized not only upon present but also upon past things, and endeavoured to ascertain their causes. According to Laërtius and others, one of his dogmas was: "That the first men were generated from the sun." Now what would be the meaning of this axiom, if the man entertained the notions attributed to him by so many ancient and modern writers? Assuredly this, than which nothing can be more absurd: "that there were men before any men existed, to whom it appeared that a sun existed, and that this sun excited motion in the earth, and from it generated men;" to pass over other absurdities connected therewith. And what would Parmenides have thought of himself, if he had classed the generations of all men and animals among empty and unreal visions? [He admitted motion in physics, but denied it in metaphysics.] Let us reject, therefore, the vulgar opinion, that Parmenides took away all motion from the nature of things, and conclude him to have simply meant, that all visible things are subject to perpetual conversions and changes, and therefore do not supply matter for stable and certain knowledge, but only for opinion, more especially as the evidence of the senses also is fallible and uncertain.

The other department of his philosophy was solely occupied in the contemplation of things removed from the senses and the sight. And of this the first precept was: "That there is one that is all, immutable, immoveable," &c. What is meant, therefore, by this one and all, is the first thing to be considered. Dr. Cudworth, and many others besides him, assert it to be God. Neither can it be denied, that what he attributed to this one and all, if rightly understood, is applicable to the Deity. For my part, however, I do not hesitate to dissent from the opinion of those, who make the one and all of Parmenides to have been the whole visible universe, abstracted by reason and thought from all forms and qualities. For the god of Parmenides, as we have already seen, was a most subtle fire, encompassing and confining the whole of nature; which by no means corresponds with what he was wont to inculcate respecting his *one*. Besides, the whole of that part of his philosophy, which he stated to consist in opinions, was employed solely in the consideration of the forms of things. It follows, therefore, that the other part, which was opposed to this, was dedicated to that nature, which is the nurse, seat, and mother of forms. For no one will easily believe, that so eminent a philosopher concerned himself about forms only, and never thought of matter, in which those forms arise; which indeed would have been the part of a man destitute of all mental subtlety and acuteness. I pass over the fact that he calls this one πεπερασμένον, or "finite," which could in no sense be said of God. Dr. Cudworth, indeed, a little afterwards tells us, that God was called by him finite, because he is πέρας καὶ μέτρον πάντων, "the term and measure of all things." But the venerable Wolf, Not. ad Origenis Philosophumena, p. 86. has already justly remarked upon the improbability of this interpretation. Certainly there would be no

* Simplic. Ar. Phys. fol. 19.

in it, it would have parts." But the only difference that was between them was this, that Parmenides called this one immoveable that was all, *πεπερασμένον*, "finite or determined," but Melissus *ἄπειρον*, "infinite;" which difference notwithstanding was in words only, there being none at all as to the reality of their sense: whilst each of them endeavoured in a different way to set forth the greatest perfection of the Deity; there being an equivocation in those words finite and infinite, and both of them signifying in one sense perfection, but in another imperfection. And the disagreeing agreement of these two philosophers with one another, Parmenides and Melissus, as also of Xenophanes with them both concerning the Deity, is well declared by Simplicius after this manner:* *Οὐδὲν δὲ ἴσως χεῖρον ὀλίγον παρεκβάντα τοῖς φιλομαθεστέροις ἐπιδεῖξαι, πῶς καίτοι διαφέρειν δοκοῦντες οἱ πάλαιοι περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν δόξας, ἐναρμονίως ὅμως συμφέρονται· Καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν περὶ τῆς νοητῆς καὶ πρώτης ἀρχῆς διελέχθησαν, ὡς Χενοφάνης καὶ Παρμενίδης καὶ Μέλισσος· ὁ μὲν Παρμενίδης ἓν λέγων καὶ πεπερασμένον· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ ἓν τοῦ πλήθους προϋπάρχειν, καὶ τὸ πᾶσιν ὅρου καὶ πέρατος αἴτιον, κατὰ τὸ πέρας μᾶλλον ἢπερ κατὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν ἀφορίζεσθαι, καὶ τὸ πάντῃ τε τέλειον τὸ τέλος τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀπειληφὸς, πεπερασμένον εἶναι,*

opinion so absurd as not to admit of an apt and convenient explication, if such latitude and freedom were allowed in attaching meanings to words. The *one* and *all* of Parmenides, therefore, is the whole nature of things, regarded in and of itself, not by the eyes, but by reason and intellect. The philosopher's meaning was this: "Although various conversions, generations, and corruptions of things take place, still it is the philosopher's part to look deeper, and to separate in his mind's eye nature itself from its numerous forms and modes. If this be done, it will be plain that the whole universe is *one*, that is, connected and fitted together in one continued chain, although many things appear to exist separately and by themselves; also that it is *eternal* and *ungenerated*; also, *immutable*, that is, none of its parts can lose its own nature, although they are variously transferred, and enter sometimes into one sometimes into another nature; lastly, it is *immoveable*, or *ἀκίνητον*, that is, all motions which take place in the nature of things do not prevent the mass itself, considered as a whole, from remaining fixed and unshaken; as the sea which is agitated by innumerable waves, and yet on the whole is not dislodged from its place, but remains in a certain sense immoveable; or, as the sand of Archimedes, although variously disturbed and stirred by his staff, nevertheless rests unmoved." I am aware how acutely learned men have expounded this dogma of Parmenides, that the universe is immoveable, but to me it appears to be better to follow that which is simple and plain, than to suffer our imagination to take wing and carry us above the clouds and the moon. Lastly, his giving a special form to his universe, likewise admits of easy explanation. Having asserted *τὸ πᾶν*, or "the universe," to be *πεπερασμένον*, or "finite," he was called upon to assign some figure to it. For whatever has limits, must necessarily also have figure. But, according to the notion of the ancients, no form was more perfect than the spherical; as we learn from Cicero, among others, De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 18. p. 2978. t. 9. opp. Hence it appeared to him most reasonable to assign this figure to the universe of things. Moreover, that these properties, just spoken of, were attributed by Parmenides to the universe, we are informed both by other authors and especially by Origen in his Philosophumena, cap 11. p. 86. and Eusebius. Præparat. Evangel. lib. 1. cap. 8. p. 23. As to his being said to have denied all generations, it must necessarily be understood thus: that when any thing arises or is generated, nothing new is produced which did not exist before.

* Ar Phys. fol. 7.

μᾶλλον δὲ τέλος τῶν πάντων, ὡς ἀρχή· τὸ γὰρ ἀτελὲς ἐνδεὲς ὄν, οὕπω πέρας ἀπείληφε· Μέλισσος δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀμετάβλητον ὁμοίως καὶ αὐτὸς ἐθεάσατο, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀνέκλειπτον τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ τό ἄπειρον τῆς δυνάμεως, ἄπειρον αὐτὸ ἀπεφήνατο, ὥσπερ καὶ ἀγέννητον· πλὴν ὁ μὲν Χενοφάνης ὡς πάντων αἴτιον, καὶ πάντων ὑπερανέχον, καὶ κινήσεως αὐτὸ καὶ ἠρεμίας καὶ πάσης ἀντιστοιχείας ἐπέκεινα τίθησιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ ὑποθέσει· ὁ δὲ Παρμενίδης, τὸ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον αὐτοῦ, καὶ πάσης μεταβολῆς, τάχα δὲ καὶ ἐνεργείας καὶ δυνάμεως ἐπέκεινα, θεασάμενος, ἀκίνητον αὐτὸ ἀνυμνεῖ, "Perhaps it will not be improper for us to digress a little here, and to gratify the studious and inquisitive reader, by showing how those ancient philosophers, though seeming to dissent in their opinions concerning the principles, did notwithstanding harmoniously agree together. As first of all, they who discoursed concerning the intelligible and first principle of all, Xenophanes, Parmenides and Melissus; of whom Parmenides called it one finite and determined; because as unity must needs exist before multitude, so that, which is to all things the cause of measure, bound and determination, ought rather to be described by measure and finitude, than infinity; as also that which is every way perfect, and hath attained its own end, or rather is the end of all things (as it was the beginning) must needs be of a determinate nature; for that which is imperfect and therefore indigent, hath not yet attained its term or measure. But Melissus, though considering the immutability of the Deity likewise, yet attending to the inexhaustible perfection of its essence, the unlimitedness and unboundedness of its power, declareth it to be infinite, as well as ingenit or unmade. Moreover, Xenophanes looking upon the Deity, as the cause of all things and above all things, placed it above motion and rest, and all those antitheses of inferior beings, as Plato likewise doth in the first hypothesis of his Parmenides; whereas Parmenides and Melissus, attending to its stability and constant immutability, and its being perhaps above energy and power, praised it as immoveable." From which of Simplicius it is plain, that Parmenides, when he called God πεπερασμένον, "finite and determined," was far from meaning any such thing thereby, as if he were a corporeal being of finite dimensions, as some have ignorantly supposed; or as if he were any way limited as to power and perfection; but he understood it in that sense, in which πέρας is taken by Plato, as opposite to ἀπειρία, and for the greatest perfection, and as God is said to be πέρας καὶ μέτρον πάντων, "the term and measure of all things." But Melissus calling God ἄπειρον, "infinite," in the sense before declared, as thereby to signify his inexhaustible power and perfection, his eternity and incorruptibility, doth therein more agree with our present theology, and the now received manner of speaking.

We have the rather produced all this, to show how curious the ancient philosophers were in their inquiries after God, and how exact in their descriptions of him. Wherefore however Anaximander's Infinite were nothing but eternal senseless matter (though called by him the τὸ θεῖον, "the divinest thing of all") yet Melissus' ἄπειρον, or "Infinite," was the true Deity.[6]

With Parmenides and Melissus fully agreed Zeno Eleates also, Parmenides's scholar, that one immoveable was all, or the original of all things; he mea[illegible]hing else but the supreme Deity. For though [illegible] this Zeno did excogitate certain arguments ag[illegible]ion of bodies, proceeding upon that hypothesis [illegible]visibility of body, one of which was famously l[illegible]me of Achilles, because it pretended to prove, [illegible]ble (upon the hypothesis) for the swift-footed [illegible]vertake the creeping snail (which arguments of [illegible]o they are well answered by Aristotle,[7] is not l[illegible]e to inquire); yet all this was nothing else but l[illegible]portful exercise of Zeno's wit, he being a subtile logician and disputant, or perhaps an endeavour also to show how puzzling and perplexing to human understanding, the conception even of the most vulgar and confessed phenomena of nature may be. For that Zeno Eleates by his one immovable that was all, meant not the corporeal world, no more than Melissus, Parmenides, and Xenophanes, is evident from Aristotle writing thus concerning him:[8] Τὸ τοιοῦτον ἓν ὂν

[6] Melissus, like his preceptor Parmenides, is held by some in good by others in bad repute, being classed by the former among the believers in a divine Being, and by the latter among Atheists. My own opinion, as to his piety and philosophy, will be fully apparent from the observations just made by me respecting his master. For there is only a slight difference between the doctrines of the two; for which reason the ancients generally associate Melissus and Parmenides together, as having professed one and the same philosophy. That the explications of *finite* and *infinite*, here quoted from Simplicius are far-fetched, and altogether improbable, will be obvious to every one.

[7] Physic. lib. 6. cap. 14. p. 359. tom. 1. opp. But Zeno's arguments against motion are set forth with much greater elegance and ingenuity by Pet. Bayle, Diction. Histor. et Critique, tom. 4. voc. Zeno, p. 2909. who has added an examination of Aristotle's answers. For myself, my limits will not permit me to dwell upon these matters. I shall, however, notice two points: I. I am satisfied, on a careful and attentive perusal of ancient authors, that most of the disputes and controversies of antiquity on the subject of motion, were conflicts, as it were, of the Andabatæ, and arose chiefly from their not all entertaining the same notion and definition of motion. Those who are said by Aristotle, Sextus, Seneca, and others, to have taken away all motion, nevertheless delivered at the same time such precepts to their disciples, as none but a man who acknowledges many things to be moved can inculcate. Which proves, in my opinion, that they attached peculiar signification to the word motion, different from the received usage. II. With respect to Zeno, I consider him to have disputed against motion merely to gratify his own humour. He is stated by Aristotle to be the inventor of the art of logic. In order, therefore, to prove that the power of this art is sufficient to shake even the most certain truths, he shows that by means of it motion itself, than which nothing appears to men to be more certain, may be attacked and controverted.

[8] These precise words are not extant in the part of Aristotle referred to, although we there find what is equivalent to them in sense.

τὸν θεὸν λέγει, οὔτε κινεῖσθαι, οὔτε κινητὸν εἶναι, "Zeno by his one Ens, which neither was moved, nor moveable, meaneth God." Moreover the same Aristotle informs us, that this Zeno endeavoured to demonstrate, that there was but one God, from that idea, which all men have of him, as that which is the best, the supreme and most powerful of all, or as an absolutely perfect being: Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεὸς ἁπάντων κράτιστον, ἕνα φησὶ προσήκειν αὐτὸν, "If God be the best of all things, then he must needs be one." Which argument was thus pursued by him:[9] Τοῦτο θεὸς καὶ θεοῦ δύναμις κρατεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ κρατεῖσθαι· ὥστε καθὸ μὴ κρεῖττον, κατὰ τοσοῦτον οὐκ εἶναι θεόν· πλειόνων οὖν ὄντων, εἰ μὲν εἶεν τὰ μὲν ἀλλήλων κρείττους, τὰ δὲ ἥττους, οὐκ ἂν εἶναι θεούς· πεφυκέναι γὰρ θεὸν μὴ κρατεῖσθαι· ἴσων δὲ ὄντων, οὐκ ἂν ἔχειν θεὸν φύσιν δεῖν εἶναι κράτιστον· τὸ δὲ ἴσον οὔτε βέλτιον οὔτε χεῖρον εἶναι τοῦ ἴσου· ὥστ' εἴπερ εἴη τε καὶ τοιοῦτον εἴη θεὸς, ἕνα μόνον εἶναι τὸν θεὸν, οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ πάντα δύνασθαι, ἃ ἂν βούλοιτο, "This is God and the power of God, to prevail, conquer and rule over all. Wherefore by how much any thing falls short of the best, by so much does it fall short of being God. Now if there be supposed more such beings, whereof some are better, some worse, those could not be all gods, because it is essential to God not to be transcended by any; but if they be conceived to be so many equal gods, then would it not be the nature of God to be the best, one equal being neither better nor worse than another: wherefore if there be a God, and this be the nature of him, then can there be but one. And indeed otherwise he could not be able to do whatever he would."

Empedocles is said to have been an emulator of Parmenides also, which must be understood of his metaphysics, because in his physiology (which was atomical) he seems to have transcended him. Now that Empedocles acknowledged one supreme and

[9] De Xenophane, Zenone et Gorgia, cap. 3. p. 840. tom. 1. opp. But the whole of what Aristotle there tells us about Zeno's doctrine, does not show what he really inculcated respecting God. I read the name of God; but I nowhere see it clearly stated what meaning Zeno attached to it; excepting only, that he asserted God to be that which is the most excellent of all. In my opinion, nothing that is there mentioned by Aristotle can with consistency be recognized and adopted by a man, who holds God to be the whole universe of things. However, I shall neither directly accuse Zeno and eject him from the number of those who believe in a Deity, as Bayle and others have done, nor altogether acquit him and rank him among the friends of God, which has been attempted not long since by the excellent J. Fr. Reimmann, Hist. Atheismi, sect. 1. cap. 30. sect. 5. p. 207. I should be inclined to say the same not only of his doctrine, but of a great part of the ancient philosophical history, that Terence said of other matters:

Incerta hæc si tu postules
Ratione certa facere, nihilo plus agas,
Quam si des operam, ut cum ratione insanias,

"These uncertain things if you seek to make certain by reasoning, you will be doing nothing more than endeavouring to be reasonably mad."

universal Numen, and that incorporeal too, may be concluded from what hath been already cited out of his philosophic poems.* Besides which, the writer De Mundo[10] (who, though not Aristotle, yet was a Pagan of good antiquity) clearly affirmeth, that Empedocles derived all things whatsoever from one supreme Deity: Τὰ γὰρ δι' ἀέρος ἅπαντα, καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς, καὶ τὰ ἐν ὕδατι, θεοῦ λέγοιτ' ἂν ὄντως ἔργα εἶναι, τοῦ τὸν κόσμον ἐπέχοντος· ἐξ οὗ κατὰ τὸν φυσικὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα:

Πάνθ' ὅσα τ' ἦν, [illegible] τε ἔσται ὀπίσσω, &c.

"All the things tha[illegible]arth, and in the air and water, may truly be [illegible]f God, who ruleth over the world. Out of w[illegible] the physical Empedocles, proceed all things th[illegible]shall be, viz. plants, men, beasts, and gods." [illegible]ding we conceive to be rather true as to Emp[illegible] his words; he affirming, as it seems, in that ci[illegible] these things were made, not immediately out of [illegible] of contention and friendship; because Simplicius, who was furnished with a copy of Empedocles' poems, twice brings in that cited passage of his in this connexion:

Ἓν δέ κύτῳ διάμορφα καὶ ἄνδιχα πάντα πέλονται,
Σὺν δ' ἔβη ἐν φιλότητι καὶ ἀλλήλοισι ποθεῖται.
Ἐκ τῶν γάρ πάνθ' ὅσσ' ἦν, ὅσσα τέ ἐστι, καὶ ἔσται,
Δένδρα τε βεβλάστηκε, καὶ ἄνερες, ἠδὲ γυναῖκες,
Θῆρες τ' οἰωνοί τε, καὶ ὑδατοθρέμμονες ἰχθῦς,
Καί τε θεοὶ δολιχαίωνες τιμῇσι φέρεστοι.

"Things are divided and segregated by contention, but joined together by friendship; from which two (contention and friendship) all that was, is, and shall be, proceeds; as trees, men and women, beasts, birds, and fishes, and, last of all, the long-lived and honourable gods." Wherefore the sense of Empedocles' words here was this; that the whole created world, together with all things belonging to it, viz. plants, beasts, men, and gods, was made from contention and friendship. Nevertheless, since, according to Empedocles, contention and friendship did themselves depend also upon one supreme Deity, which he with Parmenides and Xenophanes called τὸ ἕν, or "the very One;" the writer De Mundo might well conclude, that, according to Empedocles, all things whatsoever, and not only men, but gods, were derived from one supreme Deity. And that this was indeed Empedocles' sense, appears plainly from Aristotle[1] in his Meta-

* P. 26.

[10] Cap. 6. p. 863, tom. 1. opp. Aristotelis.

[1] This passage of Aristotle does not prove Empedocles to have held, that all things were generated by the counsel and will of one supreme Being. The Stagirite merely says, that, according to Empedocles, all things, God alone excepted, were produced from discord; and, in proof, he produces the verses in question.

physics:* Τίθησι μὲν γὰρ [Ἐμπεδοκλῆς] ἀρχήν τινα τῆς φθορᾶς τὸ νεῖκος· δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ τοῦτο γεννᾶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ἑνός. Ἅπαντα γάρ ἐκ τούτου τ' ἄλλα ἐστὶ, πλὴν ὁ Θεός· λέγει γοῦν,

Ἐξ ὧν πάνθ' ὅσα τ' ἦν, ὅσα τ' ἔσθ', ὅσα τ' ἔσται ὀπίσσω, &c.

"Empedocles makes contention to be a certain principle of corruption and generation: nevertheless, he seems to generate this contention itself also from the very One (that is, from the supreme Deity). For all things, according to him, are from this contention, God only excepted; he writing after this manner, from which (that is, contention and friendship) all the things that have been, are, and shall be (plants, beasts, men, and gods) derived their original." For Empedocles, it seems, supposed, that were it not for νεῖκος, "discord," or "contention," all things would be one: so that, according to him, all things whatsoever proceeded from contention or discord, together with a mixture of friendship; save only the supreme God, who hath therefore no contention at all in him, because he is essentially τὸ ἓν, "unity itself and friendship." From whence Aristotle takes occasion to quarrel with Empedocles, as if it would follow from his principles, that the supreme and most happy God was the least wise of all, as being not able to know any thing besides himself, or in the world without him:† Διὸ καὶ συμβαίνει αὐτῷ, τὸν εὐδαιμονέστατον θεὸν ἧττον φρόνιμον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων, οὐ γὰρ γνωρίζει τὰ στοιχεῖα πάντα· τὸ γὰρ νεῖκος οὐκ ἔχει· ἡ δὲ γνῶσις τοῦ ὁμοίου τῷ ὁμοίῳ,

Γαῖῃ μὲν γὰρ (φησὶ) γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ, &c.

"This therefore happens to Empedocles, that, according to his principles, the most happy God is the least wise of all other things, for he cannot know the elements, because he hath no contention in him; all knowledge being by that which is like: himself writing thus: We know earth by earth, water by water, air by air, and fire by fire; friendship by friendship, and contention by contention."[2] But, to let this pass, Empedocles here making the gods themselves to be derived from contention and friendship, the supreme Deity, or most happy God, only excepted (who hath no contention in him, and from whom contention and friendship themselves were derived) plainly acknowledged both one unmade Deity, the original of all things, under

* Lib. 3. cap. 4. [P. 295. tom. 4. opp.]

† Met. lib. 3. cap. 4. [P. 295. tom. 4. opp.]

[2] Aristotle deals unfairly with Empedocles, as with many of the ancient philosophers. For although he taught that men know like by like, it by no means follows, that he ascribed the same kind of knowledge to the supreme Being, or deprived God of all knowledge. Empedocles may have supposed God to perceive and know things in a very different way from men.

the name of τὸ ἕν, "the very One," and many other inferior gods, generated or produced by him; they being juniors to contention, or discord, as this was also junior to unity, the first and supreme Deity. Which gods of Empedocles, that were begotten from contention (as well as men and other things) were doubtless the stars and demons.

Moreover, we may here observe, that according to Empedocles' doctrine, the true original of all the evil, both of human souls and demons (wl[illegible]like lapsable) was derived from that νεῖκος, "di[illegible]tion,"* that is necessarily contained in the nat[illegible]ether with the ill use of their liberty, both in [illegible] their pre-existent state. So that Empedocles l[illegible] footsteps of Pythagoras, whose praises he thus [illegible] in his poems:

Ἦν δέ τις ἐ[illegible]σια εἰδὼς,
Ὃς δὴ μήκι[illegible]το πλοῦτον,
Παντοίων τ[illegible]ανος ἔργων, &c.†

Horum de numero quidam præstantia norat
Plurima, mentis opes amplas sub pectore servans,
Omnia vestigans sapientum docta reperta, &c.‡

XXII. Before we come to Socrates and Plato, we shall here take notice of some other Pythagoreans, and eminent philosophers, who clearly asserted one supreme and universal Numen, though doubtless acknowledging withal, other inferior gods. Philo, in his book De mundi Opificio,‡ writing of the Hebdomad or Septenary number, and observing, that, according to the Pythagoreans, it was called both a motherless and a virgin number, because it was the only number within the Decad, which was neither generated, nor did itself generate, tells us, that therefore it was made by them a symbol of the supreme Deity: Οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦτον ἐξομοιοῦσι τῷ ἡγεμόνι τῶν συμπάντων, "The Pythagoreans likened this number to the prince and governor of all things, or the supreme monarch of the universe;" as thinking it to bear a resemblance of his immutability: which fancy of theirs was before taken notice of by us. However, Philo hereupon occasionally cites this remarkable testimony of Philolaus the Pythagorean: Ἔστι γάρ, φησιν, ἡγεμὼν καὶ ἄρχων ἁπάντων ὁ Θεὸς, εἷς ἀεὶ ὢν, μόνιμος, ἀκίνητος, αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὅμοιος, ἕτερος τῶν ἄλλων, "God (saith he) is the prince and ruler over all, always one, stable, immoveable, like to himself, but unlike to every thing else." To which may be added what in Stobæus is further recorded out of the same Phi-

* According to that Νείκεϊ μαινομένῳ πίσυνος, p. 23.
† Porphyr. de Vit. Pyth. p. 194. [Ed. Cantab. p. 35. Ed. Kusteri.]
‡ We have already treated at some length concerning Empedocles and his philosophy, on ch. 1. especially on sect. 24.
‡ P. 23. [P. 22. opp.]

Iolaus:* Ἦν ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ἐξ αἰῶνος, καὶ εἰς αἰῶνα διαμένει, εἷς ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τῶ συγγενέως καὶ κρατίστω κυβερνώμενος, "This world was from eternity, and will remain to eternity, one governed by one, which is cognate and the best." Where notwithstanding he seemeth, with Ocellus, to maintain the world's pre-eternity. And again: Διὸ καὶ καλῶς ἔχειν ἔλεγε, κόσμον ἦμεν ἐνέργειαν ἀΐδιον θεῶ τε καὶ γενέσιος, "Wherefore, said Philolaus, the world might well be called the eternal energy or effect of God, and of successive generation."

Jamblichus,[a] in his Protreptics,† cites a passage out of Archytas, another Pythagorean, to the same purpose: Ὅστις ἀναλύσαι οἷός τέ ἐστι, πάντα τὰ γένεα ὑπὸ μίαν τε καὶ αὐτὰν ἀρχὰν, οὗτος δοκεῖ μοι καλὰν σκοπιὰν εὑρηκέναι, ἀφ' οὗ δυνατὸς ἐσσεῖται τὸν θεὸν κατοψεῖσθαι, &c., "Whosoever is able to reduce all kinds of things under one and the same principle, this man seems to me to have found out an excellent specula, or high station, from whence he may be able to take a large view and prospect of God, and of all other things; and he shall clearly perceive, that God is the beginning and end, and middle of all things, that are performed according to justice and right reason." Upon which words of Archytas Jamblichus thus glosseth; "Archytas here declares the end of all theological speculation to be this, not to rest in many principles, but to reduce all things under one and the same head." Adding, Τοιαύτη ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ἑνὸς τέλος ἐστὶ πάσης θεωρίας, "That this knowledge of the first unity, the original of all things, is the end of all contemplation." Moreover, Stobæus cites this out of Archytas' book of principles, viz. That besides matter and form,‡ Ἀναγκαιοτέραν τινὰ εἶμεν αἰτίαν, τὰν κινάσοισαν ἐνεστώτων πραγμάτων ἐπὶ τὰν μορφὼ, ταῦτα δὲ τὰν πράταν δυνάμει, καὶ καθυπερτάταν εἶμεν, ὀνομάζεσθαι δε θεὸν, &c., "There is another more necessary cause, which moving, brings the form to the matter; and that this is the first and most powerful cause, which is fitly called God. So that there are three principles, God, matter, and form; God, the artificer and mover, and matter that which is moved, and form the art introduced into the matter." In which same Stobæan excerption, it also follows afterwards: Δεῖ νόῳ τι κρέσσον εἶναι νόῳ δὲ κρέσσον ἐστὶ, ὅπερ ὀνομάζομεν θεὸν, "That there must be something better than mind; and that this thing better than mind is that which we (properly) call God."

Ocellus also in the same Stobæus thus writeth:§ Συνέχει τὰ μὲν σκάνεα ζωὰ, ταύτας δ' αἴτιον ψυχά· τὸν δὲ κόσμον ἁρμονία,

* Eccl. Phys. p. 41.

[a] From whom Dr. Th. Gale has extracted these fragments of Archytas, and inserted them among other fragments of the Pythagoreans in his Opuscula Veterum Mythologic. et Physic. p. 735. together with the elegant and accurate version of J. North.

† Cap. 4. p. 20. ‡ Ecl. Ph. p. 82. § P. 32. [Lib. 1. cap. 16.]

ταύτας δ' αἴτιον ὁ Θεός· τοὺς δ' οἴκως καὶ τὰς πόλιας ὁμόνοια, ταύτας δ' αἴτιον νόμος, "Life contains the bodies of animals, the cause of which life is the soul; concord contains houses and cities, the cause of which concord is law; and harmony contains the whole world, the cause of which mundane harmony is God." And to the same purpose Aristæus:* Ὡς ὁ τεχνίτας ποτὶ τὰν τέχναν, οὕτως Θεὸς ποτ' ἁρμονίαν, "As the artificer is to art, so is God to the harmony of the world." There is also this passage in the same Stobæus [illegible] nonymous Pythagorean: Θεὸς μέν ἐστιν ἀρχὰ κ [illegible] ἔ ὁ κόσμος, "God is the principle, and the fir [illegible] world (though it be not the supreme God) ye

Timæus Locrus, a [illegible] r to Plato, in his book concerning Nature, [illegible] he World (upon which Plato's Timæus was b [illegible] mentary) plainly acknowledgeth both one supr [illegible] er and governor of the whole world, and also [illegible] his creatures and subordinate ministers; in the close thereof, writing thus concerning the punishment of wicked men after this life: Ἅπαντα δὲ ταῦτα ἐν δευτέρᾳ περιόδῳ ἁ Νέμεσις συνδιέκρινε σὺν δαίμοσι παλαμναίοις χθονίοις τε, τοῖς ἐπόπταις τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων· οἷς ὁ πάντων ἀγεμὼν Θεὸς ἐπέτρεψε διοίκησιν κόσμω συμπεπληρωμένω ἐκ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τῶν τε ἄλλων ζώων, ὅσα δεδαμιούργηται ποτ' εἰκόνα τὰν ἀρίσταν εἴδεος ἀγεννάτω καὶ αἰωνίω, "All these things hath Nemesis decreed to be executed in the second circuit by the ministry of vindictive terrestrial demons, that are overseers of human affairs; to which demons that supreme God, the ruler over all, hath committed the government and administration of the world. Which world is completed and made up of gods, men, and other animals, all created according to the best pattern of the eternal and unmade idea." In which words of Timæus there are these three several points of the pagan theology contained; first, that there is one supreme God, eternal and unmade, the creator and governor of the whole world, and who made it according to the best pattern or exemplar of his own ideas and eternal wisdom. Secondly, that this world created by God is compounded and made up of other inferior gods, men, and brute animals. Thirdly, that the supreme God hath committed the administration of our human affairs to demons and inferior gods, who are constant inspectors over us, some of which he also makes use of for the punishment of wicked men after this life. Moreover, in this book of Timæus Locrus, the supreme God is often called ὁ Θεὸς, and sometime ὁ δαίμων, "God in way of eminency;" sometime Νόος, "Mind;" some-

* P. 45. † P. 8.

‡ Timæus de Anima Mundi in Gale's Opusc. Veter. Mythologic. et Physic, p. 566.

time τ' ἀγαθὸν, "the very Good;" sometime ἀκρὰ τῶν ἀρίστων, "the principle of the best things;" sometime δαμιουργὸς τοῦ βελτίονος, "the Maker of the better," evil being supposed not to proceed from him; sometime κράτιστον αἴτιον, "the best and most powerful Cause;" sometime ἀρχαγὸς καὶ γενέτωρ ἁπάντων, "the Prince and Parent of all things." Which God, according to him, is not the soul of the world neither, but the creator thereof, he having made the world an animal, and a secondary generated god: Δηλούμενος ὢν ἄριστον γέννημα ποιεῖν, τοῦτον ἐποίει θεὸν γενητὸν, οὔποκα φθαρησόμενον ὑπ' ἄλλω αἰτίω, ἔξω τῶ αὐτὸν συντεταγμένω θεῶ, εἴποκα δήλετο αὐτὸν διαλύειν, "God, willing to make the world the best that it was capable of, made it a generated god, such as should never be destroyed by any other cause but only by that God himself, who framed it, if he should ever will to dissolve it. But since it is not the part of that which is good to destroy the best of works, the world will doubtless ever remain incorruptible and happy, the best of all generated things, made by the best cause, looking not at patterns artificially framed without him, but the idea and intelligible essence, as the paradigms, which whatsoever is made conformable to, must needs be the best, and such as shall never need to be mended." Moreover, he plainly declares, that this generated god of his, the world, was produced in time, so as to have a beginning: Πρὶν ὠρανὸν γενέσθαι, λόγῳ ἦστην ἰδέα τε καὶ ὕλα, καὶ ὁ Θεὸς δαμιουργὸς τοῦ βελτίονος, "Before the heaven was made, existed the idea, matter, and God the opifex of the best." Wherefore, whatever Ocellus and Philolaus might do, yet this Timæus held not the world's eternity; wherein he followed not only Pythagoras himself (as we have already showed) but also the generality of the first Pythagoreans, of whom Aristotle pronounces without exception, γεννῶσι γὰρ τὸν κόσμον, "that they generated the world."* Timæus indeed in this book seems to assert the pre-eternity of the matter, as if it were a self-existent principle together with God; and yet Clemens Alexandrinus cites a passage out of him looking another way:† Ἀλλ' ἄντικρυς καὶ μίαν ἀρχὴν καὶ παρ' Ἑλλήνων ἀκοῦσαι τοξεῖς; Τίμαιος ὁ Λοκρὸς ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ συγγράμματι κατὰ λέξιν ὧδέ μοι μαρτυρήσει. Μία ἀρχὰ πάντων ἐστὶν ἀγένητος, εἰ γὰρ ἐγένετο, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἔτι ἀρχὰ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνα ἀρχὰ, ἐξ ἃς ἐγένετο, "Would you hear of one only principle of all things amongst the Greeks? Timæus Locrus, in his book of nature, will bear me witness thereof; he there in express words writing thus, There is one principle of all things unmade: for if it were made it would not be a principle, but that would be the principle

* Met. lib. 1. cap. 7. [P. 276. tom. 4. opp.]
† Strom. 5. p. 604. [P. 718. Edit. Potteri.]

from whence it was made." Thus we see, that Timæus Locrus asserted one eternal and unmade God, the maker of the whole world, and besides this, another generated god, the world itself animated, with its several parts; the difference betwixt both which gods is thus declared by him: Θεὸν δὲ, τὸν μὲν αἰώνιον νόος ὁρῇ μόνος, τῶν ἁπάντων ἀρχαγὸν καὶ γενέτορα τουτέων, τὸν δὲ γεννατὸν ὄψει ὁρέομες, κόσμον δὲ τόνδε, καὶ τὰ μέρα αὐτῶ, ὁκόσα ὠρανιά ἐντι, "That eternal God, who is the prince, original, and parent of all these t[illegible]y by the mind; but the other generated god [illegible] eyes, viz, this world, and those parts of it whi[illegible]" that is, the stars, as so many particular gods [illegible] But here it is to be observed, that the eterna[illegible] so called by Timæus, as being without begin[illegible]aving a distinct kind of duration from that [illegible] properly called Æon, or eternity, he therein [illegible]ides: Εἰκὼν δέ ἐστι τῶ ἀγεννάτω χρόνω, ὃν [illegible]μες· ὡς γὰρ ποτ' ἀΐδιον παράδειγμα τὸν ἰδάνικ[illegible]ανὸς ἐγεννάθη, οὕτως ὡς πρὸς παράδειγμα τὸν αἰῶνα ὅδε χρόνος σὺν κόσμῳ ἐδαμιουργήθη, "Time is but an image of that unmade duration, which we call eternity: wherefore, as this sensible world was made according to that exemplar or pattern of the intelligible world, so was time made together with the world, as an imitation of eternity."[7]

[6] The learned Doctor, if I am not altogether mistaken, labours in vain to prove, that Timæus Locrus did not associate eternal matter with the supreme Being, or, which is the same thing, supposed the world to have been created by God out of nothing. Any one who even cursorily examines his book De Anima Mundi, cannot help perceiving, that he ranked eternal matter and that, too, animated by a certain confused motion, among the first principles of things. Ταύταν δὲ τὰν ὕλαν, see these words p. 544. ἀΐδιον μὲν ἔφα (Τιμαῖος), οὐ μὰν ἀκίνητον, ἄμορφον δὲ κατ' αὐτὰν καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον, δεχομέναν δὲ πᾶσαν μορφάν, "This matter he pronounced to be eternal, but immoveable, and of itself without form or figure, yet receiving every form." He here calls the eternal matter with which he supplies his deity, ἀκίνητον, or "immoveable." But this must not be understood, as though Timæus supposed it to have been agitated by no motion whatever. With him that is ἀκίνητον which is not moved by reason and in order. And this orderly kind of motion he denies to matter, as is put beyond all doubt by what follows soon afterwards, p. 545. Ἀγαθὸς ὢν ὁ θεὸς, ὁρῶν τε τὰν ὕλαν δεχομέναν τὰν ἰδίαν καὶ ἀλλοιουμέναν, παντοίως μὲν, ἀτάκτως δὲ, ἔδει τ' εἰς τάξιν αὐτὰν ἄγειν, "God being good, and observing matter to receive form and to be changed variously but irregularly, he saw that it was necessary to reduce it to order." Nor are we compelled to think otherwise by what the learned Doctor here quotes in order to prove, that Timæus is not to be classed among those who held matter to be eternal. I. Aristotle in saying that all the Pythagoreans "generated the world," does not add, however, that they "generated the world out of nothing." The words which precede and follow clearly show Aristotle's meaning to be simply this, that the Pythagoreans did not hold the form of the world to be eternal, as the Stagirite himself supposed: he does not deny them to have regarded matter as eternal. II. The passage of Timæus quoted from Clemens is of no weight against the express testimonies which may be collected from the book. For, setting aside that it admits of being explained so as not to oppose the eternity of matter, it is impossible for any one to determine the sense of a few words like these, unless they were restored to their own place in the context.

[7] I should hardly consider this passage of Timæus sufficient to prove, that he held

It hath been already observed,* that Onatus, another Pythagorean, took notice of an opinion of some in his time, that there was one only God, who comprehended the whole world, and no other gods besides, or, at least, none such as was to be religiously worshipped; himself in the mean time asserting, that there was both one God and many gods; or, besides one supreme and universal Numen, many other inferior and particular deities, to whom also men ought to pay religious worship. Now his further account of both these assertions is contained in these following words:† Τοὶ δέ λέγοντες ἕνα θεὸν εἶμεν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πολλὼς, ἁμαρτάνοντι· τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον ἀξίωμα τῆς θείας ὑπεροχῆς οὐ συνθεωροῦντι· λέγω δὲ τὸ ἄρχεν καὶ καθηγέεσθαι τῶν ὁμοίων, καὶ κράτιστον καὶ καθυπέρτερον εἶμεν τῶν ἄλλων· τοὶ δ' ἄλλοι θεοὶ ποτὶ τὸν πρῶτον καὶ νοητὸν οὕτως ἔχοντι, ὥσπερ χορευτὰ ποτὶ κορυφαῖον, καὶ στρατιώτα ποτὶ στραταγὸν, καὶ λοχίτα καὶ ἐντεταγμένοι ποτὶ ταξιάρχαν καὶ λοχαρχέταν, ἔχοντε φύσιν, ἕπεσθαι καὶ ἐπακολουθεῖν τῷ καλῶς καθηγεομένῳ· κοινὸν μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν τὸ ἔργον ἐστι, καὶ τῷ ἄρχοντι, καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων· ἀλλ' οὐκέτι ξύναντο συντετάχθαι τοὶ ἀρχόμενοι ποτὶ τὸ ἔργον, ἀπολειφθέντες ἀγεμόνος· ὥσπερ οὐδὲ χορευταὶ ποτὶ συνῳδίαν, οὐδὲ στρατιῶ ται ποτὶ στρατηγίαν, ἀπολειφθέντες ἀγεμόνος, τοὶ μὲν στραταγῶ, τοὶ δὲ κορυφαιῶ, "They who maintain, that there is only one God,

eternity to be duration without any succession. Time according to him is that which is produced by the annual conversion of the sun and stars: Ὁ θεὸς, says he, ἐκόσμησεν τὰς περιόδως σὺν κόσμῳ· οὐ γὰρ ἦν πρὸ κόσμῳ ἄστρα, "God ordered time, or the conversions of time, together with the world: for before the world there were no stars." But those also, who have a conception of parts or a certain succession in eternity, acknowledge, that that time which is produced by the motion of the stars, did not exist before the world. Therefore, Timæus' denying that time existed before the origin of the stars, does not show him to have attributed a continuous eternity to God. Besides, the fact of his asserting time to have been made according to the pattern of eternity proves, that he considered time to resemble eternity, and eternity time. But, take away succession from eternity, and you cannot understand what similitude there is between time and eternity, or how time could be formed after the model of eternity. To show the possibility of any one's denying time to have existed before the creation of the world, and yet not acknowledging, that eternity is without all succession, I shall quote a passage of Cicero's on this subject, from De Natura Deor. lib. 1. cap. 9. p. 2891. tom. 9. opp.: Sæcula nunc dico, non ea, quæ dierum noctiumque numero annuis curibus conficiuntur: nam fateor, ea sine mundi conversione effici non potuisse: sed fuit quædam ab infinito tempore æternitas, quam nulla temporum circumscriptio metiebatur, *spatio* tamen, qualis ea fuerit, intelligi potest: quod ne in cogitationem quidem cadit, ut fuerit tempus aliquod, nullum quum tempus esset, "I now speak of ages, not those which are formed by the number of days and nights in their annual courses: for those I acknowledge could not be produced without the revolution of the world: but there was a certain eternity from infinity, which was measured by no circumscription of time, the nature of which notwithstanding can be understood from *space*: which is not in thought even conceived to have been time, since no time existed." These are the words of Velleius the Epicurean; who, like Timæus, denies time to have existed before the stars were, and still does not suppose eternity to be without succession and parts, as he affirms that there were ages before time. Nec enim, says he, si mundus nullus erat, *sæcula* non erant, "For, if there was no world, it does not follow that there were not *ages*." He grants therefore that in thought eternity may be distributed into ages.

* Pag. 233. † Stob. Eccl. Phys. p. 5.

and not many gods, are very much mistaken, as not considering aright, what the dignity and majesty of the divine transcendency chiefly consisteth in, namely, in ruling and governing those which are like to it (that is, gods) and in excelling or surmounting others, and being superior to them. But all those other gods which we contend for, are to that first and intelligible God but as the dancers to the Coryphæus or Choragus, and as the inferior common soldiers to the captain or general; to whom it properly belongeth t[illegible] mply with their leader and commander. The w[illegible] mmon, or the same to them both, to the ruler, ar[illegible] e ruled; but they that are ruled could not ord[illegible] d agree together into one work were they desti[illegible]; as the singers and dancers could not conspire t[illegible] e dance and harmony, were they destitute of a C[illegible] oldiers make up one orderly army, were they witl[illegible] r commander."

And as the suprem[illegible] alled by Onatus the Coryphæus of the gods, so is he in [illegible] manner by the writer De Mundo,[8] styled the Coryphæus of the world, or the Præcentor and Præsultor of it, in these words: *Καθάπερ ἐν χορῷ, κορυφαίου κατάρξαντος, συνεπηχεῖ πᾶς ὁ χορὸς ἀνδρῶν, ἔσθ' ὅτε καὶ γυναικῶν, ἐν διαφόροις φωναῖς ὀξυτέραις καὶ βαρυτέραις, μίαν ἁρμονιαν ἐμμελῆ κεραννύντων, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπί τοῦ τὸ σύμπαν διέποντος θεοῦ· κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ἄνωθεν ἐνδύσιμον ὑπὸ τοῦ φερωνύμως ἂν κορυφαίου προσαγορευθέντος, κινεῖται μὲν τὰ ἄστρα ἀεὶ καὶ ὁ σύμπας οὐρανός*, "As in a chorus, when the Coryphæus or Præcentor hath begun, the whole choir compounded of men, and sometimes of women too, followeth, singing every one their part, some in higher and some in lower notes, but all mingling together into one complete harmony; so in the world, God, as the Coryphæus, the Præcentor and Præsultor, beginning the dance and music, the stars and heavens move round after him, according to those numbers and measures which he prescribes them, altogether making up one most excellent harmony."

It was also before[9] observed, that Ecphantus the Pythagorean, and Archelaus the successor of Anaxagoras (who were both of them atomists in their physiology) did assert the world to have been made at first, and still to be governed by one divine Mind; which is more than some atomists of ours in this present age, who notwithstanding pretend to be very good Theists, will acknowledge. We shall, in the next place, mention Euclides Megarensis, the head of that sect called Megaric, and who is said to have been Plato's master for some time after Socrates' death; whose doctrine is thus set down by Laërtius:[10] *Οὗτος ἦν*

[8] Cap. 6. p. 861. 862. tom. 1. opp. Aristotelis.
[9] See ch. 1. sect. 26.
[10] Lib. 2. segm. 106. p. 142.

τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀπεφαίνετο, πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλούμενον· ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ Φρόνησιν, ὁτὲ δὲ Θεὸν, καὶ ἄλλοτε Νοῦν, καὶ τὰ λοιπά. τὰ δὲ ἀντικείμενα τῷ Ἀγαθῷ, ἀνῄρει, μὴ εἶναι φάσκων, Which we understand thus, "That Euclides (who followed Xenophanes and Parmenides) made the first principle of all things to be one the very Good, called sometimes Wisdom, sometimes God, sometimes Mind, and sometimes by other names; but that he took away all, that is opposite to good, denying it to have any real entity:" that is, he maintained, that there was no positive nature of evil, or that evil was no principle.[1] And thus do we also understand that of Cicero,[2] when he represents the doctrine of the Megarics after this manner: Id bonum solum esse, quod esset Unum, et Simile, et Idem, et Semper; to wit, that they spake this concerning God, that Good or Goodness itself is a name properly belonging to him, who is also One, and Like, and the Same, and Always; and that the true good of man consisteth in a participation of, and conformity with this first Good. Which doctrine Plato seems to have derived from him, he in like manner calling the supreme Deity by those two names, τὸ ἓν and τ' ἀγαθὸν, "the One" and "the Good," and concluding true human felicity to consist in a participation of the first Good, or of the divine Nature.

In the next place we shall take notice of Antisthenes, who was the founder also of another sect, to wit, the Cynic; for he, in a certain physiological treatise, is said to have affirmed:[3] Esse populares deos multos, sed naturalem unum; "That though there were many popular gods, yet there was but one natural God:" or, as it is expressed in Lactantius:[4] Unum esse naturalem Deum, quamvis gentes et urbes suos habeant populares, "That there was but one natural God, though nations and cities had their several popular ones." Wherefore Velleius the Epicurean in Cicero[5] quarrels with this Antisthenes, as one who destroyed the nature of the gods, because he denied a multitude of independent deities, such as Epicurus pretended to assert. For this of Antisthenes is not so to be understood, as if he had therein designed to take away all the inferior gods of the Pagans, which had he at all attempted, he would doubtless have been accounted an Atheist, as well as Anaxagoras was; but his meaning was, only to interpret the theology of the Pagans concerning those other gods of theirs, that were or might be looked upon as abso-

[1] Or to explain the thing more clearly in the language of philosophers: "He maintained evil to be privation."

[2] Academ. Quæst. lib. 4. cap. 42. p. 2325. tom. 8. opp.

[3] Cicero records this saying of Antisthenes, De Natura Deor. lib. 1. cap. 13. p. 2898. tom. 9. opp.

[4] De Ira Dei cap. 11. p. 934. But in Divinar. Institut. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 36. he exhibits Antisthenes' dogma, as it stands in Cicero.

[5] De Natura Deor. lib. 1. cap. 13. p. 2898.

lute and independent; that these, though many popular gods, yet indeed were but one and the same natural God, called by several names. As, for example, when the Greeks worshipped Zeus, the Latins Jovis, the Egyptians Hammon, the Babylonians Bel, the Scythians Pappæus; these were indeed many popular gods, yet nevertheless all but one and the same natural God. So again, when in the self-same pagan cities and countries, the respective laws thereof made mention of several gods, as supreme and absolute in their , as Jupiter in the heavens, Juno in the air, Nep r, as being chief in several kinds of functions, as ning, Bellona for war, &c. (for this Aristotle t his book against Zeno:[6] *κατὰ τὸν νόμον, πολ* *ων οἱ θεοὶ*, "That according to the laws of ci , one god was best for one thing, and another f sthenes here declared concerning these also, th ed many popular, or civil gods, but all really o atural God.[7]

To Antisthenes might be added Diogenes Sinopensis, of whom it is recorded by Laërtius,[8] that observing a woman too superstitiously worshipping the statue or image of a god, endeavouring to abate her superstition, he thus bespake her: *Οὐκ εὐλαβῇ, ὦ γύναι, μή ποτε Θεοῦ ὄπισθεν ἑστῶτος (πάντα γάρ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ πλήρη) ἀσχημονήσῃς*, "Take you not care, O woman, of not behaving yourself unseemly, in the sight of that God, who stands behind you; for all things are full of him:" thereby giving her occasion, more to mind and regard that supreme and universal Numen, that filleth the whole world and is every where.

XXIII. It hath been frequently affirmed, that Socrates died a martyr for one only God, in opposition to those many gods of the Pagans; and Tertullian,[9] for one, writeth thus of him, Propterea damnatus est Socrates, quia deos destruebat, "Socrates was therefore condemned to die, because he destroyed the gods." And indeed that Socrates asserted one supreme God, the maker and governor of the whole world, is a thing not at all to be

[6] Cap. 4. p. 782. t. 2. opp.

[7] This interpretation however of Antisthenes' saying: "That there were many popular gods, but only one natural God," is too far-fetched and does not appear to correspond to the signification of the words. For who will readily believe Antisthenes to have meant by these words, "that the gods of the several nations were merely so many different names of one supreme Being?" Because the learned Doctor was himself imbued with this opinion, he therefore could easily discover it in the words of Antisthenes; but we who hold this opinion to be doubtful are not able to do so. I consider the meaning of the father of the Cynics to have been evidently this: That, although the various nations made many gods, still these were not naturally gods, there being but one deity who is of himself and by his own nature God. So also was this dogma understood by Lactantius.

[8] Lib. 6. segm. 37. p. 333.

[9] In Apologet. cap. 14. p. 144. ed Havercampii.

doubted. In his discourse with Aristodemus, in Xenophon's first book of Memoirs,[10] he convinced him that the things of this world were not made by chance, but by Mind and Counsel: Οὕτω γε σκοπουμένῳ πάνυ ἔοικε ταῦτα σοφοῦ τινος δημιουργοῦ καὶ φιλοζώου τεχνήματι, "I am now convinced from what you say, that the things of this world were the workmanship of some wise Artificer, who also was a lover of animals." And so he endeavoured to persuade him, that that mind and understanding which is in us, was derived from some mind and understanding in the universe, as well as that earth and water which is in us, from the earth and water of the universe:[1] Σὺ δὲ σεαυτὸν φρόνιμόν τι δοκεῖς ἔχειν, ἄλλοθι δὲ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδὲν φρόνιμον εἶναι, εἰδὼς, ὅτι γῆς τε μικρὸν μέρος ἐν τῷ σώματι πολλῆς οὔσης ἔχεις, καὶ ὑγροῦ βραχὺ, πολλοῦ ὄντος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δήπου μεγάλων ὄντων ἑκάστου μικρὸν μέρος λαβόντι τὸ συνήρμοσταί σοι; νοῦν δὲ μόνον ἆρα οὐδαμοῦ ὄντα σε εὐτυχῶς πως δοκεῖς συναρπάσαι, "Do you think that you only have wisdom in yourself, and that there is none any where else in the whole world without you? though you know that you have but a small part in your body of that vast quantity of the earth which is without you; and but little of that water and fire, and so of every other thing, that your body is compounded of, in respect of that great mass and magazine of them which is in the world. Is mind and understanding therefore the only thing, which you fancy you have some way or other, luckily got and snatched unto yourself, whilst there is no such thing any where in the world without you; all those infinite things thereof being thus orderly disposed by chance?" And when Aristodemus afterwards objected, that he could not see any artificer that made the world, as he could those artificers which made all other human things, Socrates thus replies: Οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν σεαυτοῦ σύ γε ψυχὴν ὁρᾷς, ἣ τοῦ σώματος κυρία ἐστίν· ὥστε κατά γε τοῦτο ἔξεστί σοι λέγειν, ὅτι οὐδὲ γνώμῃ ἀλλὰ τύχῃ πάντα πράττεις, "Neither do you see your own soul, which rules over your body; so that you might for the same reason conclude yourself to do nothing by mind and understanding neither, but all by chance, as well as that all things in the world are done by chance." Again, when he further disputed in this manner

[10] These are not Socrates' words, but those of Aristodemus to Socrates, in Xenophon's Memorab. Socrat. p. 573 opp.

[1] I cannot see that Socrates says in these words what Dr. Cudworth makes him say, that the minds of men were derived from the mind of the whole universe. In this discourse with Aristodemus, Socrates decides nothing as to the origin and nature of the mind, his object being to prove that this world was both made by God, and is administered and governed by him. In the English version, however, there are more words than answer to the Greek. Dr. Cudworth, in quoting passages of ancient Greek authors frequently supplies them with free and paraphrastic translations: a custom which I have thought proper to follow in all instances, where no injury is done to the sense.

against the necessity of worshipping the Deity: Οὐχ ὑπερορῶ τὸ δαιμόνιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνον μεγαλοπρεπέστερον ἡγοῦμαι, ἢ ὡς τῆς ἐμῆς θεραπείας προσδεῖσθαι, "I despise not the Deity, O Socrates, but think him to be a more magnificent being than that he should stand in need of my worship of him:" Socrates again answers: Ὅσῳ μεγαλοπρεπέστερον ἀξιοῖ σε θεραπεύειν, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον τιμητέον αὐτὸ, "How much the more magnificent and illustrious that being is which takes care of you, so much the more, in al[illegible] it to be honoured by you." Lastly, Aristodemus [illegible] disbelief of providence, as a thing which seeme[illegible]ible, if not impossible, that one and the same D[illegible] able to mind all things at once, Socrates endea[illegible] this disbelief of his in this manner: Ὦ ἀγαθὲ, [illegible]ὶ ὁ σὸς νοῦς ἐνὼν τὸ σὸν σῶμα, ὅπως βούλεται [illegible] οἴεσθαι οὖν χρὴ, καὶ τὴν ἐν παντὶ φρόνησιν τὰ π[illegible] αὐτῇ ἡδὺ ἢ οὕτω τίθεσθαι· καὶ μὴ τὸ σὸν μὲν [illegible] ἐπὶ πολλὰ στάδια ἐξικνεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ τοῦ Θεοῦ [illegible] ατον εἶναι ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾶν, "Consider, friend, I pray you, if that mind, which is in your body, does order and dispose it every way as it pleases; why should not that wisdom which is in the universe be able to order all things therein also, as seemeth best to it? And if your eye can discern things several miles distant from it, why should it be thought impossible for the eye of God to behold all things at once? Lastly, if your soul can mind things both here and in Egypt, and in Sicily; why may not the great mind or wisdom of God be able to take care of all things, in all places?" And then he concludes, that if Aristodemus would diligently apply himself to the worship of God, he should at length be convinced, Ὅτι τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ θεῖον, ὥϑ' ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾷν, καὶ πάντα ἀκούειν, καὶ πανταχοῦ παρεῖναι, καὶ ἅμα πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, "That God is such and so great a being, as that he can, at once, see all things, and hear all things, and be present every where, and take care of all affairs." Moreover, Socrates, in his discourse with Euthydemus, in Xenophon's fourth book, speaks thus concerning that invisible Deity which governs the whole world: Οἱ γὰρ ἄλλοι θεοὶ ἡμῖν τὰ ἀγαθὰ διδόντες, οὐδὲν τοῦτων εἰς τὸ ἐμφανὲς ἰόντες διδόασιν, καὶ ὁ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συντάττων τε καὶ συνέχων, ἐν ᾧ πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθά ἐστι, &c. οὗτος τὰ μέγιστα μὲν πράττων ὁρᾶται, τόδε οἰκονομῶν ἀόρατος ἡμῖν ἐστιν· ἐννόει δὲ καὶ ὁ πᾶσι φανερὸς δοκῶν εἶναι ἥλιος, οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἑαυτὸν ἀκριβῶς ὁρᾶν, ἀλλ' ἐάν τις αὐτὸν ἀναιδῶς ἐγχειρῇ θεᾶσθαι, τὴν ὄψιν ἀφαιρεῖται, "The other gods giving us good things, do it without visibly appearing to us; and that God, who framed and containeth the whole world (in which are all good and excellent things) and who continually supplieth us with them, he, though

he be seen to do the greatest things of all, yet notwithstanding is himself invisible and unseen. Which ought the less to be wondered at by us, because the sun, who seemeth manifest to all, yet will not suffer himself to be exactly and distinctly viewed, but if any one boldly and impudently gaze upon him, will deprive him of his sight: as also because the soul of man, which most of all things in him partaketh of the Deity, though it be that which manifestly rules and reigns in us, yet is it never seen, ἃ χρὴ κατανοοῦντα μὴ καταφρονεῖν τῶν ἀοράτων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν γινομένων, τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν καταμανθάνοντα, τιμᾷν τὸ δαιμόνιον, "Which particulars he that considers, ought not to despise invisible things, but to honour the supreme Deity, taking notice of his power from his effects." Where we have τὸ δαιμόνιον, as also before τὸ Θεῖον, plainly put for the "supreme Deity." And we did the rather set down these passages of Socrates here concerning God and Providence, that we might shame those, who, in these latter days of ours, are so atheistically inclined, if at least they have any *pudor* or shame left in them.

But, notwithstanding Socrates' thus clearly acknowledging one supreme and universal Numen, it doth not therefore follow that he rejected all those other inferior gods of the Pagans, as is commonly conceived. But the contrary thereunto appeareth from these very passages of his now cited, wherein there is mention made of other gods besides the supreme. And how conformable Socrates was to the pagan religion and worship, may appear from those last dying words of his, (when he should be most serious,) after he had drunk the poison, wherein he required his friends to offer a votive cock for him to Æsculapius:* for which Origen thus perstringeth him: Καὶ τηλικαῦτα φιλοσοφήσαντες περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν τῆς καλῶς βεβιωκυίας διεξελθόντες, καταλιπόντες τὸ μέγεθος ὧν αὐτοῖς ὁ Θεὸς ἐφανέρωσεν, εὐτελῆ φρονοῦσι καὶ σμικρὰ, ἀλεκτρυόνα τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ἀποδιδόντες, "And they who had philosophized so excellently concerning the soul, and discoursed concerning the happiness of the future state to those who live well, do afterward sink down from these great, high, and noble things, to a superstitious regard of little, small, and trifling matters, such as the paying of a cock to Æsculapius." Where notwithstanding, Origen doth not charge Socrates with such gross and downright idolatry, as he does elsewhere,[2] for his sacrificing to the Pythian Apollo, who was but an inferior demon. And perhaps some may excuse Socrates here, as thinking that he looked upon Æsculapius no otherwise than as the supreme Deity, called by that name, as exercising his provi-

* Cont. Cels. lib. 9. p. 277.

[2] He means no doubt the passage occurring in lib. 7. adv. Celsum. p. 335. in which Origen suspects that the praises bestowed on Socrates by Apollo arose from the circumstance of the philosopher being a constant worshipper of this deity.

dence over the sickness and health or recovery of men, and that therefore he would have an eucharistic sacrifice offered to him in his behalf, as having now cured him at once of all diseases by death.[3] However Plato[4] informs us, that Socrates immediately before he drunk his poison, did εὔχεσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς, τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε εὐτυχῆ εἶναι, "pray (not to God, but to the gods, that is, to the supreme and inferior gods both together, as in Plato's Phædrus he did to Pan, and the other tutelar gods of that place) that his translation from hence into the other world might be happy to him." And Xenophon, in his Memoirs,[5] informs us, that Socrates did, both in his words and practice, approve of that doctrine of the Pythian Apollo, That the rule of piety and religion ought to be the law of every particular city and country; he affirming it to be a vanity for any man to be singular herein. Lastly, in his own apology, as written by Plato, he professes to acknowledge the sun, moon, and stars for gods; condemning the contrary doctrine of Anaxagoras, as irrational and absurd. Wherefore we may well conclude this opinion of Socrates' being condemned for denying the many gods of the Pagans, or of his being a martyr for one only God, to be nothing but a vulgar error.

But if you therefore demand what that accusation of impiety really was which he was charged with, Socrates himself, in Plato's Euthyphro, will inform you, that it was for his free and open condemning those traditions concerning the gods, wherein wicked, dishonest, and unjust actions were imputed to them. For when Euthyphro, having accused his own father as guilty of murder (merely for committing a homicide into prison, who happened to die there) would justify himself from the examples of the gods, namely Jupiter and Saturn, because Jupiter, the best and justest of the gods, had committed his father Saturn to prison for devouring his sons, as Saturn himself also had castrated his father Cælius for some miscarriages of his, Socrates thus bespeaks him: Ἀράγε, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν, οὗ ἕνεκα τὴν γραφὴν φεύγω, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπειδάν τις περὶ τῶν θεῶν λέγῃ, δυσχερῶς πως ἀποδέχομαι, &c. "Is not this the very thing, O

[3] For my part I do not approve of this explication of Socrates' concluding words. Nor do I understand how any one could recommend a cock to be sacrificed to a part or department, as it were, of divine providence. Still, I do not agree with those, who derive from these words matter for grave charge against Socrates and suppose them to prove beyond controversy, that he was as superstitious as the rest of the Athenian people. Socrates uttered them on the point of death and some time after he had drunk the poison, when he was already become nearly torpid. Who then would be so bold as to affirm, that a man speaking in such circumstances was still conscious of what he was teaching his disciples. Probably his mind was already affected, and his reason so impaired, that he did not clearly understand what he was saying.

[4] In Phædone, p. 402. opp. We have already shown the fallacy of what is here stated respecting Socrates' prayers to Pan.

[5] Lib. 4. p. 634. opp.

Euthyphro, for which I am accused? namely, because when I hear any one affirming such matters as these concerning the gods, I am very loth to believe them, and stick not publicly to declare my dislike of them? And can you, O Euthyphro, in good earnest think, that there are indeed wars and contentions among the gods, and that those other things were also done by them, which poets and painters commonly impute to them? such as the *Peplum* or veil of Minerva, which in the Panathenaics is with great pomp and ceremony brought into the Acropolis, is embroidered all over with?" Thus we see that Socrates, though he asserted one supreme Deity, yet he acknowledged, notwithstanding, other inferior created gods, together with the rest of the Pagans, honouring and worshipping them; only he disliked those poetic fables concerning them (believed at that time by the vulgar), in which all manner of unjust and immoral actions were fathered on them; which, together with the envy of many, was the only true reason, why he was then accused of impiety and atheism.[6]

[6] The conclusion here arrived at by the worthy Doctor respecting the religion of Socrates in opposition to received opinions, is a just and wise one; and since his time has been corroborated at some length by the most learned J. Le Clerc, in the Sylvæ Philologicæ subjoined to his Dialogues of Æschines the Socratic, cap. 3. entitled De Socrate, p. 177. &c. Nor ought we to listen to those, among whom are many of the early Christian fathers, who tell us, that Socrates was put to death for no other reason than because he professed one God, and denied the existence of more than one; nor, again, should those be regarded, who maintain that he wholly assented to the common religions of the Greeks, and entertained the same notions regarding the gods, as the rest of the Athenian people. Socrates occupied as it were an intermediate position between the professors of one God and the worshippers of idle deities. The illustrious man, as is manifest from Xenophon and Plato, believed in the existence of one supreme Being, the maker and framer of all things: but to this deity he supposed many natures more noble than man to be subject and to be appointed by him over certain offices; to which it behoves us to pay religious homage. These natures he considered to be the gods worshipped at that period by the Greeks and Athenians. On which account he discarded the poetic fables, as by no means applying to such gods, but wished the ceremonies and rites themselves to be retained and tolerated, till by the blessing of the supreme Being mankind should have become more enlightened. Hence it is not to be wondered at, that, as Xenophon at the very commencement of his Memoirs informs us, he both sacrificed to the gods, and attached some importance to divination. Socrates and the Athenian people were united in the worship only of the gods: their opinions respecting these gods were altogether different. The people in supplicating Mercury, prayed to that Mercury of whom the poets sung, the son of Maia, the patron of thieves and the messenger of the gods. But Socrates, when discharging the same duty, rejected such fables, and worshipped a certain divine and powerful nature, to which he supposed the omnipotent Being who controls all things had committed a portion of his own power. And the same I should wish to be understood of the other deities, to which Socrates is said to have sacrificed like the rest of the Athenians. But the people, and doubtless the priests themselves, regarded with displeasure any attempt to throw discredit upon those fables respecting the gods, upon which the whole of the public religion was based. The priests at least could not be so short-sighted as not to perceive, that, if these fictions of the poets were once thoroughly rooted out of men's minds, the time would soon arrive, when the festivals themselves, which owed their origin to the poetic fables, as also the sacrifices, images, statues, signs, temples, and last of all the priests, would be abandoned and dispensed with. Socrates was said, therefore, to introduce new gods and a new religion, and on this charge was arraigned before his judges. Nor, I must candidly confess, do I consider this to have been done unjustly, or in defiance of truth. Socrates himself, indeed, in Plato, repels the charge, nor is

It hath been also affirmed by many, that Plato really asserted one only God and no more, and that therefore, whensoever he speaks of gods plurally, he must be understood to have done this, not according to his own judgment, but only in a way of politic compliance with the Athenians, and for fear of being made to drink poison in like manner as Socrates was. In confirmation of which opinion, there is also a passage cited out of that thirteenth epistle of Plato's to Dionysius, wherein he gives this as a mark, wher[illegible] epistles, and such as were written according to [illegible] of his own mind, might by his friends be di[illegible] n those which were otherwise: Τῆς μὲν γὰρ [illegible]στολῆς Θεὸς ἄρχει, Ζεοὶ δέ τῆς ἥττον, "When I [illegible]es with God, then may you conclude I write se[illegible]ot so when I begin with gods."* And this pla[illegible]herefore the more authentic, because it was long [illegible] by Eusebius to this very purpose, namely to p[illegible]o acknowledged one only God: Δῆλος δέ ἐστιν [illegible], εἰ καὶ συνήθως Ἕλλησι, τῇ τῶν πλειόνων εἴωθε χρῆσθαι προσηγορίᾳ, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον ἐπιστολῆς, ἐν ᾗ σύμβολα δίδωσι, τῶν τε διὰ σπουδῆς αὐτῷ γραφομένων, καὶ τῶν ἄλλως ἀπερρίμμενων· "It is manifest, that Plato really acknowledged one only God, however, in compliance with the language of the Greeks, he often spake of gods plurally, from that epistle of his to Dionysius, wherein he gives this symbol or mark, whereby he might be known to write seriously, namely, when he began his epistles with God, and not with gods."

Notwithstanding which, we have already manifested out of Plato's Timæus, that he did in good earnest assert a plurality of

Xenophon less strenuous in rebutting it. But I would sooner believe the Athenian people than Socrates and Xenophon. The Athenians believed the Jupiter whom they worshipped to be the son of Saturn, the husband of Juno, the father of the gods, the ruler of thunder, and the brother of Pluto and Neptune; and with them the entire worship of Jupiter was based upon these opinions, as upon sound and sure foundations. But Socrates rejected all these stories and taught, that Jupiter was the supreme creator and lord of the universe. Wherefore, although he propitiated Jupiter with the same ceremonies as the rest of his countrymen, still the Jupiter he imagined to himself was very different from the Jupiter of the Athenians and consequently a new god and a new Jupiter, hitherto unknown to the Greeks. So far, therefore, Socrates was justly accused by Anytus and Melitus of introducing new gods into the city. For, while he allowed the names and rites of the Grecian gods to remain, by discarding the poetic fables he took away the gods themselves and substituted others of his own creation into their place. It is to be regretted, indeed, that a genius like that of Socrates did not ascend higher and investigate more minutely the nature of true religion. But he was prevented most probably from proceeding further in the search of truth by the peculiar constitution of his own mind, which was signally propense to doubt and too regardless of incorporeal subjects. Thus, if we except a few favourite dogmas on God and divine things, he held all speculations as well on physical matters as on those which consist in contemplation alone, to be altogether uncertain. For on subjects of this kind, he considered, that mankind could arrive at nothing satisfactory without some special revelation of the Deity.

* Præp. Ev. lib. 11. cap. 13. [p. 530.]

gods; by which gods of his are to be understood animated or intellectual beings superior to men, to whom there is an honour and worship from men due; he therein declaring,* not only the sun, and moon, and stars, but also the earth itself (as animated) to be a god or goddess. For though it be now read in our copies, πρεσβυτάτην σωμάτων, "that the earth was the oldest of all the bodies within the heavens;" yet it is certain that anciently it was read otherwise, πρεσβυτάτην θεῶν, "the oldest of the gods;" not only from Proclus and Cicero, but also from Laërtius† writing thus: Γῆν δὲ πρεσβυτάτην μὲν εἶναι τῶν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ θεῶν, γενέσθαι δὲ δημιούργημα, ὡς νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν ποιεῖν, οὖσαν δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου, κινεῖσθαι περὶ τὸ μέσον, "Though Plato's gods were for the most part fiery, yet did he suppose the earth to be a god or goddess too, affirming it to be the oldest of all the gods within the heavens, made or created to distinguish day and night, by its diurnal circumgyration upon its own axis, in the middle or centre of the world." For Plato, when he wrote his Timæus, acknowledged only the diurnal motion of the earth, though afterwards he is said to have admitted its annual too. And the same might be further evinced from all his other writings, but especially his book of laws (together with his Epinomis) said to have been written by him in his old age, in which he much insists upon the godships of the sun, moon, and stars; and complains, that the young gentlemen of Athens were then so much infected with that Anaxagorean doctrine, which made them to be nothing but inanimate stones and earth; as also he approves of that then vulgarly received custom of worshipping the rising and setting sun and moon, as gods, to which, in all probability, he conformed himself:† Ἀνατέλλοντός τε ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, καὶ πρὸς δυσμὰς ἰόντων, προσκυλίσεις ἅμα καὶ προσκυνήσεις Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ Βαρβάρων πάντων, ἐν συμφοραῖς παντοίαις ἐχομένων καὶ ἐν εὐπραγίαις, ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα ὄντων, καὶ οὐδαμῇ ὑποψίαν ἐνδιδόντων, ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ θεοί, "The prostrations and adorations that are used both by the Greeks and all Barbarians, towards the rising and setting sun and moon (as well in their prosperities as adversities) declare them to be unquestionably esteemed gods." Wherefore, we cannot otherwise conclude but that this thirteenth epistle of Plato to Dionysius, though extant it seems, before Eusebius' time, yet was supposititious and counterfeit by some zealous but ignorant Christian: as there is accordingly a Νοθεύεται, or brand of bastardy, prefixed to it in all the editions of Plato's works.

* P. 40. Ser.

† Lib. 3. segm. 75. p. 211. But we have shown above, that the reading in Plato's Timæus, where he speaks of the earth, ought to be θεῶν, instead of σωμάτων, as given in the MSS.

‡ De Leg. 10. [p. 664. opp.]

However, though Plato acknowledged and worshipped many gods, yet is it undeniably evident, that he was no polyarchist, but a monarchist, an assertor of one supreme God, the only *αὐτοφυὴς*, or "self-originated being," the maker of the heaven and earth, and of all those other gods. For first, it is plain, that, according to Plato, the soul of the whole world was not itself eternal, much less self-existent, but made or produced by God in time, though indeed before its body, the world, from these words of his:* [illegible] *ὡς νῦν ὑστέραν ἐπιχειροῦμεν λέγειν, οὕτως ἐμηχανι[illegible]ὸς νεωτέραν, ὁ δὲ καὶ γενέσει καὶ ἀρετῇ προτέραν καὶ [illegible]ψυχὴν σώματος, ὡς δεσπότιν καὶ ἄρξουσαν ἀρξομέν[illegible]*, "God did not fabricate or make the soul of the [illegible]me order that we now treat concerning it, that is, [illegible]unior to it; but that which was to rule over the w[illegible]ly, being more excellent, he made it first, and s[illegible]ge." Upon which account, Aristotle quarrels wi[illegible]radicting himself, in that he affirmed the soul to be a princi[illegible]nd yet supposed it not to be eternal, but made together with the heaven:† Ἀλλὰ *μὴν οὐδὲ Πλάτωνί γε οἷόν τε λέγειν, ἣν οἴεται ἀρχὴν εἶναι, ἐνίοτε αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν, ὕστερον γὰρ καὶ ἅμα τῷ οὐρανῷ ἡ ψυχὴ*, "Neither is it possible for Plato here to extricate himself, who sometimes declares the soul to be a principle, as that which moves itself, and yet affirms it again not to be eternal, but made together with the heaven." For which cause some Platonists conclude, that Plato asserted a double Psyche, one the third hypostasis of his trinity, and eternal; the other created in time, together with the world, which seems to be a probable opinion. Wherefore, since, according to Plato, the soul of the world, which is the chief of all his inferior gods, was not self-existent, but made or produced by God in time, all those other gods of his, which were but parts of the world, as the sun, moon, stars, and demons, must needs be so too. But lest any should suspect, that Plato might, for all that, suppose the world and its gods not to have been made by one only unmade God, but by a multitude of co-ordinate, self-existent principles, or deities conspiring; we shall observe, that the contrary hereunto is plainly declared by him, in way of answer to that query, whether or no there were many and infinite worlds (as some philosophers had maintained), or only one? he resolving it thus:‡ Πότερον οὖν ὀρθῶς ἕνα οὐρανὸν προειρήκαμεν, ἢ πολλοὺς καὶ ἀπείρους λέγειν ἦν ὀρθότερον; *ἕνα, εἴπερ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα δεδημιουργημένος ἔσται· τὸ γὰρ περιέχον πάντα ὁπόσα νοητὰ ζῶα, μεθ' ἑτέρου δεύτερον οὐκ ἄν ποτ' εἴη*, &c. *ἵνα οὖν τόδε κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν ὅμοιον ᾖ τῷ παντελεῖ ζώῳ, διὰ*

* Plat. Tim. p. 34. [P. 528. opp.]
† Arist. Met. lib. 14. cap. 6. [P. 478. tom. 4. opp.]
‡ Tim. p. 31. [P. 527. edit. Ficini.]

ταῦτα οὔτε δύο οὔτ' ἀπείρους ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιῶν κόσμους, ἀλλ' εἷς ὅδε μονογενὴς οὐρανὸς γεγονὼς ἔστι τε καὶ ἔσεται, "Whether have we rightly affirmed, that there is only one heaven (or world), or is it more agreeable to reason, to hold many or infinite? We say there is but one, if it be made agreeable to its intellectual paradigm, containing the ideas of all animals and other things in it; for there can be but one archetypal animal, which is the paradigm of all created beings: wherefore, that the world may agree with its paradigms in this respect of solitude or oneliness, therefore is it not two, nor infinite, but one only begotten." His meaning is, that there is but one archetypal Mind, the Demiurgus, or maker of all things that were produced, and therefore but one world.

And this one God, which, according to Plato, was the maker of the whole world, is frequently called by him, in his Timæus and elsewhere, ὁ Θεὸς, "God," or "the God," by way of excellency; sometimes ὁ Δημιουργὸς, "the Architect or Artificer of the world;" sometimes ὁ Ποιητὴς καὶ Πατὴρ τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς, "the Maker and Father of this universe," whom it is hard to find out, but impossible to declare to the vulgar. Again, ὁ ἐπὶ πᾶσι Θεὸς, "the God over all;" τῆς φύσεως Κτιστὴς, "the Creator of nature;" τοῦ παντὸς Ἀρχὴ, "the sole Principle of the universe;" πάντων Αἴτιον, "the Cause of all things;" Νοῦς πάντων βασιλεὺς, "Mind, the king of all things;" Νοῦς αὐτοκράτωρ, πάντα κοσμῶν, διὰ πάντων ἰὼν, "that sovereign Mind, which orders all things, and passes through all things; τοῦ παντὸς Κυβερνήτης, "the Governor of the whole;" τὸ ὂν ἀεὶ, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, "that which always is, and was never made;" ὁ πρῶτος Θεὸς, "the first God;" ὁ μέγιστος Δαίμων, and ὁ μέγιστος θεῶν, "the greatest God," and "the greatest of the gods;" ὁ ἥλιον γεννήσας, "he that generated or produced the sun;"[8] ὁ γῆν, οὐρανὸν καὶ θεοὺς, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ τὰ ἐν ᾅδου καὶ ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἐργάζεται,* "he that makes earth, and heaven, and the gods; and doth all things, both in heaven and hell, and under the earth." Again,[9] he by whose efficiency the things of

* De Rep. lib. 10. [P. 511.]

[8] Not having found these words in the part of Plato pointed out by the learned Doctor, I suspected, that in hastily glancing over book 10. De Legibus he had inadvertently applied what Plato there says of the soul of the world to God, and had added some words of his own. For, in p. 667. Plato tells us, that the soul of the world governs the universe, and πάντα τὰ κατ' οὐρανὸν, καὶ γῆν, καὶ θάλατταν περιάγειν, "causes all things in heaven, and earth, and the sea to move." But I abandoned this idea on meeting with the very words in another place, namely, De Republica, lib. 10. p. 511.

[9] Plato, in his Sophista, p. 168. distributes the creative power, or δύναμις ποιητικὴ, into *human* and *divine*, but defines this power generally thus: Ποιητικὴν δύναμιν πᾶσαν ἔφαμεν εἶναι, ἥτις ἂν αἰτία γίγνεται τοῖς μὴ πρότερον οὖσιν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι, "We affirm all that to be creative power, which is the cause of things existing that did not exist before." That Dr. Cudworth should refer this definition to

the world ὕστερον ἐγένετο, πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα, "were afterwards made when they were not before;" or "from an antecedent non-existence brought forth into being." This philosopher somewhere intimating, that it was as easy for God to produce those real things, the sun, moon, stars, and earth, &c., from himself, as it is for us to produce the images of ourselves and whatsoever else we please, only by interposing a looking-glass. Lastly, he is called,[10] ὃς πάντα τ[illegible]ζεται, καὶ ἑαυτὸν, "he that causeth or produceth [illegible] things, and even himself;" the meaning whereof [illegible]t is αὐτοφυὴς (as the same Plato also calls him) [illegible]ed Being, and from no other cause besides himself [illegible]f all other things." Neither doth Lactantius Firm[illegible] refuse to speak of God after

the Deity himself, I conside[illegible] cannot be denied, that according to Plato's doctrine this creati[illegible]e-eminently to God. But I by no means approve of his inte[illegible]ls, as though they signified, that God made and created all existi[illegible]ng: to which opinion this philosopher was certainly opposed. The learned Doctor was preceded in this view by Marsilius Ficinus, among others, who, as appears manifest from his index to Plato v. Deus, held this very passage from the Sophist to be sufficient to prove, that Plato entertained the same sentiments regarding the creation of all things, as the professors of the Christian religion: but this is altogether ridiculous. For, to omit other matters, Plato meant this definition of efficient power to be common to the twofold efficiency he is speaking of, namely divine and human. Wherefore, if it be taken in the sense, which these learned men attach to it, the philosopher will be made to assign the power of producing something out of nothing to men also, which is a manifest absurdity. Besides, the words which follow clearly show Plato to be speaking of the production, not of matter itself of which things consist, but of form only.

[10] Namely, De Republica, lib. 10. p. 511. where Plato thus speaks: Ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ χειροτέχνης οὐ μόνον πάντα οἷός τε τὰ σκεύη ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυόμενα ἅπαντα ποιεῖ, καὶ ζῶα πάντα ἐργάζεται, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ ἑαυτόν, "For the same artificer is not only able to make all these, but he also produces all things that grow out of the earth, and all animals, as also himself." Which words he afterwards applies to God.

[1] The learned Doctor has confounded together two passages of Lactantius on this argument. One occurs Instit. lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 53. where he says: Quia fieri non potest, quin id, quod sit, aliquando esse cœperit; consequens est, ut, quando nihil ante illum fuit, ipse ante omnia ex se ipso procreatus, ideoque ab Apolline αὐτοφυὴς, a Sibylla αὐτογενὴς et ἀγέννητος et ἀποίητος nominatur: quod Seneca, vir acutus, in exhortationibus vidit. Nos, inquit, aliunde pendemus. Itaque ad aliquem respicimus, cui, quod est optimum in nobis, animum debeamus. Alius nos edidit, alius instruxit, Deus ipse se fecit, "Forasmuch as it is impossible but that that which exists must have begun to exist, consequently, since nothing was before him, he was procreated from himself, and therefore is called by Apollo αὐτοφυὴς, by the Sibyl αὐτογενὴς, and ἀγέννητος, and ἀποίητος: which Seneca, an acute man, has observed in his exhortations. 'We,' says he, 'depend upon some other. Therefore we look back to some one, to whom we owe our best part, the soul. Another has produced, another has formed us, God made himself.'" The other is in lib. 2. cap. 8. p. 214. Ex se ipso est, ut in libro primo diximus, et ideo talis est, qualem esse voluit, impassibilis, immutabilis, &c., "He is from himself, as we said in the first book, and therefore is such, as he willed himself to be, impassible, immutable." [In like manner concerning God, Aristides, tom. 1. opp. Hymn. in Jovem. p. 5. ed. Canteri. Compare Spanheim, Ad Callimach. p. 8.] In these passages Lactantius philosophizes most corruptly concerning the Deity; and therefore ought not in my opinion to be classed along with those Platonists or even earlier Christian fathers themselves, who discoursed in the same strain, inasmuch as these admitted God to be without end and beginning. For *he is far apart from both.* I am aware, that Lactantius is not without his defenders:

this very manner; that se ipsum fecit, and that he was ex se ipso procreatus, et propterea talis, qualem se esse voluit; "that he made himself; and that being procreated from himself, he therefore was every way such as he willed himself to be." Which unusual and bold strain of theology is very much insisted upon by Plotinus, in his book, Περὶ τοῦ θελήματος τοῦ ἑνὸς,* "concerning the will of the first One, or unity;" he there writing thus of the supreme God: Αἴτιον ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ δι' αὐτὸν αὐτὸς, "He is the cause of himself, and he is from himself, and himself is for himself." And again: Αὐτός ἐστιν οὗτος ὁ ποιῶν ἑαυτὸν, καὶ κύριος ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ οὐκ ὥς τις ἕτερος ἐθέλησε γενόμενος, ἀλλ' ὡς θέλει αὐτὸς, "This is he, who is the maker of himself, and is lord over himself (in a certain sense); for he was not made that which another willed him to be, but he is that which he willeth himself to be." Moreover:† Αὐτὸς ὢν τοῦτο, ὅπερ ἠγάπησε, τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ὑποστήσας αὑτὸν, εἴπερ ἐνέργεια μένουσα ὥστε ἐνέργημα αὐτὸς, ἀλλὰ ἄλλου μὲν οὐδενὸς, ἑαυτοῦ ἄρα ἐνέργημα αὐτὸς, οὐκ ἄρα ὡς συμβέβηκεν ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐνεργεῖ αὐτὸς καὶ ὡς αὐτος ἐθέλει, &c. "The supreme Deity loving himself as a pure light, is himself what he loved; thus, as it were, begetting and giving subsistence to himself, he being a standing energy. Wherefore, since God is a work or energy, and yet he is not the work or energy of any other being, he must needs be (in some sense) his own work or energy; so that God is not that which he happened to be, but that which he willeth himself to be." Thus also, a little before:‡ Ἀνακτέον εἰς ἓν τὴν βούλησιν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν· τὸ δὲ θέλειν παρ' αὐτοῦ, ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ εἶναι παρ' αὐτοῦ, ὥστε αὐτὸν πεποιηκέναι αὑτὸν, ὁ λόγος ἀνεῦρεν· εἰ γὰρ ἡ βούλησις παρ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ οἷον ἔργον αὐτοῦ, αὕτη δὲ ταυτὸν τῇ ὑποστάσει αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸς ἂν οὕτως ὑποστήσας ἂν εἴη αὐτὸν, ὥστε οὐχ ὅπερ ἔτυχέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐβουλήθη αὐτός, "We must of necessity make will and essence the same in the

but he rejects all vindication, since the fault he is accused of lies not so much in his phraseology as in the whole of the demonstration which he gives. For he openly assumes as a principle, that "that which exists, at some time or other began to exist." From which principle he draws this conclusion: "God exists, therefore he also began to exist." Which being established, he proceeds: "But nothing was before God, from which he could be produced. Therefore God procreated himself." We here see a series of propositions strung together, which render it impossible for us to suppose, that Lactantius, any more than Synesius, Plotinus, and the other Platonists, entertained correct notions or discoursed in a proper strain respecting the Deity. He altogether discarded the eternity of God and connected things, which admit of no connexion and which destroy each other. For what is more foolish than to affirm, that a thing had a beginning and yet was produced from no cause? But there is much more to be met with in Lactantius, showing him to have been a man, who bestowed more time upon the study of eloquence and oratorical embellishment than upon the cultivation of the reasoning powers. Compare the learned J. G. Geret, in his Specimen Examinis Theologiæ Lactantii, Witteb. 1723.4. Quæst. 1. sect. 2. 3. &c. p. 3. &c.

* En. 6. lib. 8. p. 749. [Cap. 14. p. 750.]

† P. 751. ‡ P. 748.

first Being. Wherefore, since his willing is from himself, his being must needs be from himself too; the consequence of which ratiocination is this, that he made himself. For if his volition be from himself, and his own work, and this be the same with his hypostasis or substance, he may be then said to have given subsistence to himself. Wherefore he is not what he happened to be, but what he willed himself to be." But, because this is so unusual a notion, we shall here set down yet one or two passages more of [illegible]'s concerning it:* Οὐκ ἔξω τῆς βουλήσεως αὐτοῦ [illegible] ὑνεστιν αὐτοῦ τῇ οἷον οὐσία ἡ θέλησις· καὶ οὐκ ἔστι [illegible] ἄνευ τοῦ θέλειν ἑαυτῷ ὅπερ ἐστί· καὶ σύνδρομος αὐ [illegible] ιν αὐτὸς εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο ὧν ὅπερ θέλει· καὶ ἡ θέλ[illegible] ἓν· καὶ τούτῳ οὐχ ἧττον, ὅτι μὴ ἄλλο αὐτός ὅπερ [illegible] τὸ ὡς ἐβουλήθη ἂν· τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐθέλησε, ἢ το [illegible] γὰρ εἰ ὑποθοίμεθα ἑλέσθαι αὐτῷ ὅτι θέλοι γενέσ [illegible] αὐτῷ ἀλλάξασθαι τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν εἰς ἄλλο, μήτι [illegible] νέσθαι βουληθῆναι, μήτ' ἂν ἑαυτῷ τι μέμψασθαι, ὡς ὑπο [illegible] τοῦτο ὂν ὅ ἐστι, τῷ αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὅπερ αὐτὸς ἀεὶ ἐθέλησε καὶ θέλει· ἔστι γὰρ ὄντως ἡ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις θέλησις αὐτοῦ, "The essence of the supreme God is not without his will, but his will and essence are the same; so that God concurreth with himself, himself being willing to be as he is, and being that which he willeth; and his will and himself being one and the same. For himself is not one thing (as happening to be that which he is), and that he would will to be another: for what could God will to be, but that which he is? And if we should suppose, that it were in his own choice to be what he would, and that he had liberty to change his nature into whatsoever else he pleased, it is certain, that he would neither will to be any thing else besides what he is, nor complain of himself as being now that which he is out of necessity, he being indeed no other but that, which himself hath willed, and doth always will to be. For his will is his essential goodness; so that his will doth not follow his nature, but concur with it; in the very essence of this good there being contained his choice, and willing of himself to be such." Lastly:† Πᾶν ἄρα βούλησις, καὶ οὐκέτι τὸ μὴ βουλόμενον, οὐδὲ τὸ πρὸ βουλήσεως ἄρα· πρῶτον ἄρα ἡ βούλησις αὐτὸς, καὶ τὸ ὡς ἐβούλετο ἄρα καὶ οἷον ἐβούλετο, καὶ τὸ τῇ βουλήσει ἑπόμενον, ὃ ἡ τοιαύτη βούλησις ἐγέννα· ἐγέννα δὲ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἐν αὐτῷ, "God is all will, nor is there any thing in him which he doth not will, nor is his being before his will, but his will is himself, or he himself the first will. So that he is as he would himself, and such as he would, and yet his will did not generate or produce any thing that was not before." And now we may in all probability conclude, that Lactantius

* P. 747. † P. 755.

derived this doctrine from Plato and Plotinus;[2] which, how far it is to be either allowed of or excused, we leave others to judge; only we shall observe, that, as the word αὐτογενὴς, frequently attributed to God by Christians as well as Pagans,[3] seems to imply as much; so the scope and drift of Plotinus, in all this, was plainly no other, than partly to set forth the self-existence of the supreme Deity after a more lively manner, and partly to confute that odd conceit, which some might possibly entertain of God, as if he either happened by chance to be what he is, or else were such by a certain necessity of nature, and had his being imposed upon him: whereas, he is as much every way what he would will and choose to be, as if he had made himself by his own will and choice. Neither have we set down all this, only to give an account of that one expression of Plato's, "that God causeth himself and all things," but also to show how punctually precise, curious and accurate, some of these Pagans were in their speculations concerning the Deity.[4]

[2] For my part, however, I think otherwise, as I have professed just above. There is a vast difference between the doctrine of Lactantius, who expressly denies the eternity of God, and that of Plotinus, who every where strenuously maintains it. Besides, if I am not much deceived, the mind of Lactantius was a stranger to subtleties like those in which Plotinus indulged, and probably would not even have understood them, if they had been propounded to him.

[3] Many similar passages, wherein God is called αὐτογενὴς, have been collected from Greek and Latin authors by Dion. Petavius in his Dogmata Theolog. de Trinitate, lib. 5. cap. 5. p. 294. tom. 2. Which, however, as differing in sense, are not all to be held in the same account.

[4] It may be proper to make a few brief remarks upon what is here eruditely discussed by the learned Doctor. I. I know of no passage, in which Plato calls the Deity αὐτοφυὴς; but, as Lactantius informs us, that Orpheus, whoever he was, applied this term to him, it is probably a slip of the learned Doctor's memory. II. The passage of Plato from the De Republica, lib. 10. in which he affirms the supreme Being to have made all other things and also himself, I am almost inclined to think, should be understood of the ideas of natures and not of the natures themselves. I suspect the philosopher to have meant this: That God conceived and formed in his mind from all eternity the exemplar, image, or ἰδέα, not only of all things which he was about at any time to create, but also of himself. And to this surmise I am led by what follows in Plato. For he illustrates his theory, marvellous as it appeared to be, by the example of men, who produce at pleasure their own images in a mirror. Now these images are not the men themselves, but their shadows and resemblances only. Wherefore, when Plato tells us, that God procreated both himself and all other things, he ought there also to be understood, it would seem, as speaking of those eternal images or models of God and all created things. III. Be this as it may, however, Plotinus' refined subtleties upon this subject have a very different signification from the words of Plato, if these latter be even explained as referring to the nature itself of the Deity. For Plato says, that God produced himself in the same way as the world. But, according to his opinion, God framed the world by introducing into chaotic, rude, and undigested matter, a fixed and orderly form. Consequently, if God made himself and the universe in the same manner, we must conclude, agreeably to Plato's own doctrine, that at some finite time God, who had before lain in a state of confusion and disorder, assumed a new habit and a particular form. Which opinion is both foolish and absurd in itself, and as foreign as it can be to the doctrine of Plotinus and his associates. My object here is to show to others, even by this example, that those ancients who make use of the same phraseology are not necessarily to be considered as belonging to the same class on account of the affinity of words. It is inconceivable,

To return therefore to Plato: though some have suspected that trinity, which is commonly called Platonic, to have been nothing but a mere figment and invention of some later Platonists, yet the contrary hereunto seems to be unquestionably evident, that Plato himself really asserted such a trinity of universal and divine hypostases, which have the nature of principles. For first, whereas, in his tenth book of laws, he, professedly opposing Atheists, undertakes to prove the existence of a Deity, he does notwithstan nd no higher than to the Psyche, or universal as a self-moving principle, and the immediate, o of all that motion, which is

into what grave errors men e eminence in the learned world have been led in this respect. case in point to prove it. For the worthy Doctor classes Plot together, whom he with much more propriety would have kept led, that the passages of Plotinus are not always quoted by him at author, but some portions here and there omitted, which seemed little light upon the matter in hand. IV. The Christian writers be procreated from himself, referred the word for the most part to God the Father and held this to be the characteristic, which distinguished him from the Son, whom the scriptures state to be begotten of the Father. From which it is again manifest, that the notion attached by the followers of Christ to this and similar words is very different from that which the Platonists had in their mind, when using them in reference to God. For with Christians, *αὐτοφυὴς*, *ἀγέννητος*, and other names of the kind, when applied to God the Father, meant the same as "generated and produced from no other." Nor are examples altogether wanting to show, that this is not entirely at variance with the principles of the Greek language. I shall adduce one from Dionysius the Areopagite, who has these words in his De Theologia Mystica, cap. 2. p. 25. tom. 2. opp. *Ὥσπερ τὸ αὐτοφυὲς ἄγαλμα ποιοῦντες*. They, he tells us, who inquire into the nature of God, do the same as those "who chisel out a natural statue." Now it would be ridiculous to translate *αὐτοφυὲς* here: "produced from," or "by itself." For what sane man, I ask, would admit, that a statue can be produced from itself? *Ἄγαλμα αὐτοφυὲς* is here a statue not made by an artificer, but produced by nature itself; as there are many stones which represent as it were a natural statue. An *αὐτοφυὴς* God, therefore, may with propriety be interpreted thus: "A God who is without cause, or who is self-existent, and not made or produced by any one." Nevertheless, I would not deny, that some Christian writers may occasionally have applied such like terms to the godhead generally, and that too in a different sense: whom I would grant to have closely followed in the footsteps of the Platonists. Of these we have an example in Synesius, a half Christian and half Platonist, who, Hymn. 3. opp. p. 323. calls God both father and son of himself:

Πατὴρ, αὐτοπάτωρ,
Προπάτωρ, ἀπάτωρ,
Υἱὲ σεαυτοῦ,

"Father, father of thyself,
Forefather, without father,
Son of thyself."

There was one also, who did not hesitate to apply the epithets we are speaking of to the second person of the Deity, or the son of God, and to call him, *αὐτόφυτος*, *αὐτοφυὴς*, *αὐτόγονος*: namely Nonnus, whose Paraphrase on St. John is well-known. The poet has been severely censured for this, however, by Dan. Heinsius in his Aristarchus appended to this Nonnus, cap. 3. who altogether denies the applicability of such names to God, inasmuch as we thereby lay down a beginning in him who is without beginning. For my part, as I have already intimated, I think, that these words are not to be interpreted so strictly, when employed by those who professed the Christian faith.

in the world. And this is all the god that there he undertakes to prove. But in other places of his writings he frequently asserts, above the self-moving Psyche, an immoveable and standing Nous or intellect, which was properly the Demiurgus, or architectonic framer of the whole world. And lastly, above this multiform Intellect, he plainly asserts yet a higher hypostasis, one most simple and most absolutely perfect Being; which he calls τὸ ἓν, in opposition to that multiplicity, which speaks something of imperfection in it, and τ' ἀγαθὸν, "goodness itself," as being above mind and understanding; the first intelligible, and an infinite fecundity together with overflowing benignity. And accordingly, in his second epistle to Dionysius, does he mention a trinity of divine hypostases, all together. Now the words ὁ θεὸς and τὸ θεῖον, "God," and "the divinity" in Plato, seem sometimes to comprehend this whole trinity of divine hypostases, as they are again sometimes severally applied to each of them, accordingly, as we have already observed, that Zeus or Jupiter in Plato is not always taken for the first and highest hypostasis in his trinity, but sometimes the second hypostasis of mind or intellect is meant thereby, and sometimes again his third hypostasis of the universal and eternal Psyche; nevertheless the first of these three hypostases is that which is properly called by the Platonists, πηγὴ τῆς θεότητος, "the fountain of the Godhead," and by Plato himself:[5] Ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς, περὶ ὃν πάντα ἐστὶ, οὗ ἕνεκα πάντα, καὶ ὃ αἴτιον πάντων τῶν καλῶν, "The King of all things, about whom are all things, and for whose sake are all things, and the cause of all good and excellent things."

And this first divine hypostasis, which in Plato's theology is properly αὐτόθεος, "the original Deity," is largely insisted upon by that philosopher in the sixth of his Politics, under the name and title of τ' ἀγαθὸν, "the good;" but principally there illustrated by that resemblance of the sun, called by that philosopher also, "a heavenly God," and said to be the offspring of this highest good, and something analogous to it in the corporeal world, Ὅ,τι περ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ πρός τε νοῦν καὶ τὰ νοούμενα, τοῦτο τοῦτον ἐν τῷ ὁρατῷ πρός τε ὄψιν καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα, "This is the same in the intelligible world to intellect (or knowledge) and intelligibles, that the sun is in the sensible world to sight and visibles. For,[6] as the sun is not sight, but only the cause of it;

[5] These words occur in Plato's second epistle to Dionysius, p. 707. opp. On the trinity said to have been professed by Plato, Dr. Cudworth discourses at greater length below: for which place we reserve what remarks we have to offer on this argument.

[6] Do not suppose these to be the divine Plato's own words. The learned Doctor has given what he fancied to be Plato's opinion in his own language and it is very doubtful, whether he has accurately expressed the philosopher's meaning. Were I to attempt to explain and illustrate the whole of Plato's reasoning on this point, I should have to enter into a long and tedious discussion, unsuited to the plan of this work. Let those, therefore, who take delight in subtleties refer to the philosopher himself, as they will there find a plentiful harvest.

nor is that light, by which we see, the same with the sun itself, but only ἡλιοειδὲς, a sun-like thing; so neither is the supreme and highest good (properly) knowledge, but the cause of knowledge; nor is intellect (precisely considered as such) the best and most perfect being, but only ἀγαθόειδες, a boniform thing." Again, "As the sun gives to things not only their visibility, but also their generation; so does that highest good not only cause the cognoscibility of things, but also their very essences and beings: Οὐκ οὐσίας ὂ ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει his highest good being not itself properly essen essence, transcending the same, both in respect power." Which language and conceit of Plato's reek fathers seem to have entertained, yet so as e whole Trinity, when they call God ὑπερούσιον, ıtial." But the meaning of that philosopher was, no other than this, that this highest good hath no racteristic upon it, limiting and determining of it, dden and incomprehensible source of all things. In the last place, we shall observe, that this first divine hypostasis of the Platonic trinity is by that philosopher called, τοῦ τε ἡγεμόνος καὶ αἰτίου πάντων πατὴρ, "The father of the prince, and cause of all things." Wherein we cannot but take notice of an admirable correspondency betwixt the Platonic philosophy and Christianity, in that the second hypostasis of both their trinities (called also sometimes λόγος by the Platonists, as well as νοῦς) is said to be the immediate cause of all things; and the Demiurgus, the architect, maker or artificer of the whole world.

Now to Plato we might here join Xenophon, because he was his equal, and a Socratic too (though it seems there was not so good correspondence betwixt them); which Xenophon, however in sundry places of his writings he acknowledges a plurality of gods, yet doth he give plain testimony also of one supreme and universal Numen; as this particularly,[7] Ὁ πάντα σείων καὶ ἀτρεμίζων, ὡς μὲν μέγας τις καὶ δυνατὸς, φανερὸς, ὑποῖος δ' ἔστι μορφὴν, ἀφανής, "He that both agitates all things, and establisheth the frame of the whole world, though he be manifest to be great and powerful, yet is he, as to his form, inconspicuous."

XXIV. In the next place we come to Aristotle; who, that

[7] These words are not to be met with in any work of Xenophon's now extant. But they are twice quoted by Clemens Alexandr. in Cohort. ad Gentes, cap. 6. p. 61. and Stromat. lib. 5. p. 417. &c. from whom, I doubt not, they were borrowed by Eusebius and Cyril, who also appeal to them. A similar sentiment, however, occurs among the sayings of Socrates in Memorab. Socrat. lib. 4. p. 634. which led Dr. Potter to suppose, Annot. ad Clement. p. 61. that Clement had quoted this passage of Xenophon from memory, and hence had expressed the sense only and not the words. But as Clement gives the axiom twice in exactly the same words, I attach but little importance to this conjecture.

ıe acknowledged more gods than one (as well as the other Pagans) ppears from his using the word so often plurally. As particularly in this passage of his Nicomachian Ethics:* Ἡ δὲ τελεία ὐδαιμονία, ὅτι θεωρητική τίς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν φανείη· οὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι· ῥάξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονεῖμαι χρεὼν αὐτοῖς; πότερα τὰς δικαίας; ἢ γελοῖοι φανοῦνται συναλλάττοντες καὶ παρακαταθήκας ἀποδιδόντες, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα; ἄλλα τὰς ἀνδρείους; ὑπομένοντας ἃ φοβερὰ καὶ κινδυνεύοντας, ὅτι καλόν· ἢ τὰς ἐλευθερίους; τίνι δὲ δώσουσι; ἄτοπον δ', εἰ καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῖς νόμισμα, ἤ τι τοιοῦτον· εἰ δὲ σώφρονες, τί ἂν εἶεν; ἢ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσι φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας; διεξιοῦσι δὲ πάντα φαίνοιτ' ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὰ καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν αὐτοὺς· καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα, οὐ γὰρ τὸ καθεύδειν, ὥσπερ τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα· τῷ δὲ ζῶντι τὸ πράττειν ἀφῃρημένῳ, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρίας, "That perfect happiness is a speculative or contemplative energy, may be made manifest from hence, because we account the gods most of all happy. Now what moral actions can we attribute them? Whether those of justice amongst one another; as if it were not ridiculous to suppose the gods to make contracts and bargains among themselves, and the like. Or else those of fortitude and magnanimity; as if the gods had their fears, dangers and difficulties to encounter withal. Or those of liberality; as if the gods had some such thing as money too, and there were among them indigent to receive alms. Or, lastly, shall we attribute to them the actions of temperance? But would not this be a reproachful commendation of the gods to say, that they conquer and master their vicious lusts and appetites? Thus running through all the actions of moral virtue, we find them to be small, and mean, and unworthy of the gods. And yet we all believe the gods to live, and consequently to act; unless we should suppose them perpetually to sleep, as Endymion did. Wherefore if all moral actions, and therefore much more mechanical operations, be taken away from that which lives and understands, what is there left to it besides contemplation?" To which he there adds a further argument also of the same thing: "Because other animals, who are deprived of contemplation, partake not of happiness. For to the gods all their life is happy; to men so far forth, as it approacheth to contemplation; but brute animals, that do not at all contemplate, partake not at all of happiness." Where Aristotle plainly acknowledges a plurality of gods, and that there is a certain higher rank of beings above men. And by the way we may here observe, how from those words of his: Ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπειλήφασι θεοὺς, "All men

* Lib. 10. c. 8. [P. 183. tom. 3. opp.]

suppose the gods to live," and from what follows in him, that opinion[8] of some late writers may be confuted, that the Pagans generally worshipped the inanimate parts of the world as true and proper gods: Aristotle here telling us, that they universally agreed in this, that the gods were animals, living and understanding beings, and such as are therefore capable of contemplation. Moreover, Aristotle in his Politics,* writing on the means to conserve a tyranny, as he calls it, sets down this for one amongst the rest: Ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς φαίνεσθαι ἀὶ σπουδάζοντα διαφερό γὰρ φοβοῦνται, τὸ παθεῖν τὶ παράνομον ὑπὸ τῶν δεισιδαίμονα νομίζωσιν εἶναι τὸν ἄρχοντα καὶ φρον καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσιν ἧττον, ὡς συμμάχους ἔχοντι "For a prince or monarch to seem to be alw ordinarily sedulous about the worship of the men are less afraid of suffering any injustice rs or princes, as they think to be religiously disp ly affected towards the gods. Neither will they be e conspiracies against such, they supposing, that the gods will be their abettors and assistants." Where the word δεισιδαίμων seems to be taken in a good sense, and in way of commendation for a religious person; though we must confess, that Aristotle himself does not here write so much like a δεισιδαίμων, as a mere politician. Likewise in his first book De Cœlo, he writeth thus:† Πάντες ἄνθρωποι περὶ θεῶν ἔχουσιν ὑπόληψιν, καὶ πάντες τὸν ἀνωτάτω τῷ θείῳ τόπον ἀποδιδόασι, καὶ Βάρβαροι καὶ Ἕλληνες, ὡς τῷ ἀθανάτῳ τὸ ἀθάνατον συνηρτημένον, εἴπερ οὖν ἐστί τι θεῖον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔστι, &c. "All men have an opinion or persuasion, that there are gods. And they, who think so, as well Barbarians as Greeks, attribute the highest place to that which is divine, as supposing the immortal heavens to be most accommodate to immortal gods. Wherefore, if there be any divinity, as unquestionably there is, the body of the heavens must be acknowledged to be of a different kind from that of the elements." And in the following book[9] he tells us

[8] This opinion was maintained, we are told, by certain Roman catholics then living in Britain, who carried on a dispute with the most celebrated theologians of the Church of England on the true nature and meaning of idolatry, and who, in order to ward off all suspicion of this crime from themselves, endeavoured to cast the greatest infamy upon the religions of antiquity, and to prove that nations formerly had worshipped inanimate things. This, among other causes, roused the excellent Ed. Herbert of Cherbury, to write his well known work De Religione Gentilium, in which he goes to the opposite extreme in excusing and palliating the opinions and ceremonies of some nations.

* Lib. 5. c. 11.

† Cap. 3. [P. 615. tom. 1. opp.]

[9] The opinion here expressed is maintained by Aristotle in the second book De Cœlo, but he nowhere tells us, that it is agreeable τῇ μαντείᾳ περὶ θεῶν. He speaks, however, of this μαντεία at the end of the first chapter of this book, p. 641. tom. 1. opp. where he states, that if the heavens be supposed to be eternal, opinions might be brought forward more in accordance with this vaticination.

again, "That it is most agreeable τῇ μαντείᾳ περὶ τῶν θεῶν, to that vaticination, which all men have in their minds concerning the gods, to suppose the heaven to be a quintessence distinct from the elements, and therefore incorruptible." Where Aristotle affirmeth, that men have generally μαντείαν, "a vatication" in their minds concerning gods; to wit, that themselves are not the highest beings, but that there is a rank of intellectual beings, superior to men; the chief of which is the supreme Deity; concerning whom there is indeed the greatest μαντεία or "vaticination" of all.

We acknowledge it to be very true, that Aristotle does not so much insist upon demons, as Plato and the generality of Pagans in that age did; and probably he had not so great a belief of their existence; though he doth make mention of them also, as when in his Metaphysics,[10] speaking of bodies compounded of the elements, he instanceth in ζῶά τε καὶ δαιμόνια, "animals and demons," and elsewhere he insinuates them to have airy bodies, in these words:[1] Ἐπιζητήσειε γὰρ ἄν τις, καὶ διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν ἡ ἐν

[10] Meaning, I have no doubt, the following passage, Metaphys. lib. 5. cap. 8. p. 329. tom. 4. opp. Οὐσία δὲ λέγεται τά τε ἁπλᾶ σώματα, οἷον γῆ, καὶ πῦρ, καὶ ὕδωρ, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, καὶ ὅλως σώματα, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων συνεστῶτα, ζωά τε καὶ δαιμόνια, καὶ τὰ μόρια τούτων, "By substance we mean both simple bodies, such as earth, fire, water, and the like, and bodies universally, and whatever are compounded of these, both animals and demons, and the particles of these." This passage is of great weight towards confirming what we have remarked, at some length above on ch. 1. sect. 26. and 40. that what the ancient philosophers called "simple, open," ἀσώματον and "separate from body," is not the same as that, to which moderns apply these terms, and that those, who formerly believed in "spirits, incorporeal natures" and "demons," did not attach the same notions to these words as ourselves. For Aristotle here tells us, that earth, fire, and water are substance, and ἁπλᾶ, or "simple," and asserts, that animals as well as demons are compounded of these elements. Which indeed agrees admirably with Cicero's words concerning the soul, quoted by us above from Academ. Quæst. lib. 4. They clearly show also what is meant by οὐσία in many passages of the ancient philosophers, when it is opposed to γένεσις. Most of the ancients called that ἁπλοῦν which has no admixture of any any other nature or substance, and is not concrete. And οὐσία is attributed to these things, ὅτι οὐ καθ' ὑποκείμενον λέγεται, as Aristotle says, Metaphys. lib. 5. cap. 8. p. 329. ἀλλὰ κατὰ τούτων τὰ ἄλλα, "because they are not said of a subject, but the other things of them." But γένεσις is that which is compounded and generated from several elements.

[1] They occur De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 8. p. 17. tom. 2. opp. But for my part I am quite at a loss to perceive, how it can be proved from this passage, that Aristotle considered demons to have aerial bodies. For there is here no mention of demons, nor one word about aerial bodies; but the philosopher is discoursing of the soul which is in the air. Instead of this passage, therefore, as not bearing upon the question, I shall substitute another, in which demon is distinctly mentioned. It occurs in his Rhetoric. lib. 2. cap. 23. p. 785. t. 3. opp. Τὸ δαιμόνιον οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἢ θεὸς, ἢ θεοῦ ἔργον· καίτοι ὅστις οἴεται, θεοῦ ἔργον εἶναι, τοῦτον ἀνάγκη οἴεσθαι καὶ θεοὺς εἶναι, "The demon is nothing else than either God or the work of God: but whoever supposes it to be the work of God, must necessarily suppose gods also." But, candidly to confess the truth, neither this passage nor the one quoted by Dr. Cudworth, will much assist those who seek to prove, that Aristotle did not discard demons. With regard to this passage, it is an example adduced by the philosopher to show, how a rhetorician in the forum may reason from a definition; and therefore it affords us no clue to his own sentiments. For, as every one must be aware, it would be improper to

τῷ ἀέρι ψυχὴ, τῆς ἐν τοῖς ζώοις βελτίων ἐστὶ, καὶ ἀθανατωτέρα, "Some perhaps would demand a reason, why the soul that is in the air, is better and more immortal than that in animals." However, whether Aristotle believed these lower demon gods or no, it is certain, that he acknowledged a higher kind of gods, namely, the intelligences of all the several spheres, if not also the souls of them and the stars; which spheres being, according to the astronomy then received, forty-seven in number, he must needs acknowledge at least so many gods. Besides which, Aristotle seems also to suppose of incorporeal gods, without the heavens, where, n, there is neither body, nor place, nor vacuum, ese words:* Οὔτ' ἐν τόπῳ τὰκεῖ πέφυκεν, οὔτε χρ γηράσκειν, οὐδ' ἐστὶν οὐδενὸς οὐδεμία μεταβολὴ, τῶ άτω τεταγμένων φορὰν, ἀλλ' ἀναλλοίωτα καὶ ἀπαθ ἔχοντα ζωὴν καὶ αὐταρκεστάτην διατελεῖ τὸν ἅ They who exist there are such as are neither place, nor to wax old with time, nor is there a ll in those things above the highest sphere; but they being impassible and unalterable, lead the best and most self-sufficient life, throughout all eternity." But this passage is not without suspicion of being supposititious.[2]

take all that a writer brings forward in illustration of the rules of speaking as his own real opinions. If I am not very much mistaken, this example is borrowed by the philosopher from Socrates' defence, and perhaps from the very Apologies of Plato and Xenophon. Socrates was accused of denying the existence of gods, but yet he constantly affirmed, that a demon was always present to him. Aristotle, therefore, shows that this demon of Socrates is of itself sufficient to clear his character and refute the charges of his enemies. For, a demon being either God or the work of God, it follows that he who maintains the presence of a demon in himself can in no wise be suspected of atheism.

* De Cœl. lib. 1. c. 9. [P. 631. tom. 1. opp.]

[2] For myself, however, I entertain an altogether different view of this passage. In the first place I see no reason whatever for suspecting it not to be Aristotle's. For besides its being in perfect accordance with the opinions propounded by the Stagirite in the same chapter and elsewhere, these words are evidently required by the whole context of the discourse; which, without them, would be altogether lame and destitute of meaning. Again, I can in no way find out how it can be inferred from this passage, that Aristotle supposed certain gods to exist without the heavens. For he is not speaking of natures placed out of heaven, but explaining the affections of those inclosed in heaven, which he concludes to be independent of place, time, and all vicissitude, inasmuch as heaven itself is without place, vacuum, or time. I shall add a few words on the whole of the argument here pursued by the learned Doctor. If I possess the faculty of judging, all that he advances is insufficient to convince us, that Aristotle is to be ranked among those who hold the existence of many gods. I should wish the same to be understood also of some other philosophers, whose dogmas he has explained in the preceding. In the first place, the general tenor of the doctrine professed by Aristotle shows, that he could not have worshipped such gods as were at that period reverenced in Greece, or in the proper sense of the term paid homage to Juno, Jupiter, Diana, Mercury, and the other popular deities. It remains for us to inquire, whether he professed a plurality of gods in some such way as we have above shown Socrates to have done. In order to arrive at a clear view of the matter it ought to be determined in the first instance, what is meant by "believing in the existence of many gods." In my opinion, he alone believes in a plurality of gods, who not only admits the existence of many beings more powerful, more noble, and more excellent than mankind, but inculcates

Notwithstanding all which, that Aristotle did assert one supreme and universal Numen, is a thing also unquestionable. For though it be granted that he useth the singular θεὸς, as likewise τὸ θεῖον and τὸ δαιμόνιον, many times indefinitely, for a god in general, or any divine being; and that such places as these have been oftentimes mistaken by Christian writers, as if Aristotle had meant the supreme God in them; yet it is nevertheless certain, that he often useth those words also emphatically, for one only supreme God, as in that of his Metaphysics:* Ὅτε γὰρ θεὸς δοκεῖ τὸ αἴτιον πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή τις, "God seemeth to be a cause and certain principle to all things." And also in his De Anima,† where he speaks of the soul of the heavens, and its circular motion: Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ὅτι βέλτιον λέγεται· καίτοι γ' ἐχρῆν τὸν θεὸν διὰ τοῦτο κύκλῳ ποιεῖν φέρεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν, ὅτι βέλτιον αὐτῇ τὸ κίνεσθαι τοῦ μένειν, κινεῖσθαι δὲ οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως, "Neither is that a good cause of the circular motion of the heavens, which they (that is the Platonists) call the

that men ought to pay a certain homage and offer sacrifice to these beings. For we are not to rank any one among the worshippers of many gods, who simply supposes many beings to exist far superior to men in power, strength, wisdom, and other attributes. For in that case all Christians, who, agreeably to sacred writ, believe in the existence of God's messengers or angels, would have to be included in this class. There must be superadded an opinion, that it is the duty of all men to propitiate these natures with divine worship and ceremonies. We ought to ascertain first of all, therefore, whether Aristotle believed in many gods in this way. It is beyond question, that he supposed certain minds or intelligences to preside over the celestial orbs and believed them to be natures far surpassing the whole human race and to hold a middle station between the supreme God and mortals. On these intelligences he bestowed the name of gods; and, moreover, acknowledged no other gods besides these. We advance nothing here upon conjecture, but shall prove such to be the fact from Aristotle's own words, occurring Metaphysic. lib. 14. cap. 8. p. 483. tom. 4. opp. Thus, after having by sundry arguments shown the existence of such like minds, he subjoins as follows. Παραδέδοται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ παλαιῶν, ἐν μύθου σχήματι καταλελειμμένα τοῖς ὕστερον, ὅτι θεοί τέ εἰσιν οὗτοι, καὶ περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν ὅλην φύσιν, "It has been handed down from our ancestors of old, and left to posterity in the form of fable, that these (intelligences) are gods, and that the divinity contains the whole of nature." To which he adds, that this opinion is worthy of being entertained, nay, a noble one; but that the rest that is handed down respecting the gods, is mere fiction and idle nonsense, invented for the sake of the laws and the public weal: Τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μυθικῶς ἠδῆ προσίχεται πρὸς τὴν πειθὼ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ προς τὴν εἰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸ σύμφερον χρῆσιν, "But the rest is fabulously added for the persuasion of the multitude, and for the benefit of the laws and the furtherance of what is useful." Nothing can be plainer. Aristotle believed in the existence of no gods except those natures, which he supposed to preside over the celestial orbs. But did he at the same time suppose worship, prayers, and sacrifices to be due to them? I am either grossly mistaken or he ranked all these among the absurdities, which he considers to have been invented from motives of utility. So far from supposing him to have decreed divine honours to these intelligences, I suspect him to have been persuaded, that public worship and homage ought not to be paid even to the supreme Being. I see no reason, indeed, why he should have felt inclined to pray to these deities, which in his opinion not only performed their duties by fate and necessity from all eternity, but also attended to nothing else besides the orbs over which they respectively presided and exercised no sort of control over human affairs.

* Lib. 1. [Cap. 2. p. 263. tom. 4. opp.]

† Lib. 1. c. 3. [P. 10. tom. 2. opp.]

τὸ βέλτιον, because it is better that it should be so than otherwise; as if God therefore ought to have made the soul of the world such, as to move the heaven circularly, because it was better for it to move so than otherwise: but this being a speculation that properly belongs to some other science, we shall no further pursue it in this place." Thus afterwards again in the same book:[3] Συμβαίνει δὲ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ γε καὶ ἀφρονέστατον εἶναι τὸν θεὸν, μόνος γὰρ τῶν στοιχείων ἓν οὐ γνωριεῖ, τὸ Νεῖκος, τὰ δὲ θνητὰ πάντα, ἐκ πάντων γὰρ ἕκαστον, "It follows from Empedocles' principles, that God must needs be the most unwise of all, he alone being ignorant of that (out of which all other things are compounded) νεῖκος, or contention (because himself is nothing but φιλία, unity and friendship) whereas mortal animals may know or conceive all things, they being compounded of all." Which same passage we have again also, in his Metaphysics,[4] from whence it was before cited to another purpose. To these might be added another place out of his book of Generation and Corruption:[5] Τὸ ὅλον συνεπλήρωσεν ὁ θεὸς, ἐντελεχῆ ποιήσας γένεσιν, "God hath filled up the whole, or universe, and constantly supplies the same, having made a continual successive generation." Lastly, τὸ δαιμόνιον is sometimes plainly used by Aristotle also, not for the divinity in general, or any thing that is divine, but for that one supreme Deity, the governor of the whole world. Thus in that passage of his Rhetoric to Alexander:* Τοῦτό ἐστιν, ᾧ διαφέρομεν τῶν λοιπῶν ζώων, ἡμεῖς οἱ μεγίστης τιμῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ δαιμονίου τετυχηκότες, "This is that wherein we men differ from other animals, having received the greatest honour from God, that though they be endued with appetite and anger, and other passions, as well as we, yet we alone are furnished with speech and reason."

Over and besides which, Aristotle, in his Metaphysics,† (as hath been already observed) professedly opposeth that imaginary opinion of many independent principles of the universe; that is, of many unmade self-existent deities; he confuting the same from the phenomena, because ἅπαντα πρὸς ἓν συντέτακται, "all things are plainly co-ordered to one," the whole world conspiring into one agreeing harmony; whereas, if there were many principles or independent Deities, the system of the world must needs have been ἐπεισοδιώδης, "incoherent and inconspiring," like an all-agreeing drama, botched up of many impertinent in-

[3] De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 16. tom. 2. opp.
[4] Lib. 3. cap. 4. p. 295. tom. 4. opp. Where, however, we find the same sentiment only, not exactly the same words. On the matter itself I have treated above on sect. 21. and have shown, that Aristotle has done Empedocles injustice.
[5] Lib. 2. cap. 10. p. 741. tom. 1. opp.
* Cap. 1. p. 609. P. [P. 833. tom. 3. opp.]
† Lib. 14. cap. 10. Par. [P. 484. tom. 4. opp.]

tersertions. Whereupon, Aristotle concludes after this manner: Τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται κακῶς πολιτεύεσθαι,

Οὐκ ἀγαθὸν Πολυκοιρανίη, Εἷς Κοίρανος,

"But things will not be ill administered (which was then it seems a kind of proverbial speech) and according to Homer, the government of many is not good, (nor could the affairs of the world be evenly carried on under it) wherefore there is one Prince or Monarch over all." From which passage of Aristotle's it is evident, that though he asserted Πολυθείαν, "a multiplicity of gods" in the vulgar sense, as hath been already declared, yet he absolutely denied Πολυκοιρανίην and Πολυαρχίαν, "a polyarchy or mundane aristocracy," that is, a multiplicity of first principles and independent deities. Wherefore, though Aristotle doated much upon that whimsey of his, of as many intelligibles, or eternal and immoveable minds (now commonly called intelligencies) as there are moveable spheres of all kinds in the heavens, (which he sticks not also sometimes to call principles;) yet must he of necessity be interpreted to have derived all these from one supreme universal Deity, which as Simplicius expresseth it, is Ἀρχὴ ἀρχῶν, "the principle of principles;" and which comprehends and contains those inferior deities under it, after the same manner as the primum mobile, or "highest sphere," contains all the lesser spheres within it; because otherwise there would not be εἷς Κοίρανος, "one prince or monarch" over the whole; but the government of the world would be a polykœrany or aristocracy of gods, concluded to be an ill government. Moreover, as Plotinus[6] represents Aristotle's sense,* it is not conceivable that so many independent principles should thus constantly conspire, πρὸς ἓν ἔργον τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐρανοῦ συμφωνίαν, "into one work, that agreeable symphony, and harmony of the whole heaven." As there could not be any reason neither, why there should be just so many of these intelligences, as there are spheres and no more; and it is absurd to suppose, κατὰ συντυχίαν τὰς ἀρχὰς εἶναι, "that the first principles of the universe happened by chance."

Now, this highest principle as it is ἀκίνητος οὐσία, "an immoveable essence," is by Aristotle in the first place supposed to be ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, "the principle of motion in the universe," or at least of that chiefest motion of the primum mobile, or, "highest sphere," (which according to the astronomy of those

* The learned Doctor is mistaken. In that passage Plotinus is not explaining Aristotle's opinion, but enumerating the difficulties connected with it, in order to show that Plato held much sounder views on divine matters than Aristotle. And the very words quoted by him contain a certain doubt, which Plotinus considers Aristotle's doctrine to labour under. He denies it to have been made clear by Aristotle, why all the intelligences conspire so harmoniously to the performance of one work.

[6] Enn. 5. lib. 1. cap. 7. [Cap. 9. p. 490. 491.]

times seems to have been the sphere of fixed stars) by whose rapid circumgyration, all the other spheres and heavens were imagined to be carried round from east to west. And accordingly, the supreme Deity is by Aristotle* called *τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον*, "the first immoveable mover," or the mover of the primum mobile, and whole heaven. Which first mover being concluded by him to but one, he doth from thence infer the singularity of the heaven or world:† *Ἓν μὲν ἄρα τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ, τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίν… κινούμενον ἄρα ἀεὶ καὶ συνεχῶς ἓν μόνον. εἷς ἄρα* … "There is one numerically first immoveable move… ; and therefore there is but one moveable neither… one heaven or world. In which doctrine of Ar… seems to be a great difference betwixt his phil… of Plato's; in that Plato makes the principle … e heavens and whole world to be a self-moving … stotle supposeth it be an immoveable mind o… Nevertheless, according to Aristotle's explication of matter, the difference betwixt them is not great, if any at all; Aristotle's immoveable mover being understood by him, not to move the heavens efficiently, but only objectively and finally, *ὡς ἐρώμενον*, "as being loved." Which conceit of his Proclus upon Plato's Timæus‡ perstringeth after this manner: *Τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ μέν τὸν κόσμον ἐπιστρέψαντες ἐπὶ τὸν νοῦν, καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἔρωτος, τοῦ περὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὄρεκτον, δόντες αὐτῷ τὴν κίνησιν, οὐδὲν ἔφασαν ἀπὸ τοῦ νοῦ καθήκειν εἰς αὐτὸν, ἐν ἴσῳ προστάξαντες αὐτὸν τοῖς ἐρασμίοις μὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν, μηδὲν δὲ γεννήτικον ἔχουσιν ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει*, "Some of the ancients converting the world to mind (or intellect) and making it move only by love of that first desirable, acknowledged nothing at all to descend down from Mind (or God) upon the world; but equalized the same with other amiable things, amongst sensibles, that have nothing generative in their nature." Where Proclus seems to suppose Aristotle to have attributed to God no efficiency at all upon the world; the contrary whereunto shall be evidently proved afterwards. In the mean time, it is certain that Aristotle, besides his immoveable mover of the heavens, which moveth only finally or as being loved, must needs suppose another immediate mover of them, or efficient cause of that motion; which could be nothing but a soul, that enamoured with this supreme mind, did, as it were in imitation of it, continually turn round the heavens. Which seems to be nothing but Plato's doctrine disguised; that philosopher affirming likewise, the circular motions of the

* Met. lib. 14. cap. 8. p. 1003. P. [P. 481. tom. 4. opp.]
† Met. lib. 14. cap. 8. [P. 483. tom. 4. opp.
‡ P. 167.

heavens, caused efficiently by a soul of the world in his Timæus,[7] to be, *τὴν περὶ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν μάλιστα οὖσαν*, "a motion, that is most agreeable to that of mind or wisdom." And again, in his laws:[8] *Τὴν τοῦ νοῦ περιόδῳ πάντως ὡς δυνατὸν, οἰκειοτάτην καὶ ὁμοίαν*, "That which of all corporeal motions only resembles the circuit of intellect. Which Platonic conceit found entertainment with Boëtius,* who writing of the soul of the world, represents it thus:

> Quæ cum secta duos motum glomeravit in orbes,
> In semet reditura meat, mentemque profundam
> Circuit, et simili convertit imagine cœlum.

Wherefore, as well according to Plato's hypothesis, as Aristotle's, it may be affirmed of the supreme Deity, in the same Boëtius' language, that,

> ———Stabilisque manens dat cuncta moveri.

"Being itself immoveable, it causeth all other things to move." The immediate efficient cause of which motion also, no less according to Aristotle than Plato, seems to have been a mundane soul; however, Aristotle thought not so fit to make this soul a principle; in all probability, because he was not so well assured of the incorporeity of souls, as of minds or intellects.[9]

Nevertheless, this is not the only thing which Aristotle imputed to his first and highest immoveable principle, or the supreme Deity, its turning round of the primum mobile, and that no otherwise than as being loved, or as the final cause thereof, as Proclus supposed; but he, as well as Anaxagoras,† asserted it to be also, *τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς αἰτίαν*, "the cause of well and fit," or *τὸ οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ τό εὖ*, "that without which there could be no such thing as well;" that is no order, no aptitude, proportion, and harmony in the universe: he declaring excellently, that *εἰ μὴ ἔσται παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἄλλα, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρχὴ καὶ τάξις, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ-τῆν ἀρχὴς ἀρχὴ*, "unless there were something else in the world besides sensibles, there could be neither beginning nor order in it, but one thing would be the principle of another infinitely, or without end." And again in another place already

[7] Cap. 17. p. 241. ed. Fabricii. Cicero translates the words differently: Unus, says he, ex septem motibus, qui mentem atque intelligentiam cohiberet maxime, "One of the seven motions, which most controls mind and intelligence." In my opinion, Plato's meaning is better expressed by Chalcidius, who translates thus: Motum rationabilem, cui animarum proprius est circuitus, "A reasonable motion, to which the circuit of souls is proper," agreeably to the other passage from De Legibus, lib. 10. p. 669.

[8] Lib. 10. p. 669.

* De Consol. lib. 3. Met. 9.

[9] The whole of this question, whether Aristotle ascribed a soul to the world or not, and in what this soul of Aristotle's differed from that of Plato, has been copiously discussed by us above, on the Digression concerning a Plastic Nature, sect. 23. 24.

† Met. lib. 14. cap. 7. P.

cited:[10] Τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, ἴσως οὔτε πῦρ οὔτε γῆν, &c. οὐδ' αὐτῷ αὐτομάτῳ καὶ τύχῃ τοσοῦτον ἐπιτρέψαι πρᾶγμα καλῶς ἔχει, "It is not at all likely that either fire or earth, or any such body, should be the cause of that well and fit that is in the world; nor can so noble an effect as this be reasonably imputed to chance or fortune." Wherefore himself, agreeably with Anaxagoras, concludes that it is Νοῦς or "Mind," which is properly αἴτιον τοῦ καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς, "the cause of well and right," and accordingly does he frequently call the supreme Deity by that name. He affirming likewise,[1] that the order, pulchritude and harmony of the whole world dependeth upon that one highest and supreme Being in it, after the same manner as the order of any army dependeth upon the general or emperor, who is not for the order, but the order for him. Which highest Being of the universe is therefore called by him also, conformably to Plato, τὸ ἀγαθὸν κεχωρισμένον, "the separate good of the world," in way of distinction from that intrinsic or inherent good of it, which is the order and harmony itself:* Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ πότερον ἔχει ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον; πότερον κεχωρισμένον τι, καὶ αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό, ἢ τὴν τάξιν, ἢ ἀμφοτέρως, ὥσπερ στράτευμα; καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ τάξει τὸ εὖ καὶ ὁ στράτηγος, καὶ μᾶλλον οὗτος, οὐ γὰρ οὗτος διὰ τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη διὰ τοῦτόν ἐστιν· πάντα γὰρ συντέτακταί πως, "It is to be considered also what is the good and best of the universe; whether its own order only; or something separate and existing by itself? or rather both of them together? As the good of an army consisteth both in its order, and likewise in its general or emperor but principally in this latter, because the emperor is not for the order of the army, but the order of the army is for him; for all things are co-ordered together with God, and respectively to him." Wherefore, since Aristotle's supreme Deity, by what name soever called, whether mind or good, is the proper efficient cause of all that well and fit that is in the universe, of all the order, pulchritude, and harmony thereof; it must needs be granted, that besides its being the final cause of motion, or its turning round the heavens by being loved, it was also the efficient cause of the whole frame of nature and system of the world. And thus does he plainly declare his sense, where he applauds Anaxagoras for maintaining Νοῦν εἶναι καὶ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῆς τάξεως πάσης αἴτιον,† "that mind is the cause not only of all order, but also of the whole world:" and when himself positively affirms, ἐκ τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις,‡ "that

[10] Ibid. lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 266. tom. 4. opp. See what we have said on chap. 3. sect. 11.

[1] Ibid. lib. 14. cap. 10. p. 484. 485. tom. 4. opp.

* Met. lib. 14. cap. 10. [P. 484. tom. 4. opp.]

† Met. lib. 1. cap. 3. [P. 266. tom. 4. opp.]

‡ Met. lib. 14. cap. 7. [P. 479. tom. 4. opp.] De Part. An. lib. 1.

from such a principle as this, depends the heaven, and nature." Where by heaven is meant the whole world, and by nature that artificial nature of his before insisted on, which doth nothing in vain, but always acteth for ends regularly, and is the instrument of the divine mind. He also somewhere affirmeth, that if the heavens or world were generated, that is, made in time, so as to have had a beginning, then it was certainly made, not by chance and fortune, but by such an artificial nature as is the instrument of a perfect mind. And in his Physics, where he contends for the world's ante-eternity, he concludes nevertheless,* *ἀνάγκη νοῦν αἴτιον καὶ φύσιν εἶναι τοῦδε παντὸς*, "that mind together with nature must of necessity be the cause of this whole universe." For though the world were never so much co-eternal with mind, yet was it in order of nature after it, and junior to it as the effect thereof, himself thus generously resolving,† *εὐλογώτατόν εἶναι νοῦν προγενέστατον καὶ κύριον κατὰ φύσιν· τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖά φασι πρῶτα τῶν ὄντων εἶναι*, "that though some (that is, the Atheists) affirm the elements to have been the first Beings, yet it was the most reasonable thing of all to conclude, that Mind was the oldest of all things, and senior to the world and elements; and that according to nature, it had a princely and sovereign dominion over all." Wherefore, we think it now sufficiently evident, that Aristotle's supreme Deity does not only move the heavens as being loved, or is the final cause of motion; but also was the efficient cause of this whole mundane system, framed according to the best wisdom, and after the best manner possible.[2]

For perhaps it may not be amiss here to observe, that God was not called Mind by Aristotle, and those other ancient philosophers, according to that vulgar sense of many in these days of ours; as if he were indeed an understanding or perceptive being, and that perfectly omniscient, but yet nevertheless such as acted all things arbitrarily, being not determined by any rule or nature of goodness, but only by his own fortuitous will. For, according to those ancient philosophers, that which acts without

* Lib. 2. cap. 6. [P. 474. tom. 1. opp.]

† Ar. de An. lib. 1. cap. 7. [P. 16. tom. 2. opp.

[2] Our worthy author explains Aristotle's precepts concerning the Deity entirely in accordance with the opinion of the junior Platonists: and in doing so, I consider him not to have exercised sufficient caution. If I possess any faculty of judging in such matters, we ought not, I conceive, to estimate the opinions of Aristotle and other philosophers on God and divine things from a few short passages picked out here and there, but from the general tenor and context of their entire doctrine. No one is or can be so guarded in writing, as not to let fall something, which another may be able to torture into a different sense and convert into a favourable or unfavourable argument. Wherefore, if a few words be alone sufficient for establishing innocence or guilt, no man is so black or so white, but may to the minds of the careless or less intelligent be convicted of the grossest sins, or acquitted of every crime. I might, if so disposed, enter into a long disputation on these passages of Aristotle and their true meaning, which I shall refrain from doing, as I intend briefly stating my opinion respecting this philosopher's piety and religion in the sequel.

respect to good, would not be so much accounted mens as dementia, "mind," as "madness or folly;" and to impute the frame of nature or system of the world, together with the government of the same, to such a principle as this, would have been judged by them all one, as to impute them to chance or fortune. But Aristotle and those other philosophers, who called the supreme God Νοῦς or "Mind," understood thereby that which of all things in the whole world is most opposite to chance, fortune and temerity; that wl[illegible]l by the τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, "the well and fit" of [illegible] it be not rather the very rule, measure and esse[illegible]tself; that which acteth all for ends and good, and [illegible]ing after the best manner, in order to the whole. [illegible]s in that place before cited out of Plato's Phædo, [illegible] meaning of that opinion, "that Mind made the [illegible]s the cause of all things:" Ἠγησάμην, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτ[illegible] πάντα κοσμεῖν, καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτῃ ὅπῃ ἂν β[illegible] That therefore everything might be concluded to have bee[illegible]posed of after the best manner possible." And accordingly, Theophrastus, Aristotle's scholar and successor, describeth God after this manner: Τὸ πρῶτον καὶ θειότατον, πάντα τὰ ἄριστα βουλόμενον, "That first and divinest Being of all, which willeth all the best things." Whether of these two hypotheses concerning God, one of the ancient pagan philosophers, that God is as essentially goodness as wisdom, or, as Plotinus after Plato calls him, decency and fitness itself; the other, of some late professors of Christianity, that he is nothing but arbitrary will, omnipotent and omniscient; I say, whether of these two is more agreeable to piety and true Christianity, we shall leave it to be considered.

Lastly, it is not without probability, that Aristotle did, besides the frame of nature and fabric of the world, impute even the very substance of things themselves also to the divine efficiency (nor indeed can there well be any doubt of any thing save only the matter); partly from his affirming God to be a cause and principle to all things, and partly from his commending this doctrine of Anaxagoras:* Ἅμα τῷ καλῶς, αἰτίαν καὶ ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων νοῦν, "That mind was, together with well and fit, the cause and principle of things themselves."[3] However, that Aristotle's inferior gods at least, and therefore his intelligences of the lesser spheres, which were incorporeal

* Met. lib. i. cap. 3. [P. 266. tom. 4. opp.]

[3] This sentiment is not to be met with in Aristotle. He does not speak of mind: nor assert that mind, together with that which is well and fit, is the cause and principle of things. Behold the philosopher's own words: Οἱ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἅμα τῷ καλῶς τὴν αἰτίαν ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων ἔθεσαν, the meaning of which I consider to be: "Those, therefore, who supposed so (which he makes Anaxagoras and Hermotimus to have done), asserted the cause of the well and beautiful to be also the cause of all things that really exist.

substances, were all of them produced or created by one Supreme, may be further confirmed from this definition of his in his rhetoric:[*] Τὸ δαιμόνιον οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἢ θεὸς, ἢ θεοῦ ἔργον, "The divinity is nothing but either God or the work of God." Where θεὸς is unquestionably used in way of eminency for the Supreme Deity, as in those other places of Aristotle's before cited, to which sundry more might be added, as:† Πάντα ἔχει τ' ἀγαθὰ ὁ θεὸς, καὶ ἔστιν αὐτάρκης, "God possesseth all good things, and is self-sufficient. And again, where he speaks of things that are more than praiseworthy:[‡] Τοιοῦτον δὲ εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ τ' ἀγαθὸν, πρὸς ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τ' ἄλλα ἀναφέρεσθαι, "Such are God and Good, for to these are all other things referred." But here Aristotle affirming, "that there is nothing divine, but either God himself, or the work and effect of God," plainly implies, that there was no multitude of self-existent deities, and that those intelligences of the lesser stars or spheres, however eternal, were themselves also produced or caused by one supreme Deity.

Furthermore, Aristotle declares,§ that this speculation concerning the Deity does constitute a particular science by itself, distinct from those other speculative sciences of physiology, and the pure mathematics; so that there are in all three speculative sciences, distinguished by their several objects, physiology, the pure mathematics, and theology or metaphysics: the former of these, that is, physiology, being conversant περὶ ἀχώριστα μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀκίνητα, "about things both inseparable from matter, and moveable;" the second (viz. geometry, or the pure mathematics), περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐ χωριστὰ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν ὕλῃ, "About things immoveable indeed, but not really separable from matter, so as to exist alone by themselves;" but the third and last, περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα, "Concerning things both immoveable and separable from matter," that is, "incorporeal substances immoveable:" this philosopher there adding: Εἰ μή ἐστί τις ἑτέρα οὐσία παρὰ τὰς φύσει συνεστηκυίας, ἡ φυσικὴ ἂν εἴη πρώτη ἐπιστήμη, εἰ δέ ἐστί τις οὐσία ἀκίνητος, αὕτη προτέρα, καὶ φιλοσοφία πρώτη, "That if there were no other substance besides these natural things, which are material and moveable, then would physiology be the first science; but if there be any immoveable substance,

[*] This passage, as must be clear from what we have already remarked respecting its sense, is not of the slightest force towards establishing the learned Doctor's position, that Aristotle considered these intelligences which rule the celestial bodies to have been produced from God himself. Neither is it very intelligible, indeed, how this could be the case, inasmuch as he supposed them to have been connected with their orbs from all eternity.

* Lib. 2. cap. 23. [P. 785. tom. 3. opp.]

† Mag. Mor. lib. 2. cap. 15. [P. 255. tom. 3. opp.]

[‡] In these words, however, Aristotle is stating not his own, but Eudoxus' opinion.

‡ Eth. Nic. lib. 1. cap. 12. [P. 18. tom. 3. opp.]

§ Met. lib. 6. cap. 1. [P. 346. tom. 4. opp.]

the philosophy thereof must needs in order of nature be before the other." Lastly, he concludes, that as the speculative sciences in general are more noble and excellent than the other, so is theology or metaphysics the most honourable of all the speculatives. Now the chief points of the Aristotelic theology, or metaphysical doctrine concerning God, seem to be these four following. First, that though all things be not ingenit or unmade, according to that in his book against Xenophanes:[6] Ἆρ' ἀνάγκη ἀγέννητα πάντα εἶνα[illegible] γεγονέναι ἕτερα ἐξ ἑτέρων;[*] "There is no neces[illegible]ings should be unmade, for what hinders but tha[illegible]ay be generated from other things?" Yet there [illegible] something eternal and unmade, as likewise inc[illegible]use εἰ πᾶσαι οὐσίαι φθαρταί, πάντα φθαρτά, "if all [illegible]e corruptible, then all might come to nothing." [illegible] unmade (or self-existent) and incorruptible sub[illegible]g to Aristotle, is not senseless matter, but a per[illegible]condly, that God is also an incorporeal substance, κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν,[†] "separate from sensibles;" and not only so, but, according to Aristotle's judgment likewise, ἀδιαίρετος, and ἀμερὴς, and ἀμεγέθης, "indivisible," and "devoid of parts," and "magnitude." Nor can it be denied, but that besides Aristotle, the generality of those other ancients who asserted incorporeal substance, did suppose it likewise to be unextended, they dividing substances (as we learn from Philo) into διαστηματικαὶ καὶ ἀδιάστατοι οὐσίαι, "distant and indistant," or "extended and unextended substances." Which doctrine, whether true or no, is not here to be discussed. Thirdly: Τὸ αὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν,[‡] "That in God intellect is really the same thing with the intelligibles." Because the divine Mind being (at least in order of nature) senior to all things, and architectonical of the world, could not look abroad for its objects, or find them any where without itself, and therefore must needs contain them all within itself. Which determination of Aristotle's is no less agreeable to Theism than to Platonism; whereas, on the contrary, the Atheists, who assert mind and understanding as such, to be in order of nature junior to matter and the world, do therefore, agreeably to their own hypothesis, suppose all intellection to be by way of passion from corporeal things without, and no mind or intellect to contain its intelligibles, or immediate objects, within itself. Lastly, that God being an immoveable substance, his οὐσία is ἐνέργεια,[§] "his essence" and "act or operation" the same: Δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι οὐσίαν τοιαύτην, ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια, "There must therefore needs be

[6] De Xenophane, Zenone et Gorgia, cap. 2. p. 836. tom. 2. opp.
[*] Met. lib. 14. cap. 6. [P. 477. tom. 4. opp.]
[†] Met. lib. 14. cap. 7. [P. 180. tom. 4. opp.]
[‡] Met. lib. 14. cap. 7. and cap. 9.
[§] Met. lib. 14. cap. 6.

ome such principle as this, whose essence is act or energy." From which theorem Aristotle indeed endeavours to establish he eternity of the world, that it was not made ἐκ νυκτὸς, καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντων, καὶ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, "from night, and a confused chaos of things, and from nothing;" that is, from an antecedent non-existence, brought forth into being; because God, who is an immoveable nature, and whose essence is act or energy, cannot be supposed to have rested or slept from eternity, doing nothing at all, and then, after infinite ages, to have begun to move the matter, or make the world. Which argumentation of Aristotle's perhaps would not be inconsiderable, were the world, motion, and time, capable of existing from eternity, or without beginning. Of which more elsewhere. However, from hence it is undeniably evident, that Aristotle, though asserting the world's eternity, nevertheless derived the same from God, because he would prove this eternity of the world from the essential energy and immutability of the Deity.

We shall now conclude all concerning Aristotle with this short summary, which himself gives us of his own creed and religion, agreeably to the tradition of his pagan ancestors:* Παραδέδοται ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ παλαιῶν, ὅτι θεοί τέ εἰσιν οὗτοι, καὶ περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν ὅλην φύσιν· τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μυθικῶς ἤδη προσῆχθαι πρὸς τὴν πειθὼ τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ τὴν εἰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸ συμφέρον χρῆσιν· ἀνθρωποειδεῖς τε γὰρ τούτους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ὁμοίους τισὶ λέγουσι, καὶ τούτοις ἕτερα ἀκόλουθα καὶ παραπλήσια, "It hath been delivered down to us from very ancient times, that the stars are gods also; besides that supreme Deity, which contains the whole nature. But all the other things were fabulously added hereunto, for the better persuasion of the multitude, and for utility of human life and political ends, to keep men in obedience to civil laws. As for example, that these gods are of human form, or like to other animals; with such other things as are consequent hereupon." In which words of Aristotle these three things may be taken notice of. First, that this was the general persuasion of the civilized Pagans from all known antiquity downwards, that there is one τὸ θεῖον, which comprehends the whole nature. Where τὸ θεῖον is by Aristotle plainly taken for the supreme Deity. And his own sense concerning this particular is elsewhere thus declared after the same manner, where he speaks of order, harmony, and proportion:† Θείας γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο δυνάμεως ἔργον, ἥτις καὶ τόδε συνέχει τὸ πᾶν, "this is the work of divine power, which also contains this universe." Which Divinity, containing and comprehending the whole nature and universe, must needs be a single and solitary Being; according to that expression of Horace before cited:

* Met. lib. 14. cap. 8. [P. 483.] † In Polit.

Nec viget quicquam simile aut secundum,

"That, which hath hath nothing like it, nor second to it." The next thing is, that according to the pagan tradition, besides this universal Numen, there were certain other particular and inferior deities also, that is, understanding beings superior to men; namely, the animated stars or spheres, according to the vulgar apprehension, though Aristotle's philosophy would interpret this chiefly of their immoveable minds or intelligences. Lastly, that all the rest of the pag[illegible]n[illegible] theology, those two things only excepted, were [illegible]d fictitious, invented for the better persuasion of th[illegible] to piety, and the conserving of them in obedience to civil [illegible] mongst which this may be reckoned for one, that those g[illegible]e all like men or other animals; and therefore to be wors[illegible]d in images and statues of those several forms; with all th[illegible]her fabulous farrago, which dependeth hereupon. Which b[illegible] separated from the rest, the *πάτριος δόξα*, or "ancient tradi[illegible] of their pagan progenitors," would remain comprised within those two particulars above mentioned; namely, that there is one supreme Deity, that contains the whole universe, and that besides it, the animated stars or their minds are certain inferior gods also.[7]

[7] From the passage of Aristotle, here copiously discussed by Dr. Cudworth, we learn that philosopher's own sentiments respecting the public religions prevailing in his time in Greece, but not the theological opinion of the Greeks generally, much less of all the ancient nations. Neither do I agree with the learned Doctor in thinking, that *Θεῖον* in these words of the Stagirite is to be understood of the supreme Deity. This term, as is manifest from the whole tenor of the discourse, implies that "divine power," supposed by the ancients to be diffused from the stars, which they regarded as gods, through the whole of the universe. Nor is Aristotle discoursing in this place of the supreme Lord of all things, but of the minds or intelligencies, which he supposed to preside over the heavenly bodies. The meaning of the entire passage is as follows: "It has been handed down to us from our ancestors, that the stars, or the intelligences which rule the stars, are gods, and that the power and authority of these gods pervade the whole universe." It may be added, that the word *Θεῖον* is used by Aristotle generally of any thing more excellent than man, and also of gods: see De Cœlo, lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 615. tom. 1. opp.

Long and grave were the controversies of the learned of former times respecting the religion and piety of Aristotle; many of whom, as we are informed by Meric Casaubon in his notes on Diogenes Laërtius, p. 635. did not scruple to assert, that what Aristotle has written concerning God is altogether divine; while others maintained, that nothing can be more subversive of all true piety and religion than this philosopher's doctrines and that we ought to assign to him the very foremost place among atheists. The passages, which have any weight towards exculpating Aristotle, have been culled from his writings by no one more ably than by Joh. Jonsius De Scriptor. Histor. Philos. lib. 1. cap. 1. sect. 5. p. 9. while such as are in favour of those, who rank him among the enemies of God, have been set forth with great zeal and labour by the venerable J. Georg. Walch in the Exercit. De Atheismo Aristotelis, extant among his Parerga Academica, published at Leipzig, 1721.8. where we have also an account of the authors who have disputed on each side of this question: whom J. Alb. Fabricius also enumerates in his Delectus Argum. pro Veritate Religionis Christianæ, cap. 8. sect. 3. p. 307. Of all the writers who have taken up the cause of Aristotle, the latest is the most erudite, J. Fr. Reimmann, in his Historia Atheismi, sect. 2. cap. 27. sect. 1. 2. &c. p. 182. &c. The reason why this controversy is still undecided has been, that the

To Aristotle may be here subjoined Speusippus and Xenocrates, his equals and corrivals, they being Plato's successors; together with Theophrastus, his own scholar and successor.

disputants have neither attached the same meaning to the word God nor to the term Atheist. Wherefore in the first instance we shall have to inquire, what is understood by God and by a man who denies the existence of God. What has given rise to another difficulty is this, that many wish the question to be decided from some particular passages of the philosopher; while others, unquestionably with more justice, maintain, that the whole tenor and complexion of his doctrine is to be taken into consideration. Moreover, the partisans of Aristotle appeal also to the book De Mundo, which their opponents, in my opinion, are right in rejecting and excluding from his genuine works. To confess frankly my own sentiments, I am naturally more disposed to excuse than to accuse others and I am slow in subscribing my assent, when the dispute turns upon so grave a charge as the denial of God. Nevertheless, I cannot but avow my conviction, that the God of Aristotle is such as neither to impress me with feelings of love nor of fear, that is, a God in name rather than in reality. Nay more, I consider the difference to be but slight between his God and the gods of Epicurus Both are represented as neither having any functions of their own nor concerning themselves in those of others, but as occupied wholly in contemplation and on that account happy.

God is the eternal cause of all things, possessing infinite liberty, wisdom, and power, and at the same time most righteous and most just. He who takes away from God any one of these attributes worships not God, but the shadow and semblance of God, and although he may use magnificent phrases and swear ten thousand times, that he reverences a Deity, he is not to be listened to. To the God of Aristotle, as I shall briefly make appear, hardly any of these attributes will apply. From which it follows, that he can neither benefit nor injure the human race, and consequently is undeserving of their homage. In the first place, as is well known to all, Aristotle conceived the world to have existed of itself, and necessarily, from all eternity, like God himself. In what manner he associated the world with God, I shall not now inquire. Whether he supposed the nature of things to have flowed from God from everlasting, as did the junior Platonists, whom many of the moderns collaud for this, or fancied some other bond of connexion between God and the world, this one thing is unquestionable, that he ascribed the same eternal and necessary existence to both. Hence he considered the heavens to be, like God, subject to no manner of change. See his De Cœlo, lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 613. tom. 1. opp. Consequently, his God has no liberty of action and therefore it is useless for any one to address him with prayers. For if the universe is governed by an eternal law and does not admit of the least change, I see no reason, why any assistance should be expected from the deity. Some one will object, perhaps, that according to Aristotle the heavens indeed are unchangeable, but not also the things that are beneath the heavens and the moon. To whom, although having much that I could say in reply, I shall at present content myself with this one answer, that in Aristotle's opinion, as every one knows, God has nothing whatever to do with the things, which exist and take place beneath the moon. In the first place, then, we have a God destitute of liberty, and consequently unworthy of all religious homage and worship.

Again, Aristotle, it is notorious, connected God with the extreme sphere. It is evident, therefore, that he believed him neither to be infinite, nor omnipresent. And what necessity, I ask, is there to worship, love, or fear such a Deity? For my own part, I am at a loss to know by what means, if even he had left any virtue to this Deity, the prayers of mankind could be conveyed to him. Plato employs demons as ministers in this matter, and assigns these as intercessors between mortals and the supreme Being, whom he likewise considers to be far removed from all human affairs and not every where present. But Aristotle denies the existence of such demons, and, as we have already seen, adopts no other gods except the intelligences or minds that preside over the celestial bodies. But these intelligences are ignorant of all human affairs, and confine their cares exclusively to the orbs entrusted to their respective charge. The supreme Deity therefore cannot learn the prayers of mankind through these interpreters. By what other means, then, is the God of Aristotle to become acquainted with our wants and desires? I indeed can see none: nor do I understand, why I should hold in reverence a Deity, whom no affairs or prayers of mine

Concerning the former of which it is recorded in Cicero,[8] that agreeably with Plato, he asserted vim quandam, quâ omnia regantur, eamque animalem, "one animal and intellectual force,

can by possibility reach. Now to acknowledge a God, utterly destitute of liberty and power, and in whom no hope or reliance can be reposed, is in my opinion to do the same as is recorded of Epicurus, namely, to leave a God in words, but to discard him in reality.

But granting, that some of the things transacted among mortals are made known to this Deity: nay, granting him to be fully cognizant of all things, and to possess also the will to assist us; still even then he will not be one whom we ought to regard as God. And why? The God of Aristotle, like the gods of Epicurus, is perfectly inactive and otiose, existing in a state of perpetual quietude and repose, and in this quietude his chief happiness is made to consist. Aristotle, I am aware, tells us that the *οὐσία* or "essence" of God is *ἐνέργεια*, "operation," Metaphysic. lib. 14. cap. 6. tom. 4. opp. But all that is meant by this high-sounding word is, that God lives and contemplates. This I shall show by his own words, De Cœlo, lib. 2. cap. 3. p. 644. tom. 1. opp. *Θεοῦ δὲ ἐνέργεια ἀθανασία· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστι ζωὴ ἀΐδιος*, "The operation of God is immortality: but this is perpetual life." What can be clearer? In stating the essence of God to be operation, he simply means that God lives from everlasting. Besides, he expressly denies all action in his God, and leaves to him nothing but contemplation. For after saying that God lives, and concluding from this that he also acts, he tells us that no other action can apply to God but contemplation: *Τῷ δὲ ζῶντι τοῦ πράττειν ἀφῃρημένῳ, ἐτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται, πλὴν θεωρίας; ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρητική*, "But to him who lives, if we take away action and, much more, production, what is left but contemplation? So that the operation of God, surpassing as it is in happiness, consists in contemplation:" Ethic. ad Nicomachum, lib. 10. cap. 8. p. 184. tom. 3. opp. But if asked, what it is that the Deity contemplates, he decides nothing, but confesses pretty plainly, that this is beyond human comprehension: Magnor. Moral. lib. 2. cap. 15. p. 256. tom. 3. opp. *Τί μὲν οὖν ὁ Θεὸς θεάσεται, ἀφίσθω*, "Let what the Deity contemplates, therefore, be passed over." Away then with the God, who lives for himself alone and is occupied wholly in contemplation. For what comfort or assistance are mortals to expect from him?

Lastly, it is abundantly evident from what we have said, that justice has no place in the God of Aristotle. For he who is bound down by necessity, who is confined to a certain spot, and neither sees the affairs of mortals, nor, if he did so, could take the slightest interest in them, can be influenced by no desire to reward the good or punish the bad. Hence all that Aristotle has inculcated on morals and probity of life is founded upon no considerations having reference to God and his virtues, but solely upon human and natural reasons, altogether apart from virtue.

Let wise men judge from these things, how much difference there can be between a man, who disbelieves altogether the being of a God, and Aristotle, who acknowledges indeed a first cause of motion, but denies that this cause is free, infinite, omnipresent, omnipotent, cognizant of human affairs, in short, the governor of all things. If these are atheists, who own indeed the existence of a God, but inculcate that the same is to be worshipped for no other reason than because of the excellence of his nature, I cannot see how Aristotle is to be excepted from the number. Although it is even doubtful, whether he considered that God was to be worshipped at all. To conclude, Aristotle, as is manifest from all that he has written on God and divine matters, conceived this world, together with God himself, to be no other than a machine endowed with eternal motion. And as in every machine that moves, some principle of

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[8] De Natura Deor. lib. 1. cap. 13. p. 2898. 2899. tom. 9. opp. The Doctor, however, is wrong in his interpretation of Cicero's words. Velleius does not complain of Speusippus as endeavouring to destroy the Epicurean gods only, but all gods whatever. His meaning is, that the doctrine laid down by Speusippus respecting divine things would warrant the conclusion, that he meant to root out from men's minds all notion of gods: for he committed the administration of all things to one animal force, and therefore took away all power and authority from the gods.

by which all things are governed;" by reason whereof, Velleius the Epicurean complains of him, as thereby endeavouring, evellere ex animis cognitionem deorum, "to pluck out of the minds of men the notion of gods:" as indeed both he and Plato did destroy those Epicurean gods, which were all supposed to be independent and to have no sway or influence at all upon the government of the world; whereas neither of them denied a plurality of subordinate and dependent deities, generated or created by one supreme, and by him employed as his ministers in the economy of the universe: for had they done any such thing as this, they would certainly have been then condemned for Atheists. And Xenocrates' theology is thus represented in Stobæus: Τὴν Μονάδα καὶ τὴν Δυάδα θεοὺς, τὴν μὲν ὡς ἄῤῥενα πατρὸς ἔχουσαν τάξιν, ἥντινα προσαγορεύει καὶ Ζῆνα, καὶ Πέρατον, καὶ Νοῦν, ὅστις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρῶτος θεός· τὴν δὲ θήλειαν μητρὸς θεῶν δίκην, τῆς ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν λήξεως ἡγουμένην, ἥτις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός, &c., "That both a Monad and Dyad were gods, the one masculine, having the order of a father, which he calleth Zen and Mind, and which is also to him the first God; the other feminine, as it were the mother of the gods, which is to him the soul of the universe:" besides which he acknowledgeth the heaven to be divine, that is, animated with a particular soul of its own, and the fiery stars to be celestial gods, as he asserted also certain sublunary gods, viz. the invisible demons. Where instead of the Platonic trinity, Xenocrates seems to have acknowledged only a duality of divine hypostases; the first called a Monad and Mind, the second a Dyad and Soul of the universe. And lastly, we have this testimony of Theophrastus,[9] besides others, cited out of his Metaphysics: Θεία γὰρ πάντων ἀρχὴ, δι' ἧς ἅπαντα καὶ ἔστι καὶ διαμένει, "There is one divine principle of all things, by or from which all things subsist and remain."

XXV. The Stoics and their chief doctors, Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, were no better naturalists and metaphysicians than Heraclitus, in whose footsteps they trode; they in like

motion ought to be present; so he supposed also, that some cause was to be assigned for the motion of this vast mundane mass. Accordingly he tells us, that this cause is God, whom he describes in words sufficiently copious and elegant, but destitute for the most part of any intelligible meaning. If I meditate upon the existence of a certain eternal principle of motion, which lives and contemplates, what joy, or hope, or fear, have I from this, what inducement towards living well or help towards dying in peace? Just the same, if I am not mistaken, as I should derive from the pleasing dream, that the gods live a life of bliss in the intermundane gardens of Epicurus, and have neither occupation of their own nor cause any to others.

[9] Ecl. Phys. lib. 1. cap. 3. [P. 17.]

[9] Not having at hand Theophrastus' book, entitled Ἀποσπασματιῶν τῶν μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, I am unable to find out whether this passage is to be found in it or not. Many very learned men, however, consider it not be a genuine work of Theophrastus. See J. Alb. Fabricius' Biblioth. Græc. lib. 3. cap. 9. sect. 14. p. 242.

manner admitting no other substance besides body, according to the true and proper notion thereof, as that which is not only διαστατὸν, "distant and extended," but also ἀντίτυπον, "resisting and impenetrable." So that, according to these Stoics, the souls not only of other animals, but of men also, were properly corporeal, that is substances impenetrably extended; and which differed from that other part of theirs, commonly called their body, no otherwise than that they were[10] σῶμα ἀραιότερον καὶ λεπτομερέστερον, "a more thin and subtle body," and πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον, "a hot and fiery spirit:" it being supposed by these philosophers that cogitation, reason, and understanding, are lodged only in the fiery matter of the universe. And though the generality of these Stoics acknowledged human souls to have a certain permanency after death, and some of them till the next conflagration, (unless perhaps they should be crushed and broken all to pieces, in their passage out of the body, by the downfall of some tower, steeple, or the like upon them) yet did they all conclude against their immortality, there being nothing at all immortal with them (as shall be afterwards declared) save only Jupiter, or the one supreme Deity. And as for the punishment of wicked souls after death, though some of them seem to have utterly exploded the same, as a mere figment of poets, (insomuch, that Epictetus[1] himself denies there was any Acheron, Cocytus, or Phlegethon) yet others granted that as the better souls after death did mount up to the stars, their first original, so the wicked wandered up and down here in certain dark and miry subterraneous places, till at length they were quite extinct. Nevertheless, they seem to have been all of this persuasion, that the frightening of men with punishments after death was no proper nor accommodate means to promote virtue, because that ought to be pursued after for its own sake, or the good of honesty, as vice to be avoided for that evil of turpitude which is in it, and not for any other external evil consequent thereupon. Wherefore Chrysippus reprehended Plato for subjoining to his republic such affrightful stories of punishments after death:* Φησὶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀποτρέπειν τῷ ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν φόβῳ τῆς ἀδικίας τὸν Κέφαλον· εὐδιάβλητόν τ' εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τοὐναντίον ἐξάγοντα πολλοὺς περισπασμοὺς καὶ πιθανότητας ἀντιπιπτούσας, τὸν περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κολάσεων λόγον, ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέροντα τῆς Ἀκκοῦς καὶ τῆς Ἀλφιτοῦς, δι' ὧν τὰ παιδάρια τοῦ κακοσχολεῖν αἱ γυναῖκες ἀνείργουσι, "Chrysippus affirmeth,

[10] These are the words of Chrysippus, preserved by Plutarch, in his book, De Repugnantiis Stoicorum, p. 1052. tom. 2. opp. The subject here briefly touched upon is explained at greater length by Lipsius, Thomasius, Scioppius and others, who have treated professedly of the Stoics and their doctrines.

[1] See Arrian's Comm. De Epicteti Disput. lib. 3. cap. 13. p. 293.

* Plut. de Stoic. Rep. p. 1040.

that Plato (in the person of Cephalus) does not rightly deter men from injustice by the fear of divine punishments and vengeance after death; since this opinion (of torments after death) is liable to much exception, and the contrary is not without probabilities; so that it seems to be but like to women's frightening children from doing unhappy tricks, with those bugbears of Acco and Alphito." But how fondly these Stoics doated upon that hypothesis, that all was body, may appear from hence, that they maintained even accidents and qualities themselves to be bodies; for voice and sound, night and day, evening and morning, summer and winter, nay, calends and nones, months and years, were bodies with them. And not only so, but also the qualities of the mind itself, as virtue and vice, together with the motions and affections of it, as anger and envy, grief and joy; according to that passage in Seneca,[2] Corporis bona sunt corpora; corpora ergo sunt et quæ animi, nam et hic corpus est, "The goods of a body are bodies; now, the mind is a body, and therefore the goods of the mind are bodies too." And with as good logic as this did they further infer, that all the actions, passions, and qualities of the mind, were not only bodies, but also animals likewise:[3] "Animam constat animal esse, cum ipsa efficiat, ut simus animalia; virtus autem nihil aliud est quàm animus taliter se habens, ergo animal est, "It is manifest that the soul is an animal, because it is that by which we are made animals; now virtue and vice are nothing else but the soul so and so affected or modified, and therefore these are animals too." Thus we see what fine conclusions these doaters upon body (though accounted great masters of logic) made; and how they were befooled in their ratiocinations and philosophy.

Nevertheless, though these Stoics were such sottish Corporealists, yet were they not for all that Atheists; they resolving that mind or understanding, though always lodged in corporeal substance, yet was not first of all begotten out of senseless matter, so or so modified, but was an eternal unmade thing, and

[2] Epist. 106. p. 399. tom. 2. opp. But the passage in Seneca is somewhat different from the one here given: Quæ ergo propria sunt corporis, ea corporis bona sunt: corpora ergo sunt et quæ animi sunt: nam et hic corpus est, "But those things which are proper to body are the goods of the body; therefore those of the mind too are bodies: for this also is a body."

[3] Senec. Epist. 103. p. 422. tom. 2. opp. where, however, you will not find the reading, taliter se habens, but, quodammodo se habens. The learned Doctor quoted both passages out of Just. Lipsius' Introd. in Physiol. Stoic. lib. 2. diss. 4. p. 64. a. b. where they are given incorrectly as here. As to the rest, Seneca himself spurns this Stoical doctrine, and declares openly: Me in alia sententia profiteor esse, "I profess myself to be of a different opinion." At the present day we ridicule this dogma, and not altogether unjustly. Nevertheless, it will appear much less ridiculous and absurd, if we examine into their opinions on body and bodies generally, and take into consideration the definitions they were wont to give of bodies: on which subject I shall not dwell at present.

the maker of the whole mundane system. And therefore as to that controversy so much agitated amongst the ancients, whether the world were made by chance, or by the necessity of material motions, or by mind, reason and understanding; they avowedly maintained that it was neither by chance nor by material necessity, but divinâ mente, "by a divine and eternal mind" every way perfect. From which one eternal mind they also affirmed human souls to have been derived, and not from senseless matter: Prudentiam et mentem à diis ad homines pervenisse,[4] "that mind and wisdom descended down to men from the Deity." And that Ratio nihil aliud est quàm in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa,[5] "Reason is nothing else but part of the divine spirit merged into a human body:" so that these human souls were to them no other than μόρια θεοῦ καὶ ἀποσπάσματα,[6] "certain parts of God, or decerptions and avulsions from him." Neither were the reasons, by which these Stoics would prove the world to have had a divine original, at all contemptible, or much inferior to those which have been used in these latter days; they being such as these: first, that it is no more likely this orderly system of the world should have been made by chance, than that Ennius' Annals, or Homer's Iliad might have resulted from the fortuitous projection or tumbling out of so many forms of letters, confounded altogether; there being as much continued and coherent sense, and as many several combinations in this real poem of the world, as there is in any fantastic poem made by men. And since we see no houses or cities, no books or libraries any where made by the fortuitous motions of matter, it is a madness to think that this admirable compages of the whole world should first have resulted from thence. Again, there could not possibly be such an agreeing and conspiring cognation of things, and such a universal harmony throughout the whole world, as now there is, nisi ea uno divino et continuato spiritu continerentur, "were they not all contained by one and the same divine spirit:" which is the most obvious argument for the unity or oneliness of the Deity. They reasoned also from the scale of nature, or the gradual perfection of things in the universe, one above another; that therefore there must be something absolutely perfect, and that either in the world itself, or something presiding over it, was à principio sapiens,[7] "wise from the beginning," or rather without beginning, and from eternity. For as in the growth of plants and animals, Natura

[4] Cicero De Natur. Deor. lib. 2. cap. 31. p. 3000. tom. 9. opp.

[5] Seneca, Epist. 66. p. 168. tom. 2. opp.

[6] Arrian. in Epictet. lib. 1. cap. 14. p. 123. Αἱ ψυχαὶ μὲν οὕτως εἰσὶν ἐνδεδεμέναι καὶ συναφεῖς τῷ θεῷ, ἅτε αὐτοῦ μόρια οὖσαι καὶ ἀποσπασμάτια, "Souls are thus bound to and connected with God, as being parts of and decerptions from himself."

[7] Cicero uses these words, De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 13. p. 2978. tom. 9. opp. from which book all the Stoical arguments here adduced by Dr. Cudworth are taken.

suo quodam itinere ad ultimum pervenit, "nature by a continual progress, and journeying forwards, arrives at length to the greatest perfection, which those things are respectively capable of;" and as those arts of picture and architecture aim at perfection; ita in omni naturâ necesse est absolvi aliquid et perfici, "so in the nature of the whole universe there must needs be something absolutely perfect, reached unto." Necesse est præstantem aliquam esse naturam, qua nihil est melius; since there is such a gradual ascent and scale of perfections in nature, one above another, "there must needs be some most excellent and perfect Being, than which nothing can be better," at the top of all, as the head thereof. Moreover, they disputed Socratically, after this manner:[8] Unde arripuit homo vitam, mentem et rationem? "Whence did man snatch life, reason, or understanding? Or from what was it kindled in him? For is it not plain that we derive the moisture and fluidity of our bodies from the water that is in the universe, their consistency and solidity from the earth, their heat and activity from the fire, and their spirituosity from the air?" Illud autem, quod vincit hæc omnia, rationem, mentem et consilium, &c. ubi invenimus? unde sustulimus? An cætera mundus habebit omnia? Hoc unum, quod plurimi est, non habebit? "But that which far transcendeth all these things, our reason, mind and understanding, where did we find it? or from whence did we derive it? Hath the universe all those others things of ours in it, and in a far greater proportion? and hath it nothing at all of that, which is the most excellent thing in us?" Nihil quod animi, quodque rationis est expers, id generare ex se potest animantes compotesque rationis, mundus autem generat animantes compotes rationis: "Nothing that is devoid of mind and reason, can generate things animant and rational; but the world generateth such, and therefore itself (or that which contains it, and presides over it) must needs be animant and rational, or intellectual." Which argumentation is further set home by such similitudes as these: Si ex oliva modulatè canentes tibiæ nascerentur, non dubitares, quin esset in oliva tibicinis quædam scientia. Quid si platani fidiculas ferrent numerosè sonantes, idem scilicet censeres in platanis inesse musicam. Cur igitur mundus non animans sapiensque judicetur, cum ex se procreet animantes atque sapientes? "If from the olive-tree should be produced pipes sounding harmoniously, or from the plain-tree fiddles, playing of their own accord musically, it would not at all be doubted, but that there was some musical either skill or nature in those trees themselves: why therefore should not the world be concluded to be both animant and wise (or to have something in it which is so) since it produceth such beings

[8] See Cicero's De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 6. 7. 8. 9.

from itself?" And though perhaps some may think that of Cotta's here to have been a smart and witty repartee,[9] Quærit Socrates, unde animam arripuerimus, si nulla fuerit in mundo? Et ego quæro, unde orationem? unde numeros? unde cantus? nisi verò loqui solem cum luna putemus, cum proprius accesserit: aut ad harmoniam canere mundum, ut Pythagoras existimat, "Socrates demandeth whence we snatched soul, life and reason, if there were none in the world? and I demand (saith he) whence did we snatch speech, music and numbers? Unless perhaps you will suppose the sun to confabulate with the moon, when he approaches near her in the Syzygiæ; or the world to sound harmonically, as Pythagoras conceited." Yet this, how smart soever it may seem, was really but an empty flash of Academic wit, without any sol[illegible] as shall be manifest afterwards. Lastly, the [illegible]ed to prove the existence of a God after this mai[illegible]ars corporis nostri est, quæ non sit minor, quam [illegible]us, sic mundum universum pluris esse necesse e[illegible]aliquam universi: As there is no part of our bo[illegible]nferior in perfection to ourselves, so must the[illegible] needs be supposed to be better and more perf[illegible] the parts thereof." Wherefore, since it is bette[illegible]with life and understanding, than to be devoid th[illegible]are pure perfections; they being in some measu[illegible]must needs be much more in the whole. Nullius [illegible] pars potest esse sentiens; "No part of that which is utterly dead and stupid, can have life and understanding in it." And it is a madness for any man to suppose, Nihil in omni mundo melius esse, quam se, "that there is nothing in the whole world better than himself or than mankind," which is but a part thereof. Now Cotta here again exercises his jeering Academic wit after the same manner as before: Hoc si placet, jam efficies, ut mundus optime librum legere videatur, &c. Isto modo etiam disertus, mathematicus, musicus, omni denique doctrina refertus, postremo philosophus erit mundus. "By this same argument you might as well prove, that the world is also book-learned, an orator, a mathematician, a musician, and last of all, a philosopher." But neither this objection of his, nor that former, have any firmitude at all in them: because though an effect cannot be better or more perfect than its cause, nor a part than the whole, and therefore, whatsoever there is of pure perfection in any effect, it must needs be more in the cause; yet as to those things there mentioned by Cotta, (which have all a plain mixture of imperfection in them) as they could not therefore formally exist in that which is absolutely perfect, so is it sufficient, that they are all eminently and virtually contained therein.

[9] Ibid. lib. 3. cap. 11. p. 3064. tom. 9. opp.

By such argumentations as these (besides that taken from the topic of prescience and divination) did the ancient Stoics endeavour to demonstrate the existence of a God, or a universal Numen, the maker and governor of the whole world; and that such a one, as was not a mere plastic or methodical and senseless, but a conscious and perfectly intellectual nature. So that the world to them was neither a mere heap and congeries of dead and stupid matter, fortuitously compacted together; nor yet a huge plant or vegetable, that is, endued with a spermatic principle only; but an animal informed and enlivened by an intellectual soul. And though, being incorporealists, they sometimes called the whole world itself or mundane animal, God; and sometimes the fiery principle in it, as intellectual, and the Hegemonic of the mundane soul; yet was the god of the Stoics properly, not the very matter itself, but that great soul, mind, and understanding, or in Seneca's language, that "ratio incorporalis," that rules the matter of the whole world. Which Stoical god was also called as well Τ' ἀγαθὸν as Νοὺς, "good" as "mind;" as that which is a most moral, benign, and beneficent being; according to that excellent Cleanthean description of him, in Clemens Alexandrinus:[10]

> Τ' ἀγαθὸν ἰρωτᾷς μ' οἷόν ἐστι; ἄκουε δὴ,
> Τεταγμένον, δίκαιον, ὅσιον, εὐσεβὲς,
> Κρατοῦν ἑαυτοῦ, χρήσιμον, καλὸν, θέον, &c.

But this maker and governor of the whole world was most commonly named by the Stoics Zeus and Zen, or Jupiter; some of them concluding, that therefore there was but one Zeus or independent Deity, because the whole world was but one animal governed by one soul; and others of them endeavouring, on the contrary, to prove the unity and singularity of the world from the oneliness of this Zeus, or the supreme Deity, supposed and taken for granted, and because there is but one fate and providence. Which latter consequence, Plutarch would by no means allow of, he writing thus concerning it, where he pleads for a plurality of worlds:* Καὶ μὴν τά γε ἄλλα τῶν Στωικῶν τίς ἂν φοβηθείη, πυνθανομένων, πῶς Εἱμαρμένη μία μένει καὶ Πρόνοια, καὶ οὐ πολλοὶ Δίες καὶ Ζῆνες ἔσονται, πλειόνων ὄντων κόσμων; τίς γὰρ ἀνάγκη πολλοὺς εἶναι Δίας, ἂν πλείσνες ὦσι κόσμοι, καὶ μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον ἄρχοντα πρῶτον καὶ ἡγεμόνα τοῦ ὅλου θεὸν, οἷος ὁ παρ' ἡμῖν κύριος ἁπάντων καὶ πατὴρ ἐπονομαζόμενος, &c. "Neither is it at all considerable, what the Stoics here object against a plurality of worlds, they demanding, how there could be but one fate, and one providence, and one Jove (or independent Deity) where there many worlds? For what necessity is there, that

[10] In two places, namely, Protreptic. cap. 6. p. 61. and Stromat. lib. 5. p. 715.
* De Def. Or. p. 425.

there must be more Zens or Joves than one, if there were more worlds? and why might not that one and the same God of this universe, called by us the Lord and Father of all, be the first prince, and highest governor in all those worlds? Or what hinders, but that a multitude of worlds might be all subject to the fate and providence of one Jupiter, or supreme God, himself inspecting and ordering them every one; and imparting principles and spermatic reasons to them, according to which all things in them might be governed and disposed? For can many distinct persons in an army or chorus be reduced into one body or polity? and could not ten or fifty, or a hundred worlds in the universe, be all governed by [illegible] be ordered together in reference to one princi[illegible]h place these two things are plainly contained; fi[illegible]oics unquestionably asserted one supreme Deity, [illegible]narch over the whole world; and secondly, that P[illegible] far from giving any entertainment to the co[illegible] that he concluded, though there were ten or fif[illegible]d worlds, yet they were all subject to one supre[illegible] independent Deity.

But however, thou[illegible] thus unquestionably asserted one sole independen[illegible] Numen, the monarch over the whole world, ye[illegible] withstanding, together with the other Pagans, acknowledge a plurality of gods; they concluding, *πάντα μεστὰ εἶναι θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων*, "that all things were full of gods and demons." And so far were they from falling short of the other Pagans, as to this polytheism or multiplicity of gods, that they seem rather to have surpassed and outstripped them therein. Plutarch[1] making mention of their *τοσοῦτον πλῆθος θεῶν*, "their so great multitude of gods;" and affirming them, *ἐμπεπληκέναι τῷ λόγῳ θεῶν τόν οὐρανὸν, τὴν γῆν, τὸν ἀέρα, τὴν θάλατταν*, "to have filled the whole heaven, earth, air, and sea with gods." Nevertheless, they plainly declare, that all this their multiplicity of gods (one only excepted) was generated or created in time by that one, called Zeus or Jupiter, who was not only the spermatic reason, but also the soul and mind of the whole universe; and who from himself produced the world, and those gods, out of non-existence into being. And not only so, but that also in the successive conflagrations they are all again resolved and swallowed up into that one. Thus Plutarch in his defect of oracles,* writing of the mortality of demons: *Τοὺς Στωικοὺς γινώσκομεν οὐ μόνον κατὰ δαιμόνων, ἣν λέγω δόξαν, ἔχοντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ θεῶν, ὄντων τοσοῦτον τὸ πλῆθος, ἐνὶ χρωμένους ἀϊδίῳ καὶ ἀφθάρτῳ, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους καὶ γεγονέναι καὶ φθαρήσεσθαι νομίζοντας*, "We know the

[1] De Repugnantiis Stoicorum, p. 1075. tom. 2. opp.
* P. 420.

Stoics to maintain this opinion, not only concerning demons, but also the gods themselves, that they are mortal. For though they own such a multitude of gods, yet do they acknowledge only one of them eternal and incorruptible; affirming concerning all the rest, that as they were made in time, so they shall be again corrupted and destroyed." Plutarch himself there defends the mortality of demons, but this only as to their corporeal part, that they die to their present bodies, and transmigrate into others, their souls in the mean time remaining immortal and incorruptible; but the Stoics maintained the same as well concerning gods as demons; and that in such a manner, as that their very souls, lives and personalities, should be utterly extinguished and destroyed. To the same purpose Plutarch again writeth, in his book of Common Notions against the Stoics:* Χρύσιππος καὶ Κλεάνθης ἐμπεπληκότες (ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν) τῷ λόγῳ θεῶν τὸν οὐρανὸν, τὴν γῆν, τὸν ἀέρα, τὴν θάλατταν, οὐδένα τῶν τοσούτων ἄφθαρτον, οὐδὲ ἀΐδιον ἀπολελοίπασι, πλὴν μόνου τοῦ Διός· εἰς ὃν πάντας καταναλίσκουσι τοὺς ἄλλους, &c. ταῦτα δὲ οὐχ ὡς ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν ἀτόπων συλλογιζόμενα ἔχει τὰς ὑποθέσεις αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῖς δόγμασιν ἕπεται, ἀλλὰ αὐτοὶ μέγα βοῶντες ἐν τοῖς περὶ θεῶν καὶ προνοίας, εἱμαρμένης τε καὶ φύσεως γράμμασι διαῤῥήδην λέγουσι, τοὺς θεοὺς ἅπαντας εἶναι γεγονότας καὶ φθαρησομένους ὑπὸ πυρὸς, τηκτοὺς κατὰ αὐτοὺς, ὥσπερ κηρίνους ἢ καττιτερίνους ὄντας, "Chrysippus and Cleanthes, having filled the whole heaven, earth, air and sea with gods, leave not one of these their so many gods incorruptible nor eternal, save Jupiter only, into whom they consume all the rest; thereby making him to be a helluo and devourer of gods; which is as bad as if they should affirm him to be corruptible, it arguing as much imperfection for one to be nourished and preserved by the consumption of other things into him, as for himself to die. Now this is not only gathered by way of consequence from the other principles of the Stoics, but it is a thing which they expressly assert, and with a loud voice proclaim in all their writings concerning the gods, providence, fate and nature; that all the gods were generated (or made in time) and that they shall be all destroyed by fire; they supposing them to be meltable, as if they were waxen or leaden things." This indeed is essential to the Stoical doctrine, and from their principles inseparable and unavoidable; forasmuch as they held all to be body, and that in the successive conflagrations all corporeal systems and compages shall be dissolved by fire; so that no other Deity can then possibly remain safe and untouched, save Jupiter alone, the fiery principle of the universe, animated or intellectual. Here therefore there is a considerable difference to be observed betwixt these Stoics and

* P. 1075.

the other pagan Theists; that whereas the others for the most part acknowledged their gods to have been made in time by one supreme universal Numen, but yet nevertheless to be immortal, and to continue to eternity; the Stoical Pagans maintained, that all their other gods, save Jupiter alone, were not only γεγονότες, but also φθαρησόμενοι, such as should be as well corrupted as they were generated, and this so also, as that their very personalities should be utterly abolished and annihilated; all the Stoical gods in the conflagration being as it were melted and confounded into one.

Wherefore during the intervals of the successive conflagrations, the Stoics all agreed, that there is no more than one God (Zeus or Jupiter) left alone (there being then indeed nothing else besides himself, who afterwards produceth the whole mundane system, together with all the gods, out of himself again. Chrysippus in Plutarch affirmeth:* Ἐοικέναι τῷ μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ τὸν Δία καὶ τὸν κόσμον, τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ τὴν Πρόνοιαν· ὅταν οὖν ἐκπύρωσις γένηται, μόνον ἄφθαρτον ὄντα τὸν Δία τῶν θεῶν, ἀναχωρεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν, εἶτα ὁμοῦ γενομένους, ἐπὶ μιᾶς τῆς τοῦ αἰθέρος οὐσίας διατελεῖν ἀμφοτέρους, "That as Jupiter and the world may be resembled to a man, so may providence be to the soul: when therefore there shall be a conflagration, Jupiter of all the gods being alone incorruptible and then remaining, will retire and withdraw himself into providence; and so both together remain in that same ethereal substance." Where notwithstanding Jupiter and providence are really but one and the same thing. And Seneca[z] writeth thus concerning the life of a wise man in solitude: Qualis futura est vita sapientis, si sine amicis relinquatur, in custodiam conjectus, aut in desertum littus ejectus? Qualis est Jovis, cum, resoluto mundo, et DIIS IN UNUM CONFUSIS, paulisper cessante natura, acquiescit sibi, cogitationibus suis traditus, "If you ask what would be the life of a wise man, either in a prison, or desert? I answer, the same with that of Jupiter, when the world being resolved, and the GODS all CONFOUNDED into ONE, and the course of nature ceasing, he resteth in himself, conversing with his own cogitations." Arrianus' Epictetus likewise, speaking of the same thing, ironically introduces Jupiter, bemoaning himself in the conflagration as now left quite alone, after this manner:† Τάλας ἐγὼ, οὔτε τὴν Ἥραν ἔχω, οὔτε τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν, οὔτε τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα, οὔτε ὅλως ἢ ἄδελφον, ἢ υἱὸν, ἢ συγγενῆ, "Alas, I am now left all alone; I have neither Juno, nor Minerva, nor Apollo with me; neither brother nor son, nor nephew, nor kinsman (neither god nor goddess) to keep me company." He adding also, according to the sense of

* P. 1077. [De Repugn. Stoicor.]
[z] Epist. 9. p. 22. tom. 2. opp.
† Arr. lib. 3. cap. 13. [P. 291.]

the Stoics, that in all these successive conflagrations, ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ σύνεστι, καὶ ἡσυχάζει ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ἐννοεῖ τὴν διοίκησιν ἑαυτοῦ, οἷα ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐν ἐπινοίαις γίνεται πρεπούσαις ἑαυτῷ, "Jupiter being left alone, converseth only with himself, and resteth in himself, considering his own government, and being entertained with thoughts becoming himself." And thus have we made it unquestionably evident, that the Stoics acknowledged only one independent and self-existent Deity, one universal Numen, which was not only the creator of all the other gods, but also, in certain alternate vicissitudes of time, the decreator of them; he then swallowing them up, and devouring them all into himself, as he had before produced them together with the world out of himself.[3]

[3] So many grave and learned writers have expounded the doctrine of the Stoics, that were I to enter in this place into a long dissertation upon it, I should undertake a superfluous labour. I shall say a few words, however, upon the gods of this sect, in order to throw some light upon the remarks of Dr. Cudworth. I. The gods of the Stoics are, unless I am mistaken, of a twofold kind, *natural*, if we may so term them, and *made*. The natural gods are the heavenly bodies, sun, moon, fixed stars, and planets; the divinity of which is asserted at great length by Lucilius in Cicero De Natura Deor, lib. 2. Lactantius, Divinar. Institut. lib. 2. cap. 5. p. 185. says: Philosophi Stoicæ disciplinæ in ea sunt opinione, ut omnia cœlestia, quæ moventur, in Deorum numero habenda esse, censeant, "The philosophers of the Stoical creed are of opinion, that all the heavenly bodies which move are to be ranked in the number of the gods." We have already, therefore, a countless host of gods. But, whether in addition to the heavenly bodies they acknowledged any other natural deities except demons, which Plutarch informs us, De Placitis Philos. lib. 1. cap. 8. p. 882. tom. 2. opp. were introduced by them, I very much doubt. For when he says, De Repugnantiis Stoicor. p. 1075. tom. 2. opp. that this sect filled the earth, air, sea, and fire with gods, he speaks more in the spirit of malice than of truth. Nor do I think we ought to put any greater faith in those who have recorded that the earth, water, fire, and I know not what other portions of nature, were reckoned by the Stoics in the rank of gods. The style of speaking commonly adopted by the Stoics was the sole cause, in my opinion, why many entertained so unfavourable an opinion of this class. They supposed a divine power to pervade the whole universe; hence every thing, they considered, might in a certain way be called God, and was very often so called by them. Res ipsa, says the Stoic, discoursing in Cicero De Natur. Deor. lib. 2. cap. 23. p. 2988. in qua vis major est aliqua, sic appellatur, ut ea ipsa vis nominetur Deus, "The thing in which there exists any considerable power, is so named, that the power itself is called God." And a little before: Illud, quod erat a Deo natum, nomine ipsius Dei nuncupabant, "That which was produced from God they designated by the name of God himself." Hence many who did not attend to the meaning of these phrases fancied, that the several parts of the universe were regarded by the Stoics as so many separate and self-existent deities, to which opinion, however, they were altogether opposed. They suffered various names of one God to be applied according to the variety of his functions and virtues, but at the same time supposed all these names to belong to one being, who manifests his power in divers ways. Seneca, De Beneficiis, lib. 4. cap. 7. p. 427. Quæcumque voles, Deo nomina proprie aptabis, vim aliquam effectumque cœlestium rerum continentia. Tot appellationes ejus possunt esse, quot munera, "You may give to God with propriety any names whatever, that imply any power and effect of celestial things. His appellations may be as numerous as his functions." Add Athenagoras, who beautifully illustrates the same, Legat. pro Christianis cap. 6. p. 28. ed. Oxon. I should not be disposed, therefore, to look for the gods of the Stoics, strictly so called by them, out of the region of the stars; which, on account of their wonderfully constant and unvarying courses they considered to be inhabited by intelligences of surpassing excellence, culled or decerpted from the supreme Deity. The *made* gods, as I have termed them, of the Stoics, were men or *heroes*, exalted to

It it granted, that these Stoics as well as the other Pagans did religiously worship more gods than one, that is more understanding beings superior to men. For it was Epictetus'[4] own

heaven by the esteem and admiration of mortals. But, whether they ranked these among the gods from their own conviction, or merely to avoid the ill will of others, I would not rashly assert. It is sufficient for us to expound their doctrine, leaving it to others to decide, whether it were sincere or pretended. The Stoics, although they denied the immortality of souls, nevertheless considered the minds of some men to possess so much virtue and constancy, that they remained, when freed from the bodies, and did not return to the c rce of souls till the final confla- gration of the world. Thes s they held to be gods and meet to be worshipped as gods. nded the worship of Hercules, Æsculapius, Castor, and the ere known to have lived among men. This is manifest as w om ancient authors as from the discourse of the Stoic Balb Deor. lib. 2. cap. 24. p. 2990. tom. 9. opp. who, after desc of heroes, concludes the subject with these words: Quorum atque æternitate fruerentur, Dii rite habiti sunt, quum et opt hose souls, as being permanent and enjoying eternity, were , since they were both best and eternal." The rest of the g were altogether repudiated by the Stoics, who contended, t ore than parts of the nature of things, clothed by poetic fic... Hence arose those numerous physical explications of the ancient fables concerning the gods, which have for the most part come down to our own times, and in which this sect in particular took a wonderful delight.

II. We see, therefore, what sort of gods the Stoics professed, which I have thought proper to be at some pains in showing, because most of those, I observe, who have canvassed the religion of this sect, do not do them justice, while others are altogether in doubt as to the opinion they ought to form respecting their gods. To myself they appear to have worshipped no deities properly so called, except the natures residing in the stars, and the souls of great men. And even so, the multitude of their deities is sufficiently large, nay, incredible. Nevertheless, their having worshipped so many gods occasions less surprise than their not having worshipped more. For if they had wished their religions opinions to harmonize with the rest of their precepts, they ought to have adopted a much larger number. "An inferior Deity," according to the Stoics, "is a nature partaking of mind, counsel, reason, and lastly of the faculty of exciting matter, and plucked from the supreme Being, like a branch or rod." For their sole reason for ranking the stars among the gods was, because their perpetual and constant courses proved, that mind and intelligence resided in them. That is, as we learn from Cicero, they reasoned as follows, "Whatever possesses mind and counsel is a part of God, and a certain God. But, where there is constancy and perpetual order, there of necessity must be mind and counsel. Now the stars preserve their orderly, constant and equable courses; therefore they are endowed with mind and reason; therefore they are gods." However, if we follow the principles of the Stoics, this description of a God applies equally well to the souls of men. For these also not only partake of reason, mind, and order, but are also decerpted from God, and portions or branches of the supreme Being, in which there exists the power of impelling and exciting matter. Accordingly, the Stoics do not hesitate frequently to call the human mind God. Wherefore, in order to be consistent, they ought also to have placed all souls among the gods and to have mutually paid divine honours to each other. I pass over the souls of brutes, upon which they did not all hold the same opinion.

III. Now it is clear from what has been said, that the Stoics were not worshippers of many gods in the same sense as the rest of the people, and therefore cannot properly be ranked in the same class. Their gods were parts of the one supreme Being, and were ultimately to return to the source from which they emanated. They possessed, therefore, no stability or virtue of their own; at the coming of the great year death and destruction awaited them all. But the gods of the other classes were self-existent natures, really distinct and separate from the supreme Being, and about to

[4] Apud Arrian. Diss. Epictet. lib. 1. diss. 1. p. 84.

exhortation: Εὔχου θεοῖς, "Pray to the gods." And the same philosopher[5] thus describeth the disposition of a person rightly affected: Θέλω εἰδέναι, τί μοι καθῆκον πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, "I would willingly know what is my duty, first to the gods, and then to my parents and other relations." And they are M. Antoninus' precepts:[6] Αἰδοῦ θεούς, "Revere the gods," and: Ἐν ἅπασι θεοὺς ἐπικαλοῦ, "In every thing implore the aid and assistance of the gods." And accordingly in that close of his first book,[8] himself does thankfully ascribe many particular benefits to the gods in common: Παρὰ τῶν θεῶν τὸ ἀγαθοὺς πάππους, &c. "I owe to the gods, that I had good progenitors and parents," &c. Where, amongst the rest, he reckons up this for one, that he never was any great proficient, either in poetry or rhetoric; because these would probably (had he succeeded in his pursuit of them) have hindered him from the attainment of far better things. And after all his enumeration, he concludeth thus: Πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα θεῶν βοηθῶν καὶ τύχης δεῖται, "For all these things need the assistance of the gods and fortune," viz. because they are not in our own power.[9]

remain to all eternity; which also had the power of distributing rewards and inflicting punishments. The Stoics, to speak properly, acknowledged but one God. Athenagoras, Apol. pro Christian, cap. 6. p. 20. Οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, κἂν ταῖς προσηγορίαις κατὰ τὰς παραλλάξεις τῆς ὕλης, δι' ἧς φασι τὸ πνεῦμα χωρεῖν τοῦ θεοῦ, πληθύνουσι τὸ θεῖον τοῖς ὀνόμασι, τῷ γοῦν ἔργῳ ἕνα νομίζουσι τὸν θεόν, "The Stoics, although by using various appellations according to the variety of matter, through which they assert the Spirit of God to be diffused, they multiply the divinity in name, nevertheless in reality consider, that there is only one God." But inasmuch as they supposed this one God to have sent forth portions of his own virtue, and inclosed them in certain bodies, they therefore appeared to worship several gods, and were themselves anxious to appear so. Nor did they at all conceal this, but in my opinion used the words God and gods promiscuously for the very purpose of showing, that they might in a certain sense be said to be worshippers of one and also of many gods. Of this we have innumerable instances in Antoninus, Seneca, Arrian, by whom one and the same thing is attributed indiscriminately sometimes to gods and sometimes to God. As an example I shall adduce one passage of the emperor Antoninus, from lib. 12. sect. 5. p. 351. Ὁρᾷς γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς, ὅτι τοῦτο παραζητῶν δικαιολογῇ πρὸς ΤΟΝ ΘΕΟΝ· οὐκ ἂν ἐ οὕτω διελεγόμεθα ΤΟΙΣ ΘΕΟΙΣ, εἰ μὴ ἄριστοι καὶ δικαιότατοι εἶσι, "You see, that in investigating this matter you vindicate yourself before God; but we would not so vindicate ourselves before the gods, unless they were most upright and most just." Add Arrian's Epictetus, lib. 1. cap. 12. p. 118. &c. The learned Doctor himself rightly notices this a little afterwards; but he assigns a different reason, which I do not agree to; namely, that the gods of the Stoics considered conjointly are God, and reversely the God of the Stoics considered in the several parts of nature is distributed into many gods.

[5] Epict. lib. 3. cap. 17. p. 222.
[6] Lib. 6. sect. 30. p. 190.
[8] Lib. 6. sect. 23. p. 183.
[9] Lib. 1. sect. 17.. p 30.

[1] In reference to these passages, wherein the Stoics exhort us to pray to the gods, the remark made a little above ought especially to be borne in mind, namely, that they use the words θεὸς and θεοί promiscuously and indifferently. Nevertheless, I would not deny that the Stoics prayed to those whom they called gods, as well as to the supreme Being; although in both cases I consider them to have acted absurdly. According to Zeno's doctrine, the minds of men are parts of God. Therefore a Stoic, when he would have men to pray to God, is telling a part to address prayers to its whole. And again, when he says that men ought to supplicate the other gods, he is advising one part of God to become a suppliant to another part. But such is the weakness of the human mind, that even wise men are very frequently unable to perceive the consequences *immediately deducible from* their own dogmas.

Neither can it be denied, but that they did often derogate from the honour of the supreme God, by attributing such things to the gods in common (as the donors of them) which plainly belong to the supreme God only. As when Epictetus makes reason in men to be a gift of the gods:* Ἡμῖν οὖν λόγος ἐπὶ ἀτυχίᾳ καὶ κακοδαιμονίᾳ δέδοται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν; "Is reason therefore given us by the gods merely to make us miserable and unhappy? And when he again imputes virtue to them: "Hast thou overcome thy lu rance, thine anger?"† Πόσῳ μείζων αἰτία θυσίας, ταρχία; ταῦτα ἐκ σοῦ αὐτοῦ γίνεται καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν uch greater cause then hast thou of offering sacri hadst got a consulship or prætorship? For th only from thyself, and from the gods." Though ese speeches of theirs seems to have been no othe use they took it for granted, that those understan rior to men, called by them gods, were all of the ts and ministers of the supreme God in the go e world; and had therefore some kind of stroke or influence, more or less, upon all the concernments of mankind. Whence it came to pass also, that they often used those words God and gods promiscuously and indifferently; as one and the same celebrated speech of Socrates is sometimes expressed singularly: Εἰ ταύτῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, "If God will have it so, let it be so" (Arr. Epict. lib. 1. cap. 29. and lib. 4. cap. 4.); and sometimes again plurally: Εἰ ταύτῃ φίλον τοῖς θεοῖς, "If the gods will have it so."

Wherefore, notwithstanding the many gods of those Stoics, they worshipped for all that one supreme, that is, one universal Numen, that contains and comprehends the whole world, who was variously described by them, sometimes as the nature and reason of the whole world: Ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις πρεσβυτάτη θεῶν,‡ "The nature of the whole, the oldest of all the gods;" and Ἡ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦσα φύσις, "That nature which governs all things;" Ὁ τὴν τῶν ὅλων οὐσίαν διοικῶν λόγος,§ "That reason which governs the substance of all;" Ὁ διά τῆς οὐσίας διήκων λόγος, καὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος, κατὰ περιόδους τεταγμένας οἰκονομῶν τὸ πᾶν,‖ "That reason which passes through the substance of the universe, and through all eternity, orders and dispenses all according to appointed periods." Sometimes is he called, Ἡ τῶν ὅλων αἰτία,¶ "The cause of all things;" sometimes, Τὸ τοῦ κόσμου ἡγεμονικὸν,** "The hegemonic and ruling principle of the whole world;" and Ὁ ἡγεμὼν τοῦ κόσμου, "The prince of the world." Again, Ὁ διοικῶν τὰ ὅλα,†† "The

* Lib. 3. cap. 24. [Apud Arrian, p. 329.]
† Lib. 4. cap. 3. [P. 388.]
‡ Anton. lib. 9. [Sect. 1. p. 262.
§ Ant. lib. 7. sect. 18. [P. 213.]
‖ Ant. lib. 6. sect. 1. [Page 170.]
¶ Ant. lib. 5. sect. 24.
** *Ant. lib. 9.*
†† Ant. lib. 7. sect. 47. [Sect. 75. p. 236.]

governor of the whole," as in this of Epictetus: Ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὴν αὑτοῦ γνώμην ὑποτέταχε τῷ διοικοῦντι τὰ ὅλα, καθάπερ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται νόμῳ τῆς πόλεως,* "A good man submits his mind to the governor of the whole universe, as good citizens do theirs to the law of the city." Also, Ὁ διατάσσων, "The orderer of all;" in this other religious passage of the same philosophers: Τὸ παιδεύεσθαι, τουτέστι μανθάνειν ἕκαστα οὕτω θέλειν, ὡς γίνεται· πῶς δὲ γίνεται; ὡς διέταξεν αὐτὰ ὁ διατάσσων,† "To be instructed is to will things to be as they are made: and how are they made? as that great disposer of all hath appointed." Again, the supreme God is sometimes called by them: Τὸ περίεχον τὰ ὅλα νοερὸν, "that intellectual principle which contains the whole," as in this instruction of M. Antoninus: Μὴ μόνον συμπνεῖν τῷ περιέχοντι ἀέρι, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμφρονεῖν τῷ περιέχοντι πάντα νοερῷ,‡ "That, as our bodies breathe the common air, so should our souls suck and draw in vital breath from that great mind that comprehends the universe, becoming as it were one spirit with the same." He is also called by them Ὁ τοῦ ὅλου νοῦς καὶ διάνοια,§ "the mind and understanding of the whole world;" Μία πάντων πήγη νοερὰ, "One intellectual fountain of all things;" and lastly, to name no more, Θεὸς εἷς διὰ πάντων, καὶ οὐσία μία, καὶ νόμος εἷς,‖ "One God through all, one substance, and one law." Which supreme God was commonly called also by the Stoics, together with the generality of the other Pagans, ὁ Θεὸς, or "God," emphatically and in way of eminency, as in this of Epictetus:[10] Μηδὲν ἄλλο θέλε, ἢ ἃ ὁ Θεὸς θέλει, καὶ τίς σε κωλύσει; "Will nothing but what God willeth, and then who can be able to hinder thee?" And again: Θέλησον καλὸς φανῆναι τῷ θεῷ, ἐπιθύμησον καθαρὸς μετὰ καθαροῦ σεαυτοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ,¶ "Affect to seem fair to God, desire to be pure with thy pure self, and with God." Also where[1] he speaks of the regular course of things in nature: Τεταγμένως, καθάπερ ἐκ προστάγματος Θεοῦ, ὅταν ἐκεῖνος εἴπῃ τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀνθεῖν, ἀνθεῖ, ὅταν εἴπῃ βλαστάνειν, βλαστάνει, "That it proceedeth orderly, every thing as it were obeying the command of God; when he bids the plants to blossom, they blossom; and when to bring forth fruit, they bring forth fruit." To which innumerable other instances might be added. And Zeus or Jupiter was the proper name of this supreme God amongst the Stoics also; whence the government of the whole

* Lib. 1. cap. 12. [Apud Arrian. p. 118.]
† Ep. p. 119. Cant. ‡ Lib. 8. sect. 45. [Sect. 54. p. 258.]
§ Anton. p. 125. [Lib. 5. sect. 30. p. 164.] ‖ Ant. p. 257.]
¶ Anton. lib. 7. sect. 7. [Sect. 9. p. 210.]
[10] Apud Arrian, lib. 2. cap. 27. p. 221.
** Lib. 2. cap. 18. [P. 225.]
[1] Apud Arrian. lib. 1. cap. 14. p. 122. 123.

world is called by them, Διὸς διοίκησις,[2] "The government or economy of Jupiter." Lastly, this supreme God is sometimes distinguished by them from the other gods, expressly and by name; as in this of Epictetus: Ἐγὼ δ' ἔχω τίνι ὑποτετάχθαι, τίνι πείθεσθαι, τῷ θεῷ καὶ τοῖς μετ' ἐκεῖνον,* "I have, whom I ought to be subject to, whom to obey, God and those who are next after him;" that is, the supreme and inferior gods. So likewise, where he exhorteth not to desire things out of our own power: Ἀλλὰ τῷ Δι[illegible] καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς, ἐκείνοις παράδος, ἐκεῖνοι[illegible] "Let Jupiter alone with these things, and the[illegible]ver them up to be ordered and governed by thei[illegible]in, where he personates one that places his happin[illegible]gs without him: Κάθημαι καὶ στένω, καὶ ὃν δύ[illegible] τὸν Δία καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἅλλους, "I then shall[illegible] and speaking evil of every one, even Jupiter hi[illegible]er gods."

And it must in rea[illegible]l, that this Jupiter, or universal Numen of the w[illegible]noured by these Stoics far above all their other particular gods; he being acknowledged by them to have been the maker or creator of them as well as the whole world, and the only eternal and immortal God: all those other gods, as hath been already declared, being as well corruptible, mortal, and annihilable, as they were generated or created. For though Cicero's Lucilius Balbus,‡ where he pretends to represent the doctrine of the Stoics, attributes the very first original of the world to a plurality of gods, in these words: Dico igitur *providentiâ Deorum* mundum et omnes mundi partes, et initio constitutas esse, et omni tempore administrari; yet unquestionably Cicero forgat himself herein, and rather spake the language of some other Pagans, who, together with the generation of the world, held indeed a plurality of eternal (though not independent) deities, than of the Stoics, who asserted one only eternal God; and supposed, in the reiterated conflagrations, all the gods to be melted and confounded into one, so that Jupiter being then left alone, must needs make up the world again, as also all those other gods out of himself. And thus does Zeno in Laërtius[3] describe the Cosmopœia: Τὸν θεὸν κατ' ἀρχὰς, καθ' αὑτὸν ὄντα, "That God at first being alone by himself, converted the fiery substance of the world by degrees into water," that is, into a

[2] The words of Epictetus preserved by Arrian, lib. 2. cap. 23. p. 251. Ἄνθρωπε, τὸ προκείμενόν σοι, κατασκευάσαι σεαυτὸν,——συναρμόζοντα τῇ τοῦ Διὸς διοικήσει, "O man, it is thy object, so to prepare thyself,——as to harmonize with the government of Jupiter."

* Lib. 4. cap. 12. [P. 426.] † Lib. 2. cap. 17. [P. 221.]

‡ De Nat. Deor. lib. 2. p. 225. Lamb. [Cap. 30. p. 2999. tom. 9. opp.

[3] Lib. 7. De Vitis Philos. segm. 136. p. 450. The learned Doctor, however, does not repeat the identical words of Zeno or Laërtius, but merely gives what he considers to be their sum and substance.

crasser chaos; "out of which water, himself afterwards, as the spermatic reason of the world, formed the elements and whole mundane system." And Cicero himself elsewhere, in his De Legibus,[4] attributes the first original of mankind cautiously, not to the gods in common, but to the supreme God only: Hoc animal providum, &c. quem vocamus hominem, præclara quadam conditione generatum esse, à SUMMO DEO: and this, rather according to the sense of the Stoics than of the Platonists, whose inferior generated gods also (being first made) were supposed to have had a stroke in the fabrifaction of mankind, and other animals. Thus Epictetus plainly ascribes the making of the whole world to God, or the one supreme Deity, where he mentions the Galileans, that is, the Christians, their contempt of death, though imputing it only to custom in them, and not to right knowledge (as M. Antoninus[5] likewise ascribes the same to ψιλὴ παράταξις, "mere obstinacy of mind"): Ὑπὸ μανίας μὲν δύναταί τις οὕτω διατεθῆναι, καὶ ὑπὸ ἔθους οἱ Γαλιλαῖοι, ὑπὸ λόγου δὲ καὶ ἀποδείξεως οὐδεὶς δύναται μαθεῖν, ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς πάντα πεποίηκε τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν κόσμον,* "Can some be so affected out of madness, and the Galileans out of custom? and can none attain thereunto by reason and true knowledge, namely, because God made all things in the world, and the whole world itself perfect and unhinderable; but the parts thereof for the use of the whole, so that the parts ought therefore to yield and give place to the whole." Thus does he again elsewhere demand: Τὸν ἥλιον τίς πεποίηκε, καρποὺς δὲ τίς, &c. "Who made the sun? Who the fruits of the earth? Who the seasons of the year? Who the agreeable fitness of things? Wherefore thou having received all from another, even thy very self, dost thou murmur and complain against the donor of them, if he take away any one thing from thee? Did he not bring thee into the world? show thee the light? bestow sense and reason upon thee?" Now the sun[6] was the chief of the inferior Stoical gods, and therefore he being made by another, all the rest of their gods must needs be so too. And thus is it plainly expressed in this following citation: Εἴ τις τῷ δόγματι τούτῳ

[4] De Legib. lib. 1. cap. 8. p. 3804. tom. 9. opp. Our author properly reminds us, that this is said according to the sense of the Stoics. For a great portion of Cicero's discourse in this place is borrowed from that school.

[5] Lib. 2. sect. 3. p. 319. On which passage I treated specifically some time ago, Observation. Sacrar. et Historico. Criticar. lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 137.

* Lib. 4. cap. 7. [P. 500.]

[6] A more striking passage than the one here given, respecting the creation of the sun by the supreme Being, occurs in Arrian, lib. 1. cap. 14. p. 124. where he proves by no mean arguments, that God perceives all things: Ὁ δὲ καὶ τὸν ἥλιον αὐτὸν ποιητικὸς καὶ περιάγων, μέρος ὢν αὐτοῦ μικρὸν, ὡς πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, οὗτος δὲ οὐ δύναται πάντων αἰσθάνεσθαι; "But he who made the sun itself and causes it to revolve, being a small portion of his works, if compared with the whole, is he unable to perceive all things?"

*συμπαθῆσαι κατ' ἀξίαν δύναιτο, ὅτι γεγόναμεν ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ πάντες προηγουμένως, καὶ ὁ Θεὸς πατήρ ἐστι τῶν τ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν Θεῶν, οὐδὲν ἀγενὲς, οὐδε ταπεινὸν ἐνθυμηθήσεται περὶ ἑαυτοῦ,** "If any one could be thoroughly sensible of this, that we are all made by God, and that as principal parts of the world, and that God is the father both of men and gods, he would never think meanly of himself, knowing that he is the son of Jupiter also." Where Θεὸς is plainly put for the supreme God, and Θεοὶ for the inferior [illegible] again, he thus attributes the making of man and [illegible] the whole world to God, or Jupiter only: Ὁ [illegible] *ἀνθρώπους ἐπὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐποίησε,* &c. *τὴν δὲ οἰ[illegible] τοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, ὥσπερ ἄξιον τὸν κηδόμενον ἡμῶν, [illegible] προϊστάμενον ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις,†* "God made all men [illegible] they might be happy, and as became him, who [illegible] care of us, he placed our good and evil in those [illegible] are in our own power. And: *Τῷ ὄντι κακῶς διοικε[illegible] μὴ ἐπιμελεῖται ὁ Ζεὺς τῶν ἑαυτοῦ πολιτῶν, ἵν' ὡσιν [illegible] εὐδαίμονες,‡* "Things would not be well governed, if Jupiter took no care of his own citizens, that they also might be happy like himself."[7]

* Lib. 1. cap. 3. [P. 90. Vide etiam, lib. 1. cap. 14. p. 124.]
† Lib. 3. cap. 24. [P. 328.] ‡ Lib. 3. cap. 24. [P. 331.]

[7] That the Stoics, as the learned Doctor proves in this place by numerous authorities, held their supreme Being to be the parent and founder of all things, is altogether unquestionable. And yet I should not on that account find fault with Cicero for making the Stoic Balbus assert, that this world was made and is administered, Deorum immortalium providentia, "by the providence of the immortal gods," or consider him to have been guilty of any error. For, I. it has been already observed, that the Stoics employed the words God and gods promiscuously, and ascribed one and the same work sometimes to God and sometimes to gods, as its authors. And Cicero, in the very oration of the Stoic Balbus from which these words are taken, so observes this custom as to make no distinction between him and the other Stoics: Non est igitur, says he, a little after the words in question, natura *Deorum* præpotens, neque excellens, si quidem ea subjecta est vel necessitati vel naturæ.——Nihil autem est præstantius *Deo*.——Nulli igitur est naturæ obediens aut subjectus *Deus*.——Etenim, si concedimus, intelligentes esse *Deos*, concedimus etiam, providentes, "The nature of the *gods*, therefore, is not all-powerful or excellent, if it is subject either to necessity or nature.——But nothing is more excellent than *God*.——Therefore *God* is not obedient or subject to any nature.——For if we grant that the *gods* are intelligent, we grant also that they are provident." Even this one passage is a proof, that Cicero, in discoursing according to the sense of the Stoics, considered it to be all the same, whether the word God or gods be made use of. II. Nor, if we look more minutely into the Stoical doctrine, can it appear absurd to us, that the construction of the world should be ascribed by this sect to a plurality of gods, although, strictly speaking, they believed the supreme and most high God to have alone performed this work. For the gods of the Stoics are all of them parts of the supreme God, and were all in God, when he alone was meditating the creation of the world. Wherefore, when he himself commenced this work, in a certain sense the gods also, which were in him, at the same time took a part in it. Consequently the Stoic is not to be censured, if he assigns the formation of the world sometimes to God, in whom all the gods were comprised, and sometimes to gods, as being subsequently separated from the supreme Being. The tenor of his doctrine admits of both. III. But what, if I should make it appear, that the Stoics, like the Platonists, attributed some part of its fabrication even to minor deities, and did not, as the learned Doctor supposes, refer the whole of this work to the

And that these Stoics did indeed religiously worship and honour the supreme God above all their other gods, may appear from sundry instances. As first, from their acknowledging him

power and energy of their supreme Being alone? I shall prove this, not only from the express words of an illustrious philosopher of this school, but also from their esoteric physiology. The philosopher to whose evidence I shall appeal is Seneca, who, De Beneficiis, lib. 6. cap. 23. p. 494. tom. 1. opp. thus speaks of the sun, moon, and stars, which the Stoics regarded as principal gods: In prima autem illa (mundi) constitutione, quum *universa disponerent*, etiam nostra viderunt, rationemque hominis habuerunt. Itaque non possunt videri sua tantum caussa decurrere, et explicare opus suum, quia *pars operis sumus et nos*. Debemus ergo soli et lunæ et cæteris cœlestibus beneficium.——In nostras quoque utilitates a *principio rerum* præmissa mens est, et is ordo mundo datus, ut appareat, curam nostri non inter ultima habitam.—— Di non possunt videri nescisse, quid effecturi essent, quum omnibus alimenta protinus et auxilia providerint: nec eos per negligentiam genuere, quibus tam multa generabant, "But in that first formation (of the world), when *they disposed all things*, they saw also to our interests and took account of man. Therefore they cannot be looked upon as running their courses for themselves only and developing their own work, since *we also are a part of that work*. Therefore we owe an obligation to the sun, and moon, and heavenly bodies.——Moreover, *from the beginning of things*, mind was sent before for our benefit, and such order given to the world, as to make it appear, that the care of us was not reckoned among things of the lowest consideration.——The gods cannot be regarded as having been ignorant, what they were about to effect, inasmuch as they forthwith produced sustenance and succour for all: nor did they generate those carelessly, for whom they produced so many things." If we take him, therefore, as an authority, the disposition of the whole universe, the care over all things, and lastly, the generation of the human race belong to the sun, moon, and stars; and not to the supreme God alone. And this doctrine is in perfect accordance with the physical precepts of the Stoics. For, although this sect supposed all things to have flowed and proceeded from Jupiter or the supreme Deity, they notwithstanding did not believe, that the fabric of the universe was produced and arranged by one effort and impulse, but according to a certain law, process, and order. Thus they considered fire or ether to have sprung forth the first of all things, and to have occupied the highest place, the rest following in succession. From among many witnesses it will be sufficient to cite only Manilius, a well-known Stoic, who, Astronomicon, lib. 1. v. 147. &c. p. 5. thus sings:

> Sed facies quæcumque tamen sub origine rerum
> Convenit, et certo digestum est ordine corpus.
> Ignis in æthereas volucer se sustulit auras,
> Summaque complexus stellantis culmina cœli,
> Flammarum vallo naturæ mœnia fecit.

Add Diogenes Laertius, lib. segm. 136. 137. p. 450. As soon as fire was secreted (if we may so speak, from the supreme Being, the minor deities or stars were, according to their opinion, immediately generated in it; and, on these being produced, the rest of the elements then came forth, and were assigned their respective places. This, we are told in express words by Laërtius from Zeno, Chrysippus, and other champions of the Stoics, lib. 7. segm. 137. p. 451: Ἀνωτάτω μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὸ πῦρ, ὃν δὴ αἰθέρα καλεῖσθαι ἐν ᾧ πρώτην τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαῖραν γεννᾶσθαι, εἶτα τὴν τῶν πλανωμένων, μεθ' ἣν τὸν ἀέρα, εἶτα τὸ ὑγρόν, ὑποστάθμην δὲ πάντων τὴν γῆν, "For (they say) that at the top is fire, which they call ether: in which was produced first the sphere of the fixed stars, then of the planets, after which the air, then water, and as the substratum of all the earth." Consequently, the celestial deities of the Stoics, which they preferred far before all the rest, existed prior to the other elements, water, air, and earth, and before either men or animals or any other parts of the universe, rational or irrational, were produced. But that a God should exist and do nothing the Stoics, held to be absurd and ridiculous. Primum igitur, says the Stoic Balbus in Cicero, De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 30. p. 2999. tom. 9. opp. aut negandum est, Deos esse.——aut, qui deos esse concedunt, iis fatendum est, eos *aliquid agere*, idque præclarum, "In the first place, therefore, either the existence of gods

to be the sovereign legislator, and professing subjection and obedience to his laws, accounting this to be their greatest liberty. Thus Epictetus: Εἰς ἐμὲ οὐδεὶς ἐξουσίαν ἔχει, ἠλευθέρωμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἔγνωκα αὐτοῦ τὰς ἐντολὰς, οὐκέτι οὐδεὶς δουλαγωγῆσαί με δύναται,* "No man hath power over me, I am made free by God (by becoming his subject), I know his commandments, and no man can bring me under bondage to himself." And again: Ταῦτα ἐπιτηδεύων θέλω εὑρεθῆναι, ἵν' εἰπεῖν δύνωμαι τῷ Θεῷ, μήτι παρέβην σου, τὰς ἐντολάς·† &c. "These things would I be found employing myself about, that I may be able to say to God, Have I transgressed any of thy commandments? have I used my faculties and anticipations (or common notions) otherwise than thou requiredst?"

Again, from their acknowledging him to be the supreme governor of the whole world, and the orderer of all things in it by his fate and providence, and their professing to submit their wills to his will in every thing; Epictetus somewhere[s] thus bespeaks the supreme God: Μήτι ἐμεμψάμην σου τὴν διοίκησιν; ἐνόσησα, ὅτι ἐθέλησας, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἑκών· πένης ἐγενόμην σου θέλοντος ἀλλὰ χαίρων· οὐκ ἦρξα, ὅτι σὺ οὐκ ἠθέλησας· οὐδέποτ' ἐπιθύμησα ἀρχῆς· μήτι με τούτου ἕνεκα στυγνότερον εἶδες; μὴ οὐ προσῆλθόν σοι φαιδρῷ τῷ προσώπῳ, ἕτοιμος εἴτι ἐπιτάσσεις, εἴ τε σημαίνεις; νῦν με θέλεις ἀπελθεῖν ἐκ τῆς πανηγύρεως; ἄπειμι· χάριν σοι ἔχω πᾶσαν, ὅτι ἠξίωσάς με συμπανηγυρίσαι σοι, καὶ ἰδεῖν ἔργα τὰ σὰ καὶ τῇ διοικήσει σου συμπαρακολουθῆσαι· ταῦτά με ἐνθυμούμενον, ταῦτα γράφοντα, τοῦτα ἀναγινώσκοντα καταλάβοι ἂν θάνατος, "Did I ever complain of thy government? I was sick when thou wouldst have me to be, and so are others, but I was so willingly. I was poor also at thy appointment, but rejoicing; I never bore any magistracy, or had any dignity, be-

must be altogether denied,——or those who admit gods to exist, must confess that *they do something*, and something noble too." Wherefore, if the Stoical gods were first generated, and the gods cannot but do something great and noble, we must necessarily conclude, that immediately on their being produced, as Seneca expressly writes, they contributed their aid towards the disposition and arrangement of the world and the generation of men and animals. Hence there is no reason, why Cicero and others should be accused of error, when they tell us, that, according to the doctrine of the Stoics, this world was both framed originally and has ever since been administered and superintended by the care and providence of the immortal gods. For the opinion of the Stoics was the same as Plato's; who, as appears from the Timæus, attributed the production of the inferior gods to the supreme Being, and to them the procreation of men and other animals. Nor is this doctrine at variance with those numerous sayings of theirs in which they assert Jupiter, or the most high God alone to be the maker and architect of this world. For, since they supposed these deities to have sprung from the supreme Being and to have perfected all things at his bidding and by his command and power, whatever therefore was performed by them might fairly be regarded and appealed to as the work of their supreme Parent himself. Plato and his followers in numberless passages, acknowledged one God as the creator of the world, and yet, as I have before intimated, they inculcated, that a great portion of the work was intrusted to the inferior deities.

* Lib. 4. cap. 7. † Lib. 3. cap. 5.

[s] Apud Arrian. Diss. Epictet. lib. 3. cap. 5. p. 274.

cause thou wouldst not have me, and I never desired it. Didst thou ever see me the more dejected or melancholy for this? Have I appeared before thee at any time with a discontented countenance? Was I not always prepared and ready for whatsoever thou requiredst? Wilt thou now have me to depart out of this festival solemnity? I am ready to go; and I render thee all thanks for that thou hast honoured me so far as to let me keep the feast with thee, and behold thy works, and observe thy economy of the world. Let death sieze upon me no otherwise employed, than thus thinking and writing of such things." He likewise exhorts others after this manner:* Τόλμησον ἀναβλέψας πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι χρῶ μοι λοιπὸν, εἰς ὃ ἂν θέλῃς· ὁμογνωμονῶ σοι, ἴσος εἰμί· οὐδὲν παραιτοῦμαι τῶν σοι δοκούντων· ὅπου θέλεις ἄγε· ἣν θέλεις εἰθῆτα περίθες· ἄρχειν με θέλεις, ἰδιωτεύειν, μένειν, φεύγειν, πένεσθαι, πλουτεῖν; ἐγώ σοι ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων τούτων πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπολογήσομαι· δείξω τὴν ἑκάστου φύσιν, οἷα ἐστίν, "Dare to lift up thine eyes to God and say, Use me hereafter to whatsoever thou pleasest. I agree, and am of the same mind with thee, indifferent to all things. I refuse nothing that shall seem good to thee. Lead me whither thou pleasest. Let me act what part thou wilt, either of a public or private person, of a rich man or a beggar. I will apologize for thee as to all these things before men. And I will also show the nature of every one of them."

The same is likewise manifest from their pretensions to look to God, and refer all to him; expecting aid and assistance from him, and placing their confidence in him. Thus also Epictetus:† Κἀγω μὲν ἔχω ταύτην ἐπιβολὴν ἀποτελέσαι ὑμᾶς ἐλευθέρους, εὐδαιμονοῦντας, εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἀφορῶντας, ἐν παντὶ μικρῷ καὶ μεγάλῳ, "My design is this, to render you free and undisturbed, always looking at God, as well in every small, as greater matter." Again, the same Stoic concludes:‡ Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλως ἐκβαλεῖν λύπην, φόβον, ἐπιθυμίαν, &c. εἰ μὴ πρὸς μόνον τὸν θεὸν ἀποβλέποντα, ἐκείνῳ μόνῳ προσπεπονθότα, τοῖς ἐκείνου προστάγμασι καθωσιωμένον, "A man will never be able otherwise to expel grief, fear, desire, envy, &c. than by looking to God alone, and being devoted to him, and the observance of his commandments." And he affirmeth of Hercules, that this great piece of piety was so long since observed by him:§ Τὸν Δία αὐτοῦ πατέρα ἐκάλει, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἀφορῶν ἔπραττεν, ἃ ἔπραττε, "That as he called Jupiter, or the supreme God, his father, so did he whatsoever he did, looking at him." Thus M. Antoninus speaketh of a double relation that we all have; one πρὸς τοὺς συμβιοῦντας, "to those that live with us;"‖ and another,

* Lib. 2. cap. 16. [P. 217.]
‡ Lib. 2. cap. 16. [P. 218.]
‖ Lib. 8. sect. 23. [Sect. 27. p. 247.]
† Lib. 2. cap. 19. [P. 231.]
§ Lib. 3. cap. 24. [P. 330.

πρὸς τὴν θείαν αἰτίαν, ἀφ' ἧς συμβαίνει πᾶσιν πάντα, "to that divine cause, from which all things happen to all." As likewise he affirmeth, Οὐκ ἀνθρώπινόν τι ἄνευ τῆς ἐπὶ τὰ θεῖα συναναφορᾶς εὐπράξεις,* "That no human thing is well done without a reference to God." And he excellently exhorteth men, Ἐνὶ τέρπου καὶ προσαναπαύου, τῷ ἀπὸ πράξεως κοινωνικῆς μεταβαίνειν ἐπὶ πρᾶξιν κοινωνικὴν σὺν μνήμῃ τοῦ Θεοῦ,† "To be delighted and satisfied with this one thing; in doing one action after another, tending to a common good, or the good of human society; together with the remembrance of God." Elsewhere he declareth his own confidence in the supreme [illegible] words: ‡ Θαῤῥῶ τῷ διοικοῦντι, "I trust and rely up[on] [illegible] of the whole world."

This may be con[firmed] [illegible]m their thanking the one supreme God for all, [illegible]f all good, and delightfully celebrating his praise[s] [illegible]clares it to be the duty of a good man, χάριν ἔχει [illegible] τῷ θεῷ,§ "to thank God for all things." And els[ewhere] [illegible]eth thus: ‖ Εἰ νοῦν εἴχομεν, ἄλλο τι ἔδει ἡμᾶς πο[ιεῖν] [illegible] ἰδίᾳ, ἢ ὑμνεῖν τὸ θεῖον, καὶ εὐφημεῖν, καὶ ἐπεξέρχεσθαι τὰς χαριτας; οὐκ ἔδει καὶ σκάπτοντας, καὶ ἀροῦντας, καὶ ἐσθίοντας, ᾄδειν τὸν ὕμνον τὸν εἰς τὸν θεόν; μέγας ὁ θεὸς, ὅτι ἡμῖν παρέσχεν ὄργανα ταῦτα, δι' ὧν τὴν γὴν ἐργασόμεθα· μέγας ὁ θεὸς, ὅτι χεῖρας ἔδωκεν, &c. ὅτι αὔξεσθαι λεληθότως, ὅτι καθεύδοντας ἀναπνεῖν· ταῦτα ἐφ' ἑκάστου εὐφημεῖν ἔδει, καὶ τὸν μέγιστον καὶ θειότατον ὕμνον ἐφυμνεῖν, ὅτι τὴν δύναμιν ἔδωκε τὴν παρακολουθητικὴν τούτων· τί οὖν; &c. εἰ γοῦν ἀηδὼν ἦμην, ἐποίουν τὰ τῆς ἀηδόνος, εἰ κύκνος, τὰ τοῦ κύκνου, νῦν δὲ λογικός εἰμι, ὑμνεῖν με δεῖ τὸν θεὸν, "Had we understanding, what should we do else but both publicly and privately praise God, bless him, and return thanks to him? Ought not they, who dig, plough, and eat, continually to sing such a hymn to God as this: Great is that God, who gave us these organs to cultivate the earth withal; great is that God who gave us hands, &c. who enabled us to grow undiscernibly, to breathe in our sleep. But the greatest and divinest hymn of all is this, to praise God for the faculty of understanding all these things. What then if for the most part men be blinded, ought there not to be some one, who should perform this office, and sing a hymn to God for all? If I were a nightingale, I would perform the office of a nightingale; or a swan, that of a swan: but now, being a reasonable creature, I ought to celebrate and sing aloud the praises of God," that is, of the supreme Deity.

Lastly, the same is evident from their invoking the supreme God as such, addressing their devotions to him alone without the

* Lib. 3. sect. 11. [Sect. 13. p. 87.]
‡ Lib. 6. sect. 8. [Sect. 10. p. 174.]
§ Lib. 4. c. 7. [P. 401.]
† Lib. 6. sect. 5. [Sect. 7. p. 172.]
‖ Lib. 1. cap. 16. [P. 127.

conjunction of any other gods; and particularly imploring his assistance against the assaults of temptations, called by them fancies.* To this purpose is that of Epictetus: Μέγας ὁ ἀγών ἐστι, θεῖον τὸ ἔργον, ὑπὲρ βασιλείας, ὑπὲρ ἐλευθερίας· τοῦ θεοῦ μέμνησο, ἐκεῖνον ἐπικαλοῦ βοηθὸν καὶ παραστάτην, ὡς τοὺς Διοσκόρους ἐν χειμῶνι οἱ πλέοντες, "This is a great conflict or contention, a divine enterprise; it is for liberty and for a kingdom. Now remember the supreme God; call upon him as thy helper and assistant, as the mariners do upon Castor and Pollux in a tempest." He commends also this form of devotional address, or divine ejaculation, which was part of Cleanthes' litany, to be used frequently upon occasion:[9] Ἄγου δή με, ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σὺ ἡ πεπρωμένη ὅποι ποθ' (ὑμῖν) εἰμὶ διατεταγμένος, ὡς ἑψομαί γε ἄοκνος· ἢν δέ γε μὴ θέλω, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕψομαι, "Lead me, O Jupiter, and thou Fate, whithersoever I am by you destined; and I will readily and cheerfully follow; who, though I were never so reluctant, yet must needs follow." Where Jupiter and Fate are really but one and the same supreme Deity, under two several names. And therefore the sense of this devotional ejaculation was no less truly and faithfully, than elegantly thus rendered by Seneca.†

> Duc me parens, celsique dominator poli,
> Quocunque placuit, nulla parendi est mora,
> Assum impiger; fac nolle, comitabor gemens,
> Malusque patiar, quod pati licuit bono.

But because many are so extremely unwilling to believe that the Pagans ever made any religious address to the supreme God as such, we shall here set down an excellent and devout hymn of the same Cleanthes to him; the rather because it hath been but little taken notice of. And the more to gratify the reader, we shall subjoin an elegant translation thereof into Latin verse; which he must owe to the muse of my learned friend Dr. Duport.‡

> Κύδιστ' ἀθανάτων, πολυώνυμε, παγκρατὲς αἰεί,
> Ζεὺς, φύσεως ἀρχηγὲ, νόμου μετὰ πάντα κυβερνῶν,
> Χαῖρε. Σὲ γὰρ πᾶσι θέμις θνητοῖσι προσαυδᾶν·
> Ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμὲν, ἧχον μίμημα λαχόντες
> Μοῦνον, ὅσα ζώει τε καὶ ἕρπει θνήτ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν.
> Τῷ σε καθυμνήσω καὶ σὸν κράτος αἰὲν ἀείσω.
> Σοὶ δὲ πᾶς ὅδε κόσμος ἑλισσόμενος περὶ γαῖαν
> Πείθεται, ἦκεν ἄγῃς, καὶ ἑκὼν ὑπὸ σεῖο κρατεῖται.
> Τοῖον ἔχεις ὑποεργὸν ἀνικήτοις ὑπὸ χερσὶν
> Ἀμφήκη, πυρόεντα, διαζώοντα κεραυνόν·
> Τοῦ γὰρ ὑπὸ πλήγης φύσεως πάντ' ἰρρίγασι,

* Lib. 2. cap. 18. [Apud Arrian. p. 226.]
* Arrian commends this prayer in various places, especially lib. 3. cap. 26. p. 366.
† Ep. 106. [107. tom. 2. opp. p. 402.]
‡ Steph. Poes. Philos. p. 49. [Ex Stobæi. Eclog. Physic.]

Ὦι σὺ κατευθύνεις κοινὸν λόγον, ὃς διὰ πάντων
Φοιτᾷ μιγνύμενος·
Ὅς τόσσος γεγαὼς ὕπατος βασιλεὺς διὰ παντὸς·
Οὐδέ τι γίγνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ σοῦ δίχα, δαίμων,
Οὔτε κατ' αἰθέριον θεῖον πόλον, οὔτ' ἐπὶ πόντῳ,
Πλὴν ὁπόσα ῥέζουσι κακοὶ σφετέρῃσιν ἀνοίαις.
Καὶ κοσμεῖς τὰ ἄκοσμα, καὶ οὐ φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἐστίν.
Ὧδε γὰρ εἰς ἓν πάντα συνήρμοκας, ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν,
Ὥσθ' ἕνα γίνεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἐόντων.
Ὃν φεύγοντες ἐῶσιν, ὅσοι θνητῶν κακοί εἰσιν,
Δύσμοροι, οἳ τ' ἀναθῶν μὲν ἀεὶ κτῆσιν ποθέοντες,
[illegible] νόμον, οὔτε κλύουσιν,
[illegible] βίον ἐσθλὸν ἔχοιεν'
[illegible] καλοῦ ἄλλος ἐπ' ἄλλα
[illegible] ἣν δυσέριστον ἔχοντες,
[illegible] αμμένοι οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ,
[illegible] σώματος ἡδέα ἔργα,
[illegible] αινηφὲς, ἀρχικέραυνε,
[illegible] ύνης ἀπὸ λυγρῆς,
[illegible] υχῆς ἄπο, δὸς δὲ κυρῆσαι
[illegible] κης μετὰ πάντα κυβερνᾷς·
[illegible] ξώμεσθά σε τιμῇ,
[illegible] ηνεκὲς, ὡς ἐπέοικε
Θνητὸν [illegible] βροτοῖς γέρας ἄλλοτε μεῖζον,
Οὔτε θεοῖς, ἢ κοινὸν ἀεὶ νόμον ἐν δίκῃ ὑμνεῖν.

Magne pater divûm, cui nomina multa, sed una
Omnipotens semper virtus, tu Jupiter autor
Naturæ, certâ qui singula lege gubernas!
Rex salve. Te nempe licet mortalibus ægris
Cunctis compellare; omnes tua namque propago
Nos sumus, æternæ quasi imago vocis et echo
Tantum, quotquot humi spirantes repimus; ergo
Te cantabo, tuum et robur sine fine celebrans.
Quippe tuo hic totus, terram qui circuit, orbis
Paret (quoquo agis) imperio, ac obtemperat ultrò.
Invictis telum manibus tibi tale ministrum,
Anceps, ignitum, haud moriturum denique fulmen.
Ictu etenim illius tota et natura tremiscit;
Illo et communem rationem dirigis, et quæ
Mundi agitat molem, magno se corpore miscens:
Tantus tu rerum dominus, rectorque supremus.
Nec sine te factum in terris, Deus, aut opus ullum,
Æthere nec dio fit, nec per cærula ponti,
Errore acta suo nisi quæ gens impia patrat.
Confusa in sese tu dirigis ordine certo;
Auspice te ingratis et inest sua gratia rebus;
Felice harmonia; tu scilicet omnia in unum
Sic bona mixta malis compingis, ut una resurgat
Cunctorum ratio communis et usque perennans:
Quam refugit spernitque hominum mens læva malorum.
Heu miseri! bona qui quærunt sibi semper et optant,
Divinam tamen hanc communem et denique legem
Nec spectare oculis, nec fando attendere curant:
Cui si parerent, poterant traducere vitam
Cum ratione et mente bonam: nunc sponte feruntur
In mala præcipites, trahit et sua quemque voluptas.
Hunc agit ambitio, laudisque immensa cupido;
Illum et avarities, et amor vesanus habendi;
Blanda libido alium, venerisque licentia dulcis:
Sic aliò tendunt alii in diversa ruentes.
At tu, Jupiter alme, tonans in nubibus atris,

Da sapere, et mentem miseris mortalibus aufer
Insanam, hanc tu pelle pater ; da apprendere posse
Consilium, fretus quo tu omnia rite gubernas :
Nos ut honorati pariter tibi demus honorem,
Perpetuis tua facta hymnis præclara canentes,
Ut fas est homini ; nec enim mortalibus ullum,
Nec superis, majus poterit contingere donum,
Quam canere æterno communem carmine legem.[10]

[10] That the Stoics professed a certain God or fiery nature, eternal, wise and provident, admits of no controversy; and therefore, I do not agree with those, who deny all distinction between this sect and those that altogether discard a supreme Being. But neither can I assent to the opinion of others, who hold the Stoical precepts on God and religion to possess nearly as much dignity and excellence, as either the axioms of sound reason or the doctrines of Christianity. For, without disowning, that the Stoics have spoken sublimely in many instances of God and our duty towards God, and that most of their religious tenets, if considered in themselves, fall very short of the truth ; still there is much that detracts from their excellence, if we compare them with one another or with the rest of the principles of their school. The discipline of this sect is not to be learned from the magnificent phrases of this or that Stoic, but the whole of it ought to be placed before our view as a system, and afterwards a judgment formed as to the utility and excellence of the several dogmas. Indeed, no sect, in my opinion, admits of being more easily defended by an ingenious and erudite man than this ; and chiefly for two reasons. In the first place, although the Stoics sufficiently agree among themselves upon the chief points of philosophy, yet, when we come to individual precepts, they are wonderfully at issue, and what is adopted by one is not also assented to by another. Secondly, there are innumerable sayings of theirs extant, in which they appear to depart from the fundamental axioms of their own doctrine and to overthrow what they themselves had advanced. This we may be very easily convinced of from Seneca alone ; in whom we meet with so many contradictions and so many things repugnant to the first principles of the doctrine which he professed, that no one, however talented he may be, can reconcile and harmonize all the opinions of this writer with each other. Wherefore, if the dogmas or sayings of this or that Stoic be considered in themselves, we shall never be at a loss for arguments to justify and uphold the cause of this sect. For my part, however, I consider that the goodness or badness of any doctrine should be judged of from its fundamental principles, and from its general tenor and context, and that we should take into especial consideration, not what some have said or written, but what they ought to have said or written consistently with the rest of their opinions. For if this rule be neglected, who, I would ask, is so depraved or so stupid, as not to admit of being defended by an eloquent and talented man ? No one has ever existed, so hostile to God or so opposed to truth and right reason, as not to have said many excellent things from time to time, which were totally at variance with his other opinions. But I return to the god of the Stoics; who, if estimated, not from the high-sounding words of certain individuals of this sect, but from the decrees and principles of the whole body, appears to me to possess little of the greatness and majesty of Deity.

In the first place, all must confess, that the Stoical god is wholly immersed in matter, and cannot possibly be separated from it ; also that he is diffused and extended through the whole universe. The absurdities consequent upon which opinion have been already pointed out by Lactantius, Divinar. Instit. lib. 2. cap. 5. p. 189. and in our times by P. Bayle, Continuation des Pensées sur les Cometes, tom. 1. sec. 67. p. 338. &c. Secondly, this god is wholly corporeal : which even J. Lipsius has not been able to deny, and in proof of which many testimonies have been collected from ancient authors by Ez. Spanheim, Ad Juliani Cæsares, p. 110. 111. Again, he is finite. For this sect asserted the world to be finite, and denied the existence of more worlds than one ; as is evident even from Plutarch, De Stoicorum Repugnantiis, tom. 2. opp. p. 1053. Wherefore, if God is nothing but a fiery nature pervading the whole world, it follows also that God is finite, and not larger than the world, which the Stoics considered to be surrounded with an immense void. Hence, also, not a few of this sect ascribed a spherical figure to God. For, according to their doctrine, the world is spherical : but God is the soul of the world : therefore, it follows that he possesses the same form as the world itself. Manilius, Astronomic. lib. 1. cap. 7. on the figure which we call a sphere :

XXVI. It would be endless now to cite all the testimonies of other philosophers and pagan writers of latter times, concerning one supreme and universal Numen. Wherefore we shall content

Hæc æterna manet *divisque simillima forma.*

But, if the god of the Stoics be finite, it is unquestionable, that his virtues and perfections must also be finite. Neither do they attempt to deny this. From such a deity, therefore, we ought not to expect infinite knowledge, wisdom, power, and goodness. All these, and whatever other virtues he possesses besides these, are circumscribed and defined by this world. As reg[illegible] d liberty in particular, they openly acknowledged, that their God [illegible]nplish all that he wished, and that he did not possess the power of fr[illegible]und down by the fate inherent in the very nature of matter. Like th[illegible]y lamented, that the perversity and malignity of matter prevented th[illegible]t of many much better things in this world, than those which have be[illegible]rdained by God, that is, they granted matter to be more powerful than God. [illegible], De Provid. cap. 5. p. 195. tom. 1. opp. says: Quare tamen Deus tam iniqu[illegible] distributione fati fuit, ut bonis viris paupertatem, vulnera, et acerba funera adsc[illegible]peret? Non potest artifex mutare materiem: hæc passa est. Quædam sepa[illegible] quibusdam non possunt, cohærent, individua sunt, "But why was God so unju[illegible]he distribution of fate, as to dispense poverty, wounds, and cruel deaths to good [illegible]? The artificer cannot change the material: this suffered it. Some things cannot be disconnected from others, but cohere and are inseparable." Compare the same writer in Quæst. Natural. Præf. lib. 1. p. 485. tom. 2. opp. and especially Antoninus, lib. 6. Ad Se Ipsum, sect. 36. p. 195. Nor, as Thom. Gataker imagines, is this opinion at variance with what Antoninus says both elsewhere and lib. 6. sect. 1. p. 170. *τὴν τῶν ὅλων οὐσίαν*, "that the matter of the universe," *εὐπειθὴ καὶ εὐτρεπῆ*, "is obedient and compliant." For that matter obeys and complies which suffers so much to be formed and fashioned out of it, as its nature permits: as a piece of wood, out of which an artificer cannot form a Mercury, although it baffles his industry in one respect, nevertheless obeys his hand and skill in another. The Stoics leave *internal justice* to God; but the *external*, or that which rewards the good and punishes the bad, they exclude from his nature altogether: by doing which they extinguish in mankind all motive for the practice of virtue and destroy the very foundations of divine worship. I am aware, indeed, that Seneca sometimes speaks of God's rewards and punishments: see Epist. 95. p. 354. t. 2. opp. But that all such sayings are to be classed among the innumerable things spoken popularly by this writer, will be obvious to any one, who compares them with the other dogmas of the Stoics. For it is a common custom with them to leave the usage of language to the people, but to reserve the science to themselves. Agreeably to which observation we ought to estimate the force of many expressions occurring in Seneca's writings, more especially in his Consolationes ad Marciam et Helvidiam; in which he adapts his words to the comprehension of those, whom he is addressing, and discourses not so much according to the strict rules of the doctrine, which he professes, as in conformity with the commonly received usage, in order more powerfully to excite the minds of the weak and uninformed.

Let us consider somewhat more minutely, therefore, what opinion the Stoics ought to have held on divine rewards and punishments consistently with their own philosophy and apart from those admissions of theirs, which they granted, as they conceived, to the popular ear rather than to truth. Indeed, that they discarded eternal rewards and punishments and denied the immortality of souls, is notorious. [Berkeley attempts to prove the contrary, Alciphron, tom. 1. p. 206. but without success.] See for example what has been collected from M. Antoninus by J. Fran. Buddeus in his Introduc. ad Philos. Stoicam ex Mente Antonini sect. 14. sect. 8. p. 55, &c. prefixed to the edition of Antoninus lately published at Leipzig. And this doctrine, if I am not much mistaken, is in accordance with the principles of their interior philosophy. The greatest happiness, according to them, consists in virtue; the greatest misery in vice. That solum bonum honestum, solum malum turpe, "the honourable is the only good, and the base the only evil," is a well-known maxim of this sect. Life, therefore, and all things that tend to make life more agreeable or more wretched, can have no place among goods or evils: and a wise man neither requires nor wishes for life or the

ourselves only to instance in some of the most remarkable, beginning with M. Tull. Cicero; whom though some would suspect to have been a sceptic as to theism, because in his De

goods of life. Consequently, if life were eternal, a wise man would by no means be more happy, nor a wicked man more miserable. We, who taking reason for our guide suppose souls to be immortal, derive one of our strongest arguments from the state of the good and the wicked in this life. Here, we grant, the good are oftentimes in adversity and the wicked prosper. From which we draw the conclusion, that in the life hereafter the good will be rewarded and the wicked punished. And that we are right in doing so, is shown by the example of our Saviour himself, who expressly uses this very argument in the parable of the rich man, Luke xvi. 25. Μνήσθητι, ὅτι ἀπέλαβες σὺ τὰ ἈΓΑΘΑ σου ἐν τῇ ζωῇ σου, καὶ Λάζαρος ὁμοίως τὰ ΚΑΚΑ· νῦν δὲ ὧδε ΠΑΡΑΚΑΛΕΙΤΑΙ, σὺ δὲ ὈΔΥΝΑΣΑΙ, "Remember that thou in thy lifetime receivedst thy *good things*, and likewise Lazarus *evil things*: but now he is *comforted* and thou art *tormented*." But the Stoics denied, that any evil can befall a good man here, as all happiness consists in virtue alone, or that any good can happen to the wicked, as all misery is centred in vice. Hence they would have repudiated this passage altogether, nor admitted that a time is to come when the good shall receive the good things, which they lacked in this life, and the wicked suffer evils in return for the goods, which they hitherto enjoyed. Besides, I am at a loss to know, what sort of reward a wise Stoic could expect from God after death. It is not pleasures; for he, who holds virtue to be its own reward, despises these. See Antoninus, lib. 6. sect. 34. p. 193. Neither is it virtue. For a wise man can acquire this of himself, and in departing from this life is already in possession of it. In like manner, what punishment can impend over the wicked, according to the principles of the Stoics? Not torments, not pains; for they deny these to be evils or punishments. Nor vicious propensities and violent perturbations of the mind, as alone constituting evil; for these cannot proceed from God, in whom no evil exists; putting aside, that according to their doctrine all souls, even of the wicked, possess an innate faculty of quelling and subduing the passions. Consequently, there would be a power in the soul of an impious man of resisting the divine punishments and freeing itself from them. I pass over other considerations, which must necessarily have led a Stoic to suppose, that the souls of men are not immortal.

As little did their doctrine admit of rewards and punishments in this life. In the first place they held, that it is a wise man's part to be free from all perturbations of mind and entirely to expel the passions. At the same time they inculcated, that a wise man ought to follow and imitate God. Hence they must necessarily have excluded the passions, anger, mercy, hatred, &c. from God also, the same as from a wise man, and have supposed, that he cannot be offended by the wicked, nor on the other hand be appeased by the good. See Lactantius, De Ira Dei, cap. 5. p. 901. and cap. 17. p. 951. But if the Deity cannot be offended by the vices of men, if he neither hates, nor pities, nor is incensed, what will become of his rewards and punishments? By attending even to this alone we may easily understand, that the words *sin*, *reward*, *punishment*, have not the same signification in the schools of the Stoics, as among the rest of mankind, and are more ornamental than either proper or true. Again, what means has the Stoical God of rewarding the virtuous deeds of the good in this life, or checking the crimes of the wicked? Will he bestow upon the wise man riches, power, honours? But in these there is nothing of good, nor does the wise man make any use of such external and fortuitous things, who is as happy in Phalaris' bull as at the banquets of the Sybarites. Or will he remunerate him with virtue? But to obtain this a wise man needs not the assistance of God: for, if we are to believe the Stoics, virtue belongs to the things, which they term τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, or within our own power. See Epicteti Enchiridion, cap. 1. and Arrian's Diss. in Epictetum, lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 84. On the other hand, what sort of punishment will the wicked be in fear of? Is it disease, poverty, ignominy, exile? But in the first place these are fortuitous and necessarily associated with the nature of things, to which the wise and good man is as liable as the impious and wicked: Antoninus, lib. 6. sect. 36. p. 193. Again, these are not evils, and therefore cannot be considered as punishments. Or is it an overflow of vices and vicious propensities? But these God, being by nature benign and just and destitute of all vice, can in nowise impart. Lastly, the world cannot dispense with the evil and vicious, as a necessary

Natura Deorum he brings in Cotta the Academic, as well opposing Q. Lucil. Balbus the Stoic, as C. Velleius the Epicurean; yet from sundry other places of his writings it sufficiently appears, that he was a dogmatic and hearty Theist; as for example, this in his second book De Divin.: Esse præstantem aliquam æternamque naturam, et eam suspiciendam admirandamque hominum generi, pulchritudo mundi, ordoque rerum cœlestium cogit confiteri, "That there is some most excellent and eternal nature, which is to be admired and honoured by mankind, the pulchritude of the world and the order of the heavenly bodies compel us to confess." And this in his oration De Haruspicum Responsis:

part: see Antoninus, Ad Se Ipsum, lib. 6. sect. 42. p. 196. Chrysippus in Plutarch, De Repugnant. Stoicor. tom. 2. opp. p. 1049. and it is impossible, but that there must be shameless, designing, and fraudulent men: Antoninus, lib. 9. sect. 42. p. 285. What punishment, therefore, will be awarded to men, who are indispensable to the universal system and whom, if all things are to be kept in their proper state, the world can no more bear the loss of than of the sun or the stars. From this it is, I imagine, already evident, how we are to understand what the Stoics inculcate with so much pomp respecting the worship of God and our duty towards the supreme Being. To me all these things appear to possess much more of vanity and show than of truth. Why, I ask, does the Stoic address the Deity in prayer? For the sake of receiving virtue? This, however, if so disposed, he can acquire of himself. Is it then in order to obtain riches, pleasures, honours, benefits? But these are not of such importance, that we should petition the gods for them. Besides, they were long ago defined by God, at the time when he made the world and determined every man's destiny, and cannot therefore now be changed. Seneca, De Providentia, cap. 5. p. 194. tom. 1. opp. Olim constitutum est, quid gaudeas, quid fleas. Fata nos ducunt, et quantum cuique restet, prima nascentium hora disposuit, "It was long since settled and ordained, what is to cause you joy and what sorrow. Our destinies guide us, and whatever there is in store for each of us was appointed at the first hour of our birth." Similar sayings are continually to be met with among the Stoics. Why, therefore, if such be the case, do we weary both ourselves and God with prayers, since all things run on by a fixed and inviolable law? Majestatis diminutio est, says the same Seneca, Quæst. Natural. lib. 1. præf. p. 482. tom. 2. opp. et confessio erroris, mutanda fecisse. Necesse est enim, ei eadem placere, cui nisi optima placere non possunt: nec ob hoc minus liber et potens est. Ipse enim est necessitas sua, "It is a lessening of his majesty, and a confession of error, to have made things which require to be changed. For it is necessary, that the same things must always please him, whom nothing but the best can please: neither on that account is he less free and powerful. For he is his own necessity." The Stoics, in short, if they wish to follow their own precepts and not to contradict themselves, cannot be otherwise affected towards God, than nations are towards departed men, from whom they formerly received great benefits: whom, properly speaking, they neither love nor fear, but merely hold in reverence. They are indebted to their God for life, soul, and the opportunities of this world; but more they cannot expect from him, whether of good or of evil. If they practise virtue, they have in it their reward; and in vice, if addicted to it, their punishment. Wherefore they have no reason either to love or fear God: it is sufficient, if they are mindful of his benefits, or as Cicero, De Divinatione, lib. 2. cap. 72. p. 3255. tom. 9. opp. beautifully expounds the Stoical duties towards God: Esse credant aliquam præstantem æternamque naturam, eamque suspiciant et admirentur, "if they believe a certain transcendent and eternal nature to exist, and honour and admire it." Although, if they neglect even this duty, they will incur little or no evil. Such being the case, therefore, I consider all that the Stoics inculcate on the duty of praying to God and the prayers themselves, which they are said to have addressed to him, as the precepts and words of men, who do not sufficiently attend to logical consequences, or as belonging to those maxims, which they were wont frequently to give utterance to, in order that they might not appear wholly to dissent from the religion and common belief of the people.

Quis est tam vecors, qui cum suspexerit in cœlum, Deos esse non sentiat, et ea, quæ tanta mente fiunt, ut vix quisquam arte ulla ordinem rerum ac vicissitudinem persequi possit, casu fieri putet? "Who is so mad or stupid, as when he looks up to heaven, is not presently convinced, that there are gods? or can persuade himself, that those things, which are made with so much mind and wisdom, as that no human skill is able to reach and comprehend the artifice and contrivance of them, did all happen by chance?" To which purpose more places will be afterwards cited. However, in his philosophic writings it is certain, that he affected to follow the way of the new academy, set on foot by Carneades; that is, to write sceptically, partly upon prudential accounts, and partly for other reasons intimated by himself in these words:* Qui requirunt, quid quaque de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosiùs id faciunt, quam necesse est. Non enim tam auctoritatis in disputando quam rationis momenta quærenda sunt. Quinetiam obest plerumque iis, qui discere volunt, auctoritas eorum, qui se docere profitentur. Desinunt enim suum judicium adhibere, idque habent ratum, quod ab eo, quem probant, judicatum vident, "They, who would needs know, what we ourselves think concerning every thing, are more curious than they ought, because philosophy is not so much a matter of authority as of reason; and the authority of those who profess to teach, is oftentimes an hindrance to the learner, they neglecting by that means to use their own judgment, securely taking that for granted which is judged by another whom they value." Nevertheless, Cicero, in the close of this discourse De Natura Deorum† (as St. Austin[1] also observeth) plainly declares himself to be more propense and inclinable to the doctrine of Balbus, than either that of Velleius or Cotta; that is, though he did not assent to the Stoical doctrine or theology in every point (himself being rather a Platonist than a Stoic), yet he did much prefer it before, not only the Epicureism of Velleius, but also the scepticism of Cotta.[2]

* De Nat. Deor. lib. 1. [Cap. 5. p. 2886.]

[† Cicero De Natura Deor. lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 2881. expressly acknowledges in his own person, that those who believe in a God have the greater probability on their side; nay, that we are led to the opinion by nature herself. See Zimmermann's Diss. De Theologia Ciceronis in the Museum Helvetic. tom. 1. par. 3. p. 374. who modestly refutes some of our own remarks, and defends Cicero from the charge of atheism.]

[1] See his De Civitate Dei, lib. 4. cap. 30. p. 86. tom. 7. opp. where, however, he does not think very favourably of Cicero's religion.

[2] The learned Doctor is mistaken in supposing, that in the concluding words of his De Natura Deorum Cicero rejects the opinions both of the Epicureans and Academics, on the subject of the gods. For in these words he speaks as became one of the sect of the Academics, who are well known to have approved of those opinions, in which they considered there was the greatest probability, but to have regarded none as altogether certain and true. [Zimmerm. ibid. p. 519. Warburton, in his Divine Legation of Moses, tom. 1. p. 393. shows at some length, how difficult it is to ascertain Cicero's real opinion.] Properly speaking, the Academics had no dogmas of their own. They were accustomed to dispute against the opinions of all, and in the meantime to follow

Wherefore Augustinus Steuchus, and other learned men, quarrel with sundry passages of Cicero's upon another account, not as atheistical, but as seeming to favour a multitude of independent gods; he sometimes attributing not only the government of the world, and the making of mankind, but also the first constitution and fabric of the whole world, to gods plurally. As when he writeth thus:[3] Ut perpetuus mundi esset ornatus, magna adhibita cura est à providentia deorum, "For the perpetual adorning of the world, great care hath been taken by the providence of the gods." And, A diis immortalibus hominibus provisum esse, &c. "That the immortal gods have provided for the convenience of mankind, appears from the very fabric and figure of them." And that place before cited:* Dico igitur providentia deorum mundum et omnes mundi partes initio constitutas esse, "I say, that the world and all its parts were at first constituted by the providence of the gods." And lastly, where he states the controversy of that book† De Natura Deorum thus: Utrum dii nihil agant, nihil moliantur? An contrà ab his et à principio omnia facta, et constituta sint, et ad infinitum tempus regantur atque moveantur? "Whether the gods do nothing at all, but are void of care and trouble? Or whether all things were at first made and constituted, and ever since are moved and governed by them?" Notwithstanding which it is evident, that this learned orator and philosopher plainly acknowledged the monarchy of the whole, or one supreme and universal Numen over all. And that first from his so often using the word God in the singular, emphatically and by way of eminency: as,[4] Ipsi

those, which they considered to be the most probable. Hence it will be evident, in what light we are to view the religion of Cicero. He was favourable to the Academics alone; and in my opinion for this reason, because he perceived that the principles of this sect were above all others adapted to his own favourite pursuit, forensic oratory. These philosophers argued on both sides of all subjects, and what could be more desirable or more available than such a faculty to a man, who delighted in swaying the people by his eloquence and in defending the cause of the accused? Hence to suit his own purpose, he adopted and maintained sometimes this sometimes that opinion. Although regarding the precepts of the Stoics on the subject of the gods as possessing greater authority and probability than those of the other philosophers, he nevertheless believed it to be out of the power of any one to show, whether these were true or not. The religion of this great orator, therefore, is uncertain and doubtful; in fact, no religion at all. In his Orations, I admit, we meet with a considerable number of passages exhibiting great piety towards god and gods; but who is not aware, that in them the orator is addressing himself to the opinion of the vulgar, and, as he himself intimates, looked less to what seemed to be required by the truth than by the cause, which he was advocating.

[3] In these passages, however, which, with many others of the same kind, occur in lib. 3. De Natura Deorum, Cicero is not speaking in his own person, but in that of Balbus the Stoic; and the Stoics, as we have already copiously remarked, were continually discoursing about the gods.

* De Nat. Deor. p. 225. † P. 195. Lamb.

[4] Lib. 2. De Legibus, cap. 10. p. 3352. tom. 9. opp. But in this book also Cicero is in the habit of using the words god and gods indiscriminately. Wherefore I would not affirm, that the supreme Deity is here meant by him.

Deo nihil minus gratum, quàm non omnibus patere ad se placandum et colendum viam, "Nothing can be less grateful to God himself, than that there should not be a liberty open to all (by reason of the costliness of sacrifices) to worship and appease him." And,[5] Nisi juvante Deo, tales non fuerunt Curius, Fabricius, &c. "Curius and Fabricius had never been such men as they were, had it not been for the divine assistance." Again,[6] Commoda, quibus utimur, lucemque, quâ fruimur, spiritumque, quem ducimus, à Deo nobis dari atque impertiri videmus, "We must needs acknowledge, that the benefits of this life, the light which we enjoy, and the spirit which we breathe, are imparted to us from God." And to mention no more, in his version of Plato's Timæus,[7] Deos alios in terra, alios in luna, alios in reliquas mundi partes spargens Deus quasi serebat, "God distributing gods to all the parts of the world, did as it were sow some gods in the earth, some in the moon," &c. Moreover, by his making such descriptions of God as plainly imply his oneness and singularity, as in his Orat. pro Milone:[8] Est, est profectò

[5] De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 66. p. 3048. But these are not so much Cicero's words as those of Balbus, whose discourse Cicero is there repeating.

[6] Orat. pro Sexto Roscio, cap. 45. p. 449. tom. 3. opp. But it must be observed, that the reading in this passage in Cicero is not, a *Deo* nobis dari, but ab *eo*; the word *eo* referring to the name Jupiter optimus maximus, which occurs a little before. Wherefore this passage does not belong to those, in which Cicero calls the supreme Deity *God* by way of eminence.

[7] If these words occurred in the manner here represented in Cicero's Latin version of the Timæus, still they would not express the sentiment of Cicero himself, but of Plato, whom he translates. But Cicero has not written what the learned Doctor makes him write. His words, from cap. 13. Timæi, p. 4034, tom. 9. opp. are these: Quæ cum ita designasset, ... alios in terra, alios in luna, alios in reliquas partes spargens quasi serebat; where we neither have the word god nor gods. I do not deny, however, that these names are to be repeated from what goes before. And, as is well known, there are several passages in the Timæus in which Plato speaks both of one and of many gods.

[8] Cap. 31. p. 2846. tom. 3. opp. But I cannot admit even this passage to be evidence of Cicero's having professed one God. Omitting for the present, that it is taken from an oration, in which Cicero conforms to the popular judgment rather than the truth of things; it will be sufficient for me to show, that in this passage he attaches one and the same sense to the *divine power* and the *immortal gods*. The wily orator's whole object is to persuade the multitude, that Milo, in his assault on Claudius, was incited and impelled by a certain divine power, or by the immortal gods, in order to rid the Roman people of so great a monster. He thus commences this part of his oration: Hujus beneficii gratiam, Judices, fortuna populi Romani, et vestra felicitas, et *Dii* immortales sibi deberi putant, "For this kindness, O judges, the fortune of the Roman people, and your own happiness, and the *immortal gods*, consider gratitude to be due to them." After saying which he proceeds briefly to show the existence of such a *divine power*, or *immortal gods*, as he had called them. This he does chiefly in the words here quoted, and then goes on as follows: Non est humano consilio, ne mediocri quidem, judices, *deorum immortalium* cura res illa perfecta, "This deed was accomplished not by human counsel, O judges, nor by the ordinary care, indeed, of the immortal gods." And, lest any one should doubt, what sort of gods are meant, he immediately addresses the Alban gods, the Latian Jove, and the Bona Dea, who, he says, have at length opened their eyes to the punishment of Clodius. This subject he pursues also through several of the following passages, which, to avoid prolixity, I shall refrain from quoting. [See Zimmermann, ibid. p. 417. 418.] Therefore, it is plain that the divine power,

illa vis; neque in his corporibus, atque in hac imbecillitate nostrâ, inest quiddam, quod vigeat et sentiat, et non inest in hoc tanto naturæ tamque præclaro motu. Nisi fortè idcirco esse non putant, quia non apparet nec cernitur: proinde quasi nostram ipsam mentem, qua sapimus, qua providemus, qua hæc ipsa agimus et dicimus, videre, aut planè qualis et ubi sit, sentire possumus, "There is, there is certainly such a divine force in the world; neither is it reasonable to think, that in these gross and frail bodies of ours there should be something which hath life, sense, and understanding, and yet no such thing in the whole universe; unless men will therefore conclude, that there is none, because they see it not: as if we could see our own mind (whereby we order and dispose all things, and whereby we reason and speak thus), and perceive what kind of thing it is, and where it is lodged." Where, as there is a strong asseveration of the existence of a God, so is his singularity plainly implied, in that he supposes him to be one mind or soul acting and governing the whole world, as our mind doth our body. Again, in his Tusculan Questions:* Nec verò Deus ipse alio modo intelligi potest, nisi mens soluta quædam, et libera, segregata ab omni concretione mortali, omnia sentiens et movens, "Neither can God himself be understood by us otherwise than as a certain loose and free mind, segregated from all mortal concretion, which both perceives and moves all things." So again in the same book:† Hæc igitur et alia innumerabilia cum cernimus, possumusne dubitare, quin his præsit aliquis vel effector, si hæc nata sunt, ut Platoni videtur; vel si semper fuerint, ut Aristoteli placet, moderator tanti operis et muneris? "When we behold these and other wonderful works of nature, can we at all doubt, but that there presideth over them, either one maker of all, if they had a beginning, as Plato conceiveth; or else, if they always were, as Aristotle supposeth, one moderator and governor?" And in the third De Legibus:‡ Sine imperio nec domus ulla, nec civitas, nec gens, nec hominum universum genus stare, nec rerum natura omnis, nec ipse mundus potest. Nam et hic Deo paret, et huic obediunt maria terræque, et hominum vita jussis supremæ legis obtemperat, "Without government, neither any house, nor city, nor nation, nor mankind in general, nor the whole nature

whose existence Cicero is here showing, and the immortal gods or popular Roman deities are in this place one and the same. Dr. Cudworth, indeed, considers it to be evident, that Cicero here meant only one God, from his comparing this divine power with the human mind, which is one. But he clearly did not intend this comparison to be taken in so wide a sense, being properly confined within these limits: "As our own mind exists and yet is not seen, so also this divine power, invisible though it be to us, does notwithstanding really exist."

* Lib. 1. p. 126. [Cap. 27. p. 2604. tom. 8. opp.]

† Tusc. Q. lib. 1. p. 126. [Cap. 29. p. 2606.]

‡ P. 343. [Cap. 1. p. 3389. tom. 9. opp.]

of things, nor the world itself could subsist. For this also obeyeth God, and the seas and earth are subject to him, and the life of man is disposed of by the commands of the supreme law." Elsewhere he speaks of Dominans ille nobis Deus, qui nos vetat hinc injussu suo demigrare,[9] "That God, who rules over all mankind, and forbids them to depart hence without his leave;" of Deus, cujus numini parent omnia,[10] "That God, whose divine power all things obey." We read also in Cicero of summus or supremus Deus,[1] "the supreme God," to whom the first making of man is properly imputed by him; of Summi rectoris et domini Numen,[2] "The divine power of the supreme Lord and Governor;" of Deus præpotens,[3] and rerum omnium præpotens Jupiter,[4] "The most powerful God," and "Jupiter, who hath power over all things;" of Princeps ille Deus, qui omnem hunc mundum regit, sicut animus humanus id corpus, cui præpositus est,[5] "That chief or principal God, who governs the whole world in the same manner as a human soul governeth that body which it is set over." Wherefore, as for those passages before objected, where the government of the world, as to the concernments of mankind at least, is ascribed by Cicero to gods plurally, this was done by him and other Pagans, upon no other account but only this, because the supreme God was not supposed by them to do all things himself immediately in the government of the world, but to assign certain provinces to other inferior gods, as ministers under him; which therefore sharing in the economy of the world, were looked upon as co-governors thereof with him. Thus when Balbus in Cicero, to excuse some seeming defect of providence, in the prosperities of wicked and the adversities of good men, pretended, Non animadvertere omnia deos, nè reges quidem, "That the gods did not attend to all things, as

[9] Tusculan. Quæs. lib. 1. cap. 30. p. 2609. But there is a trifling inaccuracy again in this quotation. We do not read in Cicero as here: Dominans nobis Deus, but, Dominans *in nobis* Deus. Now, according to the Stoics, the god that rules in men is the rational soul or right reason. Hence it is plain, that these words are not to be understood of the supreme Deity.

[10] De Divinatione, lib. 1. cap. 53. p. 3177. tom. 9. opp.

[1] Dr. Cudworth meant, most probably, the following passage, occurring in the Somnium Scipionis, cap. 4. p. 3977. tom. 10. opp. Novem tibi orbibus connexa sunt omnia: quorum unus est cœlestis, extimus, qui reliquos omnes complectitur, *summus ipse Deus*, arcens et continens ceteros, "All things are connected together in nine spheres, of which one is the celestial and outermost, which comprehends and encompasses all the rest, the supreme God himself, confining and containing the others." But here Cicero's *summus* Deus is the last of those nine spheres, of which the ancients supposed heaven to consist. The reason why he calls this sphere the supreme God is investigated by Ramus and Vinetus in their notes on this place. Add another passage, in which he speaks of the *supremus* Deus, De Legibus, lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 3304. tom. 9. opp.

[2] See lib. 4. De Finib. Bonor. et Malor. cap. 5. p. 2471. tom. 8. opp.

[3] De Legibus, lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 3304. tom. 10. opp.

[4] De Divinat. lib. 2. cap. 18. p. 3204. tom. 9. opp.

[5] See Somnium Scipion. cap. 3. p. 3973. tom. 10. opp.

neither do kings:" Cotta amongst other things replied thus:[6] Fac divinam mentem esse distentam, cœlum versantem, terram tuentem, maria moderantem, cur tam multos deos nihil agere et cessare patitur? Cur non rebus humanis aliquos otiosos deos præfecit, qui à te, Balbe, innumerabiles explicati sunt? "Should it be granted, that the divine Mind (or supreme Deity) were distracted with turning round the heavens, observing the earth, and governing the seas, yet why does he let so many other gods do nothing at all? Or why does he not appoint some of those idle gods over human affairs, which, according to Balbus and the Stoics, are innumerable?" Again, when the immortal gods are said by Cicero to have "provided for the convenience of mankind in their first constitution," this doubtless is to be understood according to the Platonic hypothesis, that the gods and demons being first made by the supreme God, were set to work and employed by him afterward in the making of man and other mortal animals. And lastly, as to that, which hath the greatest difficulty of all in it, when the whole world is said by Cicero to have been made by the providence of the gods, this must needs be understood also of those eternal gods of Plato's, according to whose likeness or image the world and man are said to have been made; that is, of the trinity of divine hypostases, called by Amelius Plato's three minds and three kings, and by others of the Platonists the first and second and third God, and the τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, and τὸ δεύτερον αἴτιον, &c. "the first and second cause," &c. And it may be here observed, what we learn from St. Cyril, that some Pagans endeavoured to justify this language and doctrine of theirs, even from the Mosaic writings themselves:[*] Θεοῖς ἑτέροις ὑποτοπήσαντες τὸν τῶν ὅλων φᾶναι θεὸν, ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν, "They suspecting, that the God of the universe being about to make man, did there bespeak the other gods (τοῖς μεθ' ἑαυτὸν δευτέροις καὶ ἐν μείοσιν οὖσι, 'which were secondary and inferior to him') after this manner, Let us make man according to our own image and likeness." Which St. Cyril, and other Christian writers understand of the trinity. Now those eternal gods of Plato, according to whose image the world and man is said by him to have been made, and which (though one of them were properly called the Demiurgus), yet had all an influence and causality upon the making of it, were (as hath been already observed) not so many

[6] De Natura Deor. lib. 3. cap. 39. p. 3107. tom. 9. opp. But we cannot I imagine, learn what Cicero's opinion was from this passage. For in the first place, Cotta, after the manner of the Academics, is here endeavouring merely to refute Balbus, without establishing any thing certain himself. Again, as has been already observed by the learned Doctor, Cicero at the close of this work abandons Cotta and owns, that he prefers the opinion of Balbus as the more probable.

[*] Contra Jul. lib. 1.

independent and self-originated deities, but all derived from one first principle. And therefore Cicero following Plato in this is not to be suspected upon that account, to have been an assertor of many independent gods, or partial creators of the world; especially since in so many other places of his writings, he plainly owns a divine monarchy.[7]

We pass from M. Tullius Cicero to M. Terentius Varro, his equal, a man famous for polymathy or multifarious knowledge, and reputed unquestionably (though not the most eloquent, yet) the most learned of all the Romans, at least as to antiquity. He wrote one and forty books concerning the antiquities of human and divine things; wherein he transcended the Roman Pontifices themselves, and discovered their ignorance as to many points of their religion. In which books he distinguished three kinds of theology, the first mythical or fabulous, the second physical or natural, and the last civil or popular: the first being most accommodate to the theatre or stage; the second to the world, or the wiser men in it; the third to cities, or the generality of the civilized vulgar. Which was agreeable also to the doctrine of Scævola, that learned Pontifex, concerning three sorts of gods, poetical, philosophical, and political. As for the mythical and poetical theology, it was censured after this manner by Varro:* In eo sunt multa contra dignitatem et naturam immortalium ficta. In hoc enim est, ut Deus alius ex capite, alius ex femore sit, alius ex guttis sanguinis natus. In hoc, ut Dii furati sint, ut adulteraverint, ut servierint homini. Denique, in hoc omnia Diis attribuuntur, quæ non modo in hominem, sed etiam in contemptissimum hominem cadere possunt, "That, according to the literal sense, it contained many things contrary to the dignity and nature of immortal beings; the genealogy of one God being derived from the head, of another from the thigh, of another from drops of blood: some being represented as thieves, others as adulterers, &c. and all things attributed to the gods therein, that are not only incident to men, but even to the most contemptible and flagitious of them." And as for the second, the natural theology, which is the true, this Varro conceived to be above the capacity of vulgar citizens; and that therefore it was expedient, there should be another theology calculated, more accommodate for them, and of a middle kind betwixt the natural and the fabulous, which is that which

[7] Dr. Cudworth here goes out of his way without the least necessity. When Cicero wrote this passage, he was not even thinking of Plato's eternal gods. In it the Stoic is speaking, and expounding the opinion of his own sect. But that the Stoics imputed some share in the creation and administration of this world to the stars, which they regarded as gods, we have given sufficient evidence of above, when showing that this statement of Cicero cannot fairly be charged with error.

* Aug. de Civ. D. lib. 6. cap. 5. [P. 116. tom. 7. opp.]

is called civil. For he affirmed, Multa esse vera, quæ vulgo scire non sit utile, et quædam, quæ tametsi falsa sint, aliter existimare populum expediat,* "That there were many things true in religion, which it was not convenient for the vulgar to know; and again, some things, which, though false, yet it was expedient they should be believed by them." As Scævola, the Roman Pontifex, in like manner, would not have the vulgar to know that the true God had neither sex, nor age, nor bodily members. Ex istimat (saith St. Austin of him) falli in religione licere etiam in libris rerum divinarum ipse Varro Scævola therefore judgeth it expedient that ci leceived in their religion; which also Varro him t to affirm in his books of divine things." Whe o, though disapproving the fabulous theology, ye design, as he conceived, did he endeavour to asser e could the civil theology, then received among and to vindicate the same from contempt: yet as that, Si eam civitatem novam constitueret, ex naturæ potiùs formulâ, deos et deorum nomina se fuisse dedicaturum, non dubitet confiteri,‡ "If he were to constitute a new Rome himself, he doubts not to confess, but that he would dedicate gods and the names of gods after another manner, more agreeably to the form of nature or natural theology." Now, what Varro's own sense was concerning God, he freely declared in those books of Divine Things; namely, that he was the great soul and mind of the world. Thus St. Austin: Hi soli Varroni videntur animadvertisse, quid esset Deus, qui crediderunt eum esse animam, motu ac ratione mundum gubernantem,§ "These alone seem to Varro to have understood, what God is, who believed him to be a soul, governing the whole world by motion and reason." So that Varro plainly asserted one supreme and universal Numen, he erring only in this (as St. Austin conceives) that he called him a soul, and the creator of soul, or a pure and abstract mind. But as Varro acknowledged one universal Numen, the whole animated world, or rather the soul thereof, which also he affirmed to be called by several names, as in the earth, Tellus; in the sea, Neptune; and the like: so did he also admit (together with the rest of the Pagans) other particular gods, which were to him nothing but parts of the world animated with souls superior to men: A summo circuitu cœli usque ad circulum lunæ æthereas animas esse astra ac stellas, eosque cœlestes deos, non modo intelligi esse, sed etiam videri: inter lunæ verò gyrum et nimborum cacumina aëreas esse animas, sed eas animo, non oculis,

* Aug. Civ. D. lib. 4. cap. 31. [P. 87.] † Civ. D. lib. 4. cap. 27. [P. 84.]
‡ Civ. D. lib. 4. cap. 31. [P. 87.] § Civ. D. lib. 4. cap. 9. [Cap. 32. p. 87.]

videri; et vocari heroas, et lares, et genios,* "That from the highest circuit of the heavens to the sphere of the moon there are ethereal souls or animals, the stars, which are not only understood, but also seen to be celestial gods; and between the sphere of the moon and the middle region of the air, there are aëreal souls or animals, which though not seen by our eyes, yet are discovered by our mind, and called heroes, lares, and genii." So that, according to Varro, the only true natural gods were, as himself also determined, anima mundi, ac partes ejus; first, the great soul and mind of the whole world, which comprehendeth all; and secondly, the parts of the world animated superior to men. Which gods also he affirmed to be worshipped castiùs, more "purely" and "chastely," without images, as they were by the first Romans for one hundred and seventy years: he concluding: Qui primi simulachra deorum populi posuerunt, eos civitatibus suis et metum dempsisse et errorem addidisse; prudentur existimans (saith St. Austin) deos facilè posse in simulachrorum stoliditate contemni,† "That those nations, who first set up images of the gods, did both take away fear from their cities, and add error to them; he wisely judging, that the foppery of images would easily render their gods contemptible."

L. Annæus Seneca, the philosopher, was contemporary with our Saviour Christ and his Apostles, who, though frequently acknowledging a plurality of gods, did nevertheless plainly assert one supreme, he not only speaking of him singularly, and by way of eminency, but also plainly describing him as such;‡ as when he calls him Formatorem universi; rectorem et arbitrum et custodem mundi; ex quo suspensa sunt omnia; animum ac spiritum universi; mundani hujus operis dominum et artificem; cui nomen omne convenit; ex quo nata sunt omnia; cujus spiritu vivimus; totum suis partibus inditum, et se sustinentem sua vi; cujus consilio huic mundo providetur, ut inconcussus eat, et actus suos explicet; cujus decreto omnia fiunt; divinum spiritum per omnia maxima et minima æquali intentione diffusum; Deum potentem omnium; Deum illum maximum potentissimumque, qui ipse vehit omnia; qui ubique et omnibus præsto est; cœli et deorum omnium Deum; a quo ista numina, quæ singula adoramus et colimus, suspensa sunt:§ and the like, "The framer and former of the universe, the governor, disposer, and keeper thereof; him upon whom all things depend; the mind and spirit of the world: the artificer and lord of this whole mundane fabric; to whom every name belongeth; from whom all things spring; by whose spirit we live; who is in all his parts, and sustaineth himself by his own force; by whose counsel the

* Civ. D. lib. 7. cap. 6. [P. 129.] † De Civ. D. lib. 4. cap. 31. [P. 87.]
‡ Nat. Q. lib. 2. sect. 45. [P. 537. tom. 2. opp.] § P. 442. Lips.

world is provided for, and carried on in its course constantly and uninterruptedly; by whose decree all things are done; the divine Spirit that is diffused through all things both great and small with equal intention; the God, whose power extends to all things; the greatest and most powerful God, who doth himself support and uphold all things; who is present every where to all things; the God of heaven, and of all the gods, upon whom are suspended all those other divine powers which we singly worship and ad[illegible] we may here observe from St. Austin,* that thi[illegible] book of his against superstitions (that is now l[illegible]ly highly extol the natural theology, but also plai[illegible] condemn the civil theology then received amongst[illegible]d that with more freedom and vehemency than V[illegible] the fabulous, or theatrical and poetical theology.[illegible] great part whereof he pronounced, that a wise [illegible]erve such things, tanquam legibus jussa, non tan[illegible], "only as commanded by the laws (he therein exercising [illegible]obedience) but not at all as grateful to the gods."[8]

M. Fabius Quintilianus, though no admirer of Seneca, yet fully agreed with him in the same natural theology, and sets down this, as the generally received notion or definition of God, Deum esse spiritum omnibus partibus immistum,† "That God is a spirit mingled with and diffused through all the parts of the world;" he from thence inferring Epicurus to be an Atheist, notwithstanding that he verbally asserted gods, because he denied a God according to this generally received notion, he bestowing upon his gods a circumscribed human form, and placing them between the worlds.[9] And the junior Pliny, though he were a

* Civ. D. lib. 6. cap. 10. [P. 122.]

[8] As Seneca preferred and openly professed the Stoical philosophy, his religious sentiments may easily be gathered from what we have discussed a little above respecting the theology of the Stoics.

† Lib. 7. cap. 3.

[9] I am not certain, that the learned Doctor has here correctly expounded Quintilian's meaning, and has not sacrificed a little to his own cause. Of this the reader will be best able to judge, if we quote the whole passage from Instit. Orator. lib. 7. p. 412. Quando, says he, de nomine constat, de re dubium est: interim conjectura est: ut si quæratur, quid sit Deus. Nam qui id neget, Deum esse spiritum omnibus partibus immistum, tum, non hoc dicat, falsum esse illius divinæ naturæ appellationem; sicut Epicurus, qui humanam ei formam locumque inter mundos dedit. Nomine uterque uno utitur; utrum sit in re, conjectat, "When the name is agreed on, there is a doubt about the thing: meanwhile there is conjecture: as if the question be, what God is. For he who denies, that God is a spirit, mingled with and diffused through all parts of the world, may not assert, moreover, that this appellation of the divine nature is improper; as Epicurus, who bestowed upon it a human form and a place between the worlds. Both adopt one and the same name; as to which of the two it is in reality, they conjecture." Unless I am mistaken, Quintilian neither sets down this as the generally received definition of God, nor accuses Epicurus of being an Atheist for despising it. He affirms merely that both he who adopts, and Epicurus, who rejects this definition, agree that there is a certain nature to which the name God is applicable, but differ as to what kind of nature this is. For the rest, I have no

persecutor of the Christians, he concluding, qualecunque esset, quod faterentur, pervicaciam certè et inflexibilem obstinationem debere puniri, [10] "that whatsoever their religion were, yet notwithstanding their stubbornness and inflexible obstinacy ought to be punished;" and who compelled many of them to worship the images of the emperor, and to sacrifice and pray to the statues of the pagan gods, and lastly, to blaspheme Christ; yet himself plainly acknowledged also one supreme universal Numen, as may sufficiently appear from his panegyric oration to Trajan, where he is called, Deus ille, qui manifestus ac præsens cœlum ac sidera insidet, "that God who is present with, and inhabits the whole heaven and stars:"* himself making a solemn prayer and supplication to him, both in the beginning and close thereof,[1] and sometimes speaking of him therein singularly and in way of eminency; as in these words: Occultat utrorumque semina Deus, et plerumque bonorum malorumque causæ sub diversâ specie latent, "God hideth the seeds of good and evil, so that the causes of each often appear disguised to men." L. Apuleius also, whose pretended miracles the Pagans endeavoured to confirm their religion by,[2] as well as they did by those of Apollonius, doth in sundry places of his writings plainly assert one supreme and universal Numen: we shall only here set down one: Cum summus deorum cuncta hæc non solùm cogitationum ratione consideret; sed prima, media, et ultima obeat; compertaque intimæ providentiæ ordinationis universitate et constantia regat,† "Since the highest of the gods does not only consider all these things in his mind and cogitation, but also pass through and comprehend within himself the beginning, middle, and end of all things, and constantly govern all by his occult providence." Lastly, Symmachus, who was a zealous stickler for the restitution of paganism, declared the Pagans to worship one and the same God with the Christians, but in several ways; he conceiving that there was no necessity God should be worshipped by all after the same manner: Æquum est, quicquid omnes colunt, UNUM putari:

remark to offer on the religion of this most celebrated rhetorician. For he has nowhere clearly and openly expressed his sentiments.

[10] These words are taken from his well-known epistle to Trajan, lib. 10. Epistolar. ep. 97. p. 456.

* And Mundi parens, and Parens hominum deorumque.

[1] In the beginning and close of the Panegyric, Pliny addresses a solemn prayer to Jupiter Optimus Maximus and Jupiter Capitolinus. It remains to be shown, and I much question whether this be possible, whether he meant by these words Jupiter, the son of Saturn, whom the Romans worshipped, or the supreme Deity, who rules and governs all things. For my part, I consider we cannot easily ascertain from the panegyric of an orator, any more than from the verses of a poet, what sentiments they entertained on the subject of religion. A great license is allowed to both of their phraseology to the received notions of the people.

[2] According to St. Augustine, Ep. 138. p. 317. tom. 2. opp.

† De Philos. p. 278. Colo.

eadem spectamus astra; commune cœlum est; idem nos mundus involvit; quid interest, qua quisque prudentia verum requirat? Uno itinere non potest perveniri ad tam grande secretum.* "We ought in reason to think, that it is one and the same thing which all men worship; as we all behold the same stars, have the same common heaven, and are involved within the same world. Why may not men pursue one and the same thing in different ways? One path is not enough to lead men to so grand a secret." The sense whereof is expressed by Prudentius:†

Uno omnes ir eodem
Aëre, comm is aura.
Sed quid sit sa secuti
Quærimus; ntibus *unum*
Imus ad oc cuique genti,
Per quod it m grande profundum.

And again afterward,‡

Secretum sed grande nequit rationis operte
Quæri aliter, quàm si sparsis via multiplicetur
Tramitibus, et centenos terat orbita calles,
Quæsitura Deum variata indage latentem.

And the beginning of Prudentius' confutation is this:

§ Longè aliud verum est. Nam multa ambago viarum
Anfractus dubios habet, et perplexius errat.
Sola errore caret simplex via, nescia flecti
In diverticulum, biviis nec pluribus anceps, &c.

We shall now instance also in some of the latter Greek writers. Though the author of the book De Mundo were not Aristotle, yet that he was a Pagan, plainly appears from some passages thereof;[3] as where he approves of sacrificing to the

* P. 306. [Epist. lib. 10. Epist. 61. p. 442.]
† P. 285. [Contra Symmachum, lib. 2. v. 85.] ‡ P. 308. [V. 842.] § V. 846.

[3] I have been unable, however, to find these passages in the De Mundo. On the contrary, from the last chapter of this book, where he states that one God is addressed by various names, it is, I think, evident, that the author repudiated the multitude of gods formerly worshipped in Greece. Dr. Cudworth, whilst writing this, had in his mind no doubt the following words, which occur cap. 6. p. 865. tom. 1. opp. Aristotelis: *Γίνονται δὲ καὶ δημοθοινίαι νόμιμοι, καὶ πανηγύρεις ἐνιαύσιοι, ΘΕΩΝ τε θυσίαι, καὶ ἡρώων θεραπεῖαι, καὶ χοαὶ κεκμηκότων*, "There take place also the appointed public banquets, the yearly festival assemblies, the sacrifices to the gods, the worship of heroes, and the libations to the dead." But, if I am not completely mistaken, it never can be proved from this passage, that the writer of the book De Mundo was a worshipper of many gods. For he does not commend and approve of those, who do all these things, but simply relates what takes place among mankind, and recounts the various duties and occupations of the citizens of a commonwealth. In the present passage he compares the world to a state and argues, that, as in the latter all things, however various and diversified, are done agreeably to the will and law of one man, so also the whole of the things that happen in the world, infinite though they be, are nevertheless administered by the authority and power of God. In the argument drawn by the learned Doctor from Apuleius, to show that the author of the De Mundo was a Pagan, there is evidently not the slightest weight whatever.

gods, and of worshipping heroes and dead men: as also because Apuleius would not otherwise have translated so much of that book, and incorporated it into his De Mundo. He therefore does not only commend this of Heraclitus:[4] Ἐκ πάντων ἓν, καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα, "That there is one harmonious system made out of all things, and that all things are derived from one;" but doth himself also write excellently concerning the supreme God, whom he calleth, τὴν τῶν ὅλων συνεκτικὴν αἰτίαν,* "the cause, which containeth all things," and τὸ τοῦ κόσμου κυριώτατον, "the best and most excellent part of the world;" he beginning after this manner: Ἀρχαῖος μὲν οὖν τις λόγος καὶ πάτριός ἐστι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, ὡς ἐκ θεοῦ τὰ πάντα καὶ διὰ θεοῦ ἡμῖν συνέστηκε· οὐδεμία δὲ φύσις, αὐτὴ καθ' ἑαυτὴν αὐτάρκης, ἐρημωθεῖσα τῆς ἐκ τούτου σωτηρίας, "It is an ancient opinion or tradition, that hath been conveyed down to all men from their progenitors, that all things are from God, and consist by him; and that no nature is sufficient to preserve itself, if left alone, and devoid of the divine assistance and influence." Where we may observe, that the Apuleian Latin version, altering the sense, renders the words thus: Vetus opinio est, atque in cogitationes omnium hominum penitus incidit, Deum esse: originis non habere auctorem; Deumque esse salutem et per-

[4] In my opinion, the saying of Heraclitus does not mean what the learned Doctor supposes, "that all things were made by one God." The author of the book De Mundo, cap. 5. p. 856. tom. 1. opp. Aristot. tells us, that the world is compounded of contraries, agreeing and harmonizing with each other, and adds, that Heraclitus signified the same in these words: Συνάψειας ὅλα καὶ οὐχὶ ὅλα, συμφερόμενον καὶ διαφερόμενον, συνᾷδον καὶ διᾷδον, καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἓν, καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα," Connect together the crisped and the not crisped, the concordant and the discordant, the consonant and the dissonant: also, one from all, and all from one." The force of this passage, drawn from the inmost recesses of Heraclitus' philosophy, is thus learnedly explained by G. Olearius, Diss. 2. de Heracliti Principio Rerum Omnium, sec. 8. p. 865. in Stanley's History of Philosophy: Ex omnibus unum, inquam ὁδῷ ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω, dum omnes atomi diversæ figuræ, quas ὅλα καὶ οὐχὶ ὅλα vocat Heraclitus, in unam massam concrevere: ex uno omnes, ὁδῷ ἄνω, dum, as he explains the thing below, sect. 12. p. 869. ex rudi mole et indigesta, divina cura, corpora ad ornatum hujus mundi spectantia educuntur, "One from all, that is by the process downwards, when all the atoms of different figures, termed ὅλα καὶ οὐχὶ ὅλα by Heraclitus, are concreted and compounded into one mass; all from one, by the upward process, when the bodies belonging to the adornment of this world are produced by divine agency out of rude and undigested matter." After which observation he thus corrects our author: Sane istum verum verborum Heracliti apud Aristotelem sensum esse, nemo, qui totum locum consideraverit, diffitebitur: ut mirum proinde sit, doctissimum virum, R. Cudworthum sublimius quippiam in istis quæsivisse, dum auctorem Libri de Mundo commendat, quod non tantum illud Heracliteum, ἐξ ἑνὸς τὰ πάντα, allegaverit, sed et ipse egregie de summo Deo docuerit, "Indeed, that this is the true meaning of Heraclitus' words in Aristotle, will be confessed by every one who examines the whole passage: wherefore it is surprising, that the most learned Dr. R. Cudworth should have sought for any thing higher in them, where he commends the author of the book De Mundo, as not only recognizing this Heraclitean "all things from one," but as himself writing also excellently concerning the supreme God." I hope I shall have some furture opportunity of examining into the correctness of this interpretation of Olearius': in the meantime, however, I cannot but acknowledge the justice of his censure of our author.

* Cap. 6. [P. 858. tom. 1. opp. Aristot.]

severantiam earum, quas effecerit, rerum. So that whereas, in the original Greek, this is said to be the general opinion of all mankind, "That all things are from God, and subsist by him, and that nothing at all can conserve itself in being without him;" Apuleius, correcting the words, makes the general sense of mankind to run no higher than this: "That there is a God, who hath no author of his original, and who is the safety and preservation of all those things that were made by himself." From whence it may be probably co… uleius, who is said to have been of Plutarch's pr… ted also with those paradoxical opinions of Pl… sequently did suppose all things not to have bee… , nor to have depended on him (as the writer De …) but that there was something besides God, as … tter and an evil principle, uncreated and self-ex… ards the same writer De Mundo elegantly illu… litudes, how God by one simple motion and en… n, without any labour or toil, doth produce and govern all the variety of motions in the universe; and how he doth *συνέχειν τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἁρμονίαν τε καὶ σωτηρίαν*, "contain the harmony and safety of the whole." And lastly, he concludes: "*Ὅπερ ἐν νηὶ κυβερνήτης, ἐν ἅρματι δὲ ἡνίοχος, ἐν χορῷ κορυφαῖος, ἐν πόλει νόμος, ἐν στρατοπέδῳ ἡγεμὼν, τοῦτο θεὸς ἐν κόσμῳ*,[a] "That what a pilot is to a ship, a charioteer to a chariot, the coryphæus to a choir, law to a city, and a general to an army; the same is God to the world." There being only this difference, that whereas the government of some of them is toilsome and solicitous, the divine government and steerage of the world is most easy and facile; for as this writer adds: "God being himself immoveable, moveth all things; in the same manner as law, in itself immoveable, by moving the minds of the citizens, orders and disposes all things."

Plutarchus Chæronensis (as hath been already declared) was unluckily engaged in two false opinions, the first of matter's being ingenit or uncreated, upon this pretence, because nothing could be made out of nothing; the second of a positive substantial evil principle, or an irrational soul and demon self-existent, upon this ground, because[b] *τὴν κακίαν γεγονέναι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ πρόνοιαν, ὥσπερ τὸ φαῦλον ἐπίγραμμα κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ποιητοῦ βούλησιν, πᾶσαν ἐπίνοιαν ἀτοπίας ὑπερβάλλει*, "There is no greater absurdity imaginable, than that evil should proceed from the providence of God, as a bad epigram from the will of the poet." In which respect he was before called by us a Ditheist. Plutarch was also a worshipper of the many pagan gods, himself being a priest of the Pythian Apollo. Notwithstanding which, he unquestionably asserted one sole principle of all good, the

[a] P. 864. [b] De Fato, p. 572. tom. 2. opp.

cause of all things (evil and matter only excepted) the framer of the whole world, and maker of all the gods in it; who is therefore often called by him God, in way of eminency, as when he affirmeth,[6] ἀεὶ γεωμετρεῖν τὸν Θεὸν, "that God doth always act the geometrician;" that is, do all things in measure and proportion. And again:[7] Πάντα καθ' ἁρμονίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ κατασκευάζεσθαι, "That all things are made by God according to harmony;" and that,[8] ὁ Θεὸς ἁρμονικὸς καλεῖται καὶ μουσικὸς, "God is called a harmonist and musician." And he hath these epithets given him: Ὁ μέγας Θεὸς, "the great God;" and ὁ ἀνωτάτω Θεὸς, "the highest or uppermost God," and ὁ πρῶτος Θεὸς, "the first God;" and ὁ ἀγέννητος Θεὸς, "the unmade self-existent God;" all the other pagan gods, according to him, having been made in time, together with the world. He is likewise styled by Plutarch, πέλαγος τοῦ καλοῦ, "the sea of pulchritude;" and his standing and permanent duration, without any flux of time, is excellently described by the same writer, in his book concerning the Delphic inscription. Lastly, Plutarch affirmeth, that men generally pray to this supreme God for whatsoever is not in their own power, ὅσα μὴ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐστιν, εὐχόμεθα τὸν Θεὸν διδόναι.

Dio Chrysostomus, a sophist, Plutarch's equal, though an acknowledger of many gods, yet nevertheless asserteth,* βασιλεύεσθαι τὸ ὅλον, "That the whole world is under a kingly power or monarchy," he calling the supreme God, sometime,† Τὸν κοινὸν ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν βασιλέα τε καὶ ἄρχοντα, καὶ πρύτανιν, καὶ πατέρα, "The common king of gods and men, their governor and father; τὸν πάντων κρατοῦντα Θεὸν, "the God that rules over all;"‡ τὸν πρῶτον καὶ μέγιστον Θεὸν, "the first and greatest God;" τὸν κορυφαῖον προεστῶτα τῶν ὅλων, καὶ κατευθύνοντα τὸν ἅπαντα οὐρανὸν καὶ κόσμον, &c. "the chief president over all things, who orders and guides the whole heaven and world, as a wise pilot doth a ship;"§ τὸν τοῦ ξύμπαντος ἡγεμόνα οὐρανοῦ, καὶ τῆς ὅλης δεσπότην οὐσίας, "the ruler of the whole heaven, and lord of the whole essence;" and the like. And he affirming that there is a natural prolepsis in the minds of men concerning him:‖ Περὶ δὲ θεῶν τῆς τε καθόλου φύσεως, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ πάντων ἡγεμόνος, πρῶτον μὲν καὶ ἐν πρώτοις δόξα καὶ ἐπίνοια κοινὴ τοῦ ξύμπαντος ἀνθρωπίνου γένους· ὁμοίως μὲν Ἑλλήνων, ὁμοίως δὲ Βαρβάρων, ἀναγκαία καὶ ἔμφυτος ἐν παντὶ τῷ λογικῷ γιγνομένη

[6] The learned Doctor's memory has deceived him. This precept is not Plutarch's, but ascribed by report to Plato. Although Plutarch, Sympos. lib. 8. Quæst. 2. p. 718. tom. 2. opp. ably canvasses its force and meaning.

[7] De Musica, p. 1147. tom. 2. opp. Neither does Plutarch state this as his own opinion, but according to the sense of the Pythagoreans and other ancient philosophers, who he tells us taught as much.

[8] This dogma I have been unable to find in Plutarch.

* P. 199. [Ed. Morell.] † P. 210.

‡ P. 203. § P. 446. ‖ P. 201.

κατὰ φύσιν, ἄνευ θνητοῦ διδασκάλου καὶ μυσταγωγοῦ, " Concerning the nature of the gods in general, but especially of that supreme Ruler over all, there is an opinion in all human kind, as well Barbarians as Greeks, that is naturally implanted in them as rational beings, and not derived from any mortal teacher." The meaning whereof is this, that men are naturally possessed with a persuasion, that there is one God, the supreme governor of the whole world, and that there are also below him, but above men, many other int[illegible] which these Pagans called gods.

That Galen was no[illegible] what his religion was, may plainly appear from t[illegible] out of his third book De Usu Partium, to omit [illegible] Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως εἰ ἐπὶ πλέον τοιούτων μνημονεύοιμι [illegible] οἱ σωφρονοῦντες ὀρθῶς ἄν μοι μέμψοιντο, καὶ μια[illegible] λόγον, ὃν ἐγὼ τοῦ δημιουργήσαντος ἡμᾶς ὕμνον [illegible] θημι, καὶ νομίζω τοῦτ' εἶναι τὴν ὄντως εὐσέβειαν· ο[illegible] κατόμβας αὐτῷ παμπόλλους καταθύσαιμι, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μυρία μύρα θυμιάσαιμι καὶ κασίας, ἀλλ' εἰ γνοίην μὲν αὐτὸς πρῶτος, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐξηγησαίμην, οἷος μέν ἐστι τὴν σοφίαν, οἷος δὲ τὴν δύναμιν, ὁποῖος δὲ τὴν χρηστότητα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐθέλειν κοσμεῖν ἅπαντα τὸν ἐνδεχόμενον κόσμον καὶ μηδενὶ φθονεῖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τῆς τελεωτάτης χρηστότητος ἐγὼ δεῖγμα τίθεμαι· ταύτῃ μὲν ὡς ἀγαθὸς ἡμῖν ὑμνείσθω· τὸ δ' ὡς ἂν μάλιστα κοσμηθείη, πᾶν ἐξευρεῖν, ἄκρας σοφίας· τὸ δὲ καὶ δρᾶσαι πανθ', ὅσα προείλετο, δυνάμεως ἀηττήτου, " Should I any longer insist upon such brutish persons as those, the wise and sober might justly condemn me, as defiling this holy oration, which I compose as a true hymn to the praise of him that made us; I conceiving true piety and religion towards God to consist in this, not that I should sacrifice many hecatombs, or burn much incense to him, but that I should myself first acknowledge, and then declare to others, how great his wisdom is, how great his power, and how great his goodness. For that he would adorn the whole world after this manner, envying to nothing that good, which it was capable of, I conclude to be a demonstration of most absolute goodness, and thus let him be praised by us as good. And that he was able to find out how all things might be adorned after the best manner, is a sign of the greatest wisdom in him. And lastly, to be able to effect and bring to pass all those things, which he had thus decreed, argues an insuperable power."

Maximus Tyrius, in the close of his first dissertation, gives us this short representation of his own theology: Βούλομαί δέ σοι δεῖξαι τὸ λεγόμενον σαφεστέρᾳ εἰκόνι. Ἐννόει μεγάλην ἀρχὴν καὶ βασιλείαν ἐρρωμένην, πρὸς μίαν ψυχὴν βασιλέως τοῦ ἀρίστου καὶ πρεσβυτάτου συμπάντων νενευκότων ἑκόντων· ὅρον δὲ τῆς

* P. 402. [Cap. 10. tom. 2. opp. edit. Basil.].

ἀρχῆς οὐκ Ἅλυν ποταμὸν, οὐδὲ Ἑλλήσποντον, οὐδὲ τὴν Μαιῶτιν, οὐδὲ τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ ὠκεανῷ ἠϊόνας, ἀλλὰ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν τὸν μὲν ὑψοῦ, τὴν δ' ἔνερθεν· βασιλέα δὲ αὐτὸν δὴ τὸν μέγαν ἀτρεμοῦντα, ὥσπερ νόμον παρεχοντα τοῖς πειθομένοις, σωτηρίαν ὑπάρχουσαν αὐτῶν, καὶ κοινωνοὺς τῆς ἀρχῆς, πολλοὺς μὲν ὑρατοὺς θεοὺς, πολλοὺς δε ἀφανεῖς· τοὺς μὲν περὶ τὰ πρόθυρα αὐτὰ εἱλουμένους, οἷον εἰσαγγελέας τινὰς καὶ βασιλεῖς συγγενεστάτους, ὁμοτραπέζους αὐτοὺς καὶ συνεστίους· τοὺς δὲ τούτων ὑπηρέτας, τοὺς δὲ ἔτι τοῦτων καταδεεστέρους· διαδοχὴν ὁρᾷς καὶ τάξιν ἀρχῆς καταβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ μέχρι γῆς, "I will now more plainly declare my sense by this similitude: Imagine in your mind a great and powerful kingdom or principality, in which all the rest freely and with one consent conspire to direct their actions, agreeebly to the will and command of one supreme king, the oldest and the best: and then suppose the bounds and limits of this empire not to be the river Halys, nor the Hellespont, nor the Meotian lake, nor the shores of the ocean; but heaven above, and the earth beneath. Here then let that great king sit immoveable, prescribing laws to all his subjects, in which consists their safety and security: the consorts of his empire being many, both visible and invisible gods; some of which, that are nearest to him, and immediately attending on him, are in the highest royal dignity, feasting as it were at the same table with him: others again are their ministers and attendants; and a third sort, inferior to them both. And thus you see, how the order and chain of this government descends down by steps and degrees, from the supreme God to the earth and men." In which resemblance, we have a plain acknowledgment of one supreme God, the monarch of the whole world, and three subordinate ranks of inferior gods, as his ministers, in the government of the world; whom that writer there also calls, θεοὺς θεοῦ παῖδας καὶ φίλους, "gods, the sons and friends of God."

Aristides the famous Adrianean sophist and orator, in his first oration or hymn vowed to Jupiter, after he had escaped a great tempest, is so full to the purpose, that nothing can be more; he, after his proem, beginning thus: Ζεὺς τὰ πάντα ἐποίησε, καὶ Διός ἐστιν ἔργα ὅσα ἐστὶ πάντα, καὶ ποταμοὶ, καὶ γῆ, καὶ θάλαττα, καὶ οὐρανὸς· καὶ ὅσα τούτων μεταξὺ ἄνω, καὶ ὅσα ὑπὸ ταῦτα· καὶ θεοὶ καὶ ἄνθρωποι, καὶ ὅσα ψυχὴν ἔχει, καὶ ὅσα εἰς ὄψιν ἀφικνεῖται, καὶ ὅσα δεῖ νοήσει λαβεῖν. Ἐποίησε δὲ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν· οὐ Κρήτης ἐν εὐώδεσιν ἄντροις τραφεὶς· οὐδ' ἐμέλλησεν αὐτὸν Κρόνος καταπιεῖν· οὐτ' ἀντ' ἐκείνου λίθον κατέπιεν, οὐδ' ἐκινδύνευσε Ζεὺς, οὐδὲ μήποτε κινδυνεύσῃ· οὐδ' ἔστι πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲν Διός· οὐ μᾶλλόν γε ἢ υἱεῖς τε πατέρων πρεσβύτεροι γένοιτ' ἂν, καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα τῶν ποιούντων· ἀλλ' ὅδε ἐστὶ πρῶτος τε καὶ πρεσβύτατος καὶ ἀρχηγέτης τῶν πάντων· αὐτὸς ἐξ αὐτοῦ γενόμενος· ὁπότε δὲ ἐγένετο, οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἦν τε ἄρα ἐξ ἀρχῆς, καὶ ἔσται εἰσαεὶ, αὐτοπάτωρ τε καὶ μείζων ἢ ἐξ ἄλλου γεγονέναι. Καὶ ὥσπερ τὴν

Ἀθηνᾶν ἄρα ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἔφυσε, καὶ γάμου οὐδεν προσεδεήθη εἰς αὐτὴν, οὕτως ἔτι πρότερον αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἐποίησε, καὶ οὐδὲν προσεδεήθη ἑτέρου εἰς τὸ εἶναι· ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοὐναντίον πάντα εἶναι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἤρξατο, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι χρόνον εἰπεῖν. Οὔτε γὰρ χρόνος ἦν πω τότε, ὅτε μηδὲ ἄλλο μηδέν· δημιουργοῦ γὰρ ἔργον οὐδέν ἐστι πρεσβύτερον· οὕτω δὴ ἀρχὴ μὲν ἁπάντων Ζεὺς καὶ ἐκ Διὸς πάντα, ἅτε δὲ ὢν χρόνου τε κρείττων, καὶ οὐδένα ἔχων τὸν ἀντικόψοντα, αὐτός τε ὁμοῦ καὶ ὁ κόσμος ἦν, οὕτω ταχὺ πάντα ἐποίησε, ἐποίησε δὲ ὦ[illegible]r made all things, and all things whatsoever exis[illegible]f Jupiter; rivers, and earth, and sea, and heaven, a[illegible]ween these, and gods, and men and all animals, v[illegible]ceivable either by sense or by the mind. But Ju[illegible] made himself;* for he was not educated in the flo[illegible]rous caves of Crete, neither was Saturn ever about[illegible] nor instead of him did he swallow down a stone[illegible] was never in danger, nor will he be ever in da[illegible]ing. Neither is there any thing older than Jupite[illegible]n there are sons older than their parents, or works than their opificers. But he is the first and the oldest, and the prince of all things, he being made from himself; nor can it be declared when he was made, for he was from the beginning, and ever will be his own father, and greater than to have been begotten from one another. As he produced Minerva from his brain, and needed no wedlock in order thereunto, so before this did he produce himself from himself, needing not the help of any other thing for his being. But, on the contrary, all things began to be from him, and no man can tell the time; since there was not then any time when there was nothing else besides, and no work can be older than the maker of it. Thus was Jupiter the beginning of all things, and all things were from Jupiter, who is better than time, which had its beginning together with the world." And again: Ὡς δὲ καὶ θεῶν ὅσα φῦλα ἀπορρύην τῆς Διὸς τοῦ πάντων πατρὸς δυνάμεως ἕκαστα ἔχει, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὴν Ὁμήρου σειρὰν, ἅπαντα εἰς αὐτὸν διήρτηται, καὶ πάντα ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐξῆπται· ἔρωτά τε καὶ ἀνάγκην δύο τούτω συναγωγοτάτω καὶ ἰσχυροτάτω ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐγέννησεν, ὅπως αὐτὼ τὰ πάντα συνέχοιεν, &c. ἐποίει θεοὺς μὲν, ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμελητὰς, ἀνθρώπους δὲ θεῶν θεραπευτὰς τε καὶ ὑπηρέτας, &c. πάντα δὲ πανταχοῦ Διὸς μεστὰ, καὶ ἁπάντων θεῶν εὐεργεσίαι Διός εἰσιν ἔργον, &c. "All the several kinds of gods are but a defluxion and derivation from Jupiter; and, according to Homer's chain, all things are connected with him and depend upon him. He, amongst the first, produced love and necessity, two the most powerful holders of things together, that they might make all things firmly to cohere. He made gods to be the curators of

* How God was said to be self-made: See p. 405 and 406.

men, and he made men to be the worshippers and servers of those gods. All things are every where full of Jupiter, and the benefits of all the other gods are his work, and to be attributed to him, they being done in compliance with that order, which he had prescribed them."

It is certain, that all the latter philosophers after Christianity, whether Platonists or Peripatetics, though for the most part they asserted the eternity of the world, yet universally agreed in the acknowledgment of one supreme Deity, the cause of the whole world, and of all the other gods. And as Numenius, Plotinus, Amelius, Porphyrius, Proclus, Damascius, and others, held also a trinity of divine hypostases, so had some of those philosophers excellent speculations concerning the Deity, as particularly Plotinus;* who notwithstanding that he derived matter and all things from one divine principle, yet was a contender for many gods. Thus in his book inscribed against the Gnostics: Χρὴ ὡς ἄριστον μὲν αὐτὸν πειρᾶσθαι γίνεσθαι, μὴ μόνον δὲ αὐτὸν νομίζειν ἄριστον δύνασθαι γενέσθαι, οὕτω γὰρ οὔπω ἄριστος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους ἄλλους ἀρίστους, ἔτι καὶ δαίμονας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι· πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον θεούς, τούς τε ἐν τῷ δὲ ὄντας κἀκεῖ βλέποντας· πάντων δὲ μάλιστα τὸν ἡγεμόνα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς, ψυχὴν μακαριωτάτην· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἤδη καὶ τοὺς νοητοὺς ὑμνεῖν θεούς, ὑφ' ἅπασι δὲ ἤδη τὸν μέγαν τὸν ἐκεῖ βασιλέα· καὶ ἐν τῷ πλήθει μάλιστα τῶν θεῶν τὸ μέγα αὐτοῦ ἐνδεικνύμενον. Οὐ γὰρ τὸ συστεῖλαι εἰς ἕν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δεῖξαι πολὺ τὸ θεῖον, ὅσον ἔδειξεν αὐτὸς, τουτέστι δύναμιν θεοῦ εἰδότων, ὅταν μένων, ὅς ἐστι, πολλοὺς ποιῇ, πάντας εἰς αὐτὸν ἀνηρτημένους, καὶ δι' ἐκεῖνον καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου ὄντας· καὶ ὁ κόσμος ὅδε δι' ἐκεῖνόν ἐστι, κἀκεῖ βλέπει καὶ πᾶς καὶ θεῶν ἕκαστος, "Every man ought to endeavour with all his might, to become as good as may be, but yet not to think himself to be the only thing that is good, but that there are also other good men in the world, and good demons, but much more gods; who, though inhabiting this inferior world, yet look up to that superior; and most of all, the prince of this universe, that most happy soul. From whence he ought to ascend yet higher, and to praise those intelligible gods, but above all that great King and Monarch; declaring his greatness and majesty by the multitude of gods which are under him. For this is not the part of them, who know the power of God, to contract all into one, but to show forth all that divinity, which himself hath displayed, who remaining one, makes many depending on him; which are by him and from him. For this whole world is by him, and looks up perpetually to him, as also doth every one of the gods in it." And Themistius, the Peripatetic (who was so far from being a Christian, that, as Petavius probably conjectures, he perstringes

* En. 2. lib. 9. c. 9. [P. 207.]

our Saviour Christ under the name of Empedocles, for making himself a God) doth not only affirm, that one and the same supreme God was worshipped by Pagans, and the Christians, and all nations, though in different manners; but also, that God was delighted with this variety of religions:* *Ταύτῃ νόμιζε γάννυσθαι τῇ ποικιλίᾳ τὸν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχηγέτην· ἄλλως Σύρους ἐθέλει πολιτεύεσθαι, ἄλλως Ἕλληνας, ἄλλως Αἰγυπτίους, καὶ οὐδ' αὐτοὺς Σύρους ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἤδη κατακεκερμάτισται εἰς μικρά,* "The author and prince of [illegible]ns to be delighted with this variety of worship; h[illegible]e Syrians worship him one way, the Greeks anot[illegible]yptians another; neither do the Syrians (or Chris[illegible]s all agree, they being subdivided into many se[illegible]

We shall conclud[illegible] this full testimony of St. Cyril,† in his first bo[illegible]u: *Ἅπασιν ἐναργὲς, ὅτι καὶ τοῖς τὰ Ἑλλήνων φι[illegible]ιν, ἕνα μὲν ἐδόκει Θεὸν εἶναι συνομολογεῖν, τὸν τῶ[illegible]ργὸν, καὶ πάντων ἐπέκεινα κατὰ φύσιν, πεποιῆσθαι [illegible] καὶ παρῆχθαι πρὸς γένεσιν ἑτέρους τινὰς θεοὺς, κατάφασιν αὐτοὶ, νοητούς τε καὶ αἰσθητούς,* "It is manifest to all, that amongst those, who philosophize in the Greek way, it is universally acknowledged, that there is one God, the maker of the universe, and who is by nature above all things; but that there have been made by him, and produced into generation, certain other gods (as they call them) both intelligible and sensible."[10]

* Orat. 12. [P. 156. edit. Harduini.]

[9] These are not the Greek words of Themistius, but of Dan. Petavius. Andr. Dudithius published a Latin version of this twelfth oration of Themistius. But since that time, by some chance or other, the Greek copy was entirely lost, and neither Petavius nor Harduinus, with all their diligence, could meet with it. Hence Petavius, in his edition of Themistius, endeavoured to supply the loss by translating Dudithius' version into Greek.

† P. 23.

[10] Dr. Cudworth is neither the first nor the only one, who has endeavoured to prove, that one supreme God was worshipped by most of the Grecian philosophers distinguished for zeal in the cause of truth; although probably he has surpassed all, who have touched upon this argument, in the number and variety of testimonies. In the first place, all those who in the early ages of Christianity wrote apologies in defence of the truth of our holy religion against the Pagans, fancied themselves able to show, that the most eminent philosophers, like the Christians, had professed one Parent and Lord of all things. I am aware, indeed, that they were not always successful in their attempts, and that not a few were reluctantly dragged by them into this society of worshippers of one God, whom it would have been much better to rank among Atheists; nevertheless, that their object was the same as that of Dr. Cudworth is unquestionable. Of the Greeks, see Clemens Alexandr. both throughout his Stromata, and in his Cohortat. ad Gentes, cap. 6. p. 59. &c. Athenagoras, Apologia pro Christian. cap. 6. p. 22. &c. p. 27. &c. Theophilus Antioch. lib. 2. ad Autolycum, cap. 57. p. 263. and lib. 3. cap. 2. p. 268. Cyrillus Alexandr. lib. 1. contra Julian. p. 26. Justin Martyr, Cohortat. ad Gentes, p. 15. Of the Latins, Tertullian, Apologetic. cap. 24. p. 235. Minucius Felix, Octavius, cap. 19. p. 174. Arnobius, lib. 1. adv. Gentes, p. 21. &c. and others whom it is unnecessary to enumerate. In more modern times, and prior to Dr. Cudworth, besides Steuchus, Mornæus, Grotius, and others, who have undertaken the championship of the Christian religion, an acute theologian of our own church, Jac. Martini, in Exercitat. Metaphysic. published at Witteb. 1608. 8. has

XXVII. Neither was this the opinion of philosophers and learned men only amongst the Pagans, but even of the vulgar also. Not that we pretend to give an account of all the most

with great erudition and copiousness expounded the opinions of philosophers concerning one God. To whom may be added, Elias Schedius, who De Diis Germanis, p. 291. has written a very long, but verbose rather than accurate commentary on the agreement of nations in the worship of one God; also Mic. Mourgues, Plan Theologique du Pythagorisme, tom. 1. lettr. 1. p. 2. &c. Since Dr. Cudworth's time much care and labour have been bestowed upon this argument by Tobias Pfanner in his Systema Theologiæ Gentil. Purioris, cap. 2. sect. 1. &c. p. 34. &c. with whom may be joined Pet. Dan. Huet, who gives us a neat and comprehensive analysis of all that has been advanced upon the subject by others, Quæstiones Alnetanæ de Concordia Rationis et Fidei, lib. 2. cap. 2. sect. 11. p. 84. &c. I pass over Dr. Cudworth's countryman, Ed. Herbert of Cherbury, who is altogether bent upon showing, that the whole of the ancients who worshipped many gods acknowledged at the same time the one supreme God professed by us Christians, De Religione Gentilium, cap. 13. p. 214. and cap. 15. p. 248. And such was the view generally entertained in former times. But when in the last generation, or so, the doctrines of the ancient philosophers began to be more minutely inquired into, numbers started up, eminent for ability and erudition, who held all such labour to be vain and futile, and maintained that the sayings brought forward from these philosophers concerning one God, were to be understood either of the sun, or of the soul of the world, or of the whole nature of things, and consequently that most of those who were held forth as professing one God, were to be classed with Atheists rather than with Christians and the rational worshippers of a supreme Being. Prior to the publication of Dr. Cudworth's work, Dr. Sam. Parker, Bishop of Oxford. is the first that I know of, who professedly entered upon this argument, in his Tentamina Physico. Theologica de Deo, Lond. 1665. 4. in lib. 2. cap. 1. and 2. p. 181. of which he undertakes to prove: Gentilium de Deo placita perperam ad supremum, quem colimus, Deum traduci; sed aut de sole, aut de anima mundi, quæ suprema omnium Numina esse censuerunt, intelligi oportere, " That the dogmas of the Pagans concerning God are erroneously referred to the God, whom we worship; and ought to be understood either of the sun or the soul of the world, which they regarded as the supreme deities of all." Nor can it be denied, that his disputation is characterized by much ingenuity and acumen. But the same argument has in our own times been handled with still greater subtlety and eloquence by Mons. Bayle, who, in his Histor. and Crit. Dictionary, as well as in other writings, contends, that the most eminent philosophers of antiquity, whom others have confidently ranked among the worshippers of one God, are to be classed rather with the partisans of Spinoza, and that properly speaking none, or at the most but a very small portion of them acknowledged one supreme Deity. See his Response aux Questions d' un Provincial, tom. 2. cap. 107. p. 415. and Continuation des Pensées sur les Cometes, tom. 1. p. 116. 118. 331. and tom. 2. p. 495. And the opinion of this most able critic, widely diffused as it is at the present day, has led a great many writers of the highest standing in the learned world to brand almost all the ancient philosophers, even those hitherto singled out for their supposed piety, with the stigma of atheism, and to consider nearly the whole of those, who have spoken of one principle of things, as having been imbued with the insane principles of Spinoza. I have already frequently touched upon this subject, and have freely declared my sentiments on some of those philosophers, whose religion has of late been called in question. I shall now merely canvass the arguments brought forward against our author by Mons. Bayle; who, however, did not make use of the English work itself, but founded his criticisms upon the portions extracted from it by J. Le Clerc, in tom. 2. of the Biblioth. Choisie, p. 63. &c. In general, he charges Dr. Cudworth with want of selection in his testimonies, Continuat. des Pensées sur les Cometes, tom. 1. p. 333. and 335. and with having drawn to his own side many dicta of the ancients, which, if their real meaning be strictly attended to, are altogether repugnant to the doctrine of one supreme God, ibid. p. 336. Which accusation, it must be owned, is not wholly destitute of truth; as we have sufficiently shown in our own observations upon this book, and upon the various passages of ancient authors, which are quoted in it. On the other hand, however, it abounds with much excellent argument; nor is it surprising, that in such a multitude of testimonies the able and erudite author should

sottish vulgar amongst them, who, as they little considered their religion, so probably did they not understand that mystery of the pagan theology (hereafter to be declared) that many of their

sometimes have attended to the words rather than to their meaning; more especially as he seems to have cited not a few of the passages from memory. And who, I ask, possesses such strength of intellect and memory, as to be able at once to refer all that he has met with in ancient authors to their respective sources, and thence to decide upon their true sense. We ought not to look at occasional errors, but rather to feel a deep sense of gratitude towards the illustrious scholar, who has supplied us with so rich a collection of passages; from which the opinions of the early philosophers concerning God can for the most part be sufficiently ascertained.

In particular, Bayle, I. denies Dr. Cudworth to be right in ranking the Egyptians among the worshippers of a supreme Deity; which he tells us is at variance with the authority of Diodorus Siculus, who testifies, that this nation was addicted to the foulest superstitions, ibid. p. 332. This controversy may, I think, be easily decided by reference to our own copious disputation above, on the religion of the Egyptians. II. He considers, that Pythagoras is to be excepted from this class, because that philosopher held God to be the soul of the world, and the soul of the world is not any thing one and simple, but a nature compounded of various parts, ibid. p. 333. Here, however, the ingenious critic is lacking either in candour or perspicacity; as will be made appear by and by. He blends and confounds two ideas, which ought by no means to be confounded. III. He asserts the same of Xenophanes Parmenides, who he maintains were no better than Spinoza. ibid. p. 334. &c. Upon these we have already declared our opinion. IV. He is astonished most of all, p. 334. that the Romans, especially Varro and Pliny, should be numbered among those, who professed the existence of one God; for both these acknowledged no other God but the soul of the world and this whole universe of things, in which no unity, properly so called, exists. This, in the case of Varro, he intimates, is openly avowed by St. Augustine. On Pliny he adds nothing further; but it is obvious that the acute writer meant the elder Pliny, whereas Dr. Cudworth speaks of the younger Pliny, the author of the Panegyric on Trajan. V. The Stoics, he admits, may with great semblance of truth be ranked among the worshippers of one God, sect. 67. p. 378. &c. although it will be evident, he adds, if all things be duly considered, that this god of the Stoics consisted of innumerable parts, and therefore cannot truly and properly be called one. The same he affirms respecting the god of Hippocrates. Not even the Platonists, VI. will he allow to be ranked among the professors of one God, sect. 68. p. 342. For, 1. The junior Platonists, who existed subsequently to the birth of our Saviour, profited by the reading of Christian books, and copied the words as well as the doctrines of Christianity. 2. If we attentively examine, in all its parts, the doctrines of Plotinus, Proclus, and others of their class, on God and religion, nothing can possibly be more monstrous and absurd. 3. Not even Plato himself had any clear and comprehensive idea of a supreme God; which is proved by him upon the authority of Gassendi. The two last of these observations we shall canvass by and by, when we come to a general explication of this question. As respects the first, I should not deny its truth, nor suppose, that the opinions either of Plato or of the other ancient philosophers, can be learnt from the dogmas of the junior Platonists. To declare my own sentiments, indeed, Dr. Cudworth has unquestionably attached too much importance to this sect. The disputes carried on by the Christians against their pagan opponents caused philosophers to adopt much more rational views, than they had entertained before, and to combine and reconcile in some measure the doctrines of one and many gods. The manner in which this was done has been set forth by no one more elegantly, than by the erudite author of the Recognitions of Clement; who, lib. 5. sect. 19. p. 551. tom. 1. Patr. Apostol. explains the opinion of most of the philosophers of his time in the following words: Unum esse et nos dicimus Deum, qui est omnium dominus: sed et isti Dii sunt. Sicut enim unus est Cæsar, et habet sub se multos judices: . . . simili arbitramur modo, quum unus sit major omnium Deus, etiam istos ad similitudinem earum, quas diximus, potestatum ordinatos esse in hoc mundo Deos, illi quidem majori subjectos, nos tamen, et quæ in hoc mundo sunt, dispensantes, " We also say, that there is one God, who is lord of all: but these also are gods. For as there is one Cæsar, who has many judges under him . . . . so we suppose, there being one God

gods were nothing but several names and notions of one supreme Deity, according to its various manifestations and effects; but because, as we conceive, this tradition of one supreme God did run current amongst the generality of the Greek and Latin Pagans at least, whether learned or unlearned. For we cannot make a better judgment concerning the vulgar and generality of the ancient Pagans, than from the poets and mythologists, who were the chief instructors of them. Thus Aristotle, in his Politics, writing of music, judgeth of men's opinions concerning the gods from the poets: Σκοπεῖν δ' ἔξεστι τὴν ὑπόληψιν, ἣν ἔχωμεν περὶ τῶν θεῶν, οὐ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ᾄδει καὶ κιθαρίζει τοῖς ποιη-

supreme over all, that these gods also are appointed in this world after the manner of those authorities we have mentioned, subject indeed to that supreme God, but governing and administering us and every thing in this world." Thus were they compelled to speak by the force of that truth, to which the Christians were devoted. But these principles are altogether foreign to those, who lived before the Christian era. Lastly, VII. He denies also, that Heraclitus belongs to this class; and after explaining his doctrine according to the view of G. Olearius, concludes, that the god of this philosopher was not one simple nature, but a combination of various and distinct natures, tom. 2. ibid. sect. 105. p. 495.—Such are the arguments advanced by Bayle in opposition to our author; and although some of them, as we have already acknowledged, are not entirely destitute of force, still the greater part have not the slightest bearing upon the question. For Bayle plays upon the ambiguity of the words *one* and *unity*, and attaches to them a more extensive meaning, than is intended by Dr. Cudworth. The latter opposes what he calls *unity* to *multitude*, and undertakes to prove merely, that most of the philosophers, although otherwise worshipping many gods, nevertheless referred all things to one fountain and cause. But he does not contend, that all these philosophers entertained such exalted notions of this one principle and one cause of all things, as to leave no room for censure. He is satisfied with maintaining, that the generality of them acknowledged one supreme God; but, whether they taught correctly or otherwise concerning this God, he leaves undetermined; nor does he take upon himself to prove, that nothing can be deduced from their precepts, except what is sound and consistent. On the contrary, Bayle opposes to the word *unity* not only *multitude*, but *composition* also, and confounds two notions, which in my opinion he ought to have kept distinct, namely, *simplicity* and *unity*. This I shall prove from his own words, ibid. tom. 1. sect. 66. p. 335. Quel est l' etat de la question lorsqu' on veut philosopher touchant *l' Unite* de Dieu? C' est de savoir s'il y a une Intelligence parfaitement *simple*, totalement distinguée de la matiere et de la forme du monde et productrice de toutes choses, "What is the state of the question, if we wish to philosophize concerning the *unity* of God? It is to know, whether there is an Intelligence perfectly *simple*, totally distinct from the matter and form of the world, and the Creator of all things." Unity, therefore, according to him, comprises also simplicity and freedom from all corporeal concretion whatever. Wherefore, if this definition is to be admitted, which I think will be done by few, no one can be said to profess one God, unless he concedes the same to be most simple and altogether removed from all contagion of matter. To which rule if the precepts of ancient philosophy respecting God are to be reduced, I should neither feel disposed to defend Pythagoras, nor Parmenides, nor the Stoics, nor even Plato and Socrates. But Dr. Cudworth meant no such definition of unity, and therefore cannot justly be reprehended for having reckoned not a few among the worshippers of one God, who nevertheless supposed his nature to be in a certain measure corporeal or compounded of parts. I speak not of its being inconsistent with the part of a wise man, to charge the dead with inferences, which, most likely, if living, they would have altogether repudiated. But such is the wont of this most acute writer; he confounds all things, separates and combines, as his fancy leads him, changes the significations of words, puts his own interpretations upon the precepts of the ancients; in short, grasps at every thing that offers, and adorns it with no ordinary eloquence, in order to gain his own point, and to render that probable, which he wishes to appear so.

ταις,* "We may learn what opinion men have concerning the gods from hence, because the poets never bring in Jupiter singing or playing upon an instrument." Now we have already proved from sundry testimonies of the poets, that (however they were depravers of the pagan religion, yet) they kept up this tradition of one supreme Deity, one king and father of gods: to which testimonies many more might have been added, as of Seneca the tragedian, Statius, Lucan, Silius Italicus, Persius, and Martial, but that [illegible] them, to avoid tediousness. Wherefore we [illegible]tent ourselves only to set down this affirmation [illegible]omus, concerning the theology of the poets: Οὗ[illegible] *ς οἱ ποιηταὶ κατὰ ταῦτα, τὸν πρῶτον καὶ μέγιστον* [illegible]*λοῦσι συλλήβδην ἅπαντος τοῦ λογικοῦ γένους,* [illegible]*ία· οἷς πειθόμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι Διὸς βασιλέως* [illegible]*ς· καὶ δὴ καὶ πατέρα αὐτὸν οὐκ ὀκνοῦσι προσαγ*[illegible]*χαῖς*,† "All the poets call the first and greatest [illegible], universally, of all the rational kind; as also th[illegible] Agreeably with which of the poets, do men erect altars to Jupiter king, and stick not to call him father in their devotions."

Moreover, Aristotle himself hath recorded this in his Politics:[1] *Πάντες λέγουσι θεοὺς βασιλεύεσθαι,* "That all men affirmed the gods to be under a kingly power;" or, "That there is one supreme King and Monarch over the gods." And Maximus Tyrius declareth, that as well the unlearned as the learned, throughout the whole pagan world, universally agreed in this, that there was one supreme God, the father of all the other gods:‡ *Εἰ συναγαγὼν ἐκκλησίαν τῶν τεχνῶν τούτων, κελεύεις ἅπαντας ἀθρόους διὰ ψηφίσματος ἑνὸς ἀποκρίνασθαι περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅστις ἄλλο μὲν ἂν τὸν γραφέα εἰπεῖν, ἄλλο δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀγαλματοποιὸν, καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν ἄλλο, καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον ἄλλο; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὰ Δία τὸν Σκύθην, οὐδὲ τὸν Ἕλληνα, οὐδὲ τὸν Πέρσην, ἢ τὸν Ὑπερβόρειον· ἀλλὰ ἴδοις ἂν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλα, καὶ οὐ ταῦτα ψηφιζομένους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, πάντας δὲ πᾶσι διαφερομένους· οὐ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν, οὐ τὸ κακὸν ὅμοιον, οὐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν, οὐ τὸ καλὸν· νόμος μὲν γὰρ δὴ καὶ δίκη ἄνω καὶ κάτω φέρεται διασπώμενα καὶ σπαρασσόμενα· μὴ γὰρ ὅτι γένος γένει ὁμολογεῖ ἐν τούτοις, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πόλις πόλει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ οἶκος οἴκῳ, οὐδὲ ἀνὴρ ἀνδρὶ, οὐδὲ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ· ἐν τοσούτῳ δὲ πολέμῳ καὶ στάσει καὶ διαφωνίᾳ, ἕνα ἴδοις ἂν ἐν πάσῃ γῇ ὁμόφωνον νόμον καὶ λόγον, ὅτι* ΘΕΟΣ ΕΙΣ ΠΑΝΤΩΝ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΤΗΡ, *καὶ θεοὶ πολλοὶ θεοῦ παῖδες, συνάρχοντες θεῷ· ταῦτα δὲ ὁ Ἕλλην λέγει καὶ ὁ Βάρβαρος λέγει, καὶ ὁ ἠπειρώτης, καὶ ὁ θαλάττιος, καὶ ὁ σοφὸς, καὶ ὁ ἄσοφος,* "If there were a meeting called of all these several

* Lib. 8. c. 5. [P. 607. tom. 3. opp.]
† Orat. 36. p. 447.
[1] Lib. 4. cap. 15. p. 510. tom. 3. opp.
‡ Diss. 1. p. 4. 5.

trades and professions, a painter, a statuary, a poet, and a philosopher, and all of them were required to declare their sense concerning God, do you think, that the painter would say one thing, the statuary another, the poet another, and the philosopher another? No nor the Scythian neither, nor the Greek, nor the Hyperborean. In other things we find men speaking very discordantly to one another, all men as it were differing from all. The same thing is not good to all nor evil, honest nor dishonest. For law and justice itself are different every where; and not only one nation doth not agree with another therein, but also not one city with another city, nor one house with another house, nor one man with another man, nor lastly any one man with himself. Nevertheless, in this so great war, contention, and discord, you may find every where throughout the whole world, one agreeing law and opinion, That THERE IS ONE GOD THE KING AND FATHER OF ALL, and many gods, the sons of God, co-reigners together with God. These things both the Greek and the barbarian alike affirm, both the inhabitants of the continent and of the sea-coast, both the wise and the unwise." Nothing can be more full than this testimony of Maximus Tyrius, that the generality of the pagan world, as well vulgar and illiterate as wise and learned, did agree in this, that there was one supreme God, the creator and governor of all. And to the same purpose was that other testimony before cited out of Dio Chrysostomus:* Περὶ δὲ θεῶν τῆς τε καθόλου φύσεως, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ πάντων ἡγεμόνος, δόξα καὶ ἐπίνοια κοινὴ τοῦ ξύμπαντος ἀνθρωπίνου γένους, ὁμοίως δὲ Ἑλλήνων, ὁμοίως δὲ Βαρβάρων, &c. "That concerning the nature of the gods in general, but especially concerning that prince of all things, there was one agreeing persuasion in the minds of all mankind, as well barbarians as Greeks." Where Dio plainly intimates also, that there was a more universal consent of nations in the belief of one God, than of many gods.[2]

* Orat. 12. p. 201.

[2] That the vulgar and generality of the Greek and Latin Pagans worshipped one supreme God, the parent of the whole universe, can be proved, the learned Doctor thinks, by the twofold authority of the poets and of certain philosophers and rhetoricians. But I fear, that in reality there is less weight in either towards determining this question, than may at first sight appear. I. The popular sentiments concerning God and religion may, I admit, be ascertained from the poets: not that I suppose the people to have received their religion from the poets, a view adopted by many learned men, whom I have already answered in another place; but, on the contrary, that the latter embodied in verse the current traditions handed down by the priests, and by the charms of poetry contributed towards strengthening and perpetuating the popular superstition. The supreme God, Jupiter, of whom they sing, as I have already shown from Homer and Hesiod, is the son of Saturn, and boasts no higher origin than the rest of the gods, who according to the poets were all descendants of Chaos or Oceanus, the same as men. He holds the supreme and sovereign power, not, as has already been made appear, by the law of nature, but partly by force and partly by the favour of the other deities. Of one supreme God, therefore, the parent and creator of all

It hath been already observed, that the several pagan nations had vulgarly their peculiar proper names for the one supreme God. For as the Greeks called him Zeus or Zen, the Latins Jupiter or Jovis, so did the Egyptians, Africans, and Arabians, Hammon. Which Hammon therefore was called by the Greeks the Zeus of the Africans, and by the Latins their Jupiter. Whence is that in Cicero's De Natura Deorum:[3] Jovis Capitolini nobis alia species, alia Afris Ammonis Jovis, "The form of the Capitoline Jupite ns is different from that of Jupiter Ammon with The name of the Scythian Jupiter also, as Her , was Pappæus, or father. The Persians likewis ὺς πατρῴος, as Xenophon styles him, their cou upiter (namely Mithras or Oromasdes) who in phon is distinguished from the sun, and called amation in the Scripture: "The Lord God of d given him all the kingdoms of the earth." ylonian Bel is declared by Berosus (a priest of Bel, to have been that God who was the maker of heaven and earth. And learned men conceive, that

things, and secrete from matter, the poets subsequent to Homer and Hesiod seem not to have had the remotest conception; and if any thing be met with in their writings, which apparently evinces the contrary, still it is presently followed by something else, from which we may easily learn, that those are very much deceived, who interpret their magnificent phrases according to our own notions, and estimate poetical figures by the rules of prose. Take, for example, Petronius, Satyricon, cap. 122. p. 580. ed Burmanni. In this poet, Cæsar addresses Jupiter as follows:

Jupiter omnipotens, et tu Saturnia tellus,
Armis læta meis.

Now if these words be considered in themselves and the term *omnipotens* be understood in the stricter and Christian sense, the poet will appear to have entertained a sublime conception of God, and to have placed a being of infinite power over the nature of things. But on proceeding with our perusal, we soon find that a very qualified meaning is to be attached to this epithet, and that the poet's language is more exalted than his opinions. For this omnipotent Jupiter is alarmed and terrified at Pompey's triumphs, cap. 123. p. 589.

Et piratarum scopulos: modo quem ter ovantem
Jupiter horruerat.

II. Rhetoricians and philosophers I consider to be very unsafe authorities, in a dispute respecting the religion of the common people. For they are accustomed to supply their own interpretations and to measure the popular capacity by their own. Besides, what should compel us immediately to accept every thing recorded by Dio and Maximus as true? The latter indeed tells us, that the whole world agreed in the profession of one supreme God: but it still remains a question, whether in making this statement he strictly conformed to the truth, or indulged more than he ought in rhetorical exaggeration. I pass over other things tending greatly to weaken the force of such like testimonies.

[3] Lib. 1. cap. 29. p. 2923. tom. 9. opp. The utmost that can be inferred, however, from this passage is, that the Romans regarded the Hammon of the Egyptians and the Jupiter of the Greeks as one and the same God, but it does not prove, that these were not in reality two distinct deities. The Romans were accustomed to designate the principal god of other nations by the name of Jupiter. But this very difference in form between Hammon and Jupiter might of itself have convinced them, that it was wrong to confound the two together as one Deity.

Baal (which is the same with Bel, and signifies Lord) was first amongst the Phœnicians also a name for the supreme God, the Creator of heaven and earth, sometimes called Beel samen, "The Lord of heaven." As likewise that Molech, which signifies "king," was, amongst the Ammonites, "the king of their gods;" and that Marnas, the chief god of the Gazites, who were Philistines, and signifying "the Lord of men," was that from whence the Cretians derived their Jupiter, called "the Father of gods and men."[4]

Origen[5] indeed contended, that it was not lawful for Christians to call the supreme God by any of those pagan names, and probably for these reasons, because those names were then frequently bestowed upon idols, and because they were contaminated and defiled by absurd and impure fables. Nevertheless, that learned father does acknowledge the Pagans to have meant τὸν θεὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν, "the God over all," by those several names: which yet Lactantius Firmianus would by no means allow of as to the Roman Jupiter, worshipped in the capitol, he endeavouring to confute it after this manner: Vana est persuasio eorum qui nomen Jovis summo Deo tribuunt. Solent enim quidam errores suos hac excusatione defendere; qui convicti de uno Deo, cum id negare non possunt, ipsum colere affirmant, verum hoc sibi placere, ut Jupiter nominetur, quo quid absurdius? Jupiter enim sine contubernio conjugis filiæque coli non solet. Unde, quid sit, apparet, nec fas est id nomen eo transferri, ubi nec Minerva est ulla nec Juno,* "It is a vain persuasion of those, who would give the name of Jupiter to the supreme God. For some are wont thus to excuse their errors, when they have been convinced of one God, so as that they could not contradict it, by saying, that themselves worshipped him, he being called by them Jupiter: than which, what can be more absurd? since Jupiter is not worshipped without the partnership of his wife and daughter. From whence it plainly appears what this Jupiter is, and that the name ought not to be transferred thither, where there is neither any Minerva, nor Juno." The ground of which

[4] Having already treated sufficiently of all these names of God, and having at the same time pointed out the passages of the several authors here quoted, I have now nothing farther to offer. Indeed, I should readily admit, that the several nations had some peculiar name for the deity which they respectively held to be supreme. But this by no means induces me to suppose, that they all agreed in the belief of one God, from whom all the other deities had derived their power and who was the object of universal worship. For the history of the gods, to whom these names were applied, clearly shows, that they were popular and ancestral gods, and, moreover, that they were men exalted to heaven by the suffrages of the people; not to mention, that the Greeks as well as Romans gave the names of their own deities to those of other nations, and thereby occasioned a mighty confusion of gods. But I am unwilling to dwell here upon an argument, which I have already more than once touched upon at considerable length.

[5] Contra Celsum, lib. 1. p. 18.

* Lib. 1. cap. 11. p. 76.

argumentation of Lactantius was this,[6] because the great Capitoline temple of Jupiter had three Sacella or lesser chapels in it, all contained under one roof, Jupiter's in the middle, Minerva's on the right hand, and Juno's on the left; according to that of the poet:

Trina in Tarpeio fulgent consortia templo.

Which Juno, according to the poetic theology, is said to be the wife of Jupiter, his daughter, begotten not upon Juno, but from . Where it is plain, that there is a certain mix hical or poetical theology, together with the nat every where else there was, to make up that civil ıe Pagans. But here (according to the more r ane doctrine of the Pagans) these three Capitolin Minerva, and Juno, as well as some others, may l have been nothing else but several names and no preme Deity, according to its several attributes and manifestations; Jupiter signifying the divine power and sovereignty, as it were seated and enthroned in the heavens; Minerva, the divine wisdom and understanding; and Juno, the same deity, acting in these lower parts of the world. Unless we would rather, with Macrobius,[7] physiologize them all three, and make Minerva to be the higher heaven, Jupiter the middle ether, and Juno the lower air and earth, all animated; that is, one god, as acting differently in these three regions of the world. Which yet seems not so congruous, because it would place Minerva above Jupiter.[8]

[6] See a copious discussion of this subject by Just. Ryquius, De Capitolio, cap. 13. p. 158, &c.

[7] Saturnal. lib. 3. cap. 4. p. 391, 392.

[8] I. This very difference of opinion respecting these three deities, ought to have convinced the learned Doctor, that all such explications of the ancient religions were spurious, and invented at a later period by the more sagacious, for the mere purpose of concealing in some measure the turpitude and deformity of the public worship. We have eight or nine, if not more, opinions upon the hidden signification of these three capitoline gods; and which of them is to be preferred to the others is what no one can positively assert, who is guided by reason and not by a delusive imagination. It is clear therefore, that they are all destitute of foundation, and were concocted by men, who wished to accommodate the popular religions to the maxims of their own philosophy. But why many words? The temples, priests, ceremonies, and histories of the gods we are speaking of, at once refute every thing of the sort that has yet been put forward. In my opinion the history of ancient religions will be altogether done away with, unless we carefully distinguish them from the new interpretations of the philosophers and priests, especially those which were propounded subsequently to the Christian era. II. The learned Doctor, in his partiality for his own opinion, gives a greater latitude of meaning to Macrobius' words, than they will bear. For this author does not say, that the three names of Jupiter, Minerva, and Juno designate one God as exercising his power in different ways. III. As to his rejecting Macrobius' opinion on account of its placing Minerva above Jupiter, this I should consider of no importance, provided it were unobjectionable in other respects. For that Minerva occupied a more honourable position in the Capitol, or was on the right hand of Jupiter, while Juno held a lower place, is unquestionable. See Ryquius, De Capitolio, cap. 13. p. 158.

Nevertheless, it may justly be suspected, as G. I. Vossius[9] hath already observed, that there was yet some higher and more sacred mystery in this Capitoline trinity, aimed at; namely, a trinity of divine hypostases. For these three Roman or Capitoline gods were said to have been first brought into Italy out of Phrygia by the Trojans, but before that into Phrygia by Dardanus, out of the Samothracian island; and that within eight hundred years after the Noachian flood, if we may believe Eusebius. And as these were called by the Latins Dii Penates, which Macrobius thus interprets,[10] Dii per quos penitus spiramus, per quos habemus corpus, per quos rationem animi possidemus, that is, "the gods, by whom we live, and move, and have our being;" but Varro, in Arnobius,[1] Dii, qui sunt intrinsecus, atque in intimis penetralibus cœli, "the gods, who are in the most inward recesses of heaven:" so were they called by the Samothracians, Κάβειροι, Cabiri, that is, as Varro[2] rightly interprets the word, θεοὶ δυνατοὶ, or divi potes, "the powerful and mighty gods." Which Cabiri being plainly the Hebrew כבירים, gives just occasion to suspect that this ancient tradition of three divine hypostases (unquestionably entertained by Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato amongst the Greeks, and probably by the Egyptians and Persians) sprung originally from the Hebrews; the first of these divine hypostases, called Jove, being the fountain of the godhead; and the second of them, called by the Latins Minerva, (which, as Varro[3] interprets it, was that wherein ideæ et exempla rerum, "the ideas and first exemplars or patterns of things" were contained) fitly expressing the divine Logos; and

Gerh. J. Vossius, De Theolog. Gentili, lib. 8. cap. 12. p. 751. Men versed in these matters are very diligent in inquiring, why the Romans preferred the daughter of Jupiter before his wife and gave her a higher place, and divine I know not what recondite and mystical reasons for this custom. But to myself the question appears to admit of very easy explication. For, in the first place, this goddess was a portion, as it were, of Jupiter himself, as having been produced from his brain, and therefore more noble than Juno: secondly, she was also more powerful, because like her father she was armed with the thunder, which she could at pleasure hurl against her enemies: which power Juno lacked. Virgil says of Minerva, Æneid, lib. 1. v. 46,

Ipsa Jovis rapidum jaculata a nubibus ignem.

[9] De Theolog. Gentili, lib. 8. cap. 12. p. 750. 751.

[10] Saturnal. lib. 3. cap. 4. p. 391. But it ought to have been added, that with Macrobius these gods by whom we breathe and reason, are no other than the three regions of the air which encompasses this globe, the highest, middle, and lowest. Which opinion makes strongly against those, who employ this testimony of his in order to discover a trinity in the Dii Penates.

[1] Adv. Gentes, lib. 3. p. 155. But Varro subjoins what ought not to be overlooked: horum Deorum Penatum nec numerum nec nomina sciri, "that neither the number nor names of these household gods are known."

[2] De Ling. Latin. lib. 4. p. 66.

[3] He means no doubt the passage of Varro, preserved by St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, lib. 7. cap. 28. p. 141. tom. 7. opp. in which he tells us he has discovered that Jupiter signifies heaven, Juno the earth, and Minerva ideas.

the third Juno, called amor ac delicium Jovis,* well enough answering (as Vossius thinks) to the divine Spirit.[4]

But Lactantius hath yet another objection against the Roman

[4] I have no hesitation, however, in pronouncing this opinion of Vossius and Dr. Cudworth concerning the three Capitoline gods, Jupiter, Minerva, and Juno, to be palpably untrue; nor should I ever persuade myself to seek for traces of the divine Trinity in such matters. I shall say nothing of the history of these deities, which puts it beyond all controversy, that Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva were human beings, whom superstition had placed among the gods: but shall merely make a remark or two on the matter itself, to show the fallacy of such surmises. I. The reason, why the Romans associated these three deities together, is not very difficult to understand. That Jupiter and Juno should be associated, will surprise no one, the wife being meet society for the husband. It remains, therefore, to show, why Minerva alone of the rest of the deities was joined with these two. But to any one, who considers that Minerva was the darling offspring and the noblest portion of Jupiter, as being sprung from his brain, it will not appear strange, that she should be placed along with Juno by the side of her parent, in preference to all the other gods. For what, I ask, is there of mystery or singularity in a beloved and, properly speaking, only daughter, being assigned as a companion to her father. II. That these three may have been the images of three gods, I should admit; but how Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva can be the images of three persons in one godhead, let those make appear, who take delight in such conjectures. It was the universal belief of the ancient Greeks and Romans, that they were three separate and wholly distinct, but at the same time unequal, natures; nor is there the slightest vestige of any one's having held the same opinion respecting these deities, as Christians entertain in regard to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Wherefore, if Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva be the remnants of a Trinity, imported in some way or other from the Hebrews into Phrygia, Samothrace, Greece, and Rome, it will be reasonable to suppose, that the Jewish Trinity did not consist of three persons of equal dignity in one God, but of three unequal gods. III. What is more difficult of digestion than this, that the Son and Holy Spirit were represented by the statues of females, the wife and daughter of Jupiter? What could have induced any man in his senses to change the Son of God into the daughter, and the Holy Spirit into the wife of God? Did the stupidest Sabine ever dream of any thing half so absurd? I know what learned men will say: Minerva is the goddess of wisdom; but the Son of God is called the Word of God; Juno was the love and delight of Jupiter, and the Cabalists call the Holy Spirit, Love; therefore, the former might well be represented as the goddess of wisdom, and the latter as the wife of the same. But unless Vossius and some others, whose worth I hold in high respect, had said these things, I should exclaim:

O rem ridiculam, Cato, et jocosam!

This I will frankly say: If it be fair to go on reasoning in this manner, I shall soon be able to find an image of the divine Trinity in the lower regions in Pluto and Proserpine. For what should hinder us from associating Proserpine's mother, Ceres, with the wife and husband? And why, if there be any weight in such arguments, may I not assert, that the three celebrated Indian deities, Brama, Isuren, and Wistnu, exhibit most evident traces of an ancient opinion respecting three persons in one God? IV. But learned men urge: "Juno, Jupiter, and Minerva are Dii Penates: but the Dii Penates are the gods, by whom we breathe and live: also these deities are the Cabiri, which word Cabiri is derived from the Hebrew כביר, 'mighty:' therefore, these gods were imported into the other nations from the Hebrews; and who will affirm, that false deities could come from the Hebrews?" The different clauses here are so many arguments, that those who possess the faculty of reason do not always exercise it as they ought. In the first place, as regards the Dii Penates, the whole history of these gods is full of so many doubts and difficulties, that at this day nothing certain can be decided upon respecting them. It will be sufficient to read, what Arnobius, Adv. Gentes, lib. 3. p. 155. has observed concerning this class of gods. But granting, that these were the Dii Penates, and admitting also the description given of these Dii Penates by Macrobius, and by Varro in Arnobius, still it will be clear from

* De Theol. Gen. lib. 8. cap. 12.

Jupiters* being the supreme God: Quid? quod hujus nominis proprietas non divinam vim sed humanam exprimit? Jovem enim Junonemque à Juvando esse dictos, Cicero interpretatur. Et Jupiter quasi Juvans pater dicitur. Quod nomen in Deum minimè convenit, quia juvare hominis est, &c. Nemo sic Deum precatur, ut se adjuvet, sed ut servet, &c. Ergo non imperitus modo, sed etiam impius est, qui nomine Jovis virtutem summæ potestatis imminuit. "What if we add, that the propriety of this word Jupiter does not express a divine, but only a human force? Cicero deriving both Jove and Juno alike à juvando, that is, from helping: for Juvans Pater, or a helping father, is not a good description of God; forasmuch as it properly belongeth to men to help. Neither doth any one pray to God to help him only, but to save him. Nor is a father said to help his son, whom he was the begetter of, &c. Wherefore he is not only

what we have remarked a little above, on the passages of Macrobius and Arnobius, that the idea of three persons in one god is quite out of the question, when mention is made of the Dii Penates. In short, what sort of argumentation is this? "The Dii Penates are Jupiter, Juno, Minerva; but the Dii Penates are the gods, by whom we breathe and live: therefore, Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva present the image of the most holy Trinity." Nor is more aid afforded us by the Dii Cabiri, towards determining this question. In the first place, the disputes of those who treat of the Cabiri are interminable. For it is uncertain, whether there were three, or two, or four, or more gods, so designated by antiquity; and it is still more uncertain, what sort of gods these were. See Ger. J. Vossius, De Idololatria, lib. 2. cap. 57. p. 228. and Tob. Guthberlethus, De Mysteriis Deor. Cabirorum, cap. 3. and 4. p. 19. Some suppose Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva to be alone the Cabiri. But those are supported by the testimonies of a much greater number of authors, who make them either to be two only, Castor and Pollux, or four, Ceres, Proserpine, Pluto, and Mercury. See Adr. Reland's Diss. de Diis Cabiris, sect. 2. in Diss. Select. tom. 1. p. 194. Nor is the contention less about the meaning of the word Cabiri. Marsham, Vossius, Bochart, and many others, approve of the derivation adopted by Dr. Cudworth; but others not inferior in ability or erudition, reject it. See Guthberlethus, De Mysteriis Deor. Cabir. cap. 1. and Raph. Fabrettus, Comm. ad Columnam Trajani. cap. 4. p. 80. &c. And not long ago Reland started forth and attempted to prove by no contemptible arguments, that this name comes from the Hebrew word חבר, "he joined together, associated," and that the Cabiri signify the *associated gods*. But if we assent to those, who suppose them to be the כבירים, or, the *powerful gods*, and derive the word from the noun כביר, will it be evident even then, that the Cabiri were the one triune God worshipped by the Hebrews? I think not. Far different is the view taken by Sam. Bochart, who, Canaan. lib. 1. cap. 12. p. 394. relying upon this very etymology, argues most ingeniously, that the gods called Cabiri, were worshipped by the ancient Phœnicians. And certainly, inasmuch as the languages of the Phœnicians, Hebrews, and other Eastern nations, were kindred languages, although we prove a certain name to be derived from a Hebrew noun, it does not necessarily follow, that the thing designated by that name is also to be sought for among the Hebrews alone. For if we were to suppose, that whatever is allied in name to a Hebrew word is also of Hebrew origin, we should have to refer many things to the Hebrews, which are known to have originated in other nations, and never to have been adopted by the Hebrews. I might add, that there is nothing more worthless and uncertain, than what are called etymological arguments, and also, that it is impossible to understand, why, if the Hebrews called the triune God כבירים, there should be no trace of this name in their sacred writings. But what need of many words? Any one who pays even the slightest attention to the mysteries and worship of the gods, called Cabiri, will at once be convinced, that light and darkness, day and night, are not more widely different from each other, than the trinity of divine hypostases and those counterfeit deities worshipped by ancient nations.

* P. 63.

unskilful, but impious also, who, by the name of Jove or Jupiter, diminishes the power of the supreme God." But as this of Lactantius seems otherwise weak enough; so is the foundation of it absolutely ruinous, the true etymon of Jupiter (though Cicero knew not so much) being without peradventure, not Juvans Pater, but Jovis Pater, "Jove, the father of gods and men;" which Jove is the very Hebrew Tetragrammaton (however these Romans came by it) only altered by a Latin termination. Wherefore, as there [illegible] iety at all in calling the supreme God Jove o[r] [illegible]at very name which God himself chose to be c[alled] [illegible]r is there any reason why the Latins should no[t] [illegible]e supreme God thereby, as the Greeks did un[to] [illegible]eus, which will be proved afterwards from irref[ragable] [illegible]s.

[a] To avoid unnecessary p[rolixity] [illegible]r what is here put forward by the learned Doctor on the name [illegible]wever, I doubt not, will consider Cicero's derivation of this wo[rd] [illegible]le as the one preferred by himself, although he is following in the [illegible] [illegible]e highest eminence. I am free to confess also, that Lactantius' second reason for denying, that God can be designated by the name of Jupiter, is weak and futile. As regards the subject itself, however, I cannot but agree with Origen and Lactantius, in considering it to be altogether improper to address the supreme God by the names of the false deities worshipped by ancient nations; and certainly, there seems to me to be great force in the argument adduced by them in support of this opinion. The names of Jupiter, Hammon, Belus, Sabazius, were proper to certain gods, respecting whose origin and actions the most absurd stories were in circulation; and therefore, their names could not be repeated without bringing to the recollection of most of the auditors the various things, which the multitude and priests associated with these names. He who heard Jupiter spoken of would at the same time be reminded of his parents, Rhea and Saturn, of his brothers, his wife, his debauches and adulteries. Wherefore, if Christians had addressed their supreme God by the same name, they would have led all men, with the exception of some few of the more intelligent, to suppose, that the Deity of the Christians was of the same nature and consequently polluted with the same crimes as the Jupiter of the Greeks and Romans. And how great an injury such an opinion would have brought upon the human race must be obvious to every one. They certainly would have given a far different meaning to the name Jupiter from the Greeks and Romans; but who is not aware, that the people are slow in attaching new ideas to old words, and are wont to decide upon the signification of names not agreeably to the sense and wish of philosophers, but according to custom and the received usage of language? Hence, whatever the disciples of our Saviour might have said or thought, the vulgar notion of the word Jupiter would have always been present to the minds of the multitude. But supposing even, that this error could have been obviated, still it would have been derogatory to the majesty of the supreme Being to apply to him names, which had for ages been associated with the foulest and most atrocious crimes. Besides, those who required the Christians to concede, that it was a matter of indifference by what name the supreme Deity was addressed, whether by that of Jupiter, Belus, Hammon, or any other, were a few philosophers, Celsus, Hierocles, and one or two more, who neither agreed with the people in their sentiments on religion, nor had any other object than the overthrow and destruction of Christianity. Hence, they endeavoured above all things to prove, that whatever was excellent and rational in the precepts of the Christians had already been recognized by the generality of nations, long before the appearance of this sect in Palestine. But of these precepts, whose excellence and truth they were utterly unable to deny, the doctrine of one God was the most prominent. Wherefore, they contended, that there was no nation prior to the time of Christ, to which this doctrine was unknown, and that the names of the principal deities of the respective nations were all appellations of one supreme God; consequently, that the people had no occasion to resort to Christians for a knowledge

Especially if we consider that the Roman vulgar commonly bestowed these two epithets upon that Capitoline Jupiter (that is, not the senseless statue, but that God, who was there worshipped in a material statue) of Optimus and Maximus, the best and the greatest; they thereby signifying him to be a being infinitely good and powerful. Thus Cicero, in his De Nat. Deorum,[6] Jupiter à poetis dicitur divum atque hominum pater, à majoribus autem nostris optimus maximus, "That same Jupiter, who is by the poets styled the father of gods and men, is by our ancestors called the best, the greatest." And in his Orat. pro Roscio, Jupiter optimus maximus, cujus nutu et arbitrio cœlum, terra, mariaque reguntur, "Jupiter the best, the greatest, by whose beck and command, the heaven, the earth, and the seas are governed." As also the junior Pliny, in his panegyric oration, Parens hominum deorumque optimi prius, deinde maximi nomine colitur, "The father of men and gods is worshipped under the name, first of the best, and then of the greatest." Moreover, Servius Honoratus informs us, that the Pontifices in their public sacrifices were wont to address themselves to Jupiter in this form of words: Omnipotens Jupiter, seu quo alio nomine appellari volueris, "Omnipotent Jupiter, or by what other name soever thou pleasest to be called." From whence it is plain that the Romans, under the name of Jupiter, worshipped the omnipotent God. And, according to Seneca, the ancient Hetrurians, who are by him distinguished from philosophers, as a kind of illiterate superstitious persons (in these words: Hæc adhuc Etruscis et philosophis communia sunt, in illo dissentiunt*) had this very same notion answering to the word Jupiter, namely, of the supreme monarch of the universe. For first, he sets down their tradition concerning thunderbolts in this manner: Fulmina dicunt à Jove mitti, et tres illi manubias dant. Prima (ut aiunt) monet et placata est, et ipsius consilio Jovis mittitur. Secundam quidem mittit Jupiter, sed ex consilii sententiâ; duodecim enim deos advocat, &c. Tertiam idem Jupiter mittit, sed adhibitis in consilium diis, quos superiores et involutos vocant, quæ vastat, &c. "The Hetrurians say, that the thunderbolts are sent from Jupiter, and that there are three kinds of them; the first gentle and monitory, and sent by Jupiter alone; the second sent by Jupiter, but not without the counsel

of this God, or to forsake the religion of their forefathers. Such being the case, I consider the Christians to have acted most wisely in hesitating here about words. For if they had admitted that Pappæus, Jupiter, Belus, Hammon, and an infinity of other names, were designations of one and the same supreme God, and that it was of no importance by which of these names he was addressed, they must also have granted, that the popular religions were much less absurd, than they the Christians had represented them, and that after all the world stood in no great need of a new teacher and corrector of ancient superstitions.

[6] De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 25. p. 2992. tom. 9. opp. The passage which follows occurs Orat. pro Roscio. cap. 45. p. 948. tom 3. opp.

* Nat. Quæs. 1. cap. 41. [P. 536. tom. 1. opp.]

and consent of the twelve gods, which thunderbolt doth some good, but not without harm also; the third sent by Jupiter likewise, but not before he hath called a council of all the superior gods: and this utterly wastes and destroys both private and public states." And then does he make a commentary upon this old Hetrurian doctrine, that it was not to be taken literally, but only so as to impress an awe upon men, and to signify that Jupiter himself intended nothing but good, he inflicting evil not alone, but in partne[illegible]s, and when the necessity of the case required. [illegible]st place, Ne hoc quidem crediderunt (Etrusci), [illegible] in Capitolio et in cæteris ædibus colimus, mitt[illegible]ulmina; sed eundem, quem nos, Jovem intelligu[illegible]toremque universi, animum ac spiritum, mundar[illegible]dominum et artificem, cui nomen omne conven[illegible]d these Hetrurians believe, that such a Jupiter[illegible] in the Capitol and in the other temples, did fl[illegible]s with his own hands, but they understood the very same Jupiter, that we now do, the keeper and governor of the universe, the mind and spirit of the whole, the lord and artificer of this mundane fabric, to whom every name belongeth." And lastly, that the vulgar Romans afterwards, about the beginning of Christianity, had the same notion of Jupiter as the supreme God, evidently appears from what Tertullian hath recorded in his book Ad Scapulam, that when Marcus Aurelius, in his German expedition, by the prayers of the Christian soldiers made to God, had obtained refreshing showers from heaven in a great drought; Tunc populus adclamans JOVI DEO DEORUM, QUI SOLUS POTENS EST, in Jovis nomine Deo nostro testimonium reddidit, "That then the people with one consent crying out, thanks be to JUPITER THE GOD OF GODS, WHO ALONE IS POWERFUL, did thereby in the name of Jove or Jupiter, give testimony to our God." Where, by the way, we see also, that Tertullian was not so nice as Lactantius, but did freely acknowledge the Pagans by their Jupiter to have meant the true God.[7]

That some of the Romans possessed sufficient intelligence to reject the fables and absurd legends of the priests and to worship under the name of Jupiter the supreme God, who governs all things, I am by no means disposed to call into question; but I cannot prevail upon myself to believe, that the Romans generally, people and philosophers, unlearned and learned, were imbued with a like notion of Jupiter. The Roman people at least, as is shown by innumerable passages of ancient authors and evident, moreover, from the very worship itself, believed Jupiter Capitolinus to be the son of Saturn, the husband of Juno, and father of Minerva, who ruled in heaven and from thence hurled his thunderbolts amongst men. Nor has the learned Doctor here brought forward any thing, which will induce me to abandon this opinion. I. The title Optimus Maximus, "best and greatest," proves nothing. For, as every one is aware, the range of meaning in such words is to be contracted or amplified according to the nature of the circumstances under which they are applied. Hence, as the Romans every where relate things of their Jupiter Optimus Maximus, which are neither indicative of great goodness nor of unlimited power, and on the contrary record many proofs *of exceeding weakness*, it is evident, that but a very slight and circumscribed sense is to

As nothing is more frequent with pagan writers, than to speak of God singularly, they signifying thereby the one supreme Deity, so that the same was very familiar with the vulgar Pagans also, in their ordinary discourse and common speech, hath been recorded by divers of the fathers. Tertullian[8] in his book De Testimonio Animæ, and his Apologet. instanceth in several of these forms of speech then vulgarly used by the Pagans; as "Deus videt," "Deo commendo," "Deus reddet," "Deus inter nos judicabit," "Quod Deus vult," "Si Deus voluerit," "Quod Deus dederit," "Si Deus dederit," and the like. Thus also Minutius Felix:[9] Cum ad cœlum manus tendunt, nihil aliud quâm Deum dicunt, et magnus est, et Deus verus est, &c. vulgi iste naturalis sermo, an Christiani confitentis oratio? "When they stretch out their hands to heaven, they

be attached to these names. II. That Jupiter was styled "Omnipotent" by the Romans, is unquestionable. But I have already shown from Petronius, that this epithet, when applied to Jupiter, was used in a much more qualified sense than with us at the present day. III. Seneca refers the conceits of the Hetrurians to the keeper and governor of the universe. But who will say that he is guilty of no error in this exposition? The Hetrurians themselves did not profess this to be their opinion, but Seneca merely suspects or imagines, that they entertained it. And who can put faith in a philosopher, who explains the religion of a people according to the laws of his own discipline? IV. As little weight is there in the testimony of Tertullian. In the first place he nowher estates these to be the prayers of the Christian soldiers, but of the Roman people, praising God on being relieved from a great drought. This is proved by the words themselves, which I shall quote: Quomodo non geniculationibus et jejunationibus nostris etiam siccitates depulsæ sunt? Tunc populus acclamans, &c. "How are not even droughts put an end to by our kneelings and fastings? Then the people crying aloud, &c." But, as Tertullian had made mention a little before of a shower having been obtained by the prayers of the Christians in the German expedition, the learned Doctor therefore supposed these words to refer to that rain. Secondly, Tertullian does not affirm, that the Roman Jupiter is the same as the god worshipped by the Christians. The meaning of what he says is evidently this: "The Roman people, on being relieved from drought, praise Jupiter: but as this blessing was obtained by the prayers of Christians, therefore, these praises properly belong to the God of the Christians. The people sing the praises of Jupiter, but while they sing the praises of that God, from whom this boon was received, they in reality sing the praises of the God of the Christians, to whom the whole is owing." Whence it is at the same time apparent, that Tertullian did not approve of those, who called the supreme God Jupiter, and that his sentiments in that respect were not different from those of Origen and Lactantius. On the contrary, in his Apologeticus and other books, he sneers at the Roman Jupiter in such a manner, that it is not at all likely he would have patiently suffered any one to designate the supreme Being by the name of so obscene and flagitious a deity. In his Apologet. cap. 10. p. 114. we have the following of Jupiter: Etiam Jovem ostendemus tam hominem, quam ex homine, et deinceps totum generis ipsius examen tam mortale, quam seminis sui par, "We shall show Jupiter to be a man, and sprung from a man, and also that the whole tribe of his descendants are mortal, and like their race." How then can he suppose the supreme God to be meant by Jupiter, who broadly asserts Jupiter to be a wretched mortal, and afterwards enters into a review of all his crimes? I add another passage, in which he distinctly denies, that the Christians worshipped the god of the Romans, Apolog. cap. 24. p. 241. 242. Lædimus Romanos, quia non Romanorum Deum colimus, "We offend the Romans, because we do not worship the god of the Romans."

[8] See his Apologet. cap. 17. p. 175. and De Testimonio Animæ, cap. 2. p. 35. opp. ed. Venetæ. Add also his De Resurrectione Carnis, cap. 3. p. 205.

[9] In Octavio, cap. 18. p. 171. ed. Gronovii.

mention only God; and these forms of speech, He is great, and God is true, and, If God grant (which are the natural language of the vulgar), are they not a plain confession of Christianity?" And lastly Lactantius:[10] Cum jurant, et cum optant, et cum gratias agunt, non deos multos, sed Deum nominant; adeò ipsa veritas, cogente natura, etiam ab invitis pectoribus erumpit, "When they swear, and when they wish, and when they give thanks, they name not many gods, but God only; the truth, by [illegible] nature, thus breaking forth from them, whether [illegible]." And again: Ad Deum confugiunt, à Deo p[illegible] Deus ut subveniat oratur. Et si quis ad extrem[illegible] necessitatem redactus, victum precibus exposci[illegible] obtestatur, et per ejus divinum atque unicum [illegible] sibi misericordiam quærit, "They fly to God, [illegible] of God, they pray that God would help them; a[illegible] ne is reduced to extremest necessity, he begs for [illegible] by his divine power alone implores the mercy [illegible] ich same thing is fully confirmed also by Proclus upon Plato's Timæus; where he observes that the one supreme God was more universally believed throughout the world in all ages, than the many inferior gods:* Τάχα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἂν εἴποις, ὅτι δὴ αἱ ψυχαὶ τῶν ἑαυταῖς προσεχεστέρων ἧττον ἐπιλανθάνονται, τῶν δὲ ὑπερτέρων ἀρχῶν μᾶλλον μνημονεύουσι. Δρῶσι γὰρ μᾶλλον εἰς αὐτοὺς δι' ὑπεροχὴν δυνάμεως, καὶ δοκοῦσιν αὐταῖς παρεῖναι δι' ἐνέργειαν· ὃ δὴ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὄψιν γίγνεται τὴν ἡμετέραν· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ἐν γῇ κειμένων οὐχ ὁρῶντες, ὁμῶς αὐτὴν ὁρᾷν δοκῶμεν τὴν ἁπλανῆ, καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀστέρας, διότι καταλάμπουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν ὄψιν τῷ ἑαυτῶν φωτί. Μᾶλλον οὖν καὶ τὸ ὅμμα τῆς ψυχῆς λῆθην ἴσχει καὶ ἀορασίαν τῶν προσεχεστέρων, ἢ τῶν ἀνωτέρων καὶ θειοτέρων ἀρχῶν· οὕτω τὴν πρωτίστην ἀρχὴν πᾶσαι θρησκεῖαι καὶ αἱρέσεις συγχωροῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ θεὸν πάντες ἄνθρωποι ἐπικαλοῦσι βοηθόν· θεοὺς δὲ

[10] Institut. Divin. lib. 2. cap. 1. p. 159. To these passages may be added a clear evidence of the same from Armobius, Adv. Gentes, lib. 2. p. 54. Da, says he, verum judicium: et hæc omnia circumspiciens, quæ videmus, magis, an sint Dii ceteri, quam in Deo cunctabitur, quem esse, omnes naturaliter scimus: sive quum exclamamus: O Deus! sive quum illum testem Deum constituimus improborum, et quasi nos cernat, faciem sublevamus ad cœlum, "Give a true judgment: and he, who looks round upon all that we see, will doubt rather, whether the other gods, exist than hesitate with respect to God, whose existence we all naturally recognize, when for example we exclaim, O God! or appeal to this God as a witness against the wicked, and, as conscious that he beholds us, lift up our eyes to heaven." The argument itself, however, which is drawn from these phrases of the vulgar, seems to me to have very little weight in it. For it is notorious, that in ordinary discourse those, who hold the existence of many natures of the same class and order, sometimes mention only one, although meaning several. Christians, though they believe that pious men are committed by God to the protection of innumerable angels, nevertheless, when speaking thereof, frequently introduce but one angel; and yet it would be wrong to infer, that those, who express themselves in this manner, acknowledge the existence of no more than one.

* P. 286.

εἶναι μετ' αὐτὴν, καὶ πρόνοιαν ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ παντὶ, οὐ πᾶσαι πιστεύουσι· ἐναργέστερον γὰρ αὐταῖς καταφαίνεται τὸ ἓν τοῦ πλήθους, "And perhaps you may affirm, that souls do sooner lose their knowledge of those things which are lower and nearer to them, but retain a stronger remembrance of those higher principles; because these do act more vigorously upon them, by reason of the transcendency of their power, and by their energy seem to be present with them. And the same thing happens as to our bodily sight; for though there be many things here upon earth which none of us see, yet every one observes that highest sphere, and takes notice of the fixed stars in it, because these strongly radiate with their light upon our eyes. In like manner does the eye of our soul sooner lose the sight and remembrance of the lower than of the higher and diviner principles. And thus all religions and sects acknowledge that one highest principle of all, and men every where call upon God for their helper; but that there are gods, after and below that highest principle, and that there is a certain providence descending down from these upon the universe, all sects do not believe; the reason whereof is, because the one or unity appears more clearly and plainly to them, than the many or a multitude."

Moreover, we learn from Arrianus' Epictetus, that that very form of prayer, which hath been now so long in use in the Christian church, Kyrie Eleeson, "Lord have mercy upon us," was anciently part of the Pagans' litany to the supreme God, either amongst the Greeks, or the Latins, or both: Τὸν θεὸν ἐπικαλούμενοι, (saith Epictetus[a]) δεόμεθα αὐτοῦ, Κύριε ἐλέησον, "Invoking God, we pray to him after this manner, Lord have mercy upon us." Now this Epictetus lived in the times of Adrian the emperor; and that this passage of his is to be understood of Pagans, and not of Christians, is undeniably manifest from the context, he there speaking of those, who used auguria, or divination by birds. Moreover, in the writings of the Greekish Pagans, the supreme God is often called Κύριος, or "Lord." For, not to urge that passage of the Τέλειος Λόγος, or "Asclepian Dialogue," cited by Lactantius,[1] where we read of Ὁ Κύριος καὶ πάντων ποιητὴς, "The Lord and Maker of all," Menander in Justin Martyr,[2] styleth the supreme God: Τὸν ὕπατα πάντων Κύριον γενικώτατον, "The most universal Lord of all." And Osiris in Plutarch is called Ἁπάντων Κύριος, "The Lord of all things." And this is also done absolutely, and without any adjection, and that not only by the LXX. and Christians, but also by pagan writers. Thus in Plutarch's De Iside et Osiride, we read of Τοῦ πρώτου, καὶ ΚΥΡΙΟΥ, καὶ νοητοῦ γνῶ-

[a] Lib. 2. cap. 7. [P. 186.]

[1] Institut. Divinar. lib. 2. cap. 6. p. 419.

[2] De Monarchia Dei, p. 108. Compare Le Clerc's Menandri et Philemonis Reliquiæ, p. 49.

σις, "The knowledge of the first Intelligible, and the Lord," that is, of the supreme God. And Oromasdes is called ὁ Κύριος, "the Lord," in Plutarch's Life of Alexander; as Νοῦς, also Κύριος, by Aristotle,* that is, "The supreme ruler over all." Thus likewise Plato in his sixth epistle Ad Hermiam, &c. styles his first divine hypostasis, or the absolutely supreme Deity: Τοῦ ἡγεμόνος καὶ αἰτίου πατέρα Κύριον, "The father of the prince and cause of the world (that is, of the eternal Intellect), the LORD." Again, Jamblichus† writeth thus of the supreme God: Δεῖν ὁμολογεῖται παρὰ τοῦ κυρίου ἀγαθὸν ζητεῖν, "It is confessed, that every good thing ought to be asked of the Lord," that is, the supreme God; which words are afterwards repeated in him also, p. 129, but depraved in the printed copy thus:[3] Δεῖν δὲ ὁμολογεῖν περὶ τοῦ κυρίου τ' ἀγαθὸν ἐστι. Lastly, Clemens Alexandrinus[4] tells us, that the supreme God was called not by one only name, but by divers diversely, namely: Ἦτοι Ἕν, ἢ τ' Ἀγαθὸν, ἢ Νοῦν, ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ Ὄν, ἢ Πατέρα, ἢ Θεὸν, ἢ Δημιουργὸν, ἢ Κύριον, "Either the One, or the Good, or Mind, or the very Ens, or the Father, or the Demiurgos, or the Lord." Wherefore, we conclude, that this Kyrie Eleeson, or Domine Miserere, in Arrianus, was a pagan litany or supplication to the supreme God. Though from Mauritius the emperor's Stratagemata it appears, that in his time a Kyrie Eleeson was wont to be sung also by the Christian armies before battle.‡[5]

* De An. lib. 1. cap. 7. [P. 16. tom. 2. opp.]

† Vit. Pyth. p. 89. [Cap 18. p. 72. ed. Kusteri.]

[3] This has been noticed by Lud. Kuster, who, in his edition of Jamblichus, cap. 28. p. 115. exhibits the passage emended according to the view of Dr. Cudworth.

[4] Stromat. lib. 5. p. 695.

‡ Rigalt. Gloss.

[5] Dr. Cudworth's opinion respecting this well-known form of prayer of the Christians: Κύριε ἐλέησον! is the same as the one adopted by Cardinal J. Bona, Rerum Liturgic. lib. 2. cap. 4. p. 316. and Divinæ Psalmod. cap. 14. sect. 4. p. 485. and a few others of inferior authority; some of whom have gone so far as to affirm, that this prayer among many other things was borrowed by the Christians from the Pagans. To confess the truth, however, I should hardly be induced to class this among the ordinary prayers, which either the Greeks or Romans addressed to their deities in the temples and public worship. For it is very uncertain, whether Arrian or Epictetus composed this prayer himself and put it into the mouths of the men he is rebuking, or took it from the daily usage and habits of the people. In this passage Epictetus censures those persons, who were accustomed to approach God with fear and trembling, not in order to put themselves under the protection of divine providence, but to sue for deliverance from some pressing evil: Νῦν δὲ τρέμοντες τὸ ὀρνιθάριον κρατοῦμεν, καὶ τὸν θεὸν ἐπικαλούμενοι δεόμεθα αὐτοῦ· Κύριε ἐλέησον! ἐπίτρεψόν μοι ἐξελθεῖν, "But now trembling we betake ourselves to augury, and invoking God we pray to him, Lord have mercy upon us! Grant that I may escape!" As Epictetus evidently supplied the words: ἐπίτρεψόν μοι ἐξελθεῖν, out of his own head, and did not borrow them from the commonly received forms of prayer, why may he not have himself been the author of the rest of the words in question? But granting that he had at any time heard persons pray in this manner, which I do not deny to be possible, I cannot see, that a prayer made use of by one or two individuals is necessarily to be received as a part of the ordinary litany of the Pagans. But the idea entertained by ome, that the Christians in using this form merely followed the example of the Pagans, is altogether absurd. For setting aside, that so short and simple a prayer might natu-

And that the most sottishly superstitious and idolatrous of all the Pagans, and the worshippers of never so many gods amongst them, did notwithstanding generally acknowledge one supreme Deity over them all, one universal Numen, is positively affirmed, and fully attested by Aurelius Prudentius, in his Apotheosis,* in these words:

> Ecquis in Idolio recubans inter sacra mille,
> Ridiculosque deos venerans, sale, cespite, thure,
> Non putat esse Deum summum, et super omnia solum?
> Quamvis Saturnis, Junonibus, et Cytheræis,
> Portentisque aliis, fumantes consecret aras;
> Attamen in cœlum quoties suspexit, in uno
> Constituit jus omne Deo, cui serviat ingens
> Virtutum ratio, variis instructa ministris.

We are not ignorant, that Plato in his Cratylus,[6] where he undertakes to give the etymologies of words, and amongst the rest of the word θεοί, writeth in this manner, concerning the first and most ancient inhabitants of Greece: "That they seemed

rally suggest itself to men oppressed by any calamity, it is still a question, supposing any traces of imitation to exist, which of the two copied the other, the Christians or Pagans. The latter, I am certain, borrowed at least as many customs, sayings, and doctrines from the Christians, as the Christians did from them, nay even more; as I have shown by numerous examples in a specific dissertation published not long ago. But I know not what infatuation has come upon learned men, who no sooner observe any points of resemblance between the Christian and pagan observances, than they immediately cry out, that the Christians derived every thing from the impure sources of other nations: as if they on the other hand had had nothing, which could excite emulation in the pagan priests. II. But let us reserve these matters, important as they are, for a more convenient opportunity, and add a few remarks on the word κύριος. Dr. Cudworth considers these prayers to pertain to the supreme God and in proof cites some passages of the ancients, in which the almighty Architect of all things is called simply and absolutely Κύριος. But those who possess any knowledge of ancient matters cannot but be aware, that the names κύριος and δεσπότης with the Greeks, and *dominus* with the Romans, were not proper to the one supreme God, but common to all the gods. The word δεσπότης I pass over for the present; on which consult Ez. Spanheim, Preuves des Remarques sur les Cesars de Julien, p. 39. But that κύριος and *dominus* could be used simply to designate any god whatever, is proved in the case of the Roman emperors, who in order to establish their own claims to divinity, not only called themselves κύριοι and *domini* on their coins, but encouraged the people to address them by the same appellations. See Ez. Spanheim, De Usu et Præstantia Numismat. diss. 8. tom. 1. p. 758. and Anton. Borremansius, Vesper. Gorinchemenses, cap. 1. p. 3. &c. And this meaning of the words κύριος and *dominus* was not unknown to the Christians; whom on that account neither threats nor promises could induce to apply them to the emperors. Herodes the governor of Irene and Nicetes thus address Polycarp the bishop of Smyrna, in Eusebius, Histor. Eccles. lib. 4. cap. 15. p. 131: Τί κακόν ἐστιν, εἰπεῖν ΚΥΡΙΕ Καῖσαρ; "What harm is there in saying *Lord* Cæsar?" He however stedfastly refuses: Οὐ μέλλω πράττειν, ὃ συμβουλεύεταί μοι, "I will never do what you advise me." Tertullian, Apologet. cap. 34. p. 289. Dicam plane imperatorem Dominum, sed more communi; sed quando non cogor, ut *Dominum Dei vice* dicam, "I will say plainly the Lord the emperor, but after the common fashion, and when I am not compelled to say *the Lord, the vicegerent of God.* Thus much I have thought proper to remark, lest those who find the word κύριος employed in reference to God in the monuments of the ancients, should immediately think of the supreme God, and give them credit for wiser notions on the subject of the Deity than they really entertained.

* Verse 254. P 263. opp.

to him, like as other Barbarians at that time, to have acknowledged no other gods than such as were visible and sensible, as the sun and the moon, and the earth, and the stars, and the heaven. Which they perceiving to run round perpetually, therefore called them θεοὺς, from θέω, that signifies to run. But that when afterward they took notice of other invisible gods also, they bestowed the same name of θεοὶ upon them likewise." Which passage of Plato's Eusebius somewhere[7] would make use of, to prove, that the Pagans universally acknowledged no other gods but corporeal and inanimate; plainly contrary to that philosopher's meaning, who as he nowhere affirms, that any nation ever was so barbarous as to worship senseless and inanimate bodies, as such, for gods, but the contrary; so doth he there distinguish from those first inhabitants of Greece, and other Barbarians, the afterward civilized Greeks, who took notice of invisible gods also. However, if this of Plato should be true, that some of the ancient Pagans worshipped none but visible and sensible gods (they taking no notice of any incorporeal beings); yet does it not therefore follow, that those Pagans had no notion at all amongst them of one supreme and universal Numen. The contrary thereunto being manifest, that some of those Corporealists looked upon the whole heaven and ether animated as the highest God, according to that of Euripides cited by Cicero:*

> Vides sublime fusum, immoderatum æthera,
> Qui tenero terram circumvectu amplectitur;
> Hunc summum habeto divum, hunc perhibeto Jovem.

As also that others of them conceived, that subtile fiery substance, which permeates and pervades the whole world (supposed to be intellectual) to be the supreme Deity, which governs all; this opinion having been entertained by philosophers also, as namely the Heraclitics and Stoics. And lastly, since Macrobius,[8] in the person of Vettius Prætextatus, refers so many of the pagan gods to the sun, this renders it not improbable, but that some of these Pagans might adore the animated sun, as the sovereign Numen, and thus perhaps invoke him in that form of prayer there mentioned:[9] Ἥλιε παντοκράτωρ, κόσμου πνεῦμα, "O omnipotent sun, the mind and spirit of the whole world," &c. And even Cleanthes himself, that learned Stoic and devout religionist, is suspected by some to have been of this persuasion.

Nevertheless, we think it opportune here to observe, that it was not Macrobius' design, in those his Saturnalia, to defend

[7] Præpar. Evangel. lib. 1. cap. 9. p. 29.
* De Nat. Deor. p. 223. [Lib. 2. cap. 25. p. 2993.]
[8] Saturnal. lib. 1. cap. 17. &c. p. 270. &c. [9] Ibid. lib. 1. cap. 23. p. 313.

this, either as his own opinion, or as the opinion of the generality of Pagans, that the animated sun was absolutely the highest Deity (as some have conceived;) nor yet to reduce that multiplicity of pagan gods, by this device of his, into a seeming monarchy, and nearer compliance with Christianity; he there plainly confining his discourse to the dii duntaxat, qui sub cœlo sunt, that is, "the lower sort of mundane gods;" and undertaking to show, not that all of these neither, but only that many of them were reducible to the sun, as polyonymous, and called by several names, according to his several virtues and effects. For what Macrobius' own opinion was, concerning the supreme Deity, appeareth plainly from his other writings, particularly this passage of his commentary upon Scipio's dream, where the highest sphere and starry heaven was called Summus Deus, "the supreme God:"* Quod hunc extimum globum, summum Deum vocavit, non ita accipiendum est, ut iste prima causa et Deus ille omnipotentissimus existimetur; cum globus ipse, quod cœlum est, animæ sit fabrica, anima ex mente processerit, mens ex Deo, qui verè summus est, procreata sit. Sed summum quidem dixit ad cæterorum ordinem, qui subjecti sunt; Deum verò, quòd non modò immortale animal ac divinum sit, plenum inclytæ ex illa purissima mente rationis, sed quòd et virtutes omnes, quæ illam primæ omnipotentiam summitatis sequantur, aut ipse faciat, aut contineat; ipsum denique Jovem veteres vocaverunt, et apud theologos Jupiter est mundi anima, "That the outmost sphere is here called the supreme God, is not so to be understood, as if this were thought to be the first cause, and the most omnipotent God of all: for this starry sphere being but a part of the heaven, was made or produced by soul. Which soul also proceeded from a perfect mind or intellect; and again, Mind was begotten from that God who is truly supreme. But the highest sphere is here called the supreme God, only in respect to those lesser spheres or gods that are contained under it; and it is styled a god, because it is not only an immortal and divine animal, full of reason derived from that purest mind, but also because it maketh or containeth within itself all those virtues which follow that omnipotence of the first summity. Lastly, this was called by the ancients Jupiter, and Jupiter to theologers is the soul of the world." Wherefore though Macrobius, as generally the other Pagans, did undoubtedly worship the sun as a great god, and probably would not stick to call him Jupiter, nor παντοκράτωρ neither (in a certain sense) "omnipotent, or the governor of all," nor perhaps Deum Summum, as well as the starry heaven was so styled in Scipio's dream, he being the chief moderator in this lower world; yet nevertheless, it is plain, that he

* Lib. 1. cap. 17. [P. 87.]

was far from thinking the sun to be primam causam, or omnipotentissimum Deum, "the first cause," or "the most omnipotent God of all." He acknowledging above the sun and heaven, first, an eternal Psyche, which was the maker or creator of them both; and then above this Psyche, a perfect mind or intellect; and lastly, above that mind a God, who was verè summus, "truly and properly supreme, the first cause, and the most omnipotent of all gods." Wherein Macrobius plainly Platonized, asserting a trinity of archical o[illegible]ses. Which same doctrine is elsewhere also furth[illegible]im after this manner: Deus, qui prima causa est, e[illegible]omnium, quæque sunt, quæque videntur esse, pri[illegible] est. Hic superabundanti majestatis fœcunditat[illegible] creavit. Hæc mens, quæ Νοῦς vocatur, qua pa[illegible]lenam similitudinem servat auctoris, animam verè [illegible]steriora respiciens. Rursus anima partem, quam [illegible]ur, ac paulatim regrediente respectu in fabricam [illegible] corporea ipsa degenerat:* "God, who is, and is c[illegible] cause, is alone the fountain and original of all things, that are or seem to be; he by his superabundant fecundity produced from himself mind, which mind, as it looks upward towards its father, bears the perfect resemblance of its author, but as it looked downward, produced soul. And this soul again, as to its superior part, resembles that mind from whence it was begotten; but working downwards, produced the corporeal fabric, and acteth upon body." Besides which, the same Macrobius tells us,[10] that, Summi et principis omnium Dei nullum simulachrum finxit antiquitas, quia supra animam et naturam est, quo nihil fas est de fabulis pervenire; de diis autem cæteris, et de anima, non frustra se ad fabulosa convertunt, "The pagan antiquity made no image at all of the highest God, or prince of all things, because he is above soul and nature, where it is not lawful for any fabulosity to be intromitted. But as to the other gods, the soul of the world, and those below it, they thought it not inconvenient here to make use of images, and fiction or fabulosity." From all which it plainly appears, that neither Macrobius himself, nor the generality of the ancient Pagans, according to his apprehension, did look upon the animated sun as the absolutely supreme and highest Being.[1]

* Somn. Scip. lib. 1. cap. 14. [P. 73.]

[10] See Somn. Scipionis, lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 9. The learned Doctor, however, here gives the sense and meaning rather than the words of Macrobius.

[1] Macrobius, as is manifest from his commentary upon Cicero's Somnium Scipionis, was thoroughly imbued with the precepts of the school usually called by us the later Platonic. [He was not a Christian, as supposed by Barth, Grotius, Collinus, in opposition to whom see Masson, Bibl. Raisonnée, tom. 13. part. 2. p. 447. &c.] Hence we can easily understand, not only what his sentiments were upon religion and the supreme Deity, but also why he was so lavish and ingenious in his praises of the sun. For this sect of philosophers, although acknowledging a supreme God, maintained at the

And perhaps it may not be amiss to suggest here, what hath been already observed, that the Persians themselves also, who of all pagan nations have been most charged with this, the worshipping of the sun as the supreme Deity, under the name of Mithras, did notwithstanding, if we may believe Eubulus[2] (who wrote the history of Mithras at large), acknowledge another invisible Deity superior to it (and which was the maker thereof, and of the whole world), as the true and proper Mithras. Which opinion is also plainly confirmed not only by Herodotus,* distinguishing their Jupiter from the sun, but also by Xenophon in sundry places, as particularly where he speaks of Cyrus' being admonished in a dream of his approaching death, and thereupon addressing his devotion by sacrifices and prayers, first to the Ζεὺς πατρῷος, "the Persian Jupiter," and then to the sun, and the other gods :† Ἔθυε Διΐ τε πατρῴῳ καὶ ἡλίῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων, ὡς Πέρσαι θύουσιν, ὧδε ἐπευχόμενος, Ζεῦ πατρῷε καὶ ἥλιε καὶ πάντες θεοὶ, δέχεσθε τάδε χαριστήρια, &c., "He sacrificed to their country (or the Persian) Jupiter, and to the sun, and to the other gods, upon the tops of the mountains, as the custom of the Persians is; praying after this manner: Thou, our country Jupiter (that is, thou Mithras or Oromasdes),

same time, that next to him the sun was the greatest and most excellent deity: and with what subtlety they expounded this dogma, may be best learnt from Julian's Oration in Solem. Add Zac. Mitylenæus' Dialogue De Opificio Mundi, p. 173. 176. 184. Therefore Macrobius also, wholly devoted as he was to this sect, was anxious to deserve well of the sun, and affirmed that this was the only deity worshipped in former times. But throughout the whole of this disputation he is influenced more by party zeal and preconceived opinions than by reason and truth; and, as might easily be demonstrated, if time and opportunity would permit, confounds rather than explains the popular religions of antiquity. Neither was Macrobius the first who ventured to identify all gods with the sun, but merely followed in the footsteps of the principal philosophers of the sect to which he belonged. We have in Eusebius' Præparat. Evangel. lib. 3. cap. 11. p. 112. a long passage of Porphyry, in which he maintains, that no small number of the gods were the images of one sun. But the futility of all such attempts has already been powerfully exposed by Eusebius, ibid. cap. 12. p. 120. To whose arguments if learned men had paid a due degree of attention, I am quite certain they would not have so readily fallen into Macrobius' opinion. Even Julian seems to be aware, that it is impossible to refer all the deities to one sun. He therefore sets about the matter more ingeniously, and confesses that there are other deities without the sun, such as Bacchus, Mercury, Æsculapius, &c., but at the same time, in order to detract as little as possible from the honours of this luminary, he inculcates, that all these gods were generated from it: Orat. 4. in Solem. p. 144. &c. He intimates also, ibid. p. 157. that this subject, briefly touched upon by himself, was pursued to greater length by Jamblichus, in his Περὶ θεῶν, a work not now extant. I have often wondered, how great and learned men could prevail upon themselves to give their unhesitating assent to all that the later philosophers and rhetoricians, subsequent to the birth of our Saviour, have written respecting the religions and gods of the Pagans; who, as they must have known, had recourse to all sorts of expedients, in order to elude the attacks of Christians, and represent their own doctrines in the most favourable light. But with those who consume a great portion of their life in the exploration of antiquity, the name of an ancient author is every thing: a failing to be tolerated in men so excellent in other respects, and possessing so many claims to our esteem and gratitude.

[2] In Porphyry, De Antro Nympha. p. 253. &c.

* Lib. 1. n. 131. † Cyri. Inst. lib 8. p. 134.

and thou sun, and all ye other gods, accept, I pray you, these my eucharistic sacrifices," &c. And we find also the like prayer used by Darius in Plutarch: Ζεῦ πατρῷε Περσῶν, "Thou our country Jupiter," or, "supreme God of the Persians." Moreover, Herodotus and Curtius* record, that in the Persian pomp and procession there was wont to be drawn a chariot sacred to Jupiter, distinct from that of the sun. But Cyrus' proclamation in the book of Esdras putteth all out of doubt: since "that Lord God of heaven said "to have given Cyrus all the kingdoms of t mmanded him to build him a house at Jerusalem, lerstood of the sun.[3]

The Ethiopians in ay well be looked upon as Barbarians; and yet y acknowledge one supreme Deity, but also such from the world, and therefore invisible; he w cerning them:[4] Θεὸν νομίζουσι τὸν μὲν ἀθάνατ ναι τὸν αἴτιον τῶν πάντων, τὸν δὲ θνητὸν, ἀνώνυμ πιτοπολὺ τοὺς εὐεργέτας καὶ βασιλικοὺς θεοὺς νομίζουσι, "They believe, that there is one immortal God, and this the cause of all things; and another mortal one, anonymous; but for the most part they account their benefactors and kings gods also." And though Cæsar[5] affirm of the ancient Germans: Deorum numero eos solos ducunt, quos cernunt, et quorum opibus apertè juvantur, Solem, et Vulcanum,

* De Fort. Alex. lib. 2.

[3] On the religion of the Persians I have already commented at sufficient length, and shall merely observe in this place, that Cyrus' edict in Esdras i. 2. although showing this king's own estimation of the God of the Jews, cannot be considered as evidence of the religion and theological opinions of the whole Persian people.

† Lib. 17. p. 822.

[4] I am unable to find all that the learned Doctor imagines is to be found in this passage of Strabo. For the author does not state, that the Ethiopians acknowledged one supreme God distinct from the world and invisible to mortals. As to the subject itself, I am convinced, that this Ethiopian god is that twofold principle of good and evil, the worship of which was so general among the nations of antiquity. For that many of these nations, the Persians, Egyptians, and others, believed the god, from whom all evil proceeds, to be mortal and destined to be gradually extinguished and annihilated, is evident even from Plutarch De Iside et Osiride, p. 370. And I am led more easily to believe this from the following two reasons in particular. I. These Ethiopians are the people now called Abyssinians, and conterminous to the Egyptians. But that the Egyptians worshipped two deities, one good and the other evil, and held the latter, whom they denominated Typhon, to be mortal, or supposed that his power would be gradually crushed, is abundantly testified by Plutarch. In all probability, therefore, the Ethiopians adopted this, as well as many other dogmas, from the Egyptians. II. The Ethiopians were accustomed to call this god, to whom they imputed mortality, ἀνώνυμος καὶ οὐ σαφής: by which words, supposing them to be correctly expressed by Strabo in Greek, they in my opinion meant nothing more than what the Persians and other nations commonly inculcated respecting the evil deity, namely, that it resembled ἀγνοία or "ignorance:" Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, p. 369. For he, who is without a name and unknown, is certainly a true emblem of ignorance. Unless I am not mistaken therefore, learned men have in the Ethiopians an additional instance of a nation infected with the principles of Manicheism before the time of Manichæus.

[5] *De Bello* Gallico, lib. 6. cap. 21. p. 125. ed. Cellarii.

et Lunam; yet is he contradicted by Tacitus,[6] who, coming after him, had better information: and others have recorded,[7*] that they acknowledged one supreme God, under the name of

[*] See Sched. de Diis Germ. [Syngr. 1. cap. 12. p. 291.]

[6] The learned Doctor here expresses himself ambiguously in reference to the discordance between Tacitus and Cæsar in their accounts of the ancient religion of the Germans. For considering it to be his principal object to show, that all the ancients were worshippers of one God, we might suppose his meaning to be, that Cæsar in stating the Germans to have had many gods, is contradicted by Tacitus as affirming them to have acknowledged only one. But the fact is far otherwise. The sole difference between Tacitus and Cæsar is this, that while the latter asserts them to have held the sun, moon, and fire to be the only gods, the former records, Germaniæ, cap. 29. 34. 40. that they professed others besides these, namely Mercury, Mars, Hercules, Isis. There are many considerations which would induce us to reject Cæsar's authority in this matter, who no doubt hastily attributed the religion of one tribe to the whole of the German people. See G. Hecht's Germania Sacra ac Litterata, par. 1. cap. 3. 4. p. 3. &c. and P. Hachenberg's Germania Media, diss. 8. p. 178. But even should we adopt Tacitus' account in preference, still it supplies us with no proof, that the Germans acknowledged one supreme God, the ruler and governor of all things.

[7] This is Schedius' conjecture, but supported by no authorities or arguments, although not a few have considered it to be in the highest degree probable. For thus, as one laying down laws, he says, De Diis Germanis, syngr. 1. cap. 12. p. 291. Deus priscis Celtis Thau dictus fuit; postmodum errore et stupiditate populi τὸ Thau transiit in Thauta, hinc in Thautes, ultimo in Theutates. Unicus autem Deus a Celtis colebatur, qui posteris Theutates, quum primum Thau diceretur, dictus fuit, "The god of the ancient Celts was called Thau; which subsequently, through the error and stupidity of the people, was corrupted into Thauta, then into Thautes, and lastly into Theutates. But they worshipped only one God, which being called Thau primitively, was by posterity called Theutates." He afterwards diverges into a long digression, in which he endeavours to prove from ancient testimonies, that the several nations worshipped but one God. Now, in the first place, Schedius speaks, as though he had learnt all this from the Celts themselves and had personally witnessed their stupidity and faults of pronunciation. Secondly, he asserts, in total violation of truth, that they worshipped only one God; whereas it is clear, from the most unquestionable testimonies, that besides Thaautes this nation acknowledged several gods, Hesus, Taranis, and others. But perhaps his opinions were more correct than his statements, and he simply meant that the Celts, although worshipping a plurality of gods, nevertheless ascribed greater power to one, namely, Thaautes, than to the others. The learned Doctor goes still farther even, and transfers what Schedius says of the Celts to the Germans, being influenced, I suppose, by the conviction, that the Theutates of the Celts and Tuisto, the earth-sprung god of the Germans, spoken of by Tacitus, Germaniæ cap. 1. were one and the same deity. For my own part, I shall deal liberally with these most learned men, and shall neither question in this place the etymologies of Schedius nor contend, that Thaautes or Theutates and Tuisto ought by no means to be confounded. [That they are the same deities is the opinion also of Leibnitz, Epist. p. 318. 422. where he treats of the difference of the Gallic and German religions. His conjecture, p. 451. that Dis, from whom Cæsar states the Germans to be sprung, does not differ from Theut, is ingenious.] Let all these matters remain in the position in which learned men have placed them, till they fall by the arguments of others. I shall not even deny, that the Celts and Germans paid religious homage to one god pre-eminently above all the others; for ancient records supply nothing, that will enable us satisfactorily to decide this question. But I shall confine my inquiry to this alone, Whether learned men are right in identifying this Thaautes, be it that he was worshipped by the Gauls and Celts only or also by the Germans, with the supreme Parent and Lord of all things; which, I must candidly confess, seems to me to be done in opposition to all truth. For, I. It is manifest, from unquestionable ancient testimonies, collected by the most erudite J. Martini, De Veterum Gallorum Religione, that the Gauls believed Hesus to be much more powerful and excellent than Thaautes; which, indeed, led this learned writer to conclude, that Æsus or Hesus was the image of the supreme Deity; the correctness of which conclusion we shall examine into by and by. II. The Celts

Thau first, and then of Thautes, and Theutates. Lastly, the generality of the Pagans at this very day, as the Indians, Chinese, Siamenses and Guineans, the inhabitants of Peru,

or Gauls ascribed such attributes to this Theutates, as led the Romans to identify him with their own god Mercury. See Schedius, De Diis German. syngr. 1. cap. 5. p. 155. and G. J. Vossius, De Idololatria, lib. 1. cap. 35. p. 98. And I have no doubt, nay the facts themselves show, that all the accounts of Cæsar, Tertullian, and other ancient authors concerning Mercury, to whose worship, they tell us, the Gauls were devoted, pertain to this Theutates alone. Wherefore, it is by no means probable, that this deity was represented by the Gauls as the parent, architect, and governor of the universe; because if such had been the case, the Romans unquestionably would have discovered in him the image of their own Jupiter rather than of Mercury. On the contrary, it is clear I think from hence, that they held him to preside over the same things as the Mercury of the Greeks and Romans, namely, commerce, theft, and eloquence. III. The Gauls were accustomed to appease this Theutates with human victims; the same honour they paid to Hesus and Taranis. Lucan, Pharsal. lib. 1. v. 466.

> E quibus immitis placatur sanguine diro
> Theutates, horrensque feris altaribus Hesus,
> Et Taranis Scythicæ non mitior ara Dianæ.

Can such bloody and cruel rites, I ask, be applied to the supreme Being? Or if Theutates was the supreme Being, why were the same honours paid to Hesus and Taranis? These very victims, which we are told the Gauls sacrificed to Theutates, led J. Martini to suppose, that Pluto rather than Mercury was to be identified with this deity, Religion des Gaulois, lib. 3. cap. 3. p. 15. &c. whose opinion I should be inclined to adopt in preference to that of the ancient Romans, were I not convinced of the impropriety of confounding the gods of barbarous nations with the Grecian and Roman deities. But enough of Theutates, of whom I have been induced to speak at some length, because learned men, I perceive, even in the present day, are too ready to defend the cause of the ancient Gauls, Germans, Celts, and Britons, against those who do not scruple to hold them forth as having been imbued with the grossest superstitions.

The erudite Frenchman who asserts Theutates to be the image of Pluto, at the same time assigns the place of the supreme Being to another god of the Gauls or Celts, namely, Esus or Æsar, Religion des Gaulois, tom. 1. lib. 2. cap. 2. p. 257. &c. This he holds to be the *unknown* God, spoken of by St. Paul, Acts xviii. this the *hidden* God of the Hebrews, and the *anonymous* God of the Samaritans, p. 260. Hence he supposes the Gauls to have acknowledged a supreme Ruler of all things prior to the birth of our Saviour, but subsequently by some untoward fate to have converted Hesus into Jupiter. The arguments by which he considers this point to be established, are drawn partly from the words and names, and partly from the things themselves. I. He remarks, that Esus and Æsar, in the language of Hetruria and ancient Gaul, signify God, p. 257. I will grant that nothing can be more true; still I confess myself to be ignorant, what this has to do with confuting those who maintain that Hesus and the supreme God are not one and the same, "The name Hesus is the same as the Latin Deus. Therefore Hesus is the supreme God who was worshipped by the Hebrews." He who is convinced by reasoning like this, is certainly very easy of conviction. II. Hesus, he tells us, in the language of the ancient Gauls, means the same as *terrible*. But whence did the estimable writer ascertain this? Hear the reason: "Heuz, or Heus, in Lower Bretagny, signifies horror, terror." If so disposed, I might altogether disregard this argument, and pronounce it to be utterly worthless. But in courtesy to the learned monk, let us grant what he assumes, that Hesus is the same as *terrible*. What then? "But," he proceeds, "in the Scriptures God is called terrible: therefore, Hesus is the supreme God." See p. 264. What force there is in such argumentation as this will be best shown by imitating it. Jupiter is called by the ancients greater and best. The supreme God is distinguished by the same names in holy writ. Therefore Jupiter is the supreme God of the Hebrews. Mars is a thousand times denominated terrible by the poets and other writers. God is also called so in the Scriptures. Therefore Mars is the supreme Deity. Esculapius, in an infinity of places is called Σωτὴρ,

Mexico, Virginia and New England (some of which are sufficiently barbarous) acknowledge one supreme or greatest God; they having their several proper names for him, as Parmiscer,

and in the sacred volume the Deity is so designated. Therefore Esculapius is the supreme God of the Hebrews.—Now he who fancies that there is no weight in these arguments, must also reject the learned writer's reasoning. III. But the oak was sacred to Æsus; and the true and only God appeared to Abraham under an oak, according to Moses, Gen. xviii. Therefore Æsus is no other than the God who conversed with Abraham. See p. 259. I shall dismiss this reason in silence, being well aware that to any one possessing common intellect it cannot but appear contemptible. It belongs indeed to that class of arguments, to repeat which is the same as to refute them. IV. Lucan informs us, that it was granted to the Druids alone to know the gods they worshipped, Pharsal. lib. 1.

> Solis nosse deos et cœli numina vobis,
> Aut solis nescire datum.

Therefore the god Æsus is the *unknown God* of the Hebrews and St. Paul, that is, the supreme and omnipotent God. Thus the erudite author elegantly argues, p. 262. In my opinion, these verses of Lucan are best explained by Cæsar, who, De Bello Gallico, lib. 6. cap. 14. p. 191. says that the Druids, disciplinam suam in vulgus efferri noluisse, "were unwilling to have their doctrine made public." For which reason the knowledge of the gods and religion were confined to the Druids alone. But how it can be inferred from thence, that Æsus was the unknown, that is, the true God, announced by St. Paul, I am altogether at a loss to imagine. The Druids alone understood the religion of the Gauls. Therefore Æsus is the true and only God. Away with those who find nothing to object to in such an argument. I might add also, that Lucan is speaking of many gods, and not of one only. But why many words? For my own part I shall not undertake to determine, in the total absence of ancient testimonies, whether the Gauls did or did not suppose one supreme God to preside over all things; but this I am convinced of, that those are mistaken who identify this god with Æsus. Indeed, were there nothing else to deter me from assenting to their opinion, those human sacrifices even, which the Gauls are known to have offered to Hesus, would of themselves oppose an insurmountable obstacle. But I have another reason, and one too altogether decisive of the question. Those who possess even a slight acquaintance with subjects of this kind are well aware, that the Romans supposed the Hesus of the Gauls to be their own Mars. See Religion des Gaulois, tom. 1. lib. 2. cap. 1. and 2. p. 246. &c. Therefore whatever is recorded in Cæsar and other authors, respecting the worship of Mars among the Gauls, is evidently to be understood of the worship of Hesus, who was called Mars by the Romans. Now read the following words of Cæsar's from lib. 6. De Bello Gallico, cap. 17. p. 193. and consider them as said of Hesus: Martem (putant Galli) bella regere: huic, quum prælio dimicare constituerunt, ea, quæ bello ceperunt, plerumque devovent: quæ superaverint, animalia capta immolant; reliquas res in unum locum conferunt, "The Gauls suppose Mars to rule over wars: to him, when they have decided upon going forth to battle, they mostly devote the spoils: the captured animals that survive they sacrifice; and bring the other things together into one place." Do these, I ask, contain even the slightest indication of the supreme Being; nay, do they not on the contrary show, that Hesus was no other than the deity supposed by that nation to preside over the waging of wars? My readers will pardon me for the length to which I have carried these remarks. It is of the utmost importance to disclose the true nature of the religions which flourished before the birth of our Saviour, and to divest them of the false expositions of learned men, in order that the benefits conferred by Christ upon mankind may be made more clear and manifest. But there are in these days, as there were formerly, men eminent for ability and erudition, who fancy themselves able to refute almost every charge of superstition and gross error in the nations of antiquity, or at least to persuade us that there were not so many blemishes to be found in them as the Christian fathers supposed; whose opinions are the more readily instilled into the mind, the more elegant is the style and form at the present day of the books, in which they are put forth. These, in my opinion, as far as truth will permit, we ought strenuously to oppose, lest some one

Fetisso, Wiracocha, Pachacamac, Vitziliputzti, &c. though worshipping withal other gods and idols. And we shall conclude this with the testimony of Josephus Acosta:* Hoc commune apud omnes pænè Barbaros est, ut Deum quidem omnium rerum supremum et summè bonum fateantur; spirituum vero quorundam perversorum non obscura opinio sit, qui à nostris Barbaris Zupay vocari solent. Igitur et quis ille summus, idemque sempiternus rerum omnium opifex, quem illi ignorantes colunt, per omnia doceri debent ab illo, illiusque fidelibus ministris angelis, absi a cacodæmonum, "This is common almost to all to confess one supreme God over all, who is perf also they have a persuasion amongst them of ce s, which are called by our Barbarians Zupay. ey ought to be first well instructed, what that ernal Maker of all things is, whom they ignorantl then how great a difference there is betwixt those , and his faithful ministers, the angels."[8]

XXVIII. It hath been already declared, that according to Themistius and Symmachus, two zealous Pagans, one and the same supreme God was worshipped in all the several pagan religions throughout the world, though after different manners. Which diversity of religions, as in their opinion it was no way inconvenient in itself, so neither was it ungrateful nor unacceptable to Almighty God, it being more for his honour, state, and grandeur, to be worshipped with this variety, than after one only manner. Now, that this was also the opinion of other ancienter Pagans before them, may appear from this remarkable testimony of Plutarch in his book De Iside, where defending

should start forth from the ranks of those who meditate evil to all religions, and chant to us in the old strain of Celsus, Hierocles, and others foes of Christianity: "What important boon, then, has Christ conferred upon the world, if the truth, for the most part at least, was already known before his time? What wonder is it, that the Christian doctrine should have been so speedily propagated, when its seeds had already been scattered among all nations, and needed a certain culture alone to insure their full growth and development?"

* De proc. Indor. Sal. lib. 5. 479.

[8] The subject here in question is not respecting the wise men, but the multitude and common people of the various eastern nations. I have no doubt, but that most of these nations worship one god, greater and more excellent than the rest of their deities; but I do doubt whether they have the same notion of this supreme God as ourselves, who have been enlightened by revelation. There are many things, which would lead me almost to the conclusion, that most of them confine the sway of their supreme deities within the limits of the countries which they themselves inhabit, and do not suppose it to extend farther than their own kingdoms. I should like any one, therefore, acquainted with these matters, to answer me the following queries: Do the Siamese believe their Sommonacodom to give laws not only to the kingdom of Siam but also to the Gauls, Germans, and all the rest of the world? Do the Indians conceive, that their supreme god Brama is lord also of Europe, or do they think that Europe is governed by one god and India by another? Do the Japanese suppose the god, whom they hold to be the head of the whole family of gods, to have power also out of their own island, and to control the entire globe?

the Egyptian worship, (which was indeed the main design of that whole book,) but withal declaring, that no inanimate thing ought to be looked upon or worshipped as a god, he writeth thus:* Οὐ γὰρ οὖν οὐδὲ ἄψυχον ἀνθρώποις ὁ θεὸς· τοὺς δὲ δωρουμένους ἡμῖν καὶ παρέχοντας ἀένναα καὶ διαρκῆ θεοὺς ἐνομίσαμεν, οὐχ ἑτέρους παρ' ἑτέρους, οὐδὲ βαρβάρους καὶ Ἕλληνας, οὐδὲ νοτείους καὶ βορείους· ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ ἥλιος, καὶ σελήνη, καὶ οὐρανὸς, καὶ γῆ, καὶ θάλασσα, κοινὰ πᾶσιν, ὀνομάζεται δὲ ἄλλως ὑπ' ἄλλων, οὕτως ΕΝΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΥ τοῦ ταῦτα κοσμοῦντος, καὶ ΜΙΑΣ ΠΡΟΝΟΙΑΣ ἐπιτροπευούσης, καὶ δυνάμεων ὑπουργῶν ἐπὶ πάντα τεταγμένων, ἕτεραι παρ' ἑτέροις κατὰ νόμον γεγόνασι τιμαὶ καὶ προσηγορίαι· καὶ συμβόλοις χρῶνται καθιερώμενοι, οἱ μὲν ἀμυδροῖς, οἱ δὲ τρανωτέροις, ἐπὶ τὰ θεῖα νόησιν ὁδηγοῦντες οὐκ ἀκινδύνως, "No inanimate thing ought to be esteemed for a God, but they who bestow these things upon us, and afford us a continual supply thereof for our use, have been therefore accounted by us gods. Which gods are not different to different nations: as if the Barbarians and the Greeks, the southern and the northern inhabitants of the globe, had not any the same, but all other different gods. But as the sun, and the moon, and the heaven, and the earth, and the sea, are common to all, though called by several names in several countries; so ONE REASON ordering these things, and ONE PROVIDENCE dispensing all, and the inferior subservient ministers thereof, having had several names and honours bestowed upon them by the laws of several countries, have been every where worshipped throughout the whole world. And there have been also different symbols consecrated to them, the better to conduct and lead on men's understandings to divine things; though this hath not been without some hazard or danger of casting men upon one or other of these two inconveniences, either superstition or atheism." Where Plutarch plainly affirms, that the several religions of the pagan nations, whether Greeks or Barbarians, and among these the Egyptians also, as well as others, consisted in nothing else but the worshipping of one and the same supreme mind, reason, and providence, that orders all things in the world, and of its ὑπουργοὶ δυνάμεις ἐπὶ πάντα τεταγμέναι, "its subservient powers or ministers," appointed by it over all the several parts of the world; though under different names, rites, and ceremonies, and with different symbols.

Moreover, that Titus Livius was of the very same opinion, that the pagan gods of several countries, though called by several names, and worshipped with so great diversity of rites and ceremonies, yet were not for all that different, but the same common to all, may be concluded from this passage of his, where

* P. 377.

he writeth of Hannibal:* Nescio an mirabilior fuerit in adversis, quàm secundis rebus. Quippe qui mistos ex colluvione omnium gentium, quibus alius ritus, alia sacra, alii PROPE dii essent, ita uno vinculo copulaverit, ut nulla seditio exstiterit, "I know not whether Hannibal were more admirable in his adversity or prosperity; who having a mixed colluvies of all nations under him, which had different rites, different ceremonies, and almost different gods from one another, did notwithstanding so unite them altoge mon bond, that there happened no sedition at em." Where Livy plainly intimates, that thoug great diversity of religious rites and ceremonies gans, as if they had worshipped several gods, f them all were really the same, namely, one su l his ministers under him.[9] And the same Livy ares this to have been the general opinion of the alians likewise at that time; where he tells us, how d with Q. Fulvius Flaccus, for that when being censor, and ing a new temple in Spain, he uncovered another temple dedicated to Juno Lacinia amongst the Brutii, and taking off the marble tiles thereof, sent them into Spain to adorn his new erected temple withal; and how they accused him thereupon publicly in the senate house in this manner:† Quod ruinis templorum templa ædificaret, tanquam non iidem ubique dii immortales essent, sed spoliis aliorum alii colendi exornandique, "That with the ruins of temples he built up temples; as if there were not every where the same immortal gods; but that some of them might be worshipped and adorned with the spoils of others."[10]

* Lib. 28. cap. 12. [P. 679.]

[9] The learned Doctor has not quoted this passage of Livy as it stands in the author, but has extracted his meaning from a greater number of words. I doubt, however, whether many will approve of the interpretation. Livy writes that Hannibal's army was composed of various nations, differing not only in manners, language, and religion, but almost in gods. To me it seems difficult to understand how it can be inferred from hence, that their gods were really the same, although bearing different names, and moreover, that they worshipped one supreme God more excellent than the others, whom they regarded as his ministers. Learned men who are prepossessed in favour of a particular opinion are sometimes too ingenious in explaining the words of ancient authors.

† Doc. 5.

[10] This passage occurs lib. 42. cap. 3. p. 1113. It certainly shows that Livy, who here introduces the Roman people speaking his own sentiments, supposed the gods of the Romans to be worshipped also in Spain and other parts of the world. This was the general opinion of almost all the Romans: which seems to have originated in the first instance from a similarity of rites, and afterwards to have been strengthened by considerations of public utility. For the Romans calculated upon being able more easily to conciliate barbarous nations, if they could induce them to amalgamate their ceremonies, deities, and religion with their own, and could instil into their minds a belief, that the gods of Rome were the same as those of Gaul, Spain, and Germany. Hence, they gave the names of their own gods to those of barbarous nations. But that which here forms the main point in question, is not equally clear from this passage, namely, that Livy supposed all nations to have worshipped one supreme God of infinite power, and the lord of the universe.

The Egyptians were doubtless the most singular of all the Pagans, and the most oddly discrepant from the rest in their manner of worship; yet nevertheless, that these also agreed with the rest in those fundamentals of worshipping one supreme and universal Numen, together with his inferior ministers, as Plutarch sets himself industriously to maintain it, in that forementioned book De Iside; so was it further cleared and made out (as Damascius informs us) by two famous Egyptian philosophers, Asclepiades and Heraiscus, in certain writings of theirs, that have been since lost:* Αἰγυπτίους δὲ ὁ μὲν Εὔδημος οὐδὲν ἀκριβὲς ἱστορεῖ· Οἱ δὲ Αἰγύπτιοι καθ' ἡμᾶς φιλόσοφοι γεγονότες, ἐξήνεγκαν αὐτῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν κεκρυμμένην, εὑρόντες ἐν Αἰγυπτίοις δή τισι λόγοις, ὡς εἴη κατ' αὐτοὺς ἡ μὲν μία τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὴ, σκότος ἄγνωστον, &c. ἱστέον δὲ καὶ ἐκεῖνο περὶ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων, ὅτι διαιρετικοί εἰσι πολλαχοῦ τῶν κατὰ ἕνωσιν ὑφεστώτων· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ νοητὸν διῤῥήκασιν εἰς πολλῶν θεῶν ἰδιότητας, ὡς ἔξεστι μαθεῖν τοῖς ἐκείνων συγγράμμασιν ἐντυχοῦσιν τοῖς βουλομένοις· λέγω δὲ τῇ Ἡραΐσκου ἀναγραφῇ τοῦ Αἰγυπτίου καθόλου λόγου, πρὸς τὸν Πρόκλον γραφείσῃ τὸν φιλόσοφον, καὶ τῇ ἀρξαμένῃ γράφεσθαι συμφωνίᾳ ὑπὸ Ἀσκληπιάδου τῶν Αἰγυπτίων πρός τοὺς ἄλλους Θεολόγους, "Though Eudemus hath given us no certain account of the Egyptians, yet the Egyptian philosophers of latter times have declared the hidden truth of their theology, having found in some Egyptian monuments, that, according to them, there is one principle of all things, celebrated under the name of the unknown darkness, and this thrice repeated, &c. Moreover, this is to be observed concerning these Egyptians, that they are wont to divide and multiply things that are one and the same. And accordingly, have they divided and multiplied the first Intelligible, or the one supreme Deity, into the properties of many gods; as any one may find, that pleases to consult their writings: I mean that of Heraiscus, entitled, the Universal doctrine of the Egyptians, and inscribed to Proclus, the philosopher; and that symphony or harmony of the Egyptians with other theologers, begun to be written by Asclepiades, and left imperfect." Of which work of Asclepiades, the Egyptian Suidas, also maketh mention upon the word Heraiscus: Ὁ δὲ Ἀσκληπιάδης ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐν τοῖς Αἰγυπτίοις βιβλίοις ἀνατραφεὶς, ἀκριβέστερος ἦι ἀμφὶ θεολογίαν τὴν πάτριον, ἀρχάς τε αὐτῆς καὶ μέσα διεσκεμμένος ὡς ἔξεστιν εἰδέναι σαφῶς ἀπὸ τῶν ὕμνων, ὧν συγγέγραφεν εἰς τοὺς Αἰγυπτίων θεοὺς, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς πραγματείας, ἣν ὥρμησε γράφε περιέχουσαν τῶν θεολογιῶν ἁπασῶν συμφωνίαν, "But Asclepiades having been more conversant with ancient Egypti writings, was more thoroughly instructed, and exactly skilled his country theology; he having searched into the princi

* Damasc. de Princ. M. S. [Vide Wolfii Anecdota Græca, tom. 3. p. 260.]

thereof, and all the consequences resulting from them; as manifestly appeareth from those hymns which he composed in praise of the Egyptian gods, and from that tractate begun to be written by him (but left unfinished) which containeth the symphony of all theologies." Now, we say that Asclepiades' symphony of all the pagan theologers, and therefore of the Egyptian with the rest, was their agreement in those two fundamentals expressed by Plutarch; namely, the worshipping of one supreme and universal Numen, Reason, and Providence, governing all things; and then of his subservient ministers (the instruments of providence) appointed by him over all the parts of the world: which being honoured under several names, and with different rites and ceremonies, according to the laws of the respective countries, caused all that diversity of religions that was amongst them. Both which fundamental points of the pagan theology were in like manner acknowledged by Symmachus,[1] the first of them being thus expressed: Æquum est, quicquid omnes colunt, unum putari, "That all religions agreed in this, the worshipping of one and the same supreme Numen:" and the second thus, Varios custodes urbibus mens divina distribuit, "That the divine Mind appointed divers guardian and tutelar spirits under him, unto cities and countries." He there adding also, that suus cuique mos est, suum cuique jus, "that every nation had their peculiar modes and manners in worshipping of these;" and that these external differences in religion ought not to be stood upon, but every one to observe the religion of his own country. Or else these two fundamental points of the pagan theology may be thus expressed: first, that there is one self-originated Deity, who was δημιουργὸς, or "Maker of the whole world;" secondly, that there are besides him other gods also, to be religiously worshipped (that is, intellectual beings superior to men) which were notwithstanding all made or created by that one. Stobæus thus declareth their sense:* Τὸ πλῆθος τῶν θεῶν ἔργον ἐστὶ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ, ἅμα τῷ κόσμῳ γενόμενον, "That the multitude of gods is the work of the Demiurgus, made by him, together with the world."[2]

[1] Epistolar. lib. 10. ep. 61. p. 442.

* Ecl. Phys. cap. 1. [Lib. 1. p. 4.]

[2] What the learned Doctor here states respecting the subject of this unfinished work of Asclepiades, On the Harmony of all Religions, is mere conjecture, altogether unsupported by arguments. For no ancient author has given us any account of the contents of this book. But, even supposing the conjecture to be well-founded, still I should consider, that little reliance is to be placed upon the authority of this writer. For the fact of his having dedicated his work to Proclus shows him to have belonged to the sect of the later Platonists, of which Proclus was a distinguished member. Doubtless, therefore, his object was to prove in this book, that the principles of his own sect were espoused not only by the Egyptians, but by all other nations: the vanity and futility of which is self-evident. Most of the gods of ancient nations, as has already been justly observed by the erudite J. Le Clerc, Biblioth. Choisie, tom. 3. p. 81. were men who had lived in those countries, where they were worshipped. Con-

XXIX. And that the pagan theologers did thus generally acknowledge one supreme and universal Numen, appears plainly from hence, because they supposed the whole world to be an animal. Thus the writer De Placitis Philos.* and out of him Stobæus, Οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι πάντες ἔμψυχον τὸν κόσμον καὶ προνοίᾳ διοικούμενον· Λεύκιππος δὲ καὶ Δημόκριτος καὶ Ἐπίκουρος, καὶ ὅσοι τὰ ἄτομα εἰσηγοῦνται καὶ τὸ κενὸν, οὔτε ἔμψυχον οὔτε προνοίᾳ διοικεῖσθαι, φύσει δέ τινι ἀλόγῳ, "All others assert the world to be an animal, and governed by Providence; only Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, and those who make atoms and vacuum the principles of all things, dissenting, who neither acknowledge the world to be animated, nor yet to be governed by Providence, but by an irrational nature." Where, by the way, we may observe the fraud and juggling of Gassendus,[3] who takes occasion from hence highly to extol and applaud Epicurus, as one who approached nearer to Christianity than all the other philosophers, in that he denied the world to be an animal; whereas, according to the language and notions of those times, to deny the world's animation, and to be an Atheist, or to deny a God, was one and the same thing; because all the Pagans, who then asserted providence, held the world also to be animated: neither did Epicurus deny the world's animation upon any other account than this, because he denied Providence. And

sequently, he who endeavoured to refer the gods of all nations as it were to one family, and to identify them with those of the Egyptians, undertook a task no less difficult than his, who should take upon himself to prove, that the Mediterranean sea is the same as that which washes the shores of America or Arabia, or in other words, should attempt to show that to be a fact which is altogether impossible. But to try to reduce all the religions of the globe to the standard of the one Platonic sect, is even much more insane. Hence, those who laboured to do so, were obliged to resort to kinds of physical and imaginary interpretations, which the ancient Christians deservedly despised and ridiculed. But it was of the utmost importance to the Platonists to make the more ignorant believe, that all religions harmonized with each other and especially with the dogmas of their own sect, in order that they might not be without an answer to the Christians, who founded their strongest argument against the truth of the ancient superstitions upon the discordance both of the philosophers and their religions: as among other things is shown in Hermias' Irrisio Philosophiæ Gentilis, usually published along with Tatianus.

* Plut. lib. 2. cap. 3. Stob. Ecl. Phys. cap. 25.

[3] I regret that the learned Doctor has not pointed out the passage in which Gassendi suffered such words to escape him. In the writings which he has left behind him on the subject of Epicurus and his philosophy, nothing of the kind is to be found; although he there leaves no stone unturned in order to purge the character of this philosopher of every stain of infamy. As regards the opinion here professed by Dr. Cudworth, that all the ancient philosophers who asserted a god held the world to be animated, I cannot entirely concur in it. I much question whether Socrates, the parent of philosophy, believed in the world's animation, although, as is evident from Xenophon, he entertained no doubt of the being of a god. Nor will what Plato makes him say, persuade me to the contrary; since it is notorious, that Plato attributes many things to him to which he was altogether opposed. The soul ascribed by Aristotle to the world is the shadow and ghost of a soul rather than a soul; at all events, very different from that of Plato and Pythagoras. And yet he did not utterly deny a god; as we have already shown in another place. I pass over the rest of the ancient philosophers.

the ground upon which this opinion of the world's animation was built, was such as might be obvious even to vulgar understandings; and it is thus expressed by Plotinus, according to the sense of the ancients:* Ἄτοπον τὸν οὐρανὸν ἄψυχον λέγειν, ἡμῶν, οἷ μέρος σώματος ἔχομεν τοῦ παντὸς, ψυχὴν ἐχόντων· πῶς γὰρ ἂν τὸ μέρος ἔσχεν, ἀψύχου τοῦ παντὸς ὄντος; "It is absurd to affirm that the heaven or world is inanimate, or devoid of life and soul, when we ourselves, who have but a part of the mundane body in us, are endued with soul. For how could a part have life and soul in it, th ad and inanimate?" Now, if the whole world be n must it needs be governed by one soul, and not b h one soul of the world, and the whole mundane a me of the pagan theologers (as namely the Stoic e πρῶτος θεὸς, "the first and highest God of

Nevertheless, othe theologers, though asserting the world's animation ould by no means allow the mundane soul to be the ty; they conceiving the first and highest God to be an abstract and immoveable mind, and not a soul. Thus the panegyrist, cited also by Gyraldus,† invokes the supreme Deity doubtfully and cautiously, as not knowing well what to call him, whether soul or mind: Te, summe rerum sator, cujus tot nomina sunt, quot gentium linguas esse voluisti; quem enim te ipse dici velis, scire non possumus: sive in te quædam vis mensque divina est, quæ toto infusa mundo omnibus miscearis elementis, et sine ullo extrinsecus accedente vigoris impulsu, per te ipse movearis; sive aliqua supra omne cœlum potestas es, quæ hoc opus totum ex altiore naturæ arce despicias: Te, inquam, oramus, &c. "Thou supreme Original of all things, who hast as many names as thou hast pleased there should be languages; whether thou beest a certain divine force and soul, that infused into the whole world art mingled with all the elements, and without any external impulse moved from thyself; or whether thou beest a power elevated above the heavens, which lookest down upon the whole work of nature, as from a higher tower; thee we invoke," &c. And as the supreme Deity was thus considered only as a perfect mind superior to soul, so was the mundane soul and whole animated world called by these Pagans frequently, Δεύτερος Θεὸς, "The second God." Thus in the Asclepian Dialogue or Perfect Oration, is the Lord and Maker of all said to have made a second god visible and sensible, which is the world.

But for the most part, they who asserted a God, superior to the soul of the world, did maintain a trinity of universal prin-

* En. 4. lib. 3. cap. 7. [De Dubiis Animæ, lib. 1. p. 576.]
† Hist. Deor. p. 12.

ciples, or divine hypostases subordinate; they conceiving, that as there was above the mundane soul a perfect mind or intellect, so that mind and intellect, as such, was not the first principle neither, because there must be νοητὸν in order of nature before νοῦς, an Intelligible before intellect. Which first Intelligible was called by them, τὸ ἓν and τἀγαθὸν, "the One," and "the Good," or unity and goodness itself substantial, the cause of mind and all things. Now as the "Tagathon," or highest of these three hypostases, was sometimes called by them, Ὁ πρῶτος θεὸς, "The first God," and νοῦς or "Intellect," ὁ δεύτερος θεὸς, "the second god;" so was the mundane soul and animated world called τρίτος θεὸς, "the third god." Thus Numenius in Proclus upon Plato's Timæus:* Νουμήνιος μὲν γὰρ τρεῖς ἀνυμνήσας θεοὺς, πατέρα μὲν καλεῖ τὸν πρῶτον, ποιητὴν δὲ τὸν δεύτερον, ποίημα δὲ τὸν τρίτον· ὁ γὰρ κόσμος κατ' αὐτὸν ὁ τρίτος ἐστὶ θεὸς, ὡς ὁ κατ' αὐτὸν δημιουργὸς διττὸς, ὅ τε πρῶτος καὶ ὁ δεύτερος θεὸς, τὸ δὲ δημιουργούμενον ὁ τρίτος, "Numenius praising three gods, calls the father the first God, the maker the second, and the work the third. For the world, according to him, is the third god; as he supposes also two opificers, the first and the second God." Plotinus† in like manner speaks of this also, as very familiar language amongst those Pagans: Καὶ ὁ κόσμος θεὸς, ὥσπερ σύνηθες λέγειν, τρίτος, "And the world, as is commonly said, is the third god."

But neither they who held the supreme Deity to be an immoveable mind or intellect, superior to the mundane soul (as Aristotle and Xenocrates) did suppose that mundane soul and the whole world to have depended upon many such immoveable intellects self-existent, as their first cause, but only upon one: nor they, who admitting a trinity of divine hypostases, made the supreme Deity properly to be a Monad above mind or intellect, did conceive that intellect to have depended upon many such monads, as first principles co-ordinate, but upon one only. From whence it plainly appears, that the pagan theologers did always reduce things under a monarchy, and acknowledge not many independent deities, but one universal Numen (whether called soul, or mind, or monad) as the head of all. Though it hath been already declared, that those Pagans, who were Trinitarians, especially the Platonists, do often take those their three hypostases subordinate (a monad, mind, and soul) all together, for the τὸ θεῖον, or one supreme Numen; as supposing an extraordinary kind of unity in that trinity of hypostases, and so as it were a certain latitude and gradation in the Deity.

Where by the way two things may be observed concerning the pagan theologers; first, that according to them generally the

* Page 93. † Ennead. 3. lib. 5. sect. 6. [P. 296.]

whole corporeal system was not a dead thing, like a machine or automaton artificially made by men, but that life and soul was mingled with and diffused through it all: insomuch that Aristotle himself taxes those who made the world to consist of nothing but monads or atoms altogether dead and inanimate, as being therefore a kind of Atheists. Secondly, that how much soever some of them supposed the supreme Deity and first Cause to be elevated above the heaven and corporeal world, yet did they not therefore [illegible] either the world to be quite cut off from that, or that [illegible] so as to have no commerce with it, nor influence [illegible] as all proceeded from this first Cause, so did the [illegible] to be closely and intimately united with all those [illegible] om itself (though without mixture and confusion [illegible] sist in it, and be pervaded by it. Plutarch, in [illegible] Questions* propounds this among the rest: Τί [illegible] *ωτάτω Θεὸν πατέρα πάντων καὶ ποιητὴν προσεῖπεν* [illegible] called the highest God the father and maker of a [illegible] ch he answers in the first place thus: *Τῶν μὲν Θεων γεννητων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πατήρ ἐστι, ποιητὴς δὲ τῶν ἀλώγων καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων,* "That perhaps he was called the father of all the generated gods, and of men, but the maker of the irrational and inanimate things of the world." But afterward he adds, that this highest God might therefore be styled the father of the whole corporeal world also, as well as the maker, because it is no dead and inanimate thing, but endued with life: *Ἐμψύχου γὰρ γέννησις ἡ γένεσίς ἐστι· καὶ ποιητοῦ μὲν, οἷος οἰκοδόμος ἢ ὑφάντης, ἢ λύρας δημιουργὸς ἢ ἀνδριαντος, ἀπήλλακται τό γενόμενον ἔργον· ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ γεννήσαντος ἀρχὴ καὶ δύναμις ἐγκέκραται τῷ τεκνωθέντι, καὶ συνέχει τὴν φύσιν, ἀπόσπασμα καὶ μόριον οὖσαν τοῦ τεκνώσαντος. Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν οὐ πεπλασμένοις ὁ κόσμος οὐδὲ συνηρμοσμένοις ποιήμασιν ἔοικεν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν αὐτῷ μοῖρα πολλὴ ζωότητος καὶ θειότητος, ἣν ὁ Θεὸς ἐγκατέσπειρεν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ κατέμιξεν, εἰκότως ἅμα πατήρ τε τοῦ κόσμου, ζώου γεγονότος, καὶ ποιητὴς ἐπονομάζεται,* "Generation is the making or production of something animate. And the work of an artificer, as an architect or statuary, as soon as it is produced, departeth and is removed from the maker thereof, as having no intrinsic dependence upon him; whereas from him that begetteth, there is a principle and power infused into that which is begotten, and mingled therewith, that containeth the whole nature thereof, as being a kind of avulsion from the begetter. Wherefore since the world is not like to those works that are artificially made and compacted by men, but hath a participation of life and divinity, which God hath inserted into it, and mingled with it, God is therefore rightly styled by Plato, not only the maker, but also the father of the

* Page 100. par.

whole world as being an animal." To the same purpose also Plotinus,* Γενόμενος δὴ, οἷον οἰκός τις καλὸς καὶ ποικίλος, οὐκ ἀπετμήθη τοῦ πεποιηκότος, οὐδ' αὖ ἐκοίνωσεν αὐτὸν· ἔχει γὰρ ψυχὴν, κρατούμενος, οὐ κρατῶν, καὶ ἐχόμενος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχων, κεῖται γὰρ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀνεχούσῃ αὐτὸν, καὶ οὐκ ἄμοιρον ἔστιν αὐτῆς, ὡς ἂν ἐν ὕδασι δίκτυον τεγγόμενον ζωῇ, "The world being made as a large and stately edifice, was neither cut off and separated from its Maker, nor yet mingled and confounded with him. Forasmuch as he still remaineth above, presiding over it; the world being so animated, as rather to be possessed by soul than to possess it, it lying in that great Psyche, which sustaineth it, as a net in the waters, all moistened with life." Thus Plotinus supposing the whole corporeal world to be animated, affirmeth it neither to be cut off from its maker (by which maker he here understands the mundane soul), nor yet that mundane soul itself to be immersed into its body the world, after the same manner as our human souls are into these bodies; but so to preside over it, and act it, as a thing elevated above it. And though, according to him, that second divine hypostasis of Nous or Intellect be in like manner elevated above this mundane soul, and again, that first hypostasis or supreme Deity (called by him unity and goodness), above intellect; yet the corporeal world could not be said to be cut off from these neither; they being all three (monad, mind, and soul) closely and intimated united together.

XXX. The Hebrews were the only nation, who before Christianity for several ages professedly opposed the polytheism and idolatry of the pagan world. Wherefore it may be probably concluded, that they had the right notion of this pagan polytheism, and understood what it consisted in, viz. whether in worshipping many unmade, self-originated deities, as partial creators of the world; or else in worshipping, besides the supreme God, other created beings superior to men? Now Philo plainly understood the pagan polytheism after this latter way; as may appear from this passage of his in his book concerning the Confusion of Languages, where speaking of the supreme God (the maker and lord of the whole world), and of his δυνάμεις ἀρωγοὶ, his "innumerable assistant powers," both visible and invisible, he adds:† Καταπλαγέντες οὖν τινες τὴν ἑκατέρου τῶν κόσμων φύσιν οὐ μόνον ὅλους ἐξεθείωσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μερῶν, ἥλιον, καὶ σελήνην, καὶ τὸν σύμπαντα οὐρανὸν, ἅπερ οὐδὲν αἰδεσθέντες θεοὺς ἐκάλεσαν, ὧν τὴν ἐπίνοιαν κατιδὼν Μωϋσῆς φησι· κύριε, κύριε, βασιλεῦ τῶν θεῶν, ἔνδειξιν τῆς παρ' ὑπηκόους ἄρχοντος διαφορᾶς, "Wherefore some men being struck with admiration of both these worlds, the visible and the

* Ennead. 4. lib. 3. cap. 9. [P. 379.] † Page 345.

invisible, have not only deified the whole of them, but also their several parts, as the sun, and the moon, and the whole heaven: they not scrupling to call these gods. Which notion and language of theirs Moses respected in those words of his, *Thou Lord the king of gods*; he thereby declaring the transcendency of the supreme God above all those his subjects called gods." To the same purpose Philo writeth also in his Commentary upon the Decalogue:* Πᾶσαν οὖν τὴν τοιαύτην τερθρείαν ἀπωσάμενοι, τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς φύσει [illegible] εν, εἰ καὶ καθαρωτέρας καὶ ἀθανατωτέρας οὐσίας [illegible] δ' ἀλλήλων τὰ γενόμενα, καθ' ὃ γέγονεν· ἐπεὶ κ [illegible] ων ὁ ποιητὴς τῶν ὅλων· καὶ πρῶτον τοῦτο καὶ ἱερώ[illegible] μα στηλιτεύσωμεν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἕνα τὸν ἀνωτάτω νομί [illegible] θεὸν, "Wherefore removing all such impost[illegible] hip no beings, that are by nature brothers and [illegible] though endued with far more pure and immo[illegible] n we are. For all created things, as such, have [illegible] ane and brotherly equality with one another, the maker [illegible] things being their common father. But let us deeply infix this first and most holy commandment in our breasts, to acknowledge and worship one only highest God." And again afterwards: "Οσοι μὲν ἡλίου, καὶ σελήνης, καὶ τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ κόσμου, καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁλοσχερεστάτων μερῶν, ὡς θεῶν, πρόπολοί τε καὶ θεραπευταὶ, διαμαρτάνουσι, τοὺς ὑπηκόους τοῦ ἄρχοντος σεμνύνοντες, "They who worship the sun, and the moon, and the whole heaven and world, and the principal parts of them as gods, err, in that they worship the subjects of the prince;" whereas the prince alone ought to be worshipped. Thus, according to Philo, the pagan polytheism consisted in giving religious worship, besides the supreme God, to other created understanding beings, and parts of the world, more pure and immortal than men.[4]

* Page 753.

[4] I have no hesitation in saying, however, that these passages of Philo contain nothing confirmatory of Dr. Cudworth's opinion, that the pagan polytheists worshipped one God, superior to all the other deities. For in the former Philo affirms merely, that Moses held this belief and rebuked the folly of the nations, that called the world and the several parts of the world gods, by this very invocation of the supreme Being. But what, I ask, has this to do with the opinion of the Pagans respecting one God? Does it follow, because they worshipped the world and the several parts of the world as gods and Moses abominated this wickedness, that there was no one so insane as to discard a supreme God, the parent of all things? For my part I think not, being convinced, that the worthy Doctor has here been much too quick-sighted in interpreting Philo. Neither is the other passage of more avail in this matter. In it Philo is showing, that we ought to worship one God and not to pay created beings the homage, which is due only to the Creator. But I cannot understand, how the circumstance of Philo's inculcating the worship of one God and exhorting us to reject superstitions, is to be regarded as proof, that all nations acknowledged one God. To confess the truth, the contrary seems to me to be evident rather from this passage. Indeed I think I can make it plainly appear, that Philo entertained a very different notion of idolatry from Dr. Cudworth and was of opinion, that the nations of antiquity had lost all

Flavius Josephus, in his Judaic Antiquities,[5] extolling Abraham's wisdom and piety, writeth thus concerning him: Πρῶτος οὖν τολμᾷ Θεὸν ἀποφήνασθαι δημιουργὸν τῶν ὅλων ἕνα, which some would understand in this manner, "that Abraham was the first who publicly declared that there was one God the Demiurgus or maker of the whole world;" as if all mankind besides, at that time, had supposed the world to have been made not by one, but by many gods. But the true meaning of those words is this, that Abraham was the first, who, in that degenerate age, publicly declared, that the maker of the whole world was the

knowledge of one supreme Deity. To do so, I shall quote two passages, which in my opinion put it beyond all question. One occurs in his Commentary on the Decalogue, p. 751. 752. opp. where Philo is professedly treating upon the religion of the nations ignorant of the true religion: and in the first place divides it into its sects, as follows: Ἐκτεθειώκασι γὰρ οἱ μὲν τὰς τέσσαρας ἀρχὰς, γῆν, καὶ ὕδωρ, καὶ ἀέρα, καὶ πῦρ, οἱ δ' ἥλιον, καὶ σελήνην, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πλανήτας, καὶ ἀπλανεῖς ἀστέρας, οἱ δὲ μόνον τὸν οὐρανὸν, οἱ δὲ τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον, "For some have deified the four elements, the earth, water, air, and fire; others the sun, moon, planets, and fixed stars; others only heaven; and others the whole world." Philo, therefore, as is manifest also from other passages of his, made the whole of the pagan polytheism to consist in the worship of the world or its parts, and did not believe departed men to belong to the number of pagan gods; in which matter indeed he deferred too much to the expositions of the ancient religions put forth by philosophers. Having made this distribution, he boldly asserts of all these sects, that the knowledge of one supreme God was utterly obliterated and extinct among them: Τὸν δ' ἀνωτάτω καὶ πρεσβύτατον γεννήτην, τὸν ἄρχοντα τῆς μεγάλης πόλεως, τὸν στρατιάρχην τῆς ἀηττήτου στρατιᾶς, καὶ κυβερνήτην, ὃς οἰκονομεῖ σωτηρίως ἀεὶ τὰ σύμπαντα, παρεκαλύψαντο, "But the supreme and most ancient Parent, the prince of the mighty city, the leader of the invincible army, the governor who ever wisely administers all things, they have veiled in obscurity." He then at some length descants upon the folly of those, who held heaven and the stars in the rank of gods, and among other things expressly attributes to some of this class the very opinion, which Dr. Cudworth denies to have ever been entertained by any people: Ἔνιοι περὶ τὰς κρίσεις ἀπονοίᾳ τοσαύτῃ κέχρηνται, ὡς οὐ μόνον τὰ εἰρημένα θεοὺς νομίζειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μέγιστον καὶ πρῶτον Θεὸν, τὸν ὄντα ὄντως, "Some are so perverse in their judgment, as not only to believe that the above-mentioned things are gods, but also that each of them is the supreme and greatest God, who is really such." If this be true, there were formerly those, who believed in the existence of a plurality of gods, perfectly equal to each other and not subject to the power of one. The other passage which I shall appeal to occurs in his book on Monarchy, p. 812. where he thus writes: Τινὲς ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀστέρας ὑπέλαβον εἶναι θεοὺς αὐτοκράτορας, οἷς τὰς τῶν γινομένων ἁπάντων αἰτίας ἀνέθεσαν, "Some believed the sun, moon, and the rest of the stars, to be independent gods, to whom they referred the causes of all things." We here see a kind of republic of gods, governing by their own power. But in the sequel he speaks still more plainly and among other things openly asserts, that many acknowledged no other gods but the sun and moon: Οἱ γὰρ ἰδόντες ἥλιον——καὶ σελήνην, πλάνον ἐπλανήθησαν ἀνήνυτον, μόνους εἶναι τούτους θεοὺς ὑποτοπήσαντες, "For some, beholding the sun——and moon, were led into inextricable error——supposing these to be the only gods." For the rest of this argument I refer my reader to Philo himself, who certainly is very far from supporting the opinion of our author.

[5] Lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 28. &c. tom. 1. opp. But this passage, if even we adopt the learned Doctor's interpretation, is not at all to the present question. For Josephus is not stating, what sentiments the nations of antiquity entertained respecting God and religion, much less that those nations acknowledged one supreme Deity, but is merely expounding the doctrine and religious opinions of Abraham, whom no one has ever ventured to deny to have been a worshipper of one God.

one only God, and alone to be religiously worshipped; accordingly, as it follows afterwards in the same writer: Ὡι καλῶς ἔχει μόνῳ τὴν τιμὴν καὶ τὴν εὐχαριστίαν ἀπονέμειν, "to whom alone men ought to give honour and thanks." And the reason hereof is there also set down: Τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν, εἰ καί τι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν συντελεῖ, κατὰ προσταγὴν τὴν τούτου παρέχειν ἕκαστον, καὶ οὐ κατ' οἰκείαν ἰσχύν, "Because all those other beings, that were then worshipped as gods, whatsoever any of them contributed to the happine… they did it not by their own power, but by his ap… ommand;" he instancing in the sun and moon, … ea, which are all made and ordered by a higher p… dence, by the force whereof they contribute to ot… if he should have said, that no created being ou… iously worshipped, but the Creator only. And … what we read in Scripture concerning Abraham … led upon the name of the Lord, אל עולם,* the … le world;" that is, he worshipped no particular created beings, as the other Pagans at that time did, but only that supreme universal Numen, which made and containeth the whole world. And thus Maimonides interprets that place, †התחיל להודיע לעם שאין ראוי לעבוד אלא לאלוה העולם "Abraham began to teach, that none ought to be religiously worshipped, save only the God of the whole world." Moreover, the same Josephus[o] afterwards in his twelfth book brings in Aristæus (who seems to have been a secret proselyted Greek) pleading with Ptolemæus Philadelphus, in behalf of the Jews and their liberty, after this manner: Τὴν βασιλείαν σου διέποντος, τοῦ θεμένου τοὺς νόμους αὐτοῖς· τὸν γὰρ ἅπαντα συστησάμενον θεὸν, καὶ οὗτοι καὶ ἡμεῖς σεβόμεθα, Ζῆνα καλοῦντες αὐτὸν, ἑτοίμως ἀπὸ τοῦ σύμπασιν ἐμφύειν τὸ ζῆν, τὴν ἐπίκλησιν αὐτοῦ νοήσαντες, "It would well agree with your goodness and magnanimity, to free the Jews from that miserable captivity which they are under: since the same God, who governeth your kingdom, gave laws to them, as I have by diligent search found out. For both they and we do alike worship the God who made all things, we calling him Zene, because he gives life to all. Wherefore for the honour

* Gen. xxi. 23. † De Idol. c. 1. sect. 7. [P. 7. Edit. Voss.]

[o] Cap. 2. sect. 2. p. 586. tom. 1. opp. Havercampi. I should not be disposed to put much faith in this oration of Aristæus. For, I. It is the production of Josephus, who, as is well known, attempted to show, that there was less difference between the religion of the Jews and those of other nations, than people generally supposed; in which he very frequently exceeds all bounds. II. The object of this oration was to propitiate the king, and to excite his compassion. And who is not aware, that in discourses of this kind men attend less to what is in strict conformity with the truth, than to what is calculated to produce an impression upon the minds of those, whom they are addressing. III. Supposing Aristæus to have really believed the Grecian Jupiter to be the same as the God of the Hebrews, still the opinion of a scholar and philosopher like him will be no clue to the religions of the people, who are accustomed to *pay little regard* to what wise men may say and inculcate.

of that God, whom they worship after a singular manner, please you to indulge them the liberty of returning to their native country." Where Aristæus also, according to the sense of Pagans, thus concludes: Know, O king, that I intercede not for these Jews, as having any cognation with them, Πάντων δὲ ἀνθρώπων δημιούργημα ὄντων τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ γινώσκων αὐτὸν ἡδόμενον τοῖς εὐποιοῦσιν, ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ σε παρακαλῶ, "But all men being the workmanship of God, and knowing that he is delighted with beneficence, I therefore thus exhort you."

As for the latter Jewish writers and rabbins, it is certain, that the generality of them supposed the Pagans to have acknowledged one supreme and universal Numen, and to have worshipped all their other gods only as his ministers, or as mediators between him and them: Maimonides in Halacoth[7] עכו"ם describeth the rise of the pagan polytheism in the days of Enosh after this manner: בימי אנוש טעו בני האדם טעות מדול ונבערה עצת חכמי אותו הדור ואנוש עצמו מן הטועים היה וזו היתה טעותם: אמרו הואיל והאל ברא כוכבים אלו ונלגלים להנחת את העולם ונתנם במרום וחלק להם כבוד והם משמשים המשמשים לפניו ראויים הם לשבחם ולפארם ולחלוק להם כבוד וזהו רצון האל ברוך הוא לגדל ולכבד מי שגדלו וכבדו כמו שהמלך רוצה לכבד העומדים לפניו וזהו כבודו של מלך "In the days of Enosh, the sons of men grievously erred, and the wise men of that age became brutish (even Enosh himself being in the number of them); and their error was this, that since God had created the stars and spheres to govern the world, and placing them on high, had bestowed this honour upon them, that they should be his ministers and subservient instruments, men ought therefore to praise them, honour them, and worship them; this being the pleasure of the blessed God, that men should magnify and honour those whom himself hath magnified and honoured, as a king will have his ministers to be reverenced, this honour redounding to himself." Again, the same Maimonides in the beginning of the second chapter of that book writeth thus: עיקר הצווי העבודה זרה שלא לעבוד אחד מכל הברואים לא מלאך ולא כלגל ולא כוכב ולא אחד מן היסודות ולא אחד מכל הנבראים מהן ואף עלפי שהעובד יודע שהשם הוא האלהים והוא עובד הנברא הזה על דרך שעבד אנוש ואנשי דורו תחלה חרי זה עבד עבודה זרה "The foundation of that commandment against strange worship (now commonly called idolatry) is this, that no man should worship any of the creatures whatsoever, neither angel, nor sphere, nor star, nor any of the four elements, nor any thing made out of them. For though he that worships these things knows that the Lord is God, and superior to them all, and worships those creatures no otherwise than Enosh and the rest of that age did, yet is he nevertheless guilty of strange worship or idolatry." And that, after the

[7] That is, De Idololatria, cap. 1. sect. 1. p. 3.

times of Enosh also, in succeeding ages, the polytheism of the pagan nations was no other than this, the worshipping (besides one supreme God) of other created beings, as the ministers of his providence, and as middles or mediators betwixt him and men, is declared likewise by Maimonides (in his More Nevochim) to have been the universal belief of all the Hebrews or Jews:*
ואתה יודע כי כל מי שעובד עבודה זדה לא יעבדה דעת שאין אלוה בלעדיה
יה ולא דמה מעולם כלל מן העובדים ולא ידמה מן הבאים שהצורה אשר
יעשה מן המתכות או מן האב ה ההיא היה אשר בראה
השמים והארץ אבל אמנם יעבד דמיון לדבר שהיא אמצעי
ק בו אחד מבעלי תודתנו " You
know, that whosoever lolatry, he doth it not as
supposing that there i besides that which he wor-
shippeth, for it never minds of any idolaters, nor
never will, that that made by them of metal, or
stone, or wood, is that created heaven and earth;
but they worship the images only as the repre-
sentation of something is a mediator between God and
them."[8] Moses Albelda, the author of the book entitled עולת תמיד
"Gnolath Tamid," resolves all the pagan polytheism and idolatry into these two principles, one of which respected God, and the other men themselves:† האמועני לזה מצדו ית ואומרום כי הוא גבוה
מעל גבוה ואא להדבק בו רך עי תאמצעיום כמנהג המלך בו שהרוצים לשאול
שאלה מה ממנו ישאלוה עי אמצעי ולכן עשים אותה העא כדי להודיד השפע

* P. 1. c. 36.

[8] I shall not attempt to call in question these testimonies of Maimonides, although I could offer a remark or two upon them perhaps not altogether unimportant. Let me intimate, however, that this great master of the Jews was not wedded to the same opinion as Dr. Cudworth, that there never existed a nation, which did not acknowledge one God, the king and lord of all the others. For there are passages, wherein he expressly states, that before Abraham inculcated the doctrine of one God, all knowledge of this supreme Being was lost to the world, and that the learned as well as unlearned believed in the existence of no deities, except the stars and heavenly bodies. In fact Maimonides comprises the entire history of idolatry, which he supposes to have flourished in the world before Abraham's time, in two periods. In the former of these periods the condition of mankind he tells us, was such as Dr. Cudworth supposes it to have been in all ages, that is, they worshipped the stars and heavenly bodies, but yet did not deny a supreme God, whom all the stars obey: De Idololatria, cap. 1. sect. 23. p. 5. 6. In the latter period he considers much greater corruption to have prevailed, and the ignorant and learned alike to have erred so grossly, as to acknowledge no god but the stars, the knowledge of one supreme Being being utterly eradicated. I shall give his own words, in a translation only, to save space, De Idololatr. cap. 1. sect. 5. p. 6. "In process of time," says he, "the venerable and awful name perished from the mouths and minds of men, so that they no longer recognized it. And now the whole human race . . . . knew nothing, but images. . . . . But even the wise among them, such as the priests and others of that class, did not suppose any other god to exist besides the stars, on account and in resemblance of which those images were made." This distribution Maimonides has in view in the second passage quoted by Dr. Cudworth, when he declares, that though any one should worship many gods after the manner of Enosh, that is, be addicted to the better sort of idolatry, he is nevertheless guilty of strange worship. From which therefore we can by no means infer, that Maimonides supposed all men formerly to have been devoted to that species of religion.

† Fol. 147.

האלהי על ידה: הב טוענין מצד עצמם וזה כי היות האדם בשמי איט יכול להתחבורך מעצמו אם לא ישים נכדו דבר מה מחשש יעידהו ויעודדו להכין עצמו בדי שתדבק בו השכחתו יתברך " The idolaters first argued thus in respect of God; that since he was of such transcendent perfection above men, it was not possible for men to be united to, or have communion with him, otherwise than by means of certain middle beings or mediators; as it is the manner of earthly kings, to have petitions conveyed to them by the hands of mediators and intercessors. Secondly, they thus argued also in respect of themselves; that being corporeal, so that they could not apprehend God abstractly, they must needs have something sensible to excite and stir up their devotion and fix their imagination upon." Joseph Albo, in the book called Ikkarim, concludes that Ahab, and the other idolatrous kings of Israel and Judah worshipped other gods upon those two accounts mentioned by Maimonides and no otherwise, namely, that the supreme God " was honoured by worshipping of his ministers," and that there ought to be " certain middles and mediators betwixt him and men,"* אחאב וזולתו ממלכי ושראל ויהודה היו טועין אחר הכהות הגלגל יות משחי צדקן שאמרנו וגם שלמה מעה בזה עם היותם מאמינים במציאות השם ואחדותו אם כשהיו חושבים לנדר את השם בזה ואם כשהיו חושבין לעשות סרסור ואמצעיים בינם ובין השם יתב " Ahab, and other kings of Israel and Judah, and even Solomon himself, erred in worshipping the stars, upon those two accounts already mentioned out of Maimonides, notwithstanding that they believed the existence of God and his unity; they partly conceiving that they should honour God in worshipping of his ministers, and partly worshipping them as mediators betwixt God and themselves." And the same writer determines the meaning of that first commandment (which is to him the second) " Thou shalt have no other gods before my face," to be this, להנכים אותם אמצעיים ביני וביניך או שתחשוב לדמם אותי בעבודתם " Thou shalt not set up other inferior gods as mediators betwixt me and thyself, or worship them so, as thinking to honour me thereby." R. David Kimehi (upon 2 Kings xvii.) writeth thus concerning that Israelitish priest, who, by the king of Assyria's command, was sent to Samaria to teach the new inhabitants thereof to worship the God of that land (of whom it is afterwards said, that they both feared the Lord, and served their idols): אם יאמר להם שלא יהיו עובדים עבודה זרה כלל לא היו מאמינים שהוא דבר שנדלו בו כל האומות מקדם והוא אצלם כמו מושכל ראשון אך אמר להם שיהיו עובדים את אלוהיהם כמו שהיו עובדים ובלבד שתהא בוונת האל בלבם כי אלא האלהים לא ורעו ולא ייטיבו כי אם ברצון האל אלא שעובדים אותם להיותם אמצעיים בינם ובין הבורא " If he should have altogether prohibited them their idolatry, they would not have hearkened to him, that being a thing which

* P. 3. c. 18.

all those eastern people were educated in from their very infancy, insomuch that it was a kind of first principle to them. Wherefore he permitted them to worship all their several gods, as before they had done; only he required them to direct the intention of their minds to the God of Israel (as the supreme) for those gods could neither do them good nor hurt, otherwise than according to his will and pleasure: but they worshipped them to this purpose, that they might be MEDIATORS betwixt them and the Creator." In [illegible] zachon, all the polytheism and idolatry of the P[illegible] to these three heads: first, נבדו משרתי חשם לכבודו worshipped the ministers of God, as thinking to [illegible] ereby;" and secondly, עבדו אותם שיהיו מליצים בעדם worshipped them as orators and intercessors for th[illegible] nd lastly, עבדו לעץ ואבן לזכרו wood and stone for memorials of him." And [illegible] true that Isaac Abrabanel (upon 2 Kings xvii.) [illegible] te more species of pagan idolatry, even to the [illegible], yet are they all of them but so many several modes of creature-worship; and there is no such thing amongst them to be found, as the worshipping of many unmade independent deities, as partial creators of the world.

Moreover, those Rabbinic writers commonly interpret certain places of the Scripture to this sense, that the pagan idolaters did notwithstanding acknowledge one supreme Deity, as that Jeremy x. 7, "Who is there that will not fear thee, thou King of nations? For amongst all their wise men, and in all their kingdoms, there is none like unto thee; though they are become altogether brutish, and their worshipping of stocks is a doctrine of vanity;" for Maimonides thus glosseth upon those words: כלומד הכל יודעים שאתה הוא לבדך אבל מעותם וכסילותם שמדמים שזה ההבל רצונך הוא "As if he should say, all the Gentiles know, that thou art the only supreme God, but their error and folly consisteth in this, that they think this vanity of worshipping inferior gods to be a thing agreeable to thy will." And thus also Kimchi in his Commentaries: מי לא יראך אפילו הגוים העובדים האלילים ראוי להם שייראוך כי אתה מלך עליהם בכל חכמי חגוים ובכל מלכותם אומרים מאין כמוך ואינם עובדים הכוכבים אלא להיותם אמצעיים ביניך וביניהם ואמר חכמי הגוים כי הם יודעים כי הפסל איט כלום ואם יעבדו הכוכבים לא יעבדים אלא מפני שהם משרתיך להיותם אמצעיים "Who will not fear thee? It is fit, that even the nations themselves, who worshipped idols, should fear thee, for thou art their king; and indeed amongst all the wise men of the nations, and in all their kingdoms, it is generally acknowledged, that there is none like unto thee. Neither do they worship the stars otherwise than as mediators betwixt thee and them. Their wise men know that an idol is nothing; and though they worship stars, yet do they worship them as thy

ministers, and that they may be intercessors for them." Another place is that, Malachi i. 11. which, though we read in the future tense, as a prophecy of the Gentiles, yet the Jews understand it of that present time, when those words were written, "From the rising of the sun to the going down thereof, my name is great among the Gentiles; and in every place incense is offered to my name, and a pure oblation, for my name is great amongst the Gentiles, saith the Lord of hosts. But you profane it," &c. Upon which words R. Solomon glosseth thus: מי שיש לא עֵין יודע שהוא אלוה שהוא על כולם ובכל מקום מהנדבים לשמי אפ האומות "The pagan Polytheists and idolaters know, that there is one God superior to all those other gods and idols worshipped by them; and in every place are there free-will offerings brought to my name, even amongst the Gentiles." And Kimchi agreeth with him herein: אפ על פי שהגוים עובדים לצבא השמים מידים בי שאני הסבה חראשונה אלא שעובדים אותם שיהיו אמצעיים ביני ובינם "Although the Pagans worshipped the host of heaven, yet do they confess me to be the first Cause, they worshipping them only as in their opinion certain mediators betwixt me and them." Whether either of these two places of Scripture does sufficiently prove what these Jews would have, or no; yet, however, it is evident from their interpretations of them, that themselves supposed the Pagans to have acknowledged one supreme Deity, and that their other gods were all but his creatures and ministers. Nevertheless, there is another place of Scripture, which seems to sound more to this purpose, and accordingly hath been thus interpreted by Rabbi Solomon and others, Psalm lxv. 6, where God is called מבטח כל קעוי ארץ וים רחקים "The confidence of all the ends of the earth, and of them that are afar off in the sea," that is, even of all the pagan world.

Thus we see plainly, that the Hebrew doctors and rabbins have been generally of this persuasion, that the pagan nations anciently, at least the intelligent amongst them, acknowledged one supreme God of the whole world; and that all their other gods were but creatures and inferior ministers; which were worshipped by them upon these two accounts, either as thinking, that the honour done to them redounded to the Supreme, or else that they might be מליצין, סרסורים, and אמצעיים, "their mediators, and intercessors, orators, and negotiators" with him. Which inferior gods of the Pagans were supposed by these Hebrews to be chiefly of two kinds, angels and stars or spheres. The latter of which the Jews, as well as Pagans, concluded to be animated and intellectual; for thus Maimonides expressly:* כל הכוכבים והגלגלים כולן בעלי נפש וריעה והשפל הם וחם חיים ועומדים וכמרין את מי שאמר וחיה העולם בל אחד ואחר לפי מדלו ולפי מעלתו

* Jesude Hattotah, c. 3. sect. 9.

משבחין ומפארים ליוצרם כמו המלאכים "The stars and spheres are every one of them animated, and endued with life, knowledge and understanding. And they acknowledge Him, who commanded and the world was made, every one of them, according to their degree and excellency, praising and honouring him, as the angels do." And this they would confirm from that place of scripture, Neh. ix. 6, "Thou, even thou, art Lord alone; thou hast made heaven, the heaven of heavens with all their host, the earth with all things , the seas and all that is therein, and thou pre ; and the host of heaven worshippeth thee:" th n being commonly put for the stars.

XXXI. But lastly g is plainly confirmed from the Scriptures of the t also; that the Gentiles and Pagans, however idolaters, were not unacquainted with the kno ue God, that is, of the one only self-existent and ing, which comprehendeth all things under him: from whence it must needs follow, that their other many gods were all of them supposed to have been derived from this one, and to be dependent on him.

For first, St. Paul in his Epistle to the Romans[9] tells us, that these Gentiles or Pagans did *τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατέχειν*, "hold the truth in unrighteousness, or unjustly detain and imprison the same." Which is chiefly to be understood of the truth concerning God, as appears from that which follows, and therefore, implies the Pagans not to have been unfurnished of such a knowledge of God, as might and ought to have kept them from all kinds of idolatry, however, by their default it proved ineffectual to that end; as is afterwards declared: *Οὐκ ἐδοκίμασαν τὸν Θεὸν ἔχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει*,* "They liked not to retain God in the agnition," or "practical knowledge of him." Where there is a distinction to be observed betwixt *γνῶσις* and *ἐπίγνωσις*, "the knowledge" and "the agnition" of God; the former whereof, in this chapter, is plainly granted to the Pagans, though the latter be here denied them, because they lapsed into polytheism and

[9] I am not disposed to undervalue this exposition of the apostle's words, which assumes *ἐν ἀδικίᾳ* to be the same as *ἀδίκως*, or "unjustly;" nor am I ignorant, that it has been adopted by men of the highest eminence. Nevertheless, the following interpretation, I am convinced, is more elegant and more in accordance with the context: "Who by their injustice have prevented the truth from developing itself in their minds." That the words themselves will bear this interpretation, is unquestionable; neither does any one require to be told, that *ἀδικία* signifies *impiety* and *depravity* generally. And that the heavenly truth was formerly, as it is daily even now, stifled as it were and suppressed by the impiety, vices, and lusts of mankind, is most manifest. And the more depraved and vicious we are, the less are our minds illumined with the light of reason and true wisdom. Hence, the Gentiles, indulging in a most depraved course of life and imposing no restraint upon their lusts, by this *ἀδικία* caused their knowledge of God to be gradually extinguished in their minds and the most pernicious errors to usurp the place of truth.

* *Verse 28.*

idolatry; which is the meaning of these words: Μετήλλαξαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν τῷ ψεύδει,* "They changed the truth of God into a lie." Again, the same apostle there affirmeth, that the τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ φανερόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς, "that which may be known of God, was manifest within them, God himself having showed it unto them." There is something of God unknowable and incomprehensible by all mortals, but that of God, which is knowable, his eternal power and godhead, with the attributes belonging thereunto, is made manifest to all mankind from his works. "The invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, being clearly seen and understood by the things that are made." Moreover, this apostle expressly declareth the Pagans to have known God, in that censure which he giveth of them, διότι γνόντες τὸν Θεὸν, οὐχ ὡς Θεὸν ἐδόξασαν:† "That when they knew God, they glorified him not as God;" because they fell into polytheism and idolatry. Though the apostle here instanceth only in the latter of those two, their "changing the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds and beasts, and creeping things." The reason whereof is, because this idolatry of the Pagans, properly so called, that is, their worshipping of stocks and stones, formed into the likeness of man or beast, was generally taken amongst the Jews for the grossest of all their religious miscarriages. Thus Philo plainly declareth:‡ "Οσοι μὲν ἡλίου, καὶ σελήνης, καὶ τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ κόσμου, καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁλοσχερεστάτων μερῶν, ὡς θεῶν, πρόπολοί τε καὶ θεραπευταὶ, διαμαρτάνουσι μέν· (πῶς γὰρ οὔ, τοὺς ὑπηκόους τοῦ ἄρχοντος σεμνύνοντες) ἧττον δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀδικοῦσι, τῶν ξύλα καὶ λίθους, ἀργυρόν τε καὶ χρυσὸν, καὶ τὰς παραπλησίους ὕλας μορφωσάντων, &c. "Whosoever worship the sun, and moon, and the whole heaven, and world, and the chief parts thereof, as gods, do unquestionably err, (they honouring the subjects of the prince) but they are guilty of the less iniquity and injustice than those, who form wood and stone, gold and silver, and the like matters, into statues, to worship them," &c. of which assertion he afterwards gives this account: Τὸ γὰρ κάλλιστον ἔρεισμα τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξέκοψαν, τὴν περὶ τοῦ ζῶντος ἀεὶ θεοῦ προσήκουσαν ὑπόληψιν, "Because these have cut off the most excellent fulcrum of the soul, the persuasion of the ever-living God, by means whereof, like unballasted ships, they are tossed up and down perpetually, nor can be ever able to rest in any safe harbour." And from hence it came to pass, that the polytheism of the Pagans, their worshipping of inferior gods (as stars and demons) was vulgarly called also by the Jews and Christians, idolatry, it being so denominated by them à famosiore specie. Lastly, the apostle plainly declares,

* Verse 25. † Verse 21. ‡ De Decal. p. 753.

that the error of the pagan superstition universally consisted (not in worshipping many independent gods and creators, but) in joining creature worship, as such, some way or other, with the worship of the Creator: Ἐσεβάσθησαν καὶ ἐλάτρευσαν τῇ κτίσει παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα,* which words are either to be thus rendered: "They [religiously] worshipped the creature, besides the Creator," that preposition being often used in this sense, as for example, in this of Aristotle, where he affirmeth concerning Plato, that he did τὸ ἓν καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς παρὰ τὰ πράγματα ποιῆσαι,† (not make "numbers to be the things themselves," as the Pythagoreans had done, but) "unity and numbers to be besides the things;" or, τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ, "numbers to exist by themselves, besides the sensibles:" he by numbers meaning, as Aristotle himself there expounds it, τὰ εἴδη, "the ideas" contained in the first intellect (which was Plato's second divine hypostasis) as also by τὸ ἓν, ὃ τοῖς εἴδεσι παρέχεται τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, "that *ipsum unum*, or unity, which gives being to those ideas," is understood Plato's first divine hypostasis. Or else the words ought to be translated thus: "And worshipped the creature above or more than the Creator, that preposition παρὰ being sometimes used comparatively, so as to signify excess, as for example in Luke xiii. 2, "Think you that these Galileans were ἁμαρτωλοὶ παρὰ πάντας τοὺς Γαλιλαίους, sinners beyond all the Galileans?" And, ver. 4, "Think you, that those eighteen, upon whom the tower of Siloam fell were ὀφειλέται παρὰ πάντας, debtors above all the men that dwelt in Jerusalem?" According to either of which interpretations, it is supposed, that the Pagans did worship the true God, the Creator of the whole world; though they worshipped the creature also, besides him, or (perhaps in some sense) above him, and more than him also. But as for that other interpretation of παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα, which Beza chose rather to follow, that "they worshipped the creature, the Creator being wholly passed by," this is no true literal version, but only a gloss or commentary upon the words, made according to a certain preconceived and extravagant opinion, that the Pagans did not at all worship the supreme God or Creator, but universally transfer all their worship upon the creature only. But in what sense the Pagans might be said to worship the creatures, above or beyond, or more than the Creator, (because it is not possible, that the creature, as a creature, should be worshipped with more internal and mental honour than the Creator thereof, looked upon as such) we leave others to inquire. Whether or no, because when religious worship, which properly and only belongeth to the Creator, and not at all to the creature, is transferred from the Creator upon the creature, according to a Scripture interpreta-

* Verse 25. † Met. lib. 1. cap. 6. [P. 272. tom. 4. opp.]

tion and account, such may be said to worship the creature more than the Creator? Or whether, because some of these Pagans might more frequently address their devotions to their inferior gods (as stars, demons, and heroes) as thinking the supreme God either above their worship, or incomprehensible or inaccessible by them? Or lastly, whether because the image and statue-worshippers among the Pagans (whom the apostle there principally regards) did direct all their external devotion to sensible objects, and creaturely forms? However, it cannot be thought that the apostle here taxes the Pagans merely for worshipping creatures above the Creator, as if they had not at all offended, had they worshipped them only in an equality with him; but doubtless their sin was, that they gave any religious worship at all to the creature, though in way of aggravation of their crime it be said, that they also worshipped the creature more than the Creator. Thus we see plainly that the pagan superstition and idolatry (according to the true Scripture notion of it) consisted not in worshipping of many creators, but in worshipping the creatures together with the Creator.[10]

[10] The whole of this disputation of the learned Doctor's is ingenious and erudite. It only remains for us to inquire, whether St. Paul's discourse in this chapter on the pagan superstition pertains generally to all nations, or is to be divided into certain members, and not to be applied to one and the same class. To myself, on a careful examination of the whole, the apostle seems to be speaking of three distinct descriptions of men and of a threefold religion. Most assuredly, those who formerly worshipped false gods were not all of the same opinion, and therefore, cannot be comprehended in the same class. Hence, it is most probable, that St. Paul, when purposing to expose the crimes and errors of mankind, prior to the birth of our Saviour, distributed those who were ignorant of the true religion and estranged from the rational worship of God, into their respective classes. The religion of the wise men and philosophers was peculiar and altogether foreign to the opinions of the people. Next to them stood those who acknowledged one God, but at the same time worshipped heroes, genii, demons, and beings intermediate between God and men. The lowest place was occupied by the rude and uninformed vulgar, who, unable to abstract the mind from sensible objects, had no conception of a Parent and Creator of all things, but were devoted alone to statues, signs, and images. These three kinds of religion St. Paul accurately distinguishes and pourtrays in their own proper colours. He first speaks of the philosophers, in whom there was much of reason and wisdom. These, he tells us, v. 19. 20. by contemplating the divine works had become conscious of the existence of one all-wise and omnipotent God: but, v. 21. having forsaken this knowledge they had betaken themselves to subtle questions and idle disputes about inexplicable things, in which alone they made all wisdom to consist. Wherefore, while appearing to themselves to be supremely wise, they had become fools rather and madmen, v. 22. How truly this is said by the sacred writer, will be obvious to any one who has attentively perused the history of the ancient philosophers. From these St. Paul turns to the multitude, v. 23. whom he censures for changing the glory of God into the images of men and animals, and for directing all their devotion to signs and images, the worship of the one supreme God being altogether neglected and forsaken. Of which sin he immediately subjoins the punishment, v. 24. Last of all, v. 25. he rebukes those, who, although they ought to have paid divine honours to the supreme God alone, had nevertheless joined the creature with the Creator, and were more diligent in their devotions to heroes, demons, and genii, than in the worship of the incorruptible God. In my opinion, the discourse of St. Paul, if distinguished in this manner, is in admirable keeping, and gives a clear and beautiful analysis of the various errors of antiquity: whereas, if understood indiscriminately of all the worshippers of false gods, it appears to labour under a sort of confusion. But in thus

Besides this we have in the Acts of the Apostles an oration which St. Paul made at Athens in the Areopagitic court, beginning after this manner; "Ye men of Athens, I perceive that ye are every way more than ordinarily religious;" for the word δεισιδαιμονεστέρους seems to be taken there in a good sense, it being not only more likely, that St. Paul would in the beginning of his oration thus captare benevolentiam, "conciliate their benevolence," with some commendation of them, but also very unlikely, that he woul[illegible]rshipping of the true God by the name of supers[illegible]followeth: "for as I passed by and beheld your s[illegible]r monuments) I found an altar with this inscription. [illegible]Θεῷ, "To THE UNKNOWN GOD." It is true, that [illegible]atus[1] and Pausanias[2] write, that there were at Athe[illegible]ν ϑεῶν βῶμοι, "altars of unknown gods:" but th[illegible] this might well be, not that there were altars dedic[illegible]wn gods plurally, but that there were several alt[illegible]d this singular inscription, To THE UNKNOWN GOD. And that there was at least one such, besides this scripture record, is evident from that dialogue in Lucian's works, entitled Philopatris,[3] where Critias useth this form of oath: Νὴ τὸν Ἄγνωστον ἐν Ἀθήναις, "No, by the unknown god at Athens;" and Tryphon, in the close of that dialogue speaketh thus: Ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸν ἐν Ἀθήναις Ἄγνωστον ἐφευρόντες, καὶ προσκυνήσαντες, χεῖρας εἰς οὐρανὸν ἐκτείναντες, τούτῳ εὐχαριστήσομεν, ὡς καταξιωθέντες, &c, "But we having found out that unknown god at Athens, and worshipped him, with hands stretched up to heaven, will give thanks to him, as having been thought worthy to be made subject to this power."

classifying the religions of the pagan nations, the sacred writer follows the example of the Jews of his own time, who in their ridicule of these religions first of all separated the precepts and idle controversies of philosophers from the popular sentiments; as is evident from Philo's book, De Temulentia, p. 269. &c. where he admirably illustrates these words of St. Paul, φάσκοντες εἶναι σοφοὶ ἐμωράνθησαν: as also from Josephus, lib. 2. contra Apion, cap. 16. p. 482. cap. 19. p. 484. and then divided the rest of the multitude into those who, altogether unmindful of a supreme Being devoted themselves to statues and images of gods, and those who, although worshipping the sun, stars, and other created things, did notwithstanding not entirely forget the Creator. See Philo, De Monarchia, lib. 1. p. 812. &c. and elsewhere. If this explanation, then, of St. Paul's words be adopted, we must acknowledge, that all that can be proved from it is merely, that among the nations of antiquity there were some who offered prayers and sacrifices both to God and his creatures, but not that they were all addicted to this custom.

[1] De Vita Apollonii, lib. 6. cap. 3. p. 232.

[2] Lib. 5. p. 199.

[3] The first of the passages here quoted occurs cap. 9. p. 122. the other, cap. 23. p. 203. ed Gesneri. But neither of them proves any thing; for all in this dialogue is said in ridicule and in mockery of the Christian rites, and the profane man, whoever he was, is jeering at St. Paul's oration rather than showing that there really was such an altar at Athens. However, Laur. Ramiresius de Prado, in his Pentecontarch, cap. 16. p. 107. makes use of the same argument in this case as Dr. Cudworth, not to speak of others. I have no doubt, that an altar so inscribed was found by St. Paul at Athens; I merely deny these passages of Lucian to be any proof of that fact.

Which passages, as they do unquestionably refer to that Athenian inscription either upon one or more altars, so does the latter of them plainly imply, that this unknown God of the Athenians was the supreme governor of the world. And so it follows in St. Paul's oration: Ὃν οὖν ἀγνοοῦντες εὐσεβεῖτε, τοῦτον ἐγὼ καταγγέλλω ὑμῖν, "Whom therefore you ignorantly worship (under this name of the Unknown God) him declare I unto you, the God that made the world, and all things in it, the Lord of heaven and earth." From which place we may upon firm scripture authority conclude these two things; first, that by the unknown God of the Athenians was meant the only true God, he who made the world and all things in it; who, in all probability was therefore styled by them, Ἄγνωστος Θεὸς, "the unknown God," because he is not only invisible, but also incomprehensible by mortals; of whom Josephus against Appion[4] writeth thus, that he is δυνάμει μόνον ἡμῖν γνώριμος, ὁποῖος δὲ κατὰ οὐσίαν, ἄγνωστος, "knowable to us only by the effects of his power, but as to his own essence, unknowable or incomprehensible." But when in Dion Cassius, the God of the Jews is said to be ἄῤῥητος καὶ ἀειδὴς, not only "invisible" but also "ineffable," and when he is called in Lucan, Incertus Deus, "an uncertain God," the reason hereof seems to have been, not only because there was no image of him, but also because he was not vulgarly then known by any proper name, the Tetragrammaton being religiously forborne amongst the Jews in common use, that it might not be profaned. And what some learned men have here mentioned upon this occasion, of the Pagans sometimes sacrificing προσήκοντι θεῷ, "to the proper and convenient God," without signifying any name, seems to be nothing to this purpose; that proceeding only from a superstitious fear of these Pagans (supposing several gods to preside over several things) lest they should be mistaken, in not applying to the right and proper God, in such certain cases, and so their devotion prove unsuccessful and ineffectual. But that this unknown God is here said to be ignorantly worshipped by the Athenians, is to be understood chiefly in regard to their polytheism and idolatry. The second thing that may be concluded from hence, is this, that these Athenian Pagans did εὐσεβεῖν, "religiously worship the true God, the Lord of heaven and earth;" and so we have a scripture confutation also of that opinion, that the Pagans did not at all worship the supreme God.[5]

[4] Lib. 2. cap. 15. p. 482.

[5] On all this consult the very learned Dissertation of Andr. Basius, De Ara Ignoti Dei, and J. Meursius, De Pirræo, cap. 10. The truth of the opinion, here adopted by Dr. Cudworth respecting the unknown God of the Athenians, I myself attempted to establish some years ago, in my Cogitat. in Varios Novi Fœderis Locos, lib. 1. cap. 4. p. 68. &c. partly by arguments drawn from St. Paul's oration, and partly from numerous testimonies of ancient authors, in which they assert the supreme God of the

Lastly, St. Paul, citing this passage out of Aratus, a heathen poet, concerning Zeus or Jupiter,

Τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν—

"For we are his offspring," and interpreting the same of the true God, "in whom we live, and move, and have our being;" we have also here a plain scripture acknowledgment, that by the Zeus of the Greekish Pagans was sometimes at least meant the true God. And indeed that Aratus' Zeus was neither a man born in Crete nor ir[illegible] he Maker and supreme Governor of the whole [illegible] nt both from the antecedent and the subsequent [illegible] Aratus' Phenomena begins thus:

Ἐκ Διὸς ἀ[illegible]

(which in Tully's ve[illegible] e musarum primordia), and then follows a descri[illegible] s or Jupiter:

Τὸν οὐδέποτ' ἄνδρες ἐῶμεν
Ἄρρητον· μεσταὶ δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγυιαί,
Πᾶσαι δ' ἀνθρώπων ἀγοραί, μεστὴ δὲ θάλασσα,
Καὶ λιμένες· πάντῃ δὲ Διὸς κεχρήμεθα πάντες·
Τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν.

To this sense: "Him of whom we men are never silent; and of whom all things are full, he permeating and pervading all, and being every where; and whose beneficence we all constantly make use of and enjoy: for we also are his offspring." Where Theon the scholiast writeth thus: Πάνυ πρεπόντως ὁ Ἄρατος τὴν τῶν ἄστρων διεξιέναι μέλλων θέσιν, τὸν πατέρα τούτων καὶ δημιουργὸν, Δία, ἐν πρώτοις προσφωνεῖ· Δία δὲ νῦν τὸν Δημιουργὸν ἀκουστέον, "Aratus being about to declare the position of the stars, doth, in the first place, very decorously and becomingly invoke Zeus, the father and maker of them: for by Zeus is here to be understood the Demiurgus of the world;" or, as he afterwards expresseth it, Ὁ τὰ πάντα δημιουργήσας θεὸς, "The God who made all things." Notwithstanding which, we must

universe to be unknown. Nor, although aware that many think differently, am I yet induced to abandon this opinion. To the passages there brought forward, let me now add a saying of Sallust, the philosopher, from his book, De Diis, cap. 6. p. 253. wherein he calls the supreme Being, ἄρρητος δύναμις. Μετὰ δὲ τὴν οὕτως ἄρρητον δύναμιν αἱ τῶν θεῶν τάξεις εἰσί, "After this power, which cannot be expressed by words, follow the orders of the gods." But, if in this passage of St. Paul we suppose the unknown God to mean the supreme Parent and Creator of all things, still, I consider, we cannot infer from it, what the learned Doctor here wishes to prove, that all nations worshipped one God, superior to the rest of the gods. For setting aside, that the religions of the Athenians are by no means to be taken as the standard of those of other nations, it appears, that this very altar seen by St. Paul was the monument of a private man or family, consecrated for particular reasons. And it would be very rash and unsafe in us, I fancy, to estimate the religious sentiments of an entire people from the piety of private individuals.

confess, that this scholiast there adds, that some of these passages of the poet, and even that cited by the apostle, *τοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμὲν*, may be understood also in another sense, of the *Ζεὺς φυσικὸς*, "the physical Jupiter;" that is, the air; but without the least shadow of probability, and for no other reason, as we conceive, but only to show his philological skill. However this is set down by him, in the first place, as the genuine and proper sense of those words: *Πρὸς τὸ πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε· εἰ γὰρ αὐτὸς ταῦτα ἐδημιούργησε πρὸς τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις βιωφελὲς, αὐτοῦ ἂν κληθείημεν, αὐτὸν πατέρα καὶ δημιουργὸν ἐπιγραφόμενοι*, "This agreeth with that title of Jupiter, when he is called the father of gods and men: for if he made us, and all these other things for our use, we may well be called his, and also style him our father and maker." And that this was the only notion which the poet here had of Zeus or Jupiter, appears undeniably also from the following words, as:

Ὁ δ' ἤπιος ἀνθρώποισι
Δείξια σημαίνει—

"Who, as a kind and benign father, showeth lucky signs to men;" which to understrnd of the air were very absurd. And:

Αὐτὸς γὰρ τά γε σήματ' ἐν οὐρανῷ ἐστήριξεν,
Ἄστρα διακρίνας· ἐσκέψατο δ' εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν
Ἀστέρας

"For he also hath fastened the signs in heaven, distinguishing constellations, and having appointed stars to rise and set at several times of the year." And from this:

Τῷ μιν ἀεὶ πρῶτον τε καὶ ὕστατον ἱλάσκονται,

"Therefore is he always propitiated and placated both first and last." Upon which the scholiast thus: *Ἴσως δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν σπονδῶν, τῷ τὴν μὲν πρώτην σπονδὴν εἶναι θεῶν τῶν Ὀλυμπίων, δευτέραν δὲ ἡρώων, καὶ τρίτην Διὸς σωτῆρος*, "This perhaps refers to the libations, in that the first of them was for the heavenly gods, the second for heroes, and the last for Jupiter the saviour." From whence it plainly appears also, that the Pagans in their sacrifices (or religious rites) did not forget Jupiter the saviour, that is, the supreme God.

Lastly, from his concluding thus:

Χαῖρε, πάτερ, μέγα θαῦμα, μέγ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὄνειαρ·

Where the supreme God is saluted, as "the great wonder of the world, and interest of mankind."

Wherefore it is evident from Aratus' context, that by his Zeus or Jupiter was really meant the supreme God, the maker of the whole world; which being plainly confirmed also by St.

Paul and the scripture, ought to be a matter out of controversy amongst us. Neither is it reasonable to think, that Aratus was singular in this, but that he spake according to the received theology of the Greeks, and that not only amongst philosophers and learned men, but even the vulgar also.[6] Nor do we think, that that prayer of the ancient Athenians, commended by M. Antoninus* for its simplicity, is to be understood otherwise: Ὗσον, ὗσον, ὦ φίλε Ζεῦ, κατὰ τῆς ἀρούρας τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν πεδίων, "Rain, rain, O good (or gracious) Jupiter, upon the fields and pastures of the Athenians." Upon which the emperor thus: Ἤτοι οὐ δεῖ εὔχεσθαι, ἢ οὕτως ἁπλῶς καὶ ἐλευθέρως, "We should either not pray at all (to God) or else thus plainly and

[6] I. It is uncertain whether St. Paul in his oration to the Athenians alluded to these words of Aratus, or to the sentiment of some other poet, or rather of many of the Greek poets. For certainly Aratus is not the only writer, in which any thing of the kind is to be found; nor does the apostle cite only one poet, but several. Τινὲς, says he, τῶν καθ' ὑμᾶς ποιητῶν εἰρήκασι. Consult on the subject J. Chr. Wolf, in his Curæ Philologicæ ad Novi Fœderis Libros Historicos, p. 1267. II. As to the Greek Theon, whoever he was, who has illustrated Aratus' Phænomena with scholia, there was no very grave reason, why the learned Doctor should have been at the trouble either of refuting or of expressing his concurrence with him. For the class of men, commonly called Scholiasts, are too shallow and superficial to be considered as having been able to understand the meaning of the writers they interpret. Their object was principally to show their own knowledge of grammatical matters and ancient customs, and hence they attribute many things to their authors, to which beyond all question they were utter strangers. III. In my opinion, the religion of Aratus was not so holy and pure, as the learned Doctor fancies. I own at the commencement of his poem he says many noble and magnificent things of Jupiter, which might lead one to suppose, that this poet had a much more correct and sublime conception of divine matters than the multitude generally. But if we continue our perusal, and examine the whole context of the poem, we shall see the truth of the remark, already more than once repeated by us, that the majesty of poetry is not to be estimated by the rules of prose. Aratus, who represents his Jupiter as filling the whole universe and as the creator of the stars, tells us a little afterwards, that this Jupiter was born on Mount Ida, was nursed by the Curetes, and was the sun of Saturn; thus showing his own religion to be same as that of the lowest of the people:

Κρήτηθεν κεῖναι δὲ Διὸς μεγάλου ἰότητι
Οὐρανὸν εἰσανέβησαν· ὃ μιν τότε κουρίζοντα
Δίκτῳ ἐν εὐώδει ὄρεος σχεδὸν Ἰδαίοιο
Ἀντρῳ ἐγκατέθεντο, καὶ ἔτρεφον εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν
Δικταῖοι Κούρητες, ὅτε Κρόνον ἐψεύδοντο.

"From Crete by the favour of Jupiter they ascended into heaven; because the Dictæan Curetes concealed him when an infant in the fragrant grotto of Dictos, near Mount Ida, and nursed him for a year, at the time when they deceived Saturn." A noble Jupiter truly, and worthy of being compared with the omnipotent Creator of all things! After an interval of several verses, he informs us, that the family of Cepheus was related to Jupiter, p. 61:

Ἀλλ' ἄρα καὶ τῶν
Οὐρανὸν εἰς ὄνομ' ἦλθεν, ἐπεὶ Διὸς ἐγγύθεν ἦσαν,

"Moreover the name of these reached heaven, since they were related to Jupiter." What necessity to say more? Aratus supposed Jupiter to be the supreme Governor of all the gods and of the universe; but as regards his origin, he held him to be not at all superior to the rest of mortals.

* Lib. 5. sect. 5. [Sect. 8. p. 146.]

freely." And since the Latins had the very same notion of Jupiter that the Greeks had of Zeus, it cannot be denied, but that they commonly by their Jupiter also understood the one supreme God, the Lord of heaven and earth. We know nothing that can be objected against this from the scripture, unless it should be that passage of St. Paul: "In the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God." But the meaning thereof is no other than this, that the generality of the world before Christianity, by their natural light, and contemplation of the works of God, did not attain to such a practical knowledge of God as might both free them from idolatry, and effectually bring them to a holy life.[7]

XXXII. But in order to a fuller explication of this pagan theology,* and giving yet a more satisfactory account concerning it, there are three heads requisite to be insisted on: first, that the intelligent Pagans worshipped the one supreme God under many several names; secondly, that besides this one God, they worshipped also many gods, that were indeed inferior deities subordinate to him; thirdly, that they worshipped both the supreme and inferior gods, in images, statues, and symbols, sometimes abusively called also gods. We begin with the first, that the supreme God amongst the Pagans was polyonymous, and worshipped under several personal names, according to several notions and considerations of him, from his several attributes and powers, manifestations, and effects in the world.

It hath been already observed out of Origen,† that not only the Egyptians, but also the Syrians, Persians, Indians, and other barbarian Pagans, had, beside their vulgar theology, another more arcane and recondite one amongst their priests and learned men; and that the same was true concerning the Greeks and Latins also, is unquestionably evident from that account that hath been given by us of their philosophic theology. Where, by the vulgar theology of the Pagans, we understand not only their mythical or fabulous, but also their political or civil theology, it being truly affirmed by St. Austin concerning both these: Et civilis et fabulosa ambæ fabulosæ sunt, ambæque civiles, "That both the fabulous theology of the Pagans was in part their civil, and their civil was fabulous."‡ And by their more arcane or recondite theology, is doubtless meant that which they conceived to be the natural and true theology. Which

[7] The passage of St. Paul is not inaptly explained by the learned Doctor. But I cannot see, how a prayer by which the Athenians were accustomed to petition Jupiter to refresh their lands with plenteous showers, can be made to bear upon this question. The Athenian people prayed to that Jupiter, who was publicly worshipped, namely, the son of Saturn and husband of Venus, and had no idea of an eternal and self-existent Being.

* P. 314. 315. † P. 114. 115.

‡ Civ. Deor. lib. 4. cap. 8. [Lib. 5. cap. 8. p. 120. tom. 7. opp.]

distinction of the natural and true theology, from the civil and political, as it was acknowledged by all the ancient Greek philosophers, but most expressly by Antistines, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics; so was it owned and much insisted upon, both by Scævola, that famous Roman Pontifex, and by Varro, that most learned antiquary; they both agreeing, that the civil theology then established by the Roman laws was only the theology of the vulgar, but not the tr[illegible]at there was another theology besides it, called b[illegible]al, which was the theology of wise men and of t[illegible]eless granting a necessity, that in cities and comm[illegible]alt[illegible]sides this natural and true theology (which the gener[illegible]ality [illegible]e vulgar were incapable of) there should be another [illegible]ical theology, accommodate to their apprehension[illegible] theology differed from the natural only by a cer[illegible]f fabulosity in it, and was therefore looked upon [illegible]middle, betwixt the natural and the fabulous or poet[illegible]ology.

Wherefore it was acknowledged, that the vulgar theology of the Pagans, that is, not only their fabulous, but even their civil also, was oftentimes very discrepant from the natural and true theology; though the wise men amongst them, in all ages, endeavoured as much as they could, to dissemble and disguise this difference, and by allegorizing the poetic fables of the gods, to bring that theology into some seeming conformity with the natural and philosophic; but what they could not in this way reconcile, was by them excused upon the necessity of the vulgar.

The fabulous theology both of the Greeks and Romans did not only generate all the other gods, but even Jupiter himself also, their supreme Numen, it assigning him both a father and a mother, a grandfather and a grandmother. And though the Romans did not plainly adopt this into their civil theology, yet are they taxed by St. Austin[8] for suffering the statue of Jupiter's nurse to be kept in the capitol for a religious monument. And however this differed nothing at all from that atheistic doctrine of Evemerus,[9] "that all the gods were really no other than

[8] De Civitate Dei, lib. 5. cap. 7. p. 119. Quid, says he, de ipso Jove senserunt, qui ejus nutricem in Capitolio posuerunt? "What notion had they of Jupiter himself, who placed the statue of his nurse in the capitol?" Now this nurse was the goat Amalthea, as those are well aware, who have paid any attention to the fables of the poets.

[9] This is from St. Augustine, who De Civit. Dei, lib. 5. cap. 7. p. 119. thus writes: Nonne attestati sunt (Romani) Euemero, qui omnes tales Deos non fabulosa garrulitate, sed historica diligentia homines fuisse mortalesque, conscripsit? "Have they (the Romans) not appealed to Evemerus, who has recorded, not as a prating fabulist, but with the accuracy of the historian, that all such gods were men and mortal?" On the ἱερὰ ἀναγραφὴ of Evemerus, in which he attempted to prove, that all the gods were no other than mortal men, consult Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, tom. 2. opp. p. 360. and the recent disputation upon it by the ingenious J. Jac. Zimmermann, a scholar eminently acquainted with ancient philosophical history, Diss. de Atheismo *Euemeri et Diagoræ*, extant in the Museum Bremens. tom. 1. p. 715.

mortal men," yet was it tolerated and connived at by the politicians, in way of necessary compliance with the vulgar, it being so extremely difficult for them to conceive any such living being or animal, as was never made, and without beginning. Insomuch, that Callimachus,[10] who would by no means admit of Jupiter's sepulchre, either in Crete or Arcadia (but looked upon it as a foul reproach to him) for this reason:

Σὺ δ' οὐ θάνες, ἰσσὶ γὰρ αἰεί,

"Because he was immortal and could never die;" did notwithstanding himself attribute a temporary generation and nativity to him, as Origen[1] and others observe. Nevertheless, the generality of the more civilized and intelligent Pagans, and even of the poets themselves, did all this while constantly retain thus much of the natural and true theology amongst them, that Jupiter was the father both of gods and men; that is, the maker of the whole world, and consequently himself without father, eternal and unmade, according to that Peleadean oracle before cited out of Pausanias:

Ζεὺς ἦν, Ζεύς ἐστι, Ζεὺς ἔσσεται.

Again, the civil theology of the Pagans, as well as the poetic, had not only many fantastic gods in it, but also an appearance of a plurality of independent deities; it making several supreme in their several territories and functions; as one to be the chief ruler over the heavens, another over the air and winds, another over the sea, and another over the earth and hell; one to be the giver of corn, another of wine; one the god of learning, another the god of pleasure, and another the god of war; and so for all other things. But the natural theology of the Pagans (so called) though it did admit a plurality of gods too, in a certain sense, that is, of inferior deities subordinate to one supreme; yet did it neither allow of more independent deities than one, nor own any gods at all, but such as were natural, that is, such as had a real existence in nature and the world without, and not in men's opinion only. And these Varro[2] concluded to be no other than, first, the soul of the world, and then the animated parts thereof superior to men; that is, one supreme universal Numen unmade, and other particular generated gods, such as stars, demons, and heroes. Wherefore all the other gods besides these are frequently exploded by pagan writers (as Cicero and others) under the name of Dii Poëtici, that is, "not philosophical, but poetical gods," and Dii Commentitii and Fictitii, that is, "not natural

[10] Hymn. in Jovem, v. 9. &c. p. 7.

[1] Adv. Celsum, lib. 3. p. 713.

[2] Apud Augustin. De Civitate Dei, lib. 5. cap. 4. 5. &c. p. 116. &c. tom. 7. opp. and lib. 7. cap. 5. 6. p. 128. &c.

and real, but feigned and fictitious gods." They in the mean time giving this account of them, that they were indeed nothing else but so many several names and notions of one supreme Numen, according to his several powers and various manifestations, and effects in the world; it being thought fit by the wisdom of the ancient pagan theologers, that all those manifold glories and perfections of the Deity should not be huddled up, and as it were crowded and crumpled together in one general acknowledgment of an invisible being, the Maker of the world, but that they should be distinctly and severally displayed, and each of them adored singly and apart; and this too (for the greater pomp and solemnity) under so many personal names. Which perhaps the unskilful and sottish vulgar might sometimes mistake, not only for so many real and substantial, but also independent and self-existent deities.[3]

We have before proved, that one and the same supreme God, in the Egyptian theology, had several proper and personal names given him, according to several notions of him, and his several powers and effects; Jamblichus[4] himself, in that passage already cited, plainly affirming thus much: Ὁ δημιουργικὸς νοῦς, &c. τὴν ἀφανῆ τῶν κεκρυμμένων λόγων δύναμιν εἰς φῶς ἄγων, Ἀμῶν κατὰ τὴν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων γλώσσαν λέγεται, συντελῶν δὲ ἀψευδῶς ἕκαστα καὶ τεχνικῶς Φθὰ, ἀγαθῶν δὲ ποιητικὸς ὢν Ὄσιρις κέκληται, καὶ ἄλλας δι' ἄλλας δυνάμεις τε καὶ ἐνεργείας, ἐπωνυμίας ἔχει, "The demiurgical mind and president of truth, as with wisdom it proceedeth to generation, and bringeth forth the hidden power of the occult reasons, contained within itself, into light, is called in the Egyptian language Ammon; as it artificially effects all things with truth, Phtha; as it is productive of good things, Osiris; besides which it hath also several other names, according to its other powers and energies:" as namely, Neith (or according to Proclus' copy, Νηϊθὰς, Neïthas), the tutelar god of the city Sais, from whence probably the Greek Ἀθηνᾶ was derived (the Athenians being said to have been at first a colony of these Saites), and this is the divine wisdom diffusing itself through all.

[3] In this manner, indeed, the pagan theologers, especially after the rise of Christianity, attempted to conceal the absurdities of their religion and worship: namely, by asserting that the several gods were one supreme Deity, designated by various names. [So Julian explains the pagan religion, that one God was worshipped under various names, cap. 63. p. 454. ed. Lips.] But the folly of all such attempts has already been ably exposed by St. Augustine, in his De Civitate Dei. lib. 4. cap. 11. p. 76. and other places.

[4] De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect 8. cap. 3. p. 159. But setting aside, that Jamblichus here puts forth sheer nonsense, invented beyond all doubt by himself, and not by the ancient Egyptians, this passage does not at all bear upon the matter in question. For Jamblichus is not discoursing here of the supreme Being, of whom he had spoken before, and who, he considers, should be worshipped by silence alone, but of the demiurgic mind, which he places far below him. Therefore, the various names enumerated by him are not designations of the one supreme God.

So likewise Serapis, which though some would have to be the sun, is by others plainly described as an universal Numen. As Aristides in his eighth oration upon this god Serapis:* Οἱ μὲν δὴ τῆς μεγάλης πρὸς Αἰγύπτῳ πόλεως πολῖται καὶ ἕνα τοῦτον ἀνακαλοῦσι Δία· ὅτι οὐκ ἀπολέλειπται δυνάμει περιττῇ, ἀλλὰ διὰ πάντων ἥκει, καὶ τὸ πᾶν πεπλήρωκε· τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων θεῶν διῄρηνται αἱ δυνάμεις τε καὶ τιμαὶ, καὶ ἄλλους ἐπ᾽ ἄλλα ἄνθρωποι καλοῦσιν, ὁ δὲ, ὥσπερ κορυφαῖος πάντων, ἀρχὰς καὶ πέρατα ἔχει, "They, who inhabit the great city in Egypt, call upon this god Serapis as their only Jupiter, he being supposed to be no way defective in power, but to pervade all things, and to fill the whole universe. And whereas the powers and honours of the other gods are divided, and some of them are invoked for one thing, and some for another; this is looked upon by them as the coryphæus of all the gods, who contains the beginning and end of all things, and who is able to supply all wants." Cneph is also described by Eusebius[5] as that divine Intellect, which was the demiurgus of the world, and which giveth life to all things, as he is by Plutarch[6] said to be ἀγέννητος or "unmade;" so that this was also another Egyptian name of God; as likewise was

* P. 95.

[5] Out of Porphyry, Præparat. Evangel. lib. 3. cap. 11. p. 115. Even supposing Porphyry to have expressed the sentiments of the ancient Egyptians in his description of their god Cneph, which however I consider not to be the case, still it will not follow from what he says, that Cneph was the image of the supreme Being. On the contrary, this philosopher expressly states, that the demiurgic mind, the same which Jamblichus pretends to have been called Amon, Ptha and Osiris, was designated by the name and image of Cneph. But this demiurgic mind, according to the doctrine of the later Platonists, who investigated the Egyptian rites, is much inferior to the supreme Deity. Compare what is cited respecting this same Cneph by Eusebius, lib. 1. cap. 10. p. 41. out of Philo; which can in no way be applied to the supreme God. Other arguments in proof of the same are supplied by Dr. Th. Gale, in his notes on Jamblichus, p. 301. How little reliance is to be placed upon all that we read in the later Platonists, regarding these Egyptian Deities and their names, is manifest even from this alone, that Jamblichus makes Ptha to be the name of the demiurgic mind, or of that virtue which created the world; while Porphyry, in the passage of Eusebius above quoted, p. 115. considers this Ptha to be the offspring of the god Cneph, and Cneph to be the demiurgic mind. Let learned men, then, who expect to find sterling ore among this rubbish of the later Platonists, tell me which of the two is to be believed. For my own part I should say neither, but should repudiate the whole tribe of them, when pretending to expound the religions of the ancients.

[6] He tells us, De Iside et Osiride, p. 357. that the Thebans were the only Egyptians that acknowledged no mortal gods, but held the god Cneph, whom they worshipped, to be unmade. This passage, I consider, does not prove what the learned Doctor thinks may be inferred from it, that Cneph, with the Egyptians, was the name of the supreme Being. For what the Thebans alone did, cannot fairly be attributed to the whole of the Egyptian people. On the contrary, Plutarch's words show, that most of the Egyptians were so insane as to pay homage not only to made but extinct gods; but that the Thebans were wiser than the rest, and asserted their god Cneph to be ungenerated and incorruptible. Besides, it is not certain even, whether or not the Thebans regarded this Cneph as the supreme Deity. For an ungenerated god is not necessarily the one and only God, the creator of all things. It is possible, indeed, for the Thebans to have believed in several gods as existing from all eternity.

Emeph and Eicton in Jamblichus;[7] though these may be severally distinguished into a trinity of divine hypostases. Lastly, when Isis, which was sometimes called Multimammea, and made all over full of breasts, to signify her feeding all things, thus describes herself in Apuleius:[8] Summa numinum, prima cœlitum,

[7] De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. 8. cap. 3. p. 158. We have already explained this passage above and shown, that it contains not the slightest shadow or vestige of the most Holy Trinity. Let two remarks be added here. I. There seems to be much probability in the conjecture of Dr. Gale, who supposes the name Emeph to be a corruption, and that Cneph ought to be read in its place. II. It is by no means to be established from Jamblichus, that the two names Emeph and Eicton are to be referred to one and the same nature. For he openly distinguishes those two natures, to which he tells us these names belonged.

[8] Metamorphos. lib. 11. p. 258. 259. ed. Elmenhorst. I confess my regret, that the learned Doctor should have allowed himself, on the strength of a few words of a writer so destitute of penetration as Apuleius, to convert Isis into the supreme Being. I shall say nothing of the authority of Apuleius, insignificant as I own I have always considered it; neither shall I urge the point, that a female deity can hardly be the image of the supreme God; but I shall appeal to Apuleius' words themselves, which clearly refute this interpretation. Isis, who extols herself so highly, is the nature of things, and not the sovereign Deity, the parent and creator of nature: En assum, says she, tuis commota, Luci, precibus, *rerum natura parens*, elementorum omnium domina, sæculorum progenies initialis, summa Numinum, regina maniam, prima cœlitum, "Behold, I am present, moved, O Lucius, by thy prayers, the parent nature of things, the mistress of all the elements, the earliest progeny of ages, the supreme of deities, the queen of the Manes, the first of the heavenly gods." She subjoins afterwards, that she is worshipped under the names of Diana, Venus, Proserpine; but by no means intimates, as here stated by the learned Doctor, that all the gods and goddesses are contained in her alone. The meaning of this speech of Isis is admirably illustrated by Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, p. 372: Ἡ γὰρ Ἶσις ἐστὶ μὲν τὸ τῆς φύσεως θῆλυ καὶ δεκτικὸν ἁπάσης γενέσεως, καθὸ τιθήνη καὶ παραδεχὴς ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν πολλῶν μυριώνυμος κέκληται, διὰ τὸ πάσας ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου τρεπομένη μορφὰς δέχεσθαι καὶ ἰδέας. Ἔχει δὲ σύμφυτον ἔρωτα τοῦ πρώτου καὶ κυριωτάτου πάντων, ὃ τάγαθῷ ταυτόν ἐστι· κἀκεῖνο ποθεῖ καὶ διώκει, "Isis, therefore, is the female part of nature and the recipient of all generation; accordingly, she is called by Plato the nurse and receiver of all things, and by many others Myrionymos, that is, having an infinity of names; because reason converts her into all shapes and forms. In her is implanted a love of the first and principal nature, namely good; this she desires and pursues." Which nature, according to those who thought thus of Isis, was called Osiris. And that Apuleius favoured this opinion, formerly entertained by many of the Egyptians and Platonists, is abundantly evident from what he states a little afterwards in the same book respecting Osiris, whom he not only distinguishes from Isis, but describes as being much greater and more excellent than her. In the first place, he confesses, that any one initiated into the sacred rites of Isis is far from being a happy man, unless he be also imbued with the religion of Osiris. Dum, says he, p. 270. religiosum scrupulum partim apud sensum meum disputo, partim sacratorum consiliis examino, novum mirumque plane comperior: Deæ quidem me *tantum* sacris imbutum, at *magni Dei, Deumque summi parentis*, invicti Osiridis, necdum sacris illustratum, "While I debate this religious point in my own mind, and examine it by the counsels of the consecrated, I find it altogether novel and strange, that I am imbued *only* with the rites of the goddess, and not yet enlightened with those of the *great God*, and *supreme parent of the gods*, the invincible Osiris." What can be clearer towards confuting those who maintain, that Isis was the supreme Being. Afterwards, in the same book, p. 272. Osiris is called by him Deus Deum magnorum potior, et majorum summus, et summorum maximus, et maximorum regnator, "The God, the most powerful of the great gods, and the supreme of the greater, and the greatest of the supreme, and the ruler of the greatest." Indeed, to speak of Apuleius' religion generally, as far as it can be known from his Metamorphoses, he was of that class *of men, who studied* to reconcile, although in defiance of the truth, the popular religion

deorum dearumque facies uniformis, cujus numen unicum multiformi specie, ritu vario, nomine multijugo totus veneratur orbis; as she plainly makes herself to be the supreme Deity, so doth she intimate, that all the gods and goddesses were "compendiously contained in her alone, and that she (i. e. the supreme God) was worshipped under several personal names, and with different rites, over the whole pagan world." Moreover, this is particularly noted concerning the Egyptians by Damascius[9] the philosopher, that, τὸ νοητὸν διῃρήκασιν εἰς πολλῶν θεῶν ἰδιότητας, "they multiplied the first Intelligible (or the supreme Deity) breaking and dividing the same into the names and properties of many gods." Now, the Egyptian theology was in a manner the pattern of all the rest, but especially of those European theologies, of the Greeks and Romans.

Who likewise, that they often made many gods of one, is evident from their bestowing so many proper and personal names upon each of those inferior gods of theirs; the sun, and the moon, and the earth; the first whereof, usually called Apollo, had therefore this epithet of πολυώνυμος commonly given to

with their own precepts of philosophy. He himself, as appears also from other passages of his book, placed two principles over the universe, one male, if we may so speak, and the other female; that is, an omnipotent and supreme God, and a certain nature, presiding over the administration of this world and the generation of all things, or soul of the world, producing and governing all. To these two natures he referred the whole of the gods, to whom nations paid religious homage; supposing that the supreme God was worshipped in the first place in Osiris, and secondly, in all the other deities of the male sex, or that all the gods were merely different names of that one God; and that the several goddesses, Isis, Minerva, Juno, and the others, represented that one soul of the world, or generative nature. Moreover, he imagined these two principles to be connected together by a certain bond, so that in worshipping one it was impossible not to worship the other at the same time. Quamquam enim connexa, immo unica ratio Numinis religionisque esset, tamen teletæ discrimen esse maximum, aiunt, "For, although the nature of their divinity and religion is intimately connected, nay, one and the same, still there is, we are told, a great difference in the sacred rites." So he says, Metamorphos. lib. 11. p. 220.

[9] I have already more than once stated my opinion of the authority of Damascius. On the worship also, and entire religion of the Egyptians, I have discoursed at great length; so that there will be no difficulty in coming to a conclusion on the argument now in question. The accounts handed down by different authors respecting the gods of the Egyptians prove, that they were by no means all meant for one supreme God, but that they were various men and natures, translated to heaven for various causes. The several tribes, provinces, and cities extolled their respective gods with the highest praises, and scrupled not to hold them forth as superior to the other gods. By these praises, some men, especially the philosophers, at all times predisposed to put a favourable and philosophic interpretation upon the vulgar superstitions, were led to the conclusion, that all the Egyptian deities were types and images of one God. Cneph, Ptha, Eicton, Osiris, and the other gods, were each extolled as supreme by those who delighted in their worship. But as there could not be a plurality of supreme gods, the whole of these names were considered by some to belong to one god, and to designate merely his various attributes. And this course seemed especially convenient to the philosophers subsequent to the birth of our Saviour. Who, being utterly unable to deny the turpitude and absurdity of the popular religions, strenuously endeavoured to diminish the multitude of gods, and to assemble certain companies, as it were, under one roof. But St. Augustine, among others, De Civitate Dei, has already successfully answered them.

him, "the god with many names." Which many proper names of his Macrobius insisteth upon in his Saturnalia, though probably making more of them than indeed they were. And the moon was not only so called, but also Diana, and Lucina, and Hecate, and otherwise; insomuch that this goddess also hath been styled polyonymous as well as her brother the sun. And lastly, the earth, besides those honorary titles, of bona dea, and magna dea, and mater deorum, "the good goddess," and "the great goddess," and "the mother of the gods," was multiplied by them into those many goddesses, of Vesta, and Rhea, and Cybele, and Ceres, and Proserpina, and Ops, &c. And for this cause was she thus described by Æschylus:[10]

Καὶ Γαῖα πολλῶν ὀνομάτων μορφὴ μία,
Et Tellus multorum nominum facies una.

Now if these inferior gods of the Pagans had each of them so many personal names bestowed upon them, much more might the supreme God be polyonymous amongst them;[1] and so indeed he was commonly styled, as that learned grammarian Hesychius intimates upon that word πολυώνυμον, τὴν μονάδα οὕτως ἐκάλουν, καὶ ἐπίθετον Ἀπόλλωνος, "They called the Monad thus, and it was also the epithet of Apollo;" where by the Monad, according to the Pythagoric language, is meant the supreme Deity, which was thus styled by the Pagans πολυώνυμον, "the being that

[10] In Prometheo Vincto. p. 29. ed. Canteri, Antw. 1580. 12. Grotius, in his Excerpt. Veterum Tragicor. p. 5. has translated this verse as follows:

Tellusque multis una res sub vocibus.

[1] For my part, I consider this reasoning objectionable in two respects. I. It seems to me to be weak and inconclusive: "The ancients called the inferior gods by various names; therefore, they likewise designated the supreme God by many names." He certainly must be very easy of conviction, who can be swayed by an argument like this. But in such matters, every thing is decided by testimonies and authorities: nothing is proved by conjectures and surmises. II. The very foundation upon which it rests is uncertain. For it may be made a matter of question, whether the ancients did call the sun, moon, and earth, by various names. I am aware, that not a few of those, who endeavoured to reduce the ancient superstitions to the standard of reason, supposed the names of many deities to designate one sun, one moon, and one earth. Macrobius, upon whose theory I have already commented above, fancied he discovered the sun in all the gods. Others imagined, that the names of Diana, Venus, Astarte, Hecate, and other goddesses, pertained to one moon. And many supposed Vesta, Cybele, Rhea, Ops, and other names of goddesses, to designate one earth. But it has very properly been questioned, whether these were not guided by their own imagination, rather than by reason and truth. Every thing that is recorded respecting these gods and goddesses shows, that they were mortals celebrated for their inventions and exploits and ought by no means to be confounded with each other. Hence, there is very little probability in the conceits of those, who, to hide the deformity of the received superstitions, determine, that the many gods are one sun, or moon, or earth. And such being the case, the whole of this argument falls to the ground. If the attainment of truth be our object, we ought to attend to the facts themselves, and to the ancient histories, and on no account rashly to put faith in the commentitious interpretations of later writers.

hath many names." And accordingly Cleanthes thus beginneth that fore-cited hymn of his,

Κύδιστ' ἀθανάτων, πολυώνυμε,

"Thou most glorious of all the immortal gods, who art called by many names." And Zeno, his master, in Laërtius,[2] expressly declareth: Ὁ Θεὸς πολλαῖς προσηγορίαις ὀνομάζεται κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις, "God is called by many several names, according to his several powers and virtues;" whose instances shall be afterwards taken notice of. Thus also the writer De Mundo:[3] Εἷς δὲ ὢν, πολυώνυμός ἐστι, κατανομαζόμενος τοῖς πάθεσι πᾶσιν, ἅπερ αὐτὸς νεοχμεῖ, "God, though he be but one, is polyonymous, and variously denominated from his several attributes, and the effects produced by him." Quæcunque voles, (saith Seneca[4]) illi propria nomina aptabis, vim aliquam effectumque cœlestium rerum continentia. Tot appellationes ejus possunt esse quot munera, "You may give God whatsoever proper names you please, so they signify some force and effect of heavenly things: he may have as many names as he hath manifestations, offices, and gifts." Macrobius[5] also, from the authority of Virgil, thus determines: Unius Dei effectus varios pro variis censendos esse (or as Vossius corrects it, censeri) numinibus, "That the various effects of one God were taken for several gods;" that is, expressed by several personal names; as he there affirmeth, the divers virtues of the sun to have given names to divers gods, because they gave occasion for the sun to be called by several proper and personal names. We shall conclude with that of Maximus Madaurensis,[6] before cited out of St. Austin: Hujus virtutes per mundanum opus diffusas nos multis vocabulis invocamus, quoniam nomen ejus proprium ignoramus. Ita fit, ut,

[2] Lib. 7. segm. 147. p. 458. An exactly similar passage is extant in the same author, lib. 7. segm. 155. p. 440. where he thus writes according to the sense of the Stoics: "Εν τε εἶναι θεὸν, καὶ νοῦν, καὶ εἱμαρμένην, καὶ Δία, πολλαῖς τε ἑτέραις ὀναμασίαις προσονομάζεσθαι, "That God, and mind, and fate, and Jupiter, are one, and called by various other names."

[3] Cap. 7. p. 866. tom. 1. opp. Aristotelis.

[4] De Beneficiis, lib. 4. cap. 7. p. 427. tom. 1. opp.

[5] Saturnal. lib. 1. cap. 17. p. 272. Sicut, says he, Maro, quum de una Junone diceret: *quo Numine læso*, ostendit, unius Dei effectus varios pro variis censendos esse Numinibus: ita diversas virtutes solis nomina Dis dederunt, "As Maro, when he says in speaking of Juno alone: *what deity having been offended*, shows that the various effects of one God are to be considered as various deities; so the different virtues of the sun have given names to divers gods." Vossius' correction of this passage occurs, no doubt, in his work, De Idololatria; but I have not thought it worth while to seek for it.

[6] Epist. ad Augustinum: see Augustin. Oper. tom. 2. epist. 16. p. 15. But I know not why the learned Doctor has omitted to mention, that St. Augustine in the answer immediately following this epistle sneers at the opinion of the Platonic philosopher. Vides, says he, among other things, in reference to these words of Maximus, pro tua prudentia, quam locus late iste pateat reprehensioni, "Your good sense will tell you, how very open this passage is to reprehension."

dum ejus quasi quædam membra carptim variis supplicationibus prosequimur, totum colere profectò videamur, "The virtues of this one supreme God, diffused throughout the whole world, we (Pagans) invoke under many several names, because we are ignorant what his proper name is. Wherefore we thus worshipping his several divided members, must needs be judged to worship him whole, we leaving out nothing of him." With which latter words seemeth to agree that of the poet, wherein Jupiter thus bespeaks the other gods:

> Cœlicolæ, mea membra, Dei; quos nostra potestas
> Officiis divisa facit.

Where it is plainly intimated, that the many pagan gods were but the several divided members of the one supreme Deity, whether, because according to the Stoical sense, the real and natural gods were all but parts of the mundane soul; or else because all those other fantastic gods were nothing but several personal names, given to the several powers, virtues, and offices of the one Supreme.[7]

Now the several names of God, which the writer De Mundo[8] instanceth in, to prove him polyonymous, are first of all such as these: Βρονταῖος, and Ἀστραπαῖος, "the Thunderer" and "Lightener;" Ὑέτιος, "the Giver of rain;" Ἐπικάρπιος, "the Bestower of fruits;" Πολιεὺς, "the Keeper of cities;" Μειλίχιος, "the Mild and Placable;" under which notion they sacrificed no animals to him, but only the fruits of the earth: together with many other such epithets, as Φίλιος, Ξένιος, Στράτιος, Τροπαιοῦχος, Καθάρσιος, Παλαιμναῖος, &c.; and lastly, he is called Σωτὴρ and Ἐλευθέριος, "Saviour," and "Assertor." Answerably to which, Jupiter had many such names given him

[7] From the whole of this and much of what follows we learn merely, that among the philosophers and wise men of antiquity there were those who believed the several names of gods to signify only one deity. Nor was this ever questioned by any one, who paid the slightest attention to ancient records. The Stoics in particular must necessarily have held this opinion, inasmuch as they considered all animated things to be parts and members of one God diffused through the whole of the universe. But we cannot infer from thence, what the learned Doctor has undertaken to prove, that the fact really was as they supposed, and that the long catalogue of gods consisted merely of names, expressing the various virtues of one Deity. If a hundred authors and philosophers could be produced, all concurring in this one opinion: that Venus, Diana, Jupiter, Osiris, Isis, Vulcan, Pluto, Neptune, and all the other gods besides, were names merely of one God or of his various perfections; still it would by no means follow from such unanimity, that these men judged correctly respecting the ancient religions, and that there is nothing to be found fault with in their opinion. On the contrary, it is a wise man's part to see, whether their interpretation is borne out by the facts and accords with the rites and worship of the ancients. If this course be adopted, we shall soon become sensible, I fear, of the utter fallacy of such a notion, and discover this to be the private doctrine of certain philosophers, and not the public religion of the people. That various appellations were applied formerly to one God, according to the variety of benefits which were expected from him, is pretty certain; but this has nothing to do with the present question.

[8] Cap. 7. p. 866.

also by the Latins, as Victor, Invictus, Opitulus, Stator; the true meaning of which last (according to Seneca[9]), was not that which the historians pretend, quod post votum susceptum, acies Romanorum fugientium stetit, "because once after vows and prayers offered to him, the flying army of the Romans was made to stand;" sed quod stant beneficio ejus omnia, "but because all things by means of him stand firm and are established." For which same reason he was called also by them (as St. Austin informs us[10]) "Centupeda, as it were, standing firm upon an hundred feet;" and "Tigillus, the beam, prop, and supporter of the world." He was styled also by the Latins (amongst other titles) Almus and Ruminus, i. e. "He that nourisheth all things as it were with his breasts."* Again that writer De Mundo addeth another sort of names, which God was called by; as Ἀνάγκη, "Necessity," because he is an immoveable essence, though Cicero,[1] gives another reason for that appellation: Interdum Deum necessitatem appellant, quia nihil aliter esse possit, atque ab eo constitutum sit, "They sometimes call God Necessity, because nothing can be otherwise than as it is by him appointed." Likewise Εἱμαρμένη, because all things are by him connected together, and proceed from him unhinderably. Πεπρωμένη, because all things in the world are by him determined, and nothing left infinite (or undetermined). Μοῖρα, because he makes an apt division and distribution of all things. Ἀδράστεια, because his power is such, as that none can possibly avoid or escape him. Lastly, that ingenious fable (as he calls it) of the three fatal sisters, Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos, according to him, meant nothing but God neither: Ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἐστὶν οὐκ ἄλλο τι, πλὴν ὁ Θεὸς, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ γενναῖος Πλάτων φησὶ, "All this is nothing else but God, as the noble and generous Plato also intimates, when he affirmeth God to contain the beginning, and middle, and end of all things." And both Cicero and Seneca tell us, that, amongst the Latins, God was not only called Fatum, but also Natura and Fortuna. Quid aliud est natura, (saith Seneca[2]) quam Deus, et divina ratio, toti mundo et partibus ejus inserta? "What is nature else, but God and the divine reason, inserted into the whole world and all its several parts?" He adding, "that God and nature were no more two different things than Annæus and Seneca." And, Nonnunquam Deum (saith Cicero[3]) Fortunam appellant, quod efficiat multa impro-

[9] De Beneficiis, lib. 4. cap. 7. p. 427. tom. 1. opp.

[10] De Civitat. Dei, lib. 7. cap. 11. p. 131. tom. 7. opp. In the same passage he treats also of Jupiter's titles Almus and Ruminus.

* Rama Mamma.

[1] Academic. Quæst. lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 2233. tom. 8. opp.

[2] De Beneficiis, lib. 4. cap. 7. p. 427.

[3] Academic. Quæst. lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 2233. tom. 8. opp. The passage of Seneca which follows occurs in the same place as the preceding.

visa et nec opinata nobis, propter obscuritatem ignorationemque causarum, "They sometimes call God also by the name of Fortune, because he surpriseth us in many events, and bringeth to pass things unexpected to us, by reason of the obscurity of causes and our ignorance." Seneca thus concludes concerning these, and the like names of God: Omnia ejusdem Dei nomina sunt, variè utentis sua potestate, "These are all names of one and the same God, variously manifesting his power."

But concerning most of these forementioned names of God, and such as are like to them, it was rightly observed by St. Austin,* that they had no such appearance or show of many distinct gods: Hæc omnia cognomina imposuerunt uni Deo, propter causas potestatesque diversas, non tamen propter tot res etiam tot deos eum esse coegerunt, &c. "Though the Pagans imposed all these several names upon one God, in respect of his several powers, yet did they not therefore seem to make so many gods of them; as if Victor were one god, and Invictus another god, and Centupeda another god, and Tigillus another, and Ruminus another," &c. Wherefore there are other names of God used amongst the Pagans, which have a greater show and appearance of so many distinct deities, not only because they are proper names, but also because each of them had their peculiar temples appropriated to them, and their different rites of worship. Now these are of two sorts: first, such as signify the Deity according to its universal and all-comprehending nature; and secondly, such as denote the same only according to certain particular powers, manifestations, and effects of it in the world. Of the first kind there are not a few. For first of all, PAN, as the very word plainly implies him to be a universal Numen, and as he was supposed to be the Harmostes of the whole world, or to play upon the world as a musical instrument, according to that of Orpheus[4] (or Onomacritus):

Ἁρμονίαν κόσμοιο κρίκων φιλοπαίγμονι μολπῇ·

So have we before showed, that by him the Arcadians and Greeks meant, not the corporeal world inanimate, nor yet as endued with a senseless nature only, but as proceeding from an intellectual principle or divine spirit, which framed it harmoniously; and as being still kept in tune, acted and governed by

* De Civ. Deor. lib. 7. cap. 11. [P. 131.]

[4] Hymn. in Panem, p. 109. ed. Eschenbach. In the same hymn occurs also the verse which follows. Of Pan I have already spoken above. There is nothing, which I should feel less disposed to believe, than that this goat-footed god worshipped by the pastoral Arcadians was the supreme Being or the whole animated universe; although formerly, I am aware, not a few were led by the signification of the name to adopt this opinion. The same, I candidly confess, is my opinion with respect to the other gods, whose names are transferred by the learned Doctor to the supreme Deity.

the same. Which therefore is said to be the universal pastor and shepherd of all mankind, and of the whole world, according to that other Orphic passage:

Βόσκων ἀνθρώπων γενεὴν, καὶ ἀτέρμονα γαῖαν,

Pascens humanum genus, ac sine limite terram.

And this Pan, Socrates, in Plato's Phædrus, plainly invokes as the supreme Numen. Pan, therefore, is the one only God (for there cannot possibly be more than one Pan, more than one all or universe) who contained all within himself, displayed all from himself, framing the world harmoniously, and who is in a manner all things.

Again, JANUS, whom the Romans first invoked in all their sacrifices and prayers, and who was never omitted, whatsoever god they sacrificed unto, was unquestionably many times taken for a universal Numen, as in this of Martial:[5]

Nitidique sator pulcherrime mundi.

And again in this of Ovid:*

Quicquid ubique vides, cœlum, mare, nubila, terras,
Omnia sunt nostra clausa patentque manu:
Me penes est unum vasti custodia mundi.

From which passages it also appears, that Janus was not the mere senseless and inanimate matter of the world, but a principle presiding over it. And without doubt all the beginnings of things were therefore referred to this Janus, because he was accounted the most ancient god, and the beginning of all things. St. Austin,[6] concluding him to be the same with Jupiter, therefore quarrels with the Pagans (that is, with their civil theology) for thus making two gods of one:† Cum ergo Janus mundus sit, et Jupiter mundus sit, unusque sit mundus, quare duo dii sunt, Janus et Jupiter? Quare seorsum habent templa, seorsum aras, diversa sacra, dissimilia simulachra? Si propterea, quia alia vis est primordiorum, alia causarum, ex illa Jani, ex ista Jovis nomen accepit: nunquid si unus homo in diversis rebus duas habeat potestates, aut duas artes (quia singularum diversa vis est) ideo duo dicuntur artifices? &c. "Since therefore Janus is the world, and Jupiter is the world, and there is but one world, how can Janus and Jupiter be two gods? Why have they their temples apart, their altars apart, distinct

[5] Epigramm. lib. 10. epigr. 28. p. 411. * Fast. 1. [Ver. 117.]

[6] In this passage, however, he does not give this as his own opinion, but as that of Varro and some other Romans, and endeavours to demonstrate its absurdity. He himself neither supposed Janus to be the world nor Jupiter, but argued against his adversaries upon their own assumptions.

† Civ. Deor. lib. 7. cap. 10. [P. 131.]

sacred things, and statues of different forms? If because the force of beginnings is one, and the force of causes another, he is therefore called Janus from the former, and Jupiter from the latter; I ask whether or no, if one man have two several arts about different things, he therefore be to be called two artificers? Or is there any more reason, why one and the same god, having two powers, one over the beginnings of things, and another over the causes, should therefore be accounted two gods?" Where, when Jupiter and Janus are both said to be the world, this is to be understood properly not of the matter, but the soul or mind of the world, as St. Austin* himself elsewhere declares: Sit Jupiter corporei hujus mundi animus, qui universam istam molem, ex quatuor elementis constructam atque compactam, implet et movet, "Let Jupiter be the mind of this corporeal world, which both filleth and moveth that whole bulk, compounded and made up of the four elements." Nevertheless, as the soul and body both together are called the man, so was the whole animated world by the Pagans called God. Now the forementioned argumentation of St. Austin, though it be good against the Pagans' civil theology, yet their other arcane and natural theology was unconcerned in it, that plainly acknowledging all to be but one God, which for certain reasons was worshipped under several names, and with different rites. Wherefore Janus and Jupiter, being really but different names for one and the same supreme God, that conjecture of Salmasius[7] seems very probable, that the Romans derived their Janus from Ζανὸς, the Ætolian Jupiter.

* Civ. Deor. lib. 4. cap. 11. [P. 76.]

[7] Where Salmasius put forth this conjecture, is more than I can tell. But it has been adopted both by some others, and not long ago by P. Dan. Huet, Prop. 4. cap. 9. sect. 2. p. 228. who proves from it, that Janus and Jupiter are the same. How little importance is to be attached however, to what is here eruditely argued respecting Janus, will be apparent to every one from the following passage of Arnobius, Adv. Gentes, lib. 3. p. 147. Incipiamus a Jano, quem quidem ex vobis mundum, annum alii, solem esse prodiderunt nonnulli. Quod si accipiamus, ut verum sit, sequitur, ut intelligi debeat, nullum unquam fuisse Janum, quem ferunt cœlo atque Hecate procreatum, in Italia regnasse primum, Janiculi oppidi conditorem, patrem Fonti, Vulturni generum, Juturnæ maritum, "Let us begin with Janus, whom some of you have pronounced to be the world, others the year, others the sun. Which if we admit to be true, we must necessarily suppose, that no such Janus ever existed, as the one said to have sprung from Cœlus and Hecate, and to have first reigned in Italy, the founder of the town Janiculum, the father of Fontus, the son-in-law of Vulturnus, and the husband of Juturna." In the first place, therefore, the history of Janus, which showed him to have been an ancient king of Italy, exposed the error and folly of that more arcane or rather spurious theology of the Romans. Secondly, these theologists, who fancied themselves to be so wonderfully ingenious in expounding the popular religions, mutually *opposed* and *contradicted* each other. For while they are at issue as to the thing of which Janus is the figure and symbol; while, as Servius on Virgil informs us, one sees in him the sun, another the world, another the year, another Mars, another the air; they plainly prove, that not the slightest credit is to be attached to them and that the whole of this system of religious exposition is to be classed among the sports and vagaries of the human intellect. The same may be said of the other gods here mentioned.

GENIUS was also another of the twenty select Roman gods; and that this was likewise a universal Numen, containing the whole nature of things, appears from this of Festus:[8] Genium appellabant Deum, qui vim obtineret rerum omnium gerendarum, "They called that God, who hath the power of begetting or producing all things, Genius." And St. Austin*[9] also plainly declareth Genius to be the same with Jupiter; that is, to be but another name for the one supreme God: Cum alio loco [Varro] dicit, genium esse uniuscujusque animum rationalem; talem autem mundi animum Deum esse, ad hoc idem utique revocat, ut tanquam universalis Genius, ipse mundi animus esse credatur. Hic est igitur, quem appellant Jovem. And afterwards: Restat ut eum singulariter et excellenter dicant deum Genium, quem dicunt mundi animum; ac per hoc Jovem, "When Varro elsewhere calleth the rational mind of every one a genius, and affirmeth such a mind of the whole world to be God; he plainly implieth, that God is the universal genius of the world, and that Genius and Jupiter are the same. And though Genius be sometimes used for the mind of every man, yet the god Genius, spoken of by way of excellency, can be no other than the mind of the whole world, or Jupiter."

Again, that CHRONOS or SATURN was no particular deity, but the universal Numen of the whole world, is plainly affirmed by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, where, commending the fertility of Italy, he writeth thus: Οὐδὲν οὖν θαυμαστὸν τοὺς παλαιοὺς ἱερὰν ὑπολαβεῖν τοῦ Κρόνου τὴν χώραν ταύτην, τὸν μὲν δαίμονα τοῦτον οἰομένους εἶναι πάσης εὐδαιμονίας δοτῆρα, καὶ πληρωτὴν ἀνθρώποις· εἴτε Χρόνον αὐτὸν δεῖ καλεῖν, ὡς Ἕλληνες ἀξιοῦσιν, εἴτε Κρόνον ὡς Ῥωμαῖοι, πᾶσαν δὲ περιειληφότα τὴν τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν, ὁπότερον ἄν τις ὀνομάσοι, "Wherefore it is no wonder, if the ancients thought this country to be sacred to Saturn, they supposing this god to be the giver and perfecter of all happiness to men; whether we ought to call him Chronos, as the Greeks will have it, or Cronos as the Romans; he being either way such a god as comprehends the whole nature of the world." But the word Saturn was Hetrurian (which language was originally

[8] De Verborum Significat. lib. 7. in Dion. Godofredus' Auctores Latinæ Linguæ p. 272.

* Civ. Deor. lib. 7. cap. 13. [P. 132.]

[9] St. Augustine, however, is not stating his own but Varro's opinion. What he himself thought of such spurious interpretations of the different religions he declares, after expounding Varro's opinions, in the following words: Sed quum conantur vanissimas fabulas sive hominum res gestas velut naturalibus interpretationibus honorare, etiam homines acutissimi tantas patiuntur angustias, ut eorum quoque vanitatem dolere cogamur, "But even the most acute men, when they attempt to dignify the vainest fables, or the actions of mortals, as it were by physical interpretations, are involved in so great perplexity, that we cannot help being grieved at their own vanity," De Civitat. Dei, cap. 18. p. 135. Nothing can be more just than this observation.

† Rom. Ant. lib. 1. p. 24. Steph.

Oriental) and being derived from סתר signifies "hidden;" so that by Saturn was meant that hidden principle of the universe, which containeth all things; and he was therefore called by the Romans, Deus Latius, "the hidden God;" as the wife of Saturn in the pontifical books is Latia Saturni, and the land itself (which in the Hetrurian language was Saturnia) is in the Roman Latium; from whence the inhabitants were called Latins, which is as much as to say, the worshippers of the hidden God. Moreover, that Saturn could not be inferior to Jupiter, according to the fabulous theology, is plain from hence, because he is therein said to have been his father. But then the question will be, how Saturn and Jupiter could be both of them one and the same universal Numen? To which there are several answers. For first, Plato, who propounds this difficulty in his Cratylus, solves it thus: That by Jupiter here is to be understood the soul of the world, which, according to his theology, was derived from a perfect and eternal mind or intellect (which Chronos is interpreted to be) as Chronos also depended upon Uranus or Cœlus, the "supreme heavenly God," or "first original Deity." So that Plato here finds his Trinity of divine hypostases, archical and universal, Τἀγαθὸν, Νοῦς, and Ψυχὴ,[10] in "Uranus, Chronos, and Zeus;" or Cœlus, Saturn, and Jupiter. Others conceive that according to the plainer and more simple sense of Hesiod's Theogonia, that Jupiter, who, together with Neptune and Plato, is said to have been the son of Saturn, was not the supreme Deity, nor the soul of the world neither, but only the Æther, as Neptune was the sea, and Pluto the earth. All which are said to have been begotten by Chronos, or Saturn, the son of Uranus; that is, as much as to say, by the hidden virtue of the

[10] The learned Doctor fancies he has discovered more in Plato than is to be found in him. For this philosopher not only does not speak of those principles, but even brings forward sufficient to show, that he had not the slightest idea of applying the histories of Saturn, Jupiter, and Uranus to those three natures. In his Cratylus, indeed, p. 262. he explains the fable of Jupiter's origin from Saturn, by supposing Jupiter to be derived from some great intelligence: Εὔλογον δὲ, μεγάλης τινὸς διανοίας ἔκγονον εἶναι τὸν Δία, "But it is probable, that Jupiter is the offspring of a certain great intelligence." But it is difficult to understand the meaning of these words. For a little before he had openly declared Jupiter to be the supreme God, calling him, ἄρχοντα καὶ βασιλέα τῶν πάντων, "the prince and king of all things." In what sense, therefore, the supreme God is said by him to be the son of a certain great intelligence, I own myself at a loss to conceive. Much less do I understand his meaning, when he afterwards speaks of Saturn as being sprung from Cœlus: Ἔστι δὲ, says he, Οὐρανοῦ υἱὸς, ὡς λόγος· ἡ δὲ αὖ ἐς τὸ ἄνω ὄψις καλῶς ἔχει τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα καλεῖσθαι Οὐρανία, ὁρῶσα τὰ ἄνω, "He is said to be the son of Cœlus: for ἡ ἐς τὸ ἄνω ὄψις is rightly called Οὐρανία, as ὁρῶσα τὰ ἄνω." Let others explore the sense and force of these words; for my part, I feel no inclination to do so. Of this I am satisfied, that Plato here trifles like the lowest of grammarians. I perceive also that they are mistaken who suppose him to have held Uranus, Saturn, and Jupiter to be respectively what his followers call τἀγαθὸν, νοῦς, and ψυχή. About the rest, let others be solicitous. Also, let those who are so disposed assent to the learned Doctor's conjectures regarding the origin of the words Saturnus, Latium, and others: to myself, I must candidly confess, they appear idle and nugatory

supreme heavenly God. But the writer, De Mundo,* though making Jupiter to be the first and supreme God, yet, (taking Chronos to signify immensity of duration, or eternity) will have Jupiter to be the son of Chronos in this sense, because he doth διήκειν ἐξ αἰῶνος ἀτέρμονος εἰς ἕτερον αἰῶνα, "continue from one eternity to another;" so that Chronos and Zeus are to him in a manner one and the same thing. But we are apt to think that no ingenious and learned Pagan, who well understood the natural theology, would deny, but that the best answer of all to this difficulty is this, that there is no coherent sense to be made of all things in the fabulous theology. St. Austin,[1] from Varro, gives us this account of Saturn, that it is he, who produceth from himself continually the hidden seeds and forms of things, and reduceth or receiveth them again into himself; which some think to have been the true meaning of that fable concerning Saturn's devouring his male children, because the forms of these corporeal things are perpetually destroyed, whilst the material parts (signified by the female) still remain. However, it is plain, that this was but another Pagan adumbration of the Deity, that being also sometimes thus defined by them, as St. Austin[2] likewise informs us,† Sinus quidam naturæ in seipso continens omnia, "A certain bosom, or deep hollow, and inward recess of nature, which containeth within itself all things." And St. Austin himself concludes, that according to this Varronian notion of Saturn likewise, the Pagan Jupiter and Saturn were really but one and the same Numen, De Civ. Dei. lib. 7. cap. 13. Wherefore, we may with good reason affirm, that Saturn was another name for the supreme God amongst the Pagans, it signifying that secret and hidden power, which comprehends, pervades, and supports the whole world; and which produces the seeds or seminal principles and forms of all things from itself. As also Uranus or Cœlus was plainly yet another name for the same supreme Deity (or the first divine hypostasis); comprehending the whole.

In the next place, though it be true that Minerva be sometimes taken for a particular god, or for God according to a particular manifestation of him in the Æther, (as shall be showed afterwards;) yet was it often taken also for the supreme God,

* Cap. 7. p. 869. [Tom. 1. Aristot.]

[1] De Civitat. Dei. lib. 7. cap. 13. p. 132. tom. 7. opp.

[2] But in this passage of St. Augustine there is no mention made of Saturn, nor do the words here adduced pertain to Saturn. He is speaking of those who suppose God to be the soul of the world, and the world to be his body: Non enim, says he, ingenii opus est excellentia, ut deposito studio contentionis attendant,———si mundus Deus est, sinu quodam naturæ in se ipso continens omnia, "For there is no need of surpassing intellect, that having laid aside the spirit of contention, they may consider, ———if the world is God, containing all things within himself in a certain bosom or recess of nature." What, I ask, has this to do with Saturn.

† De Civ. Dei. lib. 4. cap. 12. [P. 77.]

‡ Thus in that old inscription: Optimus Maximus Cœlus æternus Jupiter.

according to his most general notion, or as a universal Numen diffusing himself through all things. Thus hath it been already proved, that Neith or Neithas was the same amongst the Egyptians, as Athena amongst the Greeks, and Minerva amongst the Latins; which that it was a universal Numen, appears from that Egyptian inscription in the temple of this god, "I am all that was, is, and shall be." And accordingly, Athenagoras tells us,[3] that Athena of the Greeks was, ἡ φρόνησις διὰ πάντων διήκουσα, "wisdom passing and diffusing itself through all things:" as in the book of Wisdom it is called, ἡ πάντων τεχνῖτις, "the Artifex of all things," and is said διήκειν καὶ χωρεῖν διὰ πάντων, "to pass and move through all things." Wherefore, this Athena or Minerva of the Pagans was either the first supreme Deity, a perfect and infinite Mind, the original of all things; or else a second divine hypostasis, the immediate offspring and first-begotten of that first original Deity. Thus, Aristides, in his oration upon Minerva:* Πάντα μὲν οὖν τὰ κάλλιστα περὶ Ἀθηνᾶν τε καὶ ἐξ Ἀθηνᾶς· κεφάλαιον δὲ εἰπεῖν, τοῦ πάντων δημιουργοῦ καὶ βασιλέως παῖς ἐστι μόνη δὴ μόνου· οὐ γὰρ εἶχεν, ἐξ ὅτου ὁμοτίμου ποιήσειεν αὐτήν· ἀλλ' ἀναχωρήσας αὐτὸς εἰς αὑτὸν, αὐτός ἐξ αὐτοῦ γενᾷ τε καὶ τίκτει τὴν θεόν· ὥστε ἔστι μόνη βεβαίως γνησία τοῦ πατρός, ἐξ ἴσου καὶ ὁμολογοῦντος ἑαυτῷ τοῦ γένους γενομένη, &c., "Wherefore all the most excellent things are in Minerva, and from her: but to speak briefly of her, this is the only immediate offspring of the only maker and king of all things; for he had none of equal honour with himself, upon whom he should beget her, and therefore retiring into himself, he begat her, and brought her forth from himself: so that this is the only genuine offspring of the first father of all." And again: Πίνδαρος δ' αὖ φησι, δεξιὰν κατὰ χεῖρα τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτὴν καθεζομένην, τὰς ἐντολὰς τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδέχεσθαι· ἀγγέλου μὲν γάρ ἐστι μείζων ἡ δὲ, τῶν ἀγγέλων ἄλλοις ἄλλα ἐπιτάττει πρώτη παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παραλαμβάνουσα, ἀντ' ἐξηγητοῦ τινος οὖσα τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ εἰσαγωγέως, ὅταν καὶ τούτου δέῃ, "Pindar also affirmeth concerning Minerva, that sitting at the right-hand of her father, she there receiveth commands from him to be delivered to the gods. For she is greater than the angels, and commandeth them some one thing and some another, according as she had first received of her father; she performing the office of an interpreter and introducer to the gods, when it is needful." Where we may observe by the way, that this word *angel* came to be in use amongst the Pagans from Jews and Christians, about this very age that Aristides lived in; after which we meet with it frequently in the writings of their philosophers. Lastly,

[3] Legat. pro Christianis, cap. 19. p. 86. Athenagoras, however, does not declare this to be his own opinion, but that of certain Greeks, which he himself despises and proves to be false.

* P. 192.

Aristides thus concludeth his oration upon Minerva: Σχεδὸν γὰρ δύναμιν τοῦ Διὸς εἶναι λέγων τις αὐτὴν ἐκ τούτων, οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτάνοι· ὥστε τί δεῖ μικρολογεῖσθαι τὰς ἐν μέρει πράξεις αὐτῆς διηγούμενον, ὅπου' ἔξεστι τὰ τοῦ Διὸς ἔργα κοινὰ τοῦ Διὸς εἶναι φῆσαι καὶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς, "He that from what we have said will determine that Minerva is as it were, the power and virtue of Jupiter himself, will not err. Wherefore (not to enumerate all the minute things belonging to Minerva) we conclude thus concerning her, that all the works of Jupiter are common with Jupiter and Minerva." Wherefore, that conceit which the learned and industrious Vossius[4] somewhere seems to favour, that the Pagans' universal Numen was no other than a senseless nature, or spermatic reason of the whole world, undirected by any higher intellectual principle, (which is indeed no better than downright atheism) is plainly confuted from hence, they making wisdom and understanding, under these names of Neith, Athena, and Minerva, to be either the absolutely supreme Deity, or the first begotten offspring of it.[5]

To Minerva may be added Apollo, who, though often taken for the sensible sun animated, and so an inferior Deity, yet was not always understood in this sense, nor indeed then when he was reckoned amongst the twelve Consentes, because the sun was afterwards added to them, in the number of the eight select gods. And that he was sometimes taken for the supreme universal Numen, the maker of the sun and of the whole world, is plainly testified by Plutarch (who is a competent witness in this case, he being a priest of this Apollo) writing thus concerning him in his Defect of Oracles:* Εἴτε ἥλιός ἐστιν, εἴτε κύριος ἡλίου καὶ πατὴρ, καὶ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὁρατοῦ παντὸς, οὐκ εἰκὸς ἀπαξιοῦν φωνῆς τοὺς νῦν ἀνθρώπους, οἷς αἴτιός ἐστι γενέσεως, καὶ τροφῆς, καὶ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ φρονεῖν, "Whether Apollo be the sun, or whether he be the lord and father of the sun, placed far above all sensible and corporeal nature, it is not likely that he should now deny his oracles to them, to whom himself is the cause of generation and nourishment, of life and understanding.[6]

[4] De Idololatria, lib. 7. cap. 1. p. 718.

[5] Of Minerva, the goddess Neith, and the inscription found in the temple of Neith, I have already said what will be sufficient towards determining the truth of the positions advanced in this place. Aristides is not a writer, from whom we can learn the religions of the ancients. Besides, the passages here cited from him do not prove what the learned Doctor is so anxious to inculcate, that the name Minerva designated the supreme God.

[*] Page 413.

[6] From this passage of Plutarch we cannot, in my opinion, infer what the learned Doctor fancies to be evident from it, that Apollo was sometimes taken for the supreme Being. I. It proves that some did not suppose him to be the sun, but the lord and father of the sun, whom no one beholds. Which opinion, I consider, amounts to this, that Apollo was the nature, which both made the sun and continually governs and controls it. But I see no necessity for our supposing, that they held Apollo to be that first principle, from which all things emanated. As must be known to all, who possess

Moreover, Urania Aphrodite, the Heavenly Venus or Love, was a universal Numen also, or another name of God, according to his more general notion, as comprehending the whole world; it being the same with that Ἔρως, "Love," which Orpheus, and others in Aristotle, made to be the first original of all things: for it is certain that the ancients distinguished concerning a double Venus and Love. Thus Pausanias, in Plato's Symposium:* Ἡ μέν γέ που πρεσβυτέρα καὶ ἀμήτωρ Οὐρανοῦ θυγάτηρ, ἣν δὴ καὶ οὐρανίαν ἐπονομάζομεν· ἡ δὲ νεωτέρα, Διὸς καὶ Διώνης, ἣν δὲ πάνδημον καλοῦμεν· ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ Ἔρωτα, τὸν μὲν ἑτέρᾳ συνεργὸν, πάνδημον ὀρθῶς καλεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ οὐράνιον, "There are two Venus's, and therefore, two Loves; one the older, and without a mother, the daughter of Uranus or heaven, which we call the heavenly Venus; another younger, begotten from Jupiter and Dione, which we call the vulgar Venus: and accordingly are there of necessity two loves, answering to these two Venus's, the one vulgar and the other heavenly." The elder of these two Venuses is in Plato said to be senior to Japhet and Saturn, and by Orpheus,[7] the oldest of all things, and πρῶτος γενέτωρ, "the first begetter of all." Upon which account, perhaps, it was called by the oriental nations Mylitta or Genitrix, as being the fruitful mother of all. This was also the same with Plato's τὸ πρῶτον καλὸν, "the first fair;" the cause of all pulchritude, order, and harmony in the world. And Pausanias,[8] the writer, tells us, that there were temples severally erected to each of these Venuses or Loves, the heavenly and the vulgar; and that Urania, or the heavenly Venus, was so called, ἐπὶ ἔρωτι καθαρῷ καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένῳ πόθου σωμάτων, "because the love belonging to it was pure, and free from all corporeal affection:" which, as it is in men is but a particular participation of that first Urania, or heavenly Venus and Love, God himself. And

even a slight acquaintance with ancient matters, it was the prevailing belief in former times, that certain genii or gods were placed over the heavenly bodies, who ruled them at will. They supposed, therefore, that the sun had also its own presiding deity. Hence, that diversity of opinion among the ancients respecting Apollo, to which Plutarch alludes; some considering him to be the sun, others, the god, who governs the sun. II. Apollo is called by Plutarch the cause of life, wisdom, and nourishment. But neither do these words clearly point out the supreme God. For who, I ask, is not aware that all these were ascribed by the ancients to the sun? Macrobius, Saturnal. lib. 1. cap. 19. p. 294. says: Sol mundi caput est et rerum sator, omnisque vis ejus non in quodam divisorum ministerio membrorum, sed in sola mente consistit, cujus sedes in capite est, "The sun is the head of the world, and the parent of things, and the whole of its power consists, not in a certain function of the divided members, but in mind alone, the seat of which is in the head." Add Julian's Oration, In Solem.

* P. 108.

[7] These words are not to be found in his hymn to Venus, p. 151. opp. although Venus is there said to produce all things, and is styled γενέτειρα θεά, "goddess mother." But this hymn, as is evident almost from every verse, was not dedicated to the heavenly Venus, but to the one, who was said to have sprung from the froth of the sea and to have passionately loved Adonis.

[8] In Bœotic. lib. 9. cap. 16. p. 742.

thus is Venus described by Euripides, in Stobæus,[9] as the supreme Numen:

Τὴν Ἀφροδίτην οὐχ ὁρᾷς, ὅση θεός;
Ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἂν εἴποις, οὐδὲ μετρήσειας ἄν,
Ὅση πέφυκε καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον διέρχεται·
Αὕτη τρέφει δὲ κἀμὲ καὶ πάντας βροτούς, &c.*

To this sense: "Do you not see how great a god this Venus is? but you are never able to declare her greatness, nor to measure the vast extent thereof. For this is she which nourisheth both thee and me, and all mortals, and which makes heaven and earth friendly to conspire together," &c. But by Ovid this is more fully expressed, in his Fastorum:[10]

Illa quidem totum dignissima temperat orbem,
Illa tenet nullo regna minora Deo:
Juraque dat cœlo, terræ, natalibus undis;
Perque suos initus continet omne genus.
Illa deos omnes (longum enumerare) creavit;
Illa satis causas arboribusque dedit.

Where all the gods are said to have been created or made by Venus, that is, by the one supreme Deity. But lastly, this is best of all performed by Severinus Boëtius, a Christian philosopher and poet, in this manner:†

Quod mundus stabili fide
Concordes variat vices,
Quod pugnantia semina
Fœdus perpetuum tenent:
Quod Phœbus roseum diem
Curru provehit aureo; &c.
Hanc rerum seriem ligat,
Terras ac pelagus regens,
Et cœlo imperitans, AMOR, &c.
Hic si frena remiserit,
Quicquid nunc amat invicem,
Bellum continuò geret.
Hic sancto populos quoque
Junctos fœdere continet;
Hic et conjugii sacrum
Castis nectit amoribus, &c.
O felix hominum genus,
Si vestros animos AMOR,
Quo cœlum regitur, regat.

And to this Urania, or heavenly Venus, was near of kin also that third Venus in Pausanias called Ἀποστροφία, and by the Latins Venus Verticordia, "pure and chaste Love," expulsive of all unclean lusts, to which the Romans consecrated a statue, as

[9] Eclog. Phys. lib. 1. cap. 17. p. 97.

* Thus also by Æschylus: Ἔρᾳ μὲν ἁγνὸς οὐρανὸς, &c. Ἔρως δὲ γαῖαν λαμβάνει, &c.——τῶν δ' ἐγὼ παραίτιος. Grot. Excerp. p. 45.

[10] Lib. 4. v. 91. &c.

† De Cons. lib. 2. Met. 8.

Valerius M. tells us (lib. 8. c. 15.), quo facilius virginum mulierumque mentes à libidine ad pudicitiam converterentur, "to this end, that the minds of the female sex might then the better be converted from lust and wantonness to chastity." We conclude therefore, that Urania, or the heavenly Venus, was sometimes among the Pagans a name for the supreme Deity, as that which is the most amiable being, and first pulchritude, the most benign and fecund begetter of all things, and the constant harmonizer of the whole world.[1]

[1] On the twofold love of the ancients I have already expressed myself at considerable length. The whole of what is here advanced by the learned Doctor, to prove that Venus was a name of the supreme Being, I frankly confess appears to me to be entirely destitute of probability. The Venus worshipped by the Greeks was unquestionably a female, or queen, translated to heaven after death. This is manifest from the whole of her history. Nor in the earlier ages did any one ever dream of a second or third Venus. The causes that subsequently led to the notion of a plurality of Venuses were the two following: I. The Greeks, on visiting foreign nations, from commercial or other motives, found in these also a goddess presiding over the affairs of love. Indeed, no people, devoted to the worship of many gods, was without such a deity; nor, as far as I know, did any nation entrust this department to a male, but all committed it to the administration of a female. These goddesses the Greeks did not scruple to identify with their own Venus, and to call by the same name. The like was afterwards done by the Romans. Hence those four Venuses enumerated by Cicero, De Natur. Deor. lib. 3. cap. 23. and by Arnobius, Adv. Gentes, lib. 4. p. 170. nay, the still greater number, which those who have leisure may collect from ancient books and inscriptions. See Car. Patinus, as quoted below, p. 396. For every goddess, to whom any nation assigned the empire of love, was called Venus. II. After the Greeks began to devote themselves to philosophy, they soon perceived, that all love was not of one and the same kind, but that blind lust and sensual love differed much from the love, which is founded upon wisdom and reason. I suspect Socrates and Plato to have been the first who taught this among the Greeks, as may be inferred from the Symposium and other works of Plato; unless we are to suppose rather, that many were led by right reason, even without the aid of a master, to the knowledge of this distinction. Be this as it may, the Greeks becoming thus enlightened would naturally consider it as unseemly to commit all love, rational and irrational, honourable and base, chaste and unchaste, to the superintendence of one and the same goddess. The Venus whom they publicly worshipped, with her son Cupid, it was evident, might be called the patroness of wantonness and lust, rather than of true and virtuous love. Therefore, that the latter might not be without its own tutelary deity, they, as it were, dissected one Venus into two goddesses, and invented a *heavenly Venus* together with a *heavenly Cupid*, to be supplicated by those whose minds were inspired with pure and genuine love; the other Venus and Cupid, whom they now distinguished by the title of *terrestrial*, being left to the slaves of carnal and sensual lusts. I am stating nothing new or unusual. For it is easy to show by numerous examples, that the application of philosophic precepts to religion and the history of the gods sometimes wrought important changes in the fables of antiquity, and that the ancients, in order to reconcile the maxims of reason with the public religion, did not hesitate frequently to remodel at will the traditions of the people. No wonder, therefore, that the ancient Greeks should dare to separate their goddess into two deities, that each kind of love might have its protector and patron. In this enterprise they were aided by the theogonies of the ancient poets, which, as may be learnt from Hesiod alone, described *Love* as being the most ancient of the gods. For as this was by no means applicable to that Venus, of whom Homer sings, and who was publicly worshipped in Greece, they considered it to be a sufficient argument for the introduction of two Loves and two Venuses. What the learned Doctor brings forward in this place is not of the slightest weight towards invalidating this hypothesis. Plato speaks of two Venuses; and Pausanias states, that the heavenly Venus was named from pure love. Will any body be led by these testimonies to conclude, that the heavenly Venus was an image of the supreme Being?

Again, though Vulcan, according to the most common and vulgar notion of him, be to be reckoned amongst the particular gods, yet had he also another more universal consideration. For Zeno in Laërtius[2] tells us, that the supreme God was called Ἥφαιστος or Vulcan, κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ τεχνικὸν πῦρ διάτασιν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ αὐτοῦ, "As his Hegemonic acted in the artificial fire." Now Plutarch[3] and Stobæus[4] testify, that the Stoics did not only call nature, but also the supreme Deity itself (the architect of the whole world), τεχνικὸν πῦρ, "an artificial fire," they conceiving him to be corporeal. And Jamblichus[5] making Phtha to be the same supreme God, amongst the Egyptians, with Osiris and Hammon, or rather, more properly, all of them alike the soul of the world, tells us, that Hephæstus, in the Greekish theology, was the same with this Egyptian Phtha: Ἕλληνες εἰς Ἥφαιστον μεταλαμβάνουσι τὸν Φθᾶ, τῷ τεχνικῷ μόνον προσβάλλοντες, "Amongst the Greeks Hephæstus (or Vulcan) answers to the Egyptian Phtha." Wherefore as the Egyptians by Phtha, so the Greeks by Hephæstus, sometimes

Euripides and Æschylus, according to poetic wont, proclaim the magnitude of the empire of Love or Venus, that is, if divested of figure, they tell us that all men and animals are impelled to love by a certain instinct of nature. What, I ask, is there in this towards proving the heavenly Venus and the supreme God to be the same? Besides, there is nothing to show us that these poets are speaking of celestial love, and Æschylus does not even mention the name of Love or Venus. Ovid's passage on love is altogether foreign to the question. For a slight inspection of his poem will convince us, that the poet is extolling no other Venus than the one to whom the Romans paid homage, the mother of Æneas:

> Proximus Anchisen, cum quo commune parentis
> Non dedignata est nomen habere Venus,
> Hinc satus Æneas.

Fastor. lib. 4. v. 35. &c. Boëthius, a Christian philosopher and poet, calls the supreme Being Love. This he was able to defend by the example of Holy Writ. But what has this to do with the worshippers of many gods? Does it follow, because Boëthius designated God by the name of Love, that those who formerly worshipped the heavenly Venus worshipped the supreme God, the parent of all things? No one, I fancy, in his senses, would admit it. Thus frequently are the most learned men deluded by some shadow of the truth. Those who are prepossessed with any particular opinion, however sound and rational their views in other respects, are generally on this one point like men afflicted with the jaundice, to whom every thing seems yellow that they look upon. They cannot take up an author without being sure to find in it their own favourite doctrines; and although facts may be against them, still they will never have to seek in vain for words that seem to favour their wishes. On the heavenly Venus and her worship, Car. Patinus in particular has treated very elaborately and copiously in his Commentary, In Antiquum Monumentum Marcellinæ e Græcia nuper allatum. published at Padua, 1688. 4. For the Marcellina to whom this monument is dedicated was ἀρχιερεία Ἀφροδίτης οὐρανίας. On Venus Verticordia or Ἀποστροφία, it will be worth while to peruse what has been collected by Mons. Bayle, Diction. Histor. et Critique, v. Sulpitia, tom. 4. not. A. p. 2676.

[2] Lib. 7. segm. 147. p. 458.
[3] De Placitis Philos. lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 881.
[4] Eclog. Phys. lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 17.
[5] De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. 8. cap. 3. p. 159.

understood no other than the supreme God, or at least the soul of the world, as artificially framing all things.[6]

Furthermore, Seneca* gives us yet other names of the supreme Deity, according to the sense of the Stoics: Hunc et liberum patrem, et Herculem, ac Mercurium nostri putant, Liberum Patrem, quia omnium parens, &c. Herculem, quod vis ejus invicta sit; Mercurium, quia ratio penes illum est, numerusque, et ordo, et scientia, "Furthermore, our philosophers take this auctor of all things to be Liber Pater, Hercules, and Mercury; the first, because he is parent of all things, &c. the second, because his force and power is unconquerable, &c. and the third, because there is in and from him reason, number, order, and knowledge." And now we see already, that the supreme God was sufficiently polyonymous amongst the Pagans; and that all these, Jupiter, Pan, Janus, Genius, Saturn, Cœlus, Minerva, Apollo, Aphrodite Urania, Hephæstus, Liber Pater, Hercules, and Mercury, were not so many really distinct and substantial gods, much less self-existent and independent ones; but only several names of that one supreme universal and all-comprehending Numen, according to several notions and considerations of him.

But besides these, there were many other pagan gods called by Servius dii speciales, "special or particular gods;" which cannot be thought neither to have been so many really distinct and substantial beings (that is, natural gods) much less self-existent and independent, but only so many several names or notions of one and the same supreme Deity, according to certain particular powers and manifestations of it. It is true, that some late Christian writers against the polytheism and idolatry of the Pagans, have charged them with at least a trinity of independent gods, viz. Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, as sharing the government of the whole world amongst these three, and consequently acknowledging no one universal Numen. Notwithstanding which it is certain, that according to the more arcane doctrine, and cabala of the Pagans, concerning the natural true theology, these three considered as distinct and independent gods, were

[6] I am either altogether ignorant of the nature of true reasoning, or nothing again can be more illogical than this conclusion. I. The Stoics asserted *Vulcan* to be one of the names of their one supreme God. But who is not aware, that this sect combined the popular religion with the precepts of philosophy in so absurd and stupid a manner, as to excite the ridicule of all wise men? Consult Cicero, De Natura Deor. lib. 3. They certainly are not to be listened to in a question respecting the sacred rites and opinions of antiquity. II. The Stoics called God an *artificial fire*. Be it so. Does this prove *Vulcan* to be the name of the supreme Being? III. On the passage of Jamblichus I have already spoken. Neither the Egyptian Deity *Ptha* nor the Greek Vulcan is the supreme God. I would admit, indeed, that Ptha in the Egyptian was the same as Vulcan in the Greek mythology; but I cannot allow of the two being confounded.

* De Ben. lib. 4. c. 8.

accounted but dii poetici et commentitii, " poetical and fictitious gods," and they were really esteemed no other than so many several names and notions of one and the same supreme Numen, as acting variously in those several parts of the world, the heaven, the sea, the earth, and hell. For first, as to Pluto and Hades, called also by the Latins Orcus, and Dis (which latter word seems to have been a contraction of Dives to answer the Greek Pluto) as Balbus in Cicero[7] attributes to him, omnem vim terrenam, " all terrene power," so others commonly assign him the " regimen of separate souls after death." Now it is certain, that, according to this latter notion, it was by Plato understood no otherwise than as a name for that part of " the divine providence which exercises itself upon the souls of men after death." This Ficinus observed upon Plato's Cratylus: Animadverte præ cæteris, Plutonum hic significare præcipuè providentiam divinam ad separatas animas pertinentem, " You are to take notice, that by Pluto is here meant that part of divine providence, which belongeth to separate souls." For this is that which, according to Plato, " binds and detains pure souls in that separate state, with the best vinculum of all, which is not necessity, but love and desire; they being ravished and charmed as it were with those pure delights which they there enjoy." And thus is he also to be understood in his book of laws, writing in this manner concerning Pluto:* Καὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον πολεμικοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὸν τοιοῦτον θεὸν, ἀλλὰ τιμητέον, ὡς ὄντα ἀεὶ τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένει ἄριστον· κοινωνία γὰρ ψυχῇ καὶ σώματι, διαλύσεως οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ κρεῖττον, ὡς ἐγὼ φαίην ἂν σπουδῇ λέγων, " Neither ought military men to be troubled or offended at this god Pluto, but highly to honour him, as who always is the most beneficent to mankind. For I affirm with the greatest seriousness, that the union of the soul with this terrestrial body is never better than the dissolution or separation of them." Pluto, therefore, according to Plato, is nothing else but a name for that part of the divine providence that is exercised upon the souls of men, in their separation from these earthly bodies.[8] And upon this account was Pluto styled

[7] De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 27. p. 2994.

* Lib. 8. [P. 642.]

[8] But what authorized Ficinus to attribute this opinion to Plato, of which in his Cratylus, where he treats of the meaning of the name Pluto, not the slightest vestige is to be found? We meet, however, with many such things both in Ficinus and the other interpreters of Plato, who almost all fancy they can present Plato to us much wiser than he really was. The passage here quoted from lib. 8. De Legibus, if it be compared with the words which precede, is of itself sufficient to refute this conceit of Ficinus. For Pluto is there ranked by Plato among the twelve gods to whom sacrifices were offered each month; and the last month of the year is said to have been consecrated to him. And can he, I ask, be considered a supreme God, who was worshipped by the Greeks only in the twelfth month of the year, and openly disregarded by the soldiers, whom Plato is exhorting to a more frequent worship of this Deity?

by Virgil,[9] the Stygian Jupiter. But by others Pluto, together with Ceres, is taken in a larger sense, for the manifestation of the Deity in this whole terrestrial globe; and thus is the writer De Mundo* to be understood, when he tells us that God or Jupiter is οὐρανιός τε καὶ χθόνιος, πάσης ἐπώνυμος ὢν φύσεως τε καὶ τύχης, ἅτε πάντων αὐτὸς αἴτιος ὤν, "both celestial and terrestrial, he being denominated from every nature, forasmuch as he is the cause of all things." Pluto therefore is Ζεὺς χθόνιος or καταχθόνιος, "the terrestrial (also as well as the Stygian and subterranean Jupiter;" and that other Jupiter, which is distinguished both from Pluto and Neptune, is properly Ζεὺς οὐράνιος, "the heavenly Jupiter," God as manifesting himself in the heavens. Hence is it, that Zeus and Hades, Jupiter and Pluto are made to be one and the same thing, in that passage which Julian[10] cites as an oracle of Apollo, but others impute to Orpheus:

Εἷς Ζεὺς, εἷς Ἀΐδης,

"Jupiter and Pluto are one and the same God." As also that Euripides, in a place before produced, is so doubtful, whether he should call the supreme God (τὸν πάντων μεδέοντα, "that takes care of all things here below) Zeus or Hades:

Ζεὺς εἴτ' Ἀΐδης
Ὀνομαζόμενος στέργεις,

"Whether thou hadst rather be called Jupiter or Pluto."

Lastly, Hermesianax the Colophonian poet, in those verses of

[9] Æneid, lib. 7. v. 327. I should look for no such important meaning in this title. The Stygian Jupiter is he who holds the same power in the lower regions as the ancients supposed Jupiter to possess in heaven. The name corresponds to the Greek word designating the name Pluto, Ζεὺς χθόνιος; which occurs in Hesiod Oper. et Dies, v. 465. p. 267. in Æschylus, Sophocles, and others. Consult J. Geo. Grævius, Lection. Hesiodeæ, cap. 10. p. 51. Nor have I any doubt, but that Virgil and the other Latin authors, who call Pluto *Jupiter Stygius*, meant to express this very Greek name Ζεὺς χθόνιος. But those who made use of it meant the Pluto depicted by the Greek poets, namely, the god who rules over the infernal regions.

* Cap. 7. p. 869. opp. Aristot.

[10] Orat. 4. in Regem Solem, p. 136. Whoever may have been the author of this oracle, which I consider to belong to some later philosopher of the Platonic school rather than to the Pythian priestess, it is not of the slightest use in the present question. We shall quote it entire:

Εἷς Ζεὺς, εἷς Ἀΐδης, εἷς ἠλιός ἐστι Σάραπις.

Its author supposed the sun alone to be concealed under the names of Jupiter, Pluto, and Serapis, or the names Jupiter, Pluto, and Serapis to be three appellations of one sun. If we agree with him, therefore, we must suppose Pluto to be the sun; an opinion which the emperor Julian certainly adopts and supports by many arguments. It was also entertained by Porphyry, the noblest philosopher of the Platonic sect; as is evident from his words in Eusebius, Præpar. Evangel. lib. 3. par. 11. p. 109. But if Pluto be the sun, how can he be the supreme God, the lord of all things?

his (afterward to be set down) makes Pluto in the first place (with many other pagan gods) to be really one and the same with Jupiter.

That Neptune was also another name of the supreme God, from another particular consideration of him, namely, as acting in the seas (at least according to the arcane and natural theology of the Pagans), is plainly declared by divers of the ancients. Xenocrates in Stobæus,[1] and Zeno in Laërtius,[2] affirm, that God as acting in the water is called Posidone or Neptune. To the same purpose Balbus in Cicero:* Sed tamen his fabulis spretis ac repudiatis, Deus pertinens per naturam cujusque rei, per terras Ceres, per maria Neptunus, alii per alia, poterunt intelligi, qui qualesque sint, &c. "But these poetic fables concerning the gods being despised and rejected, it is easy for us to understand how God, passing through the nature of every thing, may be called by several names, as through the earth Ceres (and Pluto) through the seas Neptune; and through other parts of the world by other names;" so that all these titular gods were but so many several denominations of one supreme Deity. And Cotta afterward thus represents the sense of this theology:† Neptunum esse dicis animum cum intelligentiâ per mare pergentem, idem de Cerere, "Your meaning is, Neptune is a mind, which with understanding passes through the sea, and the like of Ceres through the earth." Lastly, to name no more, Maximus Tyrius‡ agreeth also herewith: Κάλει τὸν μὲν Δία νοῦν προσεύτατον, &c. τὸν δὲ Ποσειδῶ, πνεῦμα διὰ γῆς καὶ θαλάττης ἰὸν, οἰκονομοῦν αὐτῶν τὴν στάσιν καὶ τὴν ἁρμονίαν, "You are to call Jupiter that princely mind, which all things follow and obey, &c. and Neptune that spirit, which passing through the earth and sea, causes their state and harmony."[3]

Lastly, that these three, Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, were not three really distinct substantial beings, but only so many several names for one supreme God (according to the true and natural theology of the Pagans), is thus plainly declared by

[1] Eclog. Physic. lib. 1. cap. 9. p. 56. [2] Lib. 7. segm. 147. p. 458.
* De Nat. Deor. lib. 2. [Cap. 28. p. 2996.]
† De Nat. Deor. lib. 3. [Cap. 25. p. 3090.]
‡ Dissert. 30. [Cap. 29. p. 290.]
[3] I am surprised that the learned Doctor has omitted the testimony of Phornutus, who, in his book De Natur. Deor. cap. 22. p. 192. in Gale's Opuscula Veterum Mythologica, asserts Neptune to be τὴν τεταγμένην κατὰ τὸ ὑγρὸν δύναμιν, "the power which *rules* in the humid or sea," and refers all that is related of Neptune by the ancients to this definition. But supposing this opinion of Maximus and Phornutus to be true, which, however, I consider to be far from the case, still it will be of no weight towards supporting the present argument. Granting Neptune to be a certain power which gives laws to the waters and by reason controls the motions of the seas, as these authors supposed, what should compel us to conclude, that this power is the supreme Being? Is it not possible for these writers to have meant some particular nature subject to the supreme God? The judgment of the Stoics, whose evidence is again appealed to by the learned Doctor, is utterly valueless in this question.

Pausanias in his Corinthiacs;[4] he there expounding the meaning of a certain statue of Jupiter with three eyes (called the country Jupiter of the Trojans) in this manner: Τρεῖς δὲ ὀφθαλμοὺς ἔχειν ἐπὶ τῷδε ἄν τις τεκμαίροιτο αὐτὸν· Δία γὰρ ἐν οὐρανῷ βασιλεύειν, οὗτος μὲν λόγος κοινὸς πάντων ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπων. Ὃν δὲ ἄρχειν φασὶν ὑπὸ γῆς, ἔστιν ἔπος τῶν Ὁμήρου Δία ὀνομάζον καὶ τοῦτον,

Ζεύς τε καταχθόνιος, καὶ ἐπαινὴ Περσεφόνεια.

Αἰσχύλος δὲ ὁ Εὐφορίωνος καλεῖ Δία καὶ τὸν ἐν θαλάσσῃ· Τρισὶν οὖν ὁρῶντα ἐποίησεν ὀφθαλμοῖς, ὅστις δὴ οὖν ὁ ποιήσας, ἅτε ἐν ταῖς τρισὶ ταῖς λεγομέναις λήξεσιν ἄρχοντα τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον Διόν, "Now that this statue of Jupiter was made to have three eyes, one may guess this to have been the reason; because first the common speech of all men makes Jupiter to reign in the heaven. Again, he that is said to rule under the earth, is in a certain verse of Homer, called Zeus or Jupiter too, namely, the infernal or subterraneous Jupiter, together with Proserpina. And lastly, Æschylus, the son of Euphorion, calls that God, who is the king of the sea also, Jupiter. Wherefore this statuary made Jupiter with three eyes, to signify that it is one and the same God, which ruleth in those three several parts of the world, the heaven, the sea, and the earth." Whether Pausanias were in the right or no, as to his conjecture concerning this three-eyed statue of Jupiter, it is evident, that himself and other ancient Pagans acknowledged Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto to be but three several names, and partial considerations of one and the same God, who ruleth over the whole world. And since both Proserpine and Ceres were really the same with Pluto, and Salacia with Neptune, we may well conclude that all these, Jupiter, Neptune, Salacia, Pluto, Proserpina, and Ceres, though several poetical and political gods, yet were really taken but for one and the same natural and philosophical God.

Moreover, as Neptune was a name for God, as manifesting himself in the sea, and ruling over it, so was Juno another name of God, as acting in the air. This is expressly affirmed both by Xenocrates in Stobæus,[5] and Zeno in Laërtius. And St. Austin[6] propounding this query, why Juno was joined to Jupiter as his wife and sister, makes the Pagans answer thus to it: Quia Jovem (inquiunt) in æthere accipimus, in aëre Junonem, "Because we call God in the ether Jupiter, in the air Juno." But the reason, why Juno was feminine and a goddess, is thus given by Cicero:[7] Effœminarunt autem eum, Junonique tribuerunt,

[4] Lib. 2. cap. 24. p. 166.

[5] The passages of Laërtius and Stobæus have been indicated above.

[6] De Civitate Dei, lib. 4. cap. 10. p. 74. tom. 7. opp. But St. Augustine repudiates this answer of the philosophers of his own time and exposes its folly.

[7] De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 26. p. 2994. tom. 9. opp.

quod nihil est aëre mollius, "They effeminated the air, and attributed it to Juno, a goddess, because nothing is softer than it." Minerva was also sometimes taken for a special or particular god, and then was it nothing (as Zeno informs us) but a name for the supreme God, as passing through the (higher) ether: which gave occasion to St. Austin* thus to object against the pagan theology: Si ætheris partem superiorem Minerva tenere dicitur, et hac occasione fingere poëtas, quod de Jovis capite nata sit, cur non ergo ipsa potius deorum regina deputatur, quod sit Jove superior? "If Minerva be said to possess the highest part of the ether, and the poets therefore to have feigned her to have been begotten from Jupiter's head, why is not she rather called the queen of the gods, since she is superior to Jupiter?" Furthermore, as the supreme God was called Neptune in the sea, and Juno in the air, so by the same reason may we conclude, that he was called Vulcan in the fire. Lastly, as the sun and moon were themselves sometime worshipped by the Pagans for inferior deities, they being supposed to be animated with particular souls of their own; so was the supreme God also worshipped in them both (as well as in the other parts of the world) and that under those names of Apollo and Diana. Thus the Pagans appointing a god to preside over every part of the world, did thereby but make the supreme God polyonymous, all those gods of theirs being indeed nothing but several names of him. Which theology of the ancient Pagans, Maximus Tyrius, treating concerning Homer's philosophy (after he had mentioned his tripartite empire of the world, shared between Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto) thus declareth:† Εὕροις δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλας παρ' Ὁμήρῳ ἀρχὰς καὶ γενέσεις παντοδαπῶν ὀνομάτων. ὧν ὁ μὲν ἀνόητος ὡς μύθων ἀκούει, ὁ δὲ φιλόσοφος ὡς πραγμάτων· ἔστιν αὐτῷ καὶ ἀρετῆς ἀρχή, ἀλλ' Ἀθηνᾶ λέγεται, &c. "You may find also in Homer other principles, and the originals of several names; which the ignorant hear as fables, but a philosopher will understand as things and realities. For he assigns a principle of virtue and wisdom, which he calls Minerva; another of love and desire, which he calls Venus; another of artificialness, and that is Vulcan, who rules over the fire. And Apollo also with him presides over dancings, the muses over songs, Mars over war, Æolus over winds, and Ceres over fruits." And then does he conclude thus: Καὶ οὐδὲν μέρος Ὁμήρῳ ἄθεον, οὐδὲ δυνάστου ἄπυρον, οὐδὲ ἀρχῆς ἔρημον, ἀλλὰ πάντα μεστὰ θείων ὀνομάτων, καὶ θείων λόγων, καὶ θείας τέχνης, "So that no part neither of nature nor of the world, is to Homer godless (or void of a god) none destitute of a ruler, or without a superior government; but all things full of divine names, and of divine reason, and of divine

* Civ. Dei, lib. 4. cap. 10. [P. 74.]

† Dissert. 16. p. 163.

art." Where his θεῖα ὀνόματα, his "divine names," are nothing but several names of God, as manifesting himself variously in the several things of nature, and the parts of the world, and as presiding over them.

Wherefore, besides those special gods of the Pagans already mentioned, that were appointed to preside over several parts of the world, there are others, which are but several names of the supreme God neither, as exercising several offices and functions in the world, and b l gifts upon mankind: as when in giving corn : called Ceres; in bestowing wine, Bacchus; in m their health, Æsculapius; in presiding over traff lizing, Mercury; in governing military affairs, M g the winds, Æolus; and the like.

That the more phi s did thus really interpret the fables of the gods ir many poetical and political gods to be all of t l the same supreme natural God, is evident from the testimonies of Antisthenes, Plato, Xenocrates, Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus (who allegorized all the fables of the gods accordingly) and of Scævola, the Roman Pontifex, of Cicero, Varro, Seneca, and many others. But that even their poets also did sometimes venture to broach this arcane theology, is manifest from those fragments preserved of Hermesianax[8] the Colophonian amongst the Greeks, and of Valerius Soranus amongst the Latins; the former thus enumerating the chief pagan gods, and declaring them to be all but one and the same Numen:

Πλούτων, Περσεφόνη, Δημήτηρ, Κύπρις, Ἔρωτες,
Τρίτωνες, Νηρεὺς, Τηθὺς καὶ Κυανοχαίτης,
Ἑρμῆς θ' Ἥφαιστός τε κλυτὸς, Πὰν, Ζεύς τε καὶ Ἥρη,
Ἄρτεμις, ἠδ' ἑκάεργος Ἀπόλλων, εἷς Θεός ἐστι.

Pluto, Persephone, Ceres, et Venus alma, et Amores,
Tritones, Nereus, Tethys, Neptunus et ipse,
Mercurius, Juno, Vulcanus, Jupiter, et Pan,
Diana, et Phœbus Jaculator, sunt *Deus unus*.

The latter pronouncing universally, that Jupiter Omnipotens is,

[8] Hermesianax the Colophonian, a most celebrated poet, to whom his fellow-citizens dedicated a statue, is often honourably mentioned by Pausanias, Græc. lib. 1. cap. 9. p. 23. lib. 6. cap. 17. p. 493. lib. 7. cap. 17. p. 566. and other places. He is also spoken of by Agatharchides in Photius, Biblioth. cod. 250. p. 1337. by Athenæus, Deipnosophist. p. 597. 599. &c. ed. Lugd. Bat. 1637. fol. and by other authors. His verses here adduced are cited by most of those who have attempted to prove the agreement of the Christian and the old pagan religion. But I know not how it happens that they all have omitted the name of the author, in whom they are at this day extant. Even Huet himself, who, Demonstrat. Evangel. prop. 4. cap. 10. p. 243. has aptly converted these verses to his own use, most diligent as he otherwise is in pointing out the passages of authors, does not tell us where they are to be met with. Let others who have plenty of leisure find out to whose care we are indebted for the preservation of this fragment.

Deus unus et omnes,[9]

"one god, and all gods." Whether by his Jupiter he here meant the soul of the world only, as Varro would interpret him, agreeably to his own hypothesis, or whether an abstract mind superior to it; but probably he made this Jupiter to be all gods, upon these two accounts; first, as he was the begetter and creator of all the other natural gods, which were the Pagans' inferior deities (as the stars and demons); secondly, as that all the other poetical and political gods were nothing else but several names and notions of him.

We shall add, in the last place, that St. Austin, making a more full and particular enumeration of the pagan gods, and mentioning amongst them many others besides the select Roman gods (which are not now commonly taken notice of), does pronounce universally of them all, according to the sense of the more intelligent Pagans, that they were but one and the same Jupiter:* Ipse in æthere sit Jupiter; ipse in aëre Juno; ipse in mari Neptunus; in inferioribus etiam maris ipse Salacia; in terra Pluto; in terra inferiore Proserpina; in focis domesticis Vesta; in fabrorum fornace Vulcanus; in divinantibus Apollo; in merce Mercurius; in Jano initiator; in Termino terminator; Saturnus in tempore; Mars et Bellona in bellis; Liber in vineis; Ceres in frumentis; Diana in silvis; Minerva in ingeniis. Ipse sit postremo etiam illa turba quasi plebeiorum deorum; ipse præsit nomine Liberi virorum seminibus, et nomine Liberæ fœminarum. Ipse sit Diespiter, qui partum perducat ad diem; ipse sit dea Mena, quam præfecerunt menstruis fœminarum; ipse Lucina, quæ à parturientibus invocatur; ipse opem ferat nascentibus, excipiens eos sinu terræ et vocetur Opis. Ipse in vagitu os aperiat, et vocetur, Deus Vagitanus. Ipse levet de terra, et vocetur dea Levana. Ipse cunas tueatur, et vocetur dea Cunina. Sit ipse in deabus illis, quæ fata nascentibus canunt, et vocantur Carmentes. Præsit fortuitis, voceturque Fortuna. In Diva Rumina mammam parvulis immulgeat. In Diva Potina potionem immisceat. In Diva Educa escam præbeat. De pavore infantium Paventia nuncupetur. De spe, quæ venit, Venilia; de voluptate Volupia. De actu Agenoria. De stimulis, quibus ad

[9] The verses of Valerius are extant in St. Augustine, whose passage I shall quote entire from De Civitate Dei, cap. 9. p. 131. lib. 7. opp. In hanc sententiam etiam quosdam versus Valerii Sorani exponit idem Varro in eo libro, quem seorsum ab istis de cultu Deorum scripsit: qui versus hi sunt:

Jupiter omnipotens, regum rerumque Deumque
Progenitor, genetrixque Deum, Deus unus et omnis,

* To this purport the same Varro, in a specific work on the worship of the gods, explains also certain verses of Valerius Soranus, which are as follow: 'Omnipotent Jupiter,' &c."

* De Civ. Dei, lib. 4. cap. 11. [P. 76.]

nimium actum homo impellitur, dea Stimula nominetur. Strenua dea sit, strenuum faciendo. Numeria, quæ numerare doceat; Camæna, quæ canere. Ipse sit et Deus Consus, præbendo consilia; et Dea Sentia, sententias inspirando. Ipse dea Juventas, quæ post prætextam excipiat juvenilis ætatis exordia. Ipse sit Fortuna Barbata, quæ adultos barba induit, quos honorare voluerit. Ipse in Jugatino Deo conjuges jungat; et cum virgini uxori zona solvitur, ipse invocetur, et dea Virginensis invocetur. Ipse sit Mutinus, qui [illegible] Græcos Priapus, si non pudet. Hæc omnia, quæ dixi [illegible]que non dixi, hi omnes dii deæque sit unus Jupiter; [illegible] si[illegible], ut quidam volunt, omnia ista partes ejus, sicut eis [illegible] [illegible]ibus eum placet esse mundi animum; sive virtutes ejus, [illegible] sententia velut magnorum multorumque doctorum est, "[illegible] us grant, according to the Pagans, that the supreme God is in the ether Jupiter; in the air Juno; in the sea Neptune; in the lower parts of the sea Salacia; in the earth Pluto; in the inferior parts thereof Proserpina; in the domestic hearths Vesta; in the smiths' forges Vulcan; in divination Apollo; in traffic and merchandize Mercury; in the beginnings of things Janus; in the ends of them Terminus; in time Saturn; in wars Mars and Bellona; in the vineyards Liber; in the corn-fields Ceres; in the woods Diana; and in wits Minerva. Let him be also that troop of plebeian gods; let him preside over the seeds of men under the name of Liber, and of women under the name of Libera; let him be Diespiter, that brings forth the birth to light; let him be the goddess Mena, whom they have set over women's monthly courses; let him be Lucina, invoked by women in child-bearing; let him be Opis, who aids the new-born infants; let him be Deus Vagitanus, that opens their mouths to cry; let him be the goddess Levana, which is said to lift them up from the earth; and the goddess Cunina, that defends their cradles; let him be the Carmentes also, who foretell the fates of infants; let him be Fortune, as presiding over fortuitous events; let him be Diva Rumina, which suckles the infant with the breasts; Diva Potina, which gives it drink; and Diva Educa, which affords it meat; let him be called the goddess Paventia, from the fear of infants; the goddess Venilia, from hope; the goddess Volupia, from pleasure; the goddess Agenoria, from acting; the goddess Stimula, from provoking; the goddess Strenua, from making strong and vigorous; the goddess Numeria, which teacheth to number; the goddess Camæna, which teaches to sing; let him be Deus Consus, as giving counsel; and Dea Sentia, as inspiring men with sense; let him be the goddess Juventas, which has the guardianship of young men; and Fortuna Barbata, which upon some more than others liberally bestoweth beards; let him be Deus Jugatinus, which joins man and wife together; and Dea

Virginensis, which is then invoked when the girdle of the bride is loosed; lastly, let him be Mutinus also (which is the same with Priapus amongst the Greeks) if you will not be ashamed to say it. Let all these gods and goddesses, and many more (which I have not mentioned) be one and the same Jupiter, whether as parts of him, which is agreeable to their opinion who hold him to be the soul of the world; or else as his virtues only, which is the sense of many and great pagan doctors."

But that the authority and reputation of a late learned and industrious writer, G. I. Vossius, may not here stand in our way, or be a prejudice to us, we think it necessary to take notice of one passage of his, in his book De Theologia Gentili, and freely to censure the same; where, treating concerning that pagan goddess Venus, he writeth thus:[10] Ex philosophica de diis doctrina, Venus est vel Luna (ut vidimus) vel Lucifer, sive Hesperus. Sed ex poëtica ac civili, supra hos cœlos statuuntur mentes quædam à sideribus diversæ: quomodò Jovem, Apollinem, Junonem, Venerem, cæterosque Deos Consentes, considerare jubet Apuleius. Quippe eos (inquit) natura visibus nostris denegavit: necnon tamen intellectu eos mirabundi contemplamur, acie mentis acrius contemplantes. Quid apertius hic, quam ab eo per Deos Consentes intelligi, non corpora cœlestia vel subcœlestia, sed sublimiorem quandam naturam, nec nisi animis conspicuam? "According to the philosophic doctrine concerning the gods, Venus is either the moon, or Lucifer, or Hesperus; but according to the poetic and civil theology of the Pagans, there were certain eternal minds, placed above the heavens, distinct from the stars: accordingly as Apuleius requires us to consider Jupiter and Apollo, Juno and Venus, and all those other gods called Consentes; he affirming of them, that though nature had denied them to our sight, yet notwithstanding, by the diligent contemplation of our minds, we apprehend and admire them. Where nothing can be more plain (saith Vossius) than that the Dii Consentes were understood by Apuleius, neither to be celestial nor subcelestial bodies, but a certain higher nature perceptible only to our minds." Upon which words of his we shall make these following remarks: first, that this learned writer seems here, as also throughout that whole book of his, to mistake the philosophic theology of Scævola and Varro, and others, for that which was physiological only (which physiological theology of the Pagans will be afterwards declared by us). For the philosophic theology of the Pagans did not deify natural and sensible bodies only, but the principal part thereof was the asserting of one supreme and universal Numen, from whence all their other gods were derived. Neither was Venus, according to this phi-

[10] De Theolog. Gentili, lib. 2. cap. 31. p. 172.

losophic and arcane theology, taken only for the moon, or for Lucifer or Hesperus, as this learned writer conceives, but, as we have already proved, for the supreme Deity also, either according to its universal notion, or some particular consideration thereof. Wherefore the philosophic theology, both of Scævola and Varro, and others, was called natural, not as physiological only, but (in another sense) as real and true; it being the theology neither of cities, nor of stages or theatres, but of the world, and of the wise men in it: philosophy being that properly which considers the absolute truth and nature of things. Which philosophic theology therefore was opposed both to the civil and poetical, as consisting in opinion and fancy only.[1] Our second remark is, that Vossius does here also seem incongruously to make both the civil and poetical theology, as such, to philosophize; whereas the first of these was properly nothing but the

[1] I am convinced, however, that Vossius' doctrine is less objectionable than that which is here espoused by the learned Doctor. I. He complains that Vossius mistook the philosophic theology, which Varro calls *natural*, for the physical theology. But Vossius in this expressed the opinion of Varro himself. For as is evident from the remains of his works, especially those preserved by St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, Varro applied the whole doctrine of the gods to physical science, that is, supposed Jupiter to be the world or the soul of the world, and the other gods to be members, parts, and properties of the nature of things. And St. Augustine himself bears out Vossius' view, and shows that the words *physical* and *natural* have exactly the same meaning in this argument. Dixerit aliquis, says he, De Civit. Dei, lib. 5. cap. 5. sect. 3. p. 117. hæc duo genera, mythicon et *physicum*, id est, fabulosum et *naturale*, discernamus ab hoc civili, de quo nunc agitur: "Some one will say, let us distinguish these two kinds, the mythical and *physical*, that is, the fabulous and *natural*, from the civil of which we are now treating." Nor in reference to this subject do I recollect an instance where an ancient author uses the word natural in any other sense: wherefore, what is here brought forward respecting the meaning of natural theology among the ancients, is entirely unsupported by authority. II. He assumes that there were formerly two kinds of theology in vogue among the ancients, one *physical* and the other natural, and that these were very different from each other. According to him, physical theology is the application of the ancient fables respecting the gods to physical and natural things: in which the Stoics, as is well known, were pre-eminently ingenious. The natural theology he pronounces to be the discipline of those who supposed all the gods to be merely different names of one supreme Being, and referred them all to the one Creator and Parent of all things. I do not deny that there were some who did distinguish these two methods of explaining the history of the gods; but still the generality of those who derived all things from one principle, and sought to reconcile the public religions with their own opinions, followed both kinds at the same time. This is manifest even from the example of the Stoics; Neptune, for instance, with this sect, signified the sea: and yet the same sect supposed this to be a name of the supreme Being as passing through the sea. III. He has no doubt of Scævola, Varro, and all the other wise men of antiquity having acknowledged one God the ruler of all things. On this opinion, were I disposed to be prolix, I might have much to say; but shall refer my readers to previous comments. I shall merely observe, that our worthy author is much mistaken in supposing Varro and Scævola to have followed the same system in expounding the history of the gods. Scævola, the Pontifex Maximus, interpreted the poetic fables historically, and asserted all the gods to have been men. This is openly stated by St. Augustine, De Civit. Dei, lib. 4. cap. 27. p. 84. Whether he believed in one God or not, or was imbued with no religion at all, is uncertain, as the ancients are silent on the subject. Far otherwise Varro, who connected the whole history of the gods with physical science, and referred the various names of the deities to the parts of the universe.

law of cities and commonwealths, together with vulgar opinion and error; and the second nothing but fancy, fiction, and fabulosity. Poëtarum ista sunt, saith Cotta in Cicero,[2] nos autem philosophi esse volumus, rerum auctores, non fabularum, "Those things belong to poets, but we would be philosophers, authors of things (or realities) and not of fables."[3] But the main thing which we take notice of in these words of Vossius is this, that they seem to imply the Consentes, and select, and other civil and poetical gods of the Pagans, to have been generally accounted so many substantial and eternal minds, or understanding beings superclestial and independent; their Jupiter being put only in an equality with Apollo, Juno, Venus, and the rest. For which, since Vossius pretends no other manner of proof than only from Apuleius' De Deo Socratis, who was a Platonic philosopher; we shall here make it evident, that he was not rightly understood by Vossius neither:[4] which yet ought not to be thought any derogation from this eminent philologer (whose polymathy and multifarious learning is readily acknowledged by us) that he was not so well versed in all the niceties and punctilios of the Platonic school. For though Apuleius do in that book, besides those visible gods the stars, take notice of another kind of invisible ones, such as the twelve Consentes, and others which (he saith) we may animis conjectare, per varias utilitates in vita agenda, animadversas in iis rebus, quibus eorum singuli curant, "make a conjecture of by our

[2] De Natur. Deor. lib. 3. cap. 31. p. 3096. tom. 9. opp.

[3] Here again I consider Vossius to be unjustly censured. The civil and poetic theology, I am aware, abounded with the most absurd fables: but does this prevent us from supposing, that the people and poets held the gods they worshipped to be natures or minds placed above the heavens, and there enjoying supreme felicity? Indeed I am at a loss to know, how those who possessed the least intelligence could have entertained any other opinion of the gods: and most of the poets, I observe, clearly professed it. Olympus, which the gods of Homer and the other poets inhabit, is a most delightful and happy region, situated far above the heavens. Julian in his Cæsares, p. 307. calls it *οὐρανοῦ τὸ μετέωρον*, "the highest region of heaven:" *Τοῖς μὲν Θεοῖς ἄνω κατ' αὐτὸ, φησὶν, οὐρανοῦ τὸ μετέωρον.*

Οὔλυμπον δ' ὅτι φασὶ Θεῶν ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς ἀεί,

"To the gods above in the highest region of heaven, 'Olympus which they call the everlasting habitation of the gods.'" And Seneca expressly distinguishes heaven from Olympus, Apocolocynth. p. 681. tom. 1. opp. Placet——eum *cælo* intra dies xxx excedere, *Olympo* intra diem tertium, "I move——that he depart from heaven within thirty days, from Olympus within three." Lastly, why the learned Doctor should say that Vossius makes both civil and poetic theology to philosophize I am at a loss to conceive. If all those who suppose God or the gods to be minds dwelling in a most happy region above heaven, are philosophers, then indeed philosophers will be as numerous as ants.

[4] But Dr. Cudworth is here fighting with shadows. Vossius had not the remotest idea of asserting that all the gods called Consentes were equal and that Jupiter was not superior to any of them: at least his words here censured contain nothing from which such an opinion can be elicited.

minds from the various utilities in human life, perceived from those things which each of these take care of:" yet that he was no bigot in this civil theology is manifest from hence, because in that very place he declares as well against superstition as irreligious profaneness. And his design there was plainly no other, than to reduce the civil and poetical theologies of the Pagans into some handsome conformity and agreement with that philosophical, natural and real theology of theirs, which derived all the gods from one supreme and universal Numen: but this he endeavours to do in the Platonic way, himself being much addicted to that philosophy: Hos deos in sublimi ætheris vertice locatos, Plato existimat veros, incorporales, animales, sine ullo neque fine neque exordio, sed prorsus ac retro æviternos, corporis contagione suâ quidem naturâ remotos, ingenio ad summam beatitudinem porrecto, &c. Quorum parentem, qui omnium rerum dominator atque auctor est, solum ab omnibus nexibus patiendi aliquid gerendive, nulla vice ad alicujus rei mutua obstrictum, cur ego nunc dicere exordiar? Cum Plato cœlesti facundia præditus, frequentissimè prædicet, hunc solum majestatis incredibili quadam nimietate et ineffabili, non posse penuria sermonis humani quavis oratione vel modicè comprehendi, " All these gods placed in the highest ether Plato thinks to be true, incorporeal, animal, without beginning or end, eternal, happy in themselves without any external good. The parent of which gods, who is the Lord and author of all things, and who is alone free from all bonds of doing and suffering, why should I go about in words to describe him? Since Plato, who was endued with most heavenly eloquence, equal to the immortal gods, does often declare, that this highest God, by reason of his excess of majesty, is both ineffable and incomprehensible." From which words of Apuleius it is plain, that according to him, the twelve Consentes, and all the other invisible gods, were derived from one original Deity, as their parent and author. But then if you demand, what gods of Plato these should be, to which Apuleius would here accommodate the civil and poetic gods contained in those two verses of Ennius:

> Juno, Vesta, Minerva, Ceres, Diana, Venus, Mars,
> Mercurius, Jovi', Neptunus, Vulcanus, Apollo,

and the rest of this kind, that is, all their other gods, (properly so called) invisible? we reply, that these are no other than Plato's ideas, or first paradigms and patterns of things in the archetypal world, which is the divine Intellect (and his second hypostasis) derived from his original Deity, and most simple monad. For as Plato writeth in his Timæus, *ἀνάγκη τόνδε τὸν κόσμον, εἰκόνα τινὸς εἶναι,* " This sensible world must needs be the image of another

intelligible one." And again afterwards:* *Τίνι τῶν ζώων αὐτὸν εἰς ὁμοιότητα ὁ ξυνιστὰς ξυνέστησε; τῶν μὲν οὖν ἐν μέρους εἴδει πεφυκότων μηδενὶ καταξιώσωμεν· ἀτελεῖ γὰρ ἐοικὸς οὐδέν ποτ' ἂν γένοιτο καλόν· οὗ δ' ἔστι τἆλλα ζῶα καθ' ἓν καὶ κατὰ γένη μόρια, πάντων ὁμοιότατον αὐτῷ εἶναι τιθῶμεν. Τὰ γὰρ δὴ νοητὰ ζῶα πάντα ἐκεῖνο ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιλαβὸν ἔχει, καθάπερ ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ἡμᾶς ὅσα τε ἄλλα θρέμματα συνέστηκεν ὁρατά,* "What animal was the pattern, according to whose likeness he that made this great animal of the world, framed it? Certainly, we must not think it to be any particular animal, since nothing can be perfect which is made according to an imperfect copy. Let us therefore conclude it to be that animal which containeth all other animals in it as its parts. For that intelligible world containeth all intelligible animals in it, in the same manner as this sensible world doth us, and other sensible animals." Wherefore Plato himself here and elsewhere speaking obscurely of this intelligible world, and the ideas of it, no wonder if many of his pagan followers have absurdly made so many distinct animals and gods of them. Amongst whom Apuleius accordingly would refer all the civil and poetic gods of the Pagans (I mean, their gods, properly so called invisible) to this intelligible world of Plato's, and those several ideas of it. Neither was Apuleius singular in this, but others of the pagan theologers did the like; as for example, Julian, in his book against the Christians:† *Θεοὺς ὀνομάζει Πλάτων τοὺς ἐμφανεῖς, ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην, ἄστρα καὶ οὐρανόν· ἀλλ' οὗτοι τῶν ἀφανῶν εἰσιν εἰκόνες· ὁ φαινόμενος τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἥλιος, τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ μὴ φαινομένου· καὶ πάλιν, ἡ φαινομένη τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἡμῶν σελήνη, καὶ τῶν ἄστρων ἕκαστον, εἰκόνες εἰσὶ τῶν νοητῶν· ἐκείνους οὖν τοὺς ἀφανεῖς θεοὺς ἐννυπάρχοντας καὶ συννυπάρχοντας, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ γεννηθέντας καὶ προελθόντας, ὁ Πλάτων οἶδεν· εἰκότως οὖν φησιν ὁ δημιουργὸς ὁ παρ' αὐτῷ, Θεοί, πρὸς τοὺς ἀφανεῖς λέγων, θεῶν, τῶν ἐμφανῶν δηλονότι· κοινὸς δὲ ἀμφοτέρων δημιουργὸς οὗτός ἐστιν, ὁ τεχνησάμενος οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν, καὶ ἄστρα γεννήσας, τὰ τούτων ἀρχέτυπα,* "Plato indeed speaketh of certain visible gods, the sun, and the moon, and the stars, and the heaven; but these are all but images of other invisible gods; that visible sun, which we see with our eyes, is but an image of another intelligible and invisible one: so likewise, the visible moon, and every one of the stars, are but the images and resemblances of another moon, and of other stars intelligible. Wherefore Plato acknowledged also these other invisible gods, inexisting and co-existing with the Demiurgus, from whom they were generated and produced. That Demiurgus in him thus bespeaking these invisible and intelligible gods; Ye gods of gods, that is, ye invisible gods, who are the gods and causes of the visible gods. There is one common maker there-

* Plato in Tim. p. 30. [Cap. 15. p. 238.] † St. Cyril. cont. Jul. lib. 2. p. 65.

fore of both these kinds of gods: who first of all made a heaven, earth, sea, and stars, in the intelligible world, as the archetypes and paradigms of these in the sensible." Where St. Cyril, in his Confutation writeth thus: Ἔοικε δὲ διὰ τούτων ὁ γενναῖος ἡμῖν Ἰουλιανὸς, τὰς ἰδέας βούλεσθαι καταδηλοῦν, ἃς ποτε μὲν οὐσίας καὶ ὑφεστάναι καθ' ἑαυτὰς διϊσχυρίζεται Πλάτων, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ ἐννοίας εἶναι θεοῦ διορίζεται· πλὴν ὅπως περ ἂν ἔχοι, καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῦ μαθηταῖς ἀπαράδεκτον εἶναί φασι τὸν ἐπὶ τῷδε λόγον οἱ ταῦτα τεχνῖται· τὰ γὰρ εἴδη χαιρέτω, φησὶν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, τερατίσματα γάρ ἐστι, καὶ εἴ ἐστιν, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν λόγον, " This our excellent Julian, by his intelligible and invisible gods, seems here to mean those ideas which Plato sometimes contends to be substances, and to subsist alone by themselves, and sometimes again determineth to be nothing but notions or conceptions in the mind of God. But, however the matter be, the skilful in this kind of learning affirm, that these ideas have been rejected by Plato's own disciples; Aristotle discarding them as figments, or at least such, as being mere notions could have no real causality and influence upon things." But the meaning of this pagan theology may be more fully understood from what the same St. Cyril thus further objecteth against it: Προσεπάγει δὲ, ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἐμφανῶν καὶ τῶν νοητῶν δημιουργός ἐστιν ὁ τῶν ὅλων θεὸς, ὁ γῆν καὶ οὐρανὸν τεχνησάμενος· ὅτε τοίνυν, καθὰ καὶ αὐτὸς διωμολόγηκεν ἐναργῶς, τούτων τε κἀκείνων γενεσιουργός ἐστιν ὁ ἀγέννητος θεὸς, πῶς ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγεννῆσθαί φησιν αὐτοὺς, συνυπάρχειν τε καὶ ἐνυπάρχειν αὐτῷ, πῶς, εἰπέ μοι, τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ θεῷ συνυπάρξει τὸ γεννητόν; ἐνυπάρξει δὲ κατὰ ποῖον τρόπον; ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀγέννητον ὄντα τὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγον, συνυπάρχειν ἀναγκαίως τῷ φύσαντι διϊσχυριζόμεθα, καὶ ἐνυπάρχειν μὲν αὐτῷ, προελθεῖν δὲ γεννητῶς ἐξ αὐτοῦ· ὁ δέ γε τῆς Πλάτωνος εὐρεσιεπείας συνηγόρους ἀκριβὴς, ἀγέννητον μὲν εἶναί φησι τὸν ἀνωτάτω θεὸν, ἐνυπάρχειν δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεννηθῆναι καὶ προελθεῖν τοὺς παρ' αὐτοῦ γεγονότας, τὰ πάντα κυκῶν καὶ συγχέων, The sense whereof seems to be this: " Julian addeth, that the God of the universe, who made heaven and earth, is alike the Demiurgus, both of these sensible, and of the other intelligible things. If, therefore, the ingenit God be alike the creator of both, how can he affirm those things, that are created by him, to co-exist with, and in-exist in him? How can that which is created co-exist with the ingenit God? but much less can it inexist in him. For we Christians indeed affirm that the unmade Word of God doth of necessity co-exist with, and inexist in the father, it proceeding from him, not by way of creation, but of generation. But this defender of Platonic trifles, acknowledging the supreme God to be ingenit, affirmeth, notwithstanding, those things which were made and created by him, to inexist in him; thus mingling and confounding all things." Where notwithstanding, Julian, and

the Platonic Pagans would in all probability reply, that those ideas of the intelligible and archetypal world (which is the first νοῦς, or "Intellect") proceeding from the highest hypostasis, and original Deity, by way of necessary and eternal emanation, are no more to be accounted creatures, than the Christian Λόγος; and therefore might with as little absurdity, be said to exist with and in that first original Deity. But besides, the same Julian, elsewhere in that book of his, accommodates this Platonic notion also to the Pagan gods in particular, in like manner as Apuleius had done before, he writing of Æsculapius, after this canting way:* Ὁ γὰρ Ζεὺς ἐν μὲν τοῖς νοητοῖς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τὸν Ἀσκληπιὸν ἐγέννησεν, εἰς δὲ τὴν γῆν διὰ τῆς ἡλίου γονίμου ζωῆς ἐξέφηνεν· οὗτος ἐπὶ γῆς ἐξ οὐρανοῦ ποιησάμενος πρόοδον, ἐνοειδῶς μὲν ἐν ἀνθρωποῦ μορφῇ περὶ τὴν Ἐπίδαυρον ἐφάνη, &c. "Jupiter, amongst the intelligible things, generated out of himself Æsculapius, and by the generative life of the sun manifested him here upon earth, he coming down from heaven, and appearing in a human form, first about Epidaurus, and from thence extending his salutary power or virtue over the whole earth." Where Æsculapius is first of all, the eternal idea of the medicinal art or skill generated by the supreme God in the intelligible world; which afterward, by the vivific influence of the sun, was incarnated, and appeared in a human form at Epidaurus. This is the doctrine of that Julian, who was so great an opposer of the incarnation of the eternal Logos, in our Saviour Jesus Christ. Neither was this doctrine of many intelligible gods, and powers eternal, (of which the archetypal world consisteth) first invented by Platonic Pagans, after the times of Christianity, as some might suspect; but that there was such a thing extant before amongst them also, may be concluded from this passage of Philo's:† Εἷς ὢν ὁ θεὸς ἀμυθήτους περὶ αὑτὸν ἔχει δυνάμεις ἀρωγοὺς καὶ σωτηρίους τοῦ γενομένου πάσας· δι' αὖ τούτων τῶν δυνάμεων ὁ ἀσώματος καὶ νοητὸς ἐπάγη κόσμος, τὸ τοῦ φαινομένου τοῦδε ἀρχέτυπον, ἰδέαις ἀοράτοις συσταθείς, ὥσπερ οὗτος σώμασιν ὁρατοῖς· καταπλαγέντες οὖν τινες τὴν ἑκατέρου τῶν κόσμων φύσιν, οὐ μόνον ὅλους ἐξεθείωσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μερῶν, ἥλιον, καὶ σελήνην, καὶ τὸν σύμπαντα οὐρανόν, ἅπερ οὐδὲν αἰδεσθέντες θεοὺς ἐκάλεσαν, "Though God be but one, yet hath he about himself innumerable auxiliatory powers, all of them salutiferous, and procuring the good of that which is made, &c. Moreover, by these powers, and out of them, is the incorporeal and intelligible world compacted, which is the archetype of this visible world, that consisting of invisible ideas, as this doth of visible bodies. Wherefore, some admiring, with a kind of astonishment, the nature of both these worlds, have not only deified

* Cyr. contr. Jul. lib. 6. p. 200. † De Confus. lib. 345. Par.

the whole of them, but also the most excellent parts in them, as the sun, and the moon, and the whole heaven, which they scruple not at all to call gods." Where Philo seems to speak of a double sun, moon, and heaven, as Julian did, the one sensible, the other intelligible. Moreover, Plotinus himself sometimes complies with this notion, he calling the ideas of the divine Intellect, νοητοὺς θεούς, "intelligible gods;" as in that place before cited, where he exhorteth men, ascending upward above the soul of the world, θεοὺς ὑμνεῖν νοητούς, "to praise the intelligible gods," that is, the divine Intellect, which, as he elsewhere writeth, is both εἷς καὶ πολλοί, "one and many."[5]

We have now given a full account of Apuleius' sense in that book, De Deo Socratis, concerning the civil and poetical Pagan gods; which was not to assert a multitude of substantial and and eternal deities or minds, independent in them, but only to reduce the vulgar theology of the Pagans, both their civil and poetical, into some conformity with the natural, real, and philosophic theology: and this, according to Platonic principles. Wherein many other of the pagan Platonists, both before and after Christianity, concurred with him; they making the many pagan invisible gods to be really nothing but the eternal ideas of the divine intellect, (called by them the parts of the intelligible and archetypal world) which they supposed to have been the paradigms and patterns, according to which this sensible world, and all particular things therein, were made, and upon which they depended, they being only participations of them. Wherefore, though this may well be looked upon as a monstrous extravagancy in these Platonic philosophers, thus to talk of the divine ideas, or the intelligible and archetypal paradigms of things, not only as substantial, but also as so many several animals, persons and gods; it being their humour thus upon all slight occasions to multiply gods: yet, nevertheless must it be acknowledged, that they did at the very same time declare all these to have been derived from one supreme Deity, and not only so, but also to exist in it; as they did likewise at other times, when unconcerned in this business of their pagan polytheism, freely acknowledge all these intelligible ideas to be really nothing else but νοήματα, "conceptions in the mind of God," or the first Intellect, (though not such slight accidental and evanid ones, as those conceptions and modifications of our human souls are) and consequently, not to be so many distinct substances, persons and gods, (much less, independent ones) but only so many partial considerations of the Deity.[6]

[5] Consult especially Plotinus, in his book, De Intelligibili Pulcritudine, Ennead. 5. lib. 8. cap. 9. p. 550. Compare cap. 3. p. 544.

[6] The learned Doctor gives a much more refined and subtle interpretation to Apuleius' words than was necessary, or the truth will warrant. It is certain, that the

What a rabble of invisible gods and goddesses the Pagans had, besides those their dii nobiles, and dii majorum gentium, "their noble and greater gods," (which were the Consentes and Selecti)

junior Platonists, at least many of them, were so ingenious in their folly, as to assert the existence of eternal ideas or forms of what they called the visible gods, namely, the sun, moon and other heavenly bodies, and to hold these forms in the rank of gods. In this manner, the emperor Julian imagines to himself a twofold sun, Orat. in Solem, the one visible, the other, the eternal pattern of this visible sun, and cognizable to reason alone. Those who are desirous of further information respecting these absurdities, may consult Proclus' Platonic Theology, a work jejune and crabbed in itself, but indispensable to such as are curious on the subject of Platonism. This conceit of the Platonic sect, however, has nothing whatever to do with Apuleius' doctrine concerning the gods, as explained by him in his book, De Deo Socratis. Towards the beginning of this work he distinguishes the celestial gods into the *visible* and *intelligible*. The former, he tells us, are the sun, moon and all the stars; upon the latter, indeed, he expresses himself somewhat obscurely, but says quite sufficient to show that he is not speaking of the forms and patterns of the visible gods. In the first place he includes in this class of intelligible gods those twelve which are comprehended in the well-known verses of Ennius:

> Juno, Vesta, Minerva, Ceres, Diana, Venus, Mars,
> Mercurius, Jovi', Neptunus, Vulcanus, Apollo.

If these gods were nothing else than the forms of visible gods, it would follow that Apuleius supposed Juno, Vesta, Minerva, and the rest, to be the forms and ideas of the sun, moon and other heavenly bodies. But nothing can be farther from the truth. Of what heavenly body, I ask, would Neptune be the idea? or Mercury? No Platonist, although it is almost impossible to imagine any thing too absurd to have entered into the head of some one or other of this sect, was ever so insane as to consider the deities, called by the Greeks, Juno, Jupiter, Mercury, Neptune, to be the invisible forms of the visible stars. And as to Apuleius, in particular, we have not the slightest reason for supposing him to have been guilty of such folly. Secondly, he states that these gods which are cognizable to reason alone, are appointed over certain affairs of this world, and that their powers are manifested by their various benefits in life. Potentiæ vero animis conjectatæ, per varias utilitates in vita agenda animadversæ in iis rebus, quas singuli curant, "But their powers are conjectured of by our minds, being perceived from the various utilities in life in those things which they severally take charge of." Now who, I ask can suppose these words to be applicable to the forms or ἰδέαι of the sun, moon, and stars? What Platonist ever believed that the forms of the stars superintend certain affairs of human life, and that, although themselves are concealed and invisible, their virtues are manifested in the things of this world? But all these have a clear and consistent meaning, if we suppose Neptune, for example, according to the sense of Apuleius, to be a nature invisible indeed to us, but manifesting his power in the sea and waters, and Vulcan, a nature, in like manner removed from our sight, but revealing his influence in fire. I will add a third consideration, which again clearly invalidates the position of the learned Doctor. He lays it down, that these forms or ideas of the Platonists, which they also called gods, existed, according to the opinion of this sect, in the archetypal world, or second person of the Deity. Whether correctly or not, I shall probably inquire in another place: for the present, I will assume it to be true. But whoever accedes to this opinion cannot but conclude that Apuleius is here most erroneously interpreted. For this author does not place his gods which he holds to be discernible to reason alone, in a intelligible or archetypal world, but in heaven, and that heaven too, in which the stars are fixed. The celestial gods, that is, those who have heaven for their abode, he divides into the visible and invisible. Therefore, those who are invisible, must necessarily occupy the inner heaven. I have thought it worth while to examine more minutely into this interpretation, both for other reasons, and principally to guard others from being misled by it. The opinions of eminent men, especially if they be recommended by their subtlety, and appear to be drawn from the inmost recesses of learning, gain ground rapidly, and lead many not only to put faith in them, but also to abuse them to the support of other theories which they may have adopted. Of the rest of what is eruditely argued in this place, I shall notice

hath been already showed out of St. Austin, from Varro and others; as namely, Dea Mena, Deus Vagitanus, Dea Levana, Dea Cunina, Diva Rumina, Diva Potina, Diva Educa, Diva Paventina, Dea Venilia, Dea Agenoria, Dea Stimula, Dea Strenua, Dea Numeria, Deus Consus, Dea Sentia, Deus Jugatinus, Dea Virginensis, Deus Mutinus. To which might be added more out of other places of the same St. Austin, as Dea Deverra, Deus Domiducus, Deus Domitius, Dea Manturna, Deus Pater Subigus, Dea Mater Prema, Dea Pertunda, Dea Rusina, Dea Collatina, Dea Vallonia, Dea Seia, Dea Segetia, Dea Tutilina, Deus Nodotus, Dea Volutina, Dea Patelena, Dea Hostilina, Dea Flora, Dea Lacturtia, Dea Matura, Dea Runcina. Besides which, there are yet so many more of these pagan gods and goddesses extant in other writers, as that they cannot be all mentioned or enumerated by us; divers whereof have very small, mean and contemptible offices assigned to them, as their names for the most part do imply; some of which are such, as that they were not fit to be here interpreted. From whence it plainly appears, that there was μηδὲν ἄθεον, "nothing at all without a god" to these Pagans, they having so strong a persuasion that divine providence extended itself to all things, and expressing it after this manner, by assigning to every thing in nature, and every part of the world, and whatsoever was done by men, some particular god or goddess by name, to preside over it. Now, that the intelligent Pagans should believe in good earnest that all these invisible gods and goddesses of theirs were so many several substantial minds, or understanding beings, eternal and unmade, really existing in the world, is a thing in itself utterly incredible. For how could any possibly persuade themselves that there was one eternal unmade mind or spirit; which, for example, essentially presided over the rockings of infant's cradles, and nothing else? another over the sweeping of houses? another over ears of corn? another over the husks of grain? and another over the knots of straw and grass, and the like? And the case is the very same for those other noble gods of theirs (as they call them) the Consentes, and Selecti; since there can be no reason given, why those should, all of them, be so many sub-

merely Julian's passage concerning Æsculapius, which the learned Doctor brings forward in confirmation of his opinion upon the religion of Apuleius. This passage, however, is totally at variance with the doctrine imputed to Apuleius. For Julian does not assert Æsculapius to be the pattern or form of a certain star, but imagines a double Æsculapius, one begotten by Jupiter in the ideal world, and the other produced on the earth by the sun; or which is the same thing, to use the language of Apuleius, a *visible* and an *intelligible* Æsculapius. From which we learn, what indeed is evident from other passages of his, that Julian believed in eternal models and forms of all visible things, and even of gods themselves, but by no means that he supposed the Greek and Roman deities, Æsculapius, Venus, Jupiter, and the others, to be merely the ideas of the visible gods or stars.

stantial and eternal spirits self-existent or unmade, if none of the other were such. Wherefore, if these be not all so many several substantial and eternal minds, so many self-existing and independent deities, then must they, of necessity, be either several partial considerations of the Deity, viz. the several manifestations of the divine power and providence personated, or else inferior ministers of the same. And thus have we already showed that the more high-flown and Platonic Pagans (as Julian, Apuleius, and others) understood these Consentes and select gods, and all the other invisible ones, to be really nothing else but the ideas of the intelligible and archetypal world, (which is the divine intellect;) that is indeed, but partial considerations of the Deity, as virtually and exemplarily containing all things: whilst others of them, going in a more plain and easy way, concluded these gods of theirs to be all of them but several names and notions of the one supreme Deity, according to the various manifestations of its power in the world; as Seneca[7] expressly affirmeth, not only concerning fate, nature, and fortune, &c. but also Liber Pater, Hercules, and Mercury, (before mentioned by him) that they were omnia ejusdem Dei nomina, variè utentis suâ potestate, "all names of one and the same God, as diversely using his power;" and as Zeno, in Laërtius,[8] concludes of all the rest: or else, (which amounts to the same thing,) that they were the several powers and virtues of one God fictitiously personated and deified; as the Pagans in Eusebius[9] apologize for themselves, that they did θεοποιεῖν τὰς ἀοράτους δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν,* deify nothing but the invisible powers of that God, which is over all." Nevertheless, because those several powers of the supreme God were not supposed to be all executed immediately by himself, but by certain other ὑπουργοὶ δυνάμεις, "subservient ministers under him, appointed to preside over the several things of nature, parts of the world, and affairs of mankind, (commonly called demons;) therefore were those gods sometimes taken also for such subservient spirits or demons collectively; as perhaps in this of Epictetus:† Πότε ὁ Ζέφυρος πνέυσει; ὅταν αὐτῷ δόξῃ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἢ τῷ Αἰόλῳ· σὲ γὰρ οὐκ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς ταμίαν τῶν ἀνέμων, ἀλλὰ τὸν Αἴολον, "When will Zephyrus, or the west-wind, blow? When it seemeth good to himself, or to Æolus; for God hath not made thee steward of the winds, but Æolus.

But for the fuller clearing of the whole pagan theology, and especially this one point thereof, that their Πολυθεία was in great part nothing else but Πολυωνυμία, "their polytheism," or "mul-

[7] De Beneficiis, lib. 4. cap. 8. p. 427. 428.
[8] Lib. 7. segm. 147. p. 458.
[9] But in that very passage, Eusebius shows this apology to be vain and futile.
* Pr. Ev. lib. 3. cap. 13. p. 121. † Lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 85. [Apud Arrian.]

tiplicity of gods," nothing but the polyonomy of one god, or his being called by many personal proper names, two things are here requisite to be further taken notice of; first, that, according to the pagan theology, God was conceived to be diffused throughout the whole world, to permeate and pervade all things, to exist in all things, and intimately to act all things. Thus we observed before out of Horus Apollo,[10] that the Egyptian theologers conceived of God, as τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου τὸ διῆκον πνεῦμα, "a spirit pervading the whole world;" as likewise they concluded,[1] εἶχα θεοῦ μηδὲν ὅλως συνεστάναι, "that nothing at all consisted without God." Which same theology was universally entertained also amongst the Greeks. For thus Diogenes the Cynic, in Laërtius,[2] αὐτοῦ πάντα πλήρη, "all things are full of him." And Aristotle, or the writer De Plantis, makes God not only to comprehend the whole world, but also to be an inward principle of life in animals:* Τίς οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ ζώου; τί ἄλλο, εἰ μὴ τὸ εὐγενὲς ζῶον, ὃ τὸν οὐρανὸν περιοδεύει, τὸν ἥλιον, τὰ ἄστρα, καὶ τοῦς πλάνητας; "What is the principle in the life or soul of animals? Certainly no other than that noble animal (or living being) that encompasses and surrounds the whole heaven, the sun, the stars, and the planets.[3] Sextus Empiricus* thus represents the sense of Pythagoras, Empedocles, and all the Italic philosophers: Μὴ μόνον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναί τινα κοινωνίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζώων· ἓν γὰρ ὑπάρχειν πνεῦμα τὸ διὰ παντὸς κόσμου διῆκον, ψυχῆς τρόπον, τὸ καὶ ἑνοῦν ἡμᾶς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, "That we men have not only a conjunction amongst ourselves with one another, but also with the gods above us, and with brute animals below us; because there is but one spirit, which, like a soul, pervades the whole world, and unites all the parts thereof together." Clemens Alexandrinus writeth thus of the Stoics:‡ Διὰ πάσης

[10] Hieroglyph. lib. 1. cap. 64. p. 77. Compare what we have observed at some length above on this passage.

[1] Ibid. lib. 1. cap. 13. p. 36. [2] Lib. 6. segm. 37. p. 333.

* Lib. 1. cap. 1. [Tom. 4. opp. Arist. p. 492.]

[3] But there are two things in this passage which, in my opinion, divest it of the importance which Dr. Cudworth ascribes to it. I. It is quite uncertain, what kind of animal it is which Aristotle makes to surround the heaven, stars, and sun; whether it is God or a certain soul, such as many of the ancients supposed to exist in heaven and its parts. Most probably the writer of the book De Mundo meant, that animals have souls derived from that most subtle ether or soul which pervades heaven, the air and the stars. II. Supposing it to be beyond question, that this animal spoken of by Aristotle is God, still, according to him, God would not be a nature diffused through the whole universe, such as the learned Doctor here endeavours to prove the ancients to have believed in, but a nature merely encompassing the heavens and the stars. For no mention is made of the earth or the sea. Besides, if this were Aristotle's meaning, that the life of animals is a portion of God, he would be unworthy of being ranked among the professors of a God and the friends of religion. For what difference is there between this opinion and the impious conceits of Spinoza?

† Adv. Mathem. p. 331. [Lib. 1. Advers. Physic. sect. 127. p. 580.]

‡ Protrept. p. 44. [Cap. 5. p. 58. tom. 1. opp.]

ὕλης, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀτιμοτάτης τὸ θεῖον διήκειν λέγουσι, "They affirm, that God doth pervade all the matter of the universe, and even the most vile parts thereof," which that father seems[4] to dislike; as also did Tertullian,[5] when he represented their doctrine thus: Stoici volunt Deum sic per materiam decucurrisse, quomodo mel per favos, "the Stoics will have God so to run through the matter, as the honey doth the combs." Strabo testifies of the ancient Indian Brachmans:[*] Περὶ πολλῶν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὁμοδοξεῖν, ὅτι γὰρ γενητὸς ὁ κόσμος καὶ φθαρτὸς λέγειν κἀκείνους, ὅ τε διοικῶν αὐτὸν καὶ ποιῶν θεὸς, δι' ὅλου διαπεφοίτηκεν αὐτοῦ, "That in many things they philosophized after the Greekish manner, as when they affirm that the world had a beginning, and that it would be corrupted, and that the maker governor thereof pervades the whole of it." The Latins also fully agreed with the Greeks in this: for though Seneca somewhere[6] propounds this question, Utrum extrinsecus operi suo circumfusus sit Deus, an toti inditus? "Whether God be only extrinsically circumfused about his work, the world, or inwardly insinuating do pervade it all?" yet himself elsewhere[7] answers it, when he calls God, Divinum Spiritum per omnia, maxima, ac minima, æquali intentione diffusum, "A divine spirit, diffused through all things, whether smallest or greatest, with equal intention." God, in Quintilian's[8] theology, is spiritus omnibus partibus immistus; and, Ille fusus per omnes rerum naturæ partes spiritus, "a spirit which insinuates itself into, and is mingled with all the parts of the world;" and, "that spirit, which is diffused through all the parts of nature." Apuleius[9]

[4] Clemens does not merely seem to dislike this opinion of the Stoics. He rejects it so openly and indignantly, as to assert that its authors "have brought philosophy into disgrace:" Οἳ καταισχύνουσιν ἀτεχνῶς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν. And that justly too; although the learned Doctor would seem to be labouring here to show that the Stoics erred more excusably than is commonly supposed. The same opinion of the Stoics concerning God is severely censured by Clemens in his Stromat. lib. 5. cap. 14. p. 699.

[5] Advers. Hermogenem, cap. 44. p. 149.

[*] Lib. 15. p. 730.

[6] De Otio Sapientis, cap. 31. p. 347. tom. 1. opp.

[7] De Consolat. ad Helviam, cap. 8. p. 106. But if Dr. Cudworth had quoted the whole of this passage, it would have appeared, that in it Seneca by no means determines what God is, but merely brings forward various definitions of the architect of this world; without indicating which of them is to be preferred to the others: Id actum, says he, ab illo, quisquis formator universi fuit, sive ille Deus est potens omnium, sive incorporalis ratio, ingentium operum artifex, sive divinus spiritus, &c. . . . . sive fatum, "This was done by him whoever framed the universe, whether he be the supreme God, or an incorporeal reason, the artificer of mighty works, or a divine Spirit, &c. . . . or fate." So far therefore from the words here adduced containing a definition of God as given by Seneca, this philosopher, on the contrary, openly distinguishes between the supreme God of all things and that divine spirit.

[8] Instit. Orator. lib. 7. cap. 3. p. 412. The reader, if so disposed, may refer to our previous remarks upon this passage of Quintilian; from which it appears, that it is uncertain whether or not Quintilian has here propounded his own opinion.

[9] De Mundo, p. 68. ed. Elmenhorstii. But Dr. Cudworth ought not to have omitted to mention, that Apuleius a little afterwards rejects this opinion as altogether derogatory

likewise affirmeth, Deum omnia permeare, "That God doth permeate all things;" and that, Nulla res est tam præstantibus viribus, quæ viduata Dei auxilio, sui natura contenta sit, "There is nothing so excellent or powerful, as that it could be content with its own nature alone, void of the divine aid or influence." And again, Dei præstantiam, non jam cogitatio sola, sed oculi, et aures, et sensibilis substantia comprehendit, "That God is not only present to our cogitation, but also to our very eyes and ears, in all these sensible things." Servius, agreeably with this doctrine of the ancient Pagans, determineth, that Nulla pars elementi sine Deo est, "That there is no part of the elements devoid of God." And that the poets fully closed with the same theology, is evident from those known passages of theirs, Jovis omnia plena,[10] and μεσταὶ δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγυιαί,[1] &c. i. e. "All the things of nature, and parts of the world, are full of God;" as also from this of Virgil:*

Deum namque ire per omnes
Terrasque, tractusque maris, cœlumque profundum.

Lastly, we shall observe, that both Plato and Anaxagoras, who neither of them confounded God with the world, but kept them both distinct, and affirmed God to be οὐδενὶ μεμιγμένον, "unmingled with any thing;"† nevertheless concluded, αὐτὸν πάντα κοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα διὰ πάντων ἰόντα, "that he did order and govern all things, passing through and pervading all things;" which is the very same with that doctrine of Christian theologers:[2]

to the divine glory and majesty, and openly declares, as some also of the early fathers of the church have done, that God is shut up in heaven, and pervades all things merely by his power and virtue. I quote his own words: Quare rectius est atque honestius, sic arbitrari, summam istam potestatem, sacratam cœli penetralibus, et illis, qui longissime separantur, et proximis una eademque ratione, et per se, et per alios, opem salutis afferre, *neque penetrantem* atque adeuntem specialiter singula, nec indecore attrectantem cominus cuncta. Talis quippe humilitas dejecti est et minus sublimis officii, "Wherefore it is more correct and becoming to suppose that this supreme power, consecrated to the inmost recesses of heaven, affords help and protection by itself and others, to the most remote as well as nearest, in one and the same manner, *neither pervading* and approaching each individually, nor indecorously coming into close contact with all things. For such humility belongs to a mean and less sublime office." With this passage of Apuleius compare what is said to the same purport by the author of the book De Mundo.

[10] Eclog. 3. The same sentiment is commended for its excellence by Apuleius De Mundo, p. 68. and St. Augustine De Civitat. Dei. lib. 3. cap. 9. p. 74. tom. 3. opp. Dr. Cudworth, I fancy, had Apuleius' words in his mind when he wrote this, as he ascribes the saying not only to Virgil but to many others, which Apuleius also does: Hanc opinionem vates sequuti, profiteri ausi sunt, omnia Jovis plena esse, "The poets, adopting this opinion, hesitated not to avow that all things are full of Jupiter."

[1] This verse of Aratus occurs in the beginning of his Phænomena, and is quoted also by Clemens Alexandr. Stromat. lib. 5. p. 708.

* Virg. Georg. lib. 4. [Vers. 222] † Cratyl. p. 413.

[2] The words here adduced by Dr. Cudworth are those of Joh. Damascenus De Orthodoxa Fide, cap. 13. p. 149. tom. 1. opp. ed. Lequienii: Αὐτὸς μὲν γάρ, says he, διὰ πάντων ἀμιγῶς διήκει, καὶ πᾶσι μεταδίδωσι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἐνεργείας κατὰ

Τὸν Δεὸν διὰ πάντων ἀμίγως ἰέναι, "that God permeates and passes through all things, unmixedly." Which Plato also there, in his Cratylus, plainly making δίκαιον to be a name for God, etymologizeth it from διὰ ἰὸν, i. e. "passing through all things," and thereupon gives us the best account of Heraclitus' theosophy, that is any where extant (if not rather a fragment of Heraclitus' own) in these words: Ὅσοι γὰρ ἡγοῦνται τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ἐν πορείᾳ, τὸ μὲν πολὺ αὐτοῦ ὑπολαμβάνουσι τοιοῦτόν τι εἶναι, οἷον οὐδὲ ἄλλο ἢ χωρεῖν· διὰ δὲ τούτου παντὸς εἶναι διεξιὸν, δι' οὗ πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα γίγνεσθαι· εἶναι δὲ τάχιστον τοῦτο καὶ λεπτότατον, οὐ γὰρ ἂν σύνασθ' ἄλλως διὰ τοῦ ὄντος ἰέναι παντὸς, εἰ μὴ λεπτότατόν τε ἦν, ὥστε αὐτὸ μηδὲν στέγειν, καὶ τάχιστον, ὥστε χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ ἑστῶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἐπεὶ δὲ οὖν ἐπιτροπεύει τὰ ἄλλα πάντα διαϊὸν, τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἐκλήθη ὀρθῶς δίκαιον, εὐστομίας ἕνεκα τὴν τοῦ κ σύναμιν προσλαβόν, "They who affirm the universe to be in constant motion, suppose a great part thereof to do nothing else but move and change; but that there is something which passes through and pervades this whole universe, by which all those things that are made, are made: and that this is both the most swift and most subtile thing; for it could not otherwise pass through all things, were it not so subtile, that nothing could keep it out or hinder it; and it must be most swift, that it may use all things as if they stood still, that so nothing might scape it. Since therefore this doth preside over, and order all things, permeating and passing through them, it is called δίκαιον, quasi διαϊὸν; the letter Cappa being only taken in for the more handsome pronunciation." Here we have therefore Heraclitus' description of God, namely this: Τὸ λεπτότατον καὶ τὸ τάχιστον, διὰ παντὸς διεξιὸν, δι' οὗ πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα γίγνεται, "that most subtile and most swift substance,

την ἑκάστου ἐκτηδειότητα. "For he permeates and passes through all things unmixedly, and imparts to all his own energy, according to the aptitude of each." This together with many other maxims of Damascenus, was afterwards adopted by most of the Greek and Latin theologists, it not having been hitherto determined by the concurrent voice of the learned fathers, whether God fills all things simply by his virtue and power, or by his very nature. This I should be able to demonstrate, were it necessary to my purpose, by not a few testimonies of the ancient fathers. Prior to Damascenus, however, Lactantius had spoken of God in precisely the same strain. Instit. Divinar. lib. 7. cap. 3. p. 784. Non perspexerunt (Stoici) divinum quidem spiritum esse ubique diffusum, eoque omnia contineri, non tamen ita, ut Deus ipse, qui est incorruptus, gravibus et corruptibilibus elementis misceatur. "They (the Stoics) did not fully comprehend, that the divine Spirit is every where diffused and contains all things, but not in such a manner, that God himself, who is incorrupt, should be mingled with gross and corruptible elements." Nor ought we, I consider, to understand Prosperus Aquitanicus in any other sense, who in his poem De Providentia, v. 184. 185. p. 794. opp. thus expresses himself concerning God:

> Sed nusquam non esse Dei est, qui totus ubique
> Et *penetrat* mundi membra omnia *liber* et ambit.

For to say that God freely penetrates the several parts of the world is tantamount to affirming, like Damascenus, that he permeates the world unmixedly.

which permeates and passes through the whole universe, by which all things that are made, are made." Now, saith Plato, some of these Heraclitics say, that this is fire, others that it is heat: but he, deriding both these conceits, concludes with Anaxagoras, that it is a perfect mind, unmixed with any thing; which yet permeating and passing through all things, frames, orders, and disposes all.[3]

Wherefore this being the universally received doctrine of the Pagans, that God was a spirit or substance diffused through the whole world, which permeating and inwardly acting all things, did order all; no wonder if they called him, in several parts of the world and things of nature, by several names; or, to use Cicero's language,[4] no wonder, if Deus pertinens per naturam cujusque rei, per terras Ceres, per maria Neptunus, &c. "If God pervading the nature of every thing, were in the earth called Ceres, in the sea Neptune, in the air Juno," &c. And this very account does Paulus Orosius (in his historic work against the Pagans, dedicated to St. Austin) give of the original of the pagan polytheism:* Quidam, dum in multis Deum credunt, multos Deos, indiscreto timore, finxerunt, "That some, whilst they believe God to be in many things, have therefore, out of an indiscreet fear, feigned many gods:" in which words

[3] In explaining this passage of Plato, Dr. Cudworth assumes more perhaps than every one will as a matter of course admit. I. He affirms Plato to be speaking here of Heraclitus and his opinions. But Plato does not mention Heraclitus. It is therefore a surmise of his own, founded solely upon Plato's statement that he is giving an account of the opinion of those who asserted the universe to be in constant motion. Heraclitus taught that *all things flow*. Hence the learned Doctor supposed this to be the opinion which Plato is discussing; a supposition which, to confess the truth, I consider to be liable to controversy. But II. granting that some dogma of Heraclitus is put forth in this passage, still there would be no certainty of its having reference to God. For he who affirms that something most swift and most subtle pervades and passes through the universe, is not necessarily obliged to suppose this something to be God. If no other arguments could be found to show, that Heraclitus acknowledged a god, certainly his merely imagining some subtle nature to pervade the universe would be of very little avail towards proving his religion. III. Still less ought we to admit the assertion, that Plato makes some of the Heraclitics to have held this subtle and swift thing to be fire, others heat. For there is nothing to warrant the conclusion, that in Plato these opinions are to be referred to the followers of Heraclitus. IV. Neither is it true that Plato, rejecting such conceits, adopts the opinion of Anaxagoras. He speaks of Anaxagoras' opinion, but does not profess any predilection in its favour. I regret, that the learned Doctor's partiality for the opinions he had adopted should so far have influenced him, as frequently to make him fancy he discovers many things in the passages of ancient authors which escape the eyes and attention of others. These very quotations by which he endeavours to prove, that almost all the ancients supposed God to be a nature diffused through the universe, possess very little efficacy for such a purpose. Some of them merely inculcate, that the virtue and power of God are present in every thing; others embody the infamous doctrine of Spinoza, who confounded God and matter; others again speak of the soul of the world. But in so excellent a work we ought to overlook any blemishes of the kind, which have always something useful connected with them, and among other advantages save an immensity of labour to those who are desirous of inquiring into the opinions of antiquity.

[4] De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 28. p. 2996.

* Lib. 6. cap. 1. [P. 416.]

he intimates, that the Pagans' many gods were really but several names of one God, as existing in many things, or in the several parts of the world, as the same ocean is called by several names, as beating upon several shores.

Secondly, the pagan theology went sometimes yet a strain higher, they not only thus supposing God to pervade the whole world, and to be diffused through all things (which as yet keeps up some difference and distinction betwixt God and the world), but also himself to be in a manner all things. That the ancient Egyptian theology, from whence the theologies of other nations were derived, ran so high as this, is evident from that excellent monument of Egyptian antiquity, the Saitic inscription often mentioned: "I am all, that was, is, and shall be." And the Trismegistic books insisting so much every where upon this notion, "that God is all things" (as hath been observed), renders it the more probable, that they were not all counterfeit and suppositious; but that, according to the testimony of Jamblichus, they did at least contain δόξας Ἑρμαϊκὰς, some of the old Theutical or Hermaical philosophy in them. And from Egypt, in all probability, was this doctrine by Orpheus derived into Greece, the Orphic verses themselves running much upon this strain; and the Orphic theology being thus epitomized by Timotheus the chronographer: "That all things were made by God, and that himself is all things."[5] To this purpose is that of Æschylus:[6]

Ζεύς ἐστιν αἰθὴρ, Ζεὺς δὲ γῆ, Ζεὺς δ' οὐρανός·
Ζεύς τοι τὰ πάντα, χὠ, τι τῶν δ' ὑπέρτερον,

[5] Having already discussed this subject at great length, we shall abstain from any further remarks upon it.

[6] I doubt whether it be clear from these verses, that Æschylus supposed God to be all things, or the several parts of the world to be members of God. On the sense of the former of the passages, as being disconnected from the context which is lost, I shall not venture to determine. But the latter in my opinion, if compared with the verses immediately preceding, pretty clearly show the tragedian not to have been so absurdly impious. These verses are as follows:

Χώριζε θνητῶν τὸν θεὸν, καὶ μὴ δόκει
Ὅμοιον αὐτῷ, σαρκικὸν καθεστάναι·
Οὐκ οἶσθα δ' αὐτόν· ποτὲ μὲν ὡς πῦρ φαίνεται, &c.

"Separate God from every thing mortal, nor suppose him to be like thyself and clothed with flesh. Thou knowest him not: sometimes he appears as fire," &c. It is not very probable that he who thus solemnly asserts God to have nothing in common with things corporeal and mortal, would inculcate a little afterwards, that God and this corporeal world are the same, and that all visible things are God himself. For my own part, therefore, I consider Æschylus to have meant, that God, although incomprehensible to the human intellect and devoid of all corporeal concretion, and in short different altogether from men, nevertheless declares his power and influence in the world in divers ways and under a variety of aspects: that there is nothing which God does not make use of as an instrument of his vengeance: that fire, water, wild beasts, lightnings, &c. instantly obey his behests, when the crimes of the wicked are to be punished.

[•] *Orat.* Exc. p. 57.

Et terra, et æther, et poli arx est Jupiter,
Et cuncta solus, et aliquid sublimius.

And again:*

Ποτὲ μὲν ὡς πῦρ φαίνεται
Ἄπλαστον ὁρμῇ· ποτὲ δ' ὕδωρ, ποτὲ δὲ γνόφος·
Καὶ θηρσὶν αὐτὸς γίνεται παρεμφερής,
Ἀνέμῳ, νέφει τε, κάστραπῇ, βροντῇ, βροχῇ,

Nunc ut implacabilis
Apparet ignis: nunc tenebris, nunc aquæ
Par ille cerni: simulat interdum feram,
Tonitrua, ventos, fulmina, et nubila.

As also this of Lucan, amongst the Latins:†

Superos quid quærimus ultra?
Jupiter est quodcunque vides, quocunque moveris.

Whereunto agree also these passages of Seneca the philosopher:[7] Quid est Deus? Quod vides totum, et quod non vides, totum. And[8] Sic solus est omnia; opus suum et extra et intra tenet, "What is God? he is all that you see, and all that you do not see. And he alone is all things, he containing his own work not only without, but also within. Neither was this the doctrine only of those Pagans who held God to be the soul of the world, and consequently the whole animated world to be the supreme Deity, but of those others also, who conceived of God as an abstract mind, superior to the mundane soul, or rather as a simple Monad, superior to mind also; as those philosophers, Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Melissus, who described God to be one and all things, they supposing that, because all things were from him, they must needs have been first in a manner in him, and himself all things. With which agreeth the author of the Asclepian Dialogue, when he maketh Unus omnia, and Creator omnium, "One all things," and "the Creator of all things," to be but equivalent expressions; and when he affirmeth, that before things were made: In eo jam tunc erant, unde nasci habuerunt, "They then existed in him, from whom afterwards they proceeded." So likewise the other Trismegistic books, when they give this account of God's being both all things that are, and all things that are not: Τὰ μὲν γαρ ὄντα ἐφανέρωσε, τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ, "Because those things that are, he hath manifested from himself, and those things that are not, he still containeth within himself;" or, as it is elsewhere expressed, he doth κρύπτειν, "hide them and conceal them in himself." And the Orphic verses gave this same account likewise of God's being all things: Πάντα τὰ δὲ κρύψας, &c. "Because he first concealed

* Grot. Exc. p. 53. † Lib. 9. v. 580.
[7] Natural. Quæst. lib. 1. præf. p. 485. tom. 1. opp.
[8] De Beneficiis, lib. 4. cap. 8. p. 427.

and hid them all within himself before they were made, and thence afterward from himself displayed them, and brought them forth into light:" or because,

Ζηνὸς δ' ἐνὶ γαστέρι σύμφορα πεφύκει,

"Before they were produced, they were all contained together in the womb of God."[9]

Now this was not only a further ground of that seeming polytheism amongst the Pagans, which was really nothing but the polyonymy of one God, and their personating his several powers; but also of another more strange and puzzling phenomenon in their theology, namely, their personating also the parts of the world inanimate, and things of nature, and bestowing the names of gods and goddesses upon them. It was before observed out of Moschopulus,* that the Pagans did ἑνὶ ὀνόματι τό τε τὴν δύναμιν ἔχον, καὶ τὸν ἐπιστατοῦντα τούτῳ θεὸν ὀνομάζειν, "call the things in nature, and the gods, which presided over them, by one and the same name." As for example, they did not only call the god which presideth over those arts that operate by fire, Hephæstus or Vulcan, but also fire itself: and Demeter or Ceres was not only taken by them for that god, who was supposed to give corn and fruits, but also for corn itself. So Dionysius or Bacchus did not only signify the god that giveth wine, but also wine itself. And he instancing further in Venus, and Minerva, and the Muses, concludes the same universally of all the rest. Thus Arnobius,† in his book against the Pagans, in usu sermonis vestri, Martem pro pugna appellatis, pro aqua Neptunum, Liberum Patrem pro vino, Cererem pro pane, Minervam pro stamine, pro obscœnis libidinibus Venerem. Now we will not deny, but that this was sometimes done metonymically, the efficient cause, and the ruling or governing principle, being put for the effect, or that which was ruled and governed by it. And thus was war frequently styled Mars; and that of Terence may be taken also in this sense: Sine Cerere et Libero friget Venus. And Plutarch‡ (who declares his great dislike of this kind of language) conceives, that there was no more at first in it than this: Ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς τὸν ὠνούμενον βιβλία Πλάτωνος ὠνεῖσθαι φαμὲν Πλάτωνα, καὶ Μένανδρον τὸν ὑποκρίνεσθαι τὰ Μενάνδρου ποιήματα ὑποτιθέμενον, οὕτως ἐκεῖνοι, τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ὀνόμασι τὰ τῶν θεῶν δῶρα καὶ ποιήματα καλεῖν οὐκ ἐφείδοντο, τιμῶντες ὑπὸ ἀφελείας καὶ σεμνύνοντες, "As we, when one buys the books of Plato, commonly say, that he buys Plato; and when one acts

* On these verses of Orpheus, which are met with in Proclus, Justin Martyr, and others, as well as on the subject matter said by Dr. Cudworth to be expressed in these verses and in the books of Hermes, I have already treated professedly above.

† P. 229. † Lib. 5. [P. 236.]

‡ De Iside et Osiride, p. 379.

the plays of Menander, that he acts Menander; so did the ancients not spare to call the gifts and effects of the gods, by the names of those gods respectively, thereby honouring them also for their utility." But he grants, that afterward this language was by ignorant persons abused, and carried on further, and that not without great impiety:* Οἱ δὲ ὕστεροι ἀπαιδεύτως δεχόμενοι καὶ ἀμαθῶς ἀναστρέφοντες, ἐπὶ τοὺς θεοὺς τὰ πάθη τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τὰς παρουσίας τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ ἀποκρύψεις, θεῶν γενέσεις καὶ φθορὰς, οὐ προσαγορεύοντες μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ νομίζοντες, ἀτόπων καὶ παρανόμων καὶ τεταραγμένων δοξῶν αὐτοὺς ἐνέπλησαν, "Their followers mistaking them, and thereupon ignorantly attributing the passions of fruits (their appearances and occultations) to the gods themselves, that preside over them, and so not only calling them, but also thinking them to be the generations and corruptions of the gods, have by this means filled themselves with absurd and wicked opinions." Where Plutarch well condemns the vulgar both amongst the Egyptians and Greeks, for that, in their mournful solemnities, they sottishly attributed to the gods the passions belonging to the fruits of the earth, thereby indeed making them to be gods. Nevertheless the inanimate parts of the world, and things of nature, were frequently deified by the Pagans, not only thus metonymically, but also in a further sense, as Cicero plainly declares:† Tum illud, quod erat à Deo natum, nomine ipsius Dei nuncupabant, ut cum fruges Cererem appellamus, vinum autem Liberum: tum autem res ipsa, in qua vis inest major, sic appellatur, ut ea ipsa res nominetur Deus, "Both that which proceeds from God is called by the name of a god, as corn is sometimes thus called Ceres, and wine Liber; and also whatsoever hath any greater force in it, that thing itself is often called a god too." Philo also thus represents the religion of the Pagans, as first deifying corporeal inanimate things, and then bestowing those proper personal names upon them:‡ Ἐκτεθειώκασι γὰρ οἱ μὲν τὰς τέσσαρας ἀρχάς, γῆν, καὶ ὕδωρ, καὶ ἀέρα, καὶ πῦρ· οἱ δ' ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πλανήτας, καὶ ἀπλανεῖς ἀστέρας· οἱ δὲ μόνον τὸν οὐρανὸν, οἱ δὲ σύμπαντα κόσμον· τὸν δ' ἀνωτάτω καὶ πρεσβύτατον, τὸν γεννητὴν, τὸν ἄρχοντα τῆς μεγάλης πόλεως, τὸν στρατιάρχην τῆς ἀηττήτου στρατιας, τὸν κυβερνήτην ὃς οἰκονομεῖ σωτηρίως ἀεὶ ἅπαντα, παρεκαλύψαντο, ψευδωνύμους προσρήσεις ἐκείνοις ἐπιφημίσαντες, ἑτέρας ἕτεροι· καλοῦσι γὰρ τὴν γῆν Κόρην, Δήμητρα, Πλούτωνα· τὴν δὲ θάλασσαν Ποσειδῶνα, δαίμονας ἐναλίους ὑπάρχους αὐτῷ προσαναπλάττοντες, &c. Ἥραν δὲ τὸν ἀέρα, καὶ τὸ πῦρ Ἥφαιστον, καὶ ἥλιον Ἀπόλλωνα, καὶ σελήνην Ἄρτεμιν, &c. "Some have deified the four elements, the earth, the water, the

* De Iside et Osiride, p. 379.
† De Nat. Deor. lib. 2. [Cap. 23. p. 2987.]
‡ De Decal. p. 751, 752.

air, and the fire; some the sun and the moon, and the planets and fixed stars; others the heaven; others the whole world. But that highest and most ancient Being, the parent of all things, the chief prince of this great city, and the emperor of this invincible army, who governeth all things salutiferously, him have they covered, concealed, and obscured, by bestowing counterfeit personal names of gods upon each of these things. For the earth they called Proserpina, Pluto, and Ceres; the sea Neptune, under whom they place many demons and nymphs also as his inferior ministers; the air Juno; the fire Vulcan; the sun Apollo; the moon Diana, &c. and dissecting the heaven into two hemispheres, one above the earth, the other under it; they call these the Dioscuri, feigning them to live alternately one one day, and the other another." We deny not here, but that the four elements, as well as the sun, moon, and stars, were supposed by some of the Pagans to be animated with particular souls of their own (which Ammianus Marcellinus[10] seems principally to call spiritus elementorum, "the spirits of the elements," worshipped by Julian) and upon that account to be so many inferior gods themselves. Notwithstanding which, that the inanimate parts of these were also deified by the Pagans, may be concluded from hence; because Plato, who in his Cratylus etymologizeth Dionysius from giving of wine, and elsewhere calls the fruits of the earth τὰ Δήμητρος δῶρα,* "the gifts of Ceres," doth himself nevertheless, in compliance with this vulgar speech, call wine and water as mingled together in a glass (or cup) to be drunk, gods: where he affirmeth, that a city ought to be,† Δίκην κρατῆρος κεκραμένην, οὗ μαινόμενος μὲν οἶνος κεχυμένος ζεῖ, κολαζόμενος δὲ ὑπὸ νήφοντος ἑτέρου θεοῦ, καλὴν κοινωνίαν λαβὼν, ἀγαθὸν πόμα καὶ μέτριον ἀπεργάζεται, "So tempered as in a cup, where the furious wine poured out bubbles and sparkles, but being corrected by another sober god (that is, by water), both together make a good and moderate potion." Cicero also tells us, that before the Roman admirals went to sea, they

[10] No doubt, the passage here alluded to is the following, Histor. lib. 21. cap. 1. p. 263. Elementorum omnium spiritus, utpote perennium corporum, præsentiendi motu semper et ubique vigens, ex his, quæ per disciplinas varias affectamus, participat nobiscum munera divinandi, "The spirit of all the elements, as of perennial bodies, being always and everywhere active with presentient motion, participates with us in the office of divination from those things which we aim at by various sciences." In these words Ammianus explains the source from which in his opinion men derived the divination, and intimates that all the power of foretelling future things proceeded from *the spirit of the elements*. Which spirit of the elements, if I am not completely deceived, is the soul of the world, diffused through the whole universe of things consisting of four elements. The learned Doctor is mistaken, therefore, 1. in saying, that Ammianus speaks of the spirits of the elements. He mentions only one spirit. 2. In making Arrian state that Julian worshipped these spirits. Nothing of the kind is to be found in Arrian. Thus frequently does imperfection of memory lead even the most learned men into errors.

* De Leg. p. 788. † De Leg. lib. 6.

were wont to offer up a sacrifice to the waves. But of this more afterward. However, it is certain, that mere accidents, and affections of things in nature, were by these Pagans commonly personated and deified; as time, in Sophocles' Electra,[1] is a god: Χρόνος γὰρ εὐμαρὴς Θεὸς, "For Time is an easy god;" and Love, in Plato's Symposium, where it is wondered at, that no poet had ever made a hymn τῷ Ἔρωτι τηλικούτῳ ὄντι καὶ τοσούτῳ θεῷ, "to Love, being such and so great a god." Though the same Plato, in his Philebus, when Protarchus had called Pleasure a goddess too, was not willing to comply so far there with vulgar speech: Τὸ δ' ἐμὸν δέος, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἀεὶ πρὸς τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὀνόματα οὐκ ἔστι κατ' ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ πέρα τοῦ μεγίστου φόβου· καὶ νῦν τὴν μὲν Ἀφροδίτην, ὅπῃ ἐκείνῃ φίλον, ταύτην προσαγορεύω, τὴν δὲ ἡδονὴν οἶδα, ὡς ἔστι ποικίλον, "My fear, O Protarchus, concerning the names of the gods is extraordinarily great: wherefore, as to Venus, I am willing to call her what she pleases to be called; but Pleasure, I know, is a various and multiform thing." Wherefore it cannot be denied, but that the Pagans did in some sense or other deify or theologize all the parts of the world, and things of nature. Which we conceive to have been done at first upon no other ground than this, because God was supposed by them, not only to permeate and pervade all things, to be diffused through all, and to act in and upon all, but also to be himself in a manner all things; which they expressed after this way, by personating the things of nature severally, and bestowing the names of gods and goddesses upon them. Only we shall here observe, that this was done especially (besides the greater parts of the world) to two sorts of things; first, such in which human utility was most concerned: thus Cicero:* Multæ aliæ naturæ deorum ex magnis beneficiis eorum, non sine causa, et à Græciæ sapientibus, et à majoribus nostris, constitutæ nominatæque sunt, "Many other natures of gods have been constituted and nominated, both by the wise men of Greece, and by our ancestors, merely for the great benefits received from them." The reason whereof is thus given by him: Quia quicquid magnam utilitatem generi afferret humano, id non sine divina bonitate erga homines fieri arbitrabantur, "Because they thought, that whatsoever brought any great utility to mankind, this was not without the divine goodness." Secondly, such as were most wonderful and extraordinary, or surprising; to which that of Seneca seems pertinent:† Magnorum fluminum capita veneramur: subita et ex abdito vasti amnis eruptio aras habet: coluntur aquarum calentium fontes; et stagna quædam vel opacitas vel immensa altitudo sacravit, "We adore the rising

[1] Ex Stobæo apud Hug. Grot. Excerpt. Veter. Comicor. et Tragicor. p. 66.
* Nat. Deor. lib. 2. p. 222. † Ep. 41. [P. 101. tom. 2. opp.]

heads and springs of great rivers: every sudden and plentiful eruption of waters out of the hidden caverns of the earth hath its altars erected to it; and some pools have been made sacred for their immense profundity and opacity.[2]

[2] Erudite as is the whole of this disputation of Dr. Cudworth's, still there are many, I have no doubt, who will consider it little calculated to produce conviction. It is liable to the same objection as many other portions of this work. The learned Doctor always confounds the religion of ancient nations with the theological opinions of certain private individuals, and estimates the public worship of the Greeks and Romans according to the sense of this or that poet or philosopher. His whole object is to show that the ancients converted the virtues of God, the several parts of nature, and other things of the kind into persons, and designated them by the names of gods: from which he considers it to follow as a consequence, that all the deities of antiquity were ultimately referred to one God, and that the Greeks and Romans did not acknowledge so many gods, as is commonly supposed. But how, I ask, does he endeavour to make us believe this? I. He cites certain passages of Cicero, Philo, and others, from which it appears, that the Stoics and some other philosophers, transferred the names of the gods to parts of the universe, and asserted Ceres to be the earth, Bacchus wine, Juno the ether, and Minerva wisdom. But did it escape the learned Doctor's recollection, that the Stoics and those who thought with them on this subject, met with few supporters and were ridiculed by wise men? This is manifest from Cicero's third book De Natura Deor. not to speak of other authorities to the same effect. The ancient fathers of the Christian church, Arnobius, Lactantius, Eusebius, St. Augustine, and others, inveighed still more severely against the madness of those who thus maintained the popular deities to be personifications of natural things. The truth is, this is merely a private interpretation of the public religions, which reason tells us is not to be confounded with religion itself, and which few of the ancients adopted. Is it fair indeed to conclude as follows? "The Stoics and others supposed Ceres to be the name of the earth, Neptune of the sea, Vulcan of fire: therefore this was really the fact; therefore the ancients meant nothing more by these names than portions of the universe." For my part I am little influenced by such reasoning. The cause that led many of the ancients to this system of interpretation was threefold. In the first place, some sought by this course to satisfy their own doubts respecting religion. For wise men were not so lost to reason as not to be sensible, that the absurd traditions of the priests were unworthy of the gods. Hence some of them looked round for a sort of philosophic religion, and in order to relieve the minds of the perplexed and yet not to discard the sacred rites and observances, they referred, although in violation of history, the whole worship of the gods to natural science. Such was the object of Varro and others, who, as is well known, discovered gods in the world, in the soul of the world, and in the various parts of the world. Others entered upon this course for the sake of proving, that their own doctrines were not at variance with the popular rites and religions. This was the motive of the Stoics in particular, who laboured to show, that all the Stoical principles were already to be found in the fables of the poets and the histories of the gods, before Zeno was born; just as at this day, Jac. Tollius and others imagine every thing recorded of the gods to have some mystical reference to chemistry. Lastly, others had recourse to these explications in order to meet the arguments of the Jews, and subsequently of the Christians, against their gods: but their fallacy was easily detected and exposed by the early fathers of the church. II. He shows that the poets frequently personified inanimate things, and even abstract notions, and spoke of them as so many self-existent natures and gods. True: such was the custom of the poets formerly, and such it is at the present day. But who would take this to be a proof, that the names of the gods were mere designations of the things of nature, and that the ancients deified the various parts of the world in order to signify God to be all things. To attempt indeed to estimate the religious opinions of the ancients from the figures of the poets, seems to me to be quite as preposterous, as for a Turk or Jew to infer from the works of our own poets, in which faith, hope, piety, concord, are not unfrequently introduced as speaking, that those virtues are worshipped by us in the rank of gods or heroes; or, to speak more appropriately to the present subject, for any one to conclude from the bold figures of Tasso, Petrarch, Marinus, and others, that those saints which are venerated by the Roman Catholic community were not

Now this is that which is properly called the physiological theology of the Pagans, their personating and deifying (in a certain sense) the things of nature, whether inanimate substances, or the

men, but merely the names of various perfections and virtues formerly manifested in the Virgin Mary and her husband Joseph. And here I cannot refrain from briefly remarking to those who delight in reading the early poets, and fancy that they can elicit from them the nature of the ancient religions, that on attentively examining these poets, it appears very uncertain to me, whether in all those passages, in which interpreters discover transformations of things into persons, such figures are in reality to be found. Hesiod enumerates among the descendants of Night many which might be regarded as the names of things rather than of persons, Theogoniæ, v. 224. p. 46. &c.

Μετὰ τὴν δ' Ἀπάτην τέκε καὶ Φιλότητα,
Γῆράς τ' οὐλομένην, καὶ Ἔριν τέκε καρτερόθυμον·
Αὐτὰρ Ἔρις στυγερὴ τέκε μὲν Πόνον ἀλγινόεντα.

"Afterwards she brought forth deceit and friendship, and destructive old age, and stubborn-minded contention; and dire contention gave birth to painful toil." The same may be supposed of the progeny of Styx, enumerated by the same poet, v. 383, &c. p. 69:

Στὺξ δὲ τέκ', Ὠκεανοῦ θυγάτηρ, Πάλλαντι μιγεῖσα,
Ζῆλον καὶ Νίκην καλλίσφυρον ἐν μεγάροισι,
Καὶ Κράτος, ἠδὲ Βίην, ἀριδείκετα γείνατο τέκνα.

"And Styx, the daughter of Oceanus, consorting with Pallas, brought forth in the mansions emulation and fair-ankled victory, and strength and force, illustrious offspring." Æschylus in the Prometheus Vinctus, and Callimachus in his Hymn. in Jovem. p. 66. &c. described strength and force as the attendants of Jupiter:

Οὐ σοὶ θεῶν ἰσσῆνα πάλοι θέσαν, ἔργα δὲ χειρῶν,
Σή τε βίη, τό τε κάρτος, ὃ καὶ πίλας εἴσαο δίφρου.

"Thee chance has not made the king of the gods, but the works of thy hands, and thy force and the strength which thou hast placed near thy throne." Interpreters tell us, that these and similar passages are instances of *prosopopœia*, and that the poets sung of things and abstract notions, as if they were persons. For my part, however, I am not so sure, that we ought implicitly to believe them. I will state frankly what has occurred to my own mind on a careful examination of these poets. The most ancient nations in my opinion borrowed their proper names from the virtues and vices, and from mental as well as bodily affections, in order to indicate by these names the character of the persons to whom they applied them. The whole, not only of the Greek and Roman, but of barbarous history, presents innumerable instances of such names, so that it cannot be surprising that this custom should have prevailed among the earliest inhabitants of Greece. Hence I consider *force*, *strength*, *virtue*, *fate*, *victory*, *contention*, and other poetic names, to have been the appellations of men, whom Jupiter or others of the more ancient kings and heroes of Greece had chosen as their attendants or ministers, and to have been bestowed upon them both for other reasons and as designations of the qualities of mind or body, for which they were respectively distinguished. In process of time, when the manners and customs of the Greeks had already undergone a change, those who embodied the ancient histories in poetry neither wholly rejected nor adopted the personality in these names, but left their readers in doubt, whether they were recording the achievements of antiquity or describing the origin and affinities of the virtues and vices. Those who may repudiate this conjecture will cause me not the slightest mortification; as I am not one to suppose myself capable of unravelling all the intricacies of ancient fables: nevertheless, should any one feel disposed to apply it to the poets themselves, he will acknowledge perhaps, if not biassed by preconceived opinions, that there is at least as much probability in it as in the hypotheses which have been put forth by others. For the rest, I hope some other more convenient opportunity will be afforded me of offering some further ideas on the names of the ancient deities, and of supporting them by arguments and testimonies.

affections of substances. A great part of which physiological theology was allegorically contained in the poetic fables of the gods. Eusebius indeed was of opinion that those poetic fables were at first only historical and herological, but that afterwards some went about to allegorize them into physiological senses, thereby to make them seem the less impious and ridiculous:* Τοιαῦτα ἦν τὰ τῆς παλαιᾶς θεολογίας, ἣν μεταβαλόντες νέοι τινὲς, χθὲς καὶ πρώην ἐπιφυέντες, λογικώτερόν τε φιλοσοφεῖν αὐχοῦντες, τὴν δὲ φυσικωτέραν τῆς περὶ θεῶν ἱστορίας δόξαν εἰσηγήσαντο, σεμνοτέρας εὑρεσιλογίας τοῖς μύθοις προσεπινοήσαντες, &c. Θεραπεῦσαι δὲ οὖν ὅμως οἵδε τὸ πατρικὸν ἁμάρτημα προθυμηθέντες, ἐπὶ φυσικὰς διηγήσεις καὶ θεωρίας τοὺς μύθους μετεσκευάσαντο, "Such was the ancient theology of the Pagans (namely, historical, of men deceased, that were worshipped for gods) which some late upstarts have altered, devising other philosophical and physiological senses of those histories of their gods, that they might hereby render them the more specious, and hide the impiety of them. For they being neither willing to abandon those fopperies of their forefathers, nor yet themselves able to bear the impiety of these fables (concerning the gods) according to the literal sense of them, have gone about to cure them thus by physiological interpretations." Neither can it be doubted, but that there was some mixture of herology and history in the poetic mythology; nor denied, that the Pagans of latter times, such as Porphyrius and others, did excogitate and devise certain new allegorical senses of their own, such as never were intended; Origen,† before both him and Porphyry, noting this of the Pagans, that when the absurdity of their fables concerning the gods was objected and urged against them, some of them did περὶ τούτων ἀπολογούμενοι ἐπ' ἀλληγορίας καταφεύγειν, "apologizing for these things, betake themselves to allegories." But long before the times of Christianity, those first Stoics, Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus, were famous for the great pains which they took in allegorizing these poetic fables of the gods. Of which Cotta in Cicero[3] thus: Magnam molestiam suscepit et minime necessariam primus Zeno, post Cleanthes, deindè Chrysippus, commentitiarum fabularum reddere rationem, et vocabulorum, cur quidque ita appellatum sit, causas explicare. Quod cum facitis, illud profecto confitemini, longè aliter rem se habere, atque hominum opinio sit; eos, qui dii appellantur, rerum naturas esse, non figuras deorum, "Zeno first, and after him Cleanthes and Chrysippus, took a great deal more pains than was needful, to give a reason of all those commentitious fables of the gods, and of the names that every thing was called by. By doing

* Præpar. Evang. lib. 3. cap. 6. [Lib. 2. cap. 6. p. 73.]
† Lib. 3. c. Cels. p. 123.
[3] De Natura Deor. lib. 3. cap. 24. p. 3089. tom. 9. opp.

which they confessed, that the manner was far otherwise than according to men's opinion, inasmuch as they, who are called gods in them, were nothing but the natures of things." From whence it is plain, that in the poetic theology, the Stoics took it for granted, that the natures of things were personated and deified, and that those gods were not animal, nor indeed philosophical, but fictitious, and nothing but the things of nature allegorized. Origen* also gives us a taste of Chrysippus' thus allegorizing, in his interpreting an obscene picture or fable of Jupiter and Juno, in Samos: Λέγει γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ συγγράμμασιν ὁ σεμνὸς φιλόσοφος, ὅτι τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ ὕλη παραδεξαμένη, ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῇ, εἰς κατακόσμησιν τῶν ὅλων· ὕλη γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὴν Σάμον γραφῇ, ἡ Ἥρα, καὶ ὁ Θεὸς ὁ Ζεύς, "This grave philosopher, in his writing saith, that matter having received the spermatic reasons of God, containeth them within itself for the adorning of the whole world; and that Juno, in this picture in Samos, signifies matter, and Jupiter God." Upon which occasion that pious father adds: Καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ ἡμεῖς, καὶ διὰ τοὺς τοιούτους μύθους καὶ ἄλλους μυρίους, οὐδὲ μέχρι ὀνόματος θέλομεν Δία καλεῖν τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεὸν, ἀλλὰ καθαρὰν εὐσέβειαν εἰς τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀσκοῦντες, οὐδὲ μέχρι ὀνόματος χραίνομεν τὰ θεῖα, "For the sake of which, and innumerable other such like fables, we will never endure to call the God over all by the name of Jupiter, but, exercising pure piety towards the Maker of the world, will take care not to defile divine things with impure names." And here we see again, according to Chrysippus' interpretation, that Hera or Juno was no animal nor real god, but only the nature of matter personated and deified; that is, a mere fictitious and poetic god. And we think it is unquestionably evident from Hesiod's Theogonia, that many of these poetic fables, according to their first intention, were really nothing else but physiology allegorized; and consequently those gods nothing but the natures of things personated and deified.[4] Plato himself, though no friend to these poetic fables, plainly intimates as much, in his second De Republica:† Καὶ θεομαχίας, ὅσας Ὅμηρος πεποίηκεν, οὐ παραδεκτέον εἰς τὴν πόλιν, οὔτ' ἐν ὑπονοίας πεποιημένας, οὔτ' ἄνευ ὑπονοιῶν· ὁ γὰρ νέος, οὐκ οἷός τε κρίνειν, ὅ,τι τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὃ μή, "The fightings of the gods, and such other things, as Homer hath feigned con-

* Lib. 4. p. 196.

[4] We have already given a specimen of this, and have shown, that in the history of Saturn and Jupiter, as recorded by Hesiod, certain dogmas of the ancient physiologers lie concealed. But this does not preclude us from supposing Jupiter and Saturn to have been men who were raised to the rank of gods, and had formerly really lived in Greece. For, as we have stated above at some length, the history of the gods in Hesiod and the other poets is an unskilful compound of physical precepts and ancient Grecian history.

† P. 378. [P. 430.]

cerning them, ought not to be admitted into our commonwealth, whether they be delivered in way of allegory, or without allegories; because young men are not able to judge, when it is allegory, and when not."[5] And it appears from Dionysius Halicarnassus, that this was the general opinion concerning the Greekish fables, that some of them were physically, and some tropologically allegorical:* Μηδεὶς ὑπολάβοι με ἀγνοεῖν, ὅτι τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν μύθων εἰσί τινες ἀνθρώποις χρήσιμοι, οἱ μὲν ἐπιδεικνύμενοι τὰ τῆς φύσεως ἔργα δι' ἀλληγορίας, οἱ δὲ παραμυθίας ἕνεκα συγκείμενοι τῶν ἀνθρωπείων συμφορῶν, &c. "Let no man think me to be ignorant, that some of the Greekish fables are profitable to men, partly as declaring the works of nature by allegories, partly as being helpful for human life," &c. Thus also Cicero:† Alia quoque ex ratione, et quidem physicâ, magna fluxit multitudo deorum, qui induti specie humana fabulas poetis suppeditaverunt, hominum autem vitam superstitione omni referserunt.

Eusebius,[6] indeed, seems sometimes to cast it as an imputation upon the whole pagan theology, that it did θειάζειν τὴν ἄψυχον οὐσίαν, "deify the inanimate nature;" but this is properly to be understood of this part of their theology only, which was physiological, and of their mythology or poetic fables of the gods allegorized; it being otherwise both apparently false, and all one as to make them downright Atheists. For he that acknowledges no animant god, as hath been declared, acknowledges no god at all, according to the true notion of him; whether he derive all things from a fortuitous motion of matter, as Epicurus and Democritus did, or from a plastic and orderly, but senseless nature, as some degenerate Stoics, and Strato the Peripatetic, whose atheism seems to be thus described by Manilius:[7]

[5] This passage may be of use to those who wish to show, that in Plato's time there were already men who allegorized the history of the gods. But it will not assist any one towards proving, that Plato belonged to this class. He does not tell us whether he is favourable to this system or not, but leaves the whole matter undecided.

* Lib. 2. p. 68. † Nat. Deor. lib. 2. p. 223. [Cap. 24. p. 2990.]

[6] Præpar. Evangel. lib. 3. cap. 1. &c. But Dr. Cudworth, I conceive, misapprehends Eusebius' meaning. He by no means intends to say, that the ancient nations had no other gods except the inanimate parts of nature; for which indeed he would have been justly deserving of the learned Doctor's censure: but he exclaims against those who refer the fables and histories of the gods to physical things, declaring that, if they are to be listened to, the whole family of the gods must be looked upon as merely irrational nature. The same is professed by St. Augustine, De Civitate, lib. 7. cap. 27. sect. 2. p. 140. tom. 7. opp. Ipsas physiologias quum considero, quibus docti et acuti homines has res humanas conantur vertere in res divinas, nihil video, nisi ad temporalia terrenaque opera naturamque corpoream, vel etiam si invisibilem, tamen mutabilem, potuisse revocari: quod nullo modo est verus Deus, "When I examine those physiologies, by which learned and acute men attempt to turn these human into divine things, I see nothing that might not be referred to temporal and terrestrial operations and to a corporeal nature, changeable although invisible: which is by no means the true God."

[7] Astronomic. lib. 1. v. 137. &c. p. 5.

Aut neque terra patrem novit, nec flamma, nec aër,
Aut humor, faciuntque Deum per quatuor artus,
Et mundi struxere globum, prohibentque requiri
Ultra se quidquam.

Neither ought this physiological theology of the Pagans, which consisted only in personating and deifying inanimate substances, and the natures of things, to be confounded (as it hath been by some late writers) with that philosophical theology of Scævola, Varro and others (which was called natural also, but in another sense, as true and real), it being indeed but a part of the poetical first, and afterward of the political theology, and owing its original much to the fancies of poets, whose humour it was perpetually to personate things and natures. But the philosophic theology, properly so called, which, according to Varro,[8] was that, de qua multos libros philosophi reliquerunt; as it admitted none but animal gods, and such as really existed in nature (which therefore were called natural), namely one supreme universal Numen, a perfect soul or mind comprehending all, and his ὑπουργοὶ δυνάμεις, other inferior understanding beings, his ministers created by him, such as stars and demons, so were all those personated gods, or natures things, deified in the arcane theology, interpreted agreeably thereunto.[9]

St. Austin often takes notice of the Pagans thus mingling, and, as it were, incorporating physiology with their theology, he justly condemning the same; as in his forty-ninth epistle:[10] Neque illinc excusant impii sua sacrilega sacra et simulachra, quòd eleganter interpretantur, quid quæque significent: omnis quippe illa interpretatio ad creaturam refertur, non ad Creatorem, cui uni debetur servitus religionis, illa quæ uno nomine Latria Græcè appellatur, "Neither do the Pagans sufficiently excuse their sacrilegious rites and images from hence, because they elegantly (and ingeniously) interpret, what each of those things signifieth. For this interpretation is referred to the creature, and not to the Creator, to whom alone belongeth religious worship, that which by the Greeks is called Latria." And again in his book De Civ. Deor. lib. 6. cap. 8: At enim habent ista physiologicas quasdam (sicut aiunt), id est, naturalium rationum interpretationes. Quasi verò nos in hac disputatione physiologiam quæramus, et non theologiam; id est, rationem naturæ, et non Dei. Quamvis enim qui verus Deus est, non opinione sed natura sit Deus; non tamen omnis natura Deus est, "But the Pagans pretend, that these things have certain physiological

[8] Apud Augustin. De Civitat. Dei, lib. 5, cap. 5. p. 116. tom. 7. opp.

[9] How much importance is to be attached to this opinion may easily be learnt from what we have remarked a little above in defence of Vossius, whom Dr. Cudworth is here again attacking.

[10] According to the more recent arrangement of the Benedictine editors, ep. 102. Quæst. 3. sect. 20. p. 212. tom. 2. opp.

interpretations, or according to natural reasons; as if in this disputation we sought for physiology, and not theology, or the reason of nature, and not of God. For although the true God be not in opinion only, but in nature God, yet is not every nature God." But certainly the first and chief ground of this practice of theirs, thus to theologize physiology, and deify (in one sense or other) all the things of nature, was no other than what has been already intimated, their supposing God to be not only diffused through the whole world, and in all things, but also in a manner all things; and that therefore he ought to be worshipped in all the things of nature, and parts of the world.

Wherefore, these personated gods of the Pagans, or those things of nature deified by them, and called gods and goddesses, were for all that by no means accounted by the intelligent amongst them, true and proper gods. Thus Cotta, in Cicero,* Cum fruges Cererem, vinum Liberum dicimus, genere nos quidem sermonis utimur usitato: sed ecquem tam amentem esse putas, qui illud, quo vescatur, Deum esse credat? "Though it be very common and familiar language amongst us, to call corn Ceres, and wine Bacchus, yet who can think any one to be so mad, as to take that to be really a god, which he feeds upon?" The Pagans really accounted that only for a god, by the worshipping and invoking whereof they might reasonably expect benefit to themselves, and therefore, nothing was truly and properly a god to them, but what was both substantial, and also animant and intellectual. For Plato[1] writes, that the atheistic wits of his time therefore concluded the sun, and moon, and stars, not to be gods, because they were nothing but earth and stones (or a certain fiery matter) devoid of all understanding and sense; and for this cause, οὐδὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων φροντίζειν δυνάμενα, "unable to take notice of any human affairs." And Aristotle[2] affirmeth concerning the gods in general: Ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν αὐτοὺς, καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα, &c, "That all men conceived them to live, and consequently to act, since they cannot be supposed to sleep perpetually, as Endymion did." The Pagans universally conceived the gods to be happy animals; and Aristotle there concludes the happiness of them all to consist in contemplation. Lucretius himself would not debar men of that language (then vulgarly received amongst the Pagans) of calling the sea Neptune, corn Ceres, wine Bacchus, and the Earth the mother of the gods too, provided that they did not think any of these, for all that, to be truly and really gods:

* De Nat. Deor. lib. 3. p. 345. [Cap. 16. p. 3071. tom. 9.]
[1] De Legibus, lib. 10. p. 665.
[2] Magn. Moral. lib. 5. cap. 8. p. 184. tom. 3. opp.

Hîc siquis mare Neptunum, Cereremque vocare
Constituit fruges, et Bacchi nomine abuti
Mavolt, quam laticis proprium proferre vocamen;
Concedamus, ut hic terrarum dictitet orbem
Esse deûm matrem, dum non sit re tamen apse.*

And the reason why the earth was not really a goddess, is thus given by him:

Terra quidem vero caret omni tempore sensu.

"Because it is constantly devoid of all manner of sense."† Thus, Balbus in Cicero tells us, that the first thing included in the notion or idea of a god is this, Ut sit animans, "that it be animant," or endued with life, sense, and understanding. And he conceiving the stars to be undoubtedly such, therefore concludes them to be gods: "Quoniam tenuissimus est æther, et semper agitatur et viget, necesse est, quod animal in eo gignatur, idem quoque sensu accerrimo esse. Quare cum in æthere astra gignantur, consentaneum est in iis sensum inesse et intelligentiam. Ex quo efficitur in deorum numero astra esse ducenda, "Because the ether is most subtle, and in continual agitation, that animal which is begotten in it, must needs be endued with the quickest and sharpest sense. Wherefore, since the stars are begotten in the ether, it is reasonable to think them to have sense and understanding; from whence it follows that they ought to be reckoned in the number of gods." And Cotta‡ in the third book, affirms, that all men were so far from thinking the stars to be gods, that multi ne animantes quidem esse concedant, "many would not so much as admit them to be animals;" plainly intimating, that unless they were animated, they could not possibly be gods. Lastly, Plutarch§ for this very reason, absolutely condemns that whole practice of giving the names of gods and goddesses to inanimate things, as absurd, impious, and atheistical: Δεινὰς καὶ ἀθέους ἐμποιοῦσι δόξας, ἀναισθήτοις, καὶ ἀψύχοις, καὶ φθειρομέναις ἀναγκαίως ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων δεομένων καὶ χρωμένων φύσεσι καὶ πράγμασιν ὀνόματα θεῶν ἐπιφέροντες· ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ νοῆσαι θεοὺς οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ οὖν οὐδὲ ἄψυχον ἀνθρώποις ὁ θεός, "They who give the names of gods to senseless and inanimate natures and things, and such as are destroyed by men in the use of them, beget most wicked and atheistical opinions in the minds of men; since it cannot be conceived how these things should be gods, for nothing that is inanimate is a god." And now we have very good reason to conclude, that the distinction or division of pagan gods (used by some) into animal and natural (by natural

* Lib. 2. p. 165. [Verse 654. p. 380. Ed. Havercamp.]
† De Nat. Deor. lib. 2. p. 220. ‡ De Nat. Deor. p. 241. D.
§ De Iside et Osiride, p. 377.

being meant inanimate) is utterly to be rejected, if we speak of their true and proper gods; since nothing was such to the Pagans but what had life, sense, and understanding. Wherefore, those personated gods that were nothing but the natures of things deified as such, were but dii commentitii et fictitii, "counterfeit and fictitious gods;" or, as Origen calls them in that place before cited, τὰ Ἑλλήνων ἀναπλάσματα, σωματαποιεῖσθαι δοκοῦντα ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων, "figments of the Greeks (and other Pagans) that were but things turned into persons and deified." Neither can there be any other sense made of these personated and deified things of nature, than this, that they were all of them really so many several names of one supreme God, or partial considerations of him, according to the several manifestations of himself in his works. Thus, according to the old Egyptian theology before declared, God is said to have both no name and every name; or, as it is expressed in the Asclepian Dialogue, Cum non possit uno quamvis è multis composito nomine nuncupari, potius omni nomine vocandus est, siquidem sit unus et omnia; ut necesse sit, aut omnia ipsius nomine, aut ipsum omnium nomine nuncupari, "Since he cannot be fully declared by any one name, though compounded of never so many, therefore is he rather to be called by every name, he being both one and all things: so that either every thing must be called by his name, or he by the name of every thing." With which Egyptian doctrine Seneca[3] seemeth also fully to agree, when he gives this description of God: Cui nomen omne convenit, "He to whom every name belongeth;" and when he further declares thus concerning him: Quæcunque voles illi nomina aptabis, and, Tot appellationes ejus possunt esse, quot munera, "You may give him whatsoever names you please," &c. and, "There may be as many names of him as there are gifts and effects of his:" and lastly, when he makes God and nature to be really one and the same thing, and every thing we see to be God. And the writer De Mundo[4] is likewise consonant hereunto, when he affirmeth, that God is πάσης ἐπώνυμος φύσεως, ἅτε πάντων αὐτός αἴτιος ὤν, or, "may be denominated from every nature, because he is the cause of all things." We say, therefore, that the Pagans in this their theologizing of physiology, and deifying the things of nature and parts of the world, did accordingly call every thing by the name of God, or God by the name of everything.[5]

[3] De Beneficiis, lib. 4. cap. 7. p. 427. tom. 1. opp.

[4] Cap. 7. p. 869. tom. 1. opp. Aristotelis.

[5] If the order and elegance of this disputation of the learned Doctor's, equalled the learning and multifarious reading displayed in it, nothing could have been more excellent or deserving of higher praise. But while he is absorbed in the latter and exhausts the treasures of his memory, he frequently neglects the former and mingles and confounds various things which it would have been better to have kept distinct and separate. I shall not repeat what I have already more than once dwelt upon, nor shall I urge, that

Wherefore, these personated and deified things of nature were not themselves properly and directly worshipped by the intelligent Pagans (who acknowledged no inanimate thing for a god) so as to terminate their worship ultimately in them; but either relatively only to the supreme God, or else at most in way of complication with him, whose effects and images they are, so that they were not so much themselves worshipped, as God was worshipped in them. For these Pagans* professed that they did, *τὸν οὐρανὸν μὴ παρέργως, μηδὲ ὥσπερ τὰ βοσκήματα θεωρεῖν*, "look upon the heaven (and world) not slightly and superficially, nor as mere brute animals, who take notice of nothing, but those sensible phantasms, which from the objects obtrude themselves upon them; or else, as the same Julian, in that oration, again more fully expresseth it:† *Τὸν οὐρανὸν οὐχ ὥσπερ ἵππους καὶ βόας ὁρᾷν, ἤ τι τῶν ἀλόγων καὶ ἀμαθῶν ζώων, ἀλλὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ φανέροῦ τὴν ἀφανῆ πολυπραγμονεῖν φύσιν*, "Not view and contemplate the heaven and world, with the same eyes that oxen and

opinions are here classed together, which, when all things are considered, possess no affinity beyond the mere coincidence of names. Such are the opinions of Cotta and Balbus, in Cicero, which, although here identified, are indeed diametrically opposite, and such the doctrines of the ancient Egyptians, and those of Seneca or the Stoics, between which there is no slight discrepancy. I shall touch merely upon the conclusion which the learned Doctor draws from this long array of testimonies. Nothing can be more true than what he lays down at the close of his discourse, namely, that those who referred the ancient fables to physical things, of whom the number was formerly very considerable, called every thing by the name of God, and God by the name of every thing. The system which most of them had adopted, and the nature of the doctrines espoused by them, required them to do this. But in considering, as he does, that the opinions of this class, and their physical interpretations of the ancient religions, are true, and that Jupiter, Juno, Ceres and the rest of the deities, were what the Stoics and other philosophers supposed them to be, I hold him to be altogether mistaken. He maintains that most of the gods of antiquity were parts of the nature of things, or that the ancients deified the various parts of nature, for the sake of exhibiting their religion in a more beautiful light than it really deserved. In proof thereof, he cites the authorities of the Egyptian and some other philosophers, who, as is well known, gave a physical interpretation to the public religion. But this is estimating the popular sentiment concerning God from the sense of private individuals; a course which would appear to be unsafe and illogical. But even supposing the religion of ancient nations to have been such as persons possessing more intelligence than the generality have represented it, still, there will be need for endless deliberation, before we can come to any satisfactory conclusion respecting its nature and character. For that a great variety of expositions have been given, is notorious: and the question as to which of these ought to be preferred, would be interminable. The Stoics referred the gods of antiquity to nature; while Aristotle, Metaphys. identified the Grecian deities with his celestial genii. Which of them are we to believe? Zeno and Aristotle are here certainly upon an equal footing, and one opinion is just as probable as the other. To me it has always appeared the safest course, in an inquiry into the opinions of ancient nations, to set aside all that the more intelligent may have invented for the purpose of concealing the deformity of the religions, and instead of adopting the subtleties of learned men, to attend rather to the voice of the poets and priests, and to inspect and examine the public rites.—But I fear I shall somewhat weary my readers, by so often reiterating what I have just observed. As, however, the learned Doctor frequently repeats his opinion, and exhibits it continually in a new dress, I consider it will be consulting their interests, if I follow something of the same rule, and bring forward my objections to it in a different form.

* Julian Orat. 4. [P. 148.] † P. 286.

horses do, but so as from that, which is visible to their outward senses, to discern and discover another invisible nature under it." That is, they professed to behold all things with religious eyes, and to see God in every thing, not only as pervading all things, and diffused through all things, but also as being in a manner all things. Wherefore, they looked upon the whole world as a sacred thing, and as having a kind of divinity in it: it being, according to their theology, nothing but God himself visibly displayed. And thus was God worshipped by the Pagans, in the whole corporeal world taken all at once together, or in the universe, under the name of Pan. As they also commonly conceived of Zeus and Jupiter, after the same manner; that is, not abstractly only (as we now use to conceive of God) but concretely, together with all that which proceedeth and emaneth from him, that is, the whole world. And as God was thus described in that old Egyptian monument, to be "all that was, is, and shall be;" so was it before observed out of Plutarch, that the Egyptians took the first God and the universe, for one and the same thing; not only because they supposed the supreme God virtually to contain all things within himself, but also because they were wont to conceive of him, together with his overflowing, and all the extent of his fecundity, the whole world displayed from him, all at once, as one entire thing. Thus likewise do the Pagans in Plato[6] confound* τὸν μέγιστον θεὸν, and ὅλον τὸν κόσμον, "the greatest God," and "the whole world" together, as being but one and the same thing. And this notion was so familiar with these Pagans, that Strabo himself, writing of Moses, could not conceive of his god, and of the God of the Jews, any otherwise than thus:† Τὸ περιέχον ἡμᾶς ἅπαντας, καὶ γῆν, καὶ θάλατταν, ὃ καλοῦμεν οὐρανὸν καὶ κόσμον καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅλων φύσιν, "namely, that which containeth us all, and the earth, and the sea, which we call the heaven and world, and the nature of the whole." By which, notwithstanding, Strabo did not mean the heaven or world inanimate, and a senseless nature, but an understanding Being, framing the whole world, and containing the same, which was conceived together with it: of which, therefore, he tells us, that, according to Moses, no wise man would go about to make any

* The words of Plato here intended are no doubt the following, De Legibus, lib. 7. p. 640. Τὸν μέγιστον Θεὸν καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον φαμὲν οὔτε ζητεῖν δεῖν, οὔτε πολυπραγμονεῖν τὰς αἰτίας ἐρευνῶντας, "We say that we ought not to inquire into the greatest god and the whole world, nor busy ourselves with investigating the causes of things." But that the Pagans confounded the supreme God and the whole world together, as being one and the same thing, which the learned Doctor considers to be manifest from these words, is less clear to me than I could wish. Plato warns his fellow-citizens from too curiously examining into the nature of the supreme god and the whole world, but does not affirm that the Greeks held the world and God to be the same.

* De Leg. lib. 7. p. 821. † Lib. 16. p. 761.

image or picture, resembling any thing here amongst us. From whence we conclude, that when the same Strabo,[7] writing of the Persians, affirmeth of them, that they did τὸν οὐρανὸν ἡγεῖσθαι Δία, "take the heaven for Jupiter;" and also Herodotus[8] before him, that they did κύκλον πάντα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ Δία καλεῖν, "call the whole circle of the heaven Jupiter," that is, the supreme God; the meaning of neither of them was, that the body of the heaven inanimate was to them the highest God, but that though he were an understanding nature, yet framing the whole heaven or world, and containing the same, he was at once conceived together with it. Moreover, God was worshipped also by the Pagans, in the several parts of the world, under several names; as for example, in the higher and lower ether, under those names of Minerva and Jupiter; in the air, under the name of Juno; in the fire, under the name of Vulcan; in the sea, under the name of Neptune, &c. Neither can it be reasonably doubted, but that when the Roman sea-captains sacrificed to the waves, they intended therein to worship that God who acteth in the waves, and whose "wonders are in the deep."

But besides this, the Pagans seemed to apprehend a kind of necessity of worshipping God thus, in his works, and in the visible things of this world, because the generality of the vulgar were then unable to frame any notion or conception at all of an invisible Deity; and therefore unless they were detained in a way of religion, by such a worship of God as was accommodate and suitable to the lowness of their apprehensions, would unavoidably run into atheism. Nay, the most philosophical wits amongst them confessing God to be incomprehensible to them, therefore seemed themselves also to stand in need of some sensible props, to lean upon. This very account is given by the Pagans, of their practice, in Eusebius:* Ἀσωμάτως καὶ ἀφανῶς ἐν πᾶσιν ὄντα Θεὸν, καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκοντα, καὶ τοῦτον εἰκότως διὰ τῶν δεδηλωμένων σέβειν φάσι, "That God being incorporeally and invisibly present in all things, and pervading or passing through all things, it was reasonable that men should worship him, by and through those things that are visible and manifest." Plato likewise represents this as the opinion of the generality of Pagans in his time:† Τὸν μέγιστον θεὸν καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον φαμὲν οὔτε ζητεῖν δεῖν, οὔτε πολυπραγμονεῖν, τὰς αἰτίας ἐρευνῶντας· οὐ γὰρ οὐδ' ὅσιον εἶναι, "That as for the greatest God, and the whole world, men should not busily and curiously search after the knowledge thereof, nor pragmatically inquire into the causes of things, it being not pious for them so to do." The meaning whereof seems to be no other than this, that men ought to con-

[7] Geograph. lib. 15. p. 697.
[8] Histor. lib. 1. cap. 131. p. 55.
* *Præp. Evan.* lib. 3. cap. 13.
† De Leg. lib. 7. p. 821. [P. 640.]

tent themselves to worship God in his works, and in this visible world, and not trouble themselves with any further curious speculations concerning the nature of that which is incomprehensible to them. Which though Plato professeth his dislike of, yet does that philosopher himself elsewhere plainly allow of worshipping the first invisible God in those visible images, which he hath made of himself, the sun, and moon, and stars. Maximus Tyrius* doth indeed exhort men to ascend up, in the contemplation of God, above all corporeal things: Τέλος τῆς ὁδοῦ οὐχ ὁ οὐρανὸς, οὐδὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ σώματα (καλὰ μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ θεσπέσια, ἅτε ἐκείνου ἔγγονα ἀκριβῆ καὶ γνήσια, καὶ πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον ἡρμοσμένα), ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων ἐπέκεινα ἐλθειν δεῖ, καὶ ὑπερκύψαι τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ἐπὶ τὸν ἀληθῆ τόπον, &c. "The end of your journey (saith he) is not the heaven, nor those shining bodies in the heaven; for though those be beautiful and divine, and the genuine offspring of that supreme deity, yet ought these all to be transcended by you, and your head lifted up far above the starry heavens," &c. Nevertheless, he closes his discourse thus: Εἰ δε ἐξασθενεῖς πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ δημουργοῦ θέαν, ἀρκεῖ σοι τὰ ἔργα ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὁρᾶν, καὶ προσκυνεῖν τὰ ἔγγονα, πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπὰ ὄντα, οὐχ ὅσα ὁ Βοιώτιος ποιητὴς λέγει· οὐ γὰρ τρισμύριοι μόνον θεοὶ θεοῦ παῖδες καὶ φίλοι, ἀλλ' ἄληπτοι ἀριθμῷ· τοῦτο μὲν κατ' οὐρανὸν αἱ ἀστέρων φύσεις, &c. "But if you be too weak and unable to contemplate that father and maker of all things; it will be sufficient for you for the present to behold his works, and to worship his progeny or offspring, which is various and manifold. For there are not only, according to the Bœotian poet, thirty thousand gods, all the sons and friends of the supreme God; but innumerable. And such in the heaven are the stars, in the ether demons, &c. Lastly, Socrates himself also did not only allow of this way of worshipping God (because himself is invisible), in his works that are visible, but also commend the same to Euthydemus:† Ὅτι δέ γε ἀληθῆ λέγω, καὶ σὺ γνώσῃ, ἂν μὴ ἀναμένῃς, ἕως ἂν τὰς μορφὰς τῶν θεῶν ἴδῃς, ἀλλ' ἐξαρκῇ σοι τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὁρῶντι σέβεσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν τοὺς θεούς, "That I speak the truth, yourself shall know, if you will not stay expecting, till you see the forms of the gods themselves, but count it sufficient for you beholding their works to worship and adore them." Which he afterward particularly applies to the supreme God, who made and containeth the whole world, that being invisible, he hath made himself visible in his works, and consequently was to be worshipped and adored in them. Whether Socrates and Plato, and their genuine followers, would extend this any further than to the animated parts of the world, such as the sun, moon, and stars were to them, we cannot certainly determine. But we think it very probable, that many

* Dissert. 1. [P. 12.] † Xenoph. Memor. lib. 4. [P. 633.]

of those Pagans, who are charged with worshipping inanimate things, and particularly the elements, did notwithstanding direct their worship to the spirits of those elements, as Ammianus Marcellinus tells us Julian did, that is, chiefly the souls of them, all the elements being supposed by many of these Pagans to be animated (as was before observed concerned Proclus*), and partly also those demons, which they conceived to inhabit in them, and to preside over them; upon which account it was said by Plato, and others of the ancients, that πάντα θεῶν πλήρη, "all things are full of gods and demons."[9]

XXXIII. But that these physiological gods, that is, the things of nature personated and deified, were not accounted by the Pagans true and proper gods, much less independent and self-existent ones, may further appear from hence, because they did not only thus personate and deify things substantial, and inanimate bodies, but also mere accidents and affections of substances. As for example, first, the passions of the mind; τὰ πάθη θεοὺς ἐνόμισαν, ἢ θεοὺς ἐτίμησαν, saith S. Greg. Nazianzen,[10] "They accounted the passions of the mind to be gods," or at least worshipped them as gods; that is, built temples or altars to their names. Thus was Hope, not only a goddess to the poet Theognis,[1]

* P. 236, 237.

[9] Here also is matter for comment, were I disposed to be prolix. But intelligent readers will of themselves easily collect from preceding observations sufficient towards forming a correct estimate of the present argument. On the passage of Ammianus here cited by Dr. Cudworth I have spoken a above.

[10] This passage of Nazianzen was worthy of being given entire. But Dr. Cudworth seems to have quoted it either from some other author, or from memory, as he does not point out the place where it occurs. I shall therefore produce St. Gregory's own words, which admirably expose the folly of the Greeks in their worship of many gods, Orat. 34. tom. 1. opp. p. 546. Οἱ ἐμπαθέστεροι δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ πάθη θεοὺς ἐνόμισαν, ἢ θεοῦς ἐτίμησαν, θυμὸν, καὶ μιαιφονίαν, ἀσέλγειαν, καὶ μέθην, καὶ νὴ οἶδ' ὅτι τῶν τοιούτοις παραπλησίων, οὐδὲ δικαίαν ταύτην ἀπολογίαν εὑράμενοι τῶν οἰκείων ἁμαρτημάτων, "The more vicious of them have even deified the passions, or at least have worshipped them as gods, namely, anger, bloodshed, lust, drunkenness, and others of the kind, having devised this dishonest excuse for their own crimes."

[1] In Sententiis, v. 1131. 1132. p. 115. The sense of this couplet is undoubtedly as follows: "Hope, the good goddess, is alone left amongst men; the other deities, abandoning (namely mankind), have departed into heaven." That is, the word ἔσαν in the second verse is to be joined with the noun οὐλυμπον. Hence in my opinion Dr. Cudworth here mistakes the poet's meaning in supposing him to say, that "the other gods had all forsaken heaven and their ancient mansions, Hope alone being left in Olympus." He refers οὔλυμπον to ἐκπρολιπόντες, and from this construction elicits the interpretation he has given. But in the first place, the thing itself shows that this is altogether foreign to Theognis' meaning. For what can be more improbable than that the gods had deserted heaven, which abounded with every good? Again, the same is clear from the following verses, in which the poet goes on to enumerate other goddesses, whom he in like manner feigns to have departed hence and to *have left*, not heaven, but the *earth*:

Σωφροσύνη Χάριτές τε, ὦ φίλε, γῆν ἔλιπον,

"Temperance and the Graces, O friend, abandoned the earth."

Ἐλπὶς ἐν ἀνθρώποισι μόνη θεὸς ἐσθλὴ ἔνεστιν,
Ἄλλοι δ' οὐλυμπονδ' ἐκπρολιπόντες ἔβαν,

(where he fancifully makes her to be the only Numen that was left to men in heaven, as if the other gods had all forsaken those mansions and the world), but also had real temples dedicated to her at Rome, as that consecrated by Attilius in the Forum Olitorium, and others elsewhere, wherein she was commonly pictured or feigned as a woman, covered over with a green pall, and holding a cup in her hand.[2] Thus also Love and Desire were gods or goddesses too, as likewise were care, memory, opinion, truth, virtue, piety, faith, justice, clemency, concord, victory, &c. Which Victory was, together with Virtue, reckoned up amongst the gods by Plautus in the prologue of his Amphitryo; and not only so, but that there was an altar erected to her also, near the entrance of the senate-house at Rome, which having been once demolished, Symmachus earnestly endeavoured the restoration thereof, in the reign of Theodosius; he amongst other things writing thus concerning it,[3] Nemo colendam neget, quam profitetur optandam, "Let no man deny that of right to be worshipped, which he acknowledgeth to be wished for, and to be desirable." Besides all which, Echo was a goddess to these pagans too, and so was Night (to whom they sacrificed a cock), and Sleep and Death itself, and very many more such affections of things, of which Vossius has collected the largest catalogue, in his eighth book De Theologia Gentili. And this personating and deifying of accidental things was so familiar with these Pagans, that, as St. Chrysostome hath observed, St. Paul was therefore said by some of the vulgar Athenians to have been a setter forth of strange gods, when he preached to them Jesus and the resurrection, because they supposed him, not only to have made Jesus a God, but also Anastasis, or resurrection, a goddess too.[4] Nay, this humour of theologizing the things of nature transported these Pagans so far, as to deify evil things also, that is, things both noxious and vicious. Of the former Pliny thus:* Inferi quoque in genera describuntur, morbique, et multæ etiam pestes, dum esse placatas trepido metu cupimus. Ideoque etiam publicè febri fanum in palatio dedicatum est, Orbonæ ad ædem larium ara, et malæ fortunæ Exquiliis, "So great is the number of these gods, that even hell, or the state of death itself, diseases and many plagues are numbered amongst

* Nat. Hist. lib. 2. cap. 7.

[2] See Vossius, De Idololatria, lib. 8. cap. 10. p. 748, who discourses at some length on the temples dedicated to Hope.

[3] Epistolar. lib. 9. ep. 61. p. 441.

[4] But against this interpretation of St. Chrysostom's of the passage in Acts xvii. 18, although adopted by many interpreters of high repute, others have brought forward very powerful arguments: for which consult J. Chr. Wolf, Curæ Philolog. et Critic. ad h. l. p. 1255. 1256.

them, whilst with a trembling fear we desire to have these pacified. And therefore was there a temple publicly dedicated in the palace to the Fever, as likewise altars elsewhere erected to Orbona, and to evil fortune." Of the latter, Balbus in Cicero; Quo ex genere Cupidinis et Voluptatis et Lubentinæ Veneris, vocabula consecrata sunt, vitiosarum rerum et non naturalium, "Of which kind also are those names of lust, and pleasure, and wanton venery, things vicious and not natural, consecrated and deified." Cicero, in his book of laws,[5] informs us, that at Athens there were temples dedicated also to contumely and impudence, but withal giving us this censure of such practices, Quæ omnia ejusmodi detestanda et repudianda sunt,† "All which kind of things are to be detested and rejected, and nothing to be deified but what is virtuous or good." Notwithstanding which, it is certain, that such evil things as these were consecrated to no other end, than that they might be deprecated. Moreover, as these things of nature, or natures of things, were sometimes deified by the Pagans plainly and nakedly in their own appellative names, so was this again sometimes done disguisedly, under other counterfeit proper names: as pleasure was deified under the names of Volupia, and of Lubentina Venus; time (according to the opinion of some), under the name of Cronos or Saturn, which as it produceth all things, so devours all things into itself again; prudence or wisdom likewise, under the names of Athena or Minerva. For it is plain, that Origen[6] understood it thus, when Celsus‡ not only approved of worshipping God Almighty, in the sun, and in Minerva, as that which was lawful, but also commended it as a thing highly pious; he making this reply: Εὐφημοῦμεν ἥλιον, ὡς καλὸν θεοῦ δημιούργημα, &c. Ἀθηνᾶν μέντοι μετὰ ἡλίου τασσομένην ἐμυθοποίησαν οἱ Ἑλλήνων λόγοι, εἴτ' ἐν ὑπονοίαις, εἴτε χωρὶς ὑπονοιῶν, φάσκοντες ἐκ τῆς τοῦ Διὸς γεγενῆσθαι κεφαλῆς, καθωπλισμένην, &c. "We speak well of the sun, as a good work of God's, &c., but as for that Athena or Minerva, which Celsus here joineth with the sun, this is a thing fabulously devised by the Greeks (whether according to some mystical, arcane, and

[5] De Nat. Deor. lib. 2. [Cap. 23. p. 2988. tom. 9. opp.]

[5] Lib. 2. cap. 11. p. 3354. tom. 9. opp. In Gruter's edition, which Dr. Cudworth tells us, in his note, exhibits the passage a little differently, we read as follows: Araque vetus stat—Esquiliis, Malæ Fortunæ detestataeque; quæ omnia ejusmodi repudianda sunt, "An ancient altar stands—on the Esquiliæ to evil and detested Fortune; all which kind of things are to be repudiated." And this reading, I have no doubt, which is retained also in the late edition of Verburgius, is better than the learned Doctor's emendation.

† Gruter's edition a little otherwise. ‡ C. Cels. lib. 8. p. 421.

[6] The passages themselves of Origen, which he quotes a little afterwards, prove this not to be the case. It is evident from them that the more intelligent Greeks, to avoid censure, interpreted the fable of Minerva in this manner. But Origen himself does not assent to this interpretation, nor does he say whether or not we ought to put faith in such expositions.

allegorical sense, or without it), when they say that she was begotten out of Jupiter's brain all armed." And again afterwards: "Ἵνα δὲ καὶ τροπολογῆται καὶ λέγηται φρόνησις εἶναι ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ, "If it be granted, that by Athena or Minerva be tropologically meant prudence," &c. Wherefore, not only according to the poetical, but also to the political and civil theology of the Pagans, these accidental things of nature, and affections of substances, personated, were made so many gods and goddesses; Cicero himself in his book of laws approving of such political gods as these:* Benè verò, quod mens, pietas, virtus, fides, consecratur manu; quarum omnium Romæ dedicata publicè templa sunt, ut illa, qui habeant (habent autem omnes boni) deos ipsos in animis suis collocatos putent, "It is well, that mind, piety, virtue, and faith, are consecrated (all which have their temples publicly dedicated at Rome), that so they, who possess these things (as all good men do), may think that they have the gods themselves placed in their minds." And himself makes a law for them in his own commonwealth, but with a cautionary provision, that no evil and vicious things be consecrated amongst them: Ast illa, propter quæ datur homini adscensus in cœlum, mentem, virtutem, pietatem, fidem, earumque laudum delubra sunto. Nec ulla vitiorum solemnia obeunto, "Let them also worship those things, by means whereof men ascend up to heaven; and let there be shrines or temples dedicated to them. But let no religious ceremonies be performed to vicious things."

Notwithstanding all which, according to that theology of the Pagans, which was called by Varro natural (whereby is meant not that which was physiological only, but that which is true and real), and by Scævola philosophical; and which is by both opposed, not only to the poetical and fabulous, but also to the political and civil: I say, according to this theology of theirs, these accidental things of nature deified could by no means be acknowledged for true and proper gods; because they were so far from having any life and sense in them, that they had not so much as ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν, "any real subsistance or substantial essence" of their own. And thus does Origen dispute against Minerva's godship, as tropologically interpreted to prudence:† "Ἵνα δὲ καὶ τροπολογῆται καὶ λέγηται φρόνησις εἶναι ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ, παραστησάτω τις αὐτῆς τὴν ὑπόστασιν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὡς ὑφεστηκυίας κατὰ τὴν τροπολογίαν ταύτην, "If Athena or Minerva be tropologized into prudence, then let the Pagans show what substantial essence it hath, or that it really subsists according to this tropology." Which is all one, as if he should have said, let the Pagans then show how this can be a god or goddess, which hath not so much as any substantial essence, nor subsists by

* Lib. 2. [Cap. 11. p. 3354.] † P. 422.

itself, but is a mere accidental affection of substances only. And the same thing is likewise urged by Origen, concerning other such kind of gods of theirs, as Memory the mother of the muses, and the Graces all naked, in his first book; where Celsus contended for a multiplicity of gods against the Jews; that these things having not *ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν*, "any substantial essence or subsistence," could not possibly be accounted gods, and therefore were nothing else, but *Ἑλλήνων ἀναπλάσματα σωματοποιηθέντα ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων*, "mere figments of the Greeks, things made to have human bodies, and so personated and deified." And we think there cannot be a truer commentary upon this passage of Origen's, than these following verses of Prudentius, in his second book against Symmachus:*

> Desine, si pudor est, gentilis ineptia, tandem
> Res incorporeas simulatis fingere membris,

"Let the Gentiles be at last ashamed, if they have any shame in them, of this their folly, in describing and setting forth incorporeal things with counterfeit human members." Where accidents and affections of things, such as victory was (whose altar Symmachus there contended for the restoration of), are by Prudentius called res incorporeæ, "incorporeal things," accordingly as the Greek philosophers concluded, that *ποιότητες* were *ἀσώματοι*, "qualities incorporeal." Neither is it possible, that the Pagans themselves should be insensible hereof; and accordingly we find, that Cotta in Cicero† doth for this reason utterly banish and explode these gods out of the philosophic and true theology: Num censes igitur subtiliore ratione opus esse ad hæc refellenda? Nam mentem, fidem, spem, virtutem, honorem, victoriam, salutem, concordiam, cæteraque ejusmodi, rerum vim habere videmus, non deorum. Aut enim in nobismet insunt ipsis, ut mens, ut spes, ut fides, ut virtus, ut concordia; aut optandæ nobis sunt, ut honos, ut salus, ut victoria. Quare autem in his vis deorum sit, tum intelligam, cum cognovero, "Is there any need, think you, of any great subtlety to confute these things? For mind, faith, hope, virtue, honour, victory, health, concord, and the like, we see them to have the force of things, but not of gods. Because they either exist in us, as mind, hope, virtue, concord; or else they are desired to happen to us, as honour, health, victory, (that is, they are nothing but mere accidents or affections of things), and therefore how they can have the force of gods in them, cannot possibly be understood." And again, afterwards he affirmeth: Eos, qui dii appellantur, rerum naturas esse, non figuras deorum, that those who, in the allegorical mythology of

* P. 285. † Nat. Deor. lib. 3. [Cap. 24. p. 3088.]

the Pagans, "are called gods, are really but the natures of things, and not the true figures or forms of gods."

Wherefore since the Pagans themselves acknowledged, that those personated and deified things of nature were not true and proper gods; the meaning of them could certainly be no other than this, that they were so many several names, and partial considerations of one supreme God, as manifesting himself in all the things of nature. For that vis or force, which Cicero[7] tells us, was that in all these things, which was called God or deified, is really no other, than something of God in every thing that is good. Neither do we otherwise understand those following words of Balbus, in Cicero:* Quarum rerum, quia vis erat tanta, ut sine Deo regi non posset, ipsa res deorum nomen obtinuit, "Of which things because the force is such, as that it could not be governed without God, therefore have the things themselves obtained the names of gods;" that is, God was acknowledged and worshipped in them all, which was paganically thus signified, by calling of them gods. And Pliny,† though no very divine person, yet being ingenious, easily understood this to be the meaning of it: Fragilis et laboriosa mortalitas in partes ista digessit, infirmitatis suæ memor, ut portionibus quisque coleret, quo maximè indigeret, "Frail and toilsome mortality has thus broken and crumbled the Deity into parts, mindful of its own infirmity: that so every one, by parcels and pieces, might worship that in God, which himself most stands in need of." Which religion of the Pagans, thus worshipping God, not entirely all together at once, as he is one most simple being, unmixed with any thing, but as it were brokenly, and by piece-meals, as he is severally manifested in all the things of nature, and the parts of the world, Prudentius thus perstringeth in his second book against Symmachus:‡

> Tu, me præterito, meditaris numina mille,
> Quæ simules parere meis virtutibus, ut me
> Per varias partes minuas, cui nulla recidi
> Pars aut forma potest, quia sum substantia simplex,
> Nec pars esse queo.

From which words of his we may also conclude, that Symmachus the Pagan, who determined that it was one thing that all worshipped, and yet would have victory, and such like other things, worshipped as gods and goddesses, did by these, and all those other pagan gods before mentioned, understand nothing but so many several names, and partial considerations of one supreme

[7] De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 23. p. 2988. tom. 9. opp. Res ipsa, in qua *vis* inest major *aliqua*, sic appellatur, ut ea ipsa *vis* nominetur Deus, "The thing itself, in which there is any superior force, is so named, that that very force is called God."

* Nat. Deor. lib. 2. [Chap. 23. p. 2988.] † Nat. Hist. lib. 2. cap. 7.

‡ N. 236. [P. 289.]

Deity, according to its several virtues or powers; so that when he sacrificed to victory, he sacrificed to God Almighty, under that partial notion, as the giver of victory to kingdoms and commonwealths. It was before observed out of Plutarch, that the Egyptian fable of Osiris* being mangled and cut in pieces by Typhon, did allegorically signify the same thing, viz. the one simple deity's being as it were divided (in the fabulous and civil theologies of the Pagans) into many partial considerations of him, as so many nominal and titular gods; which Isis notwithstanding, that is true knowledge and wisdom, according to the natural or philosophic theology, unites all together into one. And that not only such gods as these, victory, virtue, and the like, but also those other gods, Neptune, Mars, Bellona, &c. were all really but one and the same Jupiter, acting severally in the world, Plautus himself seems sufficiently to intimate in the prologue of his Amphitryo in these words:

Nam quid ego memorem, ut alios in tragœdiis
Vidi, Neptunum, Virtutem, Victoriam,
Martem, Bellonam, commemorare quæ bona
Vobis fecissent? Queis benefactis meus pater,
Deûm regnator, architectus omnibus.[8]

* That Osiris was the supreme Deity, see the Egyptian Inscription in Theo. Smyrn. Mathem. cap. 47. Πρεσβύτατος πάντων βασιλεὺς Ὄσιρις, Osiris the most ancient king of all things."

[8] In these testimonies, by which the learned Doctor wishes to persuade us that the numerous deities of the ancients were nothing but the perfections and virtues of one supreme God, invested with personality, there is, if I mistake not, less force than he supposes. I. He produces some passages from Cicero. But these passages are from the mouth of Balbus the Stoic, whom Cicero introduces as speaking. They therefore prove merely, that the Stoics interpreted the absurdities of the ancient fables in this manner, and accommodated them to the precepts of their own philosophy. Which as I readily admit, so on the other hand I deny, that the ancient religions are to be estimated from the refined conceits of the Stoics. II. He appeals to a passage of Pliny. But this merely shows the cause, which, according to this philosopher's idea, led mortals to imagine to themselves many gods, but by no means confirms the opinion of those who suppose not a few of the gods of antiquity to have been nothing but divine virtues and properties. III. The testimony borrowed from Prudentius and Symmachus is not of the slightest weight. For, in the first place, I see no reason for supposing the thousand deities spoken of by Prudentius to be mere personifications of the divine virtues. The poet rebukes the Romans for having, as it were, broken the one God, whose power is infinite, into a thousand deities, and distributed the functions of one supreme Being into various gods. Certainly those "diminished god by various parts," who asserted that a multitude of deities had flowed from God, and by the divine will and command discharged various offices in the world. But why many words? The fact of its being affirmed by Prudentius, that those deities, according to the opinion of the Romans, "obey the virtues of the supreme God," proves that he is not speaking of abstract notions or of the divine virtues. For that will be the sense of these words if they be understood of the divine perfections? In the next place the learned Doctor altogether perverts the religion of Symmachus; who certainly neither regarded victory as a virtue of the supreme Deity, nor supposed that all the gods of the Romans were to be referred to one Almighty God. Symmachus, 'tis true, overpowered by the arguments of Christians, did not deny the existence of a supreme God, but at the same time he believed in a number of minor deities, subject to that God, and appointed by him over various affairs and states. I shall prove this to be the case from his own words, Epistol. lib. 10. ep. 61. p. 442. Suus, says he, cuique mos, suus cuique ritus

Whereas there was before cited a passage out of G. I. Vossius' book de Theolog. Gent. which we could not understand otherwise than thus, that the generality of the Pagans by their political (or civil) gods, meant so many eternal minds independent and self-existent; we now think ourselves concerned to do Vossius so much right, as to acknowledge, that we have since met with another place of his in that same book, wherein he either corrects the former opinion, or else declares himself better concerning it, after this manner; that the Pagans generally conceived their political gods to be so many substantial minds (or spirits) not independent and self-existent, nor indeed eternal neither, but created by one supreme mind or God, and appointed by him to preside over the several parts of the world, and things of nature, as his ministers. Which same thing he affirmeth also of those deified accidents and affections, that by them were to be understood so many substantial minds or spirits created, presiding over those several things, or dispensing of them. His words in the beginning of his eighth book (where he speaks concerning these affections and accidents deified by the Pagans), are as followeth: Hujusmodi deorum propè immensa est copia. Ac in civili qui-

est. *Varios custodes* urbibus cunctis *mens divina* distribuit. Ut animæ nascentibus, ita populis fatales genii dividuntur. Accedit utilitas quæ maxime homini Deos asserit, " Each has his own custom, each his own rites. The *divine mind* has distributed *various guardians* among all cities. As souls to men when born, so are *destined genii* dispensed to nations. There is superadded utility, which most of all asserts the gods to man." IV. The interpretation of the fable of Osiris being mangled by Typhon, in which the learned Doctor finds a new confirmation of his opinion, is the subtle device of some one, who was anxious to discover more wisdom and truth in the public religions, than they in reality possessed. On individual conceits and opinions of the kind no wise man places any reliance, especially where they are amply confuted by records and facts. V. But I am much surprised at his affirming in a note, that according to the authority of the inscription in Theon, Osiris was the supreme God. The fact is far otherwise, as this inscription clearly confirms the opinion of those who suppose Osiris to have been a man and an ancient king. I quote the inscription itself from Theon Smyrnæus, Mathematic. cap. 47. p. 164. *Ἐν δὲ Αἰγυπτιακῇ στήλῃ φησὶν Εὔανδρος εὑρίσκεσθαι γραφὴν βασιλέως Κρόνου καὶ βασιλίσσης Ῥέας.* ΠΡΕΣΒΥΤΑΤΟΣ ΠΑΝΤΩΝ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΟΣΙΡΙΣ ΘΕΟΙΣ ΑΘΑΝΑΤΟΙΣ, ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙ ΚΑΙ ΟΥΡΑΝΩι, ΗΛΙΩι ΚΑΙ ΣΕΛΗΝΗι ΚΑΙ ΓΗι, ΚΑΙ ΝΥΚΤΙ ΚΑΙ ΗΜΕΡΑι, ΚΑΙ ΠΑΤΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΟΝΤΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΣΟΜΕΝΩΝ, " Evander says that in an Egyptian column a writing is found of king Saturn and queen Rhea : Osiris the most ancient king of all to the immortal gods, to spirit and heaven, to the sun and moon and earth, and to night and day, and to the father of things that are and of things to come." I am not disposed to inquire into the purport of this inscription, or to examine its truth or falsehood ; one thing is clear from it, that it was dedicated by a man who by no means arrogated to himself divine honours. VI. The learned Doctor himself does not lay much stress upon the passage of Plautus. Indeed it is not of the least efficacy towards proving the truth of his position. For Plautus does not deny, that Neptune, Virtue, Victory, and the rest, are really gods, but merely requires spectators to believe, that the benefits which they are accustomed to ascribe to these gods are to be considered rather as received from Jupiter himself, inasmuch as he rules and disposes all the gods. If Plautus had supposed, that there were no gods besides Jupiter, and that the mere names of the divine virtues were ranked as gods, how could he have made Mercury call Jupiter " his father," and at the same time " the ruler of the gods?"

dem theologia considerari solent, tanquam mentes quædam, hoc honoris à summo Deo sortitæ, ut affectionibus istis præessent. Nempe crediderunt Deum, quem optimum maximum vocabant, non per se omnia curare, quo pacto, ut dicebant, plurimum beatitudini ejus decederet, sed, instar regis, plurimos habere ministros et ministras, quorum singulos huic illive curæ præfecisset. Sic justitia, quæ et Astræa ac Themis, præfecta erat actibus cunctis, in quibus justitia attenderetur; Comus curare creditus est comessationes; et sic in cæteris id genus diis, nomen ab ea affectione sortitis, cujus cura cuique commissa crederetur. Quo pacto si considerentur, non aliter different à spiritibus sive angelis bonis malisque, quam quòd hi reverà à Deo conditi sint; illæ verò mentes, de quibus nunc loquimur, sint figmentum mentis humanæ, pro numero affectionum, in quibus vis esse major videretur, comminiscentis mentes affectionibus singulis præfectas. Facilè autem sacerdotes sua commenta persuadere simplicioribus potuerunt, quia satis videretur verisimile, summæ illi menti, deorum omnium regi, innumeras servire mentes, ut eò perfectior sit summi dei beatitudo, minusque curis implicetur; inque tot famulantium numero, summi numinis majestas magis eluceat. Ac talis quidem opinio erat theologiæ civilis, " Of such gods as these there was an innumerable company amongst the Pagans. And in their civil theology they were wont to be considered, as certain minds (or spirits) appointed by the supreme God, to preside over the affections of things; they supposing that God, whom they called the best and the greatest, did not immediately himself take care of every thing, since that must needs be a distraction to him, and a hindrance of his happiness; but that he had, as a king, many he and she ministers under him, which had their several offices assigned to them. Thus justice, which was called also Astræa and Themis, was by them thought to preside over all those actions, in which justice was concerned; and Comus over all revellings; and the like. Which gods, if considered after this manner, will no otherwise differ from angels good and bad, than only in this, that these latter are beings really created by God, but the former the figments of men only; they, according to the number of affections, that have any greater force in them, devising and imagining certain minds to preside over each of them. And the vulgar might therefore be the more easily led into this persuasion by their priests, because it seemed reasonable to them, that that supreme Mind, who is the king of all the gods, should have many other minds as his subservient ministers under him, both to free him from solicitous care, and also to add to his grandeur and majesty. And such was the doctrine of the civil theology." Where, though Vossius speak particularly of that kind of pagan gods, which were nothing but affections and accidents deified (which no man in his wits could

possibly suppose to be themselves true and proper gods, they having no subsistence of their own) that these by the generality of the vulgar Pagans were conceived to be so many created minds or spirits, appointed by the supreme God, to preside as his ministers over those several affections of substances; yet does he plainly imply the same of all those other political gods of these Pagans likewise, that they were not looked upon by them as so many unmade, self-existent, and independent beings, but only as inferior minds or spirits, created by the supreme God, and by him appointed to preside over the several parts of the world, and things of nature, and having their several offices assigned to them. Wherefore, as to the main, we and Vossius are now well agreed, viz. that the ancient Pagans asserted no such thing as a multitude of independent deities; so that there only remain some particular differences of smaller moment betwixt us.

Ourselves have before observed, that Æolus was probably taken by Epictetus in Arrianus (not indeed for one, but) for many created ministers of the supreme God, or demons collectively, appointed by him to preside over the winds, in all the several parts of the world. And the Pagans in St. Austin seem to interpret those deified accidents, and things of nature, after the same manner, as the names of certain unknown gods or demons (one or more), that were appointed to preside over them respectively, or to dispense the same.* Quoniam sciebant majores nostri nemini talia, nisi aliquo Deo largiente, concedi, quorum deorum nomina non inveniebant, earum rerum nominibus appellabant deos, quas ab iis sentiebant dari; aliqua vocabula inde flectentes; sicut à bello Bellonam nuncupaverunt, non Bellum; sicut à cunis Cuninam, non Cunam; sicut à segetibus Segetiam, non Segetem; sicut à pomis Pomonam, non Pomum; sicut à bobus Bobonam, non Bovem. Aut certè nulla vocabuli declinatione sicut res ipsæ nominantur; ut Pecunia dicta est dea, quæ dat pecuniam, non omninò pecunia dea ipsa putata: Ita Virtus, quæ dat virtutem, Honor, qui honorem, Concordia quæ, concordiam, Victoria, quæ victoriam dat. Ita, inquiunt, cum Felicitas dea dicitur, non ipsa, quæ datur, sed numen illud attenditur, à quo felicitas datur, "Because our forefathers knew well, that these things do not happen to any, without the special gift and favour of some god; therefore were those gods, whose names they knew not, called from the names of those very things themselves, which they perceived to be bestowed by them, there being only a little alteration made in them; as when the God that causeth war was called not Bellum, but Bellona; the God which presideth over infants' cradles, not Cuna, but Cunina; that which

* Civ. Dei, lib. 4. cap. 24. [P. 83. tom. 7. opp.]

giveth corn, Segetia; and that which affordeth apples, Pomona, &c. But at other times, this was done without any declension of the word at all, they calling both the thing and the god, which is the bestower of it, by one and the self-same name. As Pecunia doth not only signify money, but also the goddess which giveth money; Virtus, the goddess which giveth virtue; Honor, the god that bestoweth honour; Concordia, the goddess that causeth concord; Victory, the goddess which affordeth victory. So also when Felicity is called a goddess, by it is not meant that thing which is given, but that divine power from whence it is given." Here, I say, the Pagans may seem to have understood, by those deified things of nature, certain inferior gods or demons (one or more) the ministers of the supreme God, appointed by him to preside over those several things respectively, or to dispense the same. Neither can we deny, but that in so much ignorance and diversity of opinions, as there was amongst the Pagans, some might possibly understand those political gods, and deified things also, after the way of Vossius, for so many single minds or spirits, appointed to preside over those several things respectively throughout the whole world, and nothing else. Nevertheless, it seemeth not at all probable, that this should be the general opinion amongst the civilized Pagans, that all those gods of theirs were so many single created minds or spirits, each of them appointed to preside over some one certain thing every where throughout the whole world, and nothing else. As for example, that the goddess Victory was one single created she-spirit, appointed to bestow victory to whosoever at any time enjoyed it, in all parts of the world; and so, that the goddess Justice should be such another single mind or spirit, created to dispense justice every where, and meddle with nothing else. And the like of all those other accidental things, or affections deified, as virtue, honour, concord, felicity, &c.

And Lactantius Firmianus,* taking notice of that profession of the Pagans, to worship nothing but one supreme God, and his subservient ministers, generated or created by him (according to that of Seneca in his exhortations, Genuisse regni sui ministros deum, "That the supreme God had generated other inferior ministers of his kingdom under him," which were called by them also gods), plainly denies all the pagan gods save one, to be the created ministers of that one supreme, he making this reply: Verum hi neque dii sunt, neque deos se vocari, aut coli volunt, &c. Nec tamen illi sunt, qui vulgo coluntur, quorum et exiguus et certus est numerus, "But these ministers of the divine kingdom, or subservient created spirits, are neither gods, nor would they be called gods, or honoured as such, &c. Nor indeed are

* De Fal. Rel. cap. 7. [Instit. Divin. lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 51.]

hey those gods, that are now vulgarly worshipped by the Pagans, of which there is but a small and certain number." That is, the pagan gods are reduced into certain ranks, and the number of them is determined by the utilities of human life; of which their noble and select gods are but a few. Whereas, with he, the ministers of the supreme God are, according to heir own opinion, not twelve nor twenty, nor three hundred nd sixty, but innumerable, stars and demons.

Moreover, Aristotle,* in his book against Zeno (supposing the ea of God to be this, the most powerful of all things, or the ost perfect being), objecteth thus, that according to the laws cities and countries (that is, the civil theology), there seems be no one absolutely powerful being, but one god is supposed be most powerful as to one thing, and another as to another: *περ ἅπαντα ἐπικράτιστον τὸν θεὸν λαμβάνει, τοῦτο δυνατώτατον βέλτιστον λέγων, οὐ δοκεῖ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ίττους εἶναι ἀλλήλων οἱ θεοί· οὔκουν ἐκ τοῦ δοκοῦντος εἴληφε την κατὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ὁμολογίαν,* "Whereas Zeno takes it granted, that men have an idea in their minds of God, as one most excellent and most powerful being of all; this doth not m to be according to law (that is, the civil theology), for re the gods are mutually better one than another, respectively o several things; and therefore Zeno took not this consent nankind, concerning God, from that which vulgarly seemeth." om which passage of Aristotle's we may well conclude, that many political gods of the Pagans were not all of them garly looked upon as the subservient ministers of one supreme d; and yet they generally acknowledging (as Aristotle him- confesseth) a monarchy, and consequently not many inde- dent deities, it must needs follow, as Zeno doubtless would ly, that these their political gods were but one and the same reme natural God, as it were parcelled out, and multiplied: t is, receiving several denominations, according to several ions of him, and as he exerciseth different powers, and pro- eth various effects. And this we have sufficiently proved ady to have been the general sense of the chief pagan doc- s; that these many political and popular gods were but the yonymy of one natural God, that is, either partial considera- is of him, or his various powers and virtues, effects and nifestations in the world, severally personated and deified.

And thus does Vossius himself afterwards confess also; that ording to the natural theology, the many pagan Gods were so many several denominations of one God; though this ned philologer doth plainly straiten and confine the notion of natural theology too much, and improperly call the God

* Arist. in Zen. Gor. p. 1246. [Cap. 4. p. 841. tom. 2. opp.]

thereof the nature of things; however, acknowledging it such a nature as was endued with sense and understanding. His words are these:* Dispar verò sententia theologorum naturalium, qui non aliud numen agnoscebant, quàm naturam rerum, eóque omnia gentium numina referebant, &c. Nempe mens eorum fuit, sicut natura esset occupata circa hanc vel illam affectionem, ita numina nominaque deorum variare. Cum igitur ubicunque vim aliquam majorem viderent, ita divinum aliquid crederent; eò etiam devenere, ut immanem deorum dearumque fingerent catervam. Sagaciores interim hæc cuncta, unum esse numen aiebant; putà rerum naturam, quæ licet una foret, pro variis tamen effectis varia sortiretur nomina, vario etiam afficeretur cultu, "But the case is very different as to the natural theologers, who acknowledged no other God, but the nature of things, and referred all the pagan gods to that. For they conceived, that as nature was occupied about several things, so were the divine powers and the names of gods multiplied and diversified. And wherever they saw any greater force, there did they presently conceit something divine, and by that means came they at length to feign an innumerable company of gods and goddesses. But the more sagacious in the meantime affirmed all these to be but one and the same God; to wit the nature of things, which, though really but one, yet according to its various effects, both received divers names, and was worshipped after different manners." Where Vossius calls the supreme God of these natural theologers the nature of things, as if the natural theology had been denominated from physics, or natural philosophy only; whereas we have already showed, that the natural theology of Varro and Scævola, was of equal extent with the philosophic; whose only Numen, that it was not a blind and unintelligible nature of things, doth sufficiently appear from that history thereof before given by us: as also that it was called natural in another sense, as real, and as opposite to opinion, fancy and fabulosity, or what hath no reality of existence any where in the world. Thus doth St. Austin† distinguish betwixt natura deorum, "the true nature of the gods," and hominum instituta, "the institutes of men concerning them." As also he sets down the difference betwixt the civil and natural theology, according to the mind of Varro,‡ in this manner: Fieri potest, ut in urbe, secundum falsas opiniones ea colantur et credantur, quorum in mundo vel extra mundum natura sit nusquam, "It may come to pass, that those things may be worshipped and believed in cities, according to false opinions, which have no nature or real existence any where, either in the world, or without it." Wherefore, if instead of this nature of things,

* Lib. 8. cap. 1. † Civ. Dei. lib. 6. cap. 5. [P. 116. tom. 7.] ‡ Ibid.

which was properly the god of none but only of such atheistic philosophers, as Epicurus and Strato, we substitute that great Mind or Soul of the whole world, which pervadeth all things, and is diffused through all (which was the true God of the pagan Theists), this of Vossius will be unquestionably true concerning their natural theologers, that, according to them, those many poetical and political gods before mentioned were but one and the same natural or real god; who, in respect of his different virtues, powers and effects, was called by several names, and worshipped after different manners; yet nevertheless so, as that, according to those theologers, there were really also many other inferior ministers of this one supreme God (whether called minds or demons), that were supposed to be the subservient executioners of all those several powers of his. And accordingly we had before this full and true account of the Pagans' natural theology set down out of Prudentius:[9]

In uno
Constituit jus omne Deo, cui serviat ingens
Virtutum ratio, variis instructa ministris.

viz. "That it acknowledged one supreme omnipotent God, ruling over all, who displayeth and exerciseth his manifold virtues and powers in the world (all severally personated and deified in the poetic and civil theologies), together with the subservient ministry of other inferior created minds, understanding beings, or demons, called also by them gods."

It is very true, as we have already declared, that the more high-flown Platonic Pagans did reduce those many poetical and political gods, and therefore doubtless all the personated and deified things of nature too, to the Platonic ideas, or first paradigms and patterns of things in the archetypal world, which they affirmed to have been begotten from the supreme Deity, that is, from the first hypostasis of the Platonic trinity; and which were commonly called by them *νοητοὶ θεοὶ*, "intelligible gods," as if they had been indeed so many distinct substances and persons. And, as we have also proved out of Philo, that this high-flown paganic theology was ancienter than either Julian or Apuleius; so do we think it not unworthy our observation here, that the very same doctrine is, by Celsus, imputed also to the Egyptian theologers, as pretending to worship brute animals no otherwise than as symbols of those eternal ideas: Καὶ φησί γε ἡμᾶς τῶν μὲν Αἰγυπτίων καταγελᾶν, καί τοι πολλὰ καὶ οὐ φαῦλα παρ' αὐτοῖς αἰνίγματα, ἐπὰν ἰδεῶν ἀΐδίων, καὶ οὐχ (ὡς ἔοικεν οἱ πολλοὶ) ζώων ἐφημερίων, τιμὰς εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα διδάσκωσιν, Celsus also addeth, "that we Christians deride the Egyptians without cause, they having many mysteries in their religion,

[9] In Apotheosi, ver. 191. p. 169. [*] Orig. cont. Cels. lib. 3. p. 120.

forasmuch as they profess, that perishing brute animals are not worshipped by them, but the eternal ideas." According to which of Celsus it should seem, that this doctrine of eternal ideas, as the paradigms and patterns of all things here below in this sensible world, was not proper to Plato, nor the Greeks, but common with them to the Egyptians also. Which eternal ideas, however supposed to have been generated from that first divine hypostasis of the Platonic and Egyptian trinity, and called intelligible gods, were nevertheless acknowledged by them all to exist in one divine intellect, according to that of Plotinus,[10] *οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ νοῦ τὰ νοητὰ*, "That the intelligibles exist nowhere of themselves, without Mind or Intellect;" which Mind or Intellect being the second divine hypostasis, these intelligible and invisible gods (however generated from God), yet are therefore said by Julian, in his book against the Christians, both to coexist with God, and to in-exist in him. To which purpose also is this other passage of Julian's* in his sixth oration: *Πάντα γὰρ αὐτός ἐστιν, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ παρ' ἑαυτῷ ἔχει τῶν ὁπωσοῦν ὄντων τὰς αἰτίας· εἴτε ἀθανάτων ἀθανάτους· εἴτε ἐπικήρων οὐ θνητὰς οὐδὲ ἐπικήρους, ἀϊδίους δὲ καὶ μενούσας ἀεί, αἳ καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν αἰτίαι τῆς ἀειγενεσίας*, "For God is all things, forasmuch as he containeth within himself the causes of all things, that any way are; whether of immortal things immortal; or of corruptible and perishing things, not corruptible, but eternal also, and always remaining; which therefore are the causes of their perpetual generation, and new production." Now these causes of all things contained in God are no other than the divine ideas. Wherefore, from hence it plainly appears, that these Platonic and Egyptian Pagans, who thus reduced their multiplicity of gods to the divine ideas, did not therefore make them to be so many minds or spirits, really distinct from the supreme God (though dependent on him too), but indeed only so many partial considerations of one God, as being all things, that is, containing within himself the causes of all things. And accordingly we find in Origen,† that, as the Egyptian theologers called their religious animals symbols of the eternal ideas, so did they also call them symbols of God. *Τὰ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων σεμνολογούντων καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων, καὶ φασκόντων εἶναί τινα αὐτὰ καὶ Θεοῦ σύμβολα*, "Celsus applauds the Egyptian theologers talking so magnificently and mysteriously of those brute animals worshipped by them, and affirming them to be certain symbols of God."

And now we have given some account of the polyonymy of

[10] This is the title given by Plotinus to one of his books, which now stands as the fifth in the fifth Ennead of his works, p. 519. *Ὅτι οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ νοῦ τὰ νοητὰ, καὶ περὶ τἀγαθοῦ.*

* P. 347.? † Orig. cont Cels. p. 102.

the one supreme God, in the theologies of the Pagans; or of his being called by many proper, personal names, carrying with them an appearance of so many several gods. First, that God had many several names bestowed upon him, from many different notions and partial considerations of him, according to his universal and all-comprehending nature. Janus, as the beginning of the world, and the first original of the gods. Whom therefore that ancient lyric poet, Septimius Apher, accordingly thus invoked:[1]

> O cane rerum Sator! O PRINCIPIUM DEORUM!
> Stridula cui limina, cui cardinei tumultus,
> Cui reserata mugiunt aurea claustra mundi.

Genius, as the great mind and soul of the whole world. Saturn, as that hidden source and principle, from which all forms and lives issue forth, and into which they again retire; being there laid up as in their secret storehouse: or else, as one of the Egyptian or Hermaic writers expresseth it, that which doth *πάντα ποιεῖν καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀποποιεῖν*, "make all things out of itself, and unmake them into itself again;" this Hetrurian Saturn, answering to the Egyptian Hammon, that likewise signified hidden, and is accordingly thus interpreted by Jamblichus:[2] *Ὁ τὴν ἀφανῆ τῶν κεκρυμμένων λόγων δύναμιν εἰς φῶς ἄγων*, "He that bringeth forth the secret power of the hidden reasons of things (contained within himself) into light." God was also called Athena or Minerva, as wisdom diffusing itself through all things: and Aphrodite Urania, the heavenly Venus or Love. Thus Phanes, Orpheus' supreme God (so called according to Lactantius:[3] Quia cum adhuc nihil esset, primus ex infinito apparuerit, "Because when there was yet nothing, he first appeared out of that infinite abyss;" but according to Proclus, because he did *ἐκφαίνειν τὰς νοητὰς ἑνάδας*, "discover and make manifest the intelligible unities (or ideas) from himself;" though we think the conjecture of Athanasius Kircherus[4] to be more probable than either of these, that Phanes was an Egyptian name), this Phanes, I say, was in the Orphic and Egyptian theology, as Proclus upon Plato's Timæus informs us, styled *ἁβρὸς ἔρως*, "tender and soft Love." And Pherecydes Syrus[5] likewise affirmed: *Εἰς ἔρωτα μεταβεβλῆσθαι τὸν Δία*

[1] Apud Terentium Maurum, De Litteris, Syllabis, &c. in Putschii Grammatici Veteres, p. 2396.

[2] De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. 8. cap. 3. p. 159.

[3] Divinar. Instit. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 31.

[4] In Œdipo Ægyptiaco, p. 498.

[5] These words of Pherecydes are cited by Proclus, Comm. in Timæum Platonis, lib. 3. p. 156, but he does not add that this Pherecydes was the one surnamed from his country *Syrus*, the ancient preceptor of Pythagoras. Wherefore I suspect this to be the saying of another Pherecydes, an Athenian, who wrote a long work on Theogony,

μέλλοντα δημιουργεῖν, "That Jupiter was turned all into love, when he went about to make the world." Besides which, there were other such names of the supreme God, and more than have been mentioned by us; as for example, Summanus amongst the ancient Romans, that afterward grew obsolete: of which St. Austin[6] thus:* Romani veteres nescio quem Summanum, cui nocturna fulmina tribuebant, coluerunt magis quam Jovem, ad quem diurna fulmina pertinebant. Sed postquam Jovi templum insigne ac sublime constructum est, propter ædis dignitatem, sic ad eum multitudo confluxit, ut vix inveniatur, qui Summani nomen, quod audiri jam non potest, se saltem legisse meminerit," "The ancient Romans worshipped I know not what god, whom they called Summanus more than they did Jupiter. But after that a stately and magnificent temple was erected to Jupiter, they all betook themselves thither; in so much that the name of Summanus, now not at all heard, is scarcely to be found in ancient writings."

Again, as the Pagans had certain other gods, which they called special; so were these but several names of that supreme God also, according to particular considerations of him, either as presiding over certain parts of the world, and acting in them; or as exercising certain special powers and virtues in the world; which several virtues and powers of one God, personated and deified by the Pagans, though they had an appearance also of many distinct gods, yet were they really nothing but several denominations of one supreme God; who as yet is considered as a thing distinct from the world and nature.

But lastly, as God was supposed by these Pagans, not only to pervade all things, and to fill all things, but also, he being the cause of all things, to be himself in a manner all things; so was he called also by the name of every thing, or every thing called by his name: that is, the several things of nature and parts of the world were themselves verbally deified by these Pagans, and called gods and goddesses. Not that they really accounted them such in themselves, but that they thought fit in this manner to acknowledge God in them, as the author of them all. For thus the Pagans in St. Austin: Usque adeone, inquiunt, majores nostros insipientes fuisse credendum est, ut hæc nescirent munera divina

commented upon at great length by Claud. Salmasius in his Exercit. Plinian. ad Solinum. p. 590. &c. No one I imagine will disapprove of this conjecture, who only examines the words themselves.

[6] As far as I see, there is nothing either in this passage of St. Augustine or in other sayings of the ancients, wherein mention is made of Summanus, from which it can be inferred that this was formerly a name of the supreme Being. I might observe much the same of the other passages of ancient authors here brought forward; but my limits will not permit, neither am I willing to become tedious by frequent repetitions of one and the same thing.

* Civ. Dei. lib. 4. cap. 23. [P. 82. tom. 7. opp.]

esse, non deos? "Can you think, that our Pagan ancestors were so sottish as not to know that these things are but divine gifts, and not gods themselves." And Cicero also tells us, that the meaning of their thus deifying these things of nature was only to signify that they acknowledged the force of all things to be divine, and to be governed by God; and that whatsoever brought any great utility to mankind, was not such without the divine goodness. They conceiving also, that the invisible and incomprehensible Deity, which was the cause of all things, ought to be worshipped in all its works and effects, in which it had made itself visible, accordingly as they declare in that place of Eusebius* before cited in part: Μὴ τὰ ὁρώμενα σώματα ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἄστρων, μηδέ γε τὰ αἰσθητὰ μέρη τοῦ κόσμου φήσουσι θεοποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐν τούτοις ἀοράτους ἐυνάμεις αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν· ἕνα γὰρ ὄντα Διὸν, παντοίαις ἐυνάμεσι τὰ πάντα πληροῦν, καὶ διὰ πάντων ἰέναι, καὶ τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐπιστατεῖν· ἀσωμάτως δὲ καὶ ἀφανῶς ἐν πᾶσιν ὄντα, καὶ διὰ πάντων ἰόντα, καὶ τοῦτον εἰκότως διὰ τῶν δεδηλωμένων σέβειν, "That they did not deify those visible bodies of the sun, and moon, and stars, nor the other sensible parts of the world themselves, but those invisible powers of the God over all, that were displayed in them. For they affirm, that that God, who is but one, but yet filleth all things with his various powers, and passes through all things, forasmuch as he is invisibly and incorporeally present in all, is reasonably to be worshipped in and by those visible things."

Athanasius, bishop of Alexandria, in his book against the Greeks, reduces all the false gods of the Pagans under two general heads; the first, poetical, fictitious, fantastical gods; the second, creatures or real things of nature deified by them. His words are these: Εἰ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς παρὰ ποιηταῖς λεγομένους θεοὺς οὐκ εἶναι θεοὺς ὁ λόγος ἔδειξε, καὶ τοὺς τὴν κτίσιν θεοποιοῦντας ἤλεγξε πλανωμένους, &c. "Since this reason or discourse of ours hath sufficiently convinced, both the poetical gods of the pagans to be no gods at all; and also that they, who deify the creatures, are in a great error; and so hath confuted the whole pagan idolatry, proving it to be mere ungodliness and impiety; there is nothing now but the true piety left; he, who is worshipped by us Christians, being the only true God, the lord of nature, and the maker of all substances." From whence we may observe, that, according to Athanasius, the pagan poetic gods were no real things in nature, and therefore they could be no other than the several notions and the powers of the one supreme God deified, or several names of him. So that Athanasius' poetic gods, or οἱ παρὰ ποιηταῖς μυθευόμενοι θεοὶ, "gods fabulously devised by the poets," were chiefly those two kinds of pagan

* Præp. Evan. lib. 3. cap. 13. [P. 121.]

gods first mentioned by us; that is, the various considerations of the one supreme Numen, according to its general notion, expressed by so many proper names; and secondly, his particular powers diffused through the world, severally personated and deified. Which, considered as so many distinct deities, are nothing but mere fiction and fancy, without any reality. And this do the Pagans themselves in Athanasius acknowledge:* "Ισως γὰρ, ὡς αὐτοί φασι, καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πέπλασται, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι μὲν ὅλως Ζεὺς, οὐδὲ Κρόνος, οὐδὲ Ἥρα, οὐδὲ Ἄρης· πλάττονται δὲ τούτους, ὡς ὄντας, οἱ ποιηταὶ πρὸς ἀπάτην τῶν ἀκουόντων. "They say, that the names of those gods are merely fictitious, and that there does nowhere really exist any such Jupiter, or Saturn, or Juno, or Mars; but that the poets have feigned them to be so many persons existing, to the deception of their auditors."[7] Notwithstanding which, that third sort of pagan

* P. 14. [Tom. 1. opp. p. 17.]

[7] Dr. Cudworth misapprehends, or rather perverts, Athanasius' meaning, in order to make us believe that he has this eminent father on his own side. The affirmation of Athanasius, οὐκ εἶναι Θεούς, "to be no gods," he so interprets as though Athanasius had denied these gods to be persons, and had regarded Jupiter, Mercury, Mars, and the rest as mere notions of the mind or various considerations of the one supreme God. If this were even so, the learned Doctor's argument would derive little support from it, as the religions of the ancients cannot fairly be inferred from the opinions of Athanasius: but nothing can be further from the doctrine of this great champion of the church. For Athanasius, like the rest of the earlier fathers, supposed most of the poetic deities to have been men, who had gained a place among the gods by benefits and noble inventions. This opinion he openly avows in numerous instances in his book Contra Gentes. It will be sufficient to quote one passage: Οἱ ἀσεβέστατοι, says he, p. 10, τῶν ἀνθρώπων πεσόντες καὶ καταπεσόντες ἀπὸ τῆς περὶ Θεὸν φαντασίας, λοιπὸν καὶ ἈΝΘΡΩΠΟΥΣ καὶ ἀνθρώπων μορφὰς, τῶν μὲν ζώντων, τῶν δὲ μετὰ θάνατον, εἰς θεοὺς ἀνέθηκαν, "The most impious of men having lapsed and fallen from all conception of the Deity, henceforward raised up mortals and the forms of mortals, living as well as dead, to the rank of gods." This he immediately proves at great length by examples both of Grecian and Egyptian gods. A little afterwards, p. 11, he maintains that Neptune, Apollo, Vulcan, Mercury, Juno, Ceres, Minerva, Diana, males and females, were first classed among the gods by an edict of Theseus. And the meaning of the phrase, οὐκ εἶναι θεούς, upon which alone Dr. Cudworth's interpretation is founded, he himself shows us in the same book, p. 13, Εἰ γάρ τις τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς λεγομένων θεῶν—λάβοι τὰς πράξεις, εὑρήσει μὴ μόνον οὐκ ΕΙ'ΝΑΙ αὐτοὺς ΘΕΟΥ'Σ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς αἰσχίστους γεγονότας, "If any one takes the acts of those whom they call gods, he will find not only that they are not gods, but that they were the basest of men." That in Athanasius the Pagans, as is observed by the learned Doctor, expounded their doctrines concerning the gods, so as to make them appear to differ but little from the opinion adopted by himself, and attributed by him to Athanasius, is unquestionable. But it is equally certain, that Athanasius explodes and rejects these counterfeit interpretations. At that time, in fact, those who were so ingenious in explaining the poetic fables, had no other object but the defence of the superstitions which they were unwilling to abandon, and therefore betook themselves to these fictions, that they might have something wherewith to oppose the Christians who ridiculed their gods. I am surprised, indeed, that Dr. Cudworth, who pays so much deference to the authority of the fathers, could have allowed himself to disregard their opinions respecting the religions of antiquity, and to adopt in preference the interpretations of the enemies of the Christian truth, in which, although perhaps not entirely destitute of talent, there certainly is very little judgment or sound wisdom. But in his anxiety to crush those who aimed at the complete subversion of all religion and piety, he is sometimes too indulgent towards others who in

gods also mentioned by us, which were inanimate substances and the natures of things deified, may well be accounted poetical gods likewise; because though those things themselves be real and not feigned, yet is their personation and deification mere fiction and fancy: and however the first occasion thereof sprung from this theological opinion or persuasion, that God, who is in all things, and is the cause of all things, ought to be worshipped in all things, especially he being himself invisible; yet the making of those things themselves therefore to be so many persons or gods, was nothing but poetic fiction and phantastry, accordingly as their old mythology and allegorical fables of the gods run much upon this strain.[8]

former times had embraced the most foul and abominable superstitions under the garb of religion.

[8] As Dr. Cudworth brings forward nothing new throughout the whole of this disputation, but merely reiterates his former arguments, or strengthens them by additional passages of ancient authors, we shall not waste the time of our readers by repeating the comments already made upon them. He employs all the great ability and learning he is master of to give a colour and seemliness to the hideous rites of antiquity, and to show that the numerous deities worshipped by ancient nations were merely so many names of the one supreme God, or various considerations or notions of the divine virtues. To establish this point, he assumes much that would not readily be granted by any one conversant with ancient matters, and adopts the precepts and dogmas of individuals as the standard by which the public religions are to be estimated. Nor, indeed, having all his thoughts thus fixed upon this one object, is he always consistent with himself. For sometimes he speaks as though expounding the doctrines of the wise only, and at others, as if treating of the religious opinions of the entire people. This, however, will easily be pardoned, when we consider the other eminent virtues and merits of so great a man, who, although sometimes led away from the side of truth and religion, is, nevertheless, even when swerving from the right path, at all times edifying and instructive. But dismissing these things, let us now briefly advert to that which seems to be the strongest feature in the arguments brought forward by the learned Doctor in support of his cause.

It is notorious that the nations of antiquity, Greek and Roman as well as barbarous, dedicated temples not only to the virtues, fortitude, love, piety, and the like, but also to the vices, fear, pallor, pleasure, &c. and worshipped the elements, water, fire, air; [illegible], went so far as to consecrate even diseases themselves. This debased custom [illegible] upon by our worthy author as a striking argument in proof of the opinion which he espouses: that the gods of the ancients were not persons, but merely notions and various considerations of one God, and therefore that, properly speaking, they did not worship many gods but only one supreme and almighty God, represented by various [illegible] and virtues. For example, victory, virtue, honour, concord are not persons but [illegible] names of things and notions. According to his opinion, therefore, those who [illegible] homage to these deities worshipped the supreme Being, who of his own will dis[illegible] victory and virtue. In fact he considers the ancients to have supposed that [illegible] was nothing at all without a god, and that God was in a certain way all things, [illegible] to have been led from that cause to designate all things by the name of God, and God by the name of all things. Which opinion, even if nothing else could be brought against it, is certainly liable to this serious objection, that it is impossible to under[illegible] how they could refer terror, pallor, drunkenness, luxury, impudence, lust and [illegible] to the supreme God of all things. But it labours also under other difficulties, [illegible], as being evident of themselves, I should hold it to be mere waste of time to [illegible]. It will be better to explain what I consider to be the cause of this an[illegible] custom of consecrating the virtues, vices, diseases and elements: for when the [illegible] is made apparent, error vanishes of itself. Learned men who have touched [illegible] this subject are divided into a great variety of opinions; which I am the less [illegible] at, as I observe from Cicero's De Natura Deor. lib. 3. that even the more [illegible] of the Pagans themselves were ignorant of the true meaning of this institution

XXXIV. Hitherto have we declared the sense of the Pagans in general, those also being included who supposed God to be a being elevated above the world, that they agreed in these two

of their ancestors. For time is wont to throw the mantle of oblivion over the dogmas and opinions of antiquity; and hence even the most perspicacious of men are usually unable to determine what may have given rise to this or that custom. Some suppose the sole motive of the ancients to have been that they might thereby impress upon men's minds the love and memory of the virtues and things desirable. And Cicero himself is not far from agreeing to this opinion, who, De Legibus, lib. 2. cap. 11. p. 3353. opp. has the following words: Bene vero, quod mens, pietas, virtus, fides consecratur manu: quarum omnium Romæ dedicata publice templa sunt, ut, illa, qui habeant (habent autem omnes boni), deos ipsos in animis suis collocatos putent, "It is well, that understanding, piety, virtue, faith are consecrated: of all which there are temples publicly dedicated at Rome, that those who possess them (and all good men do possess them) may suppose the gods themselves to be placed in their minds." But if this opinion be correct, what is to become of the vices, diseases and crimes which we know to have likewise had a place among the gods? Others consider the nations to have been so mad and stupid as not to know themselves what they meant by adopting these deities, and to have been led into these errors by their own folly alone: upon the defence of which opinion the most acute J. Le Clerc has bestowed considerable diligence, Artis Criticæ par. 2. sect. 1. cap. 8. sect. 7. p. 218. But although, admitting as I do, that there was no folly too gross for the superstition of ancient nations, still I can hardly bring myself to suppose that they were influenced by no cause or motive in feigning such imaginary deities. I shall pass over the conjectures and opinions of others, and state the conclusion at which I myself have arrived on the subject. I consider, then, that the ancients who consecrated the elements, diseases, virtues and vices, worshipped not the things themselves but the genii that presided over them. It is an opinion of the remotest antiquity, that there exists nothing, however vile and abject, no disease of the mind, no virtue, that is not under the protection and control of some particular demon or genius. The doctrine is said to have been derived originally from the Chaldeans. See Ant. Van Dalen, De Origine ac Progressu Idololatriæ, cap. 4. p. 64. &c. Be this as it may, one thing is unquestionable, and evident even from the authority of Hesiod, Oper. et Dier. v. 121. p. 214. et v. 250. that the earliest inhabitants of Greece were imbued with it: and it is no less certain that the opinion was propagated from the people to the professors of wisdom themselves, having been adopted by Pythagoras and Plato, philosophers of the highest authority. With respect to Plato, indeed, no one can doubt that if the philosophy which he taught his disciples be divested of the doctrine of demons and genii, it loses its most important part. And how prone Pythagoras was to enlarge the empire of demons may be learnt both from many other incidents in his history, and especially from the fact that he at once referred to them the causes of all recondite and abstruse matters. Being asked what occasioned the acute sound emitted from brass, he gravely replied, that it was "the voice of a demon shut up in the brass," φωνήν τινος τῶν δαιμόνων, ἐναπειλημένην τῷ χαλκῷ, Porphyrius, De Vita Pythagor. p. 42. Who would have expected such an answer from a geometrician? And yet I am not surprised at there having been so many men who thought proper to follow the same course. For what method can be more convenient and expeditious than this towards clearing away all the difficulties which beset those who investigate the causes of things? Adopt this doctrine of demons, and you will be able to account for every thing which for so many ages has exercised and tortured the most ingenious men. If any thing should perplex the mind, a demon will always be at hand to dispel the mists and restore light. From this common persuasion of antiquity, therefore, and not from any mental stupidity or other more abstruse causes, in my opinion flowed all the superstition of those who decreed divine honours to the elements, diseases, and affections of the mind. To begin with the elements, those who worshipped water, fire, ether, were not so foolish as to suppose that these portions of the universe themselves were injurious or beneficial to them, but, like the Chinese of the present day, they paid homage to the minds or genii presiding over these elements. At least the Pythagoreans and Platonists, whose doctrine in this respect agreed with the vulgar opinion, believed spirits to reside in all the elements, which could dispose and employ them at will to the advantage or destruction of mankind. Let those who wish for further information on this matter

things: First, the breaking and crumbling, as it were, of the simple Deity, and parcelling out of the same into many particular notions and partial considerations, according to the various

consult Chalcidius, Comm. in Timæum Platonis, cap. 119. p. 322. and cap. 134. p. 339. With respect to bodily diseases, scarcely any of the ancients, especially the philosophers we have spoken of, entertained a doubt of their being caused by the power and agency of evil demons, who, as they supposed, lost no opportunity of inflicting injury upon mortals: which opinion of the multitude is glanced at, as others have already observed, by Hippocrates in his book De Morbis Virginum et de Morbo Sacro. Of the Platonists consult Porphyry, as one example for all, Περὶ ἀποχῆς, lib. 2. sect. 41. p. 85. And what other notion, I ask, could have been entertained by those who believed in the possibility of curing diseases by the repetition of divine names and barbarous words, by incantations, amulets, and such like absurdities; of whom there existed in former times an incredible number among the the Greeks and Jews, and who are to be found even at the present day among the professors of Christianity? If this class of persons possessed the slightest particle of reason, the whole of their superstition must necessarily have been founded upon an idea that certain demons lie hid in the bodies of the sick, causing all the maladies they are afflicted with, and capable of being expelled by the utterance of awful words, or by the written exhibition of divine names or sentences. In St. Augustine's time degenerate Christians considered no remedy to be so efficacious against fever as the placing of the book of the gospels close to the sick person's head: Ad hoc, says he, perducta est infirmitas hominum, ut gaudeamus, quum videmus, hominem in lecto suo constitutum, jactari *febribus* et doloribus, nec alicubi spem possuisse, nisi *Evangelium ad caput poneret*, "To such a pitch has men's weakness arrived, that we rejoice when we see that a man stretched upon his bed, and struggling with *fevers* and pains, has placed his only hope in *the application of the gospel to his head*," Tract. 7. in Johannem, sect. 12. p. 252. tom. 3. par. 3. opp. What else could these persons have supposed than that the sick man had been attacked with fever through the malice of some wicked demon, whom nothing would be so well calculated to expel as that most holy book which records the history and doctrines of our Saviour? The same idea, I consider, must have been entertained by those who first dreamt of the possibility of curing fever by the word Abracadabra; who indeed were either altogether insane, or imagined the sick person to be possessed by some spirit that was unable to withstand this barbarous word. Therefore those who formerly dedicated temples to *fever*, *pallor*, and other bodily affections, meant doubtless to propitiate thereby the genii who had the power of afflicting mortals with these diseases. The sense of those who sacrificed victims to such deities is expressed in the following verses of Ovid, Fast. lib. 6. v. 161, &c.

Cor pro corde, precor, pro fibris sumite fibras:
Hanc animam vobris pro meliore damus.

The mention, indeed, of genii consecrated to certain virtues and vices is less frequent in ancient records, not excepting even those of the Platonists: but the earliest Christians themselves supply us with sufficient evidence of its having been the general belief that no evil or good impulse arises in the minds of men without the influence and inspiration of some genius or other. The *fathers*, when they are about to account for men's rushing headlong into vice and crime, and to explain the reason why some are prone to one vice, some to another, almost invariably have recourse to the power of genii and demons. They suppose that each vice has its own presiding demon, and that these demons insinuate themselves into the minds of men, and excite therein all the various evil commotions and desires which agitate them. Hence they are accustomed also to designate the vices by the names of spirits or demons. This doctrine is set forth the most clearly by Origen, Homilia 15. In Josuam, whose words I shall quote, as they are given by J. B. Cotelerius in his notes Ad Hermæ Pastor, lib. 2. tom. 1. Patr. Apostol. p. 85. Est aliquis fornicationis spiritus, est iræ spiritus alius, est avaritiæ spiritus, alius vero superbiæ. Et si invenias, esse aliquem hominem, qui his omnibus malis, aut etiam pluribus, agitetur, omnes hos, vel etiam plures, in se habere inimicos putandus est spiritus. And a little afterwards: Puto, principem fornicationis spiritum unum esse, innumeros vero esse, qui in hoc officio ei pareant.——Similiter et immundiæ spiritum principem unum esse, arbitror, innumeros vero esse sub ipso agentes, qui per singulos quosque homines hujusce vitii pecata succendant, "There is a spirit of formi-

manifestations of its power and providence in the world; by the personating and deifying of which severally they made, as it were, so many gods of one. The chief ground whereof was this, because they considered not the Deity according to its simple nature, and abstractly only, but concretely also with the world, as he displayeth himself therein, pervadeth all, and diffuseth his

cation, another spirit of anger, a spirit of avarice, and another of pride. And if you find a man agitated by all these evils, or even more than these, you must suppose him to have within himself all these or even more spirits.—There is, I consider, one principal spirit of fornication, and an innumerable host of others that are subservient to it in this office.—In like manner there is one principal spirit of anger, and others without number that act under it, and incite the various individuals to the sins of this vice." This doctrine is manifestly at variance with all the declarations of sacred writ, which represent the nature of man as altogether corrupt, and as filled since the fall of our first parents with all kinds of wicked propensities and desires. And yet it was espoused formerly by most of those who were of any rank or importance in the Latin and Greek churches; from whom, besides Cotelerius as above quoted, Dr. J. Potter, Ad Clementis Alexandr. Pædagog. lib. 2. p. 174, has collected numerous testimonies. I shall add a passage of Basilius Magnus in his Exorcismus, published by J. Alb. Fabricius, Biblioth. Græc. lib. 5. cap. 19. p. 98, 99. vol. 8, Ἀναχώρησον, πᾶν δαιμόνιον κακὸν καὶ ἀκάθαρτον,—ἐπιθυμητικὸν,—μεθυμναῖον, ἢ ταραχοποιητικὸν ἀναιδὲς, φιλόνεικον, ἀκατάστατον, κ. τ. λ. "Depart every spirit of evil or impurity, of concupiscence, of drunkenness, of disturbance, of impudence, of contention, of restlessness," &c. This Exorcismus of St. Basil confirms the remark made by us a little above, that even the ancient Christians referred all the diseases which afflict the human race to the agency of malignant genii. Nor, unless I am much mistaken, could those who had devoted themselves to the precepts of the Platonists, entertain any very different notion of the vices and diseases of the mind: on which subject, to avoid prolixity, I shall not at present offer any comment. I pass rather to the virtues. These, like the vices, were supposed by the ancient Christians to have each their own genii: for example, they assigned one genius to chastity, another to equity, another to prayer, another to repentance. Should any one require authorities, let him consult, besides the Pastor of Hermas, which is full of such genii, Tertullian's books De Oratione, De Anima, De Baptismo, and others. And although they speak with less clearness of the office of these angels than of the functions of the demons, in which they considered the origin of the several vices to reside, still it is sufficiently manifest that they supposed God to have associated certain spirits with the pious and regenerated, which continually reminded them of the virtues, and by their secret influence incited them to the performance of the various duties of a Christian life. It is not to be believed that the Christians were the first inventors of this doctrine. On the contrary it unquestionably formed a part of those tenets which they had imbibed previously to their adoption of the Christian religion, and which they afterwards combined with the precepts of our Saviour. And such being the case, what necessity is there for inquiring whence originated those temples among the Greeks and Romans, which were dedicated to honour, virtue, concord, love, friendship, and on the other hand to pleasure, lust, and discord? Doubtless from the opinion of men, who supposed mortals to be impelled, and impelled to the vices as well as to the virtues, by the influence of certain genii. Those, therefore, who frequented the temples of the virtues, prayed to the genii whom they believed to have charge of these virtues, to aid them in an upright course of life; while, on the other hand, the object of those who offered sacrifices to the vices, was to propitiate the demons, in whom they supposed were the causes of the vices, and to avert their displeasure. Perhaps some also that delighted in vice besought the gods, presiding over depraved morals, to enable them to indulge their propensities without incurring ignominy and loss of character:

> Labra movet; metuens audiri: pulchra Laverna,
> Da mihi fallere, da justum sanctumque videri,
> Noctem peccatis et fraudibus objice nubem.

Horatii lib. 1. Epist. 16. v. 60, &c.

virtues through all. For as the sun, reflected by grosser vapours, is sometimes multiplied, and the same object beheld through a polyedrous glass, by reason of those many superficies, being represented in several places at once, is thereby rendered manifold to the spectator: so one and the same supreme God, considered concretely with the world, as manifesting his several powers and virtues in it, was multiplied into several names, not without the appearance of so many several gods. Whereas πολυώνυμον with those ancient Pagans, was the same thing with πολυδύναμον, that which hath "many names," all one with that which hath "many powers:" according to this of Callimachus[9] concerning Diana:

Δός μοι παρθενίην αἰώνιον, ἄππα, φυλάσσειν,
Καὶ Πολυωνυμίην·

And this of Virgil concerning Alecto:[10]

Tibi nomina mille,
Mille nocendi artes.

And accordingly the many pagan gods are, in Plato's Cratylus,[1] interpreted as the many powers of one God diffused through the world. And the pagan theologers seemed to conceive this to be more suitable to the pomp, state and grandeur of the supreme God, for him to be considered diffusively, and called by many names, signifying his many several virtues and powers (polyonymy being by them accounted an honour) rather than to be contracted and shrunk all up into one general notion of a perfect mind, the Maker or Creator of the whole world. The second thing in which the Pagans agreed, is their personating and deifying also the parts of the world, and things of nature themselves, and so making them so many gods and goddesses too. Their meaning therein being declared to be really no other than this: that God, who doth not only pervade all things, but also was the cause of all things, and therefore himself is in a manner all

[9] Hymn. in Dianam, v. 5. 6. p. 50. On which it will be well worth while to read the remarks of Spanheim in his Commentary on this passage, p. 129. 130. The position here assumed by Dr. Cudworth, that the multitude of gods among the ancient Pagans sprung from the multiplicity of names which they applied to their gods, is most eloquently maintained also by his countryman J. Selden, De Diis Syris. I wish, however, they had both employed more convincing arguments. The hymns which are ascribed to the gods in Orpheus, consist almost wholly of names by which the ancients designated their gods. But no one of these names, so far as I know, led men into the error of forming a god out of it. Diana was called Ephesia, Persia, Laphria, redux, conservatrix, felix, victrix. And which of these names, I would ask, has been transformed into a deity? I should say, not one of them

[10] Æneid. lib. 7. v. 324.

[1] The significations of the names, by which the gods were formerly distinguished, are there used with much ingenuity by Plato in his Cratylus: but I know of no passage in this book, wherein he states that they all imply only one God, considered in his various relations.

things, ought to be worshipped in all the things of nature and parts of the world: as also that the force of every thing was divine, and that in all things that were beneficial to mankind, the divine goodness ought to be acknowledged.

We shall now observe, how both those forementioned principles, of God's pervading all things, and his being all things, which were the chief grounds of the seeming polytheism of the Pagans, were improved and carried on further by those amongst them, who had no higher notion of the supreme Deity than as the soul of the world. Which opinion, that it found entertainment amongst so many of them, probably might be from hence, because it was so obvious for those of them that were religious to conceive, that as themselves consisted of body and soul, so the body of the whole world was not without its soul neither; and that their human souls were as well derived from the life and soul of the world, as the earth and water in their bodies were from the earth and water of the world. Now whereas the more refined Pagans, as was before observed, supposed God to pervade and pass through all things ἀμιγῶς, "unmixedly;" these concluded God to be (according to that definition of him in Quintilian, taken in a rigid sense), spiritum omnibus partibus immistum, "a spirit immingled with all the parts of the world:" or else in Manilius' language:

Infusumque Deum cœlo terrisque fretoque,

"Infused into the heaven, earth, and seas:" sacroque meatu conspirare Deum, and "intimately to conspire with his own work the world," as being almost one with it. Upon which account he was commonly called Nature also, that being thus defined by some of the Stoics: Deus mundo permistus, "God mingled throughout with the world;" and, Divina Ratio toti mundo insita, "The divine Reason inserted into the whole world." Which Nature notwithstanding, in way of distinction from the particular natures of things, was called κοινὴ φύσις, and communis natura, "the common nature." And it was plainly declared by them not to be a senseless nature; according to that of Balbus in Cicero: Natura est, quæ continet mundum omnem, eumque tuetur; atque ea quidem non sine sensu, atque ratione, "It is nature, by which the whole world is contained and upheld, but this such a nature as is not without sense and reason." As it is elsewhere said to be perfect and eternal Reason, the divine mind and wisdom containing also under it all the λογοὶ σπερματικοὶ, "the spermatic principles," by which the things of nature (commonly so called) are effected. Wherefore we see, that such naturalists as these may well be allowed to be Theists (Moses himself in Strabo being accounted one of them), whereas those that acknowledge no higher principle of the world than a

senseless nature (whether fortuitous, or orderly and methodical), cannot be accounted any other than absolute Atheists. Moreover, this soul of the world was by such of these Pagans as admitted no incorporeal substance, itself concluded to be a body too, but λεπτότατον καὶ τάχιστον, "a most subtle and most swift body," as was before observed out of Plato (though endued with perfect mind and understanding, as well as with spermatic reasons) which insinuating itself into all other bodies, did permeate and pervade the whole universe, and frame all things, inwardly mingling itself with all; Heraclitus and Hippasus thinking this to be fire, and Diogenes Apolloniates air; whom Simplicius, who had read some of his then extant works, vindicates from that imputation of atheism, which Hippo and Anaximander lie under.[2]

Again, whereas the more sublimated Pagans* affirmed the supreme God to be all, so as that he was nevertheless something above all too, he being above the soul of the world (and probably Æschylus in that forecited passage of his, is to be understood after this manner: Ζεύς τοι τὰ πάντα καί τι τῶνδ' ὑπέρτερον, "Jupiter is the ether, Jupiter is the earth, Jupiter is the heaven; Jupiter is all things, and yet something higher than all, or above all"); those Pagans, who acknowledged no higher Numen than the soul of the world, made God to be all things in a grosser sense, they supposing the whole corporeal world animated to be also the supreme Deity. For though God to them were principally and originally, that eternal unmade soul and mind, which diffuseth itself through all things; yet did they conceive, that as the human soul and body, both together, make up one whole rational animal or man, so this mundane soul, and its body the world, did in like manner, both together, make up one entire divine animal, or God.

It is true indeed, that as the human soul doth principally act in some one part of the body, which therefore hath been called the Hegemonicon and Principale, some taking this to be the brain, others the heart, but Strato in Tertullian[4] ridiculously,

[2] On the argument here propounded by the learned Doctor, and the passages of the ancients by which he supports it, we have already treated at some length. Having once laid down a position he is in the habit of frequently repeating it.

* As Simplicius[3] describeth God to be πάντα πρὸ πάντων, Omnia ante omnia. In Epictet. p. 234.

[3] I have in vain sought for this definition in Simplicius. I suppose our author, however, to have been thinking of these verses of his, which occur p. 236: Τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου, ὑπὲρ πάντα ὄντος τὰ ὄντα, οὐδέν ἐστιν οἰκεῖον ὄνομα, "Of the cause of all things, which is above all things that exist, there is no peculiar name."

[4] De Anima, cap. 15. p. 169. Nec in superciliorum, says he, meditullio cubat anima, ut Strato (putat) physicus, "Neither does the soul reside in the part between the eyebrows, as Strato the physiologer imagines." Strato unquestionably did suppose the soul to be located in the part of the head intervening between the eyebrows, ἐν μεσοφρύῳ, as Plutarch says, De Placitis Philos. lib. 4. cap. 5. p. 909. His doctrine, therefore, was not much more absurd than that of those who, like Herophilus, consider

the place betwixt the eyebrows; so the Stoics did suppose the great soul or mind of the world to act principally in some one part thereof (which what it was notwithstanding they did not all agree upon), as the Hegemonicon or Principale; and this was sometimes called by them emphatically God. But nevertheless they all acknowledged this mundane soul, as the souls of other animals, to pervade, animate, or enliven and actuate, more or less its whole body, the world. This is plainly declared by Laërtius in the life of Zeno:[5] Τὸν δὴ κόσμον διοικεῖσθαι κατὰ νοῦν καὶ πρόνοιαν, εἰς ἅπαν αὐτοῦ μέρος διήκοντος τοῦ νοῦ, καθάπερ ἐφ' ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς· ἀλλ' ἤδη δι' ὧν μὲν μᾶλλον, δι' ὧν δ' ἧττον· δι' ὧν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἕξις κεχώρηκεν, ὡς διὰ τῶν ὀστῶν καὶ τῶν νεύρων· δι' ὧν δὲ ὡς νοῦς, ὡς διὰ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ· οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον, ζῷον ὄντα καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ λογικὸν, ἔχειν ἡγεμονικὸν μὲν τὸν αἰθέρα, ἢ τὸν οὐρανὸν, ἢ τὸν ἥλιον· ὃ καὶ πρῶτον θεὸν λέγουσιν αἰσθητικῶς ὥσπερ κεχωρηκέναι διὰ τῶν ἐν ἀέρι, καὶ διὰ τῶν ζώων ἁπάντων καὶ φυτῶν, διὰ δὲ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς καθ' ἕξιν, "The Stoics affirm, that the world is governed by mind and providence, this mind passing through all the parts of it, as the soul doth in us: which yet doth not act in all parts alike, but in some more, in some less; it passing through some parts only as a habit (as through the bones and nerves), but through others as mind or understanding (as through that which is called the Hegemonicon or Principale). So the whole world being a living and rational animal, hath its Hegemonicon or principal part too, which according to Antipater is the ether, to Possidonius the air, to Cleanthes the sun, &c. And they say also, that this first God is, as it were, sensibly diffused through all animals and plants, but through the earth itself, only as a habit." Where the whole world, being thus acted and animated by one divine soul, is itself, according to these Stoics, also the supreme God. Thus Didymus in Eusebius:[6] Ὅλον δὲ τὸν κόσμον προσαγορεύουσι θεὸν, "The Stoics call the whole world God;" and Origen against Celsus:[*] Σαφῶς δὴ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον λέγουσι εἶναι θεὸν, Στωϊκοὶ μὲν τὸν πρῶτον, "The Greeks universally affirm the world to be a god, but the Stoics, the first and chief God." And accordingly Manilius:[7]

it to reside in the brain or about the bottom of the brain. Both look for its seat in the head, but they differ as to the place.

[5] Lib. 7. segm. 138. 139. p. 452. But Dr. Cudworth exhibits the sense rather than the very words of Laërtius, as he has here and there omitted many and altered others. In which I should find nothing to complain of, except that he combines the words ὃ καὶ πρῶτον θεὸν, &c. with the preceding, as though they were said of the sun: which sense he seems also to express in his English version of these words. But on referring to Laërtius, it will appear that they pertain not to the sun but to the ether. Chrysippus asserted the ether to be the principal god, and to pervade all things: concerning which matter consult the commentators on this passage.

[6] Præpar. Evangel. lib. 25. cap. 15. p. 817.

[*] Lib. 5. p. 235.

[7] Astronomic. lib. 1. v. 484. 485. p. 16.

Quâ pateat, mundum divino numine verti,
Atque ipsum esse Deum,

"Whereby it may appear the world to be governed by a divine mind, and also itself to be God." As likewise Seneca[8] the philosopher: Totum hoc, quo continemur, et unum est, et Deus est, "This whole world, within which we are contained, is both one thing, and God." Which is not to be understood of the mere matter of the world, as it is nothing but a heap of atoms, or as endued with a plastic and senseless nature only; but of it as animated by such a soul, as besides sense was originally endued with perfect understanding; and as deriving all its godship from thence. For thus Varro in St. Austin[9] declares both his own and the Stoical sense concerning this point: Dicit idem Varro, adhuc de naturali theologia præloquens, Deum se arbitrari esse animam mundi (quem Græci vocant κόσμον) et hunc ipsum mundum esse Deum. Sed sicut hominem sapientem, cum sit ex corpore et animo, tamen ab animo dici sapientem; ita mundum Deum dici ab animo, cum sit ex animo et corpore, "The same Varro discoursing concerning natural theology, declareth, that, according to his own sense, God is the soul of the world (which the Grecks call Cosmos,) and that this world itself is also God. But that this is so to be understood, that as a wise man, though consisting of soul and body, yet is denominated wise only from his mind or soul; so the world is denominated God from its mind or soul only, it consisting both of mind and body."

Now if the whole animated world be the supreme God, it plainly follows from thence, that the several parts and members thereof must be the parts and members of God; and this was readily acknowledged by Seneca:[9] Membra sumus corporis magni, "We are all members of one great body." And,[10] Totum hoc Deus est, socii ejus et membra sumus, "This whole world is God, and we are not only his members, but also his fellows or companions;" as if our human souls had a certain kind of fellowship also with that great soul of the universe. And accordingly, the soul of the world, and the whole mundane animal, was frequently worshipped by the Pagans, in these its several members; the chief parts of the world, and the most important things of nature; as it were by piecemeal. Nevertheless it doth not at all follow from thence, that these were therefore to them really so many several gods; for then not only

[8] Civ. Dei, lib. 7. cap. 6.

[9] Epistol. 92. p. 323. tom. 2. opp. A very similar passage occurs in the same author, Epistol. 95. p. 355. Several others have been collected by Justus Lipsius in his Physiol. Stoica, lib. 1. diss. 8. p. 16. &c. and Th. Gatakerus, Ad Marc. Antoninum, lib. 4. sect. 22. p. 110.

[9] Epist. 95. p. 355.

[10] Epist. 92. p. 323.

every man, and every contemptible animal, every plant and herb, and pile of grass, every river and hill, and all things else whatsoever, must be so many several gods. And that the Pagans themselves did not take them for such, Origen observes against that assertion of Celsus: "That if the whole were God, then the several parts thereof must needs be gods,"* or divine too: *Ὡς εἶναι θεῖα οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα, μέρη ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ φυτά· εἰ δὲ μέρη τοῦ κόσμου καὶ οἱ ποταμοὶ, καὶ τὰ ὄρη, καὶ αἱ θάλασσαι· ἄρ' ἐπεὶ ὅλος ὁ κόσμος θεός ἐστιν, ἤδη καὶ οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ αἱ θάλασσαι θεοί εἰσιν· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο φήσουσιν Ἕλληνες· τοὺς δ' ἐπιστατοῦντας (εἰ ἄρα δαίμονας, ἢ θεοὺς, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι ὀνομάζουσι) ποταμοῖς καὶ θαλάσσαις, τούτους ἂν λέγοιεν θεούς. Καὶ τὸ καθολικὸν Κέλσου γίνεται καὶ καθ' Ἕλληνας ψεῦδος, ὅτι εἰ τὸ ὅλον ἦν Θεὸς, πάντως τὰ μέρη τούτου ἐστὶ θεῖα· κατὰ τοῦτο γὰρ θεῖα ἔσται ζῶα, καὶ μυῖαι, καὶ σκνῖφες, καὶ σκώληκες, καὶ πᾶν τὸ τῶν ὄφεων εἶδος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τῶν ὀρνέων, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἰχθύων· ἅπερ οὐδ' οἱ λέγοντες Θεὸν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, φήσουσιν,* "From hence it would follow, that not only men must be divine and gods, but also all brute animals too (they being parts of the world) and plants to boot. Nay rivers, and mountains, and seas, being parts of the world likewise (if the whole world be God) must, according to Celsus, needs be gods also. Whereas the Greeks themselves will not affirm this; but they would only call those spirits or demons, which preside over these rivers and seas, gods. Wherefore this universal assertion of Celsus is false even according to the Greeks themselves; that if the whole be God, then all the parts thereof must needs be divine or gods. It following from thence, that flies, and gnats, and worms, and all kind of serpents, and birds, and fishes, are all divine animals or gods: which they themselves, who assert the world to be God, will not affirm."

Wherefore, though it be true, that the Pagans did many times personate and deify the chief parts of the world, and things of nature, as well as they did the several powers and virtues of the mundane soul, diffused through the whole world; yet did not the intelligent amongst them therefore look upon these as so many true and proper gods, but only worship them as parts and members of one great mundane animal; or rather, worship the soul of the whole world, their supreme deity, in them all, as its various manifestations. This St. Austin intimates, when writing against Faustus the Manichæan, he prefers even the pagan gods before the Manichean:[1] Jam verò cœlum,

* Lib. 5. p. 234.

[1] Contra Faustum, lib. 20. cap. 5. p. 238. tom. 8. These words however do not occur in St. Augustine in continued order, but are culled by Dr. Cudworth from different parts of this chapter.

et terra, et mare, et aër, et sol, et luna, et cætera sidera omnia, hæc manifesta oculis apparent, atque ipsis sensibus præsto sunt. Quæ cum Pagani tanquam deos colunt, vel tanquam PARTES UNIUS MAGNI DEI (nam universum mundum quidam eorum putant MAXIMUM DEUM) ea colunt, quæ sunt. Vos autem, cum ea colatis, quæ omninò non sunt, propinquiores essetis veræ pietati, si saltem Pagani essetis, qui corpora colunt, etsi non colenda, tamen vera, "Now the heaven, earth, sea, and air, sun, moon, and stars, are things all manifest and really present to our senses; which when the Pagans worship as gods, or as PARTS OF ONE GREAT GOD (for some of them think the whole world to be the GREATEST GOD), they worship things that are; so that you worshipping things, that are not, would be nearer to true piety than you are, were you Pagans and worshipped bodies too; which though they ought not to be worshipped, yet are they true and real things." But this is further insisted upon by the same St. Austin, in his book De Civ. Dei,* where after that large enumeration of the pagan gods before set down, he thus convinces their folly in worshipping the several divided members, parts and powers, of the one great God, after that manner personated: Hæc omnia, quæ dixi, et quæcunque non dixi (non enim omnia dicenda arbitratus sum) hi omnes dii deæque sit unus Jupiter; sive sint, ut quidam volunt, omnia ista partes ejus, sive virtutes ejus, sicut eis videtur, quibus eum placet esse mundi animum; quæ sententia velut magnorum multorumque doctorum est. Hæc, inquam, si ita sunt, quod quale sit, nondum interim quæro, quid perderent, si unum Deum colerent prudentiori compendio? Quid enim ejus contemneretur, cum ipse coleretur? Si autem metuendum sit, nè prætermissæ sive neglectæ partes ejus irascerentur; non ergo, ut volunt, velut unius animantis hæc tota vita est, quæ omnes simul continet deos, quasi suas VIRTUTES, vel MEMBRA, vel PARTES: sed suam quæque pars habet vitam à cæteris separatam, si præter alteram irasci altera potest, et alia placari, alia concitari. Si autem dicitur omnia simul, id est, totum ipsum Jovem potuisse offendi, si PARTES ejus non etiam singillatim minutatimque colorentur, stultè dicetur. Nulla quippe earum prætermitteretur, cum ipse unus, qui haberet omnia, coleretur, "All these things, which we have now said, and many more which we have not said (for we did not think fit to mention all) all these gods and goddesses, let them be one and the same Jupiter: whether they will have them to be his PARTS, or his POWERS, and VIRTUES, according to the sense of those, who think God to be the soul or mind of the whole world; which is the opinion of many and great doctors. This, I say, if it be so, which, what it is, we

* Lib. 4. cap. 11. [P. 76.]

will not now examine; what would these Pagans lose, if in a more prudent compendium, they should worship one only God? For what of him could be despised, when his whole self was worshipped? But if they fear, lest his parts pretermitted, or neglected, should be angry, or take offence; then it is not, as they pretend, the life of one great animal, which at once contains all the gods, as his virtues, or members, or parts, but every part hath its own life by itself, separate from the rest, since one of them may be angry when another is pleased, and the contrary. But if it should be said, that altogether, that is, the whole Jupiter might be offended, if his parts were not worshipped all of them severally and singly; this would be foolishly said, because none of the parts can be pretermitted, when he that hath all is worshipped."[2]

Thus do the Pagans in Athanasius[3] also declare, that they did not worship the several parts of the world, as really so many true and proper gods, but only as the parts, or members, of their one supreme God, that great mundane animal (or whole animated world) taken all together as one thing: Ἀλλ' ἴσως διαιρούμενα μὲν, καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ λαμβανόμενα, ἐπιδεῆ αὐτὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ συνομολογοῦσιν, ὁμοῦ δὲ πάντα συνάπτοντες, καὶ ὡς ἓν ἀποτελοῦντες μέγα σῶμα, τὸ ὅλον Θεὸν εἶναι φήσουσι, "But the Pagans themselves will acknowledge, that the divided parts of the world, taken severally, are but indigent and imperfect things, nevertheless do they contend, that as they are by them joined all together into one great body (enlivened by one soul), so is the whole of them truly and properly God." And now we think it is sufficiently evident, that though these Pagans verbally personated and deified, not only the several powers and virtues of the one supreme God, or mundane soul, diffused throughout the whole world, but also the several parts of the world itself, and the natures of things; yet their meaning herein was not to make these in themselves really so many several true and proper gods (much less independent ones), but to worship one supreme God (which to them was the whole animated world) in those his several parts and members, as it were by piecemeal, or under so many inadequate conceptions.[4]

[2] In this passage of St. Augustine, as well as in others of the kind to be met with in the ancient Christian writers, these eminent men, let it be observed, by no means affirm, as the learned Doctor supposes, that the ancients worshipped the divine virtues and perfections as gods, but merely, that there were some men both in times past and in their own day who interpreted the absurd religions of the vulgar in this manner. Whereas neither St. Augustine nor any other of the Christian fathers attached much importance to these interpretations. To pass over others, consult St. Augustine himself, Contra Faustum Manich. lib. 20. cap. 9. p. 240. tom. 8. opp.

[3] Orat. contra Græcos, p. 31. tom. 1. opp.

[4] I have so repeatedly stated, how very little can be proved from the whole of these passages of the ancients, that there is no need of further comment. Nevertheless, I *shall quote* a remarkable passage of Arnobius, which, although confirming some of the

e Pagans therefore were plainly divided in their natural
ogy, as to their opinions concerning the supreme God;
of them conceiving him to be nothing higher than a mun-

Doctor's positions, strikes at the very foundation of the opinion he so warmly
es. In lib. 3. adv. Gentes, p. 151. ed. Heraldi. Arnobius, addressing the
, says: In philosophiæ memorabili studio atque ad istius nominis columen
audatoribus elevati, universam istam molem mundi, cujus omnes amplexibus
ir, tegimur ac sustinemur, animal esse unum, sapiens, rationabile, consultum,
li asseveratione definiunt: quorum si est vera et fixa certa sententia, etiam illi
o desinent Dii esse, quos in ejus portionibus paullo ante immutatis nominibus
iebatis. Ut enim homo unus nequit, permanente sui corporis integritate, in
s multos scindi, neque homines rursus, multitudinis, junctionis differentia con-
, in unius sensus simplicitatemque conflari: ita, si mundus unum est animal, et
mentis agitatione rotatur, nec in plura potest Numina dissipari, nec (si ejus
læ Dii sunt) in unius animantis conscientiam cogi atque verti. Luna, sol,
ether, astra membra sunt et mundi partes. Quod si partes et membra sunt,
ia utique sui nominis non sunt. Neque enim partes hoc ipsum esse, quod
est, aliqua in re possunt, aut sibi sapere, sibi sentire, quod sine totius animantis
nullis propriis afficiatur motibus: quo constituto ac posito, summa omnis illuc
t neque sol Deus sit, neque luna, neque æther, tellus, et cætera. Sunt enim partes
non specialia Numinum nomina: atque ita perficitur, omnia vobis turbantibus
tibusque divina, ut in rerum natura unus Deus constituatur mundus, explosis
is ceteris, "Those who are famed for the study of philosophy, and are pane-
by you as the most eminent of their class, with some probability define the
mass of this world, by whose embraces we are all encircled, protected, and sus-
to be one animal, wise, rational, and intelligent: if which opinion be true and
, those will immediately cease to be gods, which a little before by the changing
ies you constituted in its several parts. For as neither can one man, while the
y of his body remains, be divided into many men, nor on the other hand many
he difference of multitude and composition being preserved, be combined into
sciousness and simplicity of one; so, if the world is one animal and turned
by the impulse of one mind, it neither can be dissipated into several deities nor
parts are gods) be compounded and converted into the consciousness of one
. The moon, the sun, the earth, the ether, the stars, are members and parts of
rld. But if they are parts and members, they therefore are not animals in
lves. For in nothing can parts be the same thing that the whole is, nor can that
f know and feel, which is not affected by any motions of its own without the
of the whole animal: which being established the whole amounts to this, that
the sun is a god, nor the moon, nor the ether, earth and the rest. For they
ts of the world, not special names of deities: and thus it is brought to pass by
nfounding and jumbling together all divine things, that the world is constituted
y God in the nature of things, all the others being exploded." These words
Dr. Cudworth to be perfectly right in his assertion, that there existed formerly
few philosophers, especially at the period when Christianity was making rapid
s in the world, who regarded this universe as God and knew of no other deity
ie soul of the world. But at the same time the other position which he endea-
o establish is not equally manifest from them, that this class of men, though
y acknowledging many gods, and designating not only the divine perfections
tues, but also the several parts and members of this world itself, by the names
ies, nevertheless in reality worshipped only one God. Arnobius is disputing
this sect and showing it to be a necessary consequence from their own precepts,
ere is but one God. But what need, I ask, would there have been for this dis-
n, if they had regarded these not as gods, but merely as the names and
tions of gods, and had worshipped but one god in the various parts of
rld? Men who require to have it proved to them, that if they wish to
consistently to their own dogmas, they cannot possibly help acknowledg-
e God, are evidently very widely separated in opinion from those who
profess one God. At any rate, whoever looks upon Arnobius as no mean
ty, must necessarily admit the following: I. That those ancient Pagans
bsequently to the birth of our Saviour identified God with the soul of the

dane soul: whereas others of them, to use Origen's* language, did *ὑπερβαίνειν πᾶσαν τὴν αἰσθητὴν φύσιν, καὶ μηδαμοῦ αὐτῷ νομίζειν ἱδρύσθαι τὸν Θεὸν, ἄνω καὶ δὲ ὑπερ τὰ σώματα ζητεῖν αὐτὸν*, "transcend all the sensible nature, and thinking God not at all to be seated there, looked for him above all corporeal things." Now the former of these Pagans worshipped the whole corporeal world, as the body of God; but the latter of them, though they had higher thoughts of God than as a mundane soul, yet supposing him to have been the cause of all things, and so at first to have contained all things within himself; as likewise that the world, after it was made, was not cut off from

world, accommodated the fables of the gods to physical precepts, understanding, for example, the earth by the name of Ceres, the ether by that of Juno, the upper air by Jupiter, and fire by Vulcan. But, nevertheless, II. that they regarded these natural things as real and true gods, and paid homage to the sun, moon, earth, &c., as though they had the power of working good or evil. Whence, III. it follows, that they believed certain parts or emanations of the divine essence to reside in these several parts of the world, which we ought to consider separately from God and worship with the most devout reverence. Therefore, IV. that according to them the several gods which they supplicated were not merely names and designations of one supreme Being, but gods strictly so called. For, as those who suppose our souls to be derived and drawn from the divine nature, do not deny nevertheless that these souls are natures separate and distinct from God, from whom they flowed: so also those who maintained God to be diffused through the whole universe, considered the parts of this Deity, lying concealed in the several things of nature, as abstracted from God himself, and therefore deserving of particular homage and worship. I cannot, I think, more aptly confirm and illustrate the whole of this than by appealing to a still extant work of Phornutus, De Natura Deorum, which is included by Th. Gale in his Opuscula Veterum Mythologica, Physica et Ethica. Dr. Gale supposes this Phornutus to have been a Platonist, Præfat. p. 7. For my own part I should rather consider him as a Stoic, not only on account of what he says on the conflagration of the world, cap. 17. p. 174. which is altogether at variance with Platonic principles, but from the very project itself of explaining the nature of the gods, as well as other things which I now pass over. Be this as it may, his object throughout the whole of this book is to refer the gods of the ancients to the nature of things, and to identify them with the parts and members of the visible world. The supreme God himself he at once avows to be the soul of the world, cap. 2. p. 141. *Ὥσπερ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀπὸ ψυχῆς διοικοῦμεθα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ κόσμος ψυχὴν ἔχει τὴν συνέχουσαν αὐτὸν καὶ αὕτη καλεῖται Ζεύς*, "As we are governed by a soul, so also the world has a soul, which contains it: and this soul is called Ζεὺς or Jupiter." You might suppose this man, since he refers all things to one soul of the world, to have also worshipped this alone and not to have recognized a plurality of gods. But the contrary is evident from the close of this book, p. 236. where he expressly declares it to be a wise man's part indeed to accommodate all that is recorded of the gods to the truth; but yet that we ought by all means "to worship the gods and offer prayer and sacrifice to them," *θύειν, εὔχεσθαι καὶ προσκυνεῖν*. And why many words? Any one who has at all examined the discipline of the Stoics cannot but be aware, that in supposing God to be a certain power diffused through the whole nature of things, they did not on that account discard a multiplicity of gods. For this sect, although believing God to be fire possessing reason and sense and permeating this universe, nevertheless considered it to be their duty to pay separate homage to Neptune, whom they asserted to be "a soul passing with intelligence through the sea," as also to Ceres and the other deities. See Cicero De Natura Deor. lib. 3. cap. 25. p. 3090. Most foolish, I own, are the whole of these conceits and fraught with the grossest absurdities: but in investigating the opinions of antiquity, we ought by no means to look for what may be consistent with sound wisdom or to suppose that formerly men reasoned as, under better guidance, we do at the present day; but candidly and honestly to record what we find handed down by ancient authors.

* Cont. Cels. p. 260.

him, nor subsisted alone by itself, as a dead thing, but was closely united to him, and livingly dependent on him: these, I say, though they did not take the world to be God, or the body of God, yet did they also look upon it as θεῖον, as that which was "divine and sacred;" and supposed, that God was to be worshipped in all, or that the whole world was to be worshipped, as his image or temple. Thus Plutarch,[5] though much disliking the deifying of inanimate things, doth himself nevertheless approve of worshipping God in the whole corporeal world, he affirming it to be ἱερὸν ἁγιώτατον καὶ θεοπρεπέστατον, "a most holy and most god-becoming temple." And the ancient Persians or Magi, who by no means would allow of worshipping God in any artificial temples made with men's hands, did notwithstanding thus worship God, sub dio, and upon the tops of mountains, in the whole corporeal world, as his natural temple, as Cicero† testifieth: Nec sequor Magos Persarum, quibus auctoribus Xerxes inflammasse templa Græciæ dicitur, quod parietibus includerent deos, quibus omnia deberent esse patentia ac libera, quorumque hic mundus omnis templum esset et domicilium, "Neither do I adhere to the Persian Magi, by whose suggestion and persuasion Xerxes is said to have burnt all the temples of the Greeks, because they inclosed and shut up their gods within walls, to whom all things ought to be open and free, and whose temple and habitation this whole world is." And therefore when Diogenes Laërtius[6] writeth thus of these Magi, that they did θεοὺς ἀποφαίνεσθαι πῦρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ, τῶν δὲ ξοάνων καταγινώσκειν, "make fire and earth and water to be gods, but condemn all statues and images;" we conceive the meaning hereof to be no other than this, that as they worshipped God in no temple, save only that of the whole world, so neither did they allow any other statues or images of him, than the things of nature and parts of the world, such as fire, and earth, and water, called therefore by them, in this sense and no other, gods. For thus are they clearly represented by Clemens Alexandrinus, and that according to the express testimony of Dino:† Θύειν ἐν ὑπαίθρῳ τοὺς Μάγους ὁ Δίνων λέγει, θεῶν ἀγάλματα μόνα τὸ πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ νομίζοντας. Οὐκ ἀπεκρυψάμην οὐδὲ τῶν τούτων ἄγνοιαν. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα ἀποφεύγειν οἴονται τῆς πλάνης, ἀλλ' εἰς ἑτέραν κατολισθαίνουσιν ἀπάτην. Ἀγάλματα μὲν θεῶν οὐ ξύλα καὶ λίθους ὑπειλήφασιν, ὥσπερ Ἕλληνες. οὐδὲ μὲν Ἰβιδας καὶ Ἰχνεύμονας, καθάπερ Αἰγύπτιοι· ἀλλὰ πῦρ τε καὶ ὕδωρ, ὡς φιλόσοφοι, "Dinon affirmeth, that the Persian Magi sacrificed under the open heavens, they accounting fire and

[5] See his book De Iside et Osiride, p. 382. For, excepting this, I know of no other passage of Plutarch that can be alluded to.

[6] Procem. Operis segm. 6. p. 5.

* De Leg. lib. 2. p. 335.

† Protrept. p. 43. [Cap. V. p. 56. Edit. Potteri.]

water to be the only statues and images of the gods. For I would not here conceal their ignorance neither, who, thinking to avoid one error, fall into another; whilst they allow not wood and stones to be the images of the gods, as the Greeks do, nor Ichneumones and Ibides, as the Egyptians, but only fire and water, as philosophers." Which difference betwixt the pagan theologers, that some of them looked upon the whole world as God, or as the body of God, others only as the image, or the temple of God, is thus taken notice of by Macrobius upon Scipio's dream, where the world was called a temple:* Benè autem universus mundus Dei templum vocatur, propter illos, qui æstimant, nihil esse aliud Deum, nisi cœlum ipsum, et cœlestia ista, quæ cernimus. Ideò ut summi omnipotentiam Dei ostenderet posse vix intelligi, nunquam posse videri, quicquid humano subjicitur aspectui templum ejus vocavit; ut qui hæc veneratur ut templa, cultum tamen maximum debeat conditori; sciatque, quisquis in usum templi hujus inducitur, ritu sibi vivendum sacerdotis, "The whole world is well called here the temple of God, in way of opposition to those who think God to be nothing else but the heaven itself, and those heavenly things which we see (or the whole sensible world animated): wherefore Cicero, that he might show the omnipotence of the first supreme God to be such as could scarcely be understood, but not at all perceived by sense, he calleth whatsoever falleth under human sight, his temple; that so he that worshippeth these things as the temple of God, might in the mean time remember, that the chief worship is due to the Maker and Creator of them; as also that himself ought to live in the world like a priest or mysta, holily and religiously." And thus we see, that the Pagans were universally cosmolatræ, or world-worshippers, in one sense or other; not that they worshipped the world as a dead and inanimate thing, but either as the body of God, or at least as the temple or image of him. Neither of which terminated their worship in that, which was sensible and visible only, but in that great mind or soul, which framed and governeth the whole world understandingly; though this was called also by them (not the nature of things, but φύσις κοινὴ, "the common nature," and φύσις τοῦ παντὸς, or τῶν ὅλων, "the nature of the universe," because it contained under it the spermatic reasons, or plastic principles of the whole world.

Furthermore, these pagan Theists universally acknowledging the whole world to be an animal, and that mundane animal also to be a god; those of them who supposed it not to be the first and highest God, did consequently all conceive it, as hath been already observed, to be either a second or at least a third god.

* Lib. 1. c. 14.

And thus Origen:[7] Σαφῶς δὴ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον λέγουσιν εἶναι Θεὸν, Στωϊκοὶ μὲν τὸν Πρῶτον, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος τὸν Δεύτερον, τινὲς δὲ αὐτῶν τὸν Τρίτον, "The Greeks do plainly affirm the whole world to be a god; some of them, as the Stoics, the first God; others, as the Platonists, (to whom may be added the Egyptians also) the second god; though some of these Platonists call it the third god." Those of the Platonists who called the mundane animal, or animated world, the second god, looked upon that whole Platonic trinity of divine hypostases (Τἀγαθὸν, Νοῦς and Ψυχὴ) all but as one first God: but those others of them, who called it a third god, supposed a greater distinction betwixt those three hypostases, and made so many several gods of them; the first, a monad or simple goodness; the second, mind or intellect; the third, psyche or the universal soul, which also without any more ado they concluded to be the immediate soul of this corporeal world, existing likewise from eternity with it. Now, this second god, which was the whole animated world as well to the Egyptians as the Platonists, was by them both said to be, not only the temple and image, but also the son of the first God. That the Egyptians called the animated world the son of God, hath been already proved; and that the other Pagans did the like also, is evident from this of Celsus, where he pretends that the Christians called their Jesus, the Son of God, in imitation of those ancient Pagans, who had styled the world so:* Ὁπόθεν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐπῆλθεν αὐτοῖς, Θεοῦ υἱὸν καλεῖν, σημαίνω· Ἄνδρες παλαιοὶ, τόνδε δὲ τὸν κόσμον, ὡς ἐκ Θεοῦ γενόμενον, παῖδά τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἠίθεον προσεῖπον. Πάνυ γὰρ ὅμοιος οὗτός τε κἀκεῖνος παῖς Θεοῦ, "Whence these Christians came to call their Jesus, the Son of God, I shall now declare; namely, because our ancestors had called the world, as made by God, the son of God, and God. Now, is there not a goodly similitude (think you) betwixt these two sons of God, theirs and ours?" Upon which words of his, Origen writeth thus:† φήθη δὲ υἱὸν Θεοῦ ἡμᾶς λέγειν, παραποιήσαντας τὰ περὶ τοῦ κόσμου, ὡς ἐκ Θεοῦ γενομένου, καὶ υἱοῦ ὄντος αὐτοῦ καὶ Θεοῦ, "Celsus supposed us Christians to have borrowed this appellation of the son of God from the Pagans, they calling the world, as made by God, the son of God, and God." Wherefore, these Pagans, who looked upon the whole animated world only as the second god, and son of God, did unquestionably also worship the first God, in the world, and that probably by personating and deifying his several parts and members too. Thus do we understand what that was which gave occasion to this mistake of late writers, that the Pagans worshipped the inanimate parts of the world, as such, for true and proper gods; viz.,

* Orig. contra Cels. p. 308.
† Orig. contra Cels. 208.
[7] Contra Celsum, lib. 5. p. 235.

their not perceiving that they worshipped these only, as the parts or living members of one great mundane animal, which was to them, if not the first God, yet at least the second God; the temple, image and son of the first God.

And now have we, as we conceive, given a full account of the seeming polytheism of the Pagans, not only in their poetical and fabulous, but also their political or civil theology; the former of which was nothing but fancy and fiction, and the conforming of divine to human things; the latter nothing but vulgar opinion and error, together with the laws and institutes of statesmen and politicians, designed principally to amuse the vulgar, and keep them the better in obedience and subjection to civil laws. Besides which, the intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged *another theology*, which was neither fiction nor mere opinion and law, but nature and philosophy, or absolute truth and reality; according to which natural and philosophic theology of theirs, there was only one unmade self-originated Deity, and many other created gods, as his inferior ministers. So that those many poetical and political gods could not possibly be looked upon otherwise, than either as the created ministers of one supreme God, whether taken singly or collectively; or else as the polyonymy and various denomination of him, according to several notions and partial conceptions of him; and his several powers and manifestations of the world personated and deified. Which latter we have already proved to have been the most generally received opinion of the Pagan theologers; according to that of Euclides,[s] the philosopher, ἓν Τἀγαθὸν πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλούμενον, "there is one supreme Good (or highest Deity) called by many names:" and, according to that of Antisthenes, before cited, "That the many popular gods were but one and the same natural God," viz. as Lactantius adds,[t] Summæ totius artifex, "The maker of the whole world."

We shall conclude with repeating what hath been already suggested, that though the intelligent Pagans did generally disclaim their fabulous theology, St. Austin telling us, that when the absurdities thereof were urged against them, they would commonly make such replies as these:† Absit, inquiunt, fabularum est ista garrulitas; and again, Rursus, inquiunt, ad fabulas redis, "Far be it from us (say they) to think so or so, this is nothing but the garrulity of idle fables," and, "You would bring us again to fables." And though they owned another theology besides their civil also, which was the natural and philosophical, as the only true; yet did they notwithstanding acknowledge a kind of necessity, that, in those times at least, there should be, besides the natural and philosophical theology, which the vulgar were not so

[s] Apud Diogenem Laërtium, lib. 2. segm. 106. p. 142.
[t] *Lib. 1. cap. 5.* † Civit. Dei, lib. 4. cap. 10. [P. 75.]

capable of, another theology framed and held forth, that might be more accommodate to their apprehensions. Thus that Roman pontifex Scævola, in St. Austin, declareth,[9] Expedire existimat, falli in religione civitates, "That it was expedient (as he thought) that cities and commonwealths should be deceived in their religion, or have something false or fabulous intermingled with it;" he giving this reason for the same, because the natural and philosophic theology contained many things in it, which, though true, yet would be hurtful for the vulgar to know; as for example: Quod verus Deus nec sexum habeat, nec ætatem, nec definita corporis membra, "That the true God, hath neither sex, nor age, nor bodily members; and that Hercules and Æsculapius, &c. were not gods, but men, obnoxious to the same infirmities with hers;" and the like. And the learned Varro, in his book of religions,[10] publicly maintained the same doctine: Varro, de religionibus loquens, evidenter dicit, multa esse vera, quæ vulgo scire non sit utile; multaque, quæ tametsi falsa sint, aliter existimare populum expediat: et ideò Græcos teletas et mysteria caliturnitate parietibusque clausisse, &c. "That there were many things true in religion, which it was not convenient for the vulgar to know; as likewise many things false, of which it was expedient they should think otherwise: and that for this cause, the Greeks enclosed their Teletæ or mysteries within walls, and kept them under a seal of secrecy." Upon which of Varro, St. Austin thus noteth: "Hîc certè totum consilium prodidit scientium, per quos civitates et populi regerentur, "Varro here plainly discovers and betrays the whole counsel and secrecy of statesmen and politicians,. by whom cities and nations were governed, and their very arcanum of government, namely this, That people were to be deceived in their religion, for their own good, and the good of their governors." The same father there adding, "That evil demons were much gratified with this doctrine, and liked this fraud and imposture very well, which gave them an advantage to rule and tyrannize, as well over the deceivers as the deceived." Lastly, Strabo also,[1] though otherwise a grave and sober writer, speaks freely and broadly to the same purpose: Οὐ γὰρ ὄχλόν τε γυναικῶν καὶ πάντος ἰδαίου πλήθους ἐπαγάγειν λόγῳ δυνατὸν φιλοσόφῳ, καὶ προσλέσασθαι πρὸς εὐσέβειαν καὶ ὁσιότητα καὶ πίστιν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ δεισιδαιμονίας, τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ μυθοποιΐας καὶ τερατείας, It is not possible that women and others of the vulgar sort

[9] De Civit. Dei. lib. 4. cap. 27. p. 84. tom. 7. opp.
[10] Apud Augustinum De Civit. Dei, lib. 4. cap. 31. p. 88. &c. But Varro did not, as Cudworth seems here to hint, write a specific book [On Religions. Whatever of is met with in St. Augustine, on the subject of the gods and religions, is taken from his book of Antiquities.
[1] Geograph. lib. 1. p. 18.

should be conducted and carried on towards piety, holiness, and faith, merely by philosophic reason and truth; but this must be done by superstition, and that not without the help of fables and prodigious or wonderful narrations." From whence it is plain that Strabo did not only allow a necessity of a civil theology besides the natural and philosophical, but also of a fabulous and poetical one too. And this is a thing the less to be wondered at in these Pagans, because some Christians also seem to acknowledge a kind of truth therein; Synesius himself writing after this manner:[2] Τὸ δὲ ῥᾷστον καταγελάσεται ὁ

[2] In Encomio Calvitiei, p. 78. opp. ed Petavii. Synesius, as is evident from various passages of his works, was convinced that the ancient poets, and especially Homer, concealed the most important precepts under the fables which they recorded of the gods. Nay, he held the opinion common to the Platonists and Pythagoreans, in considering it to be admissible in a philosopher to delude the vulgar with lies, if necessary, and to keep the philosophic truth from their knowledge. It will not be inappropriate to quote a striking passage of his from the Epistol. 15. addressed to his brother, p. 249. Νοῦς μὲν οὖν φιλόσοφος, ἐποπτὴς ὢν τἀληθοῦς, συγχωρεῖ τῇ χρείᾳ τοῦ ψεύδεσθαι ἀνάλογον γάρ ἐστι φῶς πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, καὶ ὄμμα πρὸς ὄημον· ᾧ οὖν ὀφθαλμὸς εἰς κακὸν ἂν ἀπολαύσειεν ἀπλήστου φωτὸς, καὶ ᾧ τοῖς ὀφθαλμιῶσι τὸ σκότος ὀφελιμώτερον· ταύτῃ καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ὄφελος εἶναι τἀληθεμαι δήμῳ, καὶ βλαβερὸν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῖς οὐκ ἰσχύουσιν ἐνατένισαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἐνάργειαν, "The philosophic mind, being the inspector of truth, yields to the necessity of lying. For light is analogous to truth and the eye to the common people. And as the eye cannot enjoy excess of light without injury to itself, and as darkness is better for those who are affected in the eyes, so I hold falsehood to be advantageous to the vulgar, and truth to be hurtful to those who are unable to look steadily into the clear light of things." Add his Epist. 142. to Herculanius, p. 279. whom he sharply rebukes for having incautiously made known certain philosophic doctrines to the common people, and most gravely warns him against divulging any mysteries of the kind for the future. Nevertheless, the learned Doctor does him injustice in supposing him to have countenanced this opinion as a Christian and a bishop. For Synesius says only that a philosopher may do so; but he expressly denies it to be allowable in a Christian teacher, and openly declares, even with the solemnity of an oath, that should he be created a bishop, he will by no means follow such a course. I shall quote his own words, from Epist. 105 p. 249. Καλούμενος δὲ εἰς ἱερωσύνην, οὐκ ἀξιῶ προσποιεῖν δόγματα· Ταῦτα Θεὸν, ταῦτα ἀνθρώπους μαρτύρομαι· Οἰκεῖον ἀλήθεια Θεῷ, ᾧ διὰ πάντων ἀναίτιος εἶναι βούλομαι, "But if called to the episcopal office, I am determined not to feign doctrines. To this I call God and men to witness. Truth is allied to God, before whom I wish to be ever free from blame." And a little afterwards: Δόγματα δὲ οὐκ ἀπηλυγάσομαι, οὐδὲ στασιάσει μοι πρὸς τὴν γλῶτταν ἡ γνώμη, "I will never conceal doctrines, neither shall my mind be at variance with my tongue." Therefore, though Synesius considered it not to be inconsistent with the character of a philosopher to deceive the people and delude them with fables, he held it to be altogether unworthy of the office of a Christian bishop. And, preeminent as he was for candour, I have no doubt that he adhered to his promises, and always freely expressed the sentiments of his mind. Not long ago indeed, J. Toland, a man whose moral perversity corresponded with the depravity of his doctrines, thought fit to call Synesius' faith in question, and to charge him with having violated this pledge: see his Clidophorus, or Exoteric and Esoteric Philosophy, a dissertation occupying the second place in the book entitled Tetradymus, and published in London, 1720, in 8vo. p. 99. But all that he can bring forward in support of this accusation is, that there are certain traces in Synesius' epistles, which show him to have taken the greatest care lest certain philosophic precepts should come to the knowledge of the public. But this most superficial writer, who took upon himself to ridicule the Christian religion, did not perceive that Synesius distinguishes the doctrine of Christ from the philosophy to which he had been devoted, and wishes himself to be regarded in a two-fold light, as a philosopher and as a Christian teacher. He considered that the truths of Christianity ought

δῆμος, δεῖται γὰρ τερατείας, "That which is easy and ordinary will be contemned by the vulgar or common people; and therefore, there is need of something strange and prodigious in religion for them." Flavius Josephus,[3] making this free acknowledgment concerning the wise men among the Greeks: Ταῦτα περὶ Θεοῦ φρονεῖν οἱ σοφώτατοι δοκοῦσι παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι, "That they held the same things concerning God which the Jews did;" adds notwithstanding afterwards, Εἰς πλῆθος δόξαις προκατειλημμένον, τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ δόγματος ἐξενεγκεῖν οὐκ ἐτόλμησαν, "That they were afraid to declare the truth of this their doctrine to the vulgar, prepossessed with other opinions." And indeed, they did not think it safe to declare the natural and true theology promiscuously to all; Plato* himself intimating as much in these words: Τὸν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ πάντος εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν, "That as it was hard to find out the maker of this universe, so neither, being found out, could he be declared to the vulgar."[4] Wherefore, since God was so

by no means to be concealed from the people, or the tongue of a bishop discoursing on sacred things be at variance with his real sentiments; but, on the other hand, he held that all the precepts of philosophy are not adapted for the vulgar, and that it is not incompatible with the character of a philosopher to keep some to themselves and their disciples alone, and to delude the people with figments. I speak not of its being uncertain, whether those epistles which Toland appeals to were written before or after he was appointed to the office of bishop. We ought to check, as far as truth will permit, the shameless temerity of those who, in these our own times, seek to injure the sacred cause of Christianity, by loading the ancient prelates with every species of abuse, and scruple not to represent them as crafty and dishonest, because, while confining certain dogmas within their own breasts, they propounded others to the people. I am not indeed so devoted an admirer of the authority of the early fathers, as to feel disposed to defend them, in opposition to truth and facts; but it is sufficient to rouse one's indignation, when men, sheer compounds as it were of vice themselves, fasten their foul calumnies upon those with whose opinions and doctrines they are in many instances almost wholly unacquainted.

[3] Contra Apionem, lib. 2. sect. 16. p. 482. tom. 2. ed Havercamp. But the learned Doctor does not give the words exactly as they stand in Josephus: Ταῦτα περὶ Θεοῦ φρονεῖν οἱ σοφώτατοι παρ' Ἕλλησιν ὅτι μὲν ἐδιδάχθησαν,——ἐῶ νῦν λέγειν, "I mention not at present that the wisest of the Greeks were taught this opinion respecting God (by Moses)." But this passage of Josephus proves nothing in the present question. For who would consider it as conclusive that Plato, Socrates, Pythagoras, and the rest of the principal philosophers, secretly agreed with the Jews, merely because it is so asserted by Josephus, who was himself a Jew, and is here speaking in praise of his own nation? What reply would Josephus have given, if any one had asked him, how he came to know, that Plato had been instructed by Moses, and secretly favoured the Jewish doctrines?

* In Timæo, cap. 13. p. 236. ed. Fabricii.

[4] Besides the passages here adduced, many others are to be met with in ancient authors, to the effect that the plain and simple truth cannot at all times be disclosed to the common people, but ought to be conveyed to them under the guise of fables and symbols. Clemens Alexandr. Stromat. lib. 5. cap 8. p. 671. tells us that this course was generally approved of by philosophers: Οὐ μόνον Αἰγύπτιοι οἱ λογικώτατοι, πρὸς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βαρβάρων ὅσοι φιλοσοφίας ὠρέχθησαν, τὸ συμβολικὸν εἶδος ἐζήλωσαν, "Not only the most intelligent Egyptians, but all those who were devoted to philosophy among the other barbarous nations, admired the symbolical mode of instruction." And to the same purport, Origen and the other ancient Christian fathers. Sallustius, in his book De Diis et Mundo, cap. 3. p. 246. in T. Gale's Scriptor. Mythologic. Τὸ μὲν πάντας τὴν περὶ Θεῶν ἀλήθειαν ἐδιδάσκειν ἐθέλειν,

hard to be understood, they conceived it necessary, that the vulgar should be permitted to worship him in his works, by parts and piece-meal, according to the various manifestations of himself; that is, should have a civil theology at least, distinct from the natural and philosophical, if not another fabulous one too.

τοῖς μὲν ἀνοήτοις, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι μανθάνειν, καταφρόνησιν, τοῖς δὲ σπουδαίοις ῥᾳθυμίαν ἐμποιεῖ· τὸ δὲ διὰ μύθων τἀληθὲς ἐπικρύπτειν, τοὺς μὲν καταφρονεῖν οὐκ ἐᾷ, τοὺς δὲ φιλοσοφεῖν ἀναγκάζει, "To attempt to teach all men the simple truth, in respect to the gods, would in the unintelligent, from their inability to learn, breed contempt, and in the studious, indolence: whereas, to disguise the truth in fables prevents the former from despising it, and compels the latter to philosophize." Phornutus, De Natura Deor. cap. 35. p. 235. Οὕτω δὲ ἂν εἰδέναι καὶ τἄλλα τῶν μυθικῶς παραδεδόσθαι περὶ θεῶν δοκούντων ἀναγαγὼν ——δύναιο, πεισθείς, ὅτι οὐχ οἱ τυχόντες ἐγένοντο οἱ παλαιοί, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνιέναι τὴν τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν ἱκανοί, καὶ πρὸς τὸ διὰ συμβόλων καὶ αἰνιγμάτων φιλοσοφῆσαι περὶ αὐτῆς εὐεπίφοροι, "In this manner you will be able to refer to the truth all the other fabulous accounts handed down on the subject of the gods, being persuaded that the ancients were men of no ordinary wisdom, but able to understand the nature of the world, and happy in their mode of explaining it by means of symbols and figures." Dionysius Halicarnassus, or whatever other author it was, in his Vita Homeri, p. 323. ed. T. Gale: Εἰ δὲ δι' αἰνιγμάτων καὶ μυθικῶν λόγων τινῶν ἐμφαίνεται τὰ νοήματα, οὐ χρὴ παράδοξον ἡγεῖσθαι, "Moreover, that he (Homer) expresses his sentiments by figures and certain fabulous narratives, ought not to be deemed strange." Τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον——τῶν ἀρχαίων ἦθος, "For this custom of the ancients is the reason," ὅπως οἱ ἀμαθεῖς μὴ καταφρονῶσι τούτων, ὧν οὐ δύνανται συνιέναι, "why the ignorant do not despise those things which they cannot understand." And who has not heard of the symbols of Pythagoras, of the hieroglyphics of the Egyptians, and other things of the kind? To declare freely my own mind, however, I have ever entertained very strong doubts on the whole of this matter. I really admit that wise men formerly kept many doctrines to themselves, or taught them only to their more favoured disciples, to avoid provoking the fury of the superstitious multitude; I grant also that moral precepts were frequently put forth in the garb of fable, with the view of being more readily instilled into men's minds; and moreover, that some philosophers were continually repeating certain short and pithy sayings, in order to excite in their hearers the recollection of particular duties and doctrines, without a long circuit of words. But I can never bring myself to believe that any ancient philosopher was so besotted and insane as to impart to the people sound and noble precepts on God and divine things, clothed and disguised in ridiculous, obscene, and most absurd fables. In the first place, I question the authority of almost all the ancient writers who affirm this to have been the case, partly because they bring forward no argument in proof, partly because the very interpretations of these fables, which they foist upon their readers, are forced and admirably at variance with each other, and lastly, because I observe most of these authors to possess more ingenuity than judgment. I speak not of its having been manifestly the interest of almost all those who attributed so much recondite wisdom to the fables, that such should be the general belief, in order that they might the more easily confirm the doctrines which they themselves deemed true by the testimonies of the ancients, whose authority was always held in the very highest estimation. In the second place, I can see no reason why the ancients should have betaken themselves to this course. Wise men, we are told, were anxious to exclude the vulgar, rude and ignorant as it was for the most part, from the knowledge of divine truths, which require a mind already purified and polished by learning. On the account they used the disguise of fables, lest these mysteries should be divulged to the uninitiated. If this be true, then truly these ancient professors of wisdom must have been wonderfully clever and ingenious! They are unwilling that the people should become acquainted with these mysteries: whether wisely or otherwise, I shall not now inquire. But in order to obtain this end, they invent the most foolish and ridiculous fables, and in these, conceal what they consider to be the most important of precepts, a course, in my opinion, the most absurd. It certainly would have been much better to have kept these doctrines altogether secret, especially as they were not at all

XXV. We have now dispatched the first of those three proposed to be insisted on, viz. that the Pagans worshipped nd the same supreme God, under many personal names, so nuch of their polytheism was but seeming and phantastical, ndeed nothing but the polyonymy of one supreme God, naking many poetical and political gods of that one natural and thus worshipping God by parts and piece-meal, ac- g to that clear acknowledgment of Maximus Madaurensis[5] cited: Unius summi Dei virtutes, per mundanum opus is, nos multis vocabulis invocamus; et dum ejus quasi im membra carptim variis supplicationibus prosequimur, colere videmur, " The virtues of the one supreme God d throughout the whole world, we (Pagans) invoke under several names; and so prosecuting, with our supplications, it were divided members, must needs be thought to worship hole, we leaving out nothing of him." We shall proceed

o communicate them, than to have imposed in this manner upon the mul- But first, these clever persons disclose in a certain way that which they wish to know, and which they had the power of keeping to themselves: secondly, stead of selecting honourable and beautiful images, they clothe it in the grossest t absurd fables, and subject themselves to the risk of having that brought to ich they wished to be unknown: and lastly, without the slightest reason, themselves as philosophers by contaminating the ignorant and innocent vulgar foulest errors. The man who wishes to keep all others in ignorance of philo- truths, which he himself has discovered with great labour, although he may nevertheless in some measure excusable: but he who without any necessity those whom he is desirous of excluding from his rites, and when he might en silent, fills them with impious doctrines, dangerous to the welfare of the d subversive of all virtue and morality, ought to be an object of detestation to men, and to be ignominiously expelled from the society of philosophers. Let nerefore, who assert that the ancient sages veiled great and important truth in and fables, consider the light they are representing them in by ascribing to ch fallacies and impostures. But some one will object perhaps: What do you o the Egyptian hieroglyphics, and the symbols of Pythagoras? Are not these hat there existed men who considered this mode of veiling the truths to be nd beneficial? To speak candidly, I think very little of either, and am not one who are eternally labouring to discover in them hidden treasures. The symbols agoras I hold to be proofs not of profound wisdom but of gross superstition in losopher. For example, he forbade his disciples to eat beans. This precept, standing all that may be said of its recondite sense by so many of the ancients derns, I accept without any interpretation; and that I am not wrong in doing an demonstrate, if necessary, by such arguments, drawn from the history of oras, as no impartial man will be disposed to impugn. But, when once Py- s had acquired a great reputation for learning and wisdom, his unthinking s easily suffered themselves to suppose that every sentence he uttered con- some recondite precept or other of wonderful importance. On the hieroglyphics Egyptians, I have already stated my opinion. Nor do I now abandon it. The n priests having accidentally discovered certain columns of a bygone age, with various figures and characters, and being ignorant of this mode of ancient rashly concluded, that the earliest inhabitants of Egypt had expressed all their and learning in those characters. Each therefore exercised his own genius in ting them, and conceived he would be acting wisely by following the same e, and making known his thoughts by signs and figures of his own. Consult arks professedly upon this subject above.

ud Augustinum Epist. 16. p. 15. tom. 2. opp.

to the second head proposed, that besides this polyonymy of one supreme God in the poetical and civil theology of the Pagans, which was their seeming and phantastic polytheism, they had another real polytheism also; they acknowledging in their natural and philosophic theology likewise a multiplicity of gods, that is, of substantial understanding beings, superior to men, really existing in the world. Which though they were called by them gods, yet were they not therefore supposed to be *ἀγέννητοι* and *αὐτογενεῖς*, "unmade and self-existent, or independent beings," but all of them (one only excepted) *γεννητοὶ θεοὶ*, "generated gods,"* according to the larger notion of that word before declared; that is, though not *κατὰ χρόνον*, yet at least, *ἀπ' αἰτίας γεννητοὶ*, though not as "made in time," yet as "produced from a superior cause."[6] Plutarch propounding this for one amongst his Platonic questions, why *ὁ ἀνωτάτω Θεὸς*, "the highest and supreme God," was called by Plato, both the father and maker of all things, gives this reply to it in the words before cited: *Ἡ τῶν μὲν θεῶν τῶν γεννητῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πατήρ ἐστιν (ὡς Ὅμηρος ἐπονομάζει) ποιητὴς δὲ τῶν ἀλόγων καὶ ἀψύχων*, "That perhaps he was said to be the father of all the generated gods and of men (as he is also styled in Homer) but the maker of all other irrational and inanimate beings." From which passage of Plutarch's it plainly appears, that the *ὁ ἀνωτάτω Θεὸς*, "the one highest God," being every way *ἀγέννητος*, "unmade" and "unproduced," was thought to be the maker or father of all the other gods, therefore called *γεννητοί*. Which is further plainly declared elsewhere by the same Plutarch in these words:† *Πλάτωνος πατέρα καὶ ποιητὴν τοῦ τε κόσμου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων γεννητῶν τὸν ἀγεννητὸν καὶ ἀΐδιον Θεὸν ἐπονομάζοντος*, "Plato calleth the one unmade and eternal God the father and maker of the world, and of all other things generated." And though some of those many gods of Plato's were by him also called *ἀΐδιοι*, or "eternal," yet were they likewise *γεννητοὶ* too, in another sense, that is, "produced" and "derived," by way of emanation, from that one, who is every way *ἀγέννητος*, "underived and independent upon any other cause," And thus Proclus universally pronounces:‡ *Τὸ εἶναι θεοὺς πάντες οἱ θεοὶ διὰ τὸν πρῶτον ἔχουσι θεὸν*, "All the gods owe their being gods to the first God," he adding, that he is therefore called *πηγὴ τῆς θεότητος*, "the fountain of the godhead."

Wherefore the "many gods" of the intelligent Pagans were

* P. 243, 254.

[6] Every one who has looked into either Plautus or Plotinus will be aware that the junior Platonists made this distinction between generation *κατὰ χρόνον* and generation *ἀπ' αἰτίας*. But that the same was observed by all the more intelligent of those who in a certain measure asserted a plurality of gods, as the learned Doctor seems to assume, is more I think than can be proved.

† Sympos. lib. 8. c. 1. [P. 718.] ‡ Theol. P. lib. 3. c. 7. [P. 132.]

derived from one God, and but ὑπουργοὶ δυνάμεις (as Plutarch somewhere calls them), "the subservient powers," or "ministers of the one supreme, unmade Deity." Which (as hath been before observed) was frequently called by these Pagans Θεὸς, "God," κατ' ἐξοχὴν, or in way of eminency; as likewise were those other inferior, or generated gods, in way of distinction from him, called θεοὶ, "the gods." And accordingly the sense of Celsus is thus represented in Origen:* Θεοὺς δημιουργοὺς εἶναι πάντων σωμάτων, μόνης ψυχῆς ἔργον οὔσης Θεοῦ, "That the gods were the makers of the bodies of all animals, the souls of them only being the work of god." Moreover, these inferior gods are styled by Ammianus Marcellinus,† substantiales potestates, "substantial powers," probably in way of distinction from those other pagan gods, that were not substantial, but only so many names and notions of the one supreme god, or his powers severally personated and deified, which substantial powers of Am. Marcellinus,[7] (as divination and prophecy was, by their means, imparted to men) were all said to be subject to that one sovereign Deity called Themis: whom (saith he) the ancient theologers seated in cubili et solio Jovis, "in the bed-chamber and throne of Jupiter;" as indeed some of the poets have made her to be the wife of Jupiter, and others his sister. And Anaxarchus‡ in Plutarch styles her πάρεδρον τοῦ Διὸς, "Jupiter's assessor," though that philosopher abused the fable, and grossly depraved the meaning of it, as if it signified πᾶν τὸ πραχθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ κρατοῦντος θέμιτον εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον, "That whatsoever is

* Lib. 4. p. 200. † Lib. 22.

[7] Historiar. lib. 21. cap. 1. p. 263. Substantiales, says he, potestates ritu diverso placatæ, velut ex perpetuis sortium venis vaticinia mortalitati suppeditant, "The substantial powers appeased by different rites supply prophecies to mortals as if from perpetual fountains of oracles." Dr. Cudworth, however, appears to me to be guilty of two errors in interpreting this passage. I. He supposes the *substantial powers* to be so called by Ammianus, by way of distinguishing the really subsisting from the fictitious gods. This is a conjecture, resting upon no foundation. In this passage the substantial powers are no doubt those demons which the Platonists, whose doctrine Ammianus appears from various parts of his History to have favoured, supposed to preside over divination. On these gods or demons Jamblichus discourses at some length De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. 3. cap. 11. p. 72. &c. But why Ammianus calls these demons substantial is as difficult to be understood as the whole of his style, which much perplexes readers by its harshness and obscurity. In lib. 14. cap. 11. p. 59. he calls Nemesis or Adrastea also substantialem tutelam, "substantial protection," which throws no greater light upon the signification of this word. I suspect Ammianus means by substantial powers those which are not bound to certain parts of the world, but wander about freely and subsist alone. For, like the Platonists, whose precepts he followed, he believed certain genii or demons to reside in the stars, elements, earth, fountains, and the like: according to him these powers were not substantial, since they had no substance of their own, but made use as it were of that of others. Whereas the substantial powers are those which subsist independently of any body of the kind. II. He tells us that Ammianus makes these powers subject to Themis as their sovereign deity. This, however, he states according to his own sense, and not upon the authority of Ammianus, with whom nothing of the kind is to be found.

‡ Vit. Alex. [P. 596. tom. 1. opp.]

done by the sovereign power, is therefore just and right:" whereas the true moral thereof was this, that justice or righteousness sits in council with God, and in his mind and will, prescribes laws to nature and the whole world. Themis therefore was another name of God, amongst the Pagans, according to his universal consideration, besides those before mentioned: and when Plato, in his book of laws,[8] would have men to swear by the names of those three gods, Jupiter, Apollo, and Themis;* these were but so many several partial notions of the one supreme Deity; the meaning thereof being no other than this, as Pighius observeth, Timore divino, veritate ipsa, ac æquitate sanciri debere juramenta. In Jove enim summi numinis potestatem, falsi ac perjurii vindicem; in Apolline veritatis lumen; in Themide, jus, fas, atque licitum esse intelligitur. Est enim Themis ipsa lex æterna atque universalis, mundo ac naturæ præscripta; or, according to Cicero, Ratio recta summi Jovis. And Ficinus, in his commentary as to the main agreeth herewith. So that, when the pagan theologers affirmed[9] the Numen of Themis to preside over the spirits of the elements, and all those other substantial powers, from whom divination was participated to men; their meaning therein was clearly no other than this; that there was one supreme Deity ruling over all the other gods, and that the divine mind, which prescribeth laws to nature and the whole world, and contains all the fatal decrees in it, according to the evolution of which things come to pass in the world, was the fountain from whence all divination proceeded; as these secrets were more or less imparted from thence to those inferior created spirits. The philosophy of the pagan theology amongst the Greeks was plainly no other than this; that there is one unmade self-existent Deity, the original of all, and that there are many other substantial powers or spirits, created by it, as the ministers of its providence in the world: but there was much of poetry, or poetic fancy, intermingled with this philosophy, as the flourish to it, to make up their pagan theology.

[8] Lib. 12. p. 685. opp. I am ignorant, however, where Dr. Cudworth discovered that the opinion here expressed was Plato's.

* De Dea Themide, p. 39.

[9] In writing this the learned Doctor had in his mind Ammianus alone, whose passage we have just been discussing. But as we remarked before, he is mistaken in stating that Ammianus speaks of the *spirits of the elements:* for Ammianus mentions only one spirit. Into the meaning of the fable concerning Themis I shall not at present inquire. Besides Alb. Pighius, whose book De Themide has been republished by J. Gronovius in his Antiquit. Græc. tom. 9. and the authors mentioned by J. Alb. Fabricius, Biblioth. Græc. lib. 1. cap. 35. p. 241. the celebrated Jo. Fred. Hombergk Zum Vach, in a specific work intitled Themis, seu de Ortu Legis Æternæ secundum Sententiam Græcorum, Magburg. 1725. 4. has displayed much learning in the attempt to develope the truths of this fable. I cannot but acknowledge, however, that the whole history of Themis and every thing recorded of this goddess seem to me to refute the opinion of those who conceive Themis to be the supreme Deity himself, or one of the names by which he was designated by the ancients.

Thus, as hath been before declared, the Pagans held both one God, and many gods, in different senses; one unmade self-existent Deity, and many generated or created gods; Onatus[10] the Pythagorean declaring, that they who asserted one only God, and not many, "understood not what the dignity and majesty of the divine transcendency consisted in, namely in ruling over gods;" and Plotinus[1] conceiving, that the supreme god was most of all glorified, not by being "contracted into one," but "by having multitudes of gods, derived from him, and dependent on him;" and that the honour done to them redounded unto him. Where there are two things to be distinguished; first, that, according to the pagan Theists, God was no solitary being; but that there were multitudes of gods, or substantial powers, and living understanding natures, superior to men, which were neither self-existent, nor yet generated out of matter, but all generated or created from one supreme. Secondly, that forasmuch as these were all supposed to have some influence, more or less, upon the government of the world, and the affairs of mankind, they were therefore all of them conceived to be the due objects of men's religious worship, adoration and invocation; and accordingly was the pagan devotion scattered amongst them all. Nor were the gods of the oriental Pagans neither mere dead statues and images, as some would conclude from the Scripture, but "living understanding beings, superior to men," (though worshipped in images) according to that reply of the Chaldeans, in Daniel to Nebuchadnezzar, when he required them to tell his dream, "There is none other, that can show this thing before the king, except those gods, whose dwelling is not with flesh;" that is, the immortal gods, or who are exalted above the condition of human frailty. Though some conceive,[2] that these words are to be understood of a peculiar sort of gods; namely, that this was such a thing, as could not be done by those demons and lower aërial gods, which frequently converse with men, but was reserved to a higher rank of gods, who are above human converse. Now, as to the former of these two things, that God is no solitary being, but that there are multitudes of understanding beings superior superior to men, the creatures and ministers of one supreme God; the Scriptures both of the Old and New Testaments fully agree with the Pagans herein: "Thousand thousands ministered unto him, and ten thousand times ten thousand stood before

[10] Libro Περὶ Θεοῦ καὶ Θείου apud Stobæum in Eclogis Physic. lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 4.

[1] I should like him to have pointed out the place where Plotinus has said so. Of all the passages in this author, which treat of the gods, I have not been able to meet with one entirely corresponding to the sentiment here given.

[2] The opinion here glanced at is that of Hugo Grotius, Comm. ad h. l. p. 412. ed. Paris. which I should not positively reject, although I consider the interpretation of those, who suppose the Magians to mean the gods generally, is equally probable.

him;"* and "Ye are come to an innumerable company of angels."† But the latter of them, that religious worship and invocation doth of right belong to these created spirits, is constantly denied and condemned in these writings, that being a thing peculiarly reserved to that one God, who was the creator of heaven and earth. And thus is that prophecy of Jeremy to be understood, expressed in the Chaldaic tongue, that so the Jews might have it in readiness for those Chaldean idolaters, when they came into Babylon: "Thus shall ye say unto them, the gods, that have not made the heavens and the earth, shall perish from the earth, and from under these heavens."‡ That is, there shall come a time when none shall be "religiously worshipped" any where upon the face of the whole earth, save only that God who made the heavens and the earth, and he without images too. Which prophecy, but in part yet fulfilled, shall then have its complete accomplishment, when the kingdoms of this world shall become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ.§ And thus is the controversy rightly stated betwixt the Pagans and the Christians by Lactantius:[3] Sed fortasse quærat aliquis à nobis, quod apud Ciceronem quærit Hortensius; Si Deus unus est, quæ esse beata solitudo queat? Tanquam nos, qui unum esse dicimus, desertum ac solitarium esse dicamus. Habet enim ministros, quos vocamus nuntios. Et est istud verum, quod dixisse Senecam suprà retuli; genuisse regni sui ministros Deum. Verùm hi neque dii sunt, neque deos se vocari aut coli volunt; quippe, qui nihil præter jussum ac voluntatem Dei faciant, "As if we who say, there is but one God, therefore made a solitary and deserted Deity. Whereas we acknowledge, that God hath his ministers, whom we call angels: and we grant that to be true, which was before cited out of Seneca, that God hath generated or created ministers of his kingdom. But these are neither gods, nor would they be called gods, nor worshipped; forasmuch as they only execute the will and command of God." And again afterwards to the same purpose: Si eos multitudo delectat, non duodecim dicimus, nec trecentos sexaginta quinque (ut Orpheus) sed innumerabiles, et arguimus eorum errores in diversum, qui tam paucos putant. Sciant tamen, quo nomine appellari debeant; nè Deum verum violent, cujus nomen exponunt, dum pluribus tribuunt, &c. "If multitude delight them, we say not, that there are twelve, nor yet three hundred and sixty-five, as Orpheus, but innumerable. And we tax their error, on the contrary, who think them to be so few. Nevertheless, let them know by what name they ought to be called, lest they violate the true God, whose

* Dan. vii. 10. † Heb. xii. 22.
‡ Jer. x. 11. § Rev. xi. 15.
[3] Instit. Divin. lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 50. 51.

me is profaned when it is given to many." From which pas-
ges of Lactantius it plainly appeareth, that the main contro-
rsy between the Christians and the Pagans was then only
is, "Whether or no the created ministers of the supreme
od might be called gods, and religiously worshipped." But
is pagan objection against the solitary Deity of the Christians
by some ancient Christian writers also otherwise answered;
mely, from those three hypostases or persons of the trinity;
ey affirming upon that account, that though Christians did not
knowledge such a multitude of gods as the Pagans, yet did
ey not therefore make God a solitary and sterile being, before
e creation neither, as the Jews did; but went in a middle way
twixt Jews and Pagans, they interpreting Moses also his
ciamus hominem, to this sense.

XXXVI. We shall now show particularly what these many
ds of the Pagans were. It hath been often observed, that the
agans were divided in their philosophic or natural theology, as
their opinions concerning the supreme God; some of them
inking, τὸ Θεῖον ἐξῃρημένον εἶναι τῆς ὅλης φύσεως, "that the
preme Deity was an abstract being, elevated above nature and
e whole world;" but others, that he was nothing higher than
anima mundi, or "soul of the world." Now the former of
ese two were chiefly amongst the Grecks, the Pythagoreans
d the Platonists, who had accordingly several distinctions
nongst them concerning their gods, as between the ὑπερκόσμιοι
οὶ and the ἐγκόσμιοι, "the super-mundane and the mundane
ds;" the θεοὶ ἀΐδιοι and the γεννητοὶ, the "eternal" and the
generated gods;" that word "latter" being now taken in a
rrower and more confined sense, for such as were made in
ne, or had a beginning of their existence: and lastly, the
ητοὶ θεοὶ and the αἰσθητοὶ, the "intelligible" and the "sen-
ble gods."[4] And the ὑπερκόσμιοι, ἀΐδιοι and νοητοὶ θεοὶ,
supermundane, eternal," and "intelligible gods," of these Py-
agoreans and Platonists, were first of all, and principally, those
εἷς ἀρχικαὶ ὑποστάσεις (as Plotinus calls them), those "three
vine hypostases," that have the nature of principles in the uni-
rse, viz. Tagathon or Hen, Nous and Psyche, or Monad, Mind
d Soul. That this trinity was not first of all a mere invention
Plato's, but much ancienter than him, is plainly affirmed by
lotinus in these words:* Καὶ εἶναι τοὺς λόγους τούσδε μὴ
ινοὺς, μὴ δὲ νῦν, ἀλλὰ πάλαι μὲν εἰρῆσθαι μὴ ἀνάπεπταμένως,
ὺς δὲ νῦν λόγους ἐξηγητὰς ἐκείνων γεγονέναι· μαρτυρίοις πιστω-
μένοις τὰς δόξας ταύτας παλαιὰς εἶναι, τοῖς αὐτοῦ τοῦ Πλάτωνος
άμμασιν· ἥπτετο μὲν οὖν καὶ Παρμενίδης πρότερον τῆς τοιαύτης

[4] On all these gods of the junior Platonists no one will be consulted to greater advantage than Proclus in his Theologia Platonica.

* Ennead 5. lib. 1. [P. 489.]

δόξης, "That these doctrines are not new, nor of yesterday, but have been very anciently delivered, though obscurely (the discourses now extant being but explications of them) appears from Plato's own writings; Parmenides before him having insisted on them."

Now it is well known that Parmenides was addicted to the Pythagoric sect, and therefore probable that this doctrine of a divine triad was one of the arcanums of that school also. Which is further confirmed from hence, because Numenius a famous Pythagorean entertained it as such. And Moderatus (as Simplicius informeth us) plainly affirmeth this trinity of principles to have been a Pythagoric cabala:* Οὗτος γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς Πυθαγορείους τὸ μὲν Πρῶτον ἓν ὑπὲρ τὸ ὄν καὶ πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἀποφαίνεται· τὸ δὲ Δεύτερον ἕν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ὄντως ὂν καὶ νοητὸν, τὰ εἴδη φησὶν εἶναι· τὸ δὲ Τρίτον ὅπερ ἐστὶ ψυχικὸν, μετέχειν τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν, "This (Moderatus) declareth that, according to the Pythagoreans, the first one or unity is above all essence; that the second one, which is that which truly is, and intelligible, according to them, is the ideas; and that the third, which is psychical or soul, partaketh both of the first unity, and of the ideas." Lastly, we have Jamblichus' testimony also in Proclus[§] to the same purpose: Τρεῖς εἶναι θεοὺς τούτους καὶ παρὰ τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις ὑμνουμένους, "That there were three gods also praised by the Pythagoreans." Now we have before showed that Pythagoras' philosophy was derived from the Orphic cabala, which Proclus in another place† thus fully testifieth: Ἅπασα γὰρ ἡ παρ' Ἕλλησι Θεολογία τῆς Ὀρφικῆς ἐστι μυσταγωγίας ἔκγονος· πρώτου μὲν Πυθαγόρου παρὰ Ἀγλαοφήμου τὰ περὶ θεῶν ὄργια διδαχθέντος· Δευτέρου δὲ Πλάτωνος ὑποδεξαμένου τὴν παντελῆ περὶ τούτων ἐπιστήμην ἔκ τε τῶν Πυθαγορείων καὶ Ὀρφικῶν γραμμάτων, "All the theology of the Greeks was derived from the Orphic Mystagogia; Pythagoras being first instructed by Aglaophemus in the Orphic Orgia, or mysteries concerning the gods; and Plato being the next who received a perfect knowledge of all these divine things, both out of the Pythagoric and the Orphic writings." And that a trinity was part of that Orphic cabala, we have already proved out of Amelius, he affirming (in Proclus) that Plato's three kings were the same with Orpheus' trinity of Phanes, Uranus, and Cronus. Moreover, since all these three, Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato, travelling into Egypt, were there initiated in that arcane theology of the Egyptians (called Hermaical), it seemeth probable (as was before observed) that this doctrine of a divine triad was also part of the arcane theology of the Egyptians. It hath

* In Ar. Phys. p. 50.
§ Comm. in Timæum Platon. lib. 2. p. 94.
† Theol. Plat. lib. 1. cap. 5. [P. 13.]

been also noted that there were some footsteps of such a trinity in the Mithraic mysteries amongst the Persians, derived from Zoroaster; as likewise that it was expressly contained in the magic or Chaldaic oracles, of whatsoever authority they may be. Moreover, it hath been signified that the Samothracians had very anciently a certain trinity of gods, that were the highest of all their gods, and that called by an Hebrew name too, Cabbirim, or the mighty gods: and that from thence the Roman Capitoline trinity of gods was derived; the second whereof was Minerva, which among the Latins, as Athena among the Greeks, was understood to signify the divine wisdom. Lastly, the ternary, or triad, was not only accounted a sacred number amongst the Pythagoreans, but also, as containing some mystery in nature, was therefore made use of by other Greeks and Pagans, in their religious rites; as Aristotle informeth us:* Διὸ παρὰ τῆς φύσεως εἰληφότες ὥσπερ νόμους ἐκείνης, καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἁγιστείας τῶν θεῶν χρώμεθα τῷ ἀριθμῷ τούτῳ, "Wherefore from nature, and as it were observing her laws, have we taken this number of three, making use of the same in the sacrifices of the gods, and other purifications."[6]

Now since it cannot well be conceived, how such a trinity of divine hypostases should be first discovered merely by human wit and reason, though there be nothing in it (if rightly understood) that is repugnant to reason; and since there are in the ancient writings of the Old Testament certain significations of a plurality in the Deity, or of more than one hypostasis, we may reasonably conclude that which Ploclus asserteth of this trinity, as it was contained in the Chaldaic Oracles, to be true, that it was at first θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία, "a theology of divine tradition or revelation," or a divine cabala, viz. amongst the Hebrews first, and from them afterwards communicated to the Egyptians and other nations. Neither ought it be thought any considerable objection to the contrary because the Platonists, Pythagoreans, and other Pagan theologers, did not express this their trinity, in the very words of the Athanasian Creed, nor according to the form of the Nicene council. Forasmuch as this mystery was gradually imparted to the world, and that first but sparingly to

* De Cœlo, lib. 1. cap. 5. [Cap. 1. p. 610. tom. 1. opp.]

[6] On the Orphic, Persian, and Pythagoric trinity I have already said what will suffice to explain the nature of this subject. But such remarks as seem to me to be required by way of illustration or stricture upon the long and crudite digression here entered into on the Platonic trinity, I purpose bringing forward altogether in the Preface. For as our excellent author pays but little attention to arrangement, and frequently separates matters which it would have been better to discuss in connexion, I am afraid to follow his example, and to examine all his conclusions in parts, lest I should confuse and perplex my readers. I pass over other reasons, which lead me to consider it the preferable course to explain the whole of this disputation, which since Dr. Cudworth's time has given rise to various controversies, in continued and uninterrupted order.

the Hebrews themselves, either in their written or oral calaba; but afterwards more fully under Christianity, the whole frame whereof was built thereupon. Nevertheless was it not so distinctly and precisely determined, nor so punctually and scrupulously stated among the Christians neither, till after the rising up of heresies concerning it. Nor when all was done, did the orthodox themselves at first universally agree in the signification of the word Ὁμούσιος, "co-essential," or "consubstantial." Nor lastly, is it a thing at all to be wondered at, that in such a difficult and mysterious point as this, there should be some diversity of apprehensions amongst the reputed orthodox Christians themselves; and much less therefore amongst pagans and philosophers. However, we freely acknowledge, that as this divine cabala was but little understood by many of those who entertained it among the Pagans, so was it by divers of them much depraved and adulterated also.

For first, the Pagans universally called this their trinity, a trinity of gods, τὸν Πρῶτον, τὸν Δεύτερον, and τὸν Τρίτον θεόν, "the first, the second," and "the third god;" as the more philosophical amongst them called it also a trinity of causes, and a trinity of principles, and sometimes a trinity of opificers. Thus is this cabala of the trinity styled in Proclus, ἡ τῶν Τριῶν θεῶν παράδοσις, "the tradition of the three gods." And accordingly is it said of Numenius by him, that τρεῖς ἀνυμνήσας θεοὺς, he did τραφγδῶν καλεῖν, πάππον, ἔγγονον, ἀπόγονον, "having the three gods, tragically or affectedly called them the grandfather, the son, and the nephew;" Numenius thereby intimating that as the second of these gods was the offspring of the first god, so the third, called the nephew of the first, was derived both from him and from the second; from the first as the grandfather, and from the second, as the father of him. Harpocration likewise, Atticus, and Amelius, are said by Proclus to have entertained this same cabala or tradition of the three gods, the latter of these styling them βασιλέας τρεῖς, and τριττὸν δημιουργὸν, "three kings," and "three opificers," or makers of the whole world. In like manner Plotinus, speaking of the second of these three hypostases (that is, νοῦς, "the first mind" or "intellect"), calls him δεύτερον Θεὸν, "the second god:"† Καὶ Θεὸς αὕτη ἡ φύσις, καὶ Θεὸς Δεύτερος, προφαίνων ἑαυτὸν, πρὶν ὁρᾶν ἐκεῖνον· ὁ δὲ ὑπερκάθηται καὶ ὑπερίδρυται ἐπὶ καλῆς οὕτως οἷον κρηπῖδος, ἢ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐξήρτηται· ἔδει γὰρ ἐκεῖνον βαίνοντα μὴ ἐπ' ἀψύχου τινὸς, μὴ δ' αὖ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς εὐθὺς βεβηκέναι, ἀλλ' εἶναι αὐτῷ κάλλος ἀμήχανον πρὸ αὐτοῦ προϊόν, "And this nature is God, I say a second God, offering himself to view, before that other god can be seen, who is seated above, this being as it were

* In Timæum Plat. p. 93. † Ibid. ‡ Ennead 5. lib. 5. cap. 3. [P. 522.]

the glorious throne of him. For it is not fit that he should be immediately seated in any that is inanimate; nor in mere soul neither, but that there should be such an immense pulchritude and splendour shining before him, like the pomp and procession before the great king." He also elsewhere mentions all these three gods together, making this world to be an image of them all:* *Εἰκότως οὖν λέγεται οὗτος ὁ κόσμος εἰκὼν ἀεὶ εἰκονιζόμενος· ἱστηκότων μὲν τοῦ πρώτου, καὶ δευτέρου, τοῦ δὲ τρίτου, ἱστηκότος μὲν καὶ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ, καὶ κατὰ συμβέβηκος κινουμένου,* "Wherefore this world may well be called an image, it depending upon that above (as an image in a glass), which is threefold. Whereof the first and second God always stand immoveably; the third likewise is in itself stable too, but accidentally moved by reason of the mobility of matter and things below it." And that we may here give a taste of the mystical theology and enthusiasm of these Platonists too, Porphyrius in his life of Plotinus[7] affirmeth, that both Plotinus and himself had sometimes experience of a kind of ecstatic union with the first of these three gods, that which is above mind and understanding: *Πολλάκις ἐνάγοντι ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸν πρῶτον καὶ ἐπέκεινα Θεὸν ταῖς ἐννοίαις, ἐφάνη ἐκεῖνος ὁ μήτε μορφὴν, μήτε τινα ἰδέαν ἔχων, ὑπὲρ δὲ νοῦν καὶ πᾶν τὸ νοητὸν ἱδρυμένος· ᾧ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ Πορφύριος ἅπαξ λέγω πλησιάσαι καὶ ἑνωθῆναι,* "Plotinus often endeavouring to raise up his mind to the first and highest God, that God sometimes appeared to him, who hath neither form nor idea, but is placed above intellect, and all that is intelligible; to whom I Porphyrius affirm myself to have been once united in the sixty-eighth year of my age." And again afterwards: *Τέλος αὐτῷ καὶ σκοπὸς ἦν, τὸ ἑνωθῆναι καὶ πελάσαι τῷ ἐπὶ πᾶσι Θεῷ, ἔτυχε δὲ τετράκις που, ὅτε συνήμην αὐτῷ, τοῦ σκοποῦ τούτου,* "Plotinus' chief aim and scope was, to be united to, and conjoined with the supreme God, who is above all; which scope he attained unto four several times, whilst myself was with him, by a certain ineffable energy." That is, Plotinus aimed at such a kind of rapturous and ecstatic union with the Τὸ ἓν, and *Τἀγαθὸν*, "the first of the three highest gods" (called the one and the good), as by himself is described towards the latter end of this last book,[8] where he calls it *ἐπαφὴν*, and *παρουσίαν ἐπιστήμης κρείττονα*, and *τὸ ἑαυτῶν κέντρον τῷ οἷον πάν.ων κέντρῳ συνάπτειν*, "a kind of tactual union," and "a certain presence better

* Ennead 2. lib. 3. cap. 18. [P. 148.]

[7] Cap. 23. p. 137. in Joh. Alb. Fabricii Biblioth. Græc. lib. 4. cap. 26. In this passage Dr. Cudworth has thought proper to omit some words, as not bearing upon the subject. Something similar to this is stated of Jamblichus by Eunapius in his Vitæ Sophistar. p. 23, and of Proclus by Marinus in his Vita Procli, cap 23. p. 26, 27. The truth is, the whole of the Platonic school delighted in the marvellous, and far surpassed any old woman in credulity.

[8] De Bono vel Uno, Ennead 6. lib. 19. cap. 10. p. 772.

than knowledge," and "the joining of our own centre, as it were, with the centre of the universe." Thus we see, that the Platonic trinity is a trinity of gods, of which three gods therefore, the second and the third must of necessity be inferior gods, because otherwise they would be three independent gods; whereas the pagan theology expressly disclaims a plurality of independent and self-originated deities.

But since, according to the principles of Christianity, which was partly designed to oppose and bear down the pagan polytheism, there is one only God to be acknowledged; the meaning whereof notwithstanding seems to be chiefly directed against the deifying of created beings, or giving religious worship to any, besides the uncreated, and the creator of all: moreover, since in the scripture, which is the only true rule and measure of this divine cabala of the trinity, though the λόγος, or word, be said to have been with God (that is, God the father), and also itself to be God (that is, not a creature), yet is it nowhere called another, or second god. Therefore cannot we Christians entertain this pagan language of a trinity of Gods, but must call it either a trinity of divine hypostases, or subsistencies, or persons, or the like. Nevertheless it is observable, that Philo,[9] though, according to his Jewish principles, he was a zealous opposer of the pagan polytheism and idolatry, yet did he not, for all that, scruple to call the Θεῖον Λόγον, "the divine Word," after the Platonic way, Δεύτερον Θεὸν, "a second God;" as not suspecting this to clash with the principles of his religion, or that second commandment of the decalogue, "Thou shalt have no other gods before my face;" possibly because he conceived that this was to be understood of creature-gods only: whereas his second

[9] The passage of Philo here meant is doubtless the one extracted from his first book of Questions and Solutions by Eusebius, Præparat. Evangel. lib. 7. cap. 13. p. 323, Διατί ὡς περὶ ἑτέρου θεοῦ φησι τὸ, ἐν εἰκόνι θεοῦ ἐποίησα τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ; παγκαλῶς καὶ σοφῶς τουτὶ κεχρησμῴδηται· θνητὸν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀπεικονισθῆναι πρὸς τὸν ἀνωτάτω καὶ πατέρα τῶν ὅλων ἐδύνατο, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δεύτερον θεὸν, ὃς ἐστιν ἐκείνου λόγος, "Why as if speaking of another god does he say, 'I have made man in the image of God,' and not in his own? This is beautifully and wisely proclaimed by the divine oracle. For no mortal can be made in the likeness of the supreme God and Father of all things, but of the second God, who is his Word." Now nothing can be more vain and contemptible than such subtlety in his attempting to interpret the divine writer, Moses, upon Platonic principles, with which he was wholly imbued. With this may be compared another passage from the same author, De Somniis a Deo Missis, p. 494, in which he in like manner calls the *divine word* God, but only τῇ καταχρήσει, or by an abuse of terms: Καλεῖ δὲ, he adds, θεὸν τὸν πρεσβύτατον αὐτοῦ γνησίως λόγον, οὐ δεισιδαιμονῶν περὶ τὴν θέσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων, "But he (Moses) calls his most ancient word God, being not scrupulous about the application of names." This passage would in a certain measure excuse Philo, whom Dr. Cudworth here not undeservedly censures. For it shows him to have used the word God in a very qualified sense, when he referred it to any other nature besides the one supreme God worshipped by the Jews, and in short to have confessed that according to its strict and proper meaning it is by no means applicable to what he calls the word. But of this argument, and of Philo's opinion respecting God, we shall speak more fully by and by.

God, the divine Λόγος or "Word," is declared by him to be ἀίδιος, "eternal," and therefore, according to the Jewish theology, uncreated. However, this language of a second and third god is not so excusable in a Jew, as it might be in a Pagan; because the Pagans, according to the principles of their religion, were so far from having any scrupulosity against a plurality of gods (so long as there was only one fountain of the godhead acknowledged), that they rather accounted it an honour to the supreme God, as hath been already showed, that he should have many other, not only titular gods under him, but also such as were religiously worshipped: wherefore, besides this second and third god, they also did luxuriate in their other many creature-gods. And indeed St. Austin doth upon this account seem somewhat to excuse the Pagans for this their trinity of gods, and principles, in these words:* Liberis enim verbis loquuntur philosophi, nec in rebus ad intelligendum difficillimis offensionem religiosarum aurium pertimescunt. Nobis autem ad certam regulam loqui fas est, ne verborum licentia, etiam in rebus, quæ in his significantur, impiam gignat opinionem. Nos autem non dicimus duo vel tria principia, cum de Deo loquimur; sicut nec duos deos vel tres, nobis licitum est dicere, quamvis de unoquoque loquentes, vel de Filio, vel de Spiritu Sancto, etiam singulum quemque Deum esse fateamur, "The philosophers use free language; nor in these things, which are extremely difficult to be understood, did they at all fear the offending of any religious and scrupulous ears. But the case is otherwise with us Christians; for we are tied up to phrases, and ought to speak according to a certain rule, lest the licentious use of words should beget a wicked opinion in any concerning those things that are signified by them." That is, though this might be in a manner excusable in the Pagans, because each of those three hypostases is God, therefore to call them severally gods, and all of them a trinity of gods, and principles; they having no such rule then given them to govern their language by as this, "That though the Father be God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, yet are they not three Gods, but one God:" yet is not this allowable for us Christians, to speak of a second or third God or principle, or to call the Holy Trinity a Trinity of Gods, notwithstanding that when we speak of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Ghost severally, we confess each of them to be God.

And indeed when the Pagans thus spake of a first, second and third God, and no more, though having innumerable other gods besides, they did, by this language, plainly imply, that these three Gods of theirs were of a very different kind from all the

* De Civitate Dei, lib. 10. cap. 23.

rest of their gods; that is, not θεοὶ γεννητοὶ, but ἀΐδιοι, not "created," but "eternal" and "uncreated ones." And that many of them did really take this whole trinity of Gods for the τὸ Θεῖον in general, the "divine Numen," and sometimes call it the first God too, in way of distinction from their generated gods, will be showed afterward. So that the Πρῶτος Θεὸς, "the first God," was used in different senses by these Pagans, sometimes in a larger sense, and in way of opposition to all the γεννητοὶ θεοὶ, the "generated" or "created gods," or the gods that were made in time, together with the world; and sometimes again, more particularly, in way of distinction from those two other divine hypostases eternal, called by them the second and third God. Which first of the three Gods is also frequently by them called Θεὸς, "God," emphatically and by way of excellency, they supposing a gradual subordination in these principles.

Neither was this trinity of divine substances only thus ill-languaged by the Pagans generally, when they called it a trinity of Gods; but also the cabala thereof was otherwise much depraved and adulterated by several of the Platonists and Pythagoreans. For first, the third of these three hypostases, commonly called "Psyche," is by some of them made to be ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος, "the immediate soul of the corporeal world," informing, acting and enlivening it, after the same manner as the souls of other animals do their respective bodies; insomuch that this corporeal world itself, as together with its soul it makes up one complete animal, was frequently called the third God. This Proclus[10] affirmeth of Numenius the Pythagorean: Ὁ γὰρ κόσμος κατ' αὐτὸν ὁ τρίτος ἐστὶ θεὸς, "That the world, according to him, was the third god." And Plotinus, being a great reader of this Numenius, seems to have been somewhat infected by him with this conceit also, though contrary to his own principles, from those words before cited out of him:[1] Ὁ κόσμος θεὸς, ὥσπερ συνηθὲς λέγειν, τρίτος, "The world, as is commonly said, is the third god."

Now, if the world be not a creature, then is there no created being at all, but all is God. But not only Timæus Locrus, but also Plato himself calls it θεῖον γεννητὸν, that is, "a created god," the word γεννητὸν being here put for that which, after it once was not, is brought into being; which is the proper notion of a creature. So that the animated world is, by Plato, made to be only the chief all the γεννητοὶ θεοὶ, that is, the "creature-gods." Wherefore it is plain, that in this trinity of some Platonists and Pythagoreans, wherein the world is made to be the third god, there is a confused jumble of created and uncreated beings together. For the first of those Gods is the father and fountain

[10] Comm. in Timæum Platon. lib. 2. p. 93.

[1] This is a mistake, for Dr. Cudworth had not cited these words before, but they are to be found in Plotinus, Ennead 3. lib. 5. cap. 6. p. 296.

of all, or the original of the Godhead. And the second, forasmuch as he is called by them, both ποιητὴς and δημιουργὸς, "the maker" and "the opificer of the whole world," he therefore can be no creature neither: whereas the third, which is said to be the world, was by Numenius himself also expressly called, both ποίημα and τὸ δημιουργούμενον, "the work," or "thing made," that is plainly, the creature of both the former. Proclus[2] thus fully represents his sense: Πατέρα μὲν καλεῖ τὸν πρῶτον, ποιητὴν δὲ τὸν δεύτερον, ποίημα δὲ τὸν τρίτον· ὥστε ὁ κατ' αὐτὸν δημιουργὸς ἔστὸς, ὅ τε πρῶτος καὶ ὁ δεύτερος Θεὸς, τὸ δὲ δημιουργούμενον ὁ τρίτος, "Numenius called the first of the three Gods the father, the second of them the maker, and the third the work, or thing made: so that, according to Numenius, there were two opificers or creators of the world, the first and the second God; and the world itself (that is, the thing made and created by them both) is said to be the third god."

And that this notion of the trinity is an adulterated one, may be also further concluded from hence, because, according to this hypothesis, they might have said, that there were three hundred and more gods, as well as that there are three; since all the other γεννητοὶ Θεοὶ, "generated gods," might have come into the number too, as well as the world, they being parts thereof, and gods that differ not in kind from it, but only in degree. Wherefore these philosophers ought not to have made a trinity of gods, distinguished from all the rest, but rather first to have distributed their gods into Θεοὶ ἀΐδιοι and γεννητοὶ, that is, "eternal" or "uncreated," and "created gods," and then to have subdivided those created gods into the whole world, and the parts thereof animated.

But because it may be here alleged in favour of this spurious hypothesis of the trinity, that the world was accounted the third god, only by accident, in respect of its soul, which is properly the third god; though Numenius, with others, plainly affirm the world itself, as ποίημα and δημιουργούμενον, as the "work" or "thing" made, to be the third: we shall therefore reply to this, that even the soul of the mundane animal itself, according to Timæus, and Plato and others, is affirmed to be γεννητὸς Θεὸς, "a generated god," that is, such as was produced from non-existence into being, and therefore truly and properly a creature. Which Aristotle[3] observing, therefore took occasion to tax Plato as contradicting himself, in making the soul of the world a principle, that is, the third god, and yet supposing it to be ὕστερον καὶ ἅμα τῷ οὐρανῷ, "not eternal, but made or created together with the heaven," of which something before.

[2] Comm. in Timæum Platon. lib. 2. p. 93.

[3] See his Metaphys. lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 298. tom. 4. opp. Auscult. Physic. lib. 3. cap. 1. p. 578. tom. 1. opp.

Wherefore we conclude, that this ancient cabala of the Trinity was depraved and adulterated by those Platonists and Pythagoreans, who made either the world itself, or else ψυχὴν ἐγκόσμιον, "an informing soul of the world," to be the third hypostasis thereof, they mingling created and uncreated beings together, in that which themselves, notwithstanding, call a trinity of causes and of principles.

And we think it highly probable that this was the true reason why Philo, though he admitted the second hypostasis of the Platonic and Pythagoric (if not the Egyptian) Trinity, called by him Θεῖος Λόγος, "the divine Word," and styled δεύτερος Θεὸς, "the second God;" and as Eusebius[4] adds, δεύτερον αἴτιον, "the second cause;" yet he would not Platonize or Pythagorize any further, so as to take in that third god, or cause, supposed by many of them to be the soul of the whole world, as an animal; because he must then have offered violence to the principles of his own religion, in making the whole created world a god; which practice is, by him, condemned in the Pagans.[5] It is true, that he somewhere[6] sticks not to call God also the soul of the world, as well as the mind thereof, whether he meant thereby τὸν πρὸ τοῦ Λόγου Θεὸν, "that God, who is before the Word," or else rather the "Word" itself, the second God (according to him the immediate Creator and Governor of the same); nevertheless, he does not seem to understand thereby such a deeply immersed soul, as would make the world an animal, and a god, but a more elevated one; that is, ψυχὴν ὑπερκόσμιον, "a supermundane soul.[7]

[4] Cap. 13. lib. 7. Præparat. Evangel. Eusebii is thus inscribed: Φίλωνος περὶ τοῦ δευτέρου αἰτίου; which title Dr. Cudworth was thinking of when he wrote this: for in no other place does Eusebius either himself say or prove by any passage of Philo's that the Word was called by this Jewish philosopher δεύτερον αἴτιον.

[5] I should here recommend my readers to consult Philo's book De Abrahamo, p. 360. where he argues against those who supposed the world to be the supreme God, and declares it to be the work of God.

[6] I have been unable to find any other passage in Philo at all applicable to this place, except the following, which occurs in his Allegor. Legis, p. 57: Οἱ γὰρ τῆς ἰδίας ψυχῆς τὴν οὐσίαν οὐκ ἴσασι, πῶς ἂν περὶ τῶν ὅλων ψυχῆς ἀκριβώσαιεν; ἡ γὰρ τῶν ὅλων ψυχὴ Θεός ἐστι κατὰ ἔννοιαν, "How can those who are ignorant of the essence of their own soul, have any accurate knowledge of the soul of the universe? For the soul of the universe is understood as God." Compare, however, his De Opificio Mundi, p. 2.

[7] Long and most weighty are the controversies of learned men on the religion and theological opinions of Philo: on which the subject itself seems to require that we should here offer a few comments. Before doing so, however, I should wish all my readers to bear in mind, that the question is not about the truth itself or what it is right and proper to believe, but merely about the doctrine of Philo, a Jew and tinctured with principles most foreign to the Jewish religion: which, if false and foolish, cannot at all detract from the truth itself, as this rests not on the opinions of men, but solely upon the divine authority. If the trinity professed by Philo be altogether different from that which Christians have received from the lips of our blessed Saviour, the utmost that the Socinians, and the other adversaries of this most holy doctrine can infer from it is, that there was a Jew about the time of Christ, who does not admit of being classed among the professors of Christianity. Should they go farther, as many

To this first depravation of that Θεοπαράδοτος Θεολογία, that "theology of divine tradition," and ancient cabala of the Trinity, by many of the Platonists and Pythagoreans, may be

of them I know have done, and argue from the opinions of Philo, that the ancient Jews were utterly ignorant of our doctrine of three persons in the Godhead, they would be deserving of the ridicule of all sensible men. For to form a judgment of the sentiments of an entire nation from the conceits and fancies of one man, who was besides tinctured with many other dogmas of his own, is just as wise as the attempt to ascertain the condition and strength of a whole army from the armour and physical powers of an individual soldier. In every sect there are men who either disregard the precepts and doctrines of the community which they wish to be members of, or accommodate them to opinions hastily adopted from others and to the idle fictions of their own minds.

I shall first speak of the philosophy of Philo, and then come to his doctrine of the three principles of things or God. The generality of ancient authors consider Philo to have been a Platonist, or imbued at least with a considerable portion of the doctrines formerly taught by Plato to his followers. Consult Dion. Petavius, Dogmat. Theolog. tom. 2. lib. 1. De Trinit. cap. 2. sect. 1. p. 13. Joh. Jonsius, De Scriptorib. Histor. Philos. lib. 3. cap. 4. p. 14. and Joh. Alb. Fabricius, Biblioth. Græc. lib. 4. cap. 4. p. 104, 105, and in a specific treatise, De Platonismo Philonis, Lips. 1693. 4. Jonsius in particular denies this, and supposes Philo to have been devoted rather to that philosophy which was then in vogue among the Jews: to whose opinion J. Fr. Buddeus, Intro. in Histor. Philos. Ebræor. sect. 32. p. 216. was formerly not unfavourable. But Fabricius, in the treatise abovementioned, opposes Jonsius. Afterwards, when certain eminent and right-thinking men perceived that the enemies of the doctrine of the Trinity perverted the Platonism of Philo to the disparagement of this doctrine, as though it were Platonic or allied to Platonic principles, they adopted the same opinion. Among these may be mentioned Pet. Allix in his Judgment of the Jewish Church against the Unitarians, cap. 23. p. 354. &c. who contends that Philo was an Eclectic of the school of Potamon; as indeed had the erudite author of the Preface prefixed to the Geneva edition of Philo's works, 1613. fol. also Jo. Van der Wayen, in a specific Dissertation de Λόγῳ, written in reply to J. Le Clerc, and prefixed to Steph. Rittangelius's Bilibra Veritatis Francek 1698. in 8vo. p. 39. 54. 74. These roused Le Clerc to set about in good earnest to prove that Philo was clearly imbued with Platonic principles, Epistolæ Critic. ep. 8. p. 210. For my own part, I consider the learned men who have taken a part in this dispute are less at issue with each other than perhaps they themselves suppose. In the first place, no man who has read Philo with an attentive mind can be ignorant, that a sort of philosophy predominates in his writings, of which not the slightest vestige can be found in the books of the Old Testament, and that this Jew did not scruple to interpret and explain either the facts or the sayings recorded in the divine writer Moses according to the laws of this philosophy. Indeed, he must be altogether devoid of liberality and candour who would deny this, and maintain that all Philo's opinions were derived from Moses and the sacred volumes of the Hebrews. It remains, therefore, to inquire, under what name this philosophy is to be designated. That Philo was himself the author and inventor of it, is not to be supposed for a moment. For he neither founded any sect whatever, nor in my opinion possessed such powers of intellect as to be able to reject the theories of other philosophers, and to strike out a new and hitherto untrodden path for himself. Besides, most of his precepts are approved of by others also, whose writings have come down to us, and who unquestionably never read Philo, much less made him their master and instructor. It is clear, therefore, that he adopted the philosophy which at that time flourished at Alexandria, either universally or at least among the Jews. And what was the nature of this? The eminent men before spoken of maintain that it was the Platonic; and not without reason, for the primary and fundamental doctrines of Plato are expressly put forth in this writer, as Le Clerc and Petavius have shown by numerous examples. Those who think otherwise observe that Plato is never quoted by Philo as the founder of his tenets, and that Plato's philosophy cannot well be combined and associated with the Jewish religion; and lastly, that Plato is sometimes refuted by Philo. See Pet. Allix, ibid. p. 355. The first of these objections falls to the ground of itself, if we consider that Philo was a Jew and belonged to a nation who made it their common boast that all the wisdom of the Greeks, and especially of Plato,

added another, that some of them declaring the second hypostasis of their trinity to be the archetypal world, or τὸν ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν παγέντα κόσμον, as Philo calls it,[8] "the world that is compounded

was borrowed fron Moses. Philo's object was to interpret Moses agreeably to the laws of his own philosophy, and to discover in the divine writer the Platonic doctrines to which he was devoted: which he every where does too. It would have been madness in him, therefore, to have confirmed his own opinions by the authority of Plato, whom he considered to owe the more excellent portion of his doctrines to Moses. The two last are of no weight against those who suppose Philo to have been a Platonist, since they refute an opinion to which these are altogether opposed. If the learned men who think Philo was devoted to Platonism were to assert that he received all his philosophy from Plato, these two objections might in that case be most justly urged against them: namely, that the religion of the Jews can in nowise be combined with the Platonic philosophy, and that Philo sometimes openly rejected Plato's dogmas. But not one of them that I know of has done so. The whole of their opinion amounts merely to this, that Philo favoured Plato as far as the Jewish religion professed by him would permit, and did all in his power to make Moses and this religion which rests upon the authority of Moses appear to agree and harmonize with the principal doctrines of Plato. Some other arguments of those who deny Philo to have been a Platonist, as being comparatively of very little force, I shall pass over without notice.

It cannot be denied, however, that there are some dogmas in Philo which are not to be met with in Plato, and some also which are wholly irreconcileable with the tenor of his philosophy. And these, together with others, no doubt led learned men to suppose Philo to have been an Eclectic rather than a Platonist. Pet. Allix, Judgment of the Jewish Church against the Platonists, cap. 23. p. 357. not only strenuously maintains this, but also, to give a greater show of probability, concocts an entirely new theory respecting the age of Potamon, the founder of the Eclectic philosophy; which the learned men who in our own times have written of Potamon and his period, G. Olearius, Jac. Hasæus, and Christ. Aug. Heumann, have not touched upon. The Eclectic philosophy, and its founder Potamon, existed, he tells us, in the time of Plato. Which opinion being at variance with the passage of Suidas, which declares this man to have taught in the reign of the emperor Augustus, Lexicon v. Potamon, Allix takes upon himself to assert that the Augustus mentioned by Suidas is Alexander the Great. So much can the minds of the most learned men be influenced by the force of opinions which they are over desirous of being true. Diogenes Laërtius alone sufficiently refutes this opinion, who records that the Eclectic sect started up a little before his own time, πρὸ ὀλίγου, Procem. de Vitis Philos. sect. 21. With respect to the opinion itself, for the sake of which Allix hazarded this conjecture, there is no reason, that I can see, why those who hold Philo to have been a Platonist should have any material objection to it. For, in the first place, there is nothing to hinder one from calling a Jew who mingled the Platonic philosophy with the precepts of his own religion, in a certain sense an Eclectic. Again, that the junior Platonists and the sect called Eclectic or Potamonic differed in nothing but the name, is well known, and has been demonstrated by me in the Diss. de Turbata a Recentioribus Platonicis Ecclesia, sect. 2. 3. &c. The Eclectics preferred Plato to all other philosophers, and maintained his opinions to be more acute and sagacious than those of any one else on the subject of God and incorporeal things: on which account they by no means refused the name of Platonists. But they were not so devoted to Plato as to consider that his dogmas were in no instance to be departed from or corrected and amplified, and that all the other philosophers were to be disregarded. On they contrary, they selected from all the sects what they conceived to be the best parts, and endeavoured to amalgamate them with the precepts of Plato. And for this reason they wished to be called Eclectics, that they might be distinguished from the rest of philosophers who followed only one leader and despised all the others. Although Philo therefore may have been an Eclectic, he will not on that account cease to be a Platonist. In the same way, I conceive, we may reconcile those, who suppose Philo to have devoted himself to the philosophy of the Hebrews, with the others, who hold him to have maintained Platonic principles. Philo

[8] De Opificio Mundi, p. 4.

and made up of ideas," and containeth in it all kinds of things intelligibly, that are in this lower world sensibly; and further concluding, that all these several ideas of this archetypal and

no doubt adopted the doctrine which was professed by those Jews who at that time inhabited Alexandria. But who is not aware that, long before the birth of our Saviour, these Alexandrine Jews had suffered themselves to be imbued with the precepts which were taught at Alexandria in the schools of the philosophers? Which precepts being either altogether Platonic, or very closely allied to the Platonic, as is testified even by the books usually termed Apocryphal, it is self evident that it can make very little difference whether Philo be supposed to have philosophized after the manner of Plato or of the Alexandrine Jews. Wherefore, to put an end to the whole dispute on the philosophy of Philo, I think we ought to conclude as follows: That Philo, like the rest of the Jews, had adopted the doctrine which was inculcated at that time by the generality of the Alexandrine philosophers: but that this doctrine agreed for the most part with the principles of Plato, although it was mixed up with some other dogmas probably derived from oriental sources, of which at least no explicit mention is to be found in Plato: and yet that Philo was not exclusively devoted to this philosophy, but did all in his power to accommodate it to the law and religion of the Jews.

Enough has been said on Philo's philosophy: let us now proceed to explain, as far as his obscurity will permit, the sentiments entertained by him on the nature and virtues of God. Being a Jew he most unquestionably professed one God, and could admit of nothing repugnant to this doctrine. But still he every where speaks of three natures or divine principles, and associates two virtues with the supreme Being. It becomes, therefore, the chief point of dispute, what were these three principles of Philo, and in what sense he wished this doctrine of his to be understood. And here I observe three opinions in particular to be maintained among those who have taken a part in the debate upon this question. Some of the early fathers of the Christian church entertained no doubt of Philo's having taught the very same as Christians on the subject of one God and of three persons in one divine nature, and of his having derived this doctrine from the books of the Old Testament and the traditions of his ancestors. So especially Eusebius, Præparat. Evangel. lib. 7. cap. 13. p. 322. and lib. 11. cap. 15. p. 533. with whom may be joined Isidorus Pelusiota, Epistol. lib. 2. ep. 143. p. 188. who, however, is a little more cautious than Eusebius and acknowledges that Philo in a certain measure adulterated the truth. Of the moderns, many have adopted this opinion, supposing that the Socinians and Jews might be more easily refuted, if it could be shown that the most eminent of the Jews, previously to the introduction of Christianity, entertained the same sentiments as ourselves on the doctrine of the Trinity. See, among others, Pet. Allix and J. Van der Wayen, in the places above indicated; Rich. Kidder, Demonstration of the Messias, par. 3. cap. 5. 6. p. 246. and Georg. Bull, Defensio Fidei Nicenæ, sect. 1. cap. 1. sect. 16. p. 12. opp. And this opinion Dr. Cudworth espouses; which appears also to have been held by Hugo Grotius, De Verit. Religion. Christ. lib. 5. sect. 21. p. 352. To these others are wholly opposed, who flatly deny Philo to have distributed the divine nature into three principles, and suppose that what he says of three divine natures is to be understood merely of the three divine virtues and perfections, which are sometimes personified by Plato. This opinion is most warmly supported by Souverainius, whose book Le Platonisme Devoilé is well known, and by Stephen Nye, in an English work, The Judgment of the Fathers concerning the Doctrine of the Trinity, Lond. 1704. 4to. p. 4. &c. [By Faydit, Apologie pour les S. Peres.] The same is also maintained, although less openly, by Jac. Basnage, Histoire de Juifs, livr. 4. cap. 5. &c p. 102. &c. Between these dissentient parties there is a third, holding as it were the middle place, which grants Philo to have acknowledged three natures in God, but denies that these natures are to be confounded with the three equal persons in the Godhead, adopted by Christians on the authority of sacred writ; maintaining on the contrary that these natures of Philo are altogether unequal, and therefore, that his trinity ought rather to be classed with the errors of the Arians than with the doctrine of true believers. [See Carpzov. Exercit. in Ep. ad Hebræos ex Philone Prolegom. p. 135. on the twofold word of Philo, and other matters.] This opinion had already been defended to a certain extent by Isidorus Pelusiota, as above quoted; but more openly and learnedly, at a later period, by the most learned Jesuit, Dion. Petavius, who, Dogm. Theolog. tom. 2. lib. 1. de Trinit. cap. 2. p. 19. after

intelligible world are really so many distinct substances, a[illegible] mals and gods, have thereby made that second hypostasis, not to be one God, but a congeries and heap of gods. These are those

citing some of Philo's sayings on the word of God, subjoins: Talibus de Filio Dei præconiis Arianorum Philo perfidiam armavit. Neque, ille adds, quibusdam ex nostris, id est, Catholicis, assentiri possum, qui et hujus et aliorum, maxime gentilium, ejusmodi scita, quæ de divinis personis utcumque aliquid tinniunt, cupide deosculantur, atque ad Christiani integritatem dogmatis accommodare student, labe omni erroris et invidia fuco quodam falsæ ac violentæ interpretationis obducta, "By such professions concerning the Son of God, has Philo fortified the unbelief of Arians. Neither can I agree with some of our own, that is, the Catholic community, who eagerly welcome suchlike dogmas both of this and other pagan writers, which in the slightest degree savour of the divine persons, and endeavour to accommodate them to the purity of the Christian doctrine, veiling every stain and blemish of error under a certain disguise of false and forced interpretation." In our own times the most perspicacious writer, J. Le Clerc has followed the footsteps of Petavius, and in his Explic. Principii Evangelii Johannis, and Epistol. Critic. ep. 8. has laboured most strenuously to show that Philo was closely allied to the principles of the Arians. The supporters of this opinion hold Philo to have been a Platonist; from which they infer that his three natures do not differ from Plato's three first principles of things, at the same time supposing Plato's three principles to be vastly different not only in order but in degree also, and therefore to be very similar to the three persons of the Arians.

Before inquiring as to which of these opinions comes nearest to the truth, I should observe, that Philo belongs to that class of writers who often purposely affect obscurity, and fancy themselves to be most wise when they are perplexing the understandings of others by their incomprehensible subtleties. It is therefore the less to be wondered at that men, in other respects the most learned, should sometimes misapprehend his meaning, and attribute opinions to him to which, if his more obscure passages be compared with others that are more intelligible, he will be found to be altogether a stranger. In the next place, it ought most certainly to be borne in mind, that Philo considered religion and divine worship to be of two kinds, one civil and popular, and adapted to the comprehension of men engaged in the ordinary affairs of life, the other sublime and recondite, and capable of being understood by none but the wise and contemplative; that the popular and civil religion inculcates many things which according to the strict words and expressions are by no means conformable to the truth; but that so great is the weakness of mankind that these things ought to be tolerated by wise men; nay, that it is even imprudent to communicate the true and natural religion to the vulgar. In short, that those more gross and crude notions of God and divine things are to be left to the multitude, while the mysteries which the purified mind can alone comprehend, are to be cautiously treasured up and kept from the eyes of the ignorant. [See what I have observed of his secret discipline on Sæc. I. H. E.] This doctrine is every where propounded by Philo, so that I am surprised that learned men should have taken little or no account of it in explaining his opinions. Lest I should be supposed to be speaking here at random, I shall quote a remarkable passage from his book De Sacrificiis Abelis et Caini, p. 139: Τὰ μὲν τὰ τρία μέτρα ταῦτα καλὸν ἐν ψυχῇ ὥσπερ φυραθῆναι, ... ἵνα τῶν τελείων μύστις γενομένη τελετῶν, μηδένι προχείρως ἐκλαλῇ τὰ θεῖα μυστήρια, ταμιευομένη δὲ αὐτὰ καὶ ἐχεμυθοῦσα ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ φυλάττῃ· γέγραπται γὰρ ἐγκρυφίας ποιεῖν, ὅτι κέκρυφθαι δεῖ τὸν ἱερὸν περὶ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων αὐτοῦ μύστην λόγον, ἐπεὶ θείων παρακαταθήκην ὀργίων οὐ παντός ἐστι φυλάξαι· τὸ γὰρ τῆς ἀκράτορος ψυχῆς νᾶμα ἔξω ῥέων διὰ στόματός τε καὶ γλώττης πάσαις ἀκοαῖς ἐπαντλεῖται· ὧν αἱ μὲν, εὐρυχωρους δεξαμενὰς ἔχουσαι, τὸ ἐπιχεόμενον φυλάττουσιν ἀρεσκεία, αἱ δὲ διὰ στενότητα πόρων ἀδυνατοῦσιν ἀρδεσθαι· τὸ δὲ ὑπερβλύζον ἀκατασχέτως ἐκχεόμενον, σκίδναται πάντη, ὡς ἐπαναπλεῖν καὶ ἐπινήχεσθαι τὰ κεκρυμμένα, καὶ φορυτοῦ τρόπον εἰκαίου, τὰ πάσης ἄξια σπουδῆς μετὰ συρμοῦ καταφέρεσθαι, "It is good for these three measures to be mixed and fermented as it were in the soul, ... that becoming initiated in the most perfect rites, it may not readily divulge the divine mysteries to any one, but treasuring them up and maintaining silence may enjoy them in secret. For Scripture speaks of making ἐγκρυφίαι, or cakes baked in the hot ashes, because the sacred and mystical doctrine of the

ods commonly called by them, νοητοὶ θεοὶ, "intelligible gods," ot as before in any way of distinction from the αἰσθητοὶ, the sensible gods" (which is a more general notion of the word)

unmade and his powers ought to be concealed; since it is not every one who can keep ve deposit of the divine orgies. For the streams of the incontinent soul flowing out nrough the mouth and the tongue are discharged into the ears of all. Of which those hat have more capacious receptacles willingly keep what is poured in. But others, on account of the narrowness of the passages, are incapable of being watered; and hat which overflows being incontinently poured forth, is scattered every where, so that that which was hidden rises up and swims on the surface, and the most grave and precious things, like vile mud, are carried away in the flood." If we reject the figures of which Philo is full, I do not think it will require many words to show, that the opinion I have expressed above is contained in this passage. Similar ones are met with in various places, especially in the book De Abrahamo, p. 367, 368, of which passage I shall take some notice by and by. Whoever loses sight of this distinction in Philo's religion and theology, will necessarily fail in interpreting him. For many sayings occur in him which are conformable to the precepts and laws of the popular theology; and again not a few which pertain to what he supposed to be the more secret and arcane religion and philosophy. Which two sciences being widely different, it therefore happens that Philo sometimes appears to be wonderfully at variance with himself; and there are not wanting learned men even who deny it to be possible at this day to determine what opinions and sentiments this Jew was imbued with. But to do away with this discordance, we ought above all things to examine with attention those passages in which he recalls and accommodates the precepts of the popular religion to the principles of the more sublime theology, and explains the opinions of the vulgar according to the doctrines of wise men; with these for guides it will be possible, I fancy, to reach the interior recesses of his philosophy.

I will try whether I can by this method explain what were Philo's sentiments on the divine nature. In the first place then, I do not scruple to charge all those with error who have hitherto supposed that Philo acknowledged three natures in one God in the same way as we Christians. For he does not reckon three principles, like most of the Platonists, but four, or to express his meaning more clearly, above the triad of divine natures, which he introduces, he places a supreme and principal God. This is evident both from many other passages and especially from the following, which occurs in his De Profugis, p. 465: Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀνὴρ τροπῆς ἑκούσιον μὲν, ἅπαγε, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἀκουσίου γεγονὼς, αὐτὸν τὸν Θεὸν κλῆρον ἔχων, ἐν αὐτῷ μόνῳ κατοικήσει οἷ ἢ οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας, ἀλλ' ἀβουλήτως χωσάμενοι σφάλμασι, καταφυγὰς ἔξουσι τὰς εἰρημένας ἀφθόνους καὶ πλουσίας· οὗτοι δὲ τῶν πρὸς καταφυγὴν πόλεων τοῖς μὲν εἰσι πόῤῥω, αἳ μακρὰν ἡμῶν τοῦ γένους ἀφεστᾶσί τινες αἰτίαι· ὁ τοῦ ἡγεμόνος λόγος, καὶ ἡ ποιητικὴ καὶ βασιλικὴ τέτραμις αὐτοῦ· τοιοῦτοι γὰρ ὅ τε οὐράνιος καὶ σύμπας ὁ κόσμος ἐστί, "He therefore who is without offence, not only voluntary but involuntary, shall have God himself for his portion, and shall dwell in him alone; but those who commit not wilful but involuntary errors, shall have for refuge the happy and rich cities. Therefore of these cities of refuge there are three beyond, which are far removed from our race. What are these? The *word* of the supreme ruler, and his *creative* and *kingly* power; for of these are both heaven and all the world." Here Philo openly speaks of four natures: God himself, the word of God, the maker or framer of the world, and the king or governor of the world. The two latter are called by him in his book De Abrahamo, p. 367, "the God by whom all things were made," and "the lord" or "king." The man being wholly made up of allegory, transfers what Moses says of the cities of refuge to moral things. He distributes men into three classes: those who do not sin at all, those who contaminate themselves with involuntary errors, and those who wilfully offend. The first, according to his opinion, become partakers of God alone; to the second he promises the communion of the three natures which he supposes to be associated with God, the word, the creator, and the lord; to the third he points out a little afterwards three other powers to which they may fly, the propitious, the imperative, and the prohibitory. But as these powers are placed by him out of God, and said to be allied and contiguous to the human race, they do not pertain to the matter in hand. Κοινωναὶ δέ, says he, καὶ προσιχεῖς ἡμῖν καὶ ἁφαπτόμεναι τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπικήρου

but from those other gods of theirs (afterwards to be insisted on also) called *νοεροὶ θεοὶ*, "intellectual gods." Proclus upon Plato's Politia[9] concludes, that there is no idea of evil, for this

γένους, ᾧ μόνῳ συμβέβηκε διαμαρτάνειν, αἳ ἐντός εἰσι τριῶν, ἡ ὅλως, ἡ προστακτικὴ τῶν ποιητέων, ἡ ἀπαγορευτικὴ τῶν μὴ ποιητέων· αὗται γὰρ ἕξεις ἡμῶν ἐφάπτονται, "But associated with and adjoining and bordering upon the mortal race of men which alone is liable to error, are three within, the propitious, the imperative, and the prohibitory. For these pertain to us." The meaning of this passage will be made appear from what we shall advance by and by; for it possesses no slight weight towards confirming the remarks we are about to offer on the real opinions of Philo. Hence, if I am not altogether mistaken, those men labour to no purpose who attempt to identify the doctrine of this Jew either with the dogma of right-minded Christians on the three persons in the Godhead, or with the errors of the Arians, as he altogether deviates from the rule of both, and subjects three inferior natures to the principal and supreme God. Neither is this a peculiar opinion and confined to Philo alone. For some of the Platonists held the same; of whom Proclus, Comm. in Timæum Platonis, lib. 2. p. 93. contends that Plato himself placed the supreme Deity over three principles of things. Nor did Synesius, although he had already enrolled himself among Christians, dissent from it, as is evident from his first Hymn on the Trinity, wherein he openly asserts three natures to have flowed from one God.

But, dismissing these matters, let us revert to the three natures connected by Philo with one God, and endeavour to explain their relation and character. To begin with the two last, which he calls *God* and *King*: it is unquestionable that Philo often speaks of them in such a way as though he regarded them as real persons. But since, as we have already observed, he very frequently expresses himself according to the opinion and sense of the vulgar, it will be proper to look for those passages in which he as it were tempers the popular doctrine with the religion of the wise, or interprets the one from the other. There is a passage of the kind in his book De Sacrificiis Abelis et Caini, p. 139: *Ἀβραὰμ μετὰ σπουδῆς καὶ τάχους καὶ προθυμίας ἴσχυν, παρακελεύεται τῇ ἀρετῇ Σαρᾶ, σπεῦσαι καὶ φυρᾶσαι τρία μέτρα σεμιδάλεως, καὶ ποιῆσαι ἐγκρυφίας, ἡνίκα ὁ Θεὸς δορυφορούμενος ὑπὸ δυεῖν τῶν ἀνωτάτω δυνάμεων, ἀρχῆς τε αὖ καὶ ἀγαθότητος, εἰς ὢν ὁ μέσος τριττὰς φαντασίας ἐνειργάζετο τῇ ὁρατικῇ ψυχῇ. ὧν ἑκάστη μεμέτρηται μὲν οὐδαμῶς· ἀπερίγραφοι γὰρ καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ· μεμέτρηκε δὲ τὰ ὅλα· ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀγαθότης αὐτοῦ μέτρον ἀγαθῶν ἐστιν ἡ δὲ ἐξουσία μέτρον ὑπηκόων· ὁ δὲ ἡγέμων αὐτὸς ἁπάντων καὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἀσωμάτων· . . . . τὰ μὲν δὴ τρία μέτρα ταῦτα καλὸν ἦν ψυχῇ ὥσπερ φυραθῆναί τε καὶ συνενεχθῆναι, ἵνα πεισθεῖσα τὸν ἀνωτάτω εἶναι Θεὸν, ὃς ὑπερκέκυφε τὰς δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτῶν ὁρώμενος, καὶ ἐν ταύταις ἐμφαινόμενος, δέξηται χαρακτῆρας ἐξουσίας τε καὶ εὐεργεσίας αὐτοῦ, καὶ τῶν τελείων μύστις γενομένη*, "For Abraham coming with great haste and alacrity, commands virtue, Sarah, to hasten and ferment three measures of meal, and to make cakes under the ashes, when God, attended by two supreme powers, dominion and goodness, being himself one in the middle, produced a threefold fancy in the visual soul, each of which it is impossible to measure (for his powers also are not to be circumscribed), but they measure all things. His goodness is the measure of the good, his power the measure of things subject; and the ruler himself is the measure of every thing corporeal and incorporeal. . . . . It is good for these three measures to be fermented, as it were, and commingled in the soul, that being persuaded of the existence of a supreme God, who surpasses his powers, and is either seen without them or appears with them, it may receive impressions of his power and beneficence and be initiated in the most perfect mysteries." Although this passage is exceedingly obscure, neither am I one who is either able or willing to divest it of all its darkness, still it evidently shows that the two natures associated by Philo with God are not persons, but divine virtues and perfections only, which he represents in the character of persons. In the first place we learn from it, that God excited in Abraham *τριττὰς φαντασίας*, "a threefold phantasy," not in the contemplative soul, but only in his *ψυχὴ ὁρατική*,

[9] This at the present day is intitled Procli in Platonis Politiam Commentarius, and is appended to his Comm. in Timæum. The passage alluded to by Dr. Cudworth occurs p. 357.

n, because if there were, καὶ ἡ τῶν κακῶν ἰδέα θεὸς ἔσται, ερ πᾶσα ἰδέα θεὸς, ὡς Παρμενίδης εἴρηκεν, " that very idea ril also would itself be a god, because every idea is a god,

soul in which the senses reside; which according to Philo is much inferior to hich is wholly abstracted from the senses and external things. See his De r. Legis. lib. 2. p. 74. and elsewhere. These three natures, therefore, are merely notions or images, produced in that part of the soul which is subject to the l of the senses. And could he speak in this manner of three natures in reality t and separate from each other? In the next place we may observe, that he asserts these two natures to be ἀγαθότητα, " goodness," and ἐξούσιαν, er." And who, I ask, would believe that goodness and power are things and s distinct and separate from God? Lastly, the very allegory which Philo here according to his own wont, plainly settles the question. According to him, is the image of virtue, or of a wise and contemplative man. The three mea- of meal, which she is commanded to mix, are symbols of the three divine s introduced by him. The action of Sarah mixing the three measures typifies action of the soul elevated above vulgar things, which by contemplation combines itself and as it were commingles the three divine natures, so that all distinction of is done away with. The allegory would have been altogether absurd, if Philo upposed the two powers which accompany God to be self-existent natures or s. On the contrary, his opinion is evidently this: that men subject to the e of the senses are accustomed to distinguish three natures in God; but that a an and a soul powerful and free can well understand that the divine virtues are imself, and ought in no wise to be separated from his essence. Whoever is not ced by this passage will probably be more powerfully impressed by another one is book De Abrahamo, p. 367. where he declares his mind more clearly. Philo is reating of the same subject which he discusses in the former passage, and has no of a great mystery being concealed in Moses' account of the three men who ed to Abraham. He first lays down Moses' meaning to be that the soul tened by God perceives his three images: Ἐπειδὰν οὖν ψυχὴ, καθάπερ ἐν βρίᾳ, θεῷ περιλαμφθῇ καὶ ὅλη δι' ὅλων νοητοῦ φωτὸς ἀναπλησθεῖσα ταῖς λῷ κεχυμέναις αὐγαῖς ἄσκιος γένηται, τριττὴν φαντασίαν ἑνὸς ὑποκειμένου αμβάνει· τοῦ μὲν ὡς ὄντος, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων δυοῖν, ὡς ἂν ἀπαυγαζομένων ούτου σκιῶν, " When therefore the mind is illuminated by God, and, being filled with intellectual light, becomes divested of darkness by the splendours l around, it perceives the three images of one subject, one of the thing itself, the two as shadows cast forth from this." The same, he adds, occasionally happens in corporeal light, of whom a twofold shadow sometimes strikes our eyes. Clear ce this of the opinion which we before attributed to Philo! The three divine s, which he exhibits, are merely three notions or images of one thing. The two bear the same relation to God as shadows to the body they proceed from. as no one regards a body accompanied by a double shadow as a threefold body, ks upon the shadows as real natures, so neither would he consider the two which Philo associates with God, to be individual persons or self-existent s. They are rays of the divine nature and perfections of God. Indeed, should ie attribute the same similitude to the three persons of the godhead professed by ans on the authority of sacred writ, which Philo ascribes to his three principles, ıld grossly err against the truth, and might justly be accused of Sabellian unbe- But let us again hear Philo, who a little afterwards thus explains his own mean- pecting this Trinity: Πατὴρ μὲν τῶν ὅλων ὁ μέσος, ὃς ἐν ταῖς ἱεραῖς γραφαῖς ὀνόματι καλεῖται ὁ ὤν· αἱ δὲ παρ' ἑκάτερα πρεσβύταται καὶ ἐγγύταται τος δυνάμεις, ὧν ἡ μὲν ποιητικὴ, ἡ δὲ βασιλικὴ προσαγορεύεται· καὶ ἡ μὲν κὴ Θεός· ταύτῃ γὰρ ἔθηκέ τε καὶ διεκόσμησε τὸ πᾶν· ἡ δὲ βασιλικὴ κύριος, middle one is the father of all, called properly in scripture *I am*; on each side most ancient and nearest powers of the I am, of which one is called creative, ıer kingly: the former is God, for by it he made and disposed all things, the s lord." These words considered in themselves might lead an incautious reader pose that Philo associates two persons with God: but they will by no means the circumspect. The three names of the Deity mentioned in sacred writ, I Jehovah), God (Elohim) and Lord (Adonai), are referred by our Jew to the

as Parmenides hath affirmed." Neither was Plotinus himself, though otherwise more sober, altogether uninfected with this fantastic conceit of the ideas being all of them gods, he writing

three divine natures into which he divides the Deity. But these three names designate only one God. Therefore Philo's three natures also represent but one God, considered in a threefold manner and respect, namely as the nature which existed of itself from all eternity, as the creator of the universe, and lastly as the king and governor. A clearer proof of this is afforded in the words immediately following: *Δορυφορούμενος οὖν ὁ μέσος ὑφ' ἑκατέρας τῶν δυνάμεων, παρίχει τῇ ὁρατικῇ διανοίᾳ, τότε μὲν ἑνὸς, τότε δὲ τῶν τριῶν φαντασίαν· ἑνὸς μὲν, ὅταν ἄκρως καθαρσεῖσα ἡ ψυχὴ, καὶ μὴ μόνον τὰ πλήθη τῶν ἀριθμῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν γείτονα μονάδος δυάδα ὑπερβᾶσα, πρὸς τὴν ἀμιγῆ καὶ ἀσύμπλοκον καὶ καθ' αὑτὴν οὐσίνος ἐπιδιᾶ τὸ παράπαν ἰδίαν ἐπείγηται· τριῶν δὲ, ὅταν μήπω τὰς μεγάλας τελεσθεῖσα τελετὰς, ἵνα ἐν ταῖς βραχυτέραις ὀργιάζηται, καὶ μὴ δύνηται τὸ ὂν ἄνευ ἑτέρου τινὸς ἐξ αὐτοῦ μόνου καταλαβεῖν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν δρωμένων, ἢ κτίζων, ἢ ἄρχων· δευτέρας μὲν οὔσης, ὥς φασι, πλοῦς οὗτος, μετέχει δ' οὐδὲν ἧττον δόξης ὑσοφιλοῦς,* "And so thus the one in the middle, attended on each side by his powers, exhibits to the perspicacious mind sometimes the image of one, sometimes of three: of one, when the soul being thoroughly purified and having passed over not only the other multitude of numbers, but also the dyad which is next to unity, hastens on to the simple and unmixed idea, altogether perfect in itself; of three, when being not yet initiated in the great mysteries but still occupied in the inferior orgies, it cannot comprehend the I am by himself alone without some other, but only by his acts, either the creator or the king of all. But this secondary sailing, as it is called, partakes nevertheless of pious opinion." We here have the whole mystery revealed. There are, Philo openly tells us, two classes of men, one rude, vulgar, and led by the eyes, the other perspicacious, and contemplative, and thoroughly purged of the popular doctrines and opinions. The latter, according to him, clearly understand these three powers to be merely three notions of one God, and worship God as he is in himself, namely, most simple and devoid of all composition whatever; the former on the contrary possessing much less penetration, are unable to know God otherwise than by his works, and from that cause distinguish in him, as it were, three persons, God himself, the virtue by which he created all things, and the goodness by which he governs and administers the universe. The latter he considers to entertain better and more exalted notions of God, although the former, he says, are not to be despised, as they cherish an opinion by no means inconsistent with piety towards God. Then follows a comparison drawn from the usages of mankind, by which he attempts to exhibit this doctrine concerning God in a clearer point of view. There is, he informs us, a threefold gradation in human habits, and this gradation is adapted to illustrate the dogma of the three notions of God. Some men worship God without any hope of reward, and these correspond to the Father, who according to him occupies the middle place between the two other virtues. Others are excited by benefits to pay homage to the supreme Being: this class he refers to the power which he places on the right side of the Father. Lastly, many are kept in their duty towards God by the fear of punishment: these he compares with the third or kingly virtue. This comparison is neither elegant nor ingenious; and besides Philo is any thing but consistent in his explication of it. Still there is sufficient light and force in it to confirm what we have stated, as to his meaning being no other than this: that God, though free from all concretion, can nevertheless be considered in a threefold relation and is in reality so considered by men. But the figurative mode of writing in which he wonderfully delights, and the multitude of subtleties, too far removed from vulgar conception, have led men of great perspicacity in other matters to ascribe to him more sound and correct sentiments than he ever entertained, and to place among the professors of three persons in one Godhead a man whom probably it would be much more proper to class among the precursors of the Sabellians. I shall add only one more passage, although many are at hand, which is of itself sufficient to decide the matter. It is evident from those which we have adduce[1], that Philo attributed the construction of this world to a certain virtue, which is placed as he says on the right of the supreme Being and which he calls *God*, and committed its government to the other power on the left hand of God, and denominated by him, *Lord*. But in the passage I am now about to bring forward, he refers

thus concerning the second god, the first mind or intellect:* Γενόμενον δὲ ἤδη τὰ ὄντα σὺν αὐτῷ γεννῆσαι, πᾶν μὲν τὸ τῶν ἰδεῶν κάλλος, πάντας δὲ θεοὺς νοητούς, "That he, being begotten

both these actions, the construction and the government of the word, to that God alone *who really is*, no other power being associated with him. Ὁ δὴ ταῦτα ἀκούων, says he, ——ὅτι τέ ἐστι καὶ ὑπάρχει θεὸς, καὶ ὅτι πεποίηκε τὸν κόσμον——καὶ ὅτι ἀεὶ προνοεῖ τοῦ γεγονότος, μακαρίαν καὶ εὐδαίμονα ζωὴν βιώσεται, "Whoever shall hear these things,——that God is and exists and that he made the world,——and that he always superintends and governs that which is made, will lead a happy and blessed life," De Mundi Opificio, p. 40 If this passage be attentively considered, it will be obvious to every one that Philo, when he added to the God *who is*, two powers, the *creative* and the *governing*, was speaking merely according to the sense of the vulgar, and that in reality he acknowledged no distinction and no divine person in this God.

Let us now turn our attention to that *reason* or *divine word*, so often magnificently spoken of by Philo, and endeavour to explore its nature. The force and meaning of the names by which he designates this *word* in several passages, is such, that, if estimated according to the received usage of the language, they would naturally lead to the notion of a person, although one inferior to the supreme Being. This λόγος is called by him ἀρχάγγελος, "the prince of angels," who is not ἀγέννητος or "unmade," as God, nor yet γεννητὸς or "made," as men, and who discharges the functions of divine ambassador amongst men and those of hostage and mediator with God; see his book, Quis Rerum Divinarum Hæres, p. 501. Compare his De Somniis, p. 601. 602. and Eusebius, Præparat. Evangel. lib. 11. cap. 15. p. 533. It is styled, Πρωτόγονος Θεοῦ υἱὸς, to whom God has committed the care of the sacred flock, De Agricultura, lib. 1. p. 152. ἀρχιερεὺς, or "high-priest" of this world, De Somniis, p. 510. and other names of the kind. Which modes of speech bearing a close resemblance to those by which the writers of the divine covenant are wont to celebrate the son of God and his eternal word, a great many of the earlier as well as later fathers of the Christian church were the more easily induced to believe that this Jew proclaimed the true doctrine concerning the son of God and that the word he speaks of is the same with Christ our Saviour. I very much fear, however, that if the shadows be dispelled with which he has obscured his diction, and the meaning of the words he makes use of be estimated by the standard of those passages which are less figurative, we shall have to conclude the same of his word as of his two powers of which we have already treated. What first excites one's suspicion on this subject, is that Philo asserts the world to have been made according to the image of this word. For so in his first book of Questions and Solutions in Eusebius, Præparat. Evangel. lib. 7. cap. 13. p. 323. Θνητὸν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀπεικονισθῆναι πρὸς τὸν ἀνωτάτω καὶ πατέρα τῶν ὅλων ἐδύνατο, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δεύτερον θεὸν, ὅς ἐστιν ἐκείνου λόγος, "For nothing mortal can be fashioned according to the image of the Supreme and Parent of all things, but according to that of the second god, which is his word." The same he states more plainly, De Opificio Mundi, p. 5. &c. in which passage, after saying that man according to the authority of Moses was formed after the likeness of the second god or the word, immediately adds, that this saying pertains to the whole universe, which more than man expresses the divine image. And he forthwith explains what god he supposes this world to have been framed in the likeness of, in the following words: Δῆλον δὲ, ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀρχέτυπος σφραγὶς, ὃν φαμεν εἶναι κόσμον νοητὸν, αὐτὸς ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀρχέτυπον παράδειγμα, ἰδέα τῶν ἰδεῶν, ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος, "But it is evident, that the archetypal seal, which we say is the intelligible world, would be the archetypal model, the idea of ideas, the word of God." Which dogma I cannot at all understand upon the hypothesis of so many grave and eminent men that Philo's word is a divine person. The world was made after the example of this word; hence there must necessarily be the closest resemblance between it and the world. Now the world manifestly consists of elements, stars, animals, plants, trees, men, mountains, rivers, valleys, and an infinity of other things of the kind. Consequently, the whole of these of which our world is composed are unquestionably in this word, in short, the divine word must of necessity be the same kind of thing, the same kind of spirit or genius as

* Ennead 5. lib. 1. cap. 7. [P. 489.]

by the first God (that is, by way of emanation, and from eternity) generated all entities together with himself, the pulchritude of the ideas, which are all intelligible gods. Apuleius[10]

the world. Let others see whether they can fancy to themselves such a person or spirit, resembling in form and appearance the sensible world. For my own part, I am utterly unable to comprehend the nature of a person, whose form and image the supreme Being could have placed before him in the construction of the universe and imitated in fashioning and disposing its various parts. A centaur, I should say, or chimæra, or any other monster more terrible and hideous than these, such as the poets have feigned, would be a truer representation of the figure and form of the world, than a person begotten of the Supreme. But if we suppose the word to be merely a certain exemplar produced in the mind by the supreme Being, by thought and reason, if we may so speak, before the creation, and afterwards really expressed in this world, I should find no greater difficulty in this hypothesis than if any one were to say, that an architect caused a royal palace to be erected according to a certain model, which he had at first designed in his own mind and subsequently committed to paper.

What is less intelligible in Philo's doctrine on God's creation of the world after the image of the Word, is expressed more clearly by himself in his book, De Opificio Mundi; from which we shall endeavour, as far as is possible to explain his meaning. In the first place, he tells us, p. 3. 4. that God, long before proceeding to the construction of the visible world, formed a *νοητὸν*, or "intelligible" world, that is, conceived by thought and reflection a specimen or image of the world he was about to form. This dogma he illustrates by a comparison drawn from human affairs. He compares God with a wise architect, who, being commissioned to build a great and splendid city, first of all designs and as it were fabricates in his mind an image and model of the whole work, and when he comes to the operation itself, continually inspects and refers to this mental model. *Τὰ παραπλήσια*, says he, *δὴ καὶ περὶ θεοῦ δοξαστέον, ὃς ἅρα μεγαλόπολιν κτίζειν διανοηθείς, ἐνενόησε πρότερον τοὺς τύπους αὐτῆς, ἐξ ὧν κόσμον νοητὸν συστησάμενος ἀποτελεῖ τὸν αἰσθητὸν, παραδείγματι χρώμενος ἐκείνῳ*, "The same is to be supposed of God, who, having designed to build this mighty city, first conceived its forms, from which having fashioned an intelligible world he constructed this sensible one, using the other as a model." Philo always attached the highest importance to this dogma of a model world having been conceived in the mind of God before the construction of the corporeal one, and considers it impossible to refute either the Epicureans or those who hold the world and God to be the same, unless its truth be admitted. Wherefore, in his De Victimas Offerentibus, p. 857. he contends that those who discard the ideas or forms of things, are the eunuchs whom Moses reproaches, and does not scruple to consider such men guilty of the greatest impiety towards God. But these matters I now pass over, and come to what he says of the *νοητὸς*, or "intelligible" world. This world, then, he pronounces to be situated in the word of God. But to enable us to form a clearer conception of his opinion, let us hear his own words. *Καθάπερ οὖν ἡ ἐν τῷ ἀρχιτεκτονικῷ προδιατυπωθεῖσα πόλις χώραν ἐκτὸς οὐκ εἶχεν, ἀλλ' ἐνεσφράγιστο τῇ τοῦ τεχνίτου ψυχῇ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οὐδ' ὁ ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν κόσμος ἄλλον ἂν ἔχοι τόπον, ἢ τὸν θεῖον λόγον, τὸν ταῦτα διακοσμήσαντα*, "As therefore, that city prefigured and predesigned in the architect, had no place externally, but was impressed merely in the mind of the artificer, in like manner, the world consisting of ideas could have no other place except in the divine word which disposed all these things." Now, any one, on attentively examining this passage, will easily perceive, if I mistake not, that according to Philo the *word of God* is nothing more than the wisdom and reason of God, and not a person procreated and generated by him before the creation of the world. He compares this word with the mind of a man about to build a certain city. As the

[10] De Deo Socratis, p. 43. But I see no reason why Apuleius' words, which are applied to all the celestial gods, should be referred to *ideas*, or what the Platonists call *intelligible Gods*. We have already treated of this passage of Apuleius, as also of Julian's dogmas, and the Egyptian worship of beasts, which the learned Doctor here again touches upon.

also (as hath been already noted) grossly and fulsomely imputes the same to Plato, in those words: Quos deos Plato existimat, veros, incorporales, animales, sine ullo neque fine neque exordio,

model of the future city resides in that faculty of the architect which we call intellect, so the form of this world is said to have resided in the word of God. This being the case, the word of God is the same in the supreme Being as intellect and reason in the architect, namely, his supreme wisdom and science, by which he figured and designed the world he was at a definite time about to create. But Philo more explicitly declares this to be his opinion in what follows, p. 5. *Εἰ δέ τις ἐθελήσειε γυμνοτέροις χρήσασθαι τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, οὐδεν ἂν ἕτερον εἴποι τὸν νοητὸν εἶναι κόσμον, ἢ θεοῦ λόγον ἤδη κοσμοποιοῦντος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ νοητὴ πόλις ἕτερόν τί ἐστιν, ἢ ὁ τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος λογισμὸς, ἤδη τὴν νοητὴν πόλιν κτίζειν διανοουμένου*, "But if any one wishes to employ plainer words, he would say that the intelligible world is nothing else than the word of God now forming the world: for neither is the intelligible city any thing more than the reasoning of the architect, who is already meditating the building of the city conceived in his mind." These words put an end to all doubt, and suffer no one to remain in ignorance as to the nature of Philo's λόγος. The *νοητὸς* and intelligible world, or the form and idea of the world contained in the divine mind, before he commenced its construction, does not differ from the λόγος, or word of God. The word of God has the same relation to the intelligible world, as the reasoning of the architect to the form conceived in his own mind of the city he is about to build. But these two are in reality not distinct things, but are separated only by thought. Wherefore, neither are the intelligible world and the word of God two really different things, although they can be distinguished by reason and intellect. Which being so, he who should assert Philo's word to be a person or a self-existent nature, would act as wisely as if he were to call the architect's cogitation upon the forthcoming city a distinct nature or individual person. On the contrary, the divine word is nothing but the wisdom and reason itself of the supreme Being, which Philo for certain reasons has clothed in the dress and garb of a person. Should any one fail to be convinced by these considerations, conclusive as they are, and deem the names applied by Philo to his word, of *ambassador, king, angel, high-priest, firstborn son*, to be much too explicit to admit of being understood of a certain mental notion or virtue of the Deity, I would simply ask them to pay some attention to Philo's style, and to mark its redundance in figures and bold metaphors. A writer who departs so far from the vulgar usage of speech, as to say that God consorted with his own science, and from it, as from a wife, generated his only son, namely, this world, can occasion us no surprise when he speaks of divine wisdom as of a certain divine person. And that he clearly expresses himself in the above manner, witness his book, De Temulentia, p. 244. *Τὸν γοῦν τόδε τὸ πᾶν ἐργασάμενον δημιουργὸν ὁμοῦ καὶ πατέρα εἶναι τοῦ γεγονότος εὐθὺς ἐν δίκῃ φήσομεν· μητέρα δὲ τοῦ πεποιηκότος ἐπιστήμην, ᾗ συνὼν ὁ θεὸς, οὐχ ὡς ἄνθρωπος, ἔσπειρε γένεσιν· ἡ δὲ παραδεξαμένη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σπέρμα, τελεσφόροις ὠδῖσι τὸν μόνον καὶ ἀγαπητὸν αἰσθητὸν υἱὸν ἀπεκύησε, τόνδε τὸν κόσμον*, "Therefore, we can justly call the artificer who made all things, the father also of his creature, and his science its mother, with which God having consorted, not after the manner of man, procreated the creature. But it having received the divine seed brought forth at mature birth the only begotten and beloved sensible son, this world." I have cited this passage the more willingly, as it not only shows that probably no writer abounded more in the metaphorical, and consequently, that his style is not to be estimated according to the ordinary rules of speech, but also makes that evident which we have hitherto put forth as proved, that the word of God means in Philo the reason and wisdom of the supreme Being. For as every one must see, the *ἐπιστήμη* or "science" which God is stated in this passage to have espoused, is that very thing which he calls in so many other passages the *word* or *reason*. Whether Philo says: "The word or reason of God made the world," or expresses himself thus: "God consorted with his own science, and from it begat the world," his opinion is all the same, namely this: "God created this world most wisely, and did not perform the work at random or fortuitously." I shall add another peculiarity of his style, which will be of equal utility to us in deciding upon this question. Philo is accustomed to call the thoughts and dogmas of men, especially the wise, their *spiritual sons*. Thus, in his De Vita Con-

sed prorsus ac retrò æviternos, ingenio ad summam beatitudinem porrecto, &c. And he, with Julian and others, reduces the greater part of the pagan gods to these ideas of the intelligible, or

templat. p 899. when commending the continence of the Therapeutidæ, he tells us they despised bodily pleasures, that by the divine virtue they might conceive and bring forth more holy and celestial sons. *Τῶν περὶ σῶμα ἡδονῶν ἠλογήσαν, οὐ θνητῶν ἐκγόνων, ἀλλ' ἀθανάτων ὀρεχθεῖσαι, ἃ μόνη τίκτειν οἷά τε ἐστιν ἡ θεοφιλὴς ψυχή, σπείραντος εἰς αὐτὴν ἀκτῖνας νοητὰς τοῦ πατρὸς, αἷς δυνήσεται θεωρεῖν τὰ σοφίας δόγματα,* "They despised the pleasures of the body, being desirous, not of mortal, but of divine offspring, which the pious soul alone can bring forth, receiving as seed the intelligible rays of the Father, by which it will be able to contemplate the dogmas of wisdom." He who philosophizes so refinedly and figuratively on the thoughts of men, is not departing from his wont, when he calls the reason and wisdom of God, or the divine thoughts and decrees, the first-born son of God. One figure is not more harsh and exceptionable than the other.

I have been led to continue this discussion to a greater length than I had at first intended, as well on account of those notable controversies agitated long ago among learned men on the Theology of Philo, as also for the sake of enabling others to correct certain errors committed by Dr. Cudworth in his explication of it, both in this and in other places. I speak not of my having considered it worth while to bestow some labour upon the task of explaining the doctrines of a man to whose authority the learned are in the habit of appealing on the various departments both of sacred and profane knowledge, although they do not sufficiently guard themselves against the snares in which his tumid and highly figurative style is calculated to entangle his readers. If there be any force in what we have advanced, the opinion of Philo was as follows: That God, as considered by a wise and contemplative man, is a nature so simple as to admit of no distinction even in thought; but that all men are not so happy as to be able to contemplate with eyes so pure, and a mind so serene and perspicuous: hence, that it is permitted to most men, by reason of their great mental infirmity, to divide in a certain way the divine nature, and to subject to the supreme Being, as far transcending all virtues, three inferior powers, namely the *word*, *God* or the beneficent virtue, and the *king*; which, however, are nothing more than his wisdom, goodness, and power; or, which is the same thing, that it is allowable to regard the one God in a threefold relation, as the god who most wisely pre-ordained all things before the creation of the world, as the most powerful maker and creator of the world, and lastly, as the ruler and governor of the same.

But it is not sufficient to know Philo's opinion: we ought also to examine into the causes which led him to entertain it. Before I conclude, therefore, I shall offer a few remarks on this subject. I consider him, then, to have derived his notions not only from the philosophers in whose society he mixed at Alexandria, but also from the Jews themselves. In the first place, with respect to the Egyptian philosophers, it will be known, that prior to the birth of our Saviour they had already begun to descant in their schools upon the three principles of things. From what source they obtained this dogma, whether from Plato or from others more ancient than Plato, and in what sense they understood it, it is not our purpose to inquire in this place. Philo, therefore, having learnt it from these philosophers, and fearing lest the three principles should corrupt or altogether subvert the sacred doctrine of Moses concerning God, he considered that these were to be accommodated to the Jewish religion, and not to be received by him otherwise than in conformity with the law of Moses. With this idea, in place of three real and self-existent principles, as inculcated by the philosophers, he substituted three notions of the mind, or exchanged a trinity of persons, so to speak, for a trinity of names or divine perfections. In this manner he appeared to himself to pay proper regard both to the philosophy he was an admirer of, and to the religion of his ancestors, which he was anxious by all means to preserve inviolate. I can hardly believe, however, that Philo would have attempted any thing of the kind, and spoken of three divine natures, if he had known this doctrine to be unpalatable to his own nation. The Jews at that time took every precaution not to admit any thing injurious to Moses' dogma concerning one God, which they held in the highest reverence. Beyond question, therefore, they would have been grievously offended, if Philo, in opposition to the opinions of his own nation, and unsupported by the testimony or authority of any Jew, had dared to speak thus boldly though obscurely of three divine

archetypal world, as making Apollo, for example, to be the intelligible sun, the idea of the sensible; and Diana the intelligible moon, and the like for the rest. Lastly, it hath been observed also, that the Egyptian theologers pretended, in like manner, to worship these intelligible gods, or eternal ideas, in their religious animals, as symbols of them.

Philo indeed Platonized so far, as to suppose God to have made an archetypal and intelligible world, before he made this corporeal and sensible:* Βουληθεὶς (ὁ Θεὸς) τὸν ὁρατὸν τουτονὶ κόσμον δημιουργῆσαι, προεξετύπου τὸν νοητὸν, ἵνα χρώμενος ἀσωμάτῳ καὶ θεοειδεστάτῳ παραδείγματι, τὸν σωματικὸν ἀπερ-

natures. Consequently, he must necessarily have been convinced that in dividing the divine nature as it were into three persons he was about to broach nothing which would be offensive or dangerous to the Jews. But why many words? We may learn from Philo himself that the Jews of his time made common mention of three persons in one God. For in his De Abrahamo, p. 367. he declares that the opinion of those who hold three natures in one God contains nothing injurious to piety, although those are to be preferred who entirely discard all division from the divine nature. Δεύτερον, says he, μὲν οὖν, ὡς φασι, πλοῦς οὗτος· μετέχει τὲ οὐδὲν ἧττον δόξης θεοφιλοῦς, "This is, as the proverb calls it, a second sailing: nevertheless, it is not foreign to pious sentiment." In the first place, these words can be understood of none but the Jews. For who would suppose a Jew to have ranked philosophers averse to the true religion, among the patrons of piety and of a true sense of God? The philosophers' opinion concerning three principles was not such as to admit of being called holy, good and pious by a Jew; as it rather favoured a multitude of gods. In the next place, these words of Philo must not be accepted as though these Jews, who at that time professed something threefold in God, understood merely three notions or three virtues of God. For I see no reason why he should have affirmed, that those who separated the divine virtues from the divine nature merely in reason and thought, and considered them separately, although they ought to be tolerated, hold improper and unwise notions concerning God; inasmuch as the most acute theologians and philosophers, Jews as well as Christians, including even Philo himself, have done the same, neither is any mortal gifted with such powers of intellect as to be able to comprehend the nature of God by one act of the mind, and without making any distinction. Besides, there are more than three virtues and perfections in God, and consequently there appears no reason why these Jews, in reckoning them, may not have exceeded the ternary number. I am convinced, therefore, that in Philo's time, most of the Jews, though acknowledging God to be one by nature, at the same time believed him to be in a certain respect threefold; which dogma, in all probability, they received partly from sacred writ, and partly from the first founders of their race. But Philo, being anxious to connect the precepts of scripture and the traditions of his ancestors, and fearing moreover, lest the enemies of the Jews, whom he frequently came in contact with, should make this dogma a pretext for accusing them of worshipping a plurality of gods, considered it the safest course to convert the trinity of persons, commonly professed by his countrymen, into a trinity of names and notions. And when we consider that, subsequently to the doctrine of three persons in the Godhead being more clearly expounded by our Saviour, Sabellius and so many others besides him did not scruple notwithstanding to substitute three names and notions of God in lieu of the three persons, can it appear strange or wonderful, I would ask, that the same thing should have been done by a Jew, who was an ardent admirer of philosophy? I have now given what I consider to be Philo's doctrine concerning God. I have also given the causes which, in my opinion, led him to adopt it. Although, therefore, Philo is to be excluded from the number of those who profess the Christian dogma of a triune God, and, on the contrary, is favourable rather to the Sabellians, still he furnishes us with abundant evidence that, previously to the introduction of Christianity, most of the Jews, at least of Alexandria, were imbued with this doctrine.

* De Mun. Opif. p. 6. [P. 3. 4.]

γάσηται, πρεσβυτέρου νεώτερον ἀπεικόνισμα, τοσαῦτα περιέξοντα αἰσθητὰ γένη, ὅσαπερ ἐν ἐκείνῳ νοητά· τὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν, συστατῶα κόσμον ἐν τόπῳ τινὶ ὑπονοεῖν ἀδύνατον, "God intending to make a visible world, first formed an intelligible one; that so having an incorporeal and most god-like pattern before him, he might make the corporeal world agreeably to the same, this younger an image of that older, that should contain as many sensible kinds in it, as the other did intelligible. But it is not possible (saith he) to conceive this world of ideas to exist in any place." Nay, according to him, Moses himself philosophised also after the same manner in his Cosmopœia, describing, in the first five verses of Genesis, the making of an intelligible heaven and earth, before the sensible: Πρῶτον οὖν παρὰ τοῦ νοητοῦ κόσμου ὁ ποιῶν ἐποίει οὐρανὸν ἀσώματον καὶ γῆν ἀόρατον, καὶ ἀέρος ἰδέαν καὶ κενοῦ, εἶθ' ὕδατος ἀσωμάτου οὐσίαν καὶ πνεύματος, καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἑβδόμου φωτὸς, ὃ πάλιν ἀσώματον ἦν καὶ νοητὸν ἡλίου παράδειγμα, &c. "The Creator first of all made an incorporeal heaven and an invisible earth; the ideas of air and vacuum; incorporeal water and air; and last of all light, which was also the incorporeal and intelligible paradigm of the sun and stars, and that from whence their sensible light is derived." But Philo does not plainly make these ideas of the intelligible and archetypal world to be so many distinct substances and animals, much less gods; though he somewhere[1] takes notice of those, who admiring the pulchritude of both these worlds, did not only deify the whole of them, but also their several parts; that is, the several ideas of the intelligible world also, as well as the greater parts of the sensible, an intelligible heaven and earth, sun and moon; they pretending to worship those divine ideas in all these sensible things. Which high-flown Platonic notion, as it gave sanctuary and protection to the grossest and foulest of all the pagan superstitions and idolatries, when the Egyptians would worship brute animals, and other Pagans all the things of nature (inanimate substances, and mere accidents), under a pretence of worshipping the divine ideas in them; so did it directly tend to absolute impiety, irreligion, and atheism; there being few that could entertain any thoughts at all of those eternal ideas, and scarcely any who could thoroughly persuade themselves that these had so much reality in them as the sensible things of nature; as the idea of a house in the mind of an architect hath not so much reality in it as a material house made up of stones, mortar, and timber; so that their devotion must needs sink down wholly into those sensible things, and themselves naturally at length fall into this atheistic persuasion, that the good things of nature are the only deities.

* P. 6. [1] De Confusione Linguarum, p. 345.

Here therefore have we a multitude of pagan gods supermundane and eternal (though all depending upon one supreme), the gods by them properly called νοητοὶ, "intelligible," or the divine ideas. And we cannot but account this for another depravation of the ancient Mosaic cabala of the trinity, that the second hypostasis thereof is made to be the archetypal world, and all the divine ideas as so many distinct substances, animals, and gods; that is, not one God, but a whole world of gods.[2]

[2] I confess, if we insist upon the words of the Platonists, and deal with them according to strict justice, the whole of the corollaries here laid to their charge by Dr. Cudworth may fairly be attributed to them. I know also that some of this sect entertained opinions so glaringly absurd and ridiculous, that any one who should attempt to defend or excuse them, would do great injustice to his own intellect and to truth itself. But if the discipline of this school be considered generally and as a whole, and not estimated from the commentaries of this or that writer, something perhaps will admit of being said in their favour. It is true that what they believed to be the second hypostasis of the divinity was called by them the *archetypal* or *intelligible world*: which doctrine, if taken strictly, is very foolish and absurd. For no one would be able to understand how the exemplar of this world, being compounded and made up of ideas, can be a divine person. But if we examine a little more minutely the dogmas and language of the more intelligent members of this sect, we shall find that they did not assert this in the strict and proper sense. These obscure masters mean nothing more than this: that the form of what they call the archetypal world lies hid in the second divine hypostasis, in the same way, for example, as the form and idea of the books De Natura Deorum existed in the mind of Cicero before he committed them to writing, or that in this hypostasis are the forms and images of all things which can in any manner take place or exist. This being the case, the first charge brought against this sect by Dr. Cudworth falls to the ground, that the second person of their trinity was a thing compounded and made up of many natures, or a certain heap and congeries of gods. As the learned Doctor himself, whose mind is stored with infinite notions and images of things, is not on that account regarded by any one in his senses as a man concreted and compounded of multifarious natures, so neither is it right to consider the divine reason or the second person of the Platonic trinity as a certain congeries of gods, because it contains the forms and images of all things of which this world is composed. I am now assuming this second hypostasis of their trinity to be a person properly and truly so called, reserving to myself the inquiry in another place, whether or not there is more truth in the conjecture of those who suppose it to be merely a divine virtue personified by philosophers.

But some will say: that all the forms, or *ideas*, were called gods by this sect, and consequently that no one can doubt but that this second person we are speaking of contained in his bosom an immense crowd of gods. I confess, indeed, that some passages can be produced wherein all the forms of things are called gods. In the first place, however, these are very few in number; in the next place, they are taken solely from those philosophers, of this sect, who seem to have run mad with these very conceits; and lastly, they are unquestionably figurative. Indeed, I can by no means imagine that any man in his right mind ever seriously believed, that the form and image of a tree, or a fox, or a lion, although eternal, and generated from the divine reason itself, is in the proper and strict sense a god. If there have been any Platonists, whose doctrines admit of being expounded in no other manner than this, which however I doubt, I should rather have to do with Phrygians, who are late indeed in becoming wise, but nevertheless do become so at last, than with such philosophers, who I am certain did not understand the meaning of their own words.

But still the Platonists all speak of νοητοὶ, or "intelligible" gods; and what else are these than the forms or ideas of things? So indeed among others, asserts the learned Doctor, in order to add weight to his opinion. But here again I am at issue with him. I will explain in three words what these νοητοὶ, or "intelligible" gods are according to the doctrine of the Platonists, provided the extreme obscurity of this sect has allowed me to ascertain their meaning. The νοητοὶ gods are not generally the forms and images of all things whatever, but of those only, which the Platonists

But over and besides all this, some of these Platonists and Pythagoreans did further deprave and adulterate the ancient Hebrew or Mosaic cabala of the Trinity (the certain rule whereof is now only the scriptures of the New Testament), when they concluded, that as from the third hypostasis of their trinity, called ἡ πρώτη ψυχή, "the first soul," there were innumerable other particular souls derived, namely the souls of all inferior animals, that are parts of the world: so in like manner, that from their second hypostasis, called ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς, "the first mind or intellect," there were innumerable other μερικοὶ Νόες, "particular minds," or intellects substantial derived, superior to the first soul; and not only so, but also, that from that first and highest hypostasis of all, called Τὸ ἕν, and Τἀγαθὸν, "the one," and "the good," there were derived likewise many particular Ἑνάδες and Ἀγαθότητες, "unities" and "goodnesses substantial," superior to the first intellect. Thus Proclus in his Theologic Institutions:[3] Μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἓν ἄρα τὸ πρῶτον, ἑνάδες· καὶ μετὰ νοῦν τὸν πρῶτον, νόες· καὶ μετὰ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν πρώτην, ψυχαὶ· καὶ μετὰ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν, φύσεις. "After the first one (and from it), there are many particular Henades or unities; after the first Intellect and from it, many particular Noes, minds or intellects; after the first Soul, many particular and derivative souls; and lastly, after the universal Nature, many particular natures, and spermatic reasons. Where it may be obiter observed, that these Platonists supposed, below the universal Psyche, or mundane soul, a universal φύσις, or "substantial nature" also; but so as that besides it there were other particular λόγοι σπερματικοὶ, "seminal reasons," or plastic principles also.

As for these Noes, and that besides the first universal mind or intellect, there are other particular minds or intellects substantial, a rank of beings not only immutably good and wise, but also every way immoveable, and therefore above the rank of all souls that are self-moveable beings; Proclus was not singular in this, but had the concurrence of many other Platonists with

ranked in the number of gods. [In Porphyry, De Abstinentia, lib. 2. sec. 34. p. 75, the νοητοὶ gods seem to be real gods, who confer benefits upon mortals. They are opposed to statues: from which it would appear that they are deities, which are to be comprehended by thought alone.] It was an axiom of this sect, that there are in God eternal models and forms of all the things that constitute the universe. But many parts of this universe, especially the stars, sun, moon, &c., which they supposed to possess soul and life, were regarded by them as gods. Hence they necessarily supposed also that the forms and images of these gods had existed from eternity in the divine mind. These forms and images of deities are those gods which the Platonic school calls νοητοὶ. Such vagaries of idle minds, absurd and ridiculous as they are, would little deserve the attention bestowed upon them by the learned Doctor, were it not that even Christians are to be found, who abuse them to the corruption of the truth and for acorns like these almost reject the fruit of true wisdom.

[3] These are appended to Proclus' Introduction to the Platonic Theology, and consist of 211 chapters. The words here quoted occur cap. 11. p. 426.

him; amongst whom Plotinus[4] may seem to be one, from this passage of his besides others: "Ὅτι ἀθάνατοι δὲ αἱ ψυχαὶ, καὶ νοῦς πᾶς, ἐν ἄλλοις διὰ πλειόνων εἴρηται, "That souls are immortal, and every mind or intellect, we have elsewhere largely proved." Upon which words Ficinus thus: Hîc, et suprà et infrà sæpè, per verba Plotini notabis, plures esse mentium animarumque substantias inter se distinctas, quamvis inter eas unio sit mirabilis, "Here, and from many other places, before and after, you may observe that, according to Plotinus, there are many substantial minds, distinct from souls, though there be a wonderful union betwixt them." Moreover, that there was also above these nocs, or immoveable but multiform minds, not only one perfect Monad, and first Good, but also a rank of many particular Henades or Monades, and Agathotetes, was, besides Proclus and others, asserted by Simplicius also:* Ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν πάντα παράγει, τά τε πρῶτα, καὶ τὰ μέσα, καὶ τὰ ἔσχατα· ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα καὶ ἑαυτῷ παράγει, μιὰ ἀγαθότης πολλὰς ἀγαθότητας, καὶ μία ἑνὰς ἡ ὑπερ πάσας, πολλὰς ἑνάδας, "The highest good (saith he) produceth all things from himself, in several ranks and degrees; the first, the middle, and the last or lowest of all. But the first and the next to himself doth he produce like himself, one goodness many goodnesses, and one unity or henade many henades." And that by these Henades and Autoagathotetes he means substantial beings, that are conscious of themselves, appears also from these following words:† Τὰ μὲν οὖν πρῶτα τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀγαθοῦ παραγομένων, διὰ τὸ πρὸς αὐτό ὁμόφυες, οὐκ ἐξίστη τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ, ἀκίνητα ὄντα καὶ ἀμετάβλητα, καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἀεὶ μακαριότητι ἱδρυμένα, οὐκ ἐνδεῆ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὅτι αὐτοαγαθότητές εἰσι, "Those beings, which are first produced from the first good, by reason of their sameness of nature with him, are immoveably and unchangeably good, always fixed in the same happiness, and never indigent of good or falling from it, because they are all essential goodnesses." Where afterward he adds something concerning the νόες also, that though these were a rank of lower beings, and not αὐτοαγαθὰ, not essentially goodnesses, but only by participation; yet, being by their own nature also immoveable, they can never degenerate, nor fall from that participation of good. Notwithstanding which, we must confess, that some of these Platonists seem to take the word Henades sometimes in another sense, and to understand

[4] Ennead b. lib. 4. cap. 10. p. 653. But it will require much ingenuity to prove from these words of Plotinus, that this philosopher was addicted to all those metaphysical subtleties in which Proclus wonderfully delighted. Plotinus is not a man that I should feel disposed to praise, or consider never to have violated the laws of sound and pure reason. On the contrary, I am aware he is frequently so hurried away by a sort of philosophic fury as almost to lose his understanding. But still he is much more perspicuous than Proclus, and does not abound with so many absurd conceits.

* In Epict. Ench. p. 9. † P. 11.

nothing else thereby but the intelligible idea before mentioned; though the ancient Platonists and Pythagoreans were not wont to call these unities, but numbers.

And now have we discovered more of the Pagans' inferior gods, supermundane and eternal, viz. besides those νοητοὶ θεοὶ, those "intelligible gods;" troops of Henades and Autoagathotetes, unities and goodnesses; and also of Noes, immoveable minds or intellects; or, as they frequently call them, θεοὶ ἑνιαῖοι, and θεοὶ νοεροὶ, "henadical (or monadical) gods," and "intellectual gods."[5]

But since these Noes, or νοεροὶ θεοὶ, are said to be all of them in their own nature a rank of beings above souls, and therefore superior to that first soul, which is the third hypostasis of this trinity; as all those Henades or ἑνιαῖοι θεοὶ, those simple monadical gods, are likewise yet a higher rank of beings above the Noes, and therefore superior to the second hypostasis also, the first mind; and yet all these Henades and Noes, however supposed by these philosophers to be eternal, forasmuch as they are particular beings only, and not universal, cannot be placed higher than in the rank of creatures; it follows from hence unavoidably, that both the second and third hypostasis of this trinity, as well the first mind as the first soul, must be accounted creatures also; because no created being can be superior to any thing uncreated. Wherefore Proclus, and some others of those Platonists, plainly understood this trinity no otherwise, than as certain scale or ladder of beings in the universe; or a gradual descent of things from the first or highest, by steps downward, lower and lower, so far as to the souls of all animals. For which cause, Proclus to make up this scale complete, adds to these three ranks and degrees, below that third of souls, a fourth of natures also; under which there lies nothing but the passive part of the universe, body and matter. So that, their whole scale of all that is above body was indeed not a trinity, but a quaternity, or four ranks and degrees of beings, one below another; the first of Henades or Unities, the second of Noes, Minds or Intellects, the third of Souls, and the last of Natures; these being, as it were, so many orbs and spheres, one within and below another. In all which several ranks of being, they supposed one first universal, and unparticipated, as the head of each respective rank, and many particular, or participated ones: as one first universal Henade, and many secondary particular Henades; one first universal Nous, Mind or Intellect, and many secondary and particular Noes or Minds; one first univeral Soul, and many particular souls; and lastly, one universal Nature, and many particular natures. In which scale of beings,

[5] On these gods see Proclus, Theolog. Platonic. lib. 1. cap. 13. p. 38, &c.

they deified, besides the first Τὸ ἓν and Τἀγαθὸν, "one" and "good," not only the first mind, and the first soul, but also those other particular Henades and Noes universally; and all particular souls above human: leaving out, besides them and inferior souls, that fourth rank of natures, because they conceived that nothing was to be accounted a god but what was intellectual and superior to men. Wherein, though they made several degrees of gods, one below another, and called some ἀϊδίους, and some γεννητοὺς, some "eternal," and some "generated," or made in time; yet did they no where clearly distinguish betwixt the Deity properly so called, and the creature, nor show how far in this scale the true Deity went, and where the creature began. But as it were melting the Deity by degrees, and bringing it down lower and lower, they made the juncture and commissure betwixt God and the creature so smooth and close, that where they indeed parted was altogether undiscernible; they rather implying them to differ only in degrees, or that they were not absolute but comparative terms, and consisted but in more and less. All which was doubtless a gross mistake of the ancient cabala of the Trinity.[6]

[6] The learned Doctor inveighs with equal force and justice against these metaphysical refinements of the modern Platonists, which are of themselves futile and obscure, and if accurately examined border closely upon the impious opinion of those who deny any difference between God and the universe of things. But still in canvassing the whole theology and philosophy of this sect, it appears to me we ought to lay it down as a rule, that their sayings are to be understood in a milder sense than the words at first view might seem to require: which if taken in their ordinary acceptation certainly savour of the rankest folly. The diction employed by this sect is peculiar, and far removed from the received usage of language, from not observing which learned men have ascribed to them the most foolish opinions, to which however they seem to have been strangers. Despising and neglecting almost all corporeal things, and wholly absorbed in contemplation, these philosophers cared about nothing but the forms, notions, and ideas of things, of which, most fertile as were their imaginations, they invented not a few distinctions. But the more easily to philosophize upon these notions and models of things, it was their custom to transform the notions of their own mind into persons and gods, and to speak of them no otherwise than as of gods and animals. The same, we may observe, obtains with our own philosophers, who frequently represent the forms and notions of things conceived in the mind as self-existent natures, and discourse of the virtues, of that which is called beautiful, good, just, infinite, exactly as though they were discoursing of men. He who does not keep this constantly before his eyes in reading the books of the Platonists, will sometimes, I am afraid, be a very imperfect interpreter of them. And in this light, in my opinion, ought we to view all that Proclus and his class tell us about the *essential, intellectual, heniæan*, and I know not what other gods. To look at the words themselves one might swear they were treating of gods truly so called, and of self-existent natures; but if we examine the whole tenor and context of their doctrine, and inquire what they say of these gods, it will soon become apparent that they speak figuratively, and clothe mere notions in the dress of persons and gods. In a word, the whole of these Platonic gods are nothing but the notions and multiform ideas of things in the divine intelligence. For such was the boldness of this sect, that they scrupled not to meddle with divine intelligence itself, and like mathematicians with their rod and sand, to describe the infinite science of the Supreme Being by their petty distinctions and unmeaning words. But I shall readily forego this opinion if convinced to the contrary by any one who has read their principal authors: nay, I should be inclined even to agree with those who, on well considering the matter, may conclude that these

This is therefore that Platonic trinity, which we oppose to the Christian, not as if Plato's own trinity, in the very essential constitution thereof, were quite a different thing from the Christian; itself in all probability having been at first derived from a divine or Mosaic cabala; but because this cabala (as might well come to pass in a thing so mysterious and difficult to be conceived), hath been by divers of these Platonists and Pythagoreans misunderstood, depraved, and adulterated, into such a trinity, as confounds the differences between God and the creature, and removes all the bounds and land-marks betwixt them; sinks the Deity lower and lower by degrees (still multiplying of it, as it goes), till it have at length brought it down to the whole corporeal world; and when it hath done this, is not able to stop there neither, but extends it further still to the animated parts thereof, stars and demons; the design or direct tendency thereof being nothing else but to lay a foundation for infinite polytheism, cosmolatry (or world-idolatry), and creature-worship. Where it is by the way observable, that these Platonic Pagans were the only public and professed champions against Christianity; for though Celsus were suspected by Origen to have been indeed an Epicurean, yet did he at least personate a Platonist too. The reason whereof might be, not only because the Platonic and Pythagoric sect was the divinest of all the Pagans, and that which approached nearest to Christianity and the truth (however it might by accident therefore prove the worst, as the corruption of the best thing), and by that means could with greatest confidence hold up the bucklers against Christianity and encounter it; but also because the Platonic principles, as they might be understood, would, of all other, serve most plausibly to defend the pagan polytheism and idolatry.[7]

Concerning the Christian Trinity, we shall here observe only three things; first, that it is not a trinity of mere names or words, nor a trinity of partial notions and inadequate conceptions of one and the same thing. For such a kind of trinity as this might be conceived in that first Platonic hypostasis itself, called Τὸ ἓν and Τἀγαθὸν, "the one" and "the good," and per-

philosophers by understanding too much at last came to that pass that they did not understand themselves. Compare, however, what Dr. Cudworth a little afterwards remarks respecting the style of the Platonists, in their vindication.

[7] On the philosophy of the Celsus, whom Origen chastises, it is my intention to treat professedly in a comment on the books of Origen. Dr. Cudworth is correct in his remark, that this foe of the Christians did not belong to the Epicureans. Origen, no doubt, made one Celsus out of two, and confounded the Epicurean with the Platonic Celsus. The principal cause why scarcely any philosophers except the Platonists wrote against the earliest Christians, was unquestionably that at that time this sect overspread almost the whole of the Roman world, the others being neglected, or nearly extinct. The reasons, however, here given by the learned Doctor are deserving of attention.

aps also in that first person of the Christian Trinity; namely, goodness, and understanding or wisdom, and will or active ower, three inadequate conceptions thereof. It is true, that lotinus was so high flown as to maintain, that the first and ghest principle of all, by reason of its perfect unity and simplity, is above the multiplicity of knowledge and understanding, nd therefore does not so much as νοεῖν ἑαυτὸ, in a proper sense, understand itself;" notwithstanding which, this philosopher imself adds, that it cannot therefore be said to be ignorant nor nwise neither; these expressions belonging only to such a eing as was by nature intellectual,* νοῦς μὲν γὰρ μὴ νοῶν, νοήτος, intellectus, nisi intelligat, demens meritò judicatur. nd he seems to grant, that it hath a certain simple clarity and rightness in it, superior to that of knowledge; as the body of he sun has a certain brightness superior to that secondary light hich streameth from it; and that it may be said to be νόησις ὑτὴ, "knowledge itself," that does not understand, as motion self does not move. But this can hardly be conceived by rdinary mortals, that the highest and most perfect of all beings hould not fully comprehend itself, the extent of its own fecunity and power, and be conscious of all that proceedeth from it, hough after the most simple manner. And therefore this high-own conceit of Plotinus (and perhaps of Plato himself too) has een rejected by latter Platonists, as fantastical and unsafe; for hus Simplicius:† Ἀλλὰ καὶ γνῶσιν ἔχειν ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀκροτάτην, ὐ γὰρ ἂν τι τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ παραγομένων ἀγνοήσειεν, "But it ust needs have also the most perfect knowledge, since it cannot e ignorant of any thing that is produced from itself."[8] And it. Austin,[9] in like manner, confutes that assertion of some hristians, that the Λόγος, or "eternal Word," was that very isdom and understanding, by which the Father himself was ise; as making it nothing but an inadequate conception of God.

* Ennead 6. lib. 7. c. 37. [P. 729.] † In Epict. p. 235.

[8] This may be taken as a specimen of the bombast and insane philosophy of the latonists. Plotinus wanted merely to inculcate what is acknowledged by every one aving a right conception of the divine nature, that God does not understand like iserable mortals, but in a much more perfect manner, and cannot be comprehended y any human intellect. If he had expressed himself so, he would have been under-ood by every body, and would have given no cause for censure. But the Platonists ould not condescend to talk like the rest of men, nor admit any thing to be too recon-ite and abstruse for them to explain and make clear. Hence, if they had nothing to ay on the subjects themselves, they amused mankind with obscure words, and con-aled their ignorance in splendid figures and similitudes. In the last century, Thom. lobbes imitated Plotinus, and denied knowledge, properly so called, in God; which, lthough admitting of easy explanation, it is much safer to leave alone, as it may give se to the gravest errors.

[9] See the beginning of lib. 6. De Trinitate, cap. 2. 3. &c. p. 598. 599. tom. 8. opp. here he is arguing against those who asserted the Son to be that wisdom which is in ie Father: from which doctrine St. Augustine reminds them it would follow, that the ie Father without the Son is not wise.

But this opinion, that the Christian Trinity is but a trinity of words, or mere logical notions, and inadequate conceptions of God, hath been plainly condemned by the Christian church in Sabellius and others. Wherefore we conclude it to be a trinity of hypostases, or substances, or persons.

The second thing that we observe concerning the Christian Trinity is this, that though the second hypostasis, or person thereof, were begotten from the first; and the third proceedeth both from the first and second; yet are neither this second nor third creatures; and that for these following reasons. First, because they were not made ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, as Arius maintained, that is, from an antecedent non-existence brought forth into being, nor can it be said of either of them, Erat quando non erant, "That once they were not," but "Their going forth was from eternity," and they were both coëve and co-eternal with the father. Secondly, because they were not only eternal emanations (if we may so call them) but also necessary, and therefore are they both also absolutely undestroyable and unannihilable. Now, according to true philosophy and theology, no creature could have existed from eternity, nor be absolutely undestroyable; and therefore that which is both eternal and undestroyable, is ipso facto uncreated. Nevertheless, because some philosophers have asserted (though erroneously) both the whole world's eternity, and its being a necessary emanation also from the deity, and consequently, that it is undestroyable; we shall therefore further add, that these second and third hypostases or persons of the holy Trinity are not only therefore uncreated, because they were both eternal and necessary emanations, and likewise are unannihilable; but also because they are universal, each of them comprehending the whole world, and all created things under it: which universality of theirs is the same thing with infinity; whereas all other beings, besides this holy Trinity, are particular and finite. Now we say, that no intellectual being, which is not only eternal, necessarily existent, or undestroyable, but also universal or infinite, can be a creature.

Again, in the last place, we add, that these three hypostases, or persons, are truly and really one God. Not only because they have all essentially one and the same will, according to that of Origen:* Θρησκεύομεν οὖν τὸν πατέρα τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ τὸν υἱὸν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὄντα δύο τῇ ὑποστάσει πράγματα, ἓν δὲ τῇ ὁμονοίᾳ καὶ τῇ συμφωνίᾳ καὶ τῇ ταυτότητι τῆς βουλήσεως, "We worship the Father of truth, and the Son the truth itself, being two things as to hypostasis, but one in agreement, consent, and sameness of will:" but also because they are physically (if we may so speak) one also; and have a mutual περιχώρησις and

* Con. Cels. p. 386. [Liv. 8.]

ἐνύπαρξις, "inexistence" and "permeation of one another," according to that of our Saviour Christ, "I am in the Father, and the Father in me; and the Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works." We grant indeed, that there can be no instance of the like unity or oneness found in any created beings; nevertheless, we certainly know from our very selves, that it is not impossible for two distinct substances, that are of a very different kind from one another, the one incorporeal, the other corporeal, to be so closely united together as to become one animal and person; much less therefore should it be thought impossible for these three divine hypostases to be one God.

We shall conclude here with confidence, that the Christian Trinity, though there be very much of mystery in it, yet is there nothing at all of plain contradiction to the undoubted principles of human reason, that is, of impossibility to be found therein, as the Atheists would pretend, who cry down all for nonsense and absolute impossibility, which their dull stupidity cannot reach to, or their infatuated minds easily comprehend, and therefore even the Deity itself. And it were to be wished, that some religionists and Trinitarians did not here symbolize too much with them, in affecting to represent the mystery of the Christian Trinity as a thing directly contradictious to all human reason and understanding; and that perhaps out of design to make men surrender up themselves and consciences, in a blind and implicit faith, wholly to their guidance; as also to debauch their understandings by this means, to the swallowing down of other opinions of theirs, plainly repugnant to human faculties. As who should say, he that believes the Trinity (as we all must do, if we will be Christians), should boggle at nothing in religion never after, nor scrupulously chew or examine any thing; as if there could be nothing more contradictious, or impossible to human understanding propounded, than this article of the Christian faith.[10]

But for the present, we shall endeavour only to show, that the Christian Trinity (though a mystery, yet) is much more agreeable to reason, than that Platonic, or Pseudo-Platonic trinity before described; and that in those three particulars then mentioned. For first, when those Platonists and Pythagoreans interpret their third god, or last hypostasis of their trinity, to be either the world, or else a ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος, such an "immediate soul" thereof, as, together with the world its body, make up one animal god; as there is plainly too great a leap here betwixt their second and third hypostasis, so do they debase the Deity

[10] In these words he most justly censures the English Catholics, who at that time, in order to recommend their absurd dogma of transubstantiation, were greatly exaggerating the difficulties connected with the doctrine of the Trinity. Thus are these patrons of error accustomed to seek the interests and welfare of their own sect at the expense even of the Christian religion.

therein too much, confound God and the creature together, laying a foundation, not only for cosmo-latry, or world-idolatry in general, but also for the grossest and most sottish of all idolatries, the worshipping of the inanimate parts of the world themselves, in pretence as parts and members of this great mundane animal and sensible god.

It is true indeed, that Origen and some others of the ancient Christian writers have supposed, that God may be said, in some sense, to be the soul of the world. Thus in that book, Peri Archōn,* Sicut corpus nostrum unum ex multis membris aptatum est, et ab una anima continetur, ita et universum mundum, velut animal quoddam immane, opinandum puto; quod quasi ab una animâ, virtute Dei ac ratione teneatur. Quod etiam à sanctâ scriptura indicari arbitror per illud, quod dictum est per prophetam; Nonne cœlum et terram ego repleo, dicit Dominus? et cœlum mihi sedes, terra autem scabellum pedum meorum; et quod Salvator, cum ait, Non esse jurandum neque per cœlum, quia sedes Dei est, neque per terram, quia scabellum pedum ejus. Sed et illud quod ait Paulus, Quoniam in ipso vivimus et movemur et sumus. Quomodo enim in Deo vivimus, et movemur, et sumus, nisi quod in virtute suâ universum constringit et continet mundum? "As our own body is made up of many members, and contained by one soul, so do I conceive, that the whole world is to be looked upon as one huge, great animal, which is contained, as it were, by one soul, the virtue and reason of God. And so much seems to be intimated by the scripture in sundry places; as in that of the prophet, Do not I fill heaven and earth? And again, Heaven is my throne, and the earth my footstool. And in that of our Saviour, Swear not at all: neither by heaven, because it is the throne of God; nor by the earth, because it is his footstool. And lastly, in that of Paul to the Athenians, For in him we live, and move, and have our being. For how can we be said to live, and move, and have our being in God, unless because he, by his virtue and power, does constringe and contain the whole world? and how can heaven be the throne of God, and the earth his footstool, unless his virtue and power fill all things both in heaven and earth?" Nevertheless, God is here said by Origen to be but quasi anima, "as it were the soul of the world:" as if he should have said, that all the perfection of a soul is to be attributed to God, in respect of the world; he quickening and enlivening all things, as much as if he were the very soul of it, and all the parts thereof were his living members. And perhaps the whole Deity ought not to be looked upon, according to Aristotle's notion thereof, merely as ἀκίνητος οὐσία, an "immoveable essence;"

* Lib. 2. cap. 1.

for then it is not conceivable, how it could either act upon the world, or be sensible of any thing therein; or to what purpose any devotional addresses should be made by us to such an unaffectible, inflexible, rocky and adamantine Being. Wherefore all the perfection of a mundane soul may perhaps be attributed to God, in some sense, and he called, quasi anima mundi, "as it were the soul thereof:" though St. Cyprian[1] would have

[1] The learned Doctor is mistaken: for St. Cyprian neither entertained this opinion respecting the Holy Spirit, nor consistently could have entertained it. In his book, Ad Demetrianum, p. 216. 217. he writes that the world is daily getting old, and every year loses much of its pristine virtue. Which doctrine cannot well be maintained by one who supposes the power which animates and rules the world to be the Holy Ghost itself. The truth is, that opinion was put forth in a sermon on the Holy Ghost, by Ernaldus or Arnaldus, an abbè living in the twelfth century, and published in a book, De Cardinalibus Christi Operibus; which is usually appended to the works of St. Cyprian; and formerly, when the art of criticism had as yet made but little progress, was universally ascribed to him: hence arose the error. In Dr. Cudworth's time, however, it had already been shown by learned men, that it could by no means be a work of St. Cyprian's, and P. Labbe, De Scriptor. Ecclesiæ, quos attigit Bellarminus, tom. 1. p. 239, on the testimony of many manuscripts, had named Arnaldus as its author. Compare Casim. Oudinus, Comm. de Scriptor. Eccles. tom. 2. p. 1291. This Arnaldus, in the first place, declares the Spirit, which, as Moses records, Gen. i. 2. brooded over the face of the waters, to be the Holy Ghost; which opinion he holds in common with many other early writers; on whom consult J. Casp. Suicer, Thesaur. Ecclesiast. tom. 2. verb. πνεῦμα, p. 755. 756. and Dan. Petavius, Dogm. Theol. tom. 3. De Opificio sex Dier. lib. 1. cap. 3. sect. 5. p. 128. In the next place, he tells us that the ancient philosophers had some sort of idea of this, and therefore spoke of a *soul of the world*, whose power is diffused through the universe: this soul of the world being the Holy Ghost under another name. The same opinion was entertained by many of those who, at a later period, contended for the truth of the Christian religion, and sought for traces of the Trinity among pagan nations, as St. Augustine, Steuchus Eugubinus, Phil. Mornæus, and others; of whom it is not now our intention to say any thing. He then boldly asserts the Holy Ghost to be that power or spirit which confines, contains, animates, rules and vivifies all things. Hic Spiritus Sanctus, omnium viventium anima, ita largitate sua se omnibus abundanter infundit, ut habeant omnia rationabilia et irrationabilia secundum genus suum ex eo, quod sunt, et quod in suo ordine suæ naturæ competentia agunt: non quod ipse sit substantialis anima singulis, sed in se singulariter manens de plenitudine sua distributor magnificus proprias efficientias singulis dividit et largitur, "This Holy Spirit, the soul of all living things, thus by its own bounteousness, abundantly infuses itself into all things, rational and irrational, according to their own kind, so that all things have from it their existence, and their acting in their own order conformably to their own nature: not that it is the substantial soul in each, but remaining singly in itself, the magnificent dispenser of its own fulness, it distributes and gives to each their proper efficiencies." This was written in the twelfth century, by a man famed for his sanctity; in which century, however, the dogma was severely censured in others, and branded as infamous. So true it is, that two who think alike do not, however, always think alike, and that in a question as to the truth or falsehood of opinions and doctrines, a great deal depends upon the authority and credit of the party who broaches them.

I fancy I shall render an acceptable and not unprofitable service to many, by briefly showing that this Arnaldus taught nothing new: especially since Dr. Cudworth regards this opinion as singular and confined to St. Cyprian, and the subject has not, to my recollection, been touched upon by any one of the writers who have explained the doctrines of the ancient Christians. [Ephræm. Syri Testim. in Assemanni Biblioth. Orient. tom. 1. This opinion undoubtedly flowed from the Jews. See Beausobre Hist. de Manich. tom. 2. p. 171.] Almost all those whose monuments have come down to us from the earliest ages of Christianity, suppose the supreme Deity to have associated with the matter of which the world is composed a certain spirit, by whose power and influence all things are generated, governed and sustained. Whether they

this properly to belong to the third hypostasis or person of the Christian Trinity, viz. the Holy Ghost. But there is something of imperfection also plainly cleaving and adhering to this

derived this doctrine from Platonic precepts, or invented it themselves, has nothing to do with the present question. On the nature of this spirit, they are of various opinions. Some maintain the soul or spirit of the world to be a nature created by God, and different from the third Person of the Divinity. But they are outweighed both in number and authority by those who deny this difference, and contend that the same spirit which animates and inspires the minds of holy men, controls and contains the universe. The former opinion was held by Theophilus of Antioch among others, who, lib. 2. Ad Autolyc. sect. 18. p. 139. thus writes: Πνεῦμα δὲ τὸ ἐπιφερόμενον ἐπάνω τοῦ ὕδατος, ὃ ἔδωκεν ὁ Θεὸς εἰς ζωογόνησιν τῇ κτίσει, καθάπερ ἀνθρώπῳ ψυχὴν τῷ λεπτῷ τὸ λεπτὸν συγκεράσας, "But that which brooded over the waters, he (Moses) calls Spirit, which God gave to the creation for the production of living things, as the soul to man, commingling the subtle with the subtle." Theophilus, therefore, supposed the same kind of soul to be in the world as in the body of man. But he held this spirit to be widely distinct from the Holy Spirit; as is sufficiently shown by these words of his, lib. 1. sect. 8. p. 25. Ἡ πᾶσα κτίσις περιέχεται ὑπὸ Πνεύματος τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ τὸ περιέχον σὺν τῇ κτίσει περιέχεται ὑπὸ χειρὸς Θεοῦ, "The whole creation is contained by the Spirit of God, and the containing Spirit, together with created things, is contained by the hand of God." Compare lib. 1. sect. 11. p. 31. This no one would consider to be applicable to the Holy Spirit. The same was held by Tatian, who, Orat. ad Græcos, cap. 7. p. 19. explicitly declares as follows: Πνεῦμα γὰρ τὸ διὰ τῆς ὕλης διῆκον, ἐλάττον ὑπάρχει τοῦ Θειοτέρου Πνεύματος, "For the spirit which pervades matter is much inferior to the Divine Spirit." Irenæus supplies more obscure traces of the same opinion, which, to avoid prolixity, I shall not waste time by repeating. The latter opinion was maintained by many grave and eminent men, distinguished alike for purity of doctrine and for intellectual ability. We shall adduce the testimony of some of these, in order to establish the truth of what we have stated; beginning with St. Gregory, of Nazianzen, whose theological science most of the ancients consider to have been unsurpassed, and who does not hesitate to affirm that the Holy Spirit is that soul of the world discoursed of formerly by the Platonists and other philosophers, Orat. 37. de Spirit. S. tom. 1. opp. p. 595: Ἑλλήνων, says he, οἱ Θεολογικώτεροι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἡμῖν προσεγγίσαντες, ἐφαντάσθησαν μὲν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, περὶ δὲ τὴν κλῆσιν διημέχθησαν, νοῦν τοῦ πάντος, καὶ τὸν ἔξωθεν νοῦν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα προσαγορεύσαντες, "The more intelligent theologians of the Greeks, and such as come nearer to ourselves, had, in my opinion, a just conception (of the Holy Ghost), but disagreed as to the name, calling it the mind of the universe, the external mind, and the like." With him join St. Cyril, whom no one was supposed to excel in devotion to the pure doctrine, and who, Contra Julianum, lib. 8. p. 275. thus speaks: Οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων λογάδες ἀντὶ τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος τρίτον, ὡς ἔφην, εἰσκομίζουσι ψυχήν, ὑφ' ἧς καὶ ἅπαν ψυχοῦται ζῷον, ἐνιείσης αὐτοῖς, τὴν ζωὴν, καὶ τὰς τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος δυνάμεις τε καὶ ἐνεργείας προσνενεμήκασιν αὐτῇ, "The principal of the Greeks in place of the Holy Spirit introduce, as I have said, a third soul, by which all animals are animated and vivified, and have attributed to it the powers and energies of the Holy Spirit." This is sufficiently plain, and places it beyond all doubt, that St. Cyril held the Holy Spirit and the soul of the world, which fills all things with spirit and life to be the same. But I shall add, from what follows, where he illustrates and explains this opinion, some other words of his, even more clear and explicit than these: Κινεῖ γὰρ, says he, τὸ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα τὰ κινούμενα, καὶ συνέχει τὸ πᾶν, καὶ ψυχοῖ, καὶ ζωοποιεῖ, καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρα φύσις ἐστὶ παρά γε τὴν τοῦ Πατρὸς, ἢ γοῦν τοῦ Υἱοῦ, ἀλλ' οἷον αὐτὸς ἐν ἡμῖν, κατά γέ, φημι, τὸ ὁμοφυὲς, ἤτοι τὸ ὁμοούσιον, "For the Holy Spirit moves all things that are moved, and contains, and animates, and vivifies the universe, neither is it another nature different from that of the Father or the Son, but as he is in us, namely, according to identity of nature or of substance." In the same century lived Æneas Gazæus, an acute and eminent Christian philosopher, who, in a Dialogue, entitled Theophrastus seu de Immortalitate Animæ, p. 55, philosophizes thus concerning the Holy Spirit: Πατὴρ ἅμα τῷ τόκῳ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας ἅγιον Πνεῦμα προήνεγκε.——καὶ τούτῳ τῷ Πνεύματι τά τε νοητὰ καὶ αἰσθητὰ ἐμπνέων, δυνάμεως

notion of a mundane soul, besides something of paganity likewise, necessarily consequent thereupon, which cannot be admitted by us. Wherefore God, or the third divine hypostasis, cannot

πληροῖ, καὶ συνέχει, καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἕλκει· ἐπιστρέφει γὰρ ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα τὸ πνεῦμα, καὶ πᾶν ἀνέλκει, οὗ ἂν ἐνάψηται, "The Father, together with the Son, produced the Holy Spirit of the same substance,——and inspiring all things, intellectual and sensual, with this Spirit, fills them with power, and contains and draws them to himself. For the Spirit reverts always to the Father, and draws with it every thing it is instilled into." A philosophy, it must be owned, sufficiently harsh and absurd, but familiar nevertheless to the times in which Æneas lived. At the close of the Dialogue, p. 83. he addresses to the Holy Spirit the following prayer, embodying the same doctrine: Ὦ Πνεῦμα Ἅγιον, δι' οὗ ὁ Θεὸς, ἅπασιν ἐμπνέων συνέχει, καὶ διασώζει, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ τέλειον ἄγει, "O Holy Spirit, by which God inspires, contains and preserves all things, and leads them to perfection." To these, who, in former times, were held free from all taint of heterodoxy, we shall add another, not equally pure, but yet erudite and not unacquainted with philosophy, the author of the Clementines, who wrote, I suspect, in the third century. For he entertains the same opinion although he represents it somewhat differently, supposing the soul or spirit not to reside in the whole universe, but in water, and by water to impart motion, life and health to all things. This spirit, which he supposes to be in water, he holds to be the spirit by means of which men are purified and regenerated in baptism, namely, the Holy Spirit. I shall quote some of his words from Homil. 12. sect. 24. p. 204. tom. 1. Patr. Apostol. Τὰ πάντα τὸ ὕδωρ ποιεῖ· τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ὑπὸ πνεύματος κινήσεως τὴν γένεσιν λαμβάνει· τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ἀπὸ τούτων ὅλων Θεοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχει, "Water produces all things: but water receives the principle of motion from spirit; and spirit has its beginning from the God of the universe." Relying on this doctrine, he afterwards exhorts men to see that they are sprinkled with water according to the precept of the Saviour: for in water is the Holy Spirit, which not only generates and moves the whole nature of things, but also restrains in the mind the influence of all evil propensities: Διὸ προσέλθετε, ἔστι γάρ τι ἐκεῖ ἀπαρχῆς ἐλεῆμον, ἐπιφερόμενον τῷ ὕδατι, τοὺς βαπτιζομένους ἐπὶ τῇ τρισμακαρίᾳ ἐπονομασίᾳ καὶ ῥύεται τῆς ἰσομένης κολάσεως, "Come, therefore, for something merciful from the beginning is there (i. e. the Holy Spirit) borne upon the water, and frees those who are baptized, by a thrice happy invocation, from future punishment." Which argument this author considered to be most powerful towards rebutting those who at that time scoffed at Christians because they taught on the authority of Holy writ, that by water men are thoroughly changed and obtain the hope of future life. There is no need, I conceive, of further evidences, although more are not wanting, to show that anciently many of the most eminent doctors of the Christian church assigned the same office to the Holy Spirit that philosophers ascribed to the soul of the world, and that this dogma was branded by no one with the stigma of heresy. The ardent desire which most of the early fathers were inflamed with, of identifying the philosophers, especially the Platonists, with the Christians, was the cause, if I mistake not, that prevented these good men from penetrating all the recesses of this doctrine; from which, by the law of consecution many things can be deduced not only absurd in themselves, but injurious to the Deity. But those of succeeding ages were so far from following their ancestors in this respect, that they on the contrary ranked all who asserted the Holy Spirit to be the soul of the world among the worst corruptors of the heavenly truth. Bernard, a contemporary with the Abbè Arnaldus, severely condemns this opinion in Abelard: Omitto, says he, Epistola 190. p. 1583. 1584. opp. quod dicit, . . . Spiritum Sanctum esse animam mundi: mundum juxta Platonem tanto excellentius animal esse, quanto meliorem animam habet, Spiritum Sanctum, ubi dum multum sudat, quomodo Platonem faciat Christianum, se probat ethnicum, "I pass over his asserting, ... that the Holy Spirit is the soul of the world: that the world according to Plato is an animal so much the more excellent, the better the soul it possesses, namely, the Holy Spirit; where, while he labours hard to make Plato a Christian, he proves himself a heathen." Jo. Sarisberiensis, a celebrated doctor of that age, gives a somewhat milder judgment; and yet he affirms, that those who profess such a sentiment respecting the Holy Spirit lie like the heathens. Metalogic. lib. 4. cap. 16. p. 897. Quod tamen, says he, aut errori gentilium accommodandum est, qui *animam mundi*

be called the soul of the world in this sense, as if it were so immersed thereinto, and so passive from it, as our soul is immersed into, and passive from its body; nor as if the world, and this soul together, made up one entire animal, each part whereof were incomplete alone by itself. And that God, or the third hypostasis of the Christian Trinity, is not to be accounted, in this sense, properly the soul of the world, according to Origen himself, we may learn from these words of his:* Solius Dei, id est, Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, naturæ, id proprium est; ut sine materiali substantia, et absque ulla corporeæ adjectionis societate, intelligatur subsistere, "It is proper to the nature of God alone, that is, of the Father, and of the Holy Ghost, to

. . . . mentiebantur esse *Spiritum Sanctum*, "Which, however, is either to be referred to the error of the Gentiles, who falsely asserted the *soul of the world to be the Holy Spirit.*" They who are aware of the high authority in which St. Bernard was always held will easily conceive that his opinion was most extensively adopted, and that from that period no one who consulted his own safety ventured to resuscitate the ancient doctrine respecting the Holy Spirit; in the condemnation of which they unquestionably would have been somewhat more cautious, if they had read the works of the early Christian fathers. Nevertheless, even after the repurgation of religion, one or two started forth out of the ranks of those philosophers, called *Paracelsists*, *Rosicrucians*, or *Fire-philosophers*, who attempted to revive this doctrine among many other conceits of the Platonic school. Of these I shall notice only Robt. Fludd, a mighty oracle of this class, who in various writings seems to have openly maintained that God himself, in particular the Holy Spirit, constitutes the soul of the world. Anima mundi, says he, in his book De Medicina Catholica, lib. 2. cap. 1. est purior naturæ catholicæ spiritus, lucis divinæ radiis immediate a monade æterna emanantibus formatus, vivificatus, atque amoris sacrosancti unione seu glutine cum ipsis in naturam quandam vivam et spiritualem redactus, "The soul of the world is a pure spirit of universal nature, formed and vivified by rays of divine light, emanating immediately from the eternal monad, and reduced with them by the union or cement of holy love into a living and spiritual nature." This doctrine has been eruditely chastised by Pet. Gassendi in his Examen Philosophiæ Fluddanæ, cap. 1. sect. 1. 11. 12. p. 222. &c. and cap. 2. sect. 13. p. 236. tom. 3. opp. Although Fr. Lanovius, Epistol. ad Marinum Mersennum in the same Gassendi, ibid. p. 267. affirms that Fludd's error in this matter would appear to consist in the mere form of expression; into the truth of which statement I am not now disposed to inquire. Others of this sect handle the subject somewhat more skilfully, or perhaps more clearly explain Fludd's opinion. They assert that the Holy Spirit made this world, or to use the words of J. Sperberus, a philosopher of some eminence in this school: Tanquam architectum, ideas in filio reconditas mundo typice impressisse et infixisse, "As an architect, typically impressed and imprinted upon the world the ideas hidden in his son." Also that the first operation of the Holy Spirit was the production of light, and that this light first produced by the Holy Spirit is the soul of the world. Hæc lux, says Sperberus in his Isagoge in Veram Triunius Dei et Naturæ Cognitionem, Hamb. 1674. 8vo. p. 2. est anima mundi catholica, vel est ipsa natura universalis. Quæ natura est fluvius ille ex Eden (hoc est, filio Dei, qui est patris voluptas et delicium, per Spiritum Sanctum in paradisum, hoc est, universum mundum) derivatus, "This light is the catholic soul of the world, or it is universal nature itself. Which nature is that river flowing out of Eden (that is, out of the Son of God, who is the pleasure and delight of the Father, through the Holy Spirit, into paradise, that is, into the whole world)." According to these, therefore, the soul of the world is not the Holy Spirit, but the first emanation which flowed from it. But let others ascertain what is the real opinion of this sect which surpasses the Platonists in obscurity of style, and speaks as if unwilling to be understood by those who wish to have clear and distinct notions of the mind expressed in clear and intelligible words.

* Περὶ Ἀρχῶν, lib. 1. c. 6.

subsist without any material substance, or body vitally united to it." Where Origen affirming, that all created souls, and spirits whatsoever, have always some body or other vitally united to them; and that it is the property only of the three persons of the holy Trinity, not to be vitally united to any body, as the soul thereof; whether this assertion of his be true or no (which is a thing not here to be discussed) he does plainly hereby declare, that God, or the third hypostasis of the Trinity, is not to be accounted, in a true and proper sense, the soul of the world.

And it is certain, that the more refined Platonists were themselves also of this persuasion; and that their third God, or divine hypostasis, was neither the whole world (as supposed to be animated) nor yet ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος, "the immediate soul of this mundane animal," but only ψυχὴ ὑπερκόσμιος, "a supermundane soul;" that is, such a thing as though it preside over the whole world, and take cognizance of all things in it, yet it is not properly an essential part of that mundane animal, but a being elevated above the same. For thus Proclus* plainly affirmeth, not only of Amelius, but also of Porphyrius himself, who likewise pretended to follow Plotinus therein: Μετὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀμέλιον ὁ Πορφύριος οἰόμενος τῷ Πλωτίνῳ συνᾴδειν, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν τὴν ὑπερκόσμιον ἀποκαλεῖ δημιουργὸν, τὸν δὲ νοῦν αὐτῆς, πρὸς ὃν ἀπέστραπται, τὸ αὐτοζῶον, ὡς εἶναι τὸ παράδειγμα τοῦ δημιουργοῦ κατὰ τοῦτον, "After Amelius, Porphyrius thinking to agree with Plotinus, calls the supermundane soul the immediate opificer or maker of the world, and that mind or intellect, to which it is converted, not the opificer himself, but the paradigm thereof." And though Proclus there makes a question, whether or no this was Plotinus' true meaning, yet Porphyrius is most to be credited herein, he having had such intimate acquaintance with him. Wherefore, according to these three Platonists, Plotinus, Amelius, and Porphyrius, the third hypostasis of the Platonic trinity is neither the world, nor the immediate soul of the mundane animal; but a certain supermundane soul, which also was δημιουργὸς, "the opificer and creator of the world," and therefore no creature. Now the corporeal world being supposed, by these Platonists also, to be an animal, they must therefore needs acknowledge a double soul, one ψυχὴν ἐγκόσμιον, "the immediate soul" of this "mundane animal," and another ψυχὴν ὑπερκόσμιον, "a supermundane soul," which was the third in their trinity of gods, or divine hypostases, the proper and immediate opificer of the world. And the same, in all probability, was Plato's opinion also; and therefore that soul, which is the only Deity, that in his book of laws he undertakes to prove, was ψυχὴ ὑπερκόσμιος, a "supermundane soul," and not the same with that ψυχὴ

* In Timæum, p. 93. 94.

ἐγκόσμιος, "that mundane soul," whose "genesis," or "generation," is described in his Timæus; the former of them being a principle and eternal; and the latter made in time, together with the world, though said to be older than it, because, in order of nature, before it. And thus we see plainly, that though some of these Platonists and Pythagoreans either misunderstood, or depraved the Cabala of the trinity, so as to make the third hypostasis thereof to be the animated world, which themselves acknowledged to be ποίημα ana σημιουργούμενον, "a creature" and "thing made;" yet others, of the refined of them, supposed this third hypostasis of their trinity to be not a mundane, but a supermundane soul, and δημιουργὸν, not a creature, but "creator" or "opificer of the world."[2]

And as for the second particular proposed; it was a gross absurdity in those Platonists also, to make the second, in their trinity of gods, and hypostases, not to be one God, or hypostasis, but a multitude of gods and hypostases; as also was that a monstrous extravagancy of theirs, to suppose the ideas, all of them, to be so many distinct substances and animals. Which, besides others, Tertullian in his book de Anima* thus imputes to Plato: Vult Plato esse quasdam substantias invisibiles, incorporales, supermundiales, divinas, et æternas, quas appellat ideas, id est, formas et exempla, et causas naturalium istorum manifestorum, et subjacentium corporalibus; et illas quidem esse veritates, hæc autem imagines earum, "Plato conceiveth, that there are certain substances, invisible, incorporeal, supermundial, divine and eternal; which he calls Ideas, that is, forms, exemplars and causes of all these natural and sensible things; they being the truths, but the other the images." Neither can it be denied, but that there are some odd expressions in Plato, sounding that way, who therefore may not be justified in this, nor I think in some other conceits of his, concerning these ideas: as when he contends, that they are not only the objects of science, but also the proper and physical causes of all things here below; as for example, that the ideas of similitude and dissimilitude are the causes of the likeness and unlikeness of all things to one another by their participation of them. Nevertheless, it cannot be at all doubted, but that Plato himself, and most of his followers very well understood, that these ideas were, all of them, really nothing else but the noëmata, or conceptions, of that one perfect intellect, which was their second hypostasis; and therefore they could not look upon them in good earnest, as so many distinct substances existing severally and apart by

[2] On this question: Whether or not Plato and his principal followers professed two souls of the world, one placed above the world, the other immersed in matter and combined with the world, we shall discourse in the sequel.

* P. 320. Rig.

themselves out of any mind, however they were guilty of some extravagant expressions concerning them. Wherefore, when they called them οὐσίας, "essences or substances" (as they are called in Philo ἀναγκαιότατα οὐσίαι, "the most necessary essences"), their true meaning herein was only this, to signify, that they were not such accidental and evanid things as our conceptions are; they being the standing objects of all science, at least, if not the causes also of existent things. Again, when they were by them sometimes called animals also, they intended only to signify thereby, that they were not mere dead forms, like pictures drawn upon paper, or carved images and statues. And thus Amelius[3*] the philosopher plainly understood that passage of St. John the Evangelist, concerning the eternal Λόγος, he pointing the words otherwise than our copies now do, ὃ γέγονεν ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν, "that, which was made, in him was life:" this philosopher, glossing after this manner upon it, ἐν ᾧ τὸ γενόμενον ζῶν, καὶ ζωὴν, καὶ ὂν πεφυκέναι, "in whom whatsoever was made, was living, and life, and true being." Lastly, no wonder, if from animals these ideas forthwith became gods too, to such men as took all occasions possible to multiply gods; in which there was also something of that scholastic notion, Quicquid est in Deo, est Deus, "Whatsoever is in God, is God." But the main thing therein was a piece of paganic poetry; these pagan theologers being generally possessed with that poetic humour of personating things and deifying them. Wherefore, though the ideas were so many titular gods to many of the Platonic pagans, yet did Julian himself, for example, who made the most of them, suppose them all συνυπάρχειν καὶ ἐνυπάρχειν, "to co-exist with God and in-exist in him," that is, in the first mind, or second hypostasis of their trinity.[4]

[3] Apud Eusebium Præparat. Evangel. lib. 11. cap. 19. p. 540. This interpunctuation of the words of St. John was approved of by many enlightened members of the early church, and is adopted also by some of the moderns. Consult the authors mentioned by the venerable J. Christ. Wolf, in his Curæ Philologicæ ad Johannem, p. 783. There are some things which might be added to the observations of learned men on the subject; but I fear I have already become tedious by my numerous digressions. With the favour of Providence, therefore, I shall in another place bestow some diligence upon the solution of the question: Whether our present copies or those followed by Amelius give the more correct reading.

[*] So Clem. Al. St. Cyril, St. Aug. and other Latins.

[4] They who have paid any attention to the remarks offered by us a little above, on the peculiar style of expression adopted by the Platonists and its causes, will readily acknowledge our learned author's present defence of this sect to be reasonable and judicious. Not only the ancients but the moderns also are greatly at issue with one another upon the question whether the forms and ideas of things which Plato and his followers make a leading point in their philosophy are natures produced from the divine intelligence, and consequently existing separately out of God, or mere notions of the divine mind, and therefore having no such separate and external existence. A long array of authors of each of these opinions is enumerated by J. Bruncker, a man unsurpassed in the present day in the study of philosophical history, Historia Doctrinæ de Ideis, sect. 1. sect. 5. p. 53. &c. who joins himself with those that suppose

Lastly, whereas Proclus, and others of the Platonists, intermingle many particular gods with those three universal principles or hypostases of their Trinity, as Noes, Minds, or Intellects

Plato's forms to be natures distinct and separate from the divine intelligence. The latter opinion is here adopted, and learnedly defended by Dr. Cudworth; with whom, after having bestowed no slight care upon the investigation of the Platonic principles, I do not hesitate to express my concurrence. This controversy will never be decided by the authorities and sayings of the ancients, nor indeed ought it to be so decided. For in the first place, the authorities here conflict with authorities, and as many learned and ingenious men are to be found on one side as on the other; and where evidence is so nicely balanced, nothing can be more difficult to a man, however acute and observant of the rules of fair reasoning he may be, than to determine which is to preferred. Again, the statements of others respecting the opinion of any philosopher do not explain what the philosopher himself meant, but merely show the sense in which his dogmas were understood by the author whose words are quoted. Lastly, a philosopher's own expressions and maxims are not always to be estimated from the ordinary power and meaning of words, but are very frequently to be expounded in a much milder sense than would appear at first view, from the general tenor of his doctrine, and from the peculiarity of style adopted by him. For, let it be observed in passing, none more readily incur reprehension, or are accused of graver errors, than those who philosophize upon things abstracted from men's eyes and senses, and cognizable to reason alone; who being unable to find in the popular language that store of words and phrases which is requisite towards expressing the contemplations and images of their own mind, however anxious they may be to make their thoughts intelligible to all, are compelled sometimes to attach a new and unusual power to words, sometimes to employ many words improperly, and in a sense unknown to the vulgar usage, and sometimes to have recourse to figures and metaphors, and to speak of mental images and notions no otherwise than of persons. Hence it frequently happens, when they meet with unthinking and inexperienced readers, that they are accused of the most pernicious errors, and charged with the gravest crimes, of which, however, they are sometimes altogether guiltless. I do not wish to be understood as advocating the cause of the Platonists, against those who consider them to have in many instances broached impious and absurd doctrines; for, by doing so, I should be liable to the charge of inconsistency, having so frequently pointed out the greatest folly and levity in this sect: my object is merely to show the necessity of great caution being exercised in expounding the opinions of others, especially of the more subtle and abstruse kind. Therefore, if regard be paid not so much to the words of Plato and the Platonists, which it must be acknowledged frequently betray great temerity, as to the whole nature and tenor of his discipline, most men I consider will feel disposed to adopt the opinion of Dr. Cudworth respecting their images and eternal forms of things. Indeed, when I see imputed to a man neither obtuse nor unlearned an opinion, which is altogether foolish and absurd, and at the same time not required by the rest of his doctrine, I cannot easily suffer myself to suppose that no injustice is done to him, although some passages of his may be adduced which seem clearly to substantiate such a charge. It would be better, I imagine, to put a more favourable interpretation upon passages of the kind, especially if others are to be found which bear out this interpretation, than to accuse a wise, acute, and erudite philosopher as the author and promulgator of flagitious and insane doctrines. Let us apply this to Plato, and his defenders will be in no lack of materials necessary for his vindication. That he was a philosopher gifted with a sagacious and discerning mind, and possessing no ordinary knowledge of things, will be denied by no one. But the opinion he is said to have entertained is so absurd and ridiculous, that, if expressed only in apt and perspicuous words, its folly would at once be apparent to every man not entirely destitute of common understanding. Any one indeed would be held by me in the light of an idle trifler who should seriously assert, that of the moon which illumines our nights, or of horses which draw our chariots, there exist eternal exemplars or ideas, which are substantial, animated, and external to the divine intelligence. The very word *idea* implies a certain notion or image present to the mind, and not a certain nature really existing and living; wherefore I should regard a man discoursing of a self-existent and animate idea, as ignorant of his own meaning, and as either misap-

superior to the first soul; and Henades and Agathotetes, Unities and Goodnesses superior to the first Intellect too; thereby making those particular beings, which must needs be creatures, superior to those hypostases that are universal and infinite, and by consequence creaturizing of them: this hypothesis of theirs, I say, is altogether absurd and irrational also; there being no created beings essentially good and wise, but all by participation, nor any immoveable natures amongst them, whose οὐσία is their ἐνέργεια, their "essence," their "operation;" but all mutable and changeable, and probably, as Origen and others of the fathers add, lapsible and peccable:* Nulla natura est, quæ non recipiat bonum et malum, exceptâ Dei naturâ, quæ bonorum omnium fons est; et Christi sapientia, sapientiæ enim fons est, et sapientia utique stultitiam recipere non potest; et justitia est, quæ nun-

prehending or perverting the notions and powers of words. Knowing what is meant by an *idea*, and what is meant by a *horse*, if any one says that the *idea of a horse* existed from all eternity, I can without difficulty understand him. But if he adds that this *idea of a horse* wanders about, lives and subsists independently in boundless space, or in the intellectual world, I hear things connected together which are in their whole nature distinct, and which no one would associate, who would not confound even and odd, straight and crooked, beautiful and deformed; of such a man's opinion, therefore, I am unable to form to myself any notion or conception. In short, although himself fancying he is saying something, he appears to me to say nothing. Neither would all this, however, prevent me from ascribing so foolish and futile an opinion to Plato, if I perceived that the rest of the philosophy inculcated by him required any thing of the kind to be instilled into the minds of his followers. For the most learned of men, I am aware, in order to support other dogmas once adopted by them, have not unfrequently broached opinions the most extravagant and senseless. But here I have been unable to observe this. Plato's sole object in being so diligent and copious in inculcating the doctrine of eternal ideas and images of things was to refute those who at that time supposed either the world itself to be God, or the nature of things to have been formed fortuitously; as is evident from his tenth Book De Legibus, and many other parts of his works. To restrain this class of men, it was sufficient to show that God, like a wise architect, before creating the world, designed in his mind, as it were, its entire form, and the forms and images of its various parts. But if he had added, that these forms were really generated from God, and long before the creation lived in a certain intelligible world, he would have afforded matter enough for cavil and ridicule to the men he was anxious to confute, but he would have brought forward nothing in aid of the cause he was advocating. Moreover, seeing that there occur in Plato and his disciples a great number of passages which show the meaning of this sect to have been simply, that the forms of all things existed in the divine intelligence from all eternity, as the form of any meditated work exists in the mind of a smith, I know of nothing more that should prevent us from acquitting, if not the school, at least its principal masters, of so absurd and insane an opinion. Not now to speak of other passages to the same effect, I should wish my readers to examine with attention what Plato says of the nature of ideas in the sixth Book De Republica, and what Proclus advances in his master's behalf in his Comm. 1. in Parmenidem. I am aware, high authorities, including Aristotle himself, can be appealed to in support of those most learned men who dissent from this opinion; with whom were I to wish to hold myself up in comparison, I should be as foolish as Plato would have been, if he supposed his ideas to be animals. I neither commend nor excuse that poetic and figurative style of expression indulged in by the Platonists, by which even perspicacious men have been so far misled as to regard ideas as persons. But neither the authority of the most weighty, nor the faults of careless writers, ought to deter us from bringing the truth to light, especially in a cause from which great help may be obtained towards a right discrimination upon matters of no ordinary importance.

* Περὶ ἀρχῶν, lib. 1. c. 8. p. 685.

quam profecto injustitiam capiet; et verbum est vel ratio, quæ utique irrationalis effici non potest; sed et lux est, et lucem certum est, quod tenebræ non comprehendent. Similiter et natura Spiritus Sancti, quæ sancta est, non recipit pollutionem; naturaliter enim vel substantialiter sancta est. Siqua autem alia natura sancta est, ex assumptione hoc vel inspiratione Spiritus Sancti habet, ut sanctificetur, non ex suâ naturâ hoc possidens, sed ut accidens; propter quod et decidere potest, quod accidit, "There is no nature, which is not capable both of good and evil, excepting only the nature of God, who is the fountain of all good; and the wisdom of Christ, for he is the fountain of wisdom, and wisdom itself never can receive folly; he is also justice itself, which can never admit of injustice; and the reason and word itself, which can never become irrational; he is also the light itself, and it is certain that darkness cannot comprehend this light, nor insinuate itself with it. In like manner the nature of the Holy Ghost is such as can never receive pollution, it being substantially and essentially holy. But whatsoever other nature is holy, it is only such in way of participation and by the inspiration of this Holy Spirit; so that holiness is not its very nature and essence, but only an accident to it; and whatsoever is but accidental, may fail. All created beings therefore having but accidental goodness and wisdom, may degenerate and fall into evil and folly." Which of Origen's is all one, as if he should have said, there is no such rank of beings as Autoagathotetes, essential goodnesses, there being only one Being essentially good, or goodness itself. Nor no such particular created beings existing in nature, as the Platonists call Noes neither, that is, minds or intellects immoveable, perfectly and essentially wise, or wisdom itself, whose οὐσία is their ἐνεργεία, whose essence is their operation, and who consequently have no flux at all in them, nor successive action (only the eternal Word and Wisdom of God being such); who also are absolutely ununitable to any bodies. It is true, that Origen did sometimes make mention of Νόες, "minds" or "intellects," but it was in another sense, he calling all souls, as first created by God, and before their lapse, by that name; which was as much as if he should have said, though some of the Platonists talk much of their Noes, yet is there nothing answerable to that name, according to their notion of them; but the only Noes really existing in nature are unfallen, but peccable souls; he often concluding, that the highest rank of created beings are indeed no better than those which the Platonists commonly call ψυχαὶ, or "souls." By which souls he understood first of all, beings in their own nature self-moveable and active; whereas the Noes of the Platonists are altogether immoveable and above action. And then again, such beings or spirits incorporeal, as

t not abstractly and separately from all matter, as the Noes
ıe Platonists were supposed to do, but are vitally unitable to
es, so as, together with those bodies, to compound and make
ne animal. Thus, I say, Origen conceived even of the
est angelical and arch-angelical orders, that they were all
hem ψυχαὶ, "souls," united to bodies, but such as were
, subtle and ethereal: however, he supposed it not im-
ible for them to sink down into bodies, more gross and
ent. And it is certain, that many of the ancient Christian
ers concurred with Origen herein, that the highest created
ts were no naked and abstract minds, but souls clothed with
corporeal indument. Lastly, Origen's souls were also sup-
l to be, all of them, endowed with liberum arbitrium, or
e-will," and consequently to be self-improvable and self-
irable; and no particular created spirits to be absolutely in
own nature impeccable, but lapsible into vicious habits:
eas the Platonic Noes are supposed to be such beings as
l never fall or degenerate. And the generality of the
stian writers seemed to have consented, or conspired with
en in this also, they supposing him, who is now the prince
evils, to have been once an angel of the highest order. Thus
St. Jerome[5] determine: Solus Deus est, in quem peccatum
adit; cætera, cùm sint liberi arbitri, possunt in utramque
m suam flectere voluntatem, "God is the only being that
solutely incapable of sin; but all other beings, having free-
in them, may possibly turn their will to either way;" that
evil as well as to good. It is certain that God, in a sense
rfection, is the most free agent of all, neither is contingent
ty universally denied to him; but here it is made the only
lege of God, that is, of the Holy Trinity, to be devoid of
um arbitrium, namely, as it implieth imperfection, that is,
ıbility and lapsibility in it.

is true, that some of the Platonic philosophers suppose,
even in that rank of beings called by them Souls, though
be not essentially immutable, but all self moveable and
e, yet there are some of them of so high a pitch and ele-
n, as that they can never degenerate, nor sink down into
us habits. Thus Simplicius for one:* Ἀλλὰ αἱ μὲν πρῶται
ψυχῶν. ἅτε προσεχῶς ὑπὸ αὐτοαγαθῶν παραχθεῖσαι, κἂν ἔσχον
ὸὺς ἐκεῖνα ὑφειμένον, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθότητες, ἀλλὰ ὀρέ-
ται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, πλὴν ὡς συνγενεῖς πρὸς αὐτὸ, συμφυῶς τε

pistola 141. On this passage of St. Jerome, and other similar ones of the ancient
consult Dion. Petavius, Dogmat. Theolog. tom. 3. de Opificio sex Dierum,
cap. 13. sect. 9. p. 230. &c. On the opinions of Origen, which Dr. Cudworth
ompares with the figments of the Platonists, it will be of advantage to read Pet.
Huet's Origeniana. An opportunity will perhaps be afforded us in another
of offering a few remarks upon them.
n Epist. p. 12. 13.

αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀναποσπάστως ὀρέγονται, καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν μονοειδῶς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τεταμένην ἔχουσι, οὐδέποτε ἀποκλίνουσι πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον· καὶ εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις ἀντ' ἄλλου τινός ἐστιν αἵρεσις, τάχα οὐκ ἂν εἴη προαίρεσις ἐκείνοις, εἰ μήτις αὐτὴν προαίρεσιν ὡς τὰ πρῶτα ἀγαθὰ αἱρουμένην καλοῖ, "But the first and highest of souls, which were immediately produced from what are essentially good, although they have some abatement in them, they being not goodnesses essentially, but desirous of good, nevertheless are they so near a-kin to that highest good of all, as that they do naturally and indivulsively cleave to the same, and have their volitions always uniformly directed towards it, they never declining to the worser. Insomuch that if Proæresis be taken for the choosing of one thing before another, perhaps there is no such thing as Proæresis to be imputed to them, unless one should call the choosing of the first goods Proæresis." By these higher souls Simplicius must needs understand, either the souls of the sun, moon and stars, or else those of the superior orders of demoniac or angelic beings. Where though he make a question, whether Proæresis or Deliberation belongs to them, yet does he plainly imply, that they have none at all of that lubricous liberum arbitrium or free-will belonging to them, which would make them capable of vice and immorality as well as virtue.

But whatever is to be said of this, there seems to be no necessity at all for admitting that assertion of Origen's, that all rational souls whatsoever, even those of men and those of the highest angelical orders, are universally of one and the same nature, and have no fundamental or essential difference in their constitution; and consequently that all the difference that is now betwixt them, did arise only from the difference of their demeanour, or use of that power and liberty, which they all alike once had. So that thrones, and dominions, and principalities, and powers, were all made such by their merits; and human souls, though now sunk so low, yet are not absolutely incapable of commencing angels, or ascending to those highest altitudes: as it is not impossible, according to him neither, but that the highest angels also, the seraphim and cherubim might, in length of time, not only degenerate into devils, but also sink down into human bodies; his reason for which monstrous paradox is only this, that the divine justice cannot otherwise well be salved, but God must needs be a προσωπολήπτης, "an accepter of persons," should he have arbitrarily made such vast differences amongst intellectual beings. Which ground he also extendeth so far as to the human soul of our Saviour Christ himself, as being not partially appointed to that transcendent dignity of its hypostatic union, but by reason of its most faithful adherence to the divine word and wisdom, in a pre-existent state, beyond all others souls; which he endeavours thus to prove from the scrip-

ture:* Quod dilectionis perfectio, et affectus sinceritas, ei inseparabilem cum Deo fecerit unitatem, ità ut non fortuita fuerit, aut cum personæ acceptione animæ ejus assumptio, sed virtutum suarum sibi merito delata; audi ad eum prophetam dicentem, Dilexisti justitiam et odisti iniquitatem; propterea unxit te Deus, Deus tuus, oleo lætitiæ præ participibus tuis: dilectionis ergo merito ungitur oleo lætitiæ anima Christi, id est, cum verbo Dei unum efficitur. Ungi namque oleo lætitiæ, non aliud intelligitur quam Spiritu Sancto repleri. Præ participibus autem dixit; quia non gratia spiritus sicut prophetis ei data est, sed ipsius verbi Dei in ea substantialis inerat plenitudo, "That the perfection of love, and sincerity of divine affection, procured to this soul its inseparable union with the Godhead, so that the assumption of it was neither fortuitous nor partial, or with prosopolepsy (the acception of persons) but bestowed upon it justly for the merit of its virtues; hear (saith he) the prophet thus declaring to him, 'Thou hast loved righteousness and hated iniquity; therefore hath God, even thy God, anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows.' The soul of Christ therefore was anointed with the oil of gladness, or made one with the Word of God, for the merits of love and faithful adherence to God, and no otherwise. For to be anointed with the oil of gladness here properly signifies nothing else but to be replenished with the Holy Ghost. But when it is said, that he was thus anointed above his fellows, this intimateth, that he had not the Holy Ghost bestowed upon him, only as the prophets and other holy men had, but that the substantial fulness of the Word of God dwelt in him." But this reason of Origen's seems to be very weak; because if there be a rank of souls below human, specifically differing from the same, as Origen himself must needs confess (he not allowing the souls of brutes to have been human souls lapsed, as some Pythagoreans and Platonists conceited, but renouncing and disclaiming that opinion, as monstrously absurd and irrational) there can be no reason given, why there might not be as well other ranks and orders of souls superior to those of men, without the injustice of prosopolepsy; as, besides Simplicius, Plotinus and the generality of other Platonists conceived.

But least of all can we assent to Origen, when from this principle, that souls, as such, are essentially endowed with liberum arbitrium, or "free will," and therefore never in their own nature impeccable, he infers those endless circuits of souls upwards and downwards, and so makes them to be never at rest, denying them any fixed state of holiness and happiness by divine grace; such as wherein they might be free from the fear and

* Περὶ ἀρχῶν, lib. 1. cap. 6.

danger of ever losing the same. Of whom St. Austin[6] therefore thus: Illum et propter alia nonnulla, et maximè propter alternantes sine cessatione beatitudines et miserias, et statutis seculorum intervallis ab istis ad illas, atque ab illis ad istas itus ac reditus interminabiles, non immeritò reprobavit ecclesia; quia et hoc, quod misericors videbatur, amisit, faciendo sanctis veras miserias, quibus pœnas luerent, et falsas beatitudines, in quibus verum ac securum, hoc est, sine timore certum sempiterni boni gaudium non haberent, "The church hath deservedly rejected Origen, both for certain other opinions of his, and especially for those his alternate beatitudes and miseries, without end, and for his infinite circuits, ascents and descents of souls from one to the other, in restless vicissitudes and after periods of time. Forasmuch as hereby he hath quite lost that very title of pitiful, or merciful, which otherwise he seemed to have deserved, by making so many true miseries for the best of saints, in which they should successively undergo punishment and smart; and none but false happiness for them, such as wherein they could never have any true or secure joy, free from the fear of losing that good which they possess." For this Origenical hypothesis seems directly contrary to the whole tenor of the gospel, promising "eternal and everlasting life" to those who believe in Christ, and perseveringly obey him, 1 John ii. "This is the promise, that he hath promised us, even eternal life;" and Titus i. 2, "In hope of eternal life, which God, that cannot lie, hath promised;" and, "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life:" and lest this should be taken for a periodical eternity only, John iii. 26, "He that believeth in me shall never die." And possibly this might be the meaning of St. Paul, 2 Tim. i. 10, when he affirmeth of our Saviour Christ, that "he hath abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light through the gospel;" not because he was the first who had discovered and published to the world the soul's immortality, which was believed before not only by all the Pharisaic Jews, but also by the generality of Pagans too; but because these, for the most part, held their endless circuits and transmigrations of souls: therefore was he the first who brought everlasting life to light, and gave the world assurance, in the faith of the gospel, of a fixed and permanent state of happiness, and a never-fading crown of glory to be obtained: "Him that overcometh, will I make a pillar in the temple of my God, and he shall go no more out," Apoc. iii. 12.[7]

[6] De Civit. Dei, lib. 21. cap. 17. p. 481. tom. 7. opp.

[7] To this new interpretation of St. Paul's words, 2 Tim. i. 10. I should prefer the old and vulgar one, which Dr. Cudworth here thinks proper to abandon. My reason *for doing so* is, that those circuits and transmigrations of human souls, which the

Now the reason why we mentioned Origen here, was because he was a person not only thoroughly skilled in all the Platonic learning, but also one who was sufficiently addicted to those

learned Doctor supposes to be meant by the apostle, were not believed in by all those who before the birth of our Saviour held the souls of men to be immortal, but only by some belonging to the class of philosophers. But St. Paul speaks of a certain benefit conferred by the doctrine of our Saviour not upon a certain class of men. Besides, in St. Paul's passage, θάνατος and ζωή are opposed to each other. For Jesus is first said to have abolished *death*, and then to have brought to light *life*, which is contrary to death. But the various wanderings and ascents and descents of souls, such as Origen imagined, are by no means opposed to death: for according to him the souls continue to live, although they are sometimes exalted on high and at others sunk to the earth. Wherefore the words ζωή and ἀφθαρσία, which here manifestly signify something opposed to death, cannot mean those fictitious circuits of souls. I speak not of the very great obscurity under which these words would labour, if St. Paul had said what the learned Doctor attributes to him. Neither is the vulgarly received interpretation militated against by what he calls our attention to, that a great many taught the soul's immortality even prior to the birth of our Saviour, and therefore that Jesus cannot be said to have been the first who brought that doctrine to light. For the word φωτίζειν used by St. Paul does not mean to propose and inculcate a thing before unheard of, but to clear of all doubt and to throw new light upon a doctrine already propounded, but not yet sufficiently confirmed and established. That such is the case is shown by the very metaphor contained in the word, drawn from light. For that which illumines any thing does not produce and make it, but by bringing light causes a thing already made to be more clearly seen and to be better comprehended in all its parts than before. Wherefore the meaning of the apostle's words is necessarily as follows: Although much was said and written by many in times past on the immortality of human souls, yet the whole of this was not sufficiently clear and established, but Jesus our Saviour, by the rays of his divine doctrine, first dispelled all doubts and caused the truth of this dogma to appear as clear as noon-day. And that this opinion is most true any one will acknowledge who attentively examines the reasonings of the ancient philosophers on the soul's immortality, and compares them with the arguments of our Saviour.

But this being the case, still I consider interpreters have not exhausted the full force of St. Paul's words: being convinced indeed that the passage is to be understood not only of the eternal and happy life of souls, but also of the resurrection of our bodies. I will state my opinion a little more explicitly. In the first place St. Paul says that our Saviour καταργήσας, "abolished," "destroyed," death: which manifestly means, that Jesus by his doctrine first caused men to be freed from the fear of death, by which they had hitherto been grievously tormented. In the next place he declares by what means Jesus accomplished this, namely, by putting an end to those things which usually excite the fear of death in men's minds, and by clearly revealing the things opposite to these: Φωτίσαντος δὲ ζωὴν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν διὰ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου. In order to learn therefore the full force of these words, it will be proper for us to consider the causes, why men entertain so great a fear of death. These are chiefly three. I. They are afraid that the soul will altogether perish and be destroyed together with the body, or that they shall be altogether annihilated. II. Although entertaining no doubt perhaps of the soul's immortality, they nevertheless dread the fate of the soul after death, from a consciousness of their own sins, and stand in awe of the divine justice. III. If they happen to have overcome this fear, still they are grievously alarmed at the destruction of the body, and shudder to think that their members shall one day be scattered and turned into dust. If Jesus, as St. Paul declares, destroyed death and the fear of death, he must necessarily have destroyed these three things, which foster and excite this fear; consequently, it is beyond question, that these three are intended by the apostle in what follows. The word ζωὴ removes from men's minds two of the above causes of fear. There are, as is well-known, numerous passages in the New Testament wherein this word is used absolutely to denote not only the natural but that eternal and happy life which will be enjoyed by the faithful. See Matt. vii. 14. 18. viii. 9. and many other passages. In the same sense it ought to be understood also in this passage: as is evident not only because the fear

dogmata, he being commonly conceived to have had too great a kindness for them; and therefore, had there been any solidity of reason for either those particular Henades or Noes of theirs, created beings above the rank of souls, and consequently, according to the Platonic hypothesis, superior to the universal Psyche also (which was the third hypostasis in their trinity, and seems to answer to the Holy Ghost in the Christian), Origen was as likely to have been favourable thereunto as any other. But it is indeed manifestly repugnant to reason, that there should be any such particular, that is, created Henades, and *αὐτοαγαθότητες*, "essential goodnesses," superior to the Platonic first Mind; or any such Noes, and *αὐτοσοφίαι*, "essential wisdoms, superior to their universal Psyche; it being all one as if, in the Christian Trinity, besides the first person, or the Father, one should suppose a multitude of particular paternities superior to the second; and also, besides the second person, the Son, or Word, a multitude of particular sons, or words, all superior to the third person, the Holy Ghost. For this is plainly to make a breach upon the Deity, to confound the Creator and creature together; and to suppose a company of such creaturely gods as imply a manifest contradiction in the very notion of them.

of eternal punishments is one of the principal causes why men dread death, and from which Jesus is said to have taken away all power, but also because the apostle has added the words *διὰ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου*. For the first and chief doctrine revealed *in the gospel*, is not natural life or the immortality of souls, but the eternal and blessed life promised to all who put faith in the merits of the Redeemer. St. Paul himself briefly and most beautifully explains the whole canon of the gospel, when he says, Acts xvi. 31: *Πίστευσον ἐπὶ κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χρίστον, καὶ σωθήσῃ*, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved." This eternal and happy life, however, comprehends at the same time that other natural life: for unless souls were immortal, they could not live in eternal felicity. There is nothing therefore to prevent us from understanding the word *ζωὴ* of both kinds of life, and from supposing St. Paul to have meant as follows: "Jesus took away all the causes for which men fear death. For he taught by the gospel that God will pardon all the sins of those who have a lively faith in the merits of Christ, and will not only grant life and immortality to their souls on leaving the body, but also will bestow upon them perfect and eternal felicity." The word *ἀφθαρσία* pertains, I am convinced, to the third cause of fear. The apostle on the approach of death recalls every thing to his mind which tends to remove the weakness of men who fear death, and as the corruption of the body is commonly no slight cause of terror in them, he shows that Jesus has abolished this also, proving by unanswerable arguments that our bodies, although about to perish for a time, will notwithstanding at last gain *ἀφθαρσία*, or a state much better than this and free from all corruption. This exposition is considerably strengthened by the fact, that St. Paul elsewhere applies the same term *ἀφθαρσία* to the state in which the bodies of the pious will exist after resurrection, 1 Cor. xv. 53: *Δεῖ γὰρ τὸ φθαρτὸν (σῶμα) τοῦτο ἐνδύσασθαι ἀφθαρσίαν*, "For this corruptible (body) must put on incorruption;" and a little afterwards: *Ὅταν δὲ τὸ φθαρτὸν τοῦτο ἐνδύσηται ἀφθαρσίαν,——τότε γενήσεται ὁ λόγος γεγραμμένος· κατεπόθη εἰς νῖκος*, "When this corruptible shall have put on incorruption,——then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written: death is swallowed up in victory." To these latter words nothing can be more similar than the passage we are now explaining. In my opinion, therefore, the phrase, *φωτίζειν τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν*, signifies, to purge from all impurity the doctrine of the future restoration of bodies to a better life, (which had been variously contaminated by the Jews, especially the Pharisees,) and to place it beyond all controversy by the most convincing *and irrefragable* arguments.

Wherefore, we shall here observe, that this was not the catholic doctrine of the Platonic school, that there were such Henades and Noes, but only a private opinion of some doctors amongst them, and that of the latter sort too. For first, as for those Henades, as there are not the least footsteps of them to be found any where in Plato's writings, so may it be plainly gathered from them, that he supposed no such thing. Forasmuch as, in his second epistle, where he describes his Trinity, he doth not say of the first, *περὶ τὸ πρῶτον τὰ πρῶτα*, "about the first are the first;" as he doth of the second, *δεύτερον περὶ τὰ δεύτερα*, and of the third, *τρίτον περὶ τὰ τρίτα*, "about the second are the second, and about the third the third:" but of the first he saith, *περὶ τὸν πάντων Βασιλέα πάντ' ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πάντα, καὶ ἐκεῖνο αἴτιον ἁπάντων τῶν καλῶν*, "about the king of all things are all things, and for his sake are all things; and he is the cause of all things, that are good." Wherefore here are no particular Henades and Autoagathotetes, "Unities" and "Goodnesses," about the first Τὸ Ἓν and Τἀγαθὸν, "One" and "Good;" but all good things are about him, he being both the efficient and final cause of all. Moreover Plotinus, throughout all his works, discovers not the least suspicion neither of these Henades and Agathotetes, this language being scarcely to be found any where in the writings of any Platonists senior to Proclus; who also, as if he were conscious that this assumentum to the Platonic theology were not so defensible a thing, doth himself sometime, as it were, tergiversate and decline it, by equivocating in the word Henades, taking them for the ideas, or the intelligible gods before mentioned. As perhaps Synesius also uses the word, in his first hymn, when God is called by him:

Ἑνοτήτων ἑνὰς ἀγνὴ,
Μονάδων μονάς τε πρώτη,

"The first Henad of Henades, and the first Monad of Monades;" that is, "the first idea of good, and cause of all the ideas." And as for the particular Noes, Minds, or intellects, these indeed seem to have crept up somewhat before Plotinus' time; he, besides the passage before cited, elsewhere giving some intimations of them, as Ennead 6. lib. 4. cap. 4:* *Ἀλλὰ πῶς ψυχαὶ πολλαὶ καὶ νοῦ πολλοὶ*, "But how can there be many souls, and many minds, and not only one, but many entia?"[8] From which, and

* P. 847. 848.

[8] Dr. Cudworth has given the sense, not the very words, of Plotinus; which in his Book Quod ens usum idemque simul totum est ubique, p. 647. run as follows: *Πῶς δὲν τὸ ὄν, καὶ τὰ ὄντα, καὶ νοῦς πολλοῦς, καὶ ψυχὰς πολλὰς, εἰ τὸ ὂν πανταχοῦ ἓν, καὶ μὴ ὁμοειδὲς, καὶ νοῦς εἷς, καὶ ψυχὴ μία*, "But how can there be ens and entia, and many minds and many souls, if ens is every where one and not merely of the same form, and mind is one, and soul is one?"

other places of his, Ficinus[9] concluded Plotinus himself really to have asserted, above the rank of souls, a multitude of other substantial beings, called *νόες*, or *νοῖ*, "minds" or "intellects." Nevertheless, Plotinus speaking of them so uncertainly, and making such an union betwixt all these Noes and their particular respective souls, it may well be questioned, whether he really took them for any thing else but the heads and summities of those souls; he supposing, that all souls have a mind in them, the participation of the first Mind; as also unity too, the participation of the first Unity; whereby they are capable of being conjoined with both:[10] *Δεῖ νοῦν ἐν ἡμῖν εἶναι, καὶ νοῦ ἀρχὴν, καὶ αἰτίαν, καὶ θεὸν· ὥσπερ τὸ κέντρον ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐστιν· ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κύκλῳ σημεῖον ἐν αυτῷ· καὶ αἱ γραμμαὶ τὸ ἴδιον προσφέρουσι πρὸς τοῦτο· τῷ γὰρ τοιούτῳ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἡμᾶς ἐφαπτόμεθα, καὶ σύνεσμεν, καὶ ἀνηρτήμεθα ἐνιδρύμεθα δὲ, οἱ ἂν συννεύωμεν ἐκεῖ*, "There must needs be mind in us, as also the principle and cause of mind, God. Not as if he were divided, but because, though remaining in himself, yet he is also considered in many, as capable to receive him. As the centre, though it remain in itself, yet is it also in every line drawn from the circumference, each of them, by a certain point of its own, touching it. And by some such thing in us it is, that we are capable of touching God, and of being united to him, when we direct our intention towards him." And in the next chapter he adds: *Ἔχοντες τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀργοῦμεν ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνεργείαις τά πολλὰ· οἱ δ' οὐδ' ὅλως ἐνεργοῦσιν· ἐκεῖνα μέν ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς ἑαυτῶν ἐνεργείαις αἰεὶ, νοῦς δὲ καὶ τὸ πρὸ νοῦ ἐν ἑαυτῷ*, &c. "That though we have these things in us, yet

[9] The words of Ficinus here meant are no doubt those which he has prefixed to the cap. 4. of the book just quoted: Sunt enim et mentes et animæ suis proprietatibus in se ipsis inter se differentibus etiam ante corpora, suntque in se invicem naturali quadam cognatione et officii communione conjunctæ, et interea alteritate proprietatis essentiæque distinctæ, non loco, "For minds and souls are in themselves different from each other by their own properties, even before the bodies, and are in themselves mutually connected by a certain natural affinity and communion of office, and nevertheless distinct by the difference of property and essence, not by place." In these words indeed Ficinus distinguishes minds from souls: but on well examining the whole it will appear that he entertained no other opinion than the one which Dr. Cudworth attributes immediately after to Plotinus. For mind and soul are two properties of the same thing, which can be distinguished in thought, and are distinguished by the Platonists, but in reality notwithstanding reside in one and the same nature. This, if I mistake not, is meant by Ficinus, when he says: Alteritate proprietatis essentiæque distinctæ, non loco. There are therefore as many minds as souls: nor was Ficinus, I consider, when he wrote this, thinking of those *νόες* of Proclus and others. And this certainly was the opinion of Plotinus himself.

[10] These occur Ennead 5. lib. 1. De Tribus Hypostatibus Archicis, cap. 11. p. 492. I wish it to be observed, however, that Dr. Cudworth has not quoted the entire words of Plotinus, but merely culled out those which he supposed would serve his own purpose. In the English version given by him there are more words than correspond to the Greek: it being a frequent custom with him, as we have already remarked elsewhere, to express in his translation what he has omitted in the Greek. This he has *done also* in the words immediately following.

do we not perceive them, being for the most part idle and asleep, as to these higher energies; as some never at all exercise them. However, those do always act; mind, and that which is before mind, Unity; but every thing which is in our souls is not perceived by us, unless come to the whole, when we dispose ourselves towards it," &c. Where Plotinus seems to make the Noes, or "Minds," to be nothing else but something in souls, whereby they partake of the first Mind. And it is said of Porphyrius,[1] who was well acquainted with Plotinus' philosophy, that he quite discarded and rejected these Noes or "Intellects," as substances really distinct from the first Mind, and separate from souls. And it is certain, that such minds as these are nowhere plainly mentioned by Plato, he speaking only of minds in souls, but not of any abstract and separate minds, save only one. And though some might think him to have given an intimation of them in his δεύτερον περὶ τὰ δεύτερα (before mentioned) his "second about the second things, or second things about the second;" yet by these may very well be understood the ideas; as by the third things about the third, all created beings. Wherefore we may conclude, that this Platonic, or rather Pseudo-Platonic trinity, which confounds the differences betwixt God and the creature, and that probably in favour of the pagan polytheism and idolatry, is nothing so agreeable to reason itself, as that Christian Trinity before described, which distinctly declares how far the Deity goes, and where the creature begins; namely, that the Deity extends so far as to this whole Trinity of hypostases; and that all other things whatsoever, this Trinity of persons only excepted, are truly and properly their creatures, produced by the joint concurrence and influence of them all, they being really but one God.

But it is already manifest, that all the forementioned depra-

[1] I am not aware of any record, in which Porphyry has discarded and rejected the νόες, imagined by Proclus and others. But it appears from his other writings, especially his Ἀφορμαὶ πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ, or "Guides to things intelligible," that he entertained much better and sounder notions upon many things than Proclus, or at least expressed himself more carefully and perspicuously. He distinguishes νοῦς, or "mind," from ψυχὴ, or "soul." See sect. 5. p. 220. sect. 17. p. 225. sect. 30. p. 230. &c. His νοῦς, however, if I rightly understand the meaning of a man who deals so plentifully in subtleties, is nothing but a certain simple nature, in which reside the notions and forms of things, such as the Platonists supposed the soul to bring with it into the world; whereas his ψυχὴ, or soul, is a nature occupying a middle station between body and mind, or, as he himself says, τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ μεριστῆς οὐσίας μεσόν τι, "something intermediate between indivisible and divisible substance," sect. 5. p. 220. and diffused through the whole body, which reasons and uses to a good or bad purpose the notions stored up in the mind, sect. 17. p. 225. Whether Porphyry supposed these two to be separate natures, or merely two faculties of one nature, which a wise man distinguishes mentally and by reason, I would not undertake to say. The Platonists are wonderfully obscure in their explications of things removed from the senses; concerning which they are accustomed to speak, as though they were self-existent and acted in the same way as persons. But this has already been stated in another place.

vations and adulterations of that divine Cabala of the trinity, and that spurious trinity, described (which, because asserted by some Platonists, was called Platonical, in way of distinction from the Christian) cannot be justly charged, neither upon Plato himself, nor yet upon all his followers universally. But, on the contrary, we shall now make it appear, that Plato and some of the Platonists retained much of the ancient genuine Cabala, and made a very near approach to the true Christian Trinity; forasmuch as their three hypostases, distinguished from all their other gods, seem to have been none of them accounted creatures, but all other things whatsoever the creatures of them.

First, therefore, we affirm that Plato himself does, in the beginning of his Timæus, very carefully distinguish betwixt God and the creature, he determining the bounds between them, after this manner:[2] Ἔστιν οὖν δὴ κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν πρῶτον διαιρετέον τάδε· τί τὸ ὂν μὲν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον· καὶ τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε· τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτὸν, ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ὄν· τὸ δ' αὖ δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου, δοξαστὸν, γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν· πᾶν δὲ αὖ τὸ γιγνόμενον, ὑπ' αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι, "We being here to treat concerning the universe, judge it necessary to begin with a distinction, betwixt that which always is, and hath no *ortus* or generation; and that which is made, but never truly is. The former of which, being always like itself and the same, is comprehensible by intellection with reason, or is the object of knowledge; the latter of them, that which is made and perisheth, but never truly is, is not properly knowable, but opinable only, or the object of opinion, together with irrational sense. Now, every thing that is made, must of necessity be made by some cause." The reason why Plato, being to treat of the universe, begins here with this distinction, was, as Proclus[3] well observes, because, Ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς ἡμῶν ἐννοίαις ἀπόκειται, τὸ εἶναί τι ἀεὶ ὄν, "It is either one of our common notions, or a thing mathematically demonstrable, that there must be something eternal, or which was never made, but always was, and had no beginning." And it is evident by sense and experience, that all things are not such, but that some things are made and perish again, or generated and corrupted. Now, the latter Platonists, being strongly possessed with a prejudice of the world's eternity, or that it had no beginning, have offered strange violence to Plato's text in this place, and wrested his words to quite a different sense from what he intended: as if by his τὸ γιγνόμενον, "that which is made," he did not at all mean that which had a beginning, but only that whose duration is flowing and successive, or tem-

[2] Cap. 12. p. 235. ed Fabricii.
[3] Comm. in Timæum Platon. lib. 1. p. 10.

porary, which might notwithstanding be without beginning; and as if he supposed the whole corporeal world to be such, which, though it hath a successive and temporary duration, yet was without any beginning. And the current ran so strong this way, that even Boëtius, that learned Christian philosopher, was himself also carried away with the force thereof, he taking it for granted likewise, that Plato held the eternity of the world in this sense, that is, its being without beginning:* Non rectè quidam (saith he) qui cum audiunt visum Platoni mundum hunc nec habuisse initium temporis, nec habiturum esse defectum, hoc modo conditori conditum mundum fieri cœternum putant. Aliud est enim, per interminabilem duci vitam, quod mundo Plato tribuit; aliud interminabilis vitæ totam pariter complexum esse præsentiam; quod divinæ mentis proprium esse manifestum est. Neque Deus conditis rebus antiquior videri debet, temporis quantitate, sed simplicis potius proprietate naturæ, "Some, when they hear Plato to have held that the world had no beginning, nor shall ever have an end, do not rightly from thence infer, that Plato therefore made the world co-eternal with God, because it is one thing always to be, and another thing to possess an endless life all at once, which is proper to the divine mind. Neither ought God to be thought older than the world, in respect of time, but only in respect of the simplicity of his nature." To which purpose he adds afterwards, Itaque si digna rebus nomina velimus imponere, Platonem sequentes, Deum quidem æternum, mundum verò dicemus esse perpetuum, "Therefore, if we would give proper names to things agreeable to their natures, following Plato, we should say, that God was eternal; but the world only perpetual." But as this doctrine of the latter Platonists quite frustrates Plato's design in this place, which was to prove or assert a God, because if the world had no beginning, though its duration be never so much successive, yet would it not follow from thence, that therefore it must needs have been made by some other cause; so is it directly contrary to that philosopher's own words, himself there declaring, that by his τὸ γιγνόμενον, "ortum," or "that which is made," he did not understand only that whose duration is successive, but also τὸ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχον, "that which had a beginning of its generation," and τὸ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τινος ἀρξάμενον, "that which begun from a certain epocha of time;" or that which once was not, and therefore must needs be brought into being by some other cause. So that Plato there plainly supposed all temporary beings once to have had a beginning of their duration, as he declareth in that very Timæus of his, that "Time itself was not eternal, or without beginning, but made together with the heaven or world;"

* Consol. Phil. lib. 5. Pro. 6.

was not without beginning; as also, that w
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αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεται, "must of
by some cause;" but that whatsoever is w
hath a permanent duration, is uncreated oi
τὸ ὂν μὲν ἀεὶ, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, "that
hath no generation, nor was ever made."
is styled in the septuagint translation of
ὁ Ὢν, "He that truly is."

Now, as for this ἀΐδιος οὐσία or φύσις,
which always is, and was never made, P
singularly only, as we Christians now
paganic way plurally also; as when, in
calls the world τῶν ἀϊδίων θεῶν γεγονὸς
created image of the eternal gods." By
there meant doubtless that τὸ πρῶτον, ai
τρίτον, "that first, and "second," and
second epistle to Dionysius, he makes to
things; that is, his trinity of divine hyp
current efficiency, and according to whose
whole was made; as Plotinus also plain
words of his before cited: Οὗτος μὲν ὁ κ
ζόμενος, ἑστηκότων μὲν τοῦ πρώτου, καὶ
τρίτου, "This world is an image always i
renewed (as the image in a glass is) of

d third of his in the forementioned epistle, of a "trinity of ods;"* Ταῦτα οἱ τὸν Πλάτωνα διασαφεῖν πειρώμενοι, ἐπὶ τὸν ὦτον Θεὸν ἀνάγουσιν, ἐπί τε τὸ Δεύτερον αἴτιον, καὶ Τρίτον τὴν ὖ κοσμου Ψυχὴν, Θεὸν Τρίτον καὶ αὐτὴν ὁριζόμενοι εἶναι, "These ings do the interpreters of Plato refer to the first God, and to e second cause; and to the third the soul of the world, they ling this also the third God. Wherefore we think there is od reason to conclude, that those eternal or uncreated gods of ato in his Timæus, whose image or statue this whole gene- ed or created and created world is said by him to be, were no ier than his trinity of divine hypostases, the makers or creators reof. And it was before (as we conceive) rightly guessed, t Cicero also was to be understood of the same eternal gods, Platonizing, when he affirmed: A diis omnia à principio facta, hat all things were at first made by the gods:" and à provi- tiâ deorum mundum et omnes mundi partes constitutas esse, hat the world and all its parts were constituted by the provi- ce of the gods."[5]

Præp. Evan. lib. 11. cap. 20. [P. 541.]

The words of Plato, in which Dr. Cudworth fancies he has discovered his *three ostases*, are the following from the Timæus, p. 529. opp. "Ως δὲ κινηθέν τε αὐτὸ ζῶν ἐνενόησε τῶν ἀϊδίων Θεῶν γεγονὸς ἄγαλμα ὁ γεννήσας πατὴρ, ἠγάσθη καί εὐφρανθείς, "When, therefore, the Father who made it, perceived this beau- image of the eternal Gods, which he had made, to be moved and live, he was sed and delighted." This passage of the philosopher presents two difficulties. t, it is a question what Plato means by the ἄγαλμα, or *image* of the gods; se- lly, it is uncertain who are those *eternal gods*, in whose likeness the thing we are iking of was expressed. Each of them has furnished matter for controversy to the ous interpreters of Plato As the philosopher in the preceding words is discoursing he soul of the world, some Platonists suppose this soul of the world to be that ge of the divinity, by the motion of which Plato tells us God was delighted. Nor this opinion appear to be entirely destitute of probability: to which, indeed, lcidius, no indifferent expositor of the Timæus, was so favourable as not to scruple ccommodate his own version of the Timæus to it. For he thus translates the ek words: Quæ quidem omnia in anima fieri, ——— palam est. Quam quum eri et vivere animadverteret, factum a se simulacrum immortalis divinitatis, genitor hilaratus impendio, "That all which things take place in the soul ——— is mani- Which soul when the father perceived to be moved and live, being an image le by him of the immortal divinity, he was exceedingly delighted." I consider, ever, that with Dr. Cudworth we ought to give preference to the opinion of those suppose Plato to be speaking of the world. For the thing itself requires this inter- ation. According to Plato, every soul is endowed with an internal power of ting and moving itself: which motive power, as most persons are aware, he held to proof of the soul's immortality. How, therefore, could God be said to be greatly ghted at seeing the soul of the world move, when he must have known that it pos- ed an inward power of moving itself? Besides, Plato had shown a little before, the soul of the world was generated out of the mind and divinity of the supreme ng itself, and was antecedent to all bodies. And such being the case, how could motion of this soul be the cause of such exceeding delight in God? Did the ty happen to be ignorant that a thing generated and derived from himself would able to move itself? or was he afraid lest a portion of his own nature had been g torpid and dead? But if we assume the world to be here meant by Plato, his ion will be sufficiently intelligible. When God, says he, saw that the mass of ter which before had been rude and unformed, and tossed about by disorderly ions, after receiving the soul generated from himself was excited by a tranquil and erly motion, he experienced great delight.

But that the second hypostasis in Plato's trinity, viz., Mind or Intellect, though said to have been generated, or to have proceeded by way of emanation from the first, called Tagathon, "the

But what are those *eternal gods*, in whose image Plato tells us the world was made? I shall spare paper and time, and shall not bring forward all the subtle conceits of the Platonists respecting them: in few of which is there any thing sound or consistent. Suffice it that I examine Dr. Cudworth's opinion, and afterwards declare my own thoughts on the matter. The learned Doctor thinks that these ἀΐδιοι θεοί of whom Plato asserts this world to be the image, are the three persons of the divinity or *hypostases*, as the Platonists call them. But what makes, I consider, against this opinion, is first, that Plato speaks of them in such a way as to show that he meant natures distinct and separate from the supreme and Almighty God who made the world. For the supreme God he tells us was greatly pleased when he beheld the world, which he had made after the image of the eternal gods, moved and agitated. Now, if the eternal gods were the supreme God himself, consisting of three persons, and the Creator of the universe, Plato would undoubtedly have said that God was delighted when he saw the orderly motion of the world, which he had made *after his own image*. But as he names distinctly both God himself, the creator of the world, and the eternal gods, he evidently means the latter to be those gods which the opificer and architect of the world used as models in creating it. Again, let any one show how this sensible and visible world can be the express image of the three persons of the Godhead or supreme Being, which is devoid of all body, figure, and form: for my part, I confess myself unable to understand it. What similitude, pray, can there be between a corporeal and changeable nature, endowed with form and figure, and compounded of various parts, and a nature most simple and immutable, devoid of all concretion, and wholly incomprehensible to the human intellect? Dr. Cudworth's quotation from Eusebius is of no use towards proving the truth of this opinion, as it treats, not of this passage of the Timæus, but of the one which occurs in the epistle to Dionysius; which no one will deny is understood by most of Plato's interpreters, as referring to the three principles of things. Neither is there the slightest weight in what he brings forward from Cicero; upon which we have already commented before.

The eternal gods of Plato, if I am not wholly mistaken, are nothing else than the eternal forms or ideas of all things, according to whose exemplar he supposed the supreme Being to have made the world. Lest any should consider this a strange interpretation, I would remark in the first place, that the whole of this world, and its more important parts, the sun, moon, and earth, were regarded by Plato as gods: of which, indeed, if any one were at all sceptical upon the matter, ample testimony might be produced even from the Timæus alone. It ought to be borne in mind, however, that Plato sometimes applies the term God in the singular number to the whole universe, or to the world considered conjointly, and sometimes speaks of several, and calls the sun, moon, earth, and other parts of the world, individually gods. He is speaking of the whole universe, when in the Timæus, p. 524. he discourses as follows: Οὕτως δὴ πᾶς ὄντως ἀεὶ λογισμὸς Θεοῦ περὶ τόν ποτὲ ἐσόμενον Θεὸν λογισθείς, "The God who always was, thinking of the god (namely, the world) which was sometime about to be made." I pass over other passages of the same kind: nor do I think it necessary to cite any one of the numerous passages wherein he speaks of the sun, moon, and earth as gods. But, corresponding to this world, which is perceived by the eyes and senses, there was from all eternity, according to Plato, another one intelligible to the mind alone, after which, as a model, God created this visible universe: of which world he copiously discourses both in other places, and especially towards the beginning of his Timæus. Whether this νοητος or intelligible world was placed by him within or without God and the divine intelligence, it is not necessary now to inquire: let us consider merely the matter itself. If then, according to Plato's opinion, this visible world is God, and its more important parts are gods, that eternal model world, which is cognizable only to the mind, and of which this world of ours is the express image, as also its nobler parts will deserve to be called gods. Granting that the sun is a god, and that of this sun, as Julian and so many other Platonists say, there exists an eternal model, whatever may be its nature, will not this eternal idea of the sun be called God, with equal propriety as the sun itself, which was formed after its image? Let us suppose that there existed a city depicted on a tablet from all eternity, and that an archi-

ood," was notwithstanding unquestionably acknowledged to ave been eternal, or without beginning, might be proved by ıany express testimonies of the most genuine Platonists: but e shall here content ourselves only with two, one of Plotinus riting thus concerning it, Ennead 5. lib. 1. cap. 6: Ἐκποδὼν δὲ *ιῖν ἔστω γένεσις ἡ ἐν χρόνῳ, τὸν λόγον περὶ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων οιουμένοις*, &c. "Let all temporal generation here be quite anished from our thoughts, whilst we treat of things eternal, or ıch as always are, we attributing generation to them only in espect of causality and order, but not of time." And though lotinus there speak particularly of the second hypostasis r Nous, yet does he afterwards extend the same also to the hird hypostasis of that trinity, called Psyche, or the mundane oul; which is there said by him likewise to be the word of the econd, as that second was the word of the first: Καὶ *τὸ γεννώ-ενον ἀπὸ κρείττονος* Νοῦ, Νοῦν *εἶναι, καὶ κρείττων ἁπάντων* Νοῦς, *ὅτι τ' ἄλλα μετ' αὐτὸν, οἷον καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ λόγος νοῦ, καὶ νέργειά τις, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ἐκείνου*, "That which is generated rom what is better than mind, can be no other than mind, ecause mind is the best of all things, and every thing else is fter it, and junior to it, as Psyche or Soul, which is in like ıanner the word of mind, and a certain energy thereof, as Mind the word and energy of the first Good." The other testimony of Porphyrius, cited by St. Cyril out of the fourth book of is philosophic history, where he sets down the doctrine

ct at a certain time built a real city after this model; would it not be proper for any ıe to call the city so built an image of that eternal city? Hence, as Plato therefore ıpposed the existence of certain ideas or forms of gods, he does not speak altogether olishly, when he asserts this world to be the *ἄγαλμα* of the eternal gods. These ernal forms of the world, the stars, and the elements, therefore, are unquestionably ıe *θεοὶ ἀΐδιοι*, of which Plato held this world to be the *ἄγαλμα*. Other Platonists ll these gods *θεοὶ νοητοί*: of which matter I have already spoken elsewhere. This terpretation is admirably confirmed by the concluding words of the Timæus, in hich the philosopher thus describes the world: Ὁ *κόσμος ζῶον ὁρατὸν, τὰ ὁρατὰ εριέχον*, ΕΙ'ΚΩ'Ν ΤΟΥ˜ ΝΟΗΤΟΥ˜, *αἰσθητὸς, μέγιστος καὶ ἄριστος*, "The orld is a visible animal, comprehending things visible, *an image of the intelligible od*, sensible, immense, boundless." And what, pray, is this Θεὸς *νοητὸς*, of which ı calls this world the image? Undoubtedly that ideal world, so much admired by the hole of this school. And such being the case, it must be evident that the *eternal ods*, of which Plato declares this world to be the image, are the more important of ıose parts, of which that *νοητὸς* world consists. There is no difference between this ıssage and the one we are treating of, except that he there speaks of several gods, ıd here only of one. But we have already shown it to be a custom with Plato hen discoursing concerning the world, to make mention sometimes of one, and some-mes of several gods. The difference between the words *νοητὸς* and *ἀΐδιος* I shall ot dwell upon: as all attentive readers of Plato must know, that according to the ws of his discipline these words are equivalent in meaning. This interpretation ill, I venture to say, be found of use, not only towards elucidating many of lato's opinions, which occasionally cause much unprofitable labour to men not suffi-ently accustomed to his phraseology, but also towards inducing those to be more ıtious, who idly fancy they can discover in many of his passages the three persons of ıe divinity.

of Plato after this manner:* Εἰπόντος Πλάτωνος περὶ τοῦ Ἀγαθοῦ οὕτως· ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου τρόπον τινὰ ἀνθρώποις ἀνεπινόητον νοῦν γενέσθαι τε ὅλον καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ὑφεστῶτα, ἐν ᾧ δὲ τὰ ὄντως ὄντα, καὶ ἡ πᾶσα οὐσία τῶν ὄντων· ὃ δὲ καὶ πρώτως καλὸν καὶ αὐτοκαλόν, παρ' ἑαυτοῦ τῆς καλλονῆς ἔχον τὸ εἶδος· προῆλθε δὲ προαιώνιος ἀπ' αἰτίου τοῦ θεοῦ ὡρμημένος, αὐτογένητος ὢν καὶ αὐτοπάτωρ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκείνου κινουμένου πρὸς γένεσιν τὴν τούτου ἡ πρόοδος γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ τούτου παρελθόντος αὐτογόνως ἐκ θεοῦ, παρελθόντος δὲ οὐκ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τινος χρονικῆς, οὔπω γὰρ χρόνος ἦν· ἀλλὰ οὐδὲ χρόνου γενομένου πρὸς αὐτόν ἐστί τι ὁ χρόνος, ἄχρονος γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ μόνος αἰώνιος ὁ νοῦς, "Plato thus declareth concerning the first Good, that from it was generated a certain mind incomprehensible to mortals; in which subsisting by itself, are contained the things that truly are, and the essences of all beings. This is the first fair, and pulchritude itself, which proceeded or sprung out of God from all eternity as its cause, but notwithstanding after a peculiar manner, as self-begotten, and as its own parent. For it was not begotten from that, as any way moved towards its generation; but it proceeded from God as it were self-begottenly. And that not from any temporal beginning, there being as yet no such thing as time; nor when time was afterwards made, did it any way affect him; for Mind is always timeless, and alone eternal. Here, besides the eternity of Mind or Intellect, the second divine hypostasis in the Platonic trinity, there are other strange and unusual expressions concerning it; for though it be acknowledged to have been generated from the first original Deity, yet is called αὐτοπάτωρ and αὐτογένητος, its "own-parent," and "own-offspring," and said to have sprung out αὐτογόνως, "self-begottenly.

Now, because this is so great a riddle or mystery, it is worth the while to consider its true meaning and the ground there which is thus declared by Porphyrius. Mind, though it "sprung from the first good" or "supreme Deity" from "eternity," yet is it said to be "self begotten," because it did not spring from it as any ways moved towards its generation, but as always abiding still or quiescent. Which doctrine was before delivered by Plotinus after this manner:† Οὐ κινηθέντος φατέον γίγνεσθαι· γὰρ κινηθέντος αὐτοῦ τι γίγνοιτο, τρίτον ἀπ' ἐκείνου τὸ γιγνόμενον μετὰ τὴν κίνησιν ἂν γίγνοιτο, καὶ οὐ δεύτερον· δεῖ οὖν τὸ ἀπ' ἄρτος, εἴ τι δεύτερον μετ' αὐτό, οὐ προσνεύσαντος, οὐδὲ βουλόμενος οὐδὲ ὅλως κινηθέντος, ὑποστῆναι αὐτό, "That which was immediately generated from the first, did not proceed from it as any ways moved towards its generation, because then it would have been the second, but the third after that motion.

* St. Cyril. C. Jul. lib. 1. p. 32. † Ennead 5. lib. 1. cap. 6.

e, if there be any second after that first good, it must needs ceed from that first, as remaining immoveable, and not so ch as actively consenting thereto, nor willing it, which would motion. Now, this in Porphyrius' language is paraphrased be, a being produced from the first good or original Deity, γογόνως, "self-begottenly," or in a way of self-generation. it the plain meaning thereof seems to be no other than this, it though this second divine hypostasis did indeed proceed from first God, yet was it not produced thence after a creaturely, in a creating way, by the arbitrary will and command thereof, by a particular *fiat* of the supreme Deity, but by way of ural and necessary emanation. Neither was Porphyrius sinar in this language, we finding the very same expression, αὐτοπάτωρ and αὐτόγονος, "self-parent" and "self-begotten," Jamblichus' mysteries: where it is likewise by him applied to the first principal of all, but to a second divine hypostasis:[6] τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς τούτου, ὁ αὐτάρκης θεὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐξέλαμψε, διὸ αὐτοπάτωρ καὶ αὐτογονος, "From this one, the self-sufficient d made himself to shine forth into light; and therefore is he ed Sui-Pater, and Seipso-genitus, his own father, and self-otten." But of this God or divine hypostasis in Jamblichus re afterward. We cannot justify such kind of language as in the Christian Trinity, because we have no warrant for rom the scripture; though we are not ignorant that some late ines have ventured to call the Christian Logos after the same nner, αὐτόθεον, and ex seipso Deum, "God from himself."[7]

De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. 8. cap. 2. p. 158. In Jamblichus, however, we do find the word αὐτόγονος, as given by Dr. Cudworth, but αὐτάρκης, "self-suffi-." Probably, he considered the reading αὐτάρκης of the copies to be a mistake αὐτόγονος, as the word αὐταρκης is used by Jamblichus a little before.

In this disquisition upon the *mind* of Plato, there are some things perhaps which be objected to. I. The question is solely as to Plato's opinion, which the learned or affirms to be much purer than the doctrine of the junior Platonists. And yet he avours to show us what Plato thought, not from Plato himself, but from two disciples e later Platonic school. If the doctrine of the junior Platonists on the three princi- of things is in many respects corrupted and depraved, how can this sect be fairly as the interpreter of the doctrine professed by Plato? In my opinion we ought to Plato himself, and to dismiss those who, as is notorious, found whatever doc- they liked in that philosopher. But all indeed who venture to write any thing Plato's three principles, finding that nothing certain and satisfactory respecting has been inculcated by himself, are obliged to have recourse to his followers for nation: which course I hold to be exceedingly slippery and unsafe. II. The pts of Plotinus and Porphyrius on the three principles, if accurately examined, to be of such a character, as to savour of the doctrines of the Sabellians, much than the true doctrine of the Trinity, as revealed in sacred Writ. For νοῦς ψυχή, which they speak of as though they were distinct natures, are described by in many other passages, so as to make it appear that nothing but the divine or intelligence, and the power of God exerting itself in the world and created , or two properties and perfections of the supreme Being, are meant by these . And what is no slight confirmation of this opinion is, that they place three hypostases in the soul of man, as well as in God himself, and speak of νοῦς and in a man almost in the same words that they use in reference to the divine mind oul. No one, however, I should imagine, would believe these philosophers to have

Dionysius Petavius having rightly declared the doctrine of Arius, after this manner, that the Father was the only eternal God, and that the Son, or Word, was a creature made by him in time, and out of nothing; that is, after he had not been, produced into being; subjoins these words:* In ea verò professione, quod suprà memoravi, planissimè constat, germanum Platonicum Arium extitisse, "From the profession of this doctrine, it is most undeniably manifest (what was before affirmed) that Arius was a german or genuine disciple of Plato's." But from what we have now cited out of Plato himself, and others of his most genuine followers, it is certain, that Petavius (though otherwise learned and industrious) was herein grossly mistaken, and that Arius was no Platonist at all. And indeed for either Plato or Plotinus to have denied the eternity of that second hypostasis of his, called Nous, or Logos, and the son of the first, would have been all one as if they should have denied the eternity of Wisdom and Understanding itself; because, according to them, this second hypostasis is essentially nothing but *αὐτοσοφία*, "original Wisdom itself," and consequently, that very Wisdom by which God himself is wise. Which how far, or in what sense it is true, we do not here dispute. Nevertheless, Athanasius seems to have been fully of the same opinion with them herein, from this passage of his:† *Καὶ σοφία καὶ ἀλήθειά ἐστιν ὁ Κύριος, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλης σοφίας δεύτερος, ἀλλὰ μόνος οὗτος δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα πεποίηκεν*

supposed that three hypostases, truly so called, reside in the souls of men. But I purpose examining into this matter more minutely in another place: at present it will be sufficient to know, that we ought to estimate and judge of any apparent affinity between our own doctrines and those of the Platonists, not so much from their words, as from the whole tenor of their discipline. III. I am aware that the junior Platonic school applied the same phraseology to the three principles they are continually inculcating, as the Christian theologers of that period were in the habit of using in reference to the eternal generation of the Son of God, and the nature and properties of the Holy Spirit. But it has not yet been shown, whether these Platonic philosophers invented these expressions themselves, or borrowed them from the Christians. It is certain, and shall be demonstrated at greater length in another place, that the Platonists of the second and third century after Christ, both laboured with great zeal to accommodate their discipline generally to the doctrines of the Christian religion, and in particular strove hard to make it appear, that there was but little difference between the three persons of the Godhead, as professed by Christians, and their own three principles. For as the Christians were daily gaining strength, and their own numbers proportionably diminishing, they thought they would best consult the interests of their religion by adopting to a certain extent the more important of the Christian precepts, which all confessed to be sublime, and connecting them with the ancient superstitions. I consider it most probable, therefore, that these philosophers were imitators of the Christians in this matter also, and that in order to persuade people the more easily of their being little or no difference between their three principles and the three divine persons of the Christians, they readily adopted those forms of expression by which the latter were accustomed to explain their doctrine of the Trinity. I have observed this in Jamblichus particularly, who was yet living at the time of the Arian controversies, and consequently uses many phrases not of earlier origin than these controversies.

* De Trin. lib. 1. cap. 8. sect. 2. [Tom. 2. Dogmat. Theolog. p. 38.]

† De Sent. Dion. tom. 1. p. 567.

ὁ πατὴρ, &c. "Our Lord is both wisdom and truth, neither is he second from any other wisdom; but it is he alone by whom the Father made all things." And again: Οὔτε γὰρ λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ λόγου πατὴρ, "For the Father of the Word is not properly himself the Word." And: Οὐκ ἦν Λόγος ὁ τὸν Λόγον προέμενος, ἦν γὰρ ὁ Λόγος πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. Σοφία γεγέννηται ὁ Κύριος· οὐκ ἦν οὖν σοφία ὁ τὴν σοφίαν ἀνείς· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἤμην, φησὶν, ᾗ προσέχαιρεν, "That was not Word, which produced the Word, for the Word was with God. The Lord is Wisdom, therefore that was not Wisdom, which produced Wisdom, that speaks thus of herself, His delight was with me." But those latter words he citeth with approbation out of Dionysius bishop of Alexandria. And the same Athanasius affirmeth Arius, on the contrary, to have maintained, that there was another Word and Wisdom senior to that Word and Wisdom in our Saviour Christ. To conclude, no Platonist in the world ever denied the eternity of that Nous, or universal Mind, which is the second hypostasis of their trinity; but, on the contrary, as hath been already observed, some of them seemed rather to attribute too much to it, in calling it αὐτοπάτωρ and αὐτόγονος, its "own parent" and its "own offspring," as that which was self-begotten, though this but in a certain mystical sense; they otherwise not denying it to have proceeded also from the first good, and to be the offspring thereof.[s] Wherefore Plato, who supposed the world not

[s] Dr. Cudworth himself seems to perceive here, that the Trinity professed by Plotinus and others of the Platonists, is not so much a trinity of persons as of divine notions and virtues, and therefore widely distinct from the Christian doctrine of three divine persons. For if Plotinus' second hypostasis is that wisdom by which God is wise, is it not merely a divine perfection which cannot be distinguished from God himself except in thought? For who would assert the reason or wisdom by which a man is wise to be a distinct and real person in that man? But we ought by no means to confound this doctrine of the Platonists, as the learned Doctor appears here to do, with that style of expression common to Athanasius, who represents Christ our Saviour to be the reason and wisdom by which God reasons and is wise. Although such was by no means the opinion and phraseology of Athanasius alone, but of a great many of the learned fathers who contended with the Arians, from most of whom testimonies have been collected by Dion. Petavius, De Trinitate, lib. 6. cap. 9. p. 347. tom. 2. Dogm. Theol. As many other things escaped those incautious but deserving men, who formerly combated the opinions of the Arians, the propriety and accuracy of which is at this day justly called into question, so this phraseology also, it must be confessed, if considered apart from that controversy, might lead to a suspicion of impure and unsound doctrine. I do not hesitate therefore to agree with St. Augustine, who argued with great zeal against those who had thought proper to adopt it. See De Trinit. lib. 6. cap. 1. p. 598. and lib. 15. cap. 7. p. 689. t. 8. opp. For although it admits of easy explanation, and has long ago been explained by many, still it is safer, I consider, to abstain altogether from expressions, the ambiguity of which might mislead the less sagacious and intelligent. If we look, however, to the meaning and intention of those eminent men, rather than to the words themselves which they employed, in my opinion we shall not find much to condemn in them. The fathers in their contest with the Arians appealed particularly to the celebrated passage of Solomon, Prov. viii. on the divine wisdom, which passage almost all the ancients usually interpret in reference to Christ, and attempted to prove from this and some other passages the eternity of the Son of God. Out of many see Athanasius, Orat. 2. contra Arianos, lib. 1. p. 319.

to have been eternal, asserting the eternity of that second hypostasis of his trinity, thereby plainly made it to be no creature, according to Athanasius's own doctrine:[a] Εἰ ἀΐδιός ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς, οὐκ ἦν κτίσμα, εἰ δὲ κτίσμα τυγχάνει, οὐκ ἦν ἀΐδιος, "If the Son be eternal, he was no creature; and, on the contrary, if he be a creature, he was not eternal."

Neither is there any force at all in that testimony of Macrobius,[b] which Petavius urgeth to the contrary; wherein the first Cause is said de se mentem creasse, "to have created Mind from itself;" and again this Mind, animam de se creasse, "to have created from itself soul;" because it is certain that these ancient Pagans did not then so strictly confine that word creare (as we Christians now do) to that narrow sense and notion, of the production of things in time; but used it generally for all manner of production or efficiency. But the chief ground of Petavius' mistake herein, besides his prejudice against Platonism in general, was his not distinguishing betwixt that spurious trinity of some Platonists, wherein the third hypostasis was the whole

opp. To evade the force of this argument, Arius, although not denying Christ to be called *wisdom* in the sacred volumes, and even to be in a certain sense God's wisdom, nevertheless contended that the wisdom discoursed of by Solomon is not Christ, but another wisdom residing in God from all eternity, as a perfection or quality; and that this is always meant by Solomon and other sacred authors who make mention of eternal wisdom: in short, that the wisdom and reason by which God is wise, is different from the word which St. John and the wisdom which St. Paul speaks of; that this is external to God and produced by the internal wisdom or λόγος. See Athanasius, Orat. 1. adv. Arian. p. 124. and De Sententia Dionysii contra Arianos, p. 507. tom. 1. opp. But the champions of the true faith would not allow this doctrine of Solomon to be wrested from them. Inflamed with the heat of debate, therefore, they did not hesitate to go so far as to assert that Christ our Saviour is that very wisdom and reason, by which the Father is wise and reasons. A bold assertion, it must be confessed; especially as they might have answered Arius in a far different manner without causing offence to any one: but still not altogether perverse and absurd. For those who talked in this manner by no means used the word *wisdom* in what is called the formal sense, like the Platonists, with whom Dr. Cudworth here classes them, nor ranked this wisdom among the divine qualities; by doing which, indeed, they would have approached more closely to the Sabellians than they themselves supposed. For wisdom, considered as a virtue and perfection of God, is manifestly the same as his essence. The Son, therefore, if these doctors had spoken properly, would according to their opinion be the essence of the Father, and the Father receive his essence, that is, his being and wisdom, from the Son. But Athanasius, to avoid falling into these snares, expressly excluded wisdom from the order of divine qualities: Εἰ δὲ φήσαιεν, says he, Orat. 5. contra Arian. p. 523. tom. 1. opp. ὡς ποιότητα εἶναι ἐν τῷ πατρὶ τὴν σοφίαν, ἢ αὐτοσοφίαν εἶναι, ἀκολουθήσει τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἄτοπα εἰρήμενα, "But if they assert that wisdom is a quality in the Father, or that he is his own wisdom, the absurdities above-mentioned will follow." I do not approve of every thing of the kind that we meet with in Athanasius and others; nor was it approved of by all the Christian fathers who lived in his time. My object here is merely to show that the Platonic philosophers, although they used the same forms of expression as the Nicene fathers, nevertheless widely differed from them in opinion. Compare our remarks upon this subject a little below.

[a] P. 119. [Tom. 1. opp. in Disput. cum Ario.]

[b] In Somnium Scipionis, cap. 14. p. 73. But Petavius does not urge this passage of Macrobius where he is maintaining Arius to have been a Platonist, but in another place, when explaining the Platonic dogma concerning three principles, lib. 1. De *Trinitate*, cap. 1. sect. 4. p. 17.

animated world (which gave him occasion to write thus, Tertius verò Deus manifestè creatus ab iisdem Platonicis putatur, quem et ποίημα nominant), and that other doctrine of those who made it not to be the world itself, that is a creature, but the opificer or creator thereof.[10]

[10] The question respecting the Platonism of Arius is doubtful and uncertain, nor have learned men who have touched upon it separated those things, which decidedly ought to be separated, before a correct judgment can be arrived at. Hence it comes to pass that they sometimes bring forward arguments which have little bearing upon the point. In my opinion the question, Whether Arius was a Platonist or not? may be taken in a three fold sense. First, Whether Arius was devoted to the Platonic philosophy? Secondly, Whether Platonic principles led him to broach his new doctrine on the Trinity? Thirdly, Whether Arius' doctrine respecting the three persons in the Godhead is entirely similar to the Platonic dogma of three principles? As respects the first question, it being manifest that Arius was imbued with philosophy, I do not hesitate to affirm that that philosophy was no other than the later Platonic, or that new discipline which first originated from Ammonius, and recommended a reconciliation and union of all sects, especial regard being had, however, to the doctrines of Plato. For Arius lived and was educated from boyhood at Alexandria; in which city, as is known to every one acquainted with such matters, no other description of philosophy was at that time taught even among Christians. Besides, some of his precepts evidently savour of the Platonic school; such as that famous dogma of souls existing before the bodies from all eternity, in the defence of which Arius was as zealous as all the rest of the *Platonists*. *In short*, the most eminent fathers openly charge Arius and his disciples with *Platonism*. St. Jerome, in his Dialogue Adv. Luciferianos, p. 142. tom. 2. opp. says: *Subtilis est hæresis* (Ariana), et ideo simplices animæ facile decipiuntur. . . . . Re vera de *Platonis* et Aristophanis in episcopatum alleguntur. Quotus enim quisque est, qui non apprime in his eruditus sit? "The (Arian) heresy is subtle, and therefore simple souls are easily deceived. . . . . In truth they are sent into the episcopacy from the bosom of *Plato* and Aristophanes. For how few are there, who are not eminently versed in these?" In this passage of St. Jerome, let me observe in passing, that instead of *Aristophanis* I should prefer reading *Aristotelis*. For I have no recollection of an Arian being reproached with the study of Aristophanes; but of their unbounded devotion to the subtleties of Aristotle we are told every where. And St. Jerome himself, a little afterwards, has the following words: Accedit ad hoc, quod Ariana hæresis magis cum sapientia sæculi facit, et argumentationum rivos de *Aristotelis* fontibus mutuatur, "Besides, the Arian heresy is more in accordance with the wisdom of the age, and borrows its ratiocinative streams from the fountains of Aristotle." Gregory of Nazianzen, Orat. 26. De Moderatione in Disputationibus Servanda, tom. 1. opp. p. 458: Ὁ δὲ ὀλίγος ἐστὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ... καὶ οὐκ οἶδε λόγων στροφὰς, ... ἢ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους τεχνῶν τὴν κακοτεχνίαν, ἢ τῆς Πλάτωνος εὐγλωττίας τὰ γοητεύματα, ὥσπερ Αἰγυπτιακαί τινες μάστιγες, "Another, on the contrary, is of feeble intellect, and knows not the quirks of words, or the crooked artifice of Aristotelic arts, or the wiles of Platonic eloquence, like certain Egyptian plagues." That these Egyptian plagues, of whom St. Gregory complains as being too fond of Aristotle and Plato, are the Arians, no one acquainted with ancient matters will doubt. I am aware that not a few testimonies can be adduced from the early fathers, in which they reproach Arius and his followers with an insane love of Aristotelic subtleties, and that Epiphanius expressly calls them Aristotelians. Hæres. 66. Arianor. sect. 69. p. 795: Ὁμοίως, says he, δὲ ταύτῃ λέξει ἄλλην ἡμῖν ἐφευρίσκουσιν οἱ νέοι Ἀριστοτελικοί· ἐκείνου γὰρ ἀπεμάξαντο τὴν ἰοβολίαν, καὶ κατέλιπον τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος τὸ ἄκακον καὶ τὸ πρᾷον, &c. "Similar to this is another mode of argument invented by these new Aristotelians; for they have exhibited all the venom of that philosopher, and have forsaken the simplicity and mildness of the Holy Spirit," &c. To which effect passages are every where to be found also in Gregorius Nyssenus, Socrates, Sozomenus, and others. But these testimonies do not prove that Arius did not belong to the sect in which we have placed him. For it was usual with these junior Platonists, as is evident from the examples of Porphyry, Ammonius, Simplicius, and so many others, to unite the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, and to follow the latter as their principal master and guide in matters pertaining to the art of

But we grant that there may be some more reason to make a question whether Plato himself held the eternity of the mundane soul (commonly said to be the third hypostasis of his trinity) or

reasoning and dialectics, upon which Plato had written scarcely any thing. Nor did these ancient fathers charge the Arians with having imbibed all the philosophy of Aristotle, but merely with conducting their arguments upon Aristotelic principles, and with adapting his rules upon syllogisms and the whole art of disputation to religious controversies, where they ought rather to have studied simplicity as recommended by the sacred writers. Hence it is that the ancients in so many places upbraid this sect with a predilection both for Aristotle and Plato. The French writer, P. Faydit, betrayed his own ignorance, therefore, when not long ago, upon the strength of these passages, he not only made Arius to be an Aristotelian, but even contended that his doctrine concerning the Trinity was to be derived from Aristotelic sources, Apologie du Systeme des S. Peres sur la Trinité, dans la Preface, p. 24. &c. [See also his Alteration du Dogme, p. 355. &c.] Those are not necessarily Aristotelians who, in contending with their adversaries, obey Aristotle's rules on the art of reasoning; much less is it fair to infer that the opinion which we see them defending upon Aristotelic principles was borrowed from Aristotle. Otherwise we should have to refer to the same philosophy the errors both of the Nestorians and Eutychians, who we are told made very frequent use of Aristotle's rules and distinctions in their disputations. Besides, there is nothing in this philosophy at all corresponding to Arius' doctrine concerning the three persons in the Godhead. Consequently he was in a certain respect a Platonist; although it does not follow from thence that his doctrine of the Trinity also was Platonic. For it is possible for a man to have approved of the major part of Plato's discipline without being altogether a Platonist; in which sense, indeed, most of the early fathers of the church were Platonists, who, although adopting many of this philosopher's principles, nevertheless on some points not only abandon but often severely censure him.

Such being the case, let us now inquire, in the second place: Whether the Platonic discipline professed by Arius was the cause of his error respecting the Trinity. If his doctrine were in all respects similar to Platonic decrees, no one could entertain any doubt upon the question. For who, on seeing a disciple of Plato defend a dogma entirely in accordance with the principles of this philosopher, could deny its origin to be Platonic? It is manifestly impossible, therefore, to come to any conclusion upon this point, unless by first deciding that which we propounded as the third question. I must confess I by no means approve of those who are more ingenious than necessary in hunting after causes of errors, and who, if they only detect any similitude between two doctrines, cry out immediately, This is Platonic, this Aristotelian, this Cartesian, this Hobbesian. There is corruption and folly enough in the minds of men to enable them to fall into errors of themselves, by their own perverse reasoning; nor is it necessary for those always to have had a master, who reject the truth, and disturb religion with errors and absurd questions. But as most men, from various causes, are prone to imitation, it so happens that they consider it scarcely possible for any one to be eminently good or evil, unless he be influenced by the force of example. Hence if there existed merely a certain affinity between the doctrines of Plato and Arius, and we had no information from other sources that the latter was imbued with Platonic precepts, I should not regard such affinity as sufficient proof of his having been corrupted by Plato. But it being notorious that he was a devoted Platonist, if his opinion concerning the Trinity were the same as Plato's, there would be no reason for doubting that Plato was the author of the error.

Let us inquire therefore: Whether Plato's doctrine of three principles accords with Arius' opinion on the divine Trinity. Petavius maintains the affirmative and Dr. Cudworth the negative of this question; the latter indeed holding it to be more proper to associate even Athanasius with the Platonists. But few men of high eminence and authority have adopted Dr. Cudworth's view; a great majority, both of Protestants and Catholics, taking the side of Petavius. Christoph. Sandius himself, an Arian, does not hesitate to concur with Petavius, and pronounces Arius to be a genuine Platonist, Nucl. Histor. Eccles. lib. 1. p. 140. Although those who hold this to be a proof of Sandius' candour, as I perceive some to have done, are I fear deceived, and do not see the drift of this astute man. Sandius was aware that most of the Christian

no; because in his Timæus, though he acknowledged it to be senior to the world, yet does he seem to attribute a temporary generation, or nativity to it. Nevertheless, it is no way prob-

fathers who wrote previously to the time of the Nicene Council were accused of Platonism; and relying on the testimonies collected by Petavius, asserted that they all entertained the same opinion as Arius. To establish this he frankly conceded that Arius was a genuine Platonist, that is, an abettor of the same doctrine that had been maintained by the earliest dignitaries of the Christian church; from which it follows, that he inculcated nothing new, but merely revived what all the most eminent had professed prior to the Nicene council. Sand would have been as ready to give his assent, if any one had gone farther and declared Plato to have been a genuine disciple of Moses. But I now pass over this subject, and come to the solution of the question itself, which I consider to be of some moment. Those that assert Arius' doctrine of the Trinity to be Platonic ought first to explain, whether they mean this man to be an imitator of Plato himself or of his later disciples, who lived subsequently to the birth of our Saviour; for, as has long ago been observed, there is a considerable difference between the doctrine of Plato and that of the junior Platonic sect. If they mean Plato himself, I confess my ignorance, whether Arius was a Platonist or not. For whatever Dr. Cudworth and other excellent men may think, what Plato writes on the subject of three principles is so obscure and ambiguous that it is impossible to ascertain his real sentiments respecting them; and to attempt to settle the question by vague conjectures and surmises, I consider to be rash and unsafe. Let us appeal, therefore, to the junior Platonists, and see what agreement there is between them and Arius. But here we meet again with two obstacles, which it will be difficult altogether to remove. In the first place, the discordance of the junior Platonists on the three principles of all things is incredible: whose various opinions are in part enumerated by Proclus, Comm. in Timæum Platonis, lib. 2. p. 93. Secondly, the principal masters of this sect speak so inconsistently and doubtfully upon this subject that they seem to have been unwilling to be understood, and supply us with the means of maintaining either position, namely, that they were or were not the precursors of Arius. Take, for example, the book of that coryphæus of the Platonists, Plotinus, De Tribus Hypostatibus Archicis, a remarkable work of its kind, which at this day occupies the first place in the fifth Ennead, and try to ascertain the writer's opinion from it: having perused the book you will confess, if I mistake not, that you are now more uncertain than before. Sometimes he will appear to you to be narrating fables and to be discoursing of notions of the mind, not of natures and persons, sometimes to be speaking of persons truly so called and their actions. If you read cap. 3. 4. 5. with attention, you will strenuously contend perhaps that the νοῦς of Plotinus is much inferior to what he calls τὸ ὂν and τὸ πρῶτον θεῖον, and his ψυχὴ again far below this νοῦς. And such being the case, a disciple of Plotinus might with some truth be termed an Arian. But proceed to cap. 6. and you will fear perhaps on reading it that you have done the man an injustice. For so magnificently does Plotinus discourse of νοῦς in this chapter, that it seems not to differ from the first principle either in eternity or any thing else. Nevertheless, when all things are considered, I am almost inclined to agree with Dr. Cudworth in opposition to Petavius and others, who hold Arius to have been a Platonist. For in the first place the early fathers who were well acquainted with the doctrine of the Platonists do not commonly refer Arius' error to their school, but rather to the Valentinians and ancient Gnostics. Athanasius, Orat. 2. adv. Arianos, tom. 1. opp. p. 263. thus writes of the Arians: Αἰσχυνθήσονται μὲν προηγουμένως, ὡς τὰ Οὐαλεντίνου καὶ Καρποκράτου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἱρετικῶν ζηλοῦντες καὶ φθεγγόμενοι. "They will at least be ashamed, as imitating and echoing Valentine and Carpocrates and other heretics." And that this opinion of the ancients is not destitute of truth, a modern writer, Geo. Bull, has elaborately attempted to show, Defensio Fidei N. æniæ, sect. 2. cap. 1. sect. 15. p. 134. opp. Another reason for my supposing Arius not to have been a Platonist is, that the very men who condemned him assert Plato to have entertained much better opinions on the three principles than he did, and reckon it as not the least of his faults that he surpassed Plato himself in error. After the Nicene Council, in which we know Arius' heresies were proscribed, Constantine the Great wrote the Oration, Ad Cœtum Sanctorum usually appended to Eusebius' Histor. Eccles. as we learn from this author's Life of Constantine,

able, that Plato's third principle of all things, in his epistle to Dionysius, and that Psyche, or Soul of his, which is the only

lib. 3. cap. 23, p. 496. In this oration, cap. 9. p. 576. 577. the Emperor bestows great commendation upon Plato's doctrine of three principles, and acknowledges this philosopher to have had a glimpse of the truth, although he obscured it with numerous errors: Πλάτων, says he, among other things, *πρῶτον μὲν θεὸν ὑφηγήσατο τὸν ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν· καλῶς ποιῶν· ὑπέταξε δὲ τούτῳ καὶ δεύτερον, καὶ δύο οὐσίας τῷ ἀριθμῷ διεῖλε, μιᾶς οὔσης τῶν ἀμφοτέρων τελειότητος,* " Plato indeed first taught the existence of a God above all substance: in which he was right. To this he subjected a second, and in number distinguished two substances, the perfection of both being one." Having explained this at some length, he adds: *Μέχρι μὲν οὖν τούτου Πλάτων σώφρων ἦν,* "Thus far Plato thought wisely." Would Constantine, I ask, have written in this way to the Egyptians, if the Christian fathers of that period had as much as suspected even that the opinions of the Arians and Platonists were altogether in unison? Socrates, after stating that Georgius, one of the main pillars of the Arian sect, was wholly absorbed in the study of Aristotle and Plato, wonders how it happened that this man remained an Arian, as he might have been recalled to his right mind by the reading of Plato alone, Histor. Eccles. lib. 2. cap. 7. p. 261. *Θαυμάσαι οὖν μοι ἔπεισι, πῶς οὗτοι οἱ ἄνδρες τῇ Ἀρειανῶν θρησκείᾳ προσέμειναν. ——οὐδὲ γὰρ Πλάτων τὸ δεύτερον καὶ τὸ τρίτον αἴτιον——ἀρχὴν ὑπάρξαι εἰληφέναι φησί,* " I am surprised, how these men could remain in the Arian sect.—— For Plato does not say that the second and third cause had any beginning of existence." Either Socrates was ignorant and altogether unacquainted with the history and opinions of his own time, which no one I think will assert, or these words of his are a strong proof that no one at that day ever dreamt of any affinity between the Platonists and Arians. But the schools of the Platonists were every where open, nor was any concealment made of the books of this sect; so that all could easily learn their opinions. It follows therefore, that at that time they expounded their doctrine concerning three principles in such a way as to show an obvious difference between it and the novel conceits of Arius. And of this doubtless Arius was well aware, as we nowhere find him appealing to Plato in support of his opinion, although he might have done so not only without any danger, but even very opportunely and advantageously to himself, as Clemens, Origen, and so many other authors of the highest eminence had long before publicly testified to Plato's having taught correctly and wisely on the subject of the Trinity. To confess the truth, indeed, in whatever sense the doctrine of the Platonists be interpreted, we shall never be able to establish an agreement between them and the Arians truly so called. For suppose the common opinion to be true, that the three Platonic principles are natures or persons in the proper sense of the word: add also, that these persons are different in order, degree, and dignity, in which difference Petavius and his party fancy they have discovered the bond of agreement between the Platonists and Arians: still there will be a grave contest between them respecting the origin of the two latter persons, which, if the principles of each sect be adhered to, will never admit of being decided. The Platonists consider *νοῦς*, or "mind," as well as *ψυχή*, to have proceeded from the very essence or bosom of God, or to have been procreated and generated from God: for which reason they totally exclude them from created things, and pronounce them to be of the same nature as God himself. Far otherwise Arius, who declared the son not to have been generated from God, but made by God *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*, or "out of things not existing," and placed both the second and third person in the order of created things: with which it was in strict accordance that he should hold the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost to be three distinct, dissimilar, and independent natures. The great difference of which two opinions must be clear to all who are not ignorant of the true meanings of words. For these and other reasons I am unable I confess to agree with those who suppose Arius to have been misled by the precepts of the Platonists, or his dogma borrowed from the school of Plotinus: nevertheless I do not go to the full extent of Dr. Cudworth's opinion, who holds Athanasius to have been a Platonist: on which I purpose offering some remarks in the Preface. On the passage of St. Cyril, which in a certain respect associates the Platonists and Arians together, I shall speak in the sequel. If thoroughly examined, it will be found to contain nothing at variance with what we have brought forward.

God, that in his tenth De Legibus he goes about to prove against the Atheists, should ever not have been; and therefore it is most reasonable to compound this business, thus, by supposing, with Plotinus and others, that Plato held a double Psyche, or soul, one ἐγκόσμιον, or mundane, which is, as it were, the concrete form of this corporeal world; whereby this world is properly made an animal, and a second, or created God; another ὑπερκόσμιον, "supramundane," or separate; and which is not so much the form, as the artificer of the world. The first of which two Plotinus, calling it the heavenly Venus, thus describeth:* Τὴν δὲ οὐρανίαν λεγομένην, ἐκ Κρόνου, νοῦ ὄντος ἐκείνου, ἀνάγκη ψυχὴν θειοτάτην εἶναι, εὐθὺς ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀκήρατον ἀκηράτου, μείνασαν ἄνω, ὡς μὴ δὲ εἰς τὰ τῇδε ἐλθεῖν, μήτε ἐθελήσασαν μήτε δυναμένην, ὅτι ἦν φύσεως μὴ κατὰ τὰ κάτω φῦσαν βαίνειν. Χωριστὴν οὖσάν τινα ὑπόστασιν, καὶ ἀμέτοχον ὕλης οὐσίαν· ὅθεν αὐτὴν τούτῳ ᾐνίττοντο, τῷ ἀμήτορα εἶναι, ἣν δὲ καὶ θεὸν ἄν τις δικαίως, οὐ δαίμονα εἴποι, ἄμικτον οὖσαν, καὶ καθαρὰν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς, &c. ὅθεν οὐδ' ἂν ἐκπέσοι, νοῦ ἐξηρτημένη πολύ μᾶλλον, ἢ ἥλιος ἂν ἔχοι ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ὅσον αὐτὸν περιλάμπει φῶς, εἰς αὐτὸν συνηρτημένον· ἐφεπομένη δε τῷ Κρόνῳ, ἢ, εἰ βούλει, τῷ πατρὶ τοῦ Κρόνου οὐρανῷ, ἐνήργησε τε πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ᾠκείωθη, καὶ ἐρασθεῖσα ἔρωτα ἐγέννησε, "This heavenly Venus, which they affirm to have been begotten from Saturn, that is, from a perfect Mind or Intellect, must needs be that most divine soul (the third archical hypostasis) which being immediately begotten, pure from that which is pure, always remains above, so that it neither can, nor will ever descend down to these lower things, so as to be immersed in them; it being of such a nature, as is not inclinable to sink, or lapse downward. A certain separate substance, which doth not at all partake of matter, as the fable intimated, when it called it motherless; and therefore may it well be styled by us, not a demon, but a god. Whence it comes to pass, that this soul can never fall, it being much more closely united and connected with that immoveable Mind or Intellect, than that light which is circumfused about the sun, is connected with the sun. This Venus therefore following Cronus, or rather the father of Cronus, Uranus, acting towards it, and being enamoured with it, begat love:" Χωριστὴν δὲ ἐκείνην τὴν ψυχὴν λέγοντες, τὴν πρώτως ἐλλάμπουσαν τῷ οὐρανῷ, χωριστὸν καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦτον θησόμεθα, "Moreover, as we call this soul itself separate, so is this love of it, or begotten by it, a separate love." After which, he speaks of another soul of the world, which is not separate from it, but closely conjoined therewith, he calling it a lower Venus and Love; namely, that other Venus, which in the fable is said to have been begotten from Jupiter himself (the

* Ennead 3. lib. 5. cap. 2. [P. 293.]]

superior soul of the world) and Dione, a watery nymph. We conclude therefore, that though this lower mundane soul, might, according to Plato, have a temporary production together with the world, or before it, yet that other superior and most divine soul, which Plotinus calls the heavenly Venus and Love, the son of Cronus without a mother, and which was truly the third hypostasis of Plato's trinity, was eternal, and without beginning. And thus, according to the forementioned principle of Athanasius, none of these three hypostases of Plato's trinity were creatures, but all of them divine and uncreated.[1]

[1] According to the promise given by me above, I shall here inquire as briefly as possible into the truth of Dr. Cudworth's position, that Plato assigned two souls to this world, one *ὑπερκόσμιος*, or placed above the world, the other *ἐγκόσμιος*, or immersed in the world and produced from the former. This opinion has long ago been rejected by J. Le Clerc, Epistolæ Critic. ep. 7. p. 203. J. Basnage, Histoire de Juifs, livr. 4. chap. 4. sect. 19. p. 97. and Nic. Hieron. Gundlingius, Otia, Fascic. 2. p. 18. We shall bestow somewhat more diligence than they have done upon the consideration of this question, especially as it will enable us to ascertain whether or not what is called Plato's trinity accords with that of Christians. Plato's doctrine concerning the soul of the world is unquestionably to be looked for in the Timæus: if therefore what is said on the soul of the world in the Timæus be altogether at variance with the doctrine of the junior Platonists of a twofold soul of the world, every candid man will acknowledge that that doctrine is to be ranked among the figments with which this sect contaminated the philosophy of Plato. First of all, therefore, it behoves us to examine the opinion put forth by Plato in the Timæus. After speaking of the construction of the world, sect. 18. p. 242. ed. Fabricii, he goes on to the generation of the soul of the world, and commences the disputation by assigning a reason why he has deferred discoursing of this soul, till he had explained the structure of the corporeal mass, seeing that the soul is more ancient than all body. He then describes the generation of this soul in the following manner, sect. 19. *Τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ αεὶ κατὰ ταυτὰ ἐχούσης οὐσίας καὶ τῆς αὖ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς, τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ συνεκεράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος, τῆς τε ταυτοῦ φύσεως αὖ πέρι καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἑτέρου, καὶ κατὰ ταυτὰ ξυνέστησεν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τε ἀμεροῦς αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ· καὶ τρία λαβὼν αὖ τὰ ὄντα, συνεκέρασατο εἰς μίαν πάντα ἰδέαν, τὴν θατέρου φύσιν δύσμικτον οὖσαν εἰς ταυτὸ ξυναρμόττων βίᾳ, μιγνὺς δὲ κατὰ τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ ἐκ τριῶν ποιησάμενος ἕν, πάλιν ὅλον τοῦτο μοίρας, ὅσας προσῆκε, διένειμεν, ἑκάστην δὲ ἓξ τε ταυτοῦ καὶ θατέρου καὶ τῆς οὐσίας μεμιγμένην,* "Out of that matter which is indivisible and always in the same state, and that which is divisible and produced in bodies, he formed by admixture a third intermediate kind of matter, having the nature both of the same and of the different: and this he placed between the indivisible and that which is divided in bodies: and having taken the three, he mingled them all into one form, forcibly uniting the nature of the different, being difficult of admixture, with the same, mingling it in matter, and having formed the three into one, he again distributed this whole into suitable parts, each compounded of the same and of the different and of matter." The same subject Plato pursues at greater length in what follows, and goes on to explain or rather mystify it by arithmetical illustrations. But these things I now pass over, as they have little to do with our question and cannot at this day be understood. I am not one to suppose myself capable of divesting these words of Plato of all the darkness that envelopes them: a task I leave to others much superior to me in mental acumen: this however, I consider to be clear from them, that Plotinus' conceit of a twofold soul of the world can in no way be reconciled with this doctrine. In the first place, Plato speaks of only one soul of the world: nor does Dr. Cudworth deny this, although it may be said perhaps that he is treating in this place only of the *ἐγκόσμιος* or mundane soul, all mention of the other being omitted. But the fallacy of this objection may be easily made appear. The *ἐγκόσμιος* soul of Plotinus, is supposed by him to have been generated in some way or other from the *ὑπερκόσμιος* soul or third hypostasis of the divine nature, when this looked upon and was

Which to make yet more evident, we shall further observe, irst, that Plato himself, in that second epistle of his to Dionyius, after he had mentioned his first, second, and third; that is,

namoured with the first principle. But Plato positively affirms, that the soul of which he speaks was made and created by the supreme Being or principal God. Whoever therefore is disposed to maintain that the discourse here is only of the inferior soul of the world, must at the same time undertake to prove, that all that Plato says in the Timæus respecting God and the works of God pertains solely to the third person or ψυχὴ ὑπερκόσμιος, the supramundane soul. For to that God, of whom the philosopher is speaking throughout the whole of the Timæus, he also attributes the procreation of the soul of the world. This, however, I think, will be attempted by no one, who does not consider himself at liberty to pervert the whole of Plato's doctrine, and to convert light into darkness, for the sake of upholding his own preconceived opinions. For the opificer and creator of the universe, who, as Plato tells us in the Timæus, looking upon that form or ἰδέα, which is always the same, fabricated this world, that is to say the visible God, and the other gods, is understood by every one to be the first and supreme God. Which, if all other proofs were wanting, is manifest even from this, that, cap. 13. p. 236. he affirms "that it is difficult to find out this parent of the universe, and that if found out it is impossible to declare him to the vulgar." Some one perhaps will meet us by saying, that the God whose works Plato is extolling in the Timæus is all the three hypostases or the entire divinity: but even this will not much avail him. For in that case he will be under the necessity of asserting that the ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος was generated by the three hypostases conjointly; which is totally at variance with the opinions of Plotinus and Dr. Cudworth. In addition to this there are other things which make it impossible for us to interpret Plato as saying that the inferior world was generated from I know not what superior one. Plato absolutely severs and disconnects the soul, whose origin he is describing, from its parent: as every one will acknowledge, who only considers, that this soul is stated by him to have been compounded by God out of an indivisible and a divisible nature. This divisible nature, whatever it may be, is beyond all question a thing placed out of God, and therefore this soul cannot be associated with God, in whom Plato will not allow of any division whatever. But that new soul of the world imagined by Plotinus remains most intimately connected with its parent, and cannot be separated from it except in thought. Besides, Plato's soul is not of the same nature as its maker: he is pure, simple, indivisible; while it is concrete, mixed and compounded and made up by God, of things indivisible and divisible. See Chalcidius, in Timæum Platonis, cap. 1. sect. 33. p. 288. 289. But the soul of Plotinus has nothing concrete, but retains the simple nature of its parent. Lastly, Who would readily believe that Plato was so forgetful of himself and so indifferent about the matter he was engaged upon as to omit all mention of that nobler soul of the world upon whose virtue the whole universe of things depends, and yet be so copious and elaborate in describing the origin of the inferior and more ignoble soul?

What Dr. Cudworth brings forward from Plato or the Platonists in support of his opinion, may be disposed of without the least difficulty. I. It is incredible, he tells us, that the third principle which Plato speaks of in his epistle to Dionysius, is not of the same nature as the first and second: but these are eternal: therefore that also is eternal. For my part, however, I do not see why it should be incredible that Plato united three principles differing from each other in degree and order. Besides, the passage in this epistle to Dionysius respecting three kings is so short and obscure, that no wise man has ever yet been found to say that he thoroughly understood its meaning. On the third king, Plato expresses his mind in these few words: Καὶ τρίτον περὶ τὰ τριττά. And who, I ask, can make out from them, whether Plato supposed this third king to be eternal, or made and procreated? In short, if I am not greatly mistaken the philosopher clearly lays down a wide distinction between his three kings. For the first of them he extols in the following magnificent terms: Ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πάντα, καὶ ἐκεῖνος αἴτιον ἁπάντων τῶν καλῶν, "For his sake are all things; and he is the cause of every thing beautiful." But of the other two he says nothing of the kind, contenting himself with merely a passing notice of them: which to me seems to be a proof that they were by no means placed by Plato in the same rank as the first king. II. He tells us, that Plato, De Legibus, lib. 10. proves, in

his trinity of divine hypostases, immediately subjoins these words: Ἡ οὖν ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχὴ, περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁρέγεται μαθεῖν, περ ἄττα ἐστὶ, βλέπουσα εἰς τὰ αὐτῆς συγγενῆ, ὧν οὐδὲν ἱκανῶς ἔχει

opposition to the enemies of the divine nature, the existence of a certain soul of the world; and that this soul is called by him God: consequently, that it is eternal, and not the ἐγκόσμιος but the ὑπερκόσμιος soul. The argument is at once divested of all force, when it is replied, that in Plato's discipline every thing that is called god is not necessarily to be considered eternal. The world, the sun, the heavens, or rather the souls residing in the world, the sun, and the heavens, are gods in Plato's opinion, and yet not on that account eternal, but created by God. Nor can any one at all conversant with the ancient philosophy be ignorant of the distinction observed by Plato between the *eternal* and the *made* gods. But I shall show from the tenth book De Legibus itself, that the learned Doctor betrays too great a partiality for his own opinions, when he fancies he discovers in this book an eternal soul of the world. Plato, in opposition to those who at that time sought the downfall of all religion, proves the existence of gods, De Legibus, lib. 10. p. 667. drawing his principal argument from motion. Matter, he says, is moved: but the power of moving does not naturally exist in matter; from which he concludes that a soul and minds reside in matter: and these minds are undoubtedly gods. This is the substance of Plato's argumentation, by which he supposes those were to be put down who at that day discarded gods. Let it be observed, however, in the first place, that in it Plato is not attempting to demonstrate the existence of one supreme and principal God, but simply of gods: consequently, this argument of his affords no support to Dr. Cudworth's cause. Again, he is speaking not of a ὑπερκόσμιος, but of an ἐγκόσμιος soul, or a soul residing in the world, the sun and the stars. Hear his own words, p. 669. Ψυχὴν δὲ διοικοῦσαν καὶ ΕΝΟΙΚΟΥΣΑΝ ΕΝ ΑΠΑΣΙ τοῖς πάντη κινουμένοις μὲν οὖ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνάγκη διοικεῖν φᾶναι; "Must not we necessarily say, that the soul which governs all things, and dwells in all things that are moved, governs also the heavens?" And to remove all cause for doubt, let us add what he subjoins a little afterwards: ΚΛ. Ὦ ξένε, ἀλλὰ ἔκ γε τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων, οὐδ' ὅσιον ἄλλως λέγειν, ἢ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἔχουσαν ψυχὴν μίαν ἢ πλείους περιάγειν αὐτά. ΑΘ. Κάλλιστα, ὦ Κλεινία, ὑπήκουσας τοῖς λόγοις· τόδε προσυπήκουσον ἔτι. ΚΛ. Τὸ ποῖον; ΑΘ. Ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα εἴπερ ψυχὴ περιάγει πάντα, ἆρ' οὐ καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον; "Cl. But, my friend, from what has been said, it would be impious to say otherwise than that these things are carried round by one or more souls possessing every virtue. Ath. You have understood these words admirably, O Clinias: but understand also this. Cl. What? Ath. If the sun, moon and all the stars are moved round by a soul, is not each individually also?" Any one who can perceive in these words an eternal soul, disconnected from the world and corporeal things, in short ὑπερκόσμιος or supramundane, must in truth be more than ordinarily keen-sighted. Besides, Plato's chief object is not to prove that there is one soul of the world: for the question, whether there be only one or more than one soul of the world, he leaves undecided. This is already evident from the words I have just quoted: but I shall add another passage, p. 670. from which it is still more apparent: Ὡς ἐπείδη ψυχὴ μὲν ἢ ψυχαὶ τούτων αἰτίαι ἐφάνησαν, ἀγαθαὶ δὲ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν, θεοὺς αὐτὰς εἶναι φήσομεν, "Since a soul or souls endowed with all virtue have been shown to be the causes of all these things, we shall affirm them to be gods." Indeed, Plato seems to be inclined rather to the opinion of those who suppose a plurality of souls to reside together in the world: he certainly declares expressly, that there are two souls in the world, one beneficent, the other malignant, but not ὑπερκόσμιος and ἐγκόσμιος, p. 669. But of these it is not necessary now to speak, especially as we have already commented at great length upon the subject in another place. Lastly, it ought not to be overlooked, that in some parts of this demonstration against the Atheists, Plato states it to be his only wish to prove that soul is *more ancient than matter and body*: he does not let fall a single word about eternity.

It now remains for us to speak of the authority of the junior Platonists, in which the learned Doctor places a third confirmation of his opinion respecting a twofold soul. In this place he shows us that Plotinus agrees with him: having before made it appear from Proclus, that those great luminaries of the Platonic school, Porphyry and Amelius, are on his side. But it has long ago been evident to men conversant with

τοῦ δὲ βασιλέως πέρι, καὶ ὧν εἶπον, οὐδὲν τοιοῦτο, "The mind of man (as parturient) has always a great desire to know what these things are, and to that end does it look upon things cognate

these matters, that the later Platonic sect dealt with Plato as the scholastic doctors have done with Aristotle, and expounded, not the opinions really entertained by Plato, but such as he would have entertained if he had been instructed in the schools of Ammonius and Plotinus. If all the junior Platonists assert with one consentient voice, that Plato held this or that doctrine, and no traces of such doctrine are to be found in his writings, I consider they are by no means to be believed: but if, moreover, the books of Plato now extant contain the very contrary doctrine, in that case I do not hesitate to charge the whole of them with falsehood. So are learned men accustomed to decide on the question regarding the eternity of the world, which these new teachers do not scruple to foist upon their master, although at variance with the whole of the Timæus: nor ought we to determine otherwise in the present question. In order to throw greater light upon the subject, however, I shall add a couple of observations drawn from the interior discipline of Plato: which I am convinced, had they occurred to the minds of Dr. Cudworth and those who have followed his footsteps in this matter, would have led them to the same conclusion as ourselves. One will explain the cause why the junior Platonists feigned a twofold soul of the world: the other will show that this dogma, even if maintained by all the Platonists, affords not the slightest aid to those who deny all difference in the doctrine of the Platonists and Christians on the Trinity.

I. The Platonists who began to make their appearance in the second century after Christ, and proceeded chiefly from the school of Ammonius, meditated a sort of harmony of all sects, and even of the Christian religion and their own. For the Christian religion, as there is abundant evidence to show, they regarded in no other light than as a new philosophical sect, and ranked its founder, our Saviour, in the class of supremely wise and divinely inspired men. Hence they strove to reconcile their own doctrines with the Christian discipline, and in particular to exhibit their celebrated dogma of three principles of things, which, previously to our Saviour's time, had been held in immense estimation among philosophers, in such a light that there should appear to be as little difference as possible between it and the most holy Christian tenet of three persons in the Godhead. The *one* and *good* of Plato, they identified with God the Father; his Λόγος, or reason, with the eternal Son; and his Ψυχή, or soul of the world, with the Holy Spirit: and that too in so artful and plausible a manner as to deceive even many of those who were justly regarded as the chief supporters of Christianity. This scheme nowhere presented greater difficulty than in the comparison of the soul of the world and the Holy Spirit; inasmuch as what Plato says of this soul in the Timæus appeared to be altogether against it. About the eternity of the soul of the world, there was indeed little controversy between them and the Christians: for, holding the whole world to be eternal and without beginning, they would be compelled to maintain the eternity also of the soul of the world. Indeed, if they had asserted the world to be without beginning, but that its soul was made and created at some finite period, they would have talked just as foolishly as a person who should say, that man existed from all eternity, but that his soul was of recent generation. As this opinion of the eternity of the mundane soul seemed to be opposed to the authority of Plato, who discourses largely in the Timæus of its generation, they insisted that in this disputation their master accommodates his language to the capacity of the vulgar and uninformed. See Chalcidius, In Timæum Platon. cap. 2. sect. 26. p. 285. 286. On this point, therefore, their identification of the Holy Spirit and the soul of the world was an easy task. But the rest of the offices which philosophers, after the example of Plato, commonly attributed to the soul of the world, such as its being diffused through all parts of the universe, its being mingled in a respect with matter, and its being the producer and nurse of all plants and trees: these, I say, seemed to be too much at variance with what the Christians, taking scripture for their guide, proclaimed respecting the Holy Spirit and its offices. To get rid, therefore, of this difficulty, some members of the sect invented a twofold soul of the world; one devoid of all matter and concretion, removed from the world, and associated by an indissoluble bond with the Λόγος, or Eternal Reason; the other produced from this simple soul, and diffused through the world: the former of which, but not the latter likewise, they compared

to it, which are all insufficient, imperfect and heterogeneous. But in that King of all things, and in the other, second and third, which I spake of, there is nothing of this kind;" that is, nothing like to these created things.

Secondly, the three hypostases of Plato's trinity are not only all eternal, but also necessarily existent, and absolutely undestroyable. For the first of them can no more exist without the second, nor the first and second without the third, than original light can exist without its splendour, coruscation, or effulgency. And Plotinus, writing against some Gnostics in his time, who would make more of these divine hypostases, or principles, than three, concludes that there can be neither more of them, nor fewer, in this manner:* Οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ ἐφ' ἑτέρας ἀρχὰς ἰέναι, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο προθησαμένους, εἶτα νοῦν μετ' αὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν πρώτως, εἶτα ψυχὴν μετὰ νοῦν· αὕτη γὰρ τάξις κατὰ φύσιν, μήτε πλείω τίθεσθαι ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, μήτε ἐλάττω· εἴτε γὰρ ἐλάττω, ἢ ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν ταυτὸ φήσουσιν, ἢ νοῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐδείχθη πολλαχῆ, λειπὸν δὲ ἐπισκέψασθαι ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εἰ πλείω τούτων, &c. "Wherefore we ought not to entertain any other principles, but having placed first the simple good, to set Mind, or the supreme Intellect, next after it, and then the universal soul in the third place. For this is the right order, according to nature, neither to make more intelligibles (or universal principles), nor yet fewer than these three. For he that will contract the number, and make fewer of them, must of necessity either suppose Soul and Mind to be the same, or else Mind and the first Good. But that all these three are diverse

with the Holy Spirit professed by Christians. In this way, indeed, all discrepancy between the Holy Spirit and the soul of the world seemed at first sight to be done away with: but, not to mention that only few of the Platonists were found willing to have recourse to such a remedy, the learned of that age could easily have seen that this dogma increased rather than diminished the difference between the Platonic and the Christian Trinity. In the first place, this soul of the world which they call ἐγκόσμιος, and separate from the ὑπερκόσμιος or supramundane soul, is so intimately associated with it, that no union can be more complete: secondly, like this it is eternal and void of all beginning. For as this sect held all things to be eternal, they must necessarily have acknowledged the soul immersed in matter to have been generated from all eternity. Lastly, this same soul of the world, as being generated out of the third essence of the hypostasis, ought to be excluded from the order of those things which the Platonists call created, concrete and mutable: and if so there is an end of the Platonic trinity, and we must abandon all hope of establishing an agreement between their precepts and the Christian doctrine. For according to this, there will not be three but four hypostases in the Deity, the *one and good*, as they call it, *reason*, the *celestial soul* or architect of the world, and the *mundane soul* or simple and eternal nature connected from infinity with matter. This second soul certainly differs in degree from that other more sublime one which has no connexion with matter: but it pertains notwithstanding to the divine nature, and is, so to speak, a necessary portion of it: consequently we are not in error in ranking it as a fourth person of the Divinity. Many of the Platonists, indeed, were by no means averse to a multiplication of the divine persons: and some of them, Proclus among the number, are inclined to make the divine essence consist of four rather than of three persons.

* Ennead 2. lib. 9. c. 1. [P. 199.]

from one another hath been often demonstrated by us. It remains now to consider, that if there be more than these three principles, what natures they should be," &c.

Thirdly, as all these three Platonic hypostases are eternal and necessarily existent, so are they plainly supposed by them, not to be particular, but universal beings; that is, such as do *περιέχειν τὸ ὅλον*, "contain and comprehend the whole world under them," and preside over all things; which is all one as to say, that they are each of them infinite and omnipotent. For which reason are they also called by Platonic writers, *ἀρχαὶ*, and *αἴτια*, and *δημιουργοὶ*, "principles," and "causes," and "opificers" of the whole world. First, as for Νοῦς, "Mind," or "Understanding;" whereas the old philosophers before Plato, as Anaxagoras, Archelaus, &c., and Aristotle after him, supposed Mind and Understanding to be the very first and highest principle of all; which also the magic or Chaldee oracles take notice of, as the most common opinion of mankind,[2]

Ὃν πρῶτον κλῄζεται ἔθνεα ἀνδρων,

That "Mind is generally by all men looked upon as the first and highest God:" Plato considering, that unity was, in order of nature, before number and multiplicity; and that there must be Νοητὸν before Νοῦς, an "Intelligible" before "Intellect;" so that knowledge could not be the first; and lastly, that there is a good transcending that of knowledge; made one most simple good, the fountain and original of all things, and the first divine hypostasis; and Mind or Intellect only the second next to it, but inseparable from it, and most nearly cognate with it. For which cause, in his Philebus,[3] though he agrees thus far with

[2] The sense of this oracle, however, is doubtful and uncertain; as will be evident if we quote the entire verses, sect. 2. v. 27. 28. p. 372. ed. Clerici.

Πάντα γὰρ ἐξετέλεσσε Πατὴρ, καὶ νῷ παρέδωκε
Δευτέρῳ, ὃν πρῶτον κλῄζεται ἔθνεα ἀνδρῶν,

"The Father perfected all things, and delivered them to the second Mind, which mankind call the first." These verses are a proof that the author of the oracles assigned the first place in the Trinity to *the Father*, the second to *mind*. But it is not clear from them that others were of a different opinion, and supposed mind to hold the first place. Dr. Cudworth indeed so interprets the latter verse: but those who are disposed to agree with him must regard the word *πρῶτον* as having the noun *αἴτιον* understood with it. For my part, however, I see no necessity for this. It would be equally, nay, I should say, more convenient and more in accordance with the words of the author to supply the word *νοῦν* to *πρῶτον*, making the whole run thus: Ὃν *πρῶτον νοῦν κλῄζεται ἔθνεα ἀνδρῶν*, to this purport: "Mankind are wont to call the second principle the first mind:" namely, to distinguish it from the other minds. Consequently, the meaning of the writer of the oracles will not be, that he himself is accustomed to assign the second place in the Trinity to *mind*, while the rest of men give it the first place, but simply that this mind which holds the second place in the principles of things is commonly called the first mind: from which it by no means follows that there were some who supposed it to be the first and highest principle.

[3] Opp. p. 80. ed. Ficini.

those ancient philosophers, *ὡς ἀεὶ τοῦ παντὸς* Νοῦς *ἄρχει*, "that Mind always rules over the whole universe;" yet does he add afterwards,* *ὅτι* Νοῦς *ἐστι γενούστης τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου*, "that Mind is (not absolutely the first principle, but) cognate with the cause of all things;" and that therefore it rules over all things, with, and in a kind of subordination to that first principle, which is, "Tagathon," or the "highest Good." Where, when Plato affirms that Mind, or his second divine hypostasis, is *γενούστης* with the first, it is all one as if he should have said, that it is *συγγενὴς*, and *ὁμοειδὴς*, and *ὁμογενὴς*, with it; all which words are used by Athanasius, as synonymous with *ὁμοούσιος*, "co-essential," or "con-substantial." So that Plato here plainly and expressly agrees, or symbolizes, not with the doctrine of Arius, but with that of the Nicene council and Athanasius; that the second hypostasis of the Trinity, whether called Mind, or Word, or Son, is not *ἑτερούσιος*, but *γενούστης* or *ὁμοούσιος*, "co-essential" or "con-substantial" with the first; and therefore not a creature.[4]

* Page 30.

[4] Whether this passage of Plato on *νοῦς*, or mind, and on its most intimate association with what he calls *the good*, will much assist the cause of Dr. Cudworth, I am very much disposed to doubt. For if what he says in the part of his Philebus referred to be attentively examined, the *νοῦς* or mind he speaks of, is not a person or divine hypostasis, but the wisdom of God which cannot be separated from his essence except in thought. In the beginning of the disputation, indeed, the philosopher expresses himself as if he was speaking of a person: for he cites the wise men who had asserted *νοῦς*, or mind, "to be the king of heaven and earth:" Πάντες *γὰρ, συμφωνοῦσιν*, says he, p. 79. *οἱ σοφοί, ὡς νοῦς ἐστι βασιλεὺς ἡμῖν οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς*: passages similar to which are to be met with also in other parts of the disputation. But when the whole tenor and contex of his discourse is examined, it becomes sufficiently obvious that he meant simply to inculcate that that the entire universe was framed and is administered by *mind* or supreme wisdom, and consequently, that the fountain of all science and wisdom is in God. And, indeed, he sometimes pretty clearly professes this. For example, p. 80. he says: *Οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἐρεῖς φύσει βασιλικὴν μὲν ψυχὴν, βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν ἐγγίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ξύναμιν*, "Therefore you will say that a kingly soul and a kingly mind exist in the nature of Jupiter (or God) himself, by virtue of the cause." He is speaking therefore of a mind that is in God, as a quality or virtue. Nay, the very scope of the entire dialogue shows this to be the case. In it he compares *νοῦς* or *mind* with *pleasure*, and inquires which of the two is preferable and more conducive to a happy life. Now, if *νοῦς* were a person, such a comparison would be absurd and futile, and the philosopher would be proposing the most ridiculous question: Whether pleasure or the son of God contributes more to human felicity. The *ἡδονὴ*, or *pleasure*, which Plato speaks of must necessarily be of one and the same nature as the *νοῦς* or *mind* it is compared with: and therefore, as no one in his senses would pronounce pleasure to be a person, so neither would he assert mind to be such. But what is of still greater weight, Plato denies the supreme felicity of man to consist in *νοῦς* or mind alone; and at the close of the dialogue mentions many other things, which in addition to mind are necessary towards a happy life. But if mind were a person and that the second person of the divinity, associated by an indissoluble bond with the first, it would have been insane in Plato to require anything more towards perfect human happiness than the possession of *νοῦς* or the *second person in the Deity*. To those who are not yet satisfied that Plato's *νοῦς*, which he discourses of in his Philebus, is not a person but a mental notion and virtue, perhaps no argument will be sufficiently convincing; nevertheless, I shall add one or two things, which, if I mistake not, will remove the doubts of the most sceptical. In the first place, I would call attention to this philosopher's own

And then, as for the third hypostasis, called Psyche, or the
nperior mundane soul, Plato, in his Cratylus, bestowing the
ame of Zeus, that is, of the supreme God upon it, and etymo-
ogizing the same from ζῆν, adds these words concerning it:
Ὃ γάρ ἐστιν ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν, ὅστις ἐστὶν αἴτιος μᾶλλον
οὗ ζῆν, ἢ ὁ ἄρχων τε καὶ βασιλεὺς τῶν πάντων, "There is
othing which is more the cause of life to us and other animals,

efinition of mind; which is to be found in p. 94. not far from the end of the
ialogue. Νοῦς δέ, says he, ἤτοι ταυτὸν καὶ ἀλήθειά ἐστιν, ἢ πάντων ὁμοιότατον
αἰ ἀληθέστατον, "Mind is either the same as truth, or the most similar to it of all
hings, and most true." Let us suppose mind to be a person: therefore, if we are to
ollow this definition, truth, to which mind is said to be most similar, will also be a
erson. Consequently, those who consider this to be absurd, and are unwilling to rank
ruth among persons, must also exclude Plato's mind from the same category. Again,
he words νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, φρόνησις, I observe are used by Plato in this dialogue in-
liscriminately, and as possessing one and the same signification. I shall give some
xamples from p. 94. where he frequently confounds and interchanges these terms.
Plato is inquiring, whether there is more moderation in mind or in pleasure. But in
his question he employs the word φρόνησις instead of νοῦς, which he otherwise
makes use of. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν μετρίοτητα ὡς οὕτως σκέψαι, πότερον
ἡδονὴ φρόνησεως, ἢ φρόνησις ἡδονῆς πλείω κέκτηται, "The next thing to be in-
quired into is moderation, whether pleasure possesses more of it than wisdom, or
wisdom than pleasure." Some will suppose perhaps that φρόνησις is here different
from νοῦς, but such supposition is completely overthrown by the answer to the
question, which proves beyond a doubt that in Plato's discourse, ἐπιστήμη, νοῦς, and
φρόνησις are synonymous: Οἶμαι γάρ, ἡδονῆς μὲν καὶ περιχαρείας οὐδὲν τῶν
ὄντων πεφυκὸς ἀμετρότερον εὑρεῖν ἄν τινα· ΝΟΥ῀Ν δὲ καὶ 'ΕΠΙΣΤΗ'ΜΗΣ ἐμμε-
τρότερον οὐδ' ἂν ἕν ποτε, "I consider, indeed, that nothing can be found more im-
moderate than pleasure and joy; and on the contrary, nothing more moderate than
mind and wisdom." A little afterwards, he so associates mind and φρόνησις together,
as to leave no room for doubt that he meant one and the same thing by them:
Ἆρ' οὖν ΦΡΟ'ΝΗΣΙΝ μὲν καὶ ΝΟΥ῀Ν οὐδεὶς πώποτε αἰσχρὸν εἶδεν, "No one ever
saw mind and wisdom deformed." And again: Τὸ τοίνυν τρίτον ΝΟΥ῀Ν καὶ
ΦΡΟ'ΝΗΣΙΝ τιθεὶς, οὐκ ἂν μέγα τι τῆς ἀληθείας παρεξέλθοις, "Putting mind
and wisdom as the third, you will not depart far from the truth." Lastly, I shall
appeal to certain queries concerning mind proposed by Plato at the close of the
dialogue. Socrates asks, whether mind or pleasure is more nearly allied to truth.
Secondly, whether mind or pleasure is more beautiful. Thirdly, in which of the two
t·ere is more moderation. Now, who on hearing these questions will not immediately
decide that it is impossible for the mind introduced by Plato in his Philebus to be a
divine hypostasis or person? I have been perhaps somewhat prolix on so plain and
easy a matter: but I have had my reasons for being so. Those who elicit a trinity
from the writings of Plato, reckon his Philebus and the disputation concerning mind
in this dialogue among the principal supports of their cause. Hence it was necessary
to show at some length that the Platonic trinity would be to be despaired of, if its
abettors were in possession of no other arguments in its favour. Besides, I considered
it to be worth while to caution the readers of Plato by an example against a hasty and
inattentive perusal of the books of a philosopher, whose diction approaches closely to
the poetic, and has deceived more than one of the learned even by its flowers and
figures. Not to mention that the persons who are once seized with an extravagant
admiration of Plato, are generally of that class that they rarely renounce their opinions
unless overwhelmed as it were by arguments.

The fallacy of what the learned Doctor here advances respecting the agreement of
Plato and Athanasius on the subject of the second person of the divinity, is already
apparent from these observations: nor indeed would there be much weight in it, even
supposing *mind* in Plato's Philebus to be a divine person. For what sort of reasoning
is this: The word γενούστης employed by Plato, and συγγενὴς and ὁμοειδὴς used
by Athanasius, are pretty nearly synonymous: therefore Plato and Athanasius do not
differ in opinion?

than this prince and king of all things; and that th
was called by the Greeks Zeus, because it is by h
animals live." And yet that all this was properly me
of the third hypostasis of his trinity, called Psyche,
from those words of his that follow; where he ex
poetic mythology before mentioned, making Zeus to
of Chronos: Εὔλογον δὲ, μεγάλης τινὸς διανοίας ἔκ
τὸν Δία, "It is agreeable to reason that Zeus sho
progeny or offspring of a certain great mind." N
and γενούστης are equivalent terms also; and ther
here makes the third hypostasis of his trinity lik
ὁμοούσιος, "co-essential" with the second; as he
made the second co-essential with the first.[5]

It is true, that by the δημίουργος, or "Opificer"
commonly meant Nous or Intellect, his second
(Plotinus affirming as much,* δημιουργὸς ὁ νοῦς Πλά
Demiurgus to Plato is Intellect.") Nevertheless, bo
and Plotinus, and other Platonists, called his third
also δημίουργον, "the artificer" or "opificer" of
world; some of them making him to be the second fr
Intellect; others the third from the first Good, th
cause of all things; who was by Atticus and Am
Demiurgus also. Wherefore, as was before suggested
to the genuine and ancient Platonic doctrine, all
hypostases were the joint-creators of the whole world
things besides themselves, as Ficinus more than on
the tenor thereof,† Hi Tres uno quodam consensu
ducunt, "These three with one common consent

[5] These passages which occur in Plato's Cratylus, a book replete with
logical absurdities, p. 262. opp. are dragged into the present question wi
reason. I. Dr. Cudworth assumes that Plato is speaking in the first
third person of his Trinity, or supramundane ψυχή. This, however, h
proves. For Plato neither makes any mention of a soul or ψυχή, nor
nature which he calls Zeus to be the soul of the world. If the learned
tures that Plato is here speaking of the soul of the world, merely bec
Jupiter to be the cause of life to all, the conjecture is certainly a b
figment of the junior Platonic school respecting the two souls of the wo
been disposed of by us a little above. II. In the other passages whe
called the progeny of a certain great mind, our excellent author doe
which the lovers of truth will not very readily approve of. 1. He take
that Zeus or Jupiter is the soul of the world: which Plato, however,
states. 2. He makes the μεγάλη διάνοια, of which Ζεὺς is called the
the second person of the Trinity: but again without the least authori
have repudiated this opinion, I imagine, if he had only paid due attenti
τινὸς: which shows that the discourse is of one thing out of many,
singular and unique nature, such as the second divine hypostasis. 3.
abuses the word ἔκγονος. For who would easily tolerate this reasoning
γενούστης are pretty nearly equivalent in sense: therefore, the third h
Trinity, which is called by Plato ἔκγονος, is equal to the second hypo
he applies the term γενούστης? Something has already been said
passage of Plato elsewhere.

* Ennead 5. lib. 1. [Cap. 8. p. 489.]. † In Plotinus, Enne

things;" and before him Proclus, Πάντα ἀνήρτηται τοῦ ἑνὸς διὰ νοῦ μὲν καὶ ψυχῆς, "All things depend upon the first One, by Mind and Soul;" and accordingly we shall conclude in the words of Porphyrius, that the true and real Deity, according to Plato, extends to three divine hypostases, the last whereof is Psyche or Soul.[6]

From all which it appears, that Arius did not so much Platonize, as the Nicene fathers and Athanasius; who notwithstanding made not Plato, but the Scripture, together with reason deducing natural consequences therefrom, their foundation. And that the Platonic trinity was a certain middle thing also betwixt the doctrine of Sabellius and that of Arius, it being neither a trinity of words only, or logical notions, or mere modes, but a trinity of hypostases; nor yet a jumbled confusion of God and creature (things heterousious) together; neither the second nor third of them being creatures, or made in time, but all eternal, infinite, and creators.

But that it may yet more fully appear how far the most refined Platonic and Parmenidian, or Pythagoric trinity, doth either agree or disagree with the Scripture doctrine, and that of the Christian church in several ages; we shall here further observe two things concerning it. The first whereof is this, that though the genuine Platonists and Pythagoreans supposed none of their three archical hypostases to be indeed creatures, but all of them eternal, necessarily existent, and universal or infinite, and consequently creators of the whole world; yet did they

[6] It is so, as the learned Doctor states. There is a mighty conflict among the Platonists as to which place in the Trinity is to be assigned to the architect or δημιουργὸς of all things. We have already shown from the Timæus that Plato did not distinguish this Creator of the world from the Supreme God: and that many others agreed with him in this opinion is beyond question. But the emperor Julian makes him to be the second from the supreme God; and Plotinus, Porphyry, and others, the third. Nay, Proclus even goes so far as to rank the opificer of the world in the fourth place from the first cause. On which dissension and its causes I am not disposed to waste space and time by entering into a lengthened comment. I cannot, however, but admire the conclusion which the learned Doctor draws from this discord of the Platonists in respect to the opificer of the world and its place in the Triad. He supposes it to be a proof that they ascribed the construction of the world to all the three persons of the divinity, and therefore, may not improperly be classed with the Christians, who it is well-known refer the works which they call *external* to the whole of the most Holy Trinity. We shall easily be enabled to judge whether he is right or not in this supposition by merely exhibiting his argument in its naked form. The Platonists are at variance as to which of their three hypostases, the name of opificer or architect of the world is to be assigned: therefore, they considered this name to belong to all the three persons conjointly and not to any one of them in particular. Most assuredly, if there is no fault in this logic, I should think we ought to approve also of the following: Critics disagree among each other as to the authorship of the dialogue, De Caussis Corruptæ Eloquentiæ, usually appended to Quinctilian: some suppose Quinctilian, some Tacitus, some Suetonius to be the writer: it is evident therefore, from this contest that the work is not to be attributed to any one of these men but to all of them together. The Platonists, I fancy, would have abstained from this controversy, and not spent much thought upon the place of the δημιουργὸς in their Trinity, if they had been unanimous in supposing this office to be, not proper to one person, but common to all.

nevertheless assert an essential dependence of the second hypostasis upon the first, as also of the third both upon the first and second; together with a gradual subordination in them. Thus Plotinus, writing of the generation of the eternal Intellect, which is the second in the Platonic trinity, and answers to the Son or Word in the Christian:* Τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ τέλειον, ἀεὶ καὶ ἀίδιον γεννᾷ, καὶ ΕΛΑΤΤΟΝ δὲ ἑαυτοῦ γεννᾷ. Τί οὖν χρὴ περὶ τοῦ τελειοτάτου λέγειν; μηδέν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γεννᾷν, ἢ τὰ μέγιστα μετ' αὐτὸν· Μέγιστον δὲ μετ' αὐτὸν Νοῦς καὶ Δεύτερον. Καὶ γὰρ ὁρᾷ ὁ Νοῦς ἐκεῖνον, καὶ δεῖται αὐτοῦ μόνου· ἐκεῖνος δὲ τούτου οὐδέν. Καὶ τὸ γεννώμενον ἀπὸ κρείττονος νοῦ, νοῦν εἶναι. Καὶ κρείττων ἁπάντων ὁ Νοῦς, ὅτι τ' ἄλλα μετ' αὐτὸν. Οἷον καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ λόγος νοῦ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργειά τις, "That which is always perfect, generates what is eternal, and that which it generates, is always less than itself. What shall we therefore say of the most absolutely perfect Being of all? Does that produce nothing from itself? or rather does it not produce the greatest of all things after it? Now, the greatest of all things after the most absolutely perfect Being, is Mind or Intellect; and this is second to it. For Mind beholdeth this as its father, and standeth in need of nothing else besides it: whereas that first principal standeth in need of no mind or intellect. What is generated from that which is better than mind, must needs be mind or intellect; because mind is better than all other things, they being all in order of nature after it and junior to it: as Psyche itself, or the first soul; for this is also the word or energy of mind, as that is the word and energy of the first good." Again, the same is more particularly declared by him, concerning the third hypostasis called Psyche, that as it essentially dependeth upon the second, so is it gradually subordinate, or some way inferior to it:† Ψυχὴν γὰρ γεννᾷ Νοῦς, νοῦς ὢν τέλειος. Καὶ γὰρ τέλειον ὄντα, γεννᾷν ἔδει, καὶ μὴ δύναμιν οὖσαν τοσαύτην ἄγονον εἶναι· Κρεῖττον δὲ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν εἶναι, οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα τὸ γεννώμενον, ἀλλ' ΕΛΑΤΤΟΝ ὄν, εἴδωλον εἶναι αὐτοῦ, "Perfect Intellect generates soul; and it being perfect, must needs generate, for so great a power could not remain sterile. But that which is here begotten also cannot be greater than its begetter; but must needs be inferior to it, as being the image thereof." Elsewhere the same philosopher, calling the first hypostasis of this trinity Uranus, the second Chronos, and the third Zeus, (as Plato had done before) and handsomely allegorizing that fable, concludes in this manner concerning Chronos, or the second of these:‡ Μεταξὺ ὢν πατρός τε ἀμείνονος, καὶ ἥττονος υἱέος, "That he is in a middle state or degree betwixt his father, who is greater, and his son, who is less and inferior." Again, the same thing is

* Ennead 5. lib. 1. cap. 6. [P. 487.]
† P. 489.
‡ P. 551. [Ennead 5. lib. 8. cap. 13.]

by that philosopher thus asserted in general:* Ἐν τοῖς γεννωμένοις, οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς τὸ ἄνω, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ κάτω χωρεῖν, "In the things generated from eternity, or produced by way of natural emanation, there is no progress upwards, but all downwards, and still a gradual descent into greater multiplicity." We shall cite but only one passage more out of this philosopher, which containeth something of argumentation in it also:† Οὐ ταυτὸν τὸ ἐξ ἐκείνου ἐκείνῳ, εἰ οὖν μὴ ταυτὸν, οὐδέ γε βέλτιον, "That which is generated or emaneth immediately from the first and highest Being, is not the very same thing with it, as if it were nothing but that repeated again and ingeminated; and as it is not the same, so neither can it be better than it." From whence it follows that it must needs be gradually subordinate and inferior to it.[7]

Which gradual subordination and essential dependence of the second and third hypostases upon the first, is by these Platonics illustrated several ways. Ficinus resembles it to the circulation of water when some heavy body falling into it, its superficies is depressed, and from thence every way circularly wrinkled. Alius (saith he) sic fermè profluit ex alio, sicut in aqua circulus dependet à circulo, "One of these divine hypostases doth in a manner so depend upon another, as one circulation of water depends upon another." Where it is observable also, that the wider the circulating wave grows, still hath it the more subsidence and detumescence, together with an abatement of celerity, till at last all becomes plain and smooth again. But, by the pagan Platonists themselves, each following hypostasis is many times said to be ἴχνος καὶ τύπος, "a print, stamp, or impression" made by the former, like the signature of a seal upon wax. Again, it is often called by them, εἰκὼν, and εἴδωλον, and μίμημα, "an image," and "representation," and "imitation;" which if considered in audibles, then will the second hypostasis be looked upon as the echo of an original voice; and the third as the repeated echo, or echo of that echo: as if both the second and third hypostases were but certain replications of the first original

[7] As this disputation is solely upon the nature of that Trinity which Dr. Cudworth styles the *genuine Platonic*, and not of the one which was inculcated by the Alexandrine school subsequently to the birth of Christ, and which the learned Doctor acknowledges to be miserably corrupt and wholly unlike the true Platonic, it will doubtless be asked by many, why he explains that Trinity by reference to passages of Plotinus, a man deserving of almost the first place among those whom he calls the corruptors of the old Platonic discipline. Is not this a silent confession that owing to the lack of ancient monuments, and the obscurity of Plato, it is uncertain what this philosopher's opinion was upon the three principles, and that he who attempts any thing on this subject must have recourse to the junior Platonists rather than to Plato himself? But such being the case, what becomes of the whole of the distinction between the genuine opinion of Plato, and the spurious doctrine of the Platonists on the three persons in the Deity?

* P. 513. [Ennead 5. lib. 3. cap. 16.] † Ennead 5. lib. 3. cap. 15. [p. 512.]

Deity with abatement: which though not accidental or evanid ones, but substantial, yet have a like dependence one upon another, and a gradual subordination. Or if it be considered in visibles, then will the second hypostasis be resembled to the image of a face in a glass, and the third to the image of that image reflected in another glass, which depend upon the original face, and have a gradual abatement of the vigour thereof. Or else the second and third may be conceived as two Parhelii, or as a second and third sun. For thus does[8] Plotinus call the universal Psyche, or third hypostasis, *εἰκόνα νοῦ σώζουσάν τι φῶς ἐκείνου*, "the image of Mind (which is the second) retaining much of the splendour thereof." Which similitude of theirs, notwithstanding, they would not have to be squeezed or pressed hard; because they acknowledge that there is something of dissimilitude in them also, which then would be forced out of them. Their meaning amounts to no more than this, that as an image in a glass is said *ἑτέρου εἶναι*, essentially to belong to something else, and to depend upon it; so each following hypostasis doth essentially depend upon the former or first, and hath a subordination to it. But we meet with no expression in any of these pagan Platonists so unhandsome and offensive as that of Philo's, in his second book of allegories: *Σκία δὲ Θεοῦ ὁ Λόγος αὐτοῦ ἐστιν, ᾧ καθάπερ ὀργάνῳ προσχρησάμενος ἐκοσμοποίει*, "The Word is the shadow of God, which he made use of as an instrument in the making of the world." Notwithstanding which, the same writer doth call him elsewhere, more honourably, "a second God," and "the son of the first God." As in the same place he doth also declare, that this shadow and image of God is itself the archetype of other things: *Αὕτη δὲ ἡ σκία, καὶ ὡσανεὶ ἀπεικόνισμα, ἑτέρων ἐστὶν ἀρχέτυπον, ὥσπερ ὁ Θεὸς παράδειγμα τῆς εἰκόνος, ἣν σκίαν νυνὶ κέκληκα, οὕτως ἡ εἰκὼν ἄλλο γίνεται παράδειγμα*, "This shadow and as it were, image (of the first God) is itself the archetype and pattern of others things below it. As God is the pattern of this image, (which we call his shadow,) so is this image itself another pattern or paradigm also."[9] But this dependence and subordination of the divine hypostases is most frequently illustrated in Platonic writings, by the *ἔκλαμψις* or *ἀπαύγασμα*, the effulgency or out-shining of light and splendour from the sun, and other luminous bodies; the "Nous," or second

[8] Ennead. 5. lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 487.

[9] Both these passages of Philo occur lib. 2. Allegor. p. 79. opp. But the second is exhibited here in a more correct form than in the editions, which have the reading *ἕτερον* and *κέκληκεν* instead of *ἑτέρων* and *κέκληκα*, as required by the context. I have explained Philo's opinion of the Word at great length above, and any one who reads my remarks will easily understand the force and meaning of the words quoted from him in this place. For the learned Doctor's reprehension of them, as harsh and offensive, proceeds solely from his supposing Philo's sentiments concerning the Word to be far different from that which we have shown by most weighty arguments he really entertained.

hypostasis being resembled to that radious effulgency, which immediately encompassing them, is beheld together with them, and, as the astronomers tell us, augments their apparent diameter, and makes it bigger than the true, when they are beheld through telescopes, cutting off those luxuriant and circumambient rays. And the third hypostasis is resembled to the remoter and more distant splendour, which circling still gradually decreaseth. Thus Plotinus,* Πῶς οὖν καὶ τί δεῖ νοῆσαι περὶ ἐκεῖνο μένον, περίλαμψιν ἐξ αὐτοῦ μὲν, ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ μένοντος, οἷον ἡλίου τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ λαμπρὸν, ὥσπερ περιθέον, ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ γεννώμενον μένοντος, "How should we consider this second hypostasis otherwise than as the circumfused splendour which encompasseth the body of the sun; and from that always remaining is perpetually generated anew."

But this essential dependence, and gradual subordination of hypostases, in the Platonic trinity, will yet more fully appear from those particular distinctive characters which are given to each of them. For the first of these is often said to be Ἓν πρὸ πάντων, "one before all things;" a simple unity, which virtually containeth all things. And as Plotinus writes,† Οὕτως εἶχε πάντα ὡς μὴ διακεκριμένα, τὰ δὲ ἐν δευτέρῳ διεκέκριτο τῷ λόγῳ, "This so containeth all things, as not being yet secrete and distinct; whereas in the second they are discerned and distinguished by reason:" that is, they are actually distinguished in their ideas; whereas the first is the simple and second power of all things. Wherefore the second was called by Parmenides, Ἓν πάντα, "one actually all things;" that is, in their distinct ideas. And the third, according to the same philosopher, as Plotinus[10] tells us, was Ἓν καὶ πάντα, "one and all things;" as having still more multiplicity and alterity in it. One effectively all things. That which doth actively display, and produce into being, what was virtually or potentially contained in the first; and ideally or exemplarily in the second. Accordingly, the first of these is sometimes said to be Πάντα ἑνικῶς, "all things unitively;" the second Πάντα νοερῶς, "all things intellectually;" and the third, Πάντα ψυχικῶς, "all things animally;" that is, self-moveably, actively, and productively." Again, the first of these is commonly styled Τ' ἀγαθὸν, "the Good, or Goodness itself, above Mind and Understanding," and also ὑπερούσιον, "above essence," ineffable and incomprehensible. And sometimes also φῶς ἁπλοῦν, "a simple light;" the second Νοῦς, Λόγος, Σοφία, "Unity and Goodness" only by participation, or Ἀγαθοειδὴς, "Boniform," but essentially and formally; Mind, or Understanding, Reason, and Wisdom, all-comprehending, or infinite Knowledge. The third, Ψυχὴ, "Self-moveable Soul;"

* P. 487. [Ennead 5. lib. 1. cap. 6.]
† P. 513. [Ennead 5. lib. 3. cap. 15.]
[10] Ennead 5. lib. 1. De Tribus Hypostas. cap. 8. p. 490. opp.

Goodness and Wisdom by participation, but essentially and formally, infinite Self-activity, or Effectiveness; infinite, active, perceptive, and animadversive power. Sometimes it is styled also Ἀφροδίτη and Ἔρως, "Venus" and "Love;" but differently from that of the first Good, which is Love too; but a Love of redundancy, or overflowing fulness and fecundity:* Ὃν γὰρ τέλειον, τῷ μηδὲν ζητεῖν, μὴ δὲ ἔχειν, μὴ δὲ δεῖσθαι, οἷον ὑπερεῤῥύη, καὶ τὸ ὑπερπλῆρες αὐτοῦ πεποίηκε πάντα, "That which being absolutely perfect, and seeking, or wanting nothing, as it were, overflowed; and by its exuberant redundancy produced all things." Whereas this latter is a Love of infinite activity. Of the first, it is said, by Plotinus, that it is ἀνενέργητος, "above all manner of action," for which cause, the making of the world is not properly ascribed to him, though he be the original fountain of all: according to that of Numenius,† Καὶ γὰρ οὔτε δημιουργεῖν ἐστι χρεὼν τὸν πρῶτον, καὶ τοῦ δημιουργοῦντος Θεοῦ (τοῦ υἱοῦ) χρὴ εἶναι, καὶ νομίζεσθαι πατέρα τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν, "Neither is it fit to attribute the architecture of the world to the first God, but rather to account him the father of that God who is the artificer." Who again speaks further to the same purpose thus: Τὸν μὲν πρῶτον Θεὸν ἀργὸν εἶναι ἔργων ξυμπάντων καὶ βασιλέα, "It is to be acknowledged, that the first God is void of all manner of work or action, he being the king of all things." Of the second, to whom the energy of intellection is attributed, it is said, notwithstanding, that his οὐσία is his ἐνέργεια, his "essence" his "operation;" and that he is ἀκίνητος οὐσία, though a "multiform," yet an "immoveable nature." He therefore is properly called the Demiurgus, as the contriving architect, or artificer, in whom the archetypal world is contained, and the first paradigm, or pattern of the whole universe. But the third is a kind of moveable deity: Τὸ περὶ νοῦν κινούμενον (as Plotinus speaks) καὶ νοῦ φῶς, καὶ ἴχνος ἐξηρτημένον ἐκείνου, "That, which moveth about Mind, or Intellect, the light or effulgency thereof, and its print, or signature, which always dependeth upon it, and acteth according to it." This is that which reduces both the fecundity of the first simple Good, and also the immoveable wisdom and architectonic contrivance of the second into act or energy. This is the immediate, and, as it were, manuary Opificer of the whole world, and τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν τοῦ παντὸς, "that which actually governs, rules, and presideth over all." Amelius, in that passage of his before cited out of Proclus, calling these three divine hypostases three Minds, and three Kings, styles the first of them, Τὸν ὄντα, "Him that is;" the second Τὸν ἔχοντα, "Him that hath;" and the third Τὸν ὁρῶντα, "Him that beholds." In which ex-

* Plotinus 494. [Ennead 5. lib. 2. cap. 1.

† Eusebius, Præp. Evan. lib. 2. cap. 18. [P. 537.]

pressions, though peculiar to himself, he denotes an essential dependence, and gradual subordination in them.

Now that which is most liable to exception, in this Platonic scale, or gradation of the Deity, seems to be the difference betwixt the first and the second. For whereas the essential character of the second is made to be understanding, reason, and wisdom, it seems to follow from hence, that either the first and the second are really nothing else but two different names, or inadequate conceptions of one and the same thing; or else, if they be distinct hypostases, or persons, that the first of them must needs be ἄνους and ἄλογος, "devoid of mind, reason," and "wisdom;" which would be very absurd. To which, all the reply we can make is as follows: first, that this is indeed one peculiar arcanum of the Platonic and Pythagoric theology (which yet seems to have been first derived from Orpheus and the Egyptians, or rather from the Hebrews themselves), that whereas the pagan theologers generally concluded, νοῦν πάντων προγενέστατον, "that Mind and Understanding, properly so called, was the oldest of all things," the highest principle and first original of the world; those others placed something above it, and consequently made it to be not the first, but the second. Which they did chiefly upon these three following grounds. First, because understanding, reason, knowledge, and wisdom, cannot be conceived, by us mortals, otherwise than so as to contain something of multiplicity in them; whereas it seems most reasonable to make the first principle of all, not to be number or multitude, but a perfect Monad, or Unity. Thus Plotinus:* Ἀόριστον μὲν νόησις ὥσπερ ὄψις, ὁριζομένη δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ· διὸ καὶ εἴρηται ἐκ τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς τὰ εἴδη καὶ οἱ ἀριθμοί· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ νοῦς, διὸ οὐχ ἁπλοῦς, ἀλλὰ πολλά, &c. "Intellection, as well as vision, is in its own nature an indefinite thing, and is determined by the intelligible: therefore it is said, that ideas, as numbers, are begotten from infinite duality and unity; and such is intellect, which consequently is not simple, but many, it contemplating many ideas; and being compounded of two, that which is understood, and that which understands." And again elsewhere:† Τὸ πρὸ τοῦ κόσμου νοητοῦ, οὔτε νοῦς ὄντε κόσμος νοητὸς, ἁπλούστερον δέ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ πολλοῦ πολὺ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πολὺ τοῦτο ἐξ οὐ πολλοῦ, &c. "The principle of every thing is more simple than the thing itself. Wherefore the sensible world was made from Intellect, or the Intelligible; and before this, must there needs be something more simple still. For many did not proceed from many; but this multiform thing Intellect proceeded from that which is not multiform, but simple, as number from unity." To this purpose does he also argue in

* P. 518. [Ennead 5. lib. 4. cap. 2.]
† P. 514. [Ennead 5. lib. 3. cap. 16.]

these words:* Εἰ τὸ νοοῦν τι πλῆθος, δεῖ ἐν τῷ μὴ πλήθει τὸ νοῦν μὴ εἶναι· ἦν δὲ τοῦτο τὸ πρῶτον· ἐν τοῖς ὑστέροις ἄρα αὐτοῦ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ νοῦς ἔσται, "If that which understands be many, or contain multitude in it, then that which contains no multitude, does not properly understand; and this is the first thing: but intellection and knowledge properly so called are to be placed among things which follow after it, and are second." And he often concludes: Ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ φύσει εἶναι τὸ γινώσκειν, "That knowledge (properly so called, by reason of its multiplicity) belongs to the second rank of being, and not the first."[1] Another ground or reason is, because, in order of nature, there must be Νοητὸν before Νοῦς, something "Intelligible" before "Intellect;" and from hence does Plotinus conclude:† Τὸ νοεῖν οὐ πρῶτον, οὔτε τῷ εἶναι, οὔτε τῷ τίμιον εἶναι· ἀλλὰ δεύτερον, καὶ γενόμενον, ἐπειδὴ ὑπέστη τὸ ἀγαθὸν· καὶ γενόμενον ἐκίνησε πρὸς αὐτό, &c. "That to understand is not the first, neither in essence, nor in dignity, but the second; a thing in order of nature, after the first Good, and springing up from thence, and that which is moved with desire towards it."[2] Their third and last ground of reason is, because intellection and knowledge are not the highest Good, that therefore there is some substantial thing, in order of nature superior to Intellect. Which consideration Plato much insisteth upon, in his sixth book De Republica. Now upon these several accounts do the Platonists confidently conclude:‡ Ὅτι Θεὸς κρείττων Λόγου καὶ νοῦ καὶ αἰσθήσεως, παρασχὼν ταῦτα, οὐκ αὐτὸς ὢν ταῦτα, "That the supreme Deity is more excellent and

* P. 535. [Ennead 5. lib. 6. cap. 3.]

[1] If the Platonists were induced to exclude all knowledge and science from the first person, on the ground that science, as consisting of many ideas, would appear to be incompatible with the dignity and perfection of the first person, they indeed consulted ill both for themselves and the Deity. For although they place science in the second person, and discard it from the first, still that second person was eternally generated from the first, and remains indissolubly connected with it. Consequently, if there is any fault, or rather imperfection, in science and knowledge, that will belong equally to the first person, from which the second proceeded and with which it is eternally associated, as it will to the second. But this opinion and reason ought probably to be classed among the subtleties of the Platonic school, which are so plentifully scattered through their books, and in which it is useless to look for any sense or meaning. For my part, indeed, I have by no means so high an estimation of my own powers as to believe myself capable of penetrating into these mysteries, and I leave it to others to consider whether it will be worth their while, or not, to exercise their sagacity in an attempt to unravel them.

† P. 536.

[2] Neither of this reason, owing probably to my own ignorance, am I able to comprehend the full force. There must be something *νοητὸν*, or *intelligible*, before *νοῦς*, or *intellect*: that is, I suppose, if intellect which reasons exists, there must necessarily have been something before intellect, which supplied it with matter to reason upon; therefore the first person of the divinity is without science or knowledge. Let others display their mental acumen in illustrating and explaining this logic: for myself, I am almost inclined to think that those Platonists, if any there were, who delighted in it, from their too great anxiety to appear more than ordinarily wise, had become more than ordinarily foolish.

‡ *Plotinus*, p. 512. [Ennead 5. lib. 3. cap. 14.]

better than the Λόγος (Reason, or the Word) Intellect and Sense, he affording these things, but not being these himself." And:* Τὸ γενόμενον ἐξ αὐτοῦ λόγος πολὺς καὶ πᾶς· τὸ δὲ ἦν δηλονότι οὐ Λόγος· πῶς οὖν ἐξ οὐ λόγου Λόγος· καὶ πῶς τὸ ἀγαθοειδὲς ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ, "That, which was generated from the first principle, was Logos (Word or Reason) manifold; but the first principle itself was not Word: if you demand therefore, how Word, or Reason, should proceed from that which is not Word or Reason? we answer, as that, which is boniform, from goodness itself." With which Platonic and Pythagoric doctrine exactly agreeth Philo the Jew also:[3] Ὁ πρὸ τοῦ Λόγου, Θεὸς κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἢ πᾶσα λογικὴ φύσις, τῷ δὲ ὑπερ τῶν πάντων ἐν τῇ βελτίστῃ καί τινι ἐξαιρέτῳ καθεστῶτι ἰδέᾳ, οὐδὲν θέμις ἦν γεννητὸν ἐξομοιωθῆναι, "That God which is before the Word or Reason, is better and more excellent than all the rational nature; neither is it fit that any thing, which is generated, should be perfectly like to that which is originally from itself and above all." And indeed, we should not have so much insisted upon this, had it not been by reason of a devout veneration that we have for all the scripture-mysteries; which scripture seem to give no small countenance to this doctrine, when it makes in like manner an eternal Word and Wisdom to be the second hypostasis of the divine Triad, and the first-begotten Son, or Offspring of God the Father. And Athanasius, as was before observed, very much complieth here also with the Platonic notion, when he denies that there was any λόγος or σοφία, any "Reason" or "Wisdom," before that Word and Son of God which is the second hypostasis of the Holy Trinity. What then, shall we say that the first hypostasis, or person in the Platonic trinity (if not the Christian also) is ἄνους and ἄλογος, "senseless" and "irrational," and altogether devoid of mind and understanding? Or would not this be to introduce a certain kind of mysterious atheism; and under pretence of magnifying and advancing the supreme Deity, monstrously to degrade the same? For why might not senseless matter as well be supposed to be the first original of all things as a senseless, incorporeal being? Plotinus therefore, who rigidly and superstitiously adheres to Plato's text here, which makes the first and highest principle of all to be such a being as, by reason of its absolute and transcendent perfection, is not only above understanding, knowledge, and reason, but also above essence itself (which therefore he can find no other names for, but only Unity and

* P. 514. [Cap. 16.]

[3] This passage of Philo is extracted from his unpublished first book of Questions and Solutions, by Eusebius, Præparat. Evangel. lib. 7. cap. 13. p. 323. It is quoted here, however, incorrectly; for in Eusebius the reading is, not ὑπὲρ τῶν πάντων, but ὑπὲρ τὸν λόγον.

Goodness substantial), and consequently, knowledge and wisdom to be but a second, or postnate thing, though eternal; but notwithstanding, does seem to labour under this metaphysical profundity; he sometimes endeavours to solve the difficulty thereof after this manner, by distinguishing of a double light; the one simple and uniform, the other multiform, or manifold; and attributing the former of these to the supreme Deity only (whose simple original light he resembles to the luminous body of the sun itself), the latter of them to the second hypostasis, as being the ἔκλαμψις or ἀπαύγασμα, the "circumambient fulgor," or "outshining splendour" of that sun. Thus Ennead 5. lib. 6. cap. 4, Τὸ *παρέχον τοῦτο τὸ φῶς, φῶς ἐστιν ἁπλοῦν*, "That from which this multiform light of Νοῦς or Intellect (the second hypostasis) is derived, is *φῶς ἁπλοῦν*, another most simple light." As he elsewhere accordingly writeth of the first principle, or supreme Deity, that it is *ἐν νοήσει ἑτέρως ἢ κατὰ τὴν νοῦ νόησιν*, "in knowledge or understanding, but of a different kind from that understanding of the second hypostasis, called Intellect." Sometimes again, this philosopher subtilly distinguisheth betwixt *νοήσις αὐτὴ*, "intelligence itself," and *τὸ νοοῦν* or *τὸ ἔχον τὴν νόησιν*, "That which doth understand," or "which hath intelligence in it;" making the first principle to be the former of these two, and the second hypostasis of their trinity to be the latter:* Οὐδ' *ἡ νόησις νοεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔχον τὴν νόησιν· δύο οὖν πάλιν αὖ, ἐν τῷ νοοῦντι γίνεται· τοῦτο δὴ οὐδαμὴ δύο*, "Intelligence itself doth not understand, but that which hath intelligence. For in that which doth understand there is a kind of duplicity. But the first principle of all hath no duplicity in it." Now that duplicity, which he fancies to be in that which hath intelligence, is either the duplicity of him that hath this intelligence, and of the intelligence itself, as being not the same; or else of him, and the *τὸ νοητὸν*, "the intelligible," or "object of his intellection;" intellect supposing an intelligible in order of nature before it. And from this subtilty would he infer, that there is a certain kind of imperfection and indigence in that which doth understand, or hath intelligence: Ἐνδεὲς *τὸ νοοῦν, ὥσπερ τὸ ὁρῶν*, "That which understandeth is indigent as that which seeth." But perhaps this difficulty might be more easily solved, and that according to the tenor of the Platonic hyposthesis too, by supposing the abatement of their second hypostasis to consist only in this, that it is not essentially Τ' *ἀγαθὸν*, "Goodness itself," but only *ἀγαθοειδὴς*, "boniform," or "good by participation;" it being essentially no higher than Νοῦς, Λόγος, and Σοφία, "Mind, Reason," and "Wisdom;" for which cause it is called by those names, as the proper charac-

* P. 537.

eristic thereof. Not as if the first were devoid of wisdom, nder pretence of being above it; but because this second is not ssentially any thing higher. As in like manner, the third ypostasis is not essentially wisdom itself, standing or quiescent, nd without motion or action; but wisdom as in motion, or isdom moving and acting.[4]

The chief ground of this Platonick doctrine of an essential ependence, and therefore gradual subordination, in their trinity f divine hypostases, is from that fundamental principle of their heology, that there is but one Original of all things, and μία ηγὴ τῆς θεότητος, "only one Fountain of the Godhead;" from vhence all other things whatsoever, whether temporal or eternal, reated or uncreated, were altogether derived. And therefore his second hypostasis of their trinity, since it must accordingly lerive its whole being from the first, as the ἀπαύγασμα from the φῶς, "the splendour" from the "original light," must of necessity have also an essential dependence upon the same; and consequently, a gradual subordination to it.

For though they commonly affirm their second hypostasis to have been begotten from their first, and their third from their second, yet do they by no means understand thereby any such generation as that of men; where the father, son and grandson,

[4] We here have a specimen of the peculiar talent of the school denominated Platonic. Transported at first by a sort of fanatical fury, they dash boldly into imaginary realms, livide and dissect with incredible subtlety the most simple notions of mind, nay subject Deity itself to their intellectual scrutiny, and examine it in all its parts. But as oon as they come to their senses, and find they have laid snares for themselves, they orthwith have recourse to subtle distinctions and similitudes; in which, however, if ard pressed, they again stick fast, so as to be unable to recede. At first they nost gravely decide: The first hypostasis has neither knowledge, nor intellect, nor hought. Any one who says to the contrary will be set down as injurious to God. Most acute and imperious truly! But should any one ask: Say you so? Is the Deity devoid of reason and intellect? You will then see these notable philosophers ooking about them for a hiding-place. If they can do nothing else, they throw at him heap of words of which they themselves know not the meaning; and should he not e satisfied with these, he is in danger of being sent to the Acusmatics, and condemned o five years' silence, till he learns to be as mad as his masters. I frankly confess I m too dull of comprehension to be able to see the force of all that is here brought orward from the Platonists on a god without intellect and the causes of this dogma. would attempt something notwithstanding, and task my reason to the utmost, in rder to gain some insight into these mysteries, did I not perceive that the efforts of thers far superior to myself have been attended with any thing but success. But utting others out of the question, Dr. Cudworth is here fighting against himself, and n his anxiety to give support to the Platonists deserts his own cause. Certainly the ourse adopted by him to show that Plotinus did not teach a perfect absurdity when e made the first principle to be above reason and wisdom, seems to me almost to be nore intricate than the dogma itself: nor can I understand what he means, when he ays that the first principle is not devoid of wisdom because of being above it, but ecause the second person is not essentially any thing higher and more excellent. But have already touched upon this opinion of the Platonic sect, and argued it to be a roof that the Triad of Plotinus is not a trinity of persons, but of notions only: I have hown also that the opinion of Athanasius is by no means to be confounded with it. I still adhere to the same sentiments, nor shall abandon them till convinced to the ontrary by more powerful arguments than those adduced here by the learned Doctor.

when adulti at least, have no essential dependence one upon another, nor gradual subordination in their nature, but are all perfectly co-equal, and alike absolute. Because this is but an imperfect generation, where that, which is begotten, doth not receive its whole being originally from that which did beget, but from God and nature; the begetter being but either a channel or an instrument, and having been himself before begotten or produced by some other. Whereas the first divine hypostasis is altogether unbegotten from any other, he being the sole principle and original of all things, and therefore must the second needs derive its whole essence from him, and be generated after another manner, namely, in a way of natural emanation, as light is from the sun; and consequently, though co-eternal, have an essential dependence on him, and gradual subordination to him.

Moreover, the Platonists would recommend this their gradation in the Deity, or trinity of hypostasis subordinate, from hence; because by this means there will not be so vast a chasm and hiatus betwixt God and the highest creatures, or so great a leap and jump in the creation, as otherwise there must needs be. Nor will the whole Deity be screwed up in such a disproportionate height and elevation, as would render it altogether uncapable of having any intercourse or commerce with the lower world; it being, according to this hypothesis of theirs, brought down by certain steps and degrees nearer and nearer to us. For if the whole Deity were nothing but one simple monad, devoid of all manner of multiplicity, as God is frequently represented to be; then could it not well be conceived by us mortals, how it should contain the distinct ideas of all things within itself, and that multiform platform and paradigm of the created universe, commonly called the archetypal world. Again, were the Deity only an immoveable mind, as Aristotle's God is ἀκίνητος οὐσία, "an absolutely immoveable substance," whose essence and operation are one and the same; and, as other theologers affirm, that "whatsoever is in God, is God;" it would be likewise utterly unconceiveable, not only, how there should be any liberty of will at all in God (whereas the same theologers, contradicting themselves, zealously contend notwithstanding, that all the actions of the Deity are not necessary, and but few of them such), but also how the Deity should have any commerce or intercourse with the lower world; how it should quicken and actuate the whole, be sensible of all the motions in it, and act pro re natâ accordingly; all which the instincts and common notions of mankind urge upon them. Neither can they be denied, without rasing the very foundations of all religion, since it would be to no more purpose, for men to make their devotional addresses to such an immoveable, inflexible, and unaffectible Deity, than to a senseless adamantine rock. But these difficulties (as the Platonists pre-

tend) are all removed by that third hypostasis in their trinity; which is a kind of moveable deity. And thus are all the phenomena of the Deity, or the different common notions in the minds of men concerning it, though seemingly repugnant and clashing with one another, yet, in their opinion, fairly reconciled and solved by this trinity of divine hypostases subordinate.[5]

Lastly, they pretend also, that according to this hypothesis of theirs, there may be some reasonable satisfaction given to the mind of man, both why there are so many divine hypostases, and why there could be no more; whereas according to other ways, it would seem to have been a mere arbitrary business; and that there might have been either but one solitary divine hypostasis, or but a duality of them; or else they might have been beyond a trinity, numberless.

The second thing which we shall observe concerning the most genuine Platonical and Parmenidian trinity is this: that though these philosophers sometimes called their three divine hypostases, not only τρεῖς φύσεις, "three natures," and "three principles," and "three causes," and "three opificers," but also "three gods," and a first, and second, and third god; yet did they often, for all that, suppose all these three to be really one Θεῖον, one "Divinity," or "Numen." It hath been already proved from Origen and others, that the Platonists most commonly called the animated world the "second God," though some of them, as for example Numenius, styled it the "third God." Now those of them who called the world the second God, attributed

[5] The Platonists I know are accustomed to reason in the way the learned Doctor here represents them. For they seem indeed to have invented such a host of demons, ideas, gods, and genii, for scarcely any other purpose than to fill up the vast and immense chasm intervening between God and matter, and to form a sort of ladder, as it were, by means of which mankind might be able to reach the supreme Deity. But even this is evidence that the sect was imbued with a most perverse notion of God, and therefore forms no recommendation of their doctrine of a disparity of the three hypostases. They who believe God to be omnipresent and infinite, as all must do who obey right reason, although they may not fully comprehend the full force of these words, have no need of steps or ladders by which to ascend to the Deity, and can well dispense with the whole tribe of Platonic demons and genii. The Platonists' great solicitude, therefore, about the means by which they might connect and associate the Deity with nature and created things, is a proof that they supposed God to be a definite nature, circumscribed by certain limits and holding as it were an exalted position; which opinion, indeed, is altogether derogatory to the divine glory and majesty. But their doctrine of the perpetual emanation of all things from God did not permit them to think otherwise; for those who maintain it, if they wish to be consistent, must necessarily place God in one extreme as it were of the universe, and devise orders and gradations of beings, by means of which he is to be reached. As to the difficulties which the Platonists fancy cannot otherwise be removed than by supposing the three persons of the godhead to be similar, they vanish at once if we assume one thing of which no one can entertain a question: That God and things pertaining to God are not to be measured according to the standard of human things, or the strength and extent of our own intelligence. Besides, if this doctrine removes perhaps one difficulty, still so many new doubts and questions arise from it, that it is better to reject the remedy altogether and confess one's own mental incapacity to comprehend divine things, than to pass off unmeaning words for arguments.

indeed (not more, but) less divinity to it, than those who would have it to be the third God. Because these latter supposed that soul of the world to be the third hypostasis of their trinity; but the other taking all these three divine hypostases together, for one supreme and first God, called the world the second God; they supposing the soul thereof to be another soul inferior to that first Psyche, which was properly their third hypostasis. Wherefore this was really all one, as if they should have called the animated world the fourth God; only by that other way of reckoning, when they called it a second God, they intimated, that though those three divine hypostases were frequently called three gods, yet were they notwithstanding, really all but one θεῖον, "Divinity," or "Numen;" or, as Plotinus speaks, τὸ ἐν τῷ παντὶ θεῖον, "the divinity which is in the whole world." Thus when God is so often spoken of in Plato singularly, the word is not always to be understood of the first hypostasis only, or the Tagathon, but many times plainly of the πρῶτον, and δεύτερον, and τρίτον, the "first," and "second," and "third" altogether; or that whole divinity, which consisteth or is made up of these three hypostases. And this will further appear from hence, because when the whole world is said in Plato to be the image of the eternal gods, as also by Plotinus, of the first, second, and third, by whom it is always produced anew, as the image in a glass is; this is not to be understood, as if the world being tripartite, each third part thereof was severally produced or created by one of those three; nor yet can it be conceived how there could be three really distinct creations of one and the same thing. Wherefore the world having but one creation, and being created by those three divine hypostases, it follows, that they are all three really but one Creator and one God. Thus when, both in Plato and Plotinus, the lives and souls of all animals (as stars, demons, and men), are attributed to the third hypostasis, the first and great Psyche, as their fountain and cause after a special manner; accordingly as in our creed, the Holy Ghost is styled "the Lord and giver of Life;" this is not so to be understood, as if therefore the first and second hypostases were to be excluded from having any causality therein. For the first is styled by Plato also, αἴτιον ἁπάντων τῶν καλῶν, "the cause of all good things;" and therefore doubtless chiefly of souls: and the second is called by him and others too, αἴτιον and δημιουργὸς, "the cause and artificer of the whole world." We conclude therefore, that souls being created by the joint concurrence and influence of these three hypostases subordinate, they are really but one and the same God. And thus it is expressly affirmed by Porphyrius in St. Cyril:[6] Ἄχρι τριῶν ὑπο-

[6] Histor. Philosoph. lib. 4. apud Cyrillum contra Julianum, lib. 8. p. 271.

στάσεων τὴν θείου προελθεῖν οὐσίαν· εἶναι δὲ τὸνμ ἐν ἀνωτάτω θεὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν, μετ' αὐτὸν δὲ καὶ δεύτερον, τὸν δημιουργόν· τρίτην δὲ καὶ τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχήν· ἄχρι γὰρ ψυχῆς τὴν θεότητα προελθεῖν, "That the essence of the divinity proceeds or propagates itself (by way of descent downwards) unto three hypostases or subsistences. The highest God is the Tagathon, or supreme Good; the second next after him is the Demiurgus so called, the architect or artificer of the world; and the soul of the world, that is the third: for the divinity extendeth so far as to this soul." Here we plainly see, that though Porphyrius calls the three divine hypostases three gods, yet does he at the very same time declare, that ἡ θείου οὐσία and θεότης, "the essence of the Godhead" and "the Divinity" extends itself to all these three hypostases, including the third and last also (which they call the "mundane soul"), within the compass of it. And therefore that even according to the Porphyrian theology itself, which could not be suspected to affect any compliance with Christianity) the three hypostases in the Platonic trinity are ὁμοούσιον, "co-essential," both as being each of them God, and as being all one God. St. Cyril himself also acknowledging as much, where he writeth thus of the Platonists: Τρεῖς ἀρχικὰς ὑποστάσεις ὑποτιθέμενοι καὶ αὐτοὶ, καὶ μέχρι τριῶν ὑποστάσεων τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ προσήκειν ἰσχυρισάμενοι, "That supposing three hypostases, which have the nature of principles (in the universe), they extend the essence of God to all these three hypostases.[7]

[7] To serve his own cause the learned Doctor here imagines not a few things of which it will be necessary to expose the fallacy, lest the authority of so great a man should lead others into error. I. What he states about those who called the world the second or third God, is neither more nor less than a downright fiction, and incapable of being supported by authority or argument. He supposes those who called the world the second God to have comprehended all the three persons under the name of the first God, and to have afterwards subjected the world, or the inferior soul of the world, to this trinity. To invent these and many other things of the kind is an easy task; but to establish and prove them by sufficient evidence and authorities, without which no wise man will admit them, is an affair of no ordinary difficulty. Those who called the world the second God, beyond all question imitated the example of Plato, who styles it so in his Timæus, cap. 18. p. 241. The same had been already done before Plato by Timæus Locrus, De Anima Mundi, p. 546. in Th. Gale's Scriptor. Mythologic. If I show, therefore, from the Timæus itself, that Plato had not the least idea of what is here attributed to those by whom the world was termed the second God, there is no one, I suppose, who will not reject the conjecture of Dr. Cudworth. If the world is called the second God by Plato, in order to distinguish it from the three principal hypostases, we are consequently to suppose the maker and opificer of the world, of which Plato discourses at large in the Timæus, to be the entire divinity, consisting of three persons. And so indeed thinks Dr. Cudworth. But we have already demonstrated above in our observations on the opinion of the later Platonists respecting a two-fold soul of the world, that it is impossible to come to any such conclusion. I shall show this somewhat more at length. All persons conversant with Platonic matters will readily grant, that the eternal forms or ideas of things in which the divine Plato so much delighted, were not placed either by him or his disciples in the first person but in the second, which they call reason or the word, and supposed to have contained the νοητὸς world from eternity. Wherefore if it can be shown from the Timæus that Plato openly separated these forms or ideas from the opificer of the world,

Indeed many conceive, that the Platonists making the three hypostases of their trinity to be thus gradually subordinate one to another, could not, for that very reason, acknowledge them to

this also will be evident that this opificer is not the entire divinity consisting of three persons. But what I have stated is so clear from the Timæus that nothing can be more so. After speaking of God's design of creating the world, he forthwith declares it to be impossible but that the Deity must have had before his eyes as it were a certain model, according to which as a pattern he created it. He therefore inquires what sort of model this is, and concludes a certain νοητὸν world to have existed from all eternity, which the Deity kept in view in constructing this visible universe. See cap. 8. p. 236. where among other things he says as follows: Τούτων δὲ ὑπαρχόντων δὴ, καὶ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τόνδε τὸν κόσμον εἰκόνα τινὸς εἶναι, "From which it necessarily follows that this world is an image of something." Add cap. 15. p. 238. The Platonists have here an option, whether they choose to assert that this eternal model which the divine architect expressed in creating the world does not differ from God, or that it is distinct and separate from him. If they prefer the former, there is an end of the Platonic trinity; for the second hypostasis will be the same as the first, nor will the eternal models of things be separated from God himself except in thought. For my own part I incline to this opinion, as I have already declared above; but neither Dr. Cudworth, nor a great portion of the Platonists, concur with me; as they both maintain Plato to have placed three separate principles over the universe of things. Let us suppose this model, therefore, to be in reality different from the Creator: but even so it will be manifest that Plato's demiurgus is not a triune God, but only the principal person of the Triad, who, when about to construct the world, placed before his eyes the eternal forms of things stored up in the second person. He who attentively examines either the Timæus, or what we have remarked above against a two-fold soul of the world, will easily collect much more in refutation of this opinion, which has been a frequent cause of error to the readers of Plato.

The true reason that led some of the Platonists to call this world the *second* and others the *third* God, will not readily strike any one, unless he first make up his mind to pay no attention to the later Platonists, in a question regarding the meaning and opinion of Plato. Plato, though abounding in subtleness, the meaning of which he probably was himself unacquainted with, never went so far, however, as either to suppose the creation of this world to be a thing unworthy of God, and foreign to his supreme simplicity, or to discard wisdom from his nature; on the contrary, he not only openly ascribed the whole of this office to the supreme Being, but declared it to have been performed with incredible wisdom. And imagining that so great a work was not accomplished without some exemplar or model, he joined to the principal Deity a νοητὸν, or "intelligible" world, by inspecting which, as it were, he supposed him to have constructed the universe. I shall not at present inquire, whether he placed this world compounded of the eternal forms of things, out of the divine nature, or within God himself; it is clear, however, both from the Timæus and other places, that the opinion of the junior Platonists, who placed the *model world* in the second person of the divinity, or in a certain second God, never once entered the mind of Plato himself. He knew, therefore, of no other principal God besides the maker and architect of the world, and him too as transcendently wise; consequently, since he supposed that the world, on account of the divine soul which he assigned to it, was also to be called God, he could not but call this the second God. At any rate, to show in Plato's Timæus those three notable hypostases of the junior Platonists, would be just as easy as to elicit from the same dialogue the three principles of chemists, salts, sulphur and mercury. But this sect arrogated to themselves much greater sagacity than their master, and as is evident from Plotinus' De Tribus Hypostatibus, and Proclus' Theologia Platonica, hurried away by the zeal of contemplation, imagined a first principle so sublime, pure, simple, and clear as to reduce it almost to nothing, representing it as not only destitute of motion but even of all knowledge. Having adopted this opinion and abandoned the footsteps of Plato, it was natural for them also to remove from it the office of making the world, which required both knowledge and motion. They then concocted a far different notion of the creation. Seeing that they held the world to be eternal, when they speak of its fabrication they are not thinking of a creation like that of the Christians, a production of matter out of nothing, or like that of Plato, an apt and artificial disposition

be one divinity: but the Platonists themselves do upon this very account, and no other, declare all these three to be one divinity, because they have an essential dependence and gradual subor-

of eternal but rude and undigested matter; with them creation is nothing but the production from all eternity of those motions without which this fabric cannot be kept together, and the perfecting of the various generations of animals and things. Wherefore the office of that which this sect calls the opificer, or δημιουργὸς, consists in perpetually agitating matter, in discharging in it the functions of father, in short, in imparting life to all living and animate things. Moreover, as they had deprived the principal God of all knowledge, all thought, and all forms or ideas of things, it was necessary to imagine another divine person or nature, which should occupy the next place from the supreme God, and be the seat and residence of all knowledge, wisdom, and science. And this second and new God prevented them from leaving the appellation of *second God* to the world, as Plato had done; consequently they called this, or rather its soul, the third God. As many therefore as adhere more closely to Plato, and do not scruple to rank wisdom and reason among the most excellent virtues of the supreme Deity, dignify the world by the name of *second God*. While with those who with no ordinary acumen disconnect eternal wisdom and reason from the most high God, and ascribe the power of agitating the world and generating all things to the soul of the world, it is styled the *third God*.

II. That the three principles of the Platonists make up one God, or in a certain way constitute one divine essence, I should be willing to admit; and yet those who consider that Porphyry, and other leaders of the Platonic sect, accommodated in many instances their words and dogmas to the spirit and standard of Christian wisdom, are in my opinion not so foolish and absurd as the learned Doctor supposes. As to his arguing, that according to the sense of the Platonists the world and souls were the joint creation of those three divine persons, I have the gravest reasons for considering this not to be the case. He first appeals to Plato, as asserting this world to be the *image of the eternal gods*. But putting aside that *to be created by any one* and *to be the image of any thing* are two very different things, I have already made it appear, if I mistake not, by cogent arguments, that the ἀΐδιοι θεοὶ of Plato, according to whose image he tells us the world was created, are the eternal forms or ideas of things, and not the three hypostases. Where Plotinus has left on record what Dr. Cudworth adds, that the world is not only an image of all the three persons, but is also perpetually created by them, I leave to others to discover. For my own part, I am afraid the learned Doctor has interpreted this philosopher's words according to his own sense, and has attached a foreign meaning to them. Probably in writing this he had in his mind Plotinus' Book on the question: Utrum Stellæ aliquid agant? Ennead 2. lib. 3. at the close of which, cap. 18. p. 148, the philosopher says something of the three artificers of the world. But whoever supposes these three artificers to be the three divine persons, manifestly mistakes the meaning of Plotinus, as he is there speaking, according to the faulty but yet usual practice of his sect, of three notions of one soul of the world, as if they were three persons. Indeed, the whole nature and tenor of the Platonic philosophy will scarcely allow me to believe that there was any one in that sect who ascribed the power of creating and generating to the three persons together. The nature which these philosophers call creator, or δημιουργὸς, proceeds with a pure and constant motion, and being equably diffused through all parts of the universe excites, generates, and animates the whole of nature. Plotinus, Ennead 8. lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 482. &c. Ψυχὴ μὲν ζῶα ἐποίησε πάντα, ἐμπνεύσασα αὐτοῖς ζωήν . . . . . αὕτη δὲ τὸν μέγαν τοῦτον οὐρανὸν καὶ αὐτὴ ἐκόσμησεν· αὐτὴ δὲ ἐν τάξει περιάγει, κ. τ. λ. "The soul made all animals and breathed life into them. The soul adorned this vast heaven, and perpetually carries it round in order." On the other hand, the first God is, according to their account, entirely devoid of all motion, and endowed with such simplicity and repose as cannot be comprehended by the human intellect. Most of this sect in like manner determine the second person to be altogether destitute of motion; which for this reason they sometimes denominate σοφίαν ἀκίνητον, or "immoveable wisdom," or else κύκλον ἀκίνητον. See Plotinus, De Dubiis Animæ, lib. 2. cap. 16. Ennead 4. lib. 4. p. 409. Consequently, as they make all motion to be absent from the two former principles, and conceive that which they term creation to be a work necessarily requiring motion, I consider it to be evi-

dination in them; the second being but the image of the first, and the third the image both of the first and second. Whereas, were these three supposed to be perfectly co-equal, and to have no essential dependence one upon another, they could not by these Platonists be concluded to be any other than three co-ordinate gods, having only a generical or specifical identity; and so no more one, than three men are one man: a thing which the Platonic theology is utterly abhorrent from, as that which is inconsistent with the perfect monarchy of the universe, and highly derogatory from the honour of the supreme God and first cause. For example, should three suns appear in the heaven all at once, with co-equal splendour, and not only so, but also be concluded, that though at first derived (or lighted and kindled) from one, yet they were now all alike absolute and independent; these three could not so well be thought to be one sun, as three that should appear gradually differing in their splendour, two of them being but the Parhelii of the other, and essentially depending on it; forasmuch as the second would be but the reflected image of the first, and the third but the second refracted. At least those three co-equal suns could not so well be thought to be one thing, as the sun, and its first and secondary splendour (which can neither be beheld without the sun, nor the sun without them) might be accounted one and the same thing.[1]

The Platonists, therefore, first of all suppose such a close and near conjunction betwixt the three hypostases of their trinity, as is nowhere else to be found in the whole world.* To this purpose Plotinus: Ὁρᾷ δὲ αὐτὸν, οὐ χωρισθεὶς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μετ' αὐτὸν καὶ μεταξὺ οὐδέν· ὡς οὐδὲ ψυχῆς καὶ νοῦ· ποθεῖ δὲ πᾶν τὸ γεννῆσαν καὶ τοῦτο ἀγαπᾷ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ὦσι μόνα τὸ γεννῆσαν καὶ τὸ γεγεννημένον· ὅταν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄριστον ᾖ τὸ γεννῆσαν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης σύνεστιν αὐτῷ, ὡς τῇ ἑτερότητι μόνον κεχωρίσθαι, "Intellect is said to behold the first good; not as if it were separated from it, but only because it is after it, but so as that there is nothing between them; as neither is there betwixt intellect and soul. Every thing which is begotten desires and loves that which begat it, especially when these two (that which begat and

dent that the Platonists could not, consistently with the laws of their philosophy, hold the work of creation to be common to the three persons. Compare what we have remarked above on the controversies of the Platonists respecting the demiurgus of the world.

[1] The learned Doctor here too openly betrays his partiality for the opinions of those who maintain the three persons of the divinity to be different in order and degree, or as we say at the present day, inculcate a *subordination* in the Trinity. And the similitudes by which he attempts to illustrate this matter, if somewhat closely examined, are of such a nature as to verge too closely upon Sabellianism. So difficult is it, without risking offence, to compare an abstruse and incomprehensible dogma with sensible things. In what follows, also, there are some things not altogether faultless, and savouring of the Sabellian rather than the Nicene school.

* Ennead 5. lib. 1. cap. 6. [P. 488.]

that which is begotten) are alone, and nothing besides them. Moreover, when that which begot is absolutely the best thing, that which is immediately begotten from it, must needs cohere intimately with it, and so as to be separated from it only by alterity." Which is all one as if he should have said, that these three divine hypostases are so intimately conjoined together, and united with one another, as that they are tantum non, "only not," the very self same. Again, the Platonists further declare, that these three hypostases of their trinity are ἀδιαίρετοι, "absolutely indivisible" and inseparable, as the ἀπαύγασμα is ἀδιαίρετον from the φῶς, "the splendour indivisibly conjoined with the light," or "sun." Which similitude also Athanasius often makes use of to the same purpose. Thirdly, these Platonists seem likewise to attribute to their three divine hypostases just such an ἐμπεριχώρησις, "circuminsession," or mutual in-being, as Christians do. For as their second and third hypostases must needs be in the first, they being therein virtually contained; so must the first likewise be in the second and third; they being as it were but two other editions thereof; or itself gradually displayed and expanded. But to speak particularly, the first must needs be in the second, the Tagathon in the Nous; and so both of them really one and the same God; because the common notions of all mankind attribute understanding and wisdom to the Deity; but according to the principles of Plato, Plotinus, and others, the Deity does not properly understand any where but in the second hypostasis, which is the Mind and Wisdom of it. And the Emperichoresis of the second or third hypostasis, was thus intimated by Plato also:* Σοφία μὲν καὶ Νοῦς ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄν ποτε γενοίσθην. Οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἑρεῖς φύσει βασιλικὴν μὲν ψυχὴν, βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν ἐγγίγνεσθαι. Where having spoken of that divine Wisdom and Mind which orders all things in the world, he adds: "But Wisdom and Mind can never be without soul (that is, cannot act without it): wherefore, in the nature of Jupiter, is at once contained both a kingly Mind and a kingly Soul. Here he makes Jupiter to be both the second and third hypostases of his trinity, Nous and Psyche; and consequently those two to be but one God. Which Nous is also said to be both the γενούστης, i. e. "of the same kind," and co-essential with the first cause of all things. To conclude: as that first Platonic hypostasis, which is itself said to be above Mind and Wisdom, is properly wise and understanding in the second; so do both the first and the second move and act in the third.[2] Lastly, all these three hypostases, Tagathon, Nous, and

* Phileb. p. 30. [P. 80.]

[2] In expounding this passage of Plato the learned Doctor is not free from error, as will be manifest to any one from what we have stated at large above respecting the meaning of the word νοῦς in the Philebus. In the first place he tells us, these words

Psyche, are said by the Platonists to be one Θεῖον, or "Divinity;" just in the same manner as the centre, immoveable distance, and moveable circumference of a sphere, or globe, are all essentially one sphere. Thus Plotinus expressly, writing of the third hypostasis, or Psyche:* Σεμνὸν γάρ τι καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ τοιαύτη, οἷον κύκλος προσαρμόττων κέντρῳ, εὐθὺς μετὰ κέντρον αὐξηθείς, διάστημα ἀδιάστατον· οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει ἕκαστα, εἰ τἀγαθόν τις καὶ τὸ κέντρον τάξειε, τὸν νοῦν κατὰ κύκλον ἀκίνητον, ψυχὴν δὲ κατὰ κύκλον κινούμενον ἂν τάξειε, "For this Psyche, or third hypostasis, is a venerable and adorable thing also; it being the circle fitted to the centre, an indistant distance (forasmuch as it is no corporeal thing). For these things are just so, as if one should make the Tagathon, or first Good, to be the centre of the universe; in the next place, Mind, or Intellect, to be the immoveable circle, or distance; and lastly, Soul to be that, which turns round, or the whole moveable circumference; acted by love, or desire." These three Platonic hypostases therefore, seem to be really nothing else but infinite Goodness, infinite Wisdom, and infinite active Love and Power, not as mere qualities or accidents, but as substantial things, that have some kind of subordination one to another; all concurring together to make up one

of Plato show Jupiter to be the second and third person of the Platonic Triad: which any one who merely looks at the words wil perceive to be far from the case. For Plato neither affirms Jupiter to be νοῦς and ψυχή, nor νοῦς and ψυχὴ to be in Jupiter. Were this passage to be understood of the three hypostases, Jupiter no doubt would be the first person, νοῦς which is said to be in Jupiter the second, and lastly ψυχὴ the third. But I perceive the reason why Dr. Cudworth interprets the passage in this manner. He had before expounded a passage from Plato's Cratylus, p. 262. wherein Jupiter is called the offspring of a certain great intelligence, so as to make Jupiter the soul of the world. On which account, if he had here acknowledged Ζεὺς or Jupiter to be the first person of the Triad, he would have weakened the interpretation given by himself of the passage of the Cratylus, and would have afforded sufficient ground for complaint to others that every thing in Plato is uncertain. In the next place, he assumes it as certain and unquestionable that νοῦς and ψυχὴ in this passage are not only persons but divine persons. But as to the word νοῦς, we have already shown it to have the same meaning in the Philebus as σοφία, ἐπιστήμη, and φρόνησις, and therefore to be the designation not of a person but of a virtue and quality. And this is proved to be the case even from this very passage now under consideration, in which the names νοῦς and σοφία are combined. Nor ought we in my opinion to decide differently respecting the word ψυχή. Persons accustomed to Plato's diction are aware that he applied the term νοῦς to that power, or if you will, that part of the mind which reasons and concludes, and ψυχὴ to that part in which resides life and the power of motion. And as he supposes this twofold part of the mind, or as others have it twofold soul, to cohere most intimately together, and to be altogether incapable of separation: consequently he sometimes mingles and confounds these two words, frequently using νοῦς in so wide a sense as at the same time to include in it the notion of ψυχὴ; and reversely employing ψυχὴ so as to signify νοῦς at the same time. Which he does even in this very dialogue. And such being the case, there is no reason why we should understand the ψυχὴ which that philosopher states to be in Jupiter, of a certain divine person. On the contrary, the following will be the plain and simple sense of the whole passage, and such as is demanded also by the context: In the supreme Deity reside not only wisdom and prudence, but also life and the power of effecting, moving and inciting.

* P. 409. [Ennead 4. lib. 4. cap. 16.

θεῖον, or "Divinity," just as the centre, immoveable distance, and moveable circumference, concurrently make up one sphere.

We have now given a full account of the true and genuine Platonic and Parmenidian or Pythagoric trinity;[3] from which it may clearly appear, how far it either agreeth or disagreeth with the Christian. First therefore, though some of the latter Platonists have partly misunderstood, and partly adulterated that ancient Cabala of the Trinity, as was before declared, confounding therein the differences between God and the creature, and thereby laying a foundation for infinite polytheism; yet did Plato himself, and some of his genuine followers (though living before Christianity) approach so near to the doctrine thereof, as in some manner to correspond therewith, in those three fundamentals before mentioned. First, in not making a mere trinity of names and words, or of logical notions and inadequate conceptions of one and the same thing; but a trinity of hypostases, or subsistences, or persons. Secondly, in making none of their three hypostases to be creatures, but all eternal, necessarily existent and universal; infinite, omnipotent, and creators of the whole world: which is all one, in the sense of the ancients, as if they should have affirmed them to be Homoousian. Lastly, in supposing these three divine hypostases, however sometimes paganically called three gods, to be essentially one divinity. From whence it may be concluded, that as Arianism is commonly supposed to approach nearer to the truth of Christianity than Plotinianism, so is Platonism undoubtedly more agreeable thereunto than Arianism; it being a certain middle thing betwixt that and Sabellianism, which in general was that mark that the Nicene council also aimed at.

Notwithstanding which, there is a manifest disagreement also betwixt the Platonic Trinity, as declared, and the now received doctrine in the Christian church; consisting in a different expli-

[3] The whole of this disputation, however, is made up chiefly of the sayings and decrees of Plotinus: and will it be possible to learn the true and genuine Platonic, Parmenidian, and Pythagorean doctrine of the trinity from such a writer? Not even Dr. Cudworth himself would say so, who so often confesses that the junior Platonists, of whom Plotinus was unquestionably the leader, vitiated the pure doctrine of Plato respecting the Trinity, and disfigured the truth handed down to him from Moses with their own ridiculous conceits. But taking away Plotinus' authority from this demonstration, how are we to know that he has so far been explaining the true doctrine of Plato and Pythagoras? But should he perchance except Plotinus from the number of those Platonists whom he owns to have contaminated the genuine dogmas of Plato, I should wish to learn by what marks we are to distinguish between those who follow and those who forsake Plato, and what proof there is that Plotinus did not tamper with the precepts of his master. To me, at least, on accurately comparing Plato's Timæus and Plotinus' book De Tribus Principiis Archicis with each other, there appears so great a difference between the doctrines of the two as probably never existed between those of Aristotle and Plato. For specimens of which consult what we have above brought forward respecting the double soul attributed by Plotinus to the world, and the causes why some Platonists, including Plotinus, called the world the *third*, and others the *second god*.

cation of the two latter points mentioned. First, because the Platonists dreamed of no such thing at all as one and the same numerical essence, or substance, of the three divine hypostases. And secondly, because, though they acknowledged none of those hypostases to be creatures, but all God, yet did they assert an essential dependence of the second and third upon the first, together with a certain gradual subordination; and therefore no absolute co-equality. And this is the true reason, why so many late writers have affirmed Platonism to symbolize with Arianism, and the latter to have been indeed nothing else but the spawn of the former; merely because the Platonists did not acknowledge one and the same numerical essence, or substance of all their three hypostases, and asserted a gradual subordination of them; but chiefly for this latter ground. Upon which account some of the ancients also have done the like, as particularly St. Cyril (contra Jul. lib. 1), he writing thus concerning Plato:[*] Τεθεώρηκε μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὑγιῶς εἰσάπαν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τὰ Ἀρείου πεφρονηκόσιν ἐν ἴσῳ διαιρεῖ, καὶ ὑφίστησιν, ὑποκαθειμένας τε ἀλλήλαις τὰς ὑποστάσεις εἰσφέρει, "Plato did not thoroughly perceive the whole truth of the trinity, but, in like manner with those who follow Arius, divided the Deity, or made a gradation in it, and introduced subordinate hypostases:" as elsewhere the same pious father also taxes the Platonists, for not declaring the three hypostases of their trinity to be, in his sense, Homoousian, that is, "absolutely co-equal." But though we have already proved, that Platonism can by no means be confounded with Arianism, because it directly confronted the same in its main essentials, which were Erat quando non erat, or the second hypostasis being made ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, together with its being mutable and lapsable; since, according to Platonism, the Nous is essentially both eternal and immutable:[4] yet that the most refined Platonism differed from the now received doctrine of the Christian church, in respect of its gradual subordination, is a thing so unquestionably evident, as that it can by no means be dissembled, palliated, or excused.

[*] P. 34.

[4] Read our copious remarks above on the Platonism of Arius: in opposition to which there is no weight whatever in this passage of St. Cyril: for he does not say that Arius imported his errors into the Christian community from the schools of the Platonists, or that Arius and Plato entirely agreed in their opinions, but merely indicates a certain affinity between the two: in short he states sufficiently clearly in the same passage, that the Platonic doctrine is better and purer than the Arian, and considers its founder, Plato, to have expressed his meaning somewhat obscurely that he might not fall in the same snares in which Socrates had perished: Πλὴν οὖν, says he, ἠγνόησε ὁλοτρόπως τὸ ἀληθὲς· οἶμαι δ' ἂν, ὅτι κἂν ὑγιῶς ἔφη τε καὶ πεφρόνησεν,——εἰ μὴ τάχα που τὴν Ἀνύτου καὶ Μελίτου γραφὴν ἐδεδίει, "Neither indeed was he altogether ignorant of the truth: nay I should rather suppose he would have said and thought wisely,——if he had not feared the accusation of Anytus and Melitus." And what need of many words? The very nature of the Arian and Platonic doctrine precludes us from regarding the one to be the standard and model of the other.

Over and besides which, it cannot be denied, but the best of Plato's followers were sometimes also further extravagant in their doctrine of the Trinity, and spake at random concerning it, and inconsistently with their own principles; especially where they make such a vast and disproportionate distance betwixt the second and third hypostases thereof; they not descending gradually and orderly, but as it were tumbling down from the former of them to the latter. Thus Plotinus himself, when having spoken magnificently of that soul of the world, which is his third hypostasis, he subjoins immediately:* Ὁμοειδὴς δὲ καὶ ἡμετέρα, καὶ ὅταν ἄνευ τῶν προσελθόντων σκοπῇς, λαβὼν κεκαθαρμένην, εὑρήσεις τὸ αὐτὸ τίμιον, ὃ ἦν ψυχή, "That this soul of ours is also uniform (or of the same species) with that mundane soul; for if any one (saith he) will consider it as in itself, pure and naked, or stript from all things adventitious to it, he shall find it to be in like manner venerable." Agreeably whereunto doth this same philosopher elsewhere call that mundane soul, πρεσβυτέραν καὶ ἀδελφὴν, that is, "but the elder sister of our human souls." Which, as it rankly savours of philosophic pride and arrogancy, thus to think so magnificently of themselves, and to equalize in a manner their own souls with that mundane soul; so was it a monstrous degradation of that third hypostasis of their trinity, and little other than an absolute creaturizing of the same. For if our human soul be ὁμοειδὴς, "of the same kind" or "species" with the third hypostasis of the trinity; then is it not only ὁμότιμος, "of like honour and dignity," but also, in the language of the Christian church, ὁμοούσιος, "co-essential" with our human souls (as our Saviour Christ, according to the Arians in Athanasius,† is said to be ὁμοούσιος ἡμῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, "co-essential with us men"). From whence it will follow, that either that must be a creature, or else our human souls divine. Wherefore unless these Platonists would confine the Deity wholly to their first hypostasis, which would be monstrously absurd for them to suppose that first eternal Mind and Wisdom, by which the world was made, to be a creature; they must of necessity make a vast leap or jump betwixt the second and third of their hypostases; the former of them being that perfect Wisdom which was the architect or Demiurgus of the world, whilst the latter is only the elder sister of all human souls. Moreover, these Platonists, by their thus bringing down the third hypostasis of their trinity so low, and immersing it so deeply into the corporeal world, as if it were the informing soul thereof, and making it to be but the elder sister of our created souls, did doubtless therein designedly lay a foundation for their poly-

* Ennead 5. lib. 1. cap. 2. [P. 483.]
† Tom. 1. p. 557. [Libro de Sententiâ Dionysius.]

theism and creature-worship (now vulgarly called idolatry), that is, for their cosmo-latry, astro-latry, and demono-latry. For thus much is plainly intimated in this following passage of Plotinus:* Διὰ ταύτην ὁ κόσμος δὲ θεός· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἥλιος θεὸς, ὅτι ἔμψυχος, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα, "This whole corporeal world is made a god by the soul thereof. And the sun is also a god, because animated; as likewise are all the stars therefore gods." Where he afterwards adds: Τὴν δὲ θεοῖς αἰτίαν τοῦ θεοῖς εἶναι, ἀνάγκη πρεσβυτέραν θεὸν αὐτῶν εἶναι, "That which is to these gods, or goddesses, the cause of their being gods, must needs itself be the elder god, or goddess." So that this third hypostasis of the Platonic Trinity, called the mundane soul, is but a kind of sister goddess with the souls of the sun, moon, and stars, though elder indeed than they; they being all made goddesses by her. Where there is a confused jumble of things contradictious together; that soul of the world being at once supposed to be a sister to other souls, and yet, notwithstanding, to deify them; whereas this sisterly relation and consanguinity betwixt them would, of the two, rather degrade and creaturize that mundane soul, which is their third god, or divine hypostasis, than advance and deify those particular created souls. Here therefore we see the inconvenience of these Platonic βαθμοὶ, "stories," stairs and gradations in the Deity, that it is a thing liable to be much abused to creature-worship and idolatry, when the distances are made so wide, and the lowest of the deity is supposed to differ but gradually only from the highest of created beings. And because Porphyrius trod in Plotinus' footsteps here, as elsewhere, this was in all probability the true reason why the Arians (as Socrates recordeth[5]) were by Constantine

* P. 483. [Ennead 5. lib. 1. cap. 2.

[5] The epistle or rather edict of Constantine, commanding the Arians to be called Porphyrians, occurs in Socrates' Histor. Eccles. lib. 1. cap. 9. p. 32. and in Gelasius' Acta Concilii Nicæni, lib. 2. cap. 36. tom. 1. Conciliorum, p. 446. ed. Harduini. This decree is mentioned also by Athanasius in his Epist. ad. Solitariam Vitam Agentes, tom. 1. opp. p. 844. The epistle itself allows no one to remain in ignorance of the reason of this appellation: for the emperor says that they are to be branded with this stigma as being imitators of the manners of Porphyry: "Ιν' ὧν τοὺς τρόπους μεμίμηνται, τούτων ἔχωσι καὶ τὴν προσηγορίαν. And what manners of Porphyry he is alluding to, he clearly indicates in the preceding, where he states that Porphyry wrote books against the Christian religion, and that Arius after his example had done the same. If we follow this epistle, therefore, Arius and his followers acquired the name of Porphyrians on account of having in public writings attacked the true and fundamental doctrine of Christians respecting God and the Son of God, in the same way as Porphyry in a specific work had assaulted the whole Christian discipline. This reason has been approved of generally by learned men, among whom Pet. de Marca, De Concordia Sacerdotii ac Imperii, lib. 2. cap. 10. sect. 10. p. 137. Joh. Alb. Fabricius, Biblioth. Græc. lib. 5. cap. 23. p. 309. and J. Le Clerc, Biblioth. Histor. et Univers. tom. 10. p. 448. deserve honourable mention: they supposing a Porphyrian to be the same as a hater of Christ, and of the truth handed down from Christ. At that age, I suspect, in which Christians were filled with a supreme detestation of Porphyry, this word was applied as a term of reproach and malediction to all who were notorious

called Porphyrianists; not because their trinities were exactly the same, but because Arius and Porphyrius did both of them alike (though upon different grounds) make their trinity a foun-

for their enmity to Christ and his divine discipline. The most learned Urb. Godofr. Siberus, in his Epistol. ad Jo. Fred. Thomæ, is nearly of the same opinion, although he explains its meaning somewhat differently, and supposes the Arians to have been called Porphyrians on account of their having like Porphyry acknowledged nothing divine in our Saviour Jesus. For he who in his doctrines denies all divinity in our Saviour is no other than an adversary and enemy of the Christian religion. These letters are extant in the Miscellan. Lipsiens. published a few years ago by the eminent Car. Frid. Bezoldus, tom. 1. p. 310.

But simple and plain as is this reason for the appellation, and resting moreover on the epistle of the emperor himself, still it has not satisfied every one. Not long since, the most erudite Jo. Fred. Thomæ inquired of the venerable Siberus the cause and origin of the name; and being answered by Siberus in the manner above stated, called in question the authenticity of the epistle itself, ibid. p. 315. In this I imagine he will have but few imitators, seeing that it contains no traces of imposture, and, as I have intimated above, is appealed to by Athanasius; not to mention, that if we reject the authority of this decree or epistle, the whole dispute will be reduced to most vague and uncertain conjectures, all the other ancient authors being silent. I have met with three other opinions respecting the origin of this name, which I shall briefly enumerate and examine: in order to ascertain whether we ought to rest content with the reason supplied in the epistle of Constantine or look about for a new one. The first is the one here rejected by Dr. Cudworth; which supposes the Arians to have been called Porphyrians because they had introduced into the Christian religion the trinity of Porphyrius and the Platonists. This opinion is warmly supported by Christoph. Sandius in his Diss. de Λόγῳ seu Verbo, subjoined to his Interpretationes Paradoxæ quatuor Evangeliorum. Amstelod. 1669.8. p. 292. and in his Nucleus Historiæ Ecclesiast. lib. 2. p. 171. Ideo, says he in the latter place, Constantinus decrevit Arianos vocitandos Porphyrianos, quod Arius et Ariani non solum cum Porphyrianis, sed et omnibus aliis Platonicis et Platoni ipso eamdem de uno Deo et verbo et Spiritu Sancto defenderunt doctrinam, "Constantine ordained that the Arians should be called Porphyrians, because the Arians defended the same doctrine concerning one God and the Word and the Holy Spirit, not only as Porphyry, but also all the rest of the Platonists and Plato himself." The truth is, it was this man's object to have it generally supposed that Plato's sentiments on the divine Triad were the same as those of the earliest Christian fathers, who are known to have approved of Plato in many respects. But in addition to what we have remarked above on the dissimilitude of the Arian and Platonic doctrine, there are two things which entirely demolish this conjecture. In the first place, Porphyry never was of that authority among the Platonists that the whole sect should be named after him, nor did any one in speaking of the Platonists ever make use of the name Porphyrians. Constantine, therefore, had he wished to accuse Arius of Platonic errors, would no doubt have abstained from this epithet, and would have named the man from Plato himself. Secondly, Constantine was so far from deeming Plato to have held impious notions concerning God, that he rather considered this philosopher to have taught more correctly on the subject of the trinity than Arius himself. See his Oratio ad Cœtum Sanctor. cap. 9. p. 576. 577. The second opinion is that adopted by Dr. Cudworth: who considers Arius to have been called a Porphyrian on account of his being supposed like Porphyry to have led men by his doctrine to the worship of many gods. What chiefly induces me to withhold my assent from this is, that this reason goes too far, and pertains not only to Porphyry, but to an infinity of others besides him. There must necessarily have been something peculiar in Porphyry, and belonging to him alone, which led the emperor to select him in particular, and not others, as the means of stigmatizing Arius. Now the inciting of men to the worship of many gods was not the crime of Porphyry alone, but common to a multitude of others and to the whole Platonic sect. With equal justice therefore the Arians might have been called by Constantine Ammonians, Plotinians, Celsians, if he had looked merely to this crime, nor is there any cause why he should have applied the name of Porphyry in particular as a designation of this sect. The third opinion was broached not long since by Jo. Hermann, who in his notes on Jo. Launoius' book

dation for creature-worship and idolatry. But nevertheless, all this (as many other things) was but heedlessly and inadvertently written by Plotinus; he, as it were, drowsily nodding all the while, as it was also but supinely taken up by Porphyrius after him: it being plainly inconsistent with the genuine tenor of both their hypotheses, thus to level the third hypostasis of the trinity with particular created souls, and thereby to make so disproportionate a distance, and so vast a chasm, betwixt it and the second. For Plotinus himself, when in a more sober mood, declares that third hypostasis not to be the immediate informing soul of the corporeal world, but a higher separate soul, or superior Venus, which also was the Demiurgus, the "maker," both of other souls and of the whole world. As Plato had before expressly affirmed him to be the Inspirer of all life, and Creator of souls, or the Lord and Giver of life; and likewise declared, that amongst all those things which are ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς συγγενῆ, "congenerous and cognate with our human souls," there is οὐδὲν τοιοῦτο, "nothing any where to be found at all like unto it." So that Plato, though he were also a star-worshipper and idolater, upon other grounds, yet in all probability would he not at all have approved of Plotinus' ὁμοειδὴς δὲ καὶ ἡμετέρα, "our souls being of the same species with that third hypostasis of the divine triad;" but rather have said, in the language of the Psalmist: "It is he that hath made us, and not we ourselves; we are his people, and the sheep of his pasture."[6]

De Varia Fortuna Aristotelis in Acad. Parisiensi, p. 158. considers that this appellation arose from Arius having abused the philosophy of Porphyry to confirm his own errors. Scilicet, says he, Porphyrius conscripsit quinque vocum institutionem ad Chrysoarum, qua egregie librum Categoriarum illustrat. At hac, quod multis vetustiorum confirmari potest testimoniis, Ariani abutebantur, "Porphyry wrote a treatise on the five words to Chrysoarus, in which he admirably illustrates the book of Categories. But the Arians, as can be shown by many testimonies of the earlier writers, abused this." This opinion is to be commended for its ingenuity, but not for its truth. The book written by Porphyry to Chrysoarus I am not ignorant of; but I have yet to learn what ancient author has recorded that Arius fortified his dogmas from this book in particular. Nay, if there were ancient testimonies extant on this matter, still it would appear to me incredible that the reason of this public reproach intended by him to be in the mouths of all men, should be drawn by the emperor from a book which none but doctors and philosophers were acquainted with, and of which the common people knew absolutely nothing. Constantine would have called Arius an Aristotelian rather, if he had wished to brand the man by an opprobious epithet for his insane love of dialectics: for we learn from many authors that he set the highest value upon the precepts and logical subtleties of Aristotle. See Epiphanius, Hæres. 69. sect. 69. p. 795. It is better, if I am not completely mistaken, to rest satisfied with the reason expressed in Constantine's letter than to rush headlong into new conjectures without any authorities for our guidance.

[6] I. The doctrine formerly inculcated by the Platonists on the origin of our souls from the soul of the world is altogether false and dangerous. Still, provided they had taught any thing sound and excellent on other subjects, I should not on account of this opinion alone accuse this sect of consummate and insufferable arrogance. For many of the Christian fathers, both ancient and modern, though otherwise highly deserving men, were tinctured with the same error. Persons even moderately versed in the

Notwithstanding all which, a Christian Platonist, or Platonic Christian, would, in all probability, apologize for Plato himself, and the ancient and most genuine Platonists and Pythagoreans, after this manner.[7] First, that since they had no scriptures, councils, nor creeds, to direct their steps in the darkness of this mystery, and to confine their language to a regular uniformity; but theologized all freely and boldly, and without any scrupulosity, every one according to his own private apprehensions; it is no wonder at all, if they did not only speak many times unadvisedly and inconsistently with their own principles, but also plainly wander out of the right path. And that it ought much rather to be wondered at, that living so long before Christianity, as some of them did, they should in so abstruse a point and dark a mystery, make so near an approach to the Christian truth afterwards revealed, than that they should any where fumble or fall short of the accuracy thereof: they not only extending the true and real Deity to three hypostases, but also calling the second of them, Λόγον, "Reason" or "Word" too

monuments of the ancients are aware that many of the early fathers of the church did not hesitate to affirm, according to the words of Virgil, Georg. lib. 4. ver. 220:

> Esse nobis partem divinæ mentis et haustus
> Æthereos,

and to call our souls portions of the divine essence. See Lactantius, Instit. Divinar. lib. 2. cap. 12. p. 239. lib. 7. cap. 5. and cap. 10. p. 794. and 824. Arnobius, Adv. Gentes, lib. 2. p. 67. Synesius, Ep. 105. p. 248. opp. not to speak of almost the whole body of Mystics, who held this doctrine in the highest reverence. See Pet. Poiret, Œconomie Divine, tom. 1. cap. 10. sect. 24. p. 277. Now I cannot suppose them all to have fallen into this error by reason of excessive pride, being convinced that most of them were led into it by the force and influence of other opinions which they had rashly adopted. II. What the learned Doctor advances in excuse of Plotinus and Porphyry, and in extenuation of their error respecting the origin of souls, is of less weight than he supposes. For although these philosophers invented a twofold soul of the world, one *mundane*, the other *supramundane*, and derived the souls of men from the properly mundane soul, still they associated these two souls of the world so closely and intimately together, that what pertains to one must necessarily pertain also to the other.

[7] That the learned Doctor himself lies concealed under this character of Platonic Christian, has both long ago been observed by others, and is shown by the history and circumstances of the age in which he lived. At that time the Platonic philosophy was much studied in the university of Cambridge, and most of the theologians there, Wilkins, Witchcote, H. More, Cudworth, Worthington, were immoderately devoted to it. See Burnet's History of his own Time, book 2. year 1661. p. 186. 187. Dr. Cudworth therefore was himself a Platonic Christian, and is here defending not so much another's as his own cause. But other English theologians, and in my opinion with some reason, disapproved of and publicly censured this immoderate love of Platonism, fearing that many errors would arise from it. See Sam. Parker's Impartial Censure of the Platonic Philosophy, Oxon. 1660. 4. I hope to say more in the Preface on this subject, which is of much importance towards gaining an insight into the opinions of Dr. Cudworth and other English theologians of that period. As the learned Doctor, however, in this comparison of the Platonic and Christian Trinity, assumes all that he has hitherto advanced on the nature and character of the Platonic triad as true, it will be necessary to revert sometimes to the remarks, which we have here and there made to show its weakness and fallacy.

(as well as Νοῦν, "Mind" or "Intellect") and likewise the Son of the first hypostasis, or Father; and affirming him to be the Δημιουργὸς and Αἴτιον, "Artificer and Cause of the whole world;" and lastly describing him, as the scripture doth, to be the image, the figure and character, and the splendour or brightness of the first. This, I say, our Christian Platonist supposes to be much more wonderful, that this so great and abstruse a mystery, of three eternal hypostases in the Deity, should thus by pagan philosophers, so long before Christianity, have been asserted, as the principal and original of the whole world; it being more indeed than was acknowledged by the Nicene fathers themselves; they then not so much as determining that the Holy Ghost was an hypostasis, much less that he was God.[8]

[8] Many I fear will consider this as a great injustice done to the Nicene fathers. I shall content myself with saying that these words seem to have escaped the learned Doctor unawares. The word ὑπόστασις, it is true, does not occur in the Nicene creed, neither is the name Θεὸς added to the words εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον. See the creed itself as exhibited by Athanasius in his Epistola ad Jovianum de Fide, tom. 1. opp. p. 247. But I should by no means be disposed on that account to deny that the Nicene fathers held the Holy Ghost to be either a *person* or a *God*. The fact of their associating the Holy Ghost with the Father and Son, and wishing men to believe in the Holy Ghost equally as in the Father and Son, is, if I am not altogether mistaken, a sufficient proof that the Holy Ghost was considered by them an hypostasis or person. If the Father and Son were held by this council to be persons, which no one can for a moment question, the same must be supposed of the Holy Ghost, which it associates with these two persons. And pray what would be the force of the phrase: I believe in the Holy Ghost, if the Holy Ghost were not a person, but merely a certain notion or virtue of God? Is it credible that men in their senses would have taught their brethren to put firm trust in a certain notion or divine perfection, not different from the nature itself of God? Of the divinity of the Holy Ghost, the Nicene fathers, I confess, have spoken somewhat too obscurely. Not a few of the ancients, I am aware, purposely abstained from using the name God, when speaking of the Holy Ghost, as has been shown by numerous examples by Dion. Petavius, Dogm. Theolog. tom. 2. lib. 1. De Trinitate, cap. 14. p. 63. and by Thom. Ittigius, in the Opuscula Varia, edited by Christ. Ludovicus Lips. 1714. 8. p. 415. 417. and whether the Nicene fathers wished to follow in their footsteps, I shall not undertake to determine. But their faith in my opinion is sufficiently cleared by this, that they did not prefix the word Θεὸς to that part of their profession either in which they enjoin us to believe in Jesus Christ, but wrote simply: Καὶ εἰς τὸν ἕνα Κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν; although afterwards, on accouht of the Arians, whose errors in particular they were opposing, they inculcate more at large concerning the divinity of the Son of God. For it follows from it, that the words, πιστεύομεν εἰς ἕνα Θεὸν, standing at the beginning of the formula, pertain to all the three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and therefore that the fathers sufficiently clearly declared the Deity to be common to the three Persons. Indeed, by repeating the word Θεὸς with each of the Persons, it was to be feared that they might seem to some to introduce not three Persons so much as three Gods: but to name God once, and afterwards distinguish three persons, is openly to profess that which ancients as well as moderns so often rightly inculcate, that μίαν φύσιν, "there is one divine nature," but τρεῖς ἐν μιᾷ φύσει ὑποστάσεις, "three Persons in one nature." These remarks have been considered necessary, on account of those who, even in the present day, to give countenance to their own errors, are continually appealing to the Nicene council, which they rashly tell us has determined nothing certain. This, however, is an old accusation, and was long ago put forth by the Macedonians and others, that the bishops assembled at Nice left it open for any one to form what opinion he pleased respecting the Holy Spirit. But it was also

But particularly as to their gradual subordination of the second hypostasis to the first, and of the third to the first and second; our Platonic Christian, doubtless, would therefore plead them the more excusable, because the generality of Christian doctors, for the first three hundred years after the apostles' times, plainly asserted the same; as Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Tatianus, Irenæus, the author of the Recognitions, Tertullian, Clemens Alexandrinus, Origen, Gregorius Thaumaturgus, Dionysius of Alexandria, Lactantius, and many others.[9] All whose testimonies because it would be too tedious to set down here, we shall content ourselves only with one of the last mentioned:* Et Pater et Filius Deus est; sed ille quasi exuberans fons, hic tanquam defluens ex eo rivus: Ille tanquam sol, hic tanquam radius à sole porrectus, "Both the Father and the Son is God; but he as it were an exuberant fountain, this as a stream derived from him: he like to the sun, this like to a ray extended from the sun."[10] And though it be true that Athanasius,[1] writing against the Arians, does appeal to the tradition of the ancient church, and, amongst others, cites Origen's testimony too; yet was this only for the eternity and divinity of the Son of God, but not at all for such an absolute co-equality of him with the Father, as would exclude all dependence, subordination and inferiority; those ancients so unanimously agreeing therein, that they are by Petavius[2] therefore taxed for Platonism, and having

promptly met by the vigilance of the orthodox fathers. We have evidence of both in the Synodica Amphilochii Iconiensis Epistola, published since Dr. Cudworth's time by Jo. Bapt. Cotelerius in the Monumenta Ecclesiæ Græcæ, tom. 2. p. 99. and included also by Jo. Harduinus in Concilorum, tom. 9. p. 798. from which we shall extract a few words corroborative of some of the things that we have stated: Σεσιγημένου δὲ, says Amphilochius, in Cotelerius, p. 101. τηνικαῦτα τοῦ κατὰ τὸ πνεῦμα ζητήματος· διὰ τοῦτο πλατύτερον μὲν οὐδὲν προσίθεσαν τοῖς μέν γε συνετῶς ἀναγινώσκουσιν αὐτάρκης καὶ ἡ περὶ τοῦ πνεύματος ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ πίστει διδασκαλία· ὥσπερ εἰς Πατέρα καὶ Υἱὸν πιστεύειν, οὕτω καὶ εἰς τὸ Πνεῦμα πιστεύειν ἐδογμάτισαν, μήτε ἑτέραν τινὰ φύσιν ἐπεισάγοντες τῇ θείᾳ καὶ μακαρίᾳ τριάδι, μήτε τι τῶν ἐκ τῆς τριάδος ἀποτέμνοντες, εἰς τὴν τῆς πίστεως ἔκθεσιν, "The question respecting the Holy Ghost being at that time at rest, they therefore added nothing more. But to intelligent readers the doctrine concerning the Holy Ghost contained in that creed will seem sufficient. For they taught, that as we believe in the Father and the Son, so ought we to believe in the Holy Ghost, neither introducing any other nature into the divine and blessed Trinity, nor cutting off any thing from the Trinity in that exposition of faith."

[9] Besides Petavius, G. Bull has produced and illustrated the testimonies of all these in his Defensio Fidei Nicænæ, sect. 4, entitled, De Subordinatione Filii ad Patrem, ut ad sui Originem ac Principium, p. 251. &c. opp. Whether, however, these passages have all the force they are supposed to have is very doubtful, and affords matter for longer discussion than we have here an opportunity of entering into.

* Instit. lib. 4. cap. 29. [P. 514.]

[10] The first words of this passage adduced from Lactantius, namely: Et Pater et Filius Deus est, do not expressly occur in that author. I would not deny, however, that he states the same in other words in that place.

[1] See his book or epistle De Synodi Nicænæ contra Hæresem Arianam Decretis, tom. 1. opp. 277.

[2] See lib. 1. De Trinitate, cap. 3. p. 20. and cap. 4. p. 24. tom. 2. Dogm. Theologicor.

by that means corrupted the purity of the Christian faith, in this article of the Trinity. Which, how it can be reconciled with those other opinions of ecclesiastic tradition being a rule of faith, and the impossibility of the visible church's erring in any fundamental point, cannot easily be understood. However, this general tradition or consent of the Christian church, for three hundred years together after the apostles' times, though it cannot justify the Platonists in any thing discrepant from the scripture, yet may it in some measure doubtless plead their excuse, who had no scripture revelation at all to guide them herein; and so at least make their error more tolerable or pardonable.

Moreover, the Platonic Christian would further apologize for these pagan Platonists after this manner: That their intention in thus subordinating the hypostases of their trinity was plainly no other, than to exclude thereby a plurality of co-ordinate and independent gods, which they supposed an absolute co-equality of them would infer. And that they made only such subordination of them, as was both necessary to this purpose, and unavoidable; the juncture of them being in their opinion so close, that there was, μηδὲν μεταξὺ, "nothing intermedious," or that could possibly be thrust in between them. But now again, on the other hand, whereas the only ground of the co-equality of the persons in the holy Trinity is, because it cannot well be conceived, how they should otherwise all be God; since the essence of the Godhead, being absolute perfection, can admit of no degrees; these Platonists do on the contrary contend, that notwithstanding that dependence and subordination, which they commonly suppose in these hypostases, there is none of them, for all that, to be accounted creatures, but that the general essence of the Godhead, or the uncreated nature, truly and properly belongeth to them all: according to that of Porphyrius before cited: Ἄχρι τριῶν ὑποστάσεων τὴν θείου προελθεῖν οὐσίαν, "The essence of the Godhead proceedeth to three hypostases." Now these Platonists conceive, that the essence of the Godhead, as common to all the three hypostases of their trinity, consisteth (besides perfect intellectuality) in these following things: First, in being eternal, which, as we have already shown, was Plato's distinctive character betwixt God and the creature. That whatsoever was eternal, is therefore uncreated; and whatsoever was not eternal, is a creature. He by eternity meaning, the having not only no beginning, but also a permanent duration. Again, in having not a contingent but necessary existence, and therefore being absolutely undestroyable; which perhaps is included also in the former. Lastly, in being not particular but universal, ἓν καὶ πάντα, "one and all things," or that which comprehends the whole; which is all one as to say, in being infinite and omnipotent, and the creator of the whole world. Now, say these

Platonists, if any thing more were to be added to the general essence of the Godhead besides this, then must it be self-existence, or to be underived from any other, and the first original principle, and cause of all: but if this be made so essential to the Godhead, or uncreated nature, as that whatsoever is not thus originally of itself, is therefore ipso facto to be detruded and thrust down into the rank of creatures; then must both the second and third hypostases, as well in the Christian as the Platonic Trinity, upon this supposition, needs be creatures, and not God; the second deriving its whole being and godship from the first; and the third, both from the first and second; and so neither first nor second being the cause of all things. But it is unquestionable to these Platonists, that whatsoever is eternal, necessarily existent, infinite, and omnipotent, and the creator of all things, ought therefore to be religiously worshipped and adored as God, by all created beings. Wherefore, this essence of the Godhead, that belongeth to all the three hypostases, being, as all other essences, perfectly indivisible, it might be well affirmed, according to Platonic grounds, that all the three divine hypostases (though having some subordination in them) yet in this sense are co-equal, they being all truly and alike God or uncreated. And the Platonists thus distinguishing betwixt *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*, "the essence of the Godhead," and the "distinct hypostases" or "personalities" thereof, and making the first of them to be common, general and universal, are not without the consent and approbation of the orthodox fathers herein; they determining likewise, that in the Deity, essence or substance differs from hypostasis, as *τὸ κοινὸν* from *τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον*, "that which is common and general differs from that which is singular and individual." Thus, besides many others, St. Cyril:[3] *Ἦν ἔχει διαφορὰν τὸ γενὸς, ἢ εἶδος, ὑπὲρ τὸ ἄτομον, ταύτην ἡ οὐσία πρὸς τὸν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει*, "The essence or sub-

[3] I am afraid the learned Doctor's memory is in fault here and has named St. Cyril instead of Theodoret: for I find these very words in Theodoret, Dialog. 1. adv. Hereses, entitled *Ἀτρεπτος*, not far from the beginning, tom. 2. p. 297. The mistake was the more easy as the same thing is said by St. Cyril, although in other words, and in a different way, Dialog. 1. de Trinitate, p. 408. tom. 5. opp. ed. Auberti. Peace be with the ashes of those excellent men who formerly were satisfied with this distinction: for I acknowledge they possessed a mind devoted to rectitude and truth. But I regret that they did not either altogether abstain from such like subtleties, or at least employ more caution in explaining them. For from this distinction of *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*, those seek no slight support to their opinion, who wish us to believe that the Nicene doctors professed one God in genus or species only, but not in number, that is, *three equal Gods*. Certainly, whoever chooses to look to the words rather than the intention of those Doctors, may with some plausibility reason as follows: There is as much difference between *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις* as between genus and individual. In God, therefore, there are three individuals, which, however, are comprised in one genus: and consequently the three Persons in the divinity differ in the same way as Peter, Paul and John, who are three individuals, having however but one genus, namely human nature. But of this elsewhere.

stance of the Deity differs from the hypostasis, after the same manner as a genus or species differs from an individuum." So that, as well according to these fathers as the Platonists, that essence or substance of the Godhead, which all the three persons agree in, is not singular, but generical or universal; they both supposing each of the persons also to have their own numerical essence. Wherefore, according to this distinction, betwixt the essence or substance of the Godhead, and the particular hypostases (approved by the orthodox fathers), neither Plato, nor any intelligent Platonist, would scruple to subscribe that form of the Nicene council, that the Son or Word is ὁμοούσιος, "co-essential," or "con-substantial," and "co-equal" with the Father. And we think it will be proved afterwards, that this was the very meaning of the Nicene council itself, that the Son was therefore co-essential or con-substantial with the Father, merely because he was God, and not a creature.

Besides which, the genuine Platonists would doubtless acknowledge also all the three hypostases of their trinity to be homoousian, co-essential or con-substantial, yet in a farther sense than this; namely, as being all of them one Θεῖον, or "Divinity." For thus, besides that passage of Porphyrius before cited, may these words of St. Cyril be understood concerning them:[4] Μέχρι τριῶν ὑποστάσεων τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ προσήκειν ἰσχυρίζονται, "That, according to them, the essence of God extendeth to three hypostases, or comprehendeth three hypostases in it:" that is, not only so as that each of these three is God; but also that they are not so many separate and divided Gods, but all of them together one God or divinity. For though the Platonists, as Pagans, being not so scrupulous in their language as we Christians are, do often call them three Gods, and a first, second, and third God; yet notwithstanding, as philosophers, did they declare them to be one Θεῖον or divinity; and that, as it seems, upon these several accounts following. First, because they are indivisibly conjoined together, as the splendour is indivisible from the sun. And then, because they are mutually inexistent in each other, the first being in the second, and both first and second in the third. And lastly, because the entireness of the whole divinity is made up of all these three together, which have all μίαν ἐνέργειαν, "one and the same energy" or "action" ad extrà. And therefore, as the centre, radious distance, and moveable circumference, may be all said to be co-essential to a sphere; and the root, stock, and boughs or branches, co-essential to an entire tree; so, but in a much more perfect sense, are the Platonic "Tagathon," "Nous," and "Psyche," co-essential to that ἐν τῷ παντὶ θεῖον, "that divinity in the

[4] Contra Julian. lib. 8. p. 270.

whole universe." Neither was Athanasius[5] a stranger to this notion of the word ὁμοούσιος also, he affirming: * Τὰ κλήματα ὁμοούσια καὶ ἀδιαίρετα εἶναι τῆς ἀμπέλου, "That the branches are co-essential with, and indivisible from the vine;" and illustrating the Trinity by that similitude. Neither must it be thought that the whole Trinity is one, after the very same manner that each single person thereof is in itself one, for then should there be a trinity also in each person. Nor that it is so called undivided, as if three were not three in it (which were to make the mystery contemptible): but because all the three hypostases, or persons, are indivisibly and inseparably united to each other, as the sun and the splendour, and really but one God. Wherefore, though there be some subordination of hypostases, or persons, in Plato's trinity (as it is commonly represented), yet this is only ad intra, "within the Deity" itself, in their relation to one another, and as compared amongst themselves; but ad extra, "outwardly," and to us, are they all one and the same God, concurring in all the same actions; and in that respect, without any inequality, because in identity there can be no inequality.

Furthermore, the Platonic Christian would, in favour of these Platonists, urge also, that, according to the principles of Christianity itself, there must of necessity be some dependence and subordination of the persons of the Trinity, in their relation to one another; a priority and posteriority, not only τάξεως, but also ἀξιώματος, of "dignity" as well as "order," amongst them. First, because that which is originally of itself, and underived from any other, must needs have some superiority and preeminence over that which derives its whole being and godship from it, as the second doth from the first alone, and the third from the first with the second. Again, though all those three hypostases, or persons, be alike omnipotent ad extrà, or "outwards," yet ad intrà, "inwards," or "within the Deity itself, are they not so; the Son not being able to beget the Father, nor the Holy Ghost to produce either Father or Son; and therefore neither of these two latter is absolutely the cause of all things, but only the first. And upon this account was that first of these three hypostases

[5] It is not true, that St. Athanasius makes use of this similitude of the vine to illustrate the doctrine of the Trinity. He is there disputing against the Arians, who maintained the Son of God to be ὁμοούσιος with us, and for proof appealed to the saying of our Saviour, John xv. 1. To refute these, he contends that this passage pertains to his human not his divine nature, and points out our own affinity in body with Christ our Saviour: Ὥσπερ ἐστὶ τὰ κλήματα ὁμοούσια τῆς ἀμπέλου καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς· οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς ὁμογενῆ τὰ σώματα ἔχομεν τῷ σώματι τοῦ Κυρίου, "As the branches are from the vine and co-essential with it, so we also have bodies of the same kind as the body of the Lord." By this comparison, therefore, Athanasius is not explaining the nature of the divine Triad, but the relation and affinity of our bodies to Christ.

* De Sent. Dionys. p. 556. [Tom. 1. opp.]

(who is the original fountain of all) by Macrobius styled,[6] omnipotentissimus Deus, "the most omnipotent God;" he therein implying the second and third hypostases, Nous and Psyche, to be omnipotent too, but not in a perfect equality with him, as within the Deity they are compared together: however ad extrà or "outwardly," and to us, they being all one, are equally omnipotent. And Plotinus writeth also to the same purpose:[6] Εἰ τέλειόν ἐστι τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ δύναμις ἡ πρώτη, δεῖ πάντων τῶν ὄντων δυνατώτατον εἶναι, &c., "If the first be absolutely perfect, and the first power, then must it needs be the most powerful of all beings; other powers only imitating and partaking thereof." And accordingly hereunto would the Platonic Christian further pretend, that there are sundry places in the Scripture which do not a little favour some subordination and priority both of order and dignity, in the persons of the Holy Trinity; of which none is more obvious than that of our Saviour Christ, "My Father is greater than I:" which to understand of his humanity only, seemeth to be less reasonable, because this was no news at all, that the eternal God, the Creator of the whole world, should be greater than a mortal man, born of a woman. And thus do divers of the orthodox fathers, as Athanasius himself, St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen, and St. Chrysostom, with several others of the Latins, interpret the same to have been spoken, not of the humanity, but the divinity of our Saviour Christ.[7] Inso-

[6] In Somnium Scipionis, lib. 1. cap. 17. p. 87.

[6] * P. 517. [Ennead 5. lib. 4. cap. 1.]

[7] The passages of the ancient doctors, who have not scrupled to refer this saying of our Saviour to his divine nature, have been collected by Dion. Petavius, Dogm. Theolog. tom. 2. lib. 2. de Trinitate, cap. 2. p. 70, &c., Sam. Clarke in his celebrated work, The Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity, p. 141. and Mich. Lequien, in his notes, Ad Damasceni lib. 1. De Orthodoxa Fide, p. 136. Also those of such as consider Christ to be speaking here of his human nature, are pointed out by the same Petavius, ibid. sect. 11. p. 73. [See Wolle, Hermeneutica N. T. p. 163. &c.] For my own part, I approve of neither interpretation. For, putting other things out of the question, our Saviour is manifestly speaking here of his whole person, and not separating one nature from the other. Although, to tell the truth, most of the ancient interpreters who applied the words of Christ to his human nature, do not appear to have supposed, as Dr. Cudworth imagines them to have done, that the human nature is here compared simply and absolutely with the divine, but that the Son of God is called inferior to the Father, by reason of his having assumed the human nature, and clothed himself in human flesh. See the authorities collected by J. Casp. Suicer, in his Thesaur. Eccles. tom. 2. p. 1368. Neither, as the learned Doctor seems to suppose, did those who sought to discover the sense of this saying, confine themselves to these two interpretations. For other interpretations of the ancients have already been enumerated by Photius, Epistolar. 226. p. 262. who himself has struck out a new and altogether singular one, and considers Christ to have spoken not according to the truth, but agreeably to the notion and opinion of his disciples at that time imbued with numerous errors. The thoughts of certain later writers, most of whom however differ in words rather than in sentiment, I shall pass over, contenting myself with the mention of only one, Fred. Adolph. Lampius, a very recent and most erudite interpreter, who would persuade us that the words are to be understood de ea officii Christi mediatorii parte, qua defunctus est, antequam ad dextram patris exaltaretur, "of that part of Christ's mediatorial office discharged by him before he was exalted to the right hand of the Father," Comm. in Johann. tom. 2. p. 191. For my part, I think these eminent men would have found less diffi-

uch that Petavius himself,* expounding the Athanasian creed, riteth in this manner: Pater major Filio, ritè et catholicè ronuntiatus est à plerisque veterum; et origine prior sine repre-ensione dici solet, "The Father is, in a right catholic manner, firmed by most of the ancients to be greater than the Son; id he is commonly said also, without reprehension, to be before im in respect of original." Whereupon he concludeth the ue meaning of that creed to be this, than no person in the rinity is greater or less than other, in respect of the essence of ie Godhead common to them all; Quia vera Deitas in nullo ise aut minor aut major potest, "Because the true Godhead in be nowhere greater or less;" but that, notwithstanding, there ay be some inequality in them, as they are hic Deus, and hæc ersona; "this God," and "that person." It is true indeed, iat many of those ancient fathers do restrain and limit this in-quality only to the relation of the persons one to another, as

ilty in this passage, and would have more easily repressed the Arians and others who used it, if they had not chosen to consider it apart from the context, instead of com-uring and combining it with the preceding words. Our Saviour had said: that his eparture from this earth to the heavenly Father would be an occasion for joy rather an for sorrow to his friends, if they really loved him, and subjoins the following eason: "Οτι ὁ πατήρ μου μείζων μοῦ ἐστι. These words therefore contain the eason, why Christ was to be congratulated on account of his departure from the earth. ow, I wish all reasonable men to judge whether this reason can be any other than the iange from a state of misery and wretchedness to a far more glorious and happy ate. Hence, our blessed Lord's meaning, I am convinced, is simply this: "There is) cause for your being grieved at my going to the Father: for the Father is placed in r greater glory and felicity than I now am; of whose glory, when taken away from ence, I shall be made partaker." Nor does the word μείζων preclude this interpre-tion. For any one having even a slight acquaintance with the Greek language is vare that this word in its metaphorical sense can imply not only superiority of nature id dignity, but of glory, splendour, and felicity. Petavius, I observe, ibid. sect. 12. 73. 74. makes Calvin and Beza to be principal supporters of this opinion; but he ther incorrectly represented the meaning of these men, or shamefully suffered himself be led away by his anxiety to censure what he calls the *heretics*, when he wrote that is explication accords with the opinion of those ancient doctors who maintained iat Christ's words were to be understood of his human nature. There is certainly a ide difference between those who hold Christ to be inferior to the Father as regards s human nature, and those who assert that the Father is called greater than Christ, ecause at that time he was superior to him in glory and felicity. Of our own coun-ymen, Henr. Bened. Slarck, in his Notæ Selectæ ad Difficiliora N. T. Loca, Lipsiæ, '24. 4. p. 109. according to the testimony of Joh. Christoph. Wolf, Curæ Philol. l N. T. p. 946. does not dissent from this opinion. This explication, however, is so ain and simple, that it has occurred no doubt to many others, whose suffrages time ill not permit us at present to collect. Whoever wishes, therefore, to judge of the due of the other explications of this passage, let him adopt this as a rule: Every terpretation that assigns either no reason at all or an insufficient one, why Christ was be congratulated on account of his return to heaven, ought to be rejected. ccording to which standard, if we examine the opinion of the Arians or that the ancient fathers, to which Dr. Cudworth here attaches some importance, e shall easily perceive the fallacy of both. For what sort of reasoning would is be: Rejoice at my going to the Father: for I am much inferior to the ather in nature, degree, order, and dignity? Away with the Platonic Christian, who here imagined to be speaking, if he is able to adduce nothing from Scripture except is passage in support of his opinion.

* De Trinitate, p. 863.

the Father's begetting, and the Son's being begotten by the Father, and the Holy Ghost proceeding from both; they seeming to affirm that there is otherwise a perfect equality amongst them. Nevertheless several of them do extend this difference further also, as for example, St. Hilary, a zealous opposer of the Arians, he in his book of Synods writing thus:[8] Siquis unum dicens Deum, Christum autem Deum, ante secula Filium Dei, obsecutum Patri in creatione omnium, non confitetur, anathema sit. And again, Non exæquamus vel conformamus Filium Patri, sed subjectum intelliginus. And Athanasius himself, who is commonly accounted the very rule of orthodoxality in this point, when he doth so often resemble the Father to the ἥλιος, or to the φῶς, the "sun," or the "original light," and the Son to the ἀπαύγασμα, the "splendour" or "brightness of it," (as likewise doth the Nicene council and the Scripture itself;) he seems hereby to imply some dependence of the second upon the first, and subordination to it; especially when he declareth, that the three persons of the Trinity are not to be looked upon as three principles, nor to be resembled to three suns, but to the sun and its splendour, and its derivative light:* Οὐδὲ γὰρ τρεῖς ἀρχὰς εἰσάγομεν, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τριῶν ἡλίων ὑπεθέμεθα τὴν εἰκόνα, ἀλλὰ ἥλιον καὶ ἀπαύγασμα, καὶ ἓν τὸ ἐξ ἡλίου ἐν τῷ ἀπαυγάσματι φῶς· οὕτω μίαν ἀρχὴν οἴδαμεν, "For it appears from the similitude used by us, that we do not introduce three principles (as the Marcionists and Manicheans did;) we not comparing the Trinity to three suns, but only to the sun and its splendour; so that we acknowledge only one principle."[9]

[8] These words it is true are to be met with in St. Hilary, De Synodis seu de Fide Orientalium, p. 1178. 1182. opp. ed. Bened. They are not his own, however, but the decrees of the Sirmian Council in the year 357, against Plotinus, translated by him from the Greek, and illustrated. The former words constitute the *third canon* of this council, the latter are part of the *eighteenth*. See Joh. Harduini Concilia, tom. 1. p. 702. 703. 704. But as St. Hilary approves of these laws of the Sirmian Council, it is fair to attribute to him the sentiment contained in them. In both canons those Sirmian fathers speak very incautiously, not to use a harsher term, and in words at least detract from the glory and majesty of our Saviour.

* Contra Ar. Or. p. 467. [Tom. 1. opp.]

[9] This passage will be of little avail to those who maintain that Athanasius held the Father and the Son to be widely different and dissimilar. Those who have treated of the laws of interpretation tell us, that comparisons made use of by authors are not to be stretched further than their purpose requires: which rule, if applied to this passage, will divest it of all suspicion of error. Athanasius is disputing against those who charged the orthodox Christians with introducing three gods, and among other things brings against them the similitude now in question, from which he affirms it to be evident that the charge is without foundation. By this comparison, therefore, he merely wishes to expose the grievous mistake of those who proclaim that the three persons of Christians are so many gods; but by no means intended to show by it what difference there is between the Father and the Son. Those who expound Athanasius' meaning, cannot fairly go beyond these limits unless they wish to offend against that well-known precept of the critics, which tells them in every similitude to attend to what is called the *third* term of the comparison.

As also where he approves of this of Dionysius of Alexandria,* Ὁ δέ γε Θεὸς αἰώνιον ἐστι φῶς, οὔτε ἀρξάμενον, οὔτε λῆξόν ποτε· οὐκοῦν αἰώνιον πρόσκειται καὶ σύνεστιν αὐτῷ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα, ἄναρχον καὶ ἀειγενὲς προφαινόμενον αὐτοῦ, "God is an eternal light, which never began, and shall never cease to be; wherefore there is an eternal splendour also co-existent with him, which had no beginning neither, but was always generated by him, shining out before him." For if the Son of God be as the splendour of the sun ἀειγενὴς, "always generated," then must he needs have an essential dependence upon the Father, and subordination to him. And this same thing further appears from those other resemblances, which the same Dionysius maketh, of the Father and the Son, approved in like manner also by Athanasius; viz., to the fountain and the river; to the root and the branch; to the water and the vapour; for so it ought to be read, ὕδατος, and not πνεύματος,[10] as appeareth from his book of

* P. 565. [Lib. de Sententiâ Dionys. contra Arian. tom. 1.

[10] The passage of Athanasius here corrected by the learned Doctor, is from his book, De Sententia Dionysii, p. 565. tom. 1. opp. Καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα δὲ τῆς πηγῆς καὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ, καὶ τῆς ῥίζης, καὶ τοῦ βλαστοῦ, καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος, καὶ τῆς ἀτμίδος, καταισχύνει τοὺς Χριστομάχους, τοὐναντία θρυλλοῦντας κατ' αὐτοῦ, "For these similitudes of the fountain and the river, the root and the branch, the breath and the vapour, put to shame the foes of Christ spreading adverse reports against him" (Dionysius). From this passage Dr. Cudworth would exclude the word πνεύματος and read ὕδατος in its stead: in my opinion, however, no alteration ought to be made in it. For among the resemblances of Dionysius by which he was accustomed to illustrate the doctrine of the divine Triad, and the generation of the Son from the Father, there is one also drawn from the *breath of the mouth*, or πνεῦμα, and *vapour*. This will be manifest to any one who attentively examines the following words of Dionysius, which are preserved by Athanasius, De Sententia Dionysii, tom. 1. opp. p. 560. Φωτὸς μὲν ὄντος τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὁ Χρίστος ἐστὶν ἀπαύγασμα· ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΟΣ δὲ ὄντος, (πνεῦμα γὰρ, φησὶν, ὁ Θεὸς) ἀναλόγως πάλιν ὁ Χρίστος ΑΤΜΙΣ λέγεται· ΑΤΜΙΣ γὰρ, φησὶν, ἔστι τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ δυνάμεως, "If God be light, Christ is splendour: if he be breath (for God he says is breath) Christ again is analogously called vapour. For he is, says he, the vapour of the power of God." Into the truth and propriety of these similitudes of Dionysius we shall not inquire; it being sufficient for us that they show the passage of Athanasius to need no emendation. For as in that saying of Athanasius, so in these words of Dionysius, πνεῦμα and ἀτμὶς are combined and considered no otherwise than as cause and effect. Nor could it have escaped the learned Doctor that there are some of the ancient fathers who compare the generation of the Son of God with the generation of our words, and assert that the word of God was produced by the breath of God, in the same way as our words are by the breath of our mouth. Lactantius, Divinar. Instit. lib. 4. cap. 8. p. 426. Deus procedentem de ore suo *vocalem spiritum*, quem non utero sed mente conceperat, inexcogitabili quadam majestatis suæ virtute ac potentia in effigiem, quæ proprie sensu ac sapientia vigeat, comprehendit, "God, by a certain incomprehensible virtue and power of his majesty, composed the vocal breath proceeding out of his mouth, which he had conceived not in the womb but in the mind, into an image, which should abound in sense and wisdom." And a little afterwards: Quod si quis miretur, ex Deo Deum *prolatione vocis ac spiritus* potuisse generari, si sacras voces prophetarum cognoverit, desinet profecto mirari, "But should any one wonder how God could be generated from God by the *production of the voice and breath*, on becoming acquainted with the sacred words of the prophets, he will certainly cease to wonder." So much the less ought the learned Doctor to have been offended with the word πνεύματος in Athanasius.

the Nicene synod,* where he affirmeth the Son to have been begotten of the essence or substance of the Father: Ὡς τοῦ φωτὸς ἀπαύγασμα, ὡς ὕδατος ἀτμὶς, "as the splendour of the light, and as the vapour of the water;" adding, Οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα, οὔτε ἡ ἀτμὶς, αὐτὸ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐστὶν, ἢ αὐτὸς ὁ ἥλιος· οὔτε ἀλλότριον, ἀλλὰ ἀπόῤῥοια τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας, "For neither the splendour nor the vapour is the very sun and the very water; nor yet is it alien from it, or a stranger to its nature; but they are both effluxes from the essence or substance of them; as the Son is an efflux from the substance of the Father, yet so as he is no way diminished or lessened thereby." Now all these similitudes, of the fountain and the river, the root and the branch, the water and the vapour, (as well as that of the sun and the splendour) seem plainly to imply some dependence and subordination. And Dionysius doubtless intended them to that purpose, he asserting, as Photius informeth us,[1] an inferiority of power and glory in the second, as likewise did Origen before him; both whose testimonies, notwithstanding, Athanasius maketh use of, without any censure or reprehension of them. Wherefore, when Athanasius and the orthodox fathers, writing against Arius, do so frequently assert the equality of all the three Persons, this is to be understood in way of opposition to Arius only, who made the Son to be unequal to the Father, as ἑτεροούσιον, "of a different essence from him," one being God and the other a creature; they affirming on the contrary, that he was equal to the Father, as ὁμοούσιος, "of the same essence with him;" that is, as God, and not a creature. Notwithstanding which equality, there might be some subordination in them, as hic Deus and hæc persona (to use Petavius' language) "this God and that person."[2]

* P. 275. [Tom. 1. opp.]

[1] Plotinus, nowhere that I remember, accuses Dionysius of corrupting the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. But he relates out of Steph. Gobarus, Biblioth. cod. 132. p. 901. that St. Basil did not think very favourably of Dionysius, while Athanasius, on the other hand, altogether approved of his doctrines. In opposing the Sabellians, this great man certainly made use of phrases and forms of expression by no means elegant, or adapted to explain the mystery of the Holy Trinity. Hence it happened that he was not only subjected to much crimination in former times, but also at the present day is held by many excellent men to have uttered words unworthy of and derogatory to God. See Pet. Dan. Huet, Origenian. lib. 2. cap. 2. qu. 2. sect. 10. 25. But Dionysius rendered more prudent by these slanders of his adversaries, refuted the charges in a specific *Apology*, and towards the close of his life discoursed of the divine persons with much greater modesty and reverence.

[2] It is not my intention to defend all that the early Christian fathers have suffered to escape them in explaining the doctrine of three persons in one God: in which there is much, it must be confessed, that is not in conformity with the strict rule of scriptural theology, or will stand the test of severe criticism: their comparisons especially, drawn from human and natural things, not even excepting those in which Athanasius was accustomed to indulge, are calculated to shock the minds of those who entertain a right conception of things divine, and who deny that the Deity is to be estimated according to the frail and miserable circumstances of mortals. Still, however, I cannot

And thus does there seem not to be so great a difference betwixt the more genuine Platonists, and the ancient orthodox fathers, in their doctrine concerning the Trinity, as is by many

agree with those who press those similitudes and images too closely, and, like the learned Doctor, consider them to be a sufficient proof that the ancient Christian fathers belonged to that class who suppose the natures of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost to differ in degree and dignity. What in the first place indisposes me from doing so is, that these very similitudes from which Dr. Cudworth concludes Dionysius and Athanasius to have held the Son to be inferior to the Father, and the Holy Ghost inferior to both Father and Son, if interpreted too rigidly and invidiously, would subject these doctors to the charge of Sabellianism; a crime from which they were notoriously most free. For the sun, the splendour of the sun, and the radiance surrounding the sun, are no other light than one and the same sun striking the eyes in different ways: neither are water and vapour distinguished by any thing else than the mere mode of existence. The same may be said of the fountain and the river that flows from it. Those, therefore, who deny these comparisons to be sufficient to establish against the ancient doctors of the church the charge of Sabellianism, must admit at the same time, that no use whatever can be made of them towards determining what sentiments those who employed them entertained in reference to the divine Trinity. In the second place I am induced to put a more favourable construction upon these comparisons than at first view seems to be required, for this reason also, that their authors very frequently acknowledge that there is much dissimilitude in them, and that human and visible things supply nothing so perfect as to be a genuine image of the divine nature. I have observed in ancient authors many passages to this effect: some of which I shall here adduce in order to correct the impressions of those who draw matter for the gravest charges from the similitudes employed by the Christian fathers. The first is a striking passage of Cosma, surnamed *Indicopleustes*, in which he tells us that all comparisons of the Trinity are unworthy of the Deity, not even excepting those by which the apostles illustrated this mystery. Thus after bringing forward certain similitudes himself, Topograph. Christianæ, lib. 5. p. 258. tom. 2. Collect. Novæ Patr. Græcor. a Bernh. Montfaucon. Curatæ, he proceeds as follows: Ἐχρήσαντο δὲ καί τινες πατέρες παραδείγμασι σωματικώτερον ἐπὶ τῆς ἱερᾶς Τριάδος· οἱ μὲν ὡς ἀπὸ ἀενάου πηγῆς καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς δύο ποταμοὺς προχεομένους· οἱ δὲ δένδρῳ, ὡς ῥίζῃ, καὶ κλάδῳ, καὶ καρπῷ· πάντες δὲ, εἴτε ἀπόστολοι, εἴτε πατέρες, ὡς ἄνθρωποι, σωματικώτερον ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος ἐμπνευσθέντες ἐξεῖπον, ὡς ἐν παραδείγμασι, λειπόμενα μέντοι πάνυ τῆς θείας οὐσίας· ἐν δὲ τῇ μελλούσῃ καταστάσει, ὡς πνευματικοὶ ἀνιστάμενοι πάλιν, ἀκριβέστερον γνωσόμεθα περὶ θεοῦ, "Certain of the fathers, however, made use of similitudes respecting the holy Trinity after a more corporeal manner: some speaking of it as of two rivers flowing out of an eternal fountain; others comparing it to a tree, as consisting of root, branch, and fruit: but they all, whether apostles or fathers, spoke as men after a corporeal manner, by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit; using examples falling far short of the divine essence. But in a future state, as having risen again in spirit, we shall have a more accurate knowledge of God." The next is St. Hilary, who intimates not only that human comparisons little correspond to the glory and majesty of divinity, but also that the corruptors of the truth were principally the cause why the Christian fathers had recourse to such like adumbrations, De Trinitate, lib. 7. sec. 29. p. 935, Admonuisse, says he, nos in exordio sermonis nostri, meminimus, *humanas comparationes* divinis non satisfacere exemplis: tamen pro parte intelligentiæ nostræ sensum formis corporalibus erudiri, "I remember having observed in the beginning of my discourse, that human comparisons are not adequate to the divine examples: nevertheless that on the part of our intelligence the sense is instructed by bodily forms." Afterwards, having instanced some comparisons of the kind, he thus goes on, sec. 30. p. 937: Hæc—ad intelligentiam fidei tantum comparata sint, non etiam ad Dei dignitatem, ut nos potius intelligentiam invisibilium ex corporalibus sumeremus, non utique ut aliquid naturæ Dei satisfaceret comparationis exemplum,—sed quia simpliciorum fidem furor hæreticus turbaret, ut id de Deo credi non oporteret, quod difficile, nisi per corpoream comparationem, posset intelligi, "These—are to be considered as accommodated merely to our understanding of the faith, not also to the dignity of God, that we rather might obtain

conceived. However, our Platonic Christian would further add, that there is no necessity at all from the principles of Platonism itself, why the Platonists should make any other or more subordination in their Trinity, than the most severely orthodox fathers themselves. For according to the common hypothesis of the Platonists, when the character of the first hypostasis is supposed by them to be infinite goodness; of the second, infinite wisdom; and of the third, infinite active love and power (these not as accidents and qualities, but as all substantial), it is more easy to conceive

a knowledge of invisible from corporeal things, not certainly that any example used in comparison should fully represent the nature of God,—but because the faith of the more simple was unsettled by the madness of heretics, as that in reference to God that which can with difficulty be understood except by corporeal comparison ought not to be believed." Our third testimony is from St. Cyril of Alexandria, who discoursing of divine generation and the three persons in one God, says, amongst other things as follows, Adv. Julianum. lib. 8. p. 264, 265, *Μικρὰ μὲν λίαν τῶν παραδειγμάτων ἡ παράθεσις· ἱκανὴ δὲ οὖν ὅμως ἀναβίβασαι τὸν νοῦν εἰς τὰ ἐπέκεινα λόγου τοῦ καθ' ἡμᾶς· ἐπειδὴ γάρ, εἴ τι πρὸς γένεσιν τὴν τῆς ἀνωτάτω πασῶν οὐσίας ὑποπέπτωκε δόξαν, καὶ οὐδεν ἐστιν ὁλοτρόπως προσεικὸς αὐτῇ καὶ ἀπαραλλάκτως ἔχον ταύτῃ τοι καὶ μάλα εἰκότως τὴν ἐκ τῶν παραδειμάτων ἐρανιζόμεθα, ἐκ πολλῶν ἕν τι καὶ μόλις βραχὺ συναγείροντες, εἰς ἀμυδρὰν καὶ μετρίαν τῶν ζητουμένων παράστασιν,* "The comparisons propounded are exceedingly weak and imperfect: nevertheless they are sufficient to elevate the mind to things which are above our reason. For since whatever is brought forward is far below the glory of the supreme essence of all, and nothing is wholly similar or equal to it, we therefore not unreasonably ask for the use of comparisons, collecting one thing from many, and that too a mere trifle, as an obscure and slight demonstration of what we are inquiring into." St. Augustine is complained of by many, and not altogether without reason, for too free and bold a use of images respecting the divine Trinity. And yet he himself in various places ascribes but little importance to his comparisons; as for instance in the following words from his book Contra. Sermon. Arianor. cap. 16. tom. 8. opp. p. 450, Quatenus sint autem ista similia, et rursus quantum dissimilia illi incommutabili Trinitati, quæ Deus est, longum est enucleatissime disputare. Sed ideo tantum hoc commemorandum putavi, ut etiam de ipsa creatura aliquid adhiberem, unde isti, si possunt, intelligant, quam non sit absurdum, quod de patre, filio, et spiritu sancto dicimus, &c. " In what respect these are similar, and again how far they are dissimilar, to the incommutable Trinity, which is God, would be matter for long and elaborate discussion. But I have thought it right to speak of this simply on this account, that I might make use also of something borrowed from created things, from which those may understand, if they can, how that should not be absurd, which we say of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost," &c. The last evidence we shall quote is Joh. Damascenus, De Fide Orthodoxa, lib. 1. p. 137. tom. 1. opp. *Ἀδύνατον γὰρ εὑρεθῆναι ἐν τῇ κτίσει ἀπαραλλάκτως ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὸν τρόπον τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος παραδεικνύουσαν· τὸ γὰρ κτιστὸν, καὶ σύνθετον, καὶ ῥευστὸν, καὶ τρεπτὸν, καὶ περιγραπτὸν, καὶ σχῆμα ἔχον, καὶ φθαρτὸν, πῶς σαφῶς ἐηλώσει τὴν πάντων τούτων ἀπηλλαγμένην ὑπερούσιον θείαν οὐσίαν,* "For it is impossible for any image to be found in created things, representing in itself the nature of the holy Trinity without any point of dissimilitude. For how can a thing created, and compound, and perishable, and changeable, and endowed with figure, and corruptible, clearly express the superessential divine essence, which is exempt from all these?" Many more passages of the kind might be adduced, if necessary, from the books now extant of the ancient fathers of the church. And seeing that they thought thus modestly and wisely of the nature and use of their comparisons, I do not understand with what justice they are charged by many persons with the gravest errors for no other reason than because the similitudes by which they illustrate the mystery of the divine Triad are not sufficiently elegant, and do not fully and adequately express its dignity and majesty.

that all these are really but one and the same God, than how there should be any considerable inferiority in them.[3] But besides this, there is another Platonic hypothesis (which St.

[3] The learned Doctor here expresses himself more briefly and obscurely than I could wish. I shall endeavour, however, to explain his meaning; and for whatever error I may be guilty of must rest upon his obscurity for my excuse. The characteristic of the first person he tells us, according to the Platonic doctrine, is goodness, of the second *wisdom*, of the third *love* and *power*. This doctrine he considers to go far towards proving an agreement between the Christian and Platonic dogmas respecting the divine Trinity; it being easy to understand from it how three persons constitute one God, but difficult to conceive how one is inferior to another. For we can readily comprehend, in the case even of our own souls, how goodness, wisdom, and love form one nature, but why goodness should be inferior to wisdom, or wisdom to love, or what should so disconnect and separate these three, as to render one subject to another, is not equally plain and intelligible. According to the learned Doctor, therefore, this doctrine of the Platonists, if rightly understood, admirably illustrates the unity of the divine essence in three persons; while, on the other hand, it affords scarcely any vestige of *subordination* or subjection, just as little or no difference is observable in the three virtues or perfections above mentioned. This, if I am not much mistaken, is Dr. Cudworth's meaning, expressed as it is by him somewhat obscurely. Now I will admit all that he lays down as the groundwork of this opinion, namely, that the Platonic sect thought as he here represents them to have done; I will grant also, that it is much easier for us to conceive how three virtues can constitute one nature, than to understand the difference that separates these virtues, confining my inquiries to the subject itself. In my opinion, however, the very thing added by Dr. Cudworth, that these three names, *goodness*, *wisdom*, *love*, are names not of three virtues or qualities, but of three persons, or really existing natures, entirely destroys the force of this subtle argumentation. For if these three words were to imply three modes or three notions or perfections, Dr. Cudworth's reasoning would have been intelligible, and we should have no reason to complain of this dogma of a triune God being involved in infinite darkness; for every one is aware that one nature can be viewed in various respects, and be endowed with many perfections. In that case, however, there would be an end of all distinction, and there would be no more difference between the three persons of the divine nature than between three faculties of one soul, or three modes of action. The Sabellians, as they are called, therefore, would be right; nor have I any doubt but that the Socinians themselves, and the Jews, would willingly adopt this Trinity. But if *goodness*, *wisdom* and *love* are the names of three persons, I am at a loss to understand what aid these names can afford us towards a more clear conception of the divine Trinity. For the expressing an abstruse thing by different names does not change its nature; and therefore, if instead of the words *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, men make use of the names *goodness*, *love*, *wisdom* in the same notion, they do not thereby render it more intelligible than before how three in God are one. The same may be said of all those who, after the example of St. Augustine, De Trinitate, lib. 14. cap. 8. tom. 9. opp. p. 675. &c. fancied they discovered images of the divine Trinity in our soul and its faculties. If the words *memory*, *intelligence*, and *love*, which St. Augustine and an infinity of others after him employed in this matter, retain the same signification which they possess when applied to the human soul, we can better understand indeed, what is meant by a triune God, but at the same time we lose the whole mystery. But if these names receive a new meaning and signify really existing natures, we come back again to the old difficulties, and have gained nothing by this image, inasmuch as the change of names can produce no change in the thing itself. Such being the case, Dr. Cudworth's Platonic Christian will have a twofold risk to encounter. Should he acknowledge the names *goodness*, *love*, *wisdom* to be designations of qualities and perfections, the Trinity of the Platonists will differ entirely from the Christian Trinity; but if he declares that persons are meant by these names, what I would ask have we gained towards removing the barriers that separate us from the Platonists? Will the unity in the Trinity be made more intelligible thereby? Will the *subordination* of persons in the Platonic Trinity disappear, because the names of things in which no difference in dignity is discernible are applied to those persons? There is a vast difference and disparity between *a king*, the *son of a king*, and the *minister* of both; but

Austin* hinteth from Porphyrius, (though he professeth he did not well understand it) where the third hypostasis is made to be a certain middle betwixt the first and second. And this does Proclus also sometimes follow, calling the third in like manner, *μέσην δύναμιν*, "a middle power," and *σχέσιν ἀμφοῖν*, "the relation of both the first and second to one another." Which agreeth exactly with that apprehension of some Christians, that the third hypostasis is as it were the nexus betwixt the first and the second, and that love whereby the Father and Son love each other.[4] Now, according to this latter Platonic hypothesis, there

let us discard these names and substitute these three in their stead, *lord, governor, magistrate*, will this change of names cause the persons themselves, who before were so widely separated, to be equal to each other?

* De Civit. Dei. lib. 10. cap. 23. Cum dicit medium, non postponit, sed interponit.

[4] To give a clearer insight into what is here stated I shall quote St. Augustine's own words: Quæ (Porphyrius) dicat esse principia, tamquam Platonicus, novimus. Dicit enim Deum patrem et Deum filium, quem Græce appellat paternum intellectum vel paternam mentem. De Spiritu autem sancto aut nihil, aut non aperte aliquid dicit: quamvis, quem alium dicat horum medium, non intelligo. Si enim tertiam, sicut Plotinus, ubi de tribus principalibus substantiis disputat, animæ naturam etiam iste vellet intelligi, non utique diceret horum medium, id est, patris et filii medium. Postponit quippe Plotinus animæ naturam paterno intellectui: iste autem, quum dicit medium, non postponit, sed interponit, "What he (Porphyry), as a Platonist, says are principles we know. For he says God the Father and God the Son, whom in Greek he calls the paternal intellect or mind. But of the Holy Spirit he says either nothing at all or nothing clearly, although I don't know what else he can call middle between these. For if he also, like Plotinus, when discoursing of the three principal substances, meant the nature of the soul to be understood as the third, he would not have said middle between these, that is, between the Father and the Son. For Plotinus places the nature of the soul after the paternal intellect; whereas he, by using the term middle, does not place it after but between." To me St. Augustine appears to have written this without due consideration. For he reasons thus: Whatever is intermediate between two natures cannot be subject to them or inferior in order; therefore as Porphyry calls the nature which he adds to the Father and the Son, *middle*, it cannot possibly be the same nature that Plotinus calls *mind* and the *third hypostasis*; consequently Plotinus and Porphyry differ in their theology. The worthy father here creates unnecessary difficulties, and forgets that there is nothing to hinder a nature from being *intermediate* between two others, and at the same time the *third* in order. For a thing is said to be *μέσον* or *middle* in two ways, either in respect to *nature* or *order*. Whatever is made up, as it were, and compounded of two natures, or possesses any thing of a twofold kind, is sometimes called *middle*; in which sense the word *middle* is the same as *mixed*. Cicero De Optimo Genere Orator. cap. 1. p. 822. tom. 2. opp. Oratorum si quis ita numeret plura genera, ut alios grandes,—alios tenues, alios eis interjectos et tamquam *medios* putet, "If any one should reckon more kinds of orators, so as to suppose some as copious, others as barren, and others as interposed and as it were *intermediate* between them." Here the intermediate orators are compounded, as it were, of the copious and barren. But those also are called intermediate who hold the second or middle place between two. It does not necessarily follow, however, that that which is intermediate in the former way, namely, in respect to *nature*, is intermediate in respect to *order* also. The number three, to give an example especially appropriate to this subject, is intermediate as regards its nature between unity and the number two, as being compounded of the monad and dyad; but in respect to order it occupies not the middle but the third place. Cicero supplies us with another example; as he calls the oratorical foot the *pæon*, which consists of an *iambus* and a *trochee*, both intermediate between the iambus and trochee, and at the same time the *third*, namely, in degree and order, De Oratore, cap. 57. p. 744. tom. 2. opp. Ita Pæona probat (Ephorus), eoque ait uti omnes, sed ipsos non sentire, quum utantur, esse autem *tertium* ac *medium* inter illos, "Thus he

would seem to be not so much a gradation or descent, as a kind of circulation in the Trinity. Upon all which considerations, the Platonic Christian will conclude, that though some junior Platonists have adulterated the notion of the Trinity, yet either there is no such great difference betwixt the genuine Platonic trinity, rightly understood, and the Christian; or else, that as the same might be modelled and rectified, there need not to be.

But though the genuine Platonists do thus suppose the three hypostases of their trinity to be all of them, not only God, but also one God, or μία θεότης, "one entire Divinity;" upon which latter account the whole may be said also by them to have one singular or numerical essence: yet notwithstanding must it be acknowledged, that they nowhere suppose each of these three hypostases to be numerically the very same, or to have no distinct singular essences of their own; this being, in their apprehensions, directly contradictious to their very hypothesis

(Ephorus) approves of the pæon, and says that all use it, and when they do use it are not themselves aware that it is the *third* and *intermediate* between those." The Platonists, who call the third hypostasis a certain *middle*, or μέση δύναμις between the first and second, use this word in the former signification, and mean simply that the third person is mixed up as it were of the two former, and owes something to both. Thus they suppose the first hypostasis to be the most perfect *monad*, the second, which they call reason or wisdom, to comprise a multitude, and the third to be compounded in a certain manner of unity and multitude. In the first hypostasis they place infinite *goodness*, in the second infinite *wisdom*; and suppose that the third person derives both goodness and wisdom from these. Whoever reads Plotinus' book De Tribus Hypostatibus with attention can have no doubt of this being the case; for Plotinus both declares the third hypostasis to be *one*, cap. 2. p. 483. and in another place says that it is *number* or *multitude*. See cap. 3. 6. p. 484. 487. Compare Proclus' Theologia Platonica, lib. 3. cap. 11. p. 135. &c. where he discusses the whole of this subject with great copiousness and subtlety, declaring that the third hypostasis is μέση or *intermediate* between that which is ἄπειρον, or *infinite*, and that which is *finite*, that is, is compounded as it were of both. But this intermediate nature ascribed by the Platonists to the third hypostasis, does not prevent it from holding the third place in the divine Triad, and being inferior to the other two. And this being the case, it is evident that St. Augustine did not take a correct view of the entire Platonic discipline, when he fancied Plotinus to be at variance with Porphyry, because one calls the soul of the world the intermediate and the other the third nature; neither did Dr. Cudworth make use of due diligence when he thought it right to follow in his footsteps, and to abuse his authority towards lessening the discrepancy between the Platonic and the Christian Trinity. Because the Platonists call their third hypostasis intermediate, the learned Doctor considers it to be a proof that they do not place it very far below the first and second hypostasis, and therefore that the subordination in the Platonic Trinity is not so great as would appear; on the contrary, that the doctrine of the Platonists respecting the third hypostasis is not far removed from the opinion of those Christians who assert the Holy Ghost to be the bond or connecting link between the Father and Son. The worthy Doctor, I conceive, would have written nothing of the kind if he had been less anxious to establish a harmony between the Platonists and Christians. Concerning those who called the Holy Ghost the bond between the Father and Son consult Dion. Petavius, Dogm. Theolog. tom. 2. lib. 7. De Trinitate, cap. 12. sect. 8. p. 410. &c. It were to be wished, indeed, that they had exercised more prudence and caution, and had abstained from introducing into a doctrine so far above human comprehension notions and words, of which no examples are to be met with in sacred writ. Nevertheless, they are far removed in opinion from those Platonists who call their third hypostasis a μέση δύναμις, and merely illustrate the intimate connexion of the three persons by an image borrowed from human affairs.

itself, and all one, as if they should affirm them indeed not to be three hypostases, but only one. Nevertheless, the Christian Platonists would here also apologize for them after this manner; that the ancient orthodox fathers of the Christian church were generally of no other persuasion than this, that that essence or substance of Godhead, which all the three persons or hypostases agree in, as each of them is God, was not one singular and individual, but only one common and universal essence or substance; that word substance being used by them as synonymous with essence, and applied to universals likewise, as it is by the Peripatetics, when then they call a man, or animal in general, substantiam secundam, "a second substance." Now this is evident from hence, because these orthodox fathers did commonly distinguish, in this controversy of the Trinity, betwixt Οὐσία and Ὑπόστασις, "the essence or substance of the Godhead," and the hypostases or persons themselves, after this manner; namely, that the hypostasis or person was singular and individual, but the essence or substance common and universal. Thus does Theodoret* pronounce of these fathers in general: Κατάγε τὴν τῶν πατέρων διδασκαλίαν, ἣν ἔχει διαφορὰν τὸ κοινὸν ὑπὲρ τὸ ἴδιον, ἢ τὸ γένος ὑπὲρ τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ἄτομον, ταύτην ἔχει Ἡ ΟΥ̓ΣἸΑ πρὸς ΤἨΝ ΥΠὈΣΤΑΣΙΝ, "According to the doctrine of the fathers, as that which is common differs from that which is proper, and the genus from the species or individium, so doth essence or substance, differ from hypostases;" that is to say, that essence or substance of the Godhead, which is common to all the three hypostases, or whereby each of them is God, was concluded by the fathers not to be one singular or individual, but one general or universal essence and substance; Theodoret, notwithstanding, there acknowledging that no such distinction was observed by other Greek writers betwixt those two words οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, "essence or substance" and hypostasis, as that the former of them should be restrained to universals only, generical or specifical essences or substances; but that this was peculiar to the Christian fathers, in their doctrine concerning the Trinity. They in the mean time not denying but that each hypostasis, prosopon, or person, in the Trinity, might be said in another sense, and in way of opposition to Sabellius, to have its own singular, individual, or existent essence also; and that there are thus, τρεῖς οὐσίαι,† "three singular existent essences" in the Deity, as well as τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, "three hypostases;" an hypostasis being nothing else to them, but an existent essence:[5] however, for distinction's sake, they here

* Dial. 1. adv. Hær. [Tom. 2. opp. p. 297.]

† Greg. Nyssen. adv. Eunom. lib. 12. [P. 301. tom. 2. opp.]

[5] Add of the same Gregory, whom Dr. Cudworth cites in his note, lib. 1. adv. Eunomium, in Appendice opp. Gregorii Nysseni, Paris. 1618. fol. p. 97. It ought

thought fit thus to limit and appropriate the signification of these two words, that a singular and existent essence should not be called essence, but hypostasis; and by *οὐσία*, "essence" or "substance," should be meant that general or universal nature of the Godhead only, which is common to all those three singular hypostases or persons, or in which they all agree. We might here heap up many more testimonies for a further confirmation of this; as that of St. Basil:* Ὃν ἔχει λόγον τὸ κοινὸν πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον, τοῦτον ἔχει ἡ οὐσία πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν, "What common is to proper, the same is essence or substance (in the Trinity) to the hypostases." But we shall content ourselves only with this full acknowledgment of D. Petavius:† In hoc uno Græcorum præsertim omnium judicia concordant, *οὐσίαν*, id est, essentiam sive substantiam, aut naturam (quàm *φύσιν* vocant) generale esse aliquid et commune, ac minimè definitum; *ὑπόστασιν* verò proprium, singulare, et circumscriptum, quod ex illo communi, et peculiaribus quibusdam notis ac proprietatibus veluti componitur, "In this one thing do the judgments and opinions of all the Greeks especially agree, that Usia, essence or substance, and nature, which they call Physis (in the trinity) is something general, common, and undetermined; but hypostasis is that which is proper, singular, and circumscribed, and which is, as it were, compounded and made up of that common essence or substance, and certain peculiar notes and properties, or individuating circumstances."

But besides this, it is further certain, that not a few of those ancient fathers, who were therefore reputed orthodox, because they zealously opposed Arianism, did entertain this opinion also, that the three hypostases or persons of the Trinity, had not only one general and universal essence of the Godhead, belonging to them all, they being all God; but were also three individuals, under one and the same ultimate species, or specific essence and substance of the Godhead; just as three individual men (Thomas, Peter, and John) under that ultimate species of man; or that specific essence of humanity which have only a numerical difference from one another. Wherefore an hypostasis, or person (in the Trinity) was accordingly thus defined by some of these fathers (viz. Anastasius and Cyril[6]) to be Essentia cum suis qui-

here to be remarked generally, that the Nicene Doctors, and those immediately following them, employ the words *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις* promiscuously in reference to the Trinity, and frequently confound the two; but that those who are a little further removed from the Nicene period circumscribe the meaning of each word, as Theodoret has done.

* Ep. 369. [Ep. 349 tom. 2. opp. p. 1046. Edit. Paris, 1638.]

† De Trin. lib. 4. c. 7. [Sect. 2. p. 215. tom. 2. Dogmat. Theolog.]

[6] This definition is met with in the *Ἐκθεσις σύντομος τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως*, or *Concise Exposition of the Orthodox Faith*, extant under the names of Anastasius and St. Cyril, and supposed by learned men to be a compilation from the writings of both

busdam proprietatibus ab iis, quæ sunt ejusdem speciei, numero differens, "an essence or substance, with its certain properties (or individuating circumstances) differing only numerically from those of the same species with it." This doctrine was plainly asserted and industriously pursued (besides several others both of the Greeks and Latins), especially by Gregory Nyssen, Cyril of Alexandria, Maximus the Martyr, and Damascen; whose words, because Petavius[7] hath set them down at large, we shall not here insert. Now these were they who principally insisted upon the absolute co-equality and independent co-ordination of the three hypostases or persons in the Trinity, as compared with one another. Because, as three men, though one of them were a father, another a son, and the third a nephew, yet have no essential dependence one upon another, but are naturally co-equal and unsubordinate, there being only a numerical difference betwixt them; so did they in like manner conclude, that the three hypostases, or persons of the Deity (the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost), being likewise but three individuals, under the same ultimate species or specific essence of the Godhead, and differing only numerically from one another, were absolutely co-equal, unsubordinate, and independent: and this was that which was commonly called by them their ὁμοουσιότης, their co-essentiality or consubstantiality. Wherefore it is observable, that St. Cyril, one of these theologers, finds no other fault at all with the Platonic trinity, but only this, that such an Homo-ousiotes, such a co-essentiality or consubstantiality as this, was not acknowledged therein: Ἐλελοίπει δ' ἂν πρὸς τοῦτο αὐτοῖς οὐδέν, εἰ τὸν τῆς ὁμοουσιότητος λόγον ἐφαρμόττειν ἤθελον ὑποστάσεσι ταῖς τρισὶν, ἵνα καὶ μία νοοῖτο τῆς θεότητος φύσις, τὸ τρισχιδὲς οὐκ ἔχουσα πρὸς ἑτερότητα φυσικὴν, καὶ τό γε δὴ δεῖν ἀλλήλων ἐν μείωσιν ὁρᾶσθαι ὑποστάσεις, "There would have been nothing at all wanting to the Platonic trinity for an absolute agreement of it with the Christian, had they but accommodated the right notion of co-essentiality or consubstantiality to their three hypostases; so that there might have been but one specific nature or essence of the Godhead, not futher distinguishable by any natural diversity, but numerically only, and so no one hypostasis any way inferior or subordinate to another." That is, had these Platonists complied with that hypostasis of St.

these fathers. It was first edited by Theod Beza, and was afterwards included in the fifteenth volume of the Magna Bibliotheca, published at Paris, 1645, p. 677.

[7] De Trinitate, lib. 4. cap. 9. sec. 4. &c. tom. 2. Dogm. Theol. It is my intention to discuss the whole of this subject in the Preface. For since the time of Dr. Cudworth and Petavius the same charge has been brought against many of the Nicene doctors by several others also, of equal ability and learning; whose arguments are considered by a great many as very difficult to be refuted.

[8] Contra Julian. lib. 8. p. 270.

Cyril and others, that the three persons of the Trinity were but three independent and co-ordinate individuals, under the same ultimate species or specific essence of the Godhead, as Peter, Paul, and John, under that species or common nature of humanity, and so taken in this co-essentiality or consubstantiality of theirs, then had they been completely orthodox. Though we have already showed that this Platonic trinity was, in another sense, Homo-ousian; and perhaps it will appear afterwards, that it was so also in the very sense of the Nicene fathers, and of Athanasius. Again, these theologers supposed the three persons of their trinity to have really no other than a specific unity or identity; and because it seems plainly to follow from hence, that therefore they must needs be as much three gods as three men are three men; these learned fathers endeavoured with their logic to prove, that three men are but abusively and improperly so called three, they being really and truly but one, because there is but one and the same specific essence or substance of human nature in them all; and seriously persuaded men to lay aside that kind of language. By which same logic of theirs they might as well prove also, that all the men in the world are but one man, and that all Epicurus' gods were but one god neither. But not to urge here, that, according to this hypothesis, there cannot possibly be any reason given why there should be so many as three such individuals in the species of God, which differ only numerically from one another, they being but the very same thing thrice repeated; and yet that there should be no more than three such neither, and not three hundred, or three thousand, or as many as there are individuals in the species of man; we say, not to urge this, it seems plain, that this trinity is no other than a kind of Tritheism, and that of gods independent and co-ordinate too. And therefore some would think, that the ancient and genuine Platonic trinity, taken with all its faults, is to be preferred before this trinity of St. Cyril and St. Gregory Nyssen, and several other reputed orthodox fathers; and more agreeable to the principles both of Christianity and of reason. However, it is evident from hence, that these reputed orthodox fathers, who were not a few, were far from thinking the three hypostases of the Trinity to have the same singular existent essence, they supposing them to have no otherwise one and the same essence of the Godhead in them, nor to be one God, than three individual men have one common specifical essence of manhood in them, and are all one man. But as this trinity came afterwards to be decried for tritheistic; so in the room thereof started there up that other trinity of persons numerically the same, or having all one and the same singular existent essence; a doctrine which seemeth not to have been

owned by any public authority in the Christian church, save that of the Lateran council[8] only.

And that no such thing was ever entertained by the Nicene fathers and those first opposers of Arianism, might be rendered probable in the first place from the free confession and acknowledgment of D. Petavius (a person well acquainted with ecclesiastic antiquity), and for this reason especially, because many are much led by such new names and authorities: In eo præcipuam vim collocasse patres, ut æqualem patri naturâ excellentiâque filium esse defenderent, citra expressam SINGULARITATIS mentionem, licet ex eo conjicere. Etenim Nicæni isti præsules, quibus nemo melius Arianæ sectæ arcana cognovit, nemo, qua re opprimenda maximè foret, acrius dijudicare potuit, nihil in professionis suæ formulâ spectarunt aliud, nisi ut æqualitatem illam essentiæ, dignitatis, æternitatis astruerent. Testatur hoc ὁμοούσιον vox ipsa, quæ arx quædam fuit catholici dogmatis. Hæc enim æqualitatem potius essentiæ, quam SINGULARITATEM significat, ut capite quinto docui. Deinde cætera ejusdem modi sunt in illo decreto, ut, &c. "The chief force, which the ancient fathers opposed against the Arian heretics, was in asserting only the equality of the Son with the Father, as to nature or essence, without any express mention of the SINGULARITY of the same. For those Nicene bishops themselves, who did understand best of any the secrets of the Arian faction, and which way it should especially be oppugned, aimed at nothing else in their confession of faith, but only to establish that equality of essence, dignity,

[8] He means no doubt the fourth general Lateran Council, assembled under the auspices of Pope Innocent III. A.D. 1215. The Acts are extant in J. Harduinus' Concilior. tom. 7. p. 1. &c. The Abbè Joachim had at that period propounded a doctrine somewhat similar to that which Dr. Cudworth tells us a little above was taught by some of the ancient theologians: namely, he had denied "a true, simple, and real unity of essence of the three persons:" asserting on the contrary, that there is in God "only *a unity of concord*, as many men are called one people, and many believers one church." See Natalis Alexander, Histor. Eccles. sæc. 13. cap. 331. To meet this error the Lateran Council at once decided in their first decree as follows: Firmiter credimus, et simpliciter confitemur, quod unus solus est verus Deus,—Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, tres quidem personæ, sed una essentia, substantia seu natura simplex omnino," "We firmly believe and simply confess that the true God is one only,—Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, three persons but one essence, substance, or nature, perfectly simple." And in the second law they decree as follows: Nos autem, sacro et universali concilio approbante, credimus et confitemur cum Petro, quod una quædam summa res est, incomprehensibilis quidem et ineffabilis, quæ veraciter est Pater, Filius, et Spiritus sanctus, tres simul personæ ac singulatim quælibet earumdem. Et ideo in Deo Trinitas est solummodo, non quaternitas; quia quælibet trium personarum est illa res, videlicet substantia, essentia, sive natura divina, quæ sola est universorum principium, præter quod aliud inveniri non potest, "But we, with the approval of this sacred and universal council, believe and confess with St. Peter, that there is one supreme, incomprehensible, and ineffable, which is truly the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, the three persons together, and each of them separately. And therefore there is in God only a Trinity, not a quaternity; because each of the three persons is that supreme thing, namely divine substance, essence, or nature, which alone is the principle of all things, besides which no other can be found."

* De Trin. lib. 4. cap. 13. [Sec. 7. p. 248. tom. 2. Dogmat. Theolog.]

and eternity between them. This does the word Homo-ousios itself declare, it signifying rather equality, than SINGULARITY of essence, as we have before showed. And the like do those other passages in the same decree; as, That there was no time when the Son was not; and, That he was not made of nothing, nor of a different hypostasis, or essence." Thus does Petavius clearly confess, that this same singularity of numerical essence was not asserted by the Nicene council, nor the most ancient fathers, but only an equality or sameness of generical essence; or else that the Father and Son agreed only in one common essence or substance of the Godhead, that is, the eternal and uncreated nature.

But the truth of this will more fully appear from these following particulars: first, Because these orthodox Anti-arian fathers did all of them zealously condemn Sabellianism, the doctrine whereof is no other than this, that there was but one hypostasis, or singular individual essence, of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and consequently that they were indeed but three several names, or notions, or modes, of one and the self-same thing. From whence such absurdities as these would follow, that the Father's begetting the Son was nothing but one name, notion, or mode of the Deity's begetting another; or else the same Deity, under one notion, begetting itself under another notion. And when again the Son, or Word, and not the Father, is said to have been incarnated, and to have suffered death for us upon the cross, that it was nothing but a mere logical notion or mode of the Deity, that was incarnate and suffered, or else the whole Deity under one particular notion or mode only. But should it be averred notwithstanding, that this trinity, which we now speak of, was not a trinity of mere names and notions, as that of the Sabellians, but of distinct hypostases or persons; then must it needs follow (since every singular essence is an hypostasis, according to the sense of the ancient fathers) that there was not a trinity only, but a quaternity of hypostases, in the Deity. Which is a thing that none of those fathers ever dreamed of.

Again, the word Homo-ousios, as was before intimated by Petavius, was never used by Greek writers otherwise than to signify the agreement of things numerically differing from one another in some common nature or universal essence, or their having a generical unity or identity, of which sundry instances might be given. Nor indeed is it likely that the Greek tongue should have any name for that which neither is a thing in nature, nor falls under human conception, viz. several things having one and the same singular essence. And accordingly St. Basil interprets the force of this word thus:* Ἀναιρεῖ τὴν ταυτότητα τῆς

* In Epist. [Epist. 300. p. 1070. tom. 2. opp.]

ὑποστάσεως· οὐ γὰρ αὐτῷ τί ἐστιν ἑαυτῷ ὁμοούσιον, ἀλλ' ἑτερὸν ἑτέρῳ, "That it plainly takes away the sameness of hypostasis, that is, of singular numerical essence (this being that which the ancient fathers meant by the word hypostasis), for the same thing is not homo-ousios, co-essential or consubstantial with itself, but always one thing with another." Wherefore as τὸ ὁμοούσιον and συγγένεια, are used by Plotinus as synonymous, in these words concerning the soul,* θείων μεστὴ διὰ συγγένειαν καὶ τὸ ὁμοούσιον, "that it is full of divine things, by reason of its being cognate or congenerous, and homo-ousios with them;" so doth Athanasius in like manner use them, when he affirmeth,† τὰ κλήματα εἶναι ὁμοούσια καὶ συγγενῆ τῆς ἀμπέλου, "that the branches are homo-ousious [co-essential or consubstantial] and congenerous with the vine, or with the root thereof." Besides which, the same father uses ὁμογενὴς, and ὁμοειδὴς, and ὁμοφυὴς, indifferently for ὁμοούσιος, in sundry places; none of which words can be thought to signify an identity of singular essence, but only of generical or specifical. And thus was the word homo-ousios plainly used by the council of Chalcedon,[9] they affirming that our Saviour Christ was ὁμοούσιος τῷ πατρὶ κατὰ τὴν θεότητα, καὶ ὁμοούσιος ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, "co-essential or consubstantial with the Father, as to his divinity; but co-essential or consubstantial with us men, as to his humanity." Where it cannot reasonably be suspected that one and the same word should be taken in two different senses in the same sentence, so as in the first place to signify a numerical identity, but in the second, a generical or specifical only. But lastly, which is yet more, Athanasius himself speaketh in like manner of our Saviour Christ's being homo-ousious with us men:‡ Εἰ μὲν οὖν ὁμοούσιός ἐστιν ἡμῖν υἱὸς, καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡμῖν ἔχει γένεσιν, ἔστω κατὰ τοῦτο ὁ υἱὸς ἀλλότριος κατ' οὐσίαν τοῦ πατρὸς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἄμπελος τοῦ γεωργοῦ, "If the Son be co-essential or con-substantial (or of the same essence or substance) with us men, he having the very same nature with us, then let him be in this respect a stranger to the essence or substance of the Father, even as the vine is to the essence of the husbandman." And again, a little after, in the same epistle: Ἢ λέγων μὴ εἶναι τὸν λόγον ἴδιον τῆς τοῦ Πατρὸς οὐσίας, ἐφρόνει τοῦτον ὁμοούσιον ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, "Or did Dionysius,§ think

* Ennead 4. lib. 7. cap. 10. [P. 464.]

† Epist. De Sent. Dion. p. 556. [Tom. 1 opp.]

[9] In the Definitio Fidei, as it is called, which is extant in the Actio 5. of this council, tom. 2. Concilior. p. 456. ed. Harduini.

‡ Tom. 1. p. 556. [De Sentent. Dionys.]

§ Thus also in his first Epistle to Serapion: Ἄνθρωποί γ' οὖν ὅμοιοι καὶ τὴν ταυτότητα ἔχοντες ὁμοούσιοί ἐσμεν ἀλλήλων, "We men being alike, and having the sameness of nature, are consubstantial with one another." And p. 170. Ὥσπερ οὖν μαίνοιτ' ἂν τις λέγων, τὴν οἰκίαν ὁμοούσιον τοῦ οἰκοδόμου, καὶ τὸ σκάφος τοῦ

you, when he affirmed the Word not to be proper to the essence of the Father, suppose him therefore to be co-essential or consubstantial with us men?" From all which it is unquestionably evident that Athanasius did not, by the word homo-ousios, understand that which hath the same singular and numerical essence with another, but the same common generical or specifical only; and consequently, that he conceived the Son to be co-essential or consubstantial with the Father after that manner.[10]

Furthermore, the true meaning of the Nicene fathers may more fully and thoroughly be perceived, by considering what that doctrine of Arius was which they opposed and condemned. Now Arius maintained, the Son or Word to be κτίσμα, "a creature, made in time," and "mutable," or "defectible;" and for that reason, as Athanasius tells us, ἑτεροούσιον and ἀλλοτριούσιον, "of a different essence or substance from the Father" (that which is created being supposed to differ essentially or substantially from that which is uncreated). Wherefore the Nicene fathers, in way of opposition to this doctrine of Arius, determined that the Son or Word was not thus ἑτεροούσιος, nor ἀλλοτριούσιος, but ὁμοούσιος τῷ Πατρὶ, "co-essential or consubstantial with the Father;" that is, not a creature, but God; or agreeing with the Father in that common nature or essence of the Godhead. So that this is that οὐσία, "essence" or substance" of the ancient fathers, which is said to be the same in all the three hypostases of the Trinity, as they are called God; not a singular existent essence, but the common, general, or universal essence of the Godhead, or of the uncreated nature, called by St. Hilary,* Natura una, non unitate personæ, sed generis, "one nature, not by unity of person, but of kind." Which unity of the common or general essence of the Godhead is the same thing also with that equality, which some of the ancient fathers so much insist upon against Arius; namely, an equality of nature, as the Son and Father are both of them alike God, that essence of the Godhead (which is common to all the three persons) being, as all other essences, supposed to be indivisible. From which equality itself also does it appear, that they acknowledged no identity of singular essence, it being

ναυπηγοῦ, οὕτως πρεπόντως ἂν τις εἴποι, πάντα υἱὸν ὁμοούσιον εἶναι τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ πατρὸς, "It were madness to say, that a house is co-essential or consubstantial with the builder, or a ship with the shipwright; but it is proper to say, that every son is co-essential or consubstantial with his father.

[10] The true meaning of the word ὁμοούσιος in Christian as well as profane Greek authors has been treated of at much greater length by Dion. Petavius, De Trinitate, lib. 4. cap. 5. p. 204. tom. 2. Dogm. Theolog. and Geor. Bull, Defensio Fidei Nicænæ, sec. 2. cap. 1. p. 25. &c. opp. Add Mich. Psellus in the Variæ Quæstiones, edited by Joh. Alb. Fabricius, at the end of vol. 5. Biblioth. Græcæ, quæst. 5. sec. 73.

* De Synodis. [Seu Fide Orientalium, sec. 76. p. 1193. opp.]

absurd to say, that one and the self-same thing is equal to itself. And with this equality of essence did some of these orthodox fathers themselves imply, that a certain inequality of the hypostases or persons also, in their mutual relation to one another, might be consistent. As for example, St. Austin writing thus against the Arians:* Patris ergo, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, etiamsi disparem cogitant potestatem, naturam saltem confiteantur æqualem, "Though they conceive the power of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost to be unequal, yet let them, for all that, confess their nature at least to be equal." And St. Basil likewise:† "Though the Son be in order second to the Father, because produced by him, and in dignity also (forasmuch as the Father is the cause and principle of his being) yet he is not, for all that, second in nature, because there is one divinity in them both." And that this was indeed the meaning, both of the Nicene fathers, and of Athanasius, in their Homo-ousiotes, their co-essentiality or consubstantiality, and co-equality of the Son with the Father, namely, their having both the same common essence of the Godhead; or that the Son was no creature, as Arius contended, but truly God or uncreated likewise, will appear undeniably from many passages in Athanasius, of which we shall here mention only some few. In his epistle concerning the Nicene council, he tells us, how the Eusebian faction subscribed the form of that council, though afterward they recanted it:‡ *Πάντων τε ὑπογραψάντων ὑπέγραψαν καὶ οἱ περὶ Εὐσέβιον τούτοις τοῖς ῥήμασιν, οἷς αἰτιῶνται νῦν οὗτοι· λέγω δὲ τῷ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ τῷ ὁμοουσίῳ, καὶ ὅτι μήτε κτίσμα ἢ ποίημα, μήτε τῶν γεννητῶν ἐστιν ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ υἱός· ἀλλὰ γέννημα καὶ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας ὁ λόγος*, "All the rest subscribing the Eusebianists themselves subscribed also to these very words, which they now find fault with; I mean, of the essence or substance, and co-essential or consubstantial, and that the Son is no creature or factor, or any of the things made, but the genuine offspring of the essence or substance of the Father." Afterwards he declareth, how the Nicene council at first intended to have made use only of scripture words and phrases against the Arians;§ *τῆς συνόδου βουλομένης τὰς μὲν τῶν Ἀρειανῶν τῆς ἀσεβείας λέξεις ἀνελεῖν· τὰς δὲ τῶν γραφῶν ὁμολογουμένας φωνὰς γράψαι, ὅτι τε υἱός ἐστιν οὐκ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ λόγος ἐστὶ καὶ σοφία, ἀλλ' οὐ κτίσμα οὐδὲ ποίημα· ἴδιον δὲ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς γέννημα*, "as that Christ was the Son of God, and not from nothing, but from God, the word and wisdom of God, and consequently, no creature or thing made. But when they perceived that the Eusebian faction would evade all those expressions by equivocation,

* Cont. Serm. Arian. c. 18. [P. 451. tom. 8. opp.]
† 3 Cont. Eunom. [P. 79. tom. 2. opp. Edit. Par. 16. 15.
‡ Page 251. § Page 267.

ναγκάσθησαν λοιπὸν λευκότερον εἰπεῖν τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ· καὶ ῥάψαι ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Θεοῦ εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν, ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ κοινὸν καὶ ἴσον, τοῦ τε υἱοῦ καὶ τῶν γεννητῶν νομίζεσθαι, "they conceived themselves necessitated, more plainly to declare, that they meant by being from God, or out of him; and therefore added, that the Son was out of the substance of God, hereby to distinguish him from all created beings." Again, a little after, in the same epistle, he adds: Ἡ σύνοδος τοῦτο νοοῦσα, καλῶς ὁμοούσιον ἔγραψεν, ἵνα τήν τε τῶν αἱρετικῶν κακοήθειαν ἀναστρέψωσι· καὶ δείξωσιν ἄλλον εἶναι τῶν γεννητῶν τὸν λόγον· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο γράψαντες εὐθὺς ἐπήγαγον· τοὺς δὲ λέγοντας ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἢ κτιστόν· ἢ τρεπτόν· ἢ ποίημα· ἢ ἐξ ἑτέρας οὐσίας, τούτους ἀναθεματίζει ἡ ἁγία καὶ καθολικὴ Ἐκκλησία, "The synod perceiving this, rightly declared, that the Son was Homo-ousios with the Father; both to cut off the subterfuges of heretics, and to show him to be different from the creatures. For after they had decreed this, they added immediately, They who say that the Son of God was from things that are not, or made, or mutable, or a creature, or of another substance or essence, all such does the holy and catholic church anathematize. Whereby they made it evident that these words, Of the Father, and co-essential or consubstantial with the Father, were opposed to the impiety of those expressions of the Arians, that the Son was a creature, or thing made, and mutable, and that he was not before he was made; which he that affirmeth, contradicteth the synod, but whosoever dissents from Arius, must needs consent to these forms of the synod." In this same epistle,* to cite but one passage more out of it: Χαλκὸς, στίλβων, καὶ χρυσὸς, &c. ἀλλ' ἑτεροφυῆ καὶ ἑτεροούσια ἀλλήλων· εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ υἱὸς οὕτως ἐστὶν, ἔστω κτίσμα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς, καὶ μὴ ὁμοούσιος, εἰ δὲ υἱός ἐστι λόγος, σοφία, εἰκὼν τοῦ Πατρὸς, ἀπαύγασμα, εἰκότως ὁμοούσιος ἂν εἴη, "Brass and gold, silver and tin, are alike in their shining and colour; nevertheless in their essence and nature are they very different from one another. If therefore the Son be such, then let him be a creature as we are, and not co-essential (or consubstantial); but if he be a Son, the word, wisdom, image of the Father, and his splendour, then of right should he be accounted co-essential and consubstantial."† Thus in his epistle concerning Dionysius, we have ἵνα τῶν γεννητῶν εἶναι τὸν Υἱὸν, and μὴ ὁμοούσιον τῷ Πατρὶ, "the Son's being one of the creatures," and "his not being co-essential or consubstantial with the Father," put for synonymous expressions, which signify one and the same thing.

Wherefore it seemeth to be unquestionably evident, that when the ancient orthodox fathers of the Christian church maintained,

* Page 272. † Page 561.

against Arius, the Son to be homo-ousios, co-essential or consubstantial with the Father, though that word be thus interpreted, "Of the same essence or substance," yet they universally understood thereby, not a sameness of singular and numerical, but of common or universal essence only; that is, the generical or specifical essence of the Godhead; that the Son was no creature, but truly and properly God. But if it were needful, there might be yet more testimonies cited out of Athanasius to this purpose. As from his epistle De Synodis Arimini et Seleuciæ,* where he writeth thus, concerning the difference betwixt those two words, Ὁμοιούσιον, "of like substance," and Ὁμοούσιον, "of the same substance:" Οἴδατε γὰρ καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον οὐκ ἐπὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ σχημάτων καὶ ποιοτήτων λέγεται ὅμοιον· ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν οὐσιῶν οὐχ Ὁμοιότης, ἀλλὰ ταυτότης ἂν λεχθείη· ἄνθρωπος γοῦν ἀνθρώπῳ ὅμοιος λέγεται οὐ κατὰ τὴν σύσίαν . . . τῇ γὰρ οὐσίᾳ Ὁμοφυεῖς εἰσι· καὶ πάλιν ἄνθρωπος κυνὶ οὐκ Ἀνόμοιος λέγεται, ἀλλ' Ἑτεροφυής· Οὐκοῦν τὸ Ὁμοφυὲς καὶ Ὁμοούσιον, τὸ δὲ Ἑτεροφυὲς καὶ ἑτερούσιον, "For even yourselves know, that similitude is not predicated of essences or substances, but of figures and qualities only. But of essences or substances, identity or sameness is affirmed, and not similitude. For a man is not said to be like to a man, in respect of the essence or substance of humanity, but only as to figure or form; they being said, as to their essence, to be congenerous, of the same nature or kind with one another. Nor is a man properly said to be unlike to a dog, but of a different nature or kind from him. Wherefore that which is congenerous, of the same nature, kind, or species, is also Homo-ousion, co-essential or consubstantial (of the same essence or substance) and that, which is of a different nature, kind or species, is Heterousion (of a different essence or substance)." Again, Athanasius, in that fragment of his against the hypocrisy of Meletius, &c. concerning consubstantiality, writeth in this manner: Ὁ τοίνυν ἀναιρῶν τὸ εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ, λέγων δὲ ὅμοιον, ἀναιρεῖ τὸ εἶναι Θεὸν· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐξηγούμενος τὸ Ὁμοούσιον, ὡς ὅμοιον, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἑτέραν τὴν οὐσίαν λέγει, Θεῷ δὲ ὁμοιωμένην· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας, εἶναι πρεπόντως λέγει μὴ φρονῶν ὁμοούσιον, ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρώπου οὐσίας· εἰ δὲ μὴ ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου κατά οὐσιαν, ἐκ Θεοῦ ὁ υἱὸς, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν ὁμοιώματι, καθάπερ ἀνδριὰς ἀνθρώπῳ, ἢ ὡς ἄνθρωπος Θεῷ, δῆλός ἐστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος ὁμοούσιον μὲν λέγων, ὁμοούσιον δὲ οὐ φρονῶν· Οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν συνήθειαν βούλεται τὸ Ὁμοούσιον ἀκούεσθαι, ὅπερ ἐστὶν, περὶ μιᾶς καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας· ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν συνήθειαν, καὶ ἵνα διαφάλλῃ ταύτην. Ἑλληνικὴν ῥῆσιν εἰρηκέναι τὸ ὁμοούσιον ῥῆμα τοῦ ἐν Ἕλλησιν ἔθους ἐπ' οὐδενὶ ἑτέρῳ κείμενον ἢ ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν

* Page 929.

φύσιν παραστῆσαι, &c. "He that denies the Son to be Homo-ousios, consubstantial with the Father, affirming him only to be like to him, denies him to be God. In like manner he, who retaining the word Homo-ousios or consubstantial, interprets it notwithstanding only of similitude or likeness in substance, affirmeth the Son to be of another different substance from the Father, and therefore not God, but like to God only. Neither doth such a one rightly understand those words, 'Of the substance of the Father,' he not thinking the Son to be so consubstantial, or of the essence and substance of the Father, as one man is consubstantial, or of the essence or substance of another who begat him. For he who affirmeth, that the Son is not so of God, as a man is of a man, according to essence or substance; but that he is like him only, as a statue is like a man, or as a man may be like to God, it is manifest, that such a one, though he use the word Homo-ousios, yet he doth not really mean it. For he will not understand it, according to the customary signification thereof, for that which hath one and the same essence or substance; this word being used by Greeks and Pagans in no other sense than to signify that which hath the same nature; as we ought to believe concerning the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost." Where we see plainly, that though the word Homo-ousios be interpreted, "that which hath one and the same essence or substance," yet is this understood of the same common nature, and as one man is of the same essence or substance with another. We might here also add to this the concurrent testimonies of the other orthodox fathers; but, to avoid tediousness, we shall omit them, and only insert some passages out of St. Austin to the same purpose. For he, in his first book, contra Maxim. chap. the 15th,[1] writeth thus: Duo veri homines, etsi nullus eorum filius sit alterius, unius tamen et ejusdem sunt substantiæ. Homo autem alterius hominis verus filius nullo modo potest nisi ejusdem cum patre esse substantiæ, etiamsi non sit per omnia similis patri. Quocirca verus Dei filius, et unius cum patre substantiæ est, quia verus filius est; et per omnia est patri similis, quia est Dei filius, "Two true men, though neither of them be son to the other, yet are they both of one and the same substance. But a man, who is the true son of another man, can by no means be of a different substance from his father, although he be not in all respects like unto him. Wherefore the true Son of God is both of one substance with the Father, because he is a true Son, and he is also in all respects like to him, because he is the Son of God." Where Christ, or the Son of God, is said to be no otherwise of one substance with God the Father, than here amongst men the son is of the same sub-

[1] Cap. 16. sect. 11. p. 503. tom. 7. opp. ed. Benedict.

stance with his father, or any one man with another.* Again, the same St. Austin, in his Respons. ad Sermonem Arianorum,[2] expresseth himself thus: Ariani nos vocitant Homoousianos, quia contra eorum errorem, Græco vocabulo ὁμοούσιον defendimus, Patrem, Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum; id est, unius ejusdemque substantiæ, vel, ut expressiùs dicamus, essentiæ (quæ οὐσία Græcè appellatur) quod planiùs dicitur unius ejusdemque naturæ. Et tamen siquis istorum, qui nos Homoousianos vocant, filium suum non cujus ipse esset, sed diversæ diceret esse naturæ, exhæredari ab ipso mallet filius, quam hoc putari. Quanta igitur impietate isti cæcantur, qui cum confiteantur unicum Dei filium, nolunt ejusdem naturæ cujus pater est confiteri, sed diversæ atque imparis, et multis modis rebusque dissimilis, tanquam non de Deo natus, sed ab illo de nihilo sit creatus; gratiâ filius, non naturâ, "The Arians call us Homo-ousians, because, in opposition to their error, we defend the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be in the language of the Greeks Homo-ousios, that is, of one and the same substance; or, to speak more clearly, essence, this being in Greek called Ousia, which is yet more plainly thus expressed, of one and the same nature. And yet there is none of their own sons who thus call us Homo-ousians, who would not as willingly be disinherited as be accounted of a different nature from his father. How great impiety, therefore, are they blinded with, who, though they acknowledge that there is one only Son of God, yet will not confess him to be of the same nature with his Father, but different and unequal, and many ways unlike him, as if he were not born of God, but created out of nothing by him, himself being a creature, and so a son, not by nature, but grace only." Lastly (to name no more place), in his first book De Trinitate,[3] he hath these words: Si Filius creatura non est, ejusdem cum Patre substantiæ est. Omnis enim substantia, quæ Deus non est, creatura est; et quæ creatura non est, Deus est. Et si non est Filius ejusdem substantiæ, cujus est Pater, ergo facta substantia est, "If the Son be not a creature, then is he of the same substance with the Father; for whatever substance is not God, is creature; and whatever is not creature, is God. And therefore if the Son be not of the same substance with the Father, he must needs be a made and created substance, and not truly God.

Lastly, that the ancient orthodox fathers, who used the word

* To the same purpose is that in his second Book, ch. 6; Diversa quidem substantia est Deus Pater, et Homo Mater: non tamen diversa substantia est Deus Pater et Deus Filius: sicut non est diversa substantia, Homo Mater, et Homo Filius.

[2] Cap. 36. p. 458. tom. 8. opp. In this passage of St. Augustine Dr. Cudworth has omitted these words: Ac per hoc et ipse creatura sit, "and thereby is himself also creature," which follow after the words, de nihilo creatus.

[3] Cap. 6. p. 534. 535. tom. 8. opp.

Homo-ousios against Arius, intended not therein to assert the Son to have one and the same singular or individual essence with the Father, appeareth plainly from their disclaiming and disowning those two words, Ταυτοούσιον and Μονοούσιον. Concerning the former of which, Epiphanius thus:* Καὶ οὐ λέγομεν Ταυτοούσιον, ἵνα μὴ ἡ λέξις παρά τισι λεγομένη, Σαβελλίῳ ἀπεικασθῇ· Ταυτὸν δὲ λέγομεν τῇ θεότητι, καὶ τῇ οὐσία, καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, "We affirm not the Son to be Tauto-ousion (one and the same substance with the Father) lest this should be taken in way of compliance with Sabellius; nevertheless do we assert him to be the same in Godhead, and in essence, and in power." Where it is plain, that when Epiphanius affirmed the Son to be the same with the Father in Godhead and essence, he understood this only of a generical or specifical, and not of a singular or individual sameness; namely, that the Son is no creature, but God also, as the Father is; and this he intimates to be the true and genuine sense of the word Homo-ousios; he therefore rejecting that other word Tauto-ousios, because it would be liable to misinterpretation, and to be taken in the Sabellian sense for that which hath one and the same singular and individual essence, which the word Homo-ousios could not be obnoxious to. And as concerning that other word Mono-ousios, Athanasius himself, in his "Exposition of Faith," thus expressly condemns it: Οὔτε γὰρ νιοπατέρα φρονοῦμεν, ὡς οἱ Σαβέλλιοι Μονοούσιον καὶ οὐχ Ὁμοούσιον, "We do not think the Son to be really one and the same with the Father, as the Sabellians do, and to be Mono-ousious, and not Homo-ousios; they thereby destroying the very being of the Son." Where ousia, "essence" or "substance," in that fictitious word Mono-ousios, is taken for "singular" or "existent essence," the whole Deity being thus said, by Sabellius, to have only one singular essence or hypostasis in it: whereas in the word Homo-ousios is understood a common or universal, generical or specifical essence; the Son being thus said to agree with the Father in the common essence of the Godhead, as not being a creature. Wherefore Athanasius here disclaimeth a Mono-ousian trinity, as Epiphanius did before a Tauto-ousian; both of them a trinity of mere names and notions, or inadequate conceptions of one and the same singular essence or hypostasis; they alike distinguishing them from the Homo-ousian trinity, as a trinity of real hypostases or persons, that have severally their own singular essence, but agree in one common and universal essence of the Godhead, they being none of them creatures, but all uncreated or creators. From whence it is plain, that the ancient orthodox fathers asserted no such thing as one and the same singular or numerical essence, of the several

* Hæres. 76. not. 7. [Hæres. Anomœor. p. 920. Tom. 1. opp.]

persons of the trinity; this, according to them, being not a real trinity, but a trinity of mere names, notions, and inadequate conceptions only, which is thus disclaimed and declared against by Athanasius:[4] Τριὰς δέ ἐστιν οὐχ ἕως ὀνόματος μόνου, καὶ φαντασίᾳ λέξεως, ἀλλὰ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ ὑπάρξει Τριάς, "The trinity is not a trinity of mere names and words only, but of hypostases truly and really existing." But the Homo-ousian Trinity of the orthodox went exactly in the middle, betwixt that Mono-ousian trinity of Sabellius, which was a trinity of different notions or conceptions only of one and the self-same thing, and that other Hetero-ousian trinity of Arius, which was a trinity of separate and heterogeneous substances (one of which only was God, and the other creatures); this being a trinity of hypostases or persons numerically differing from one another, but all of them agreeing in one common or general essence of the Godhead or the uncreated nature, which is eternal and infinite. Which was also thus particularly declared by Athanasius:* Οὔτε ἔλαττόν τι φρονεῖ ἡ καθολικὴ Ἐκκλησία, ἵνα μὴ εἰς τοὺς νῦν κατὰ Καιάφαν Ἰουδαίους, καὶ εἰς Σαβέλλιον περιπέσῃ· οὔτε πλεῖον ἐπινοεῖ, ἵνα μὴ εἰς τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν πολυθεότητα κατακυλισθῇ, "The catholic church doth neither believe less than this Homo-ousian trinity, lest it should comply with Judaism, or sink into Sabellianism; nor yet more than this, lest, on the other hand, it should tumble down into Arianism, which is the same with Pagan polytheism and idolatry;" it introducing in like manner the worshipping of creatures, together with the Creator.

And now, upon all these considerations, our Platonic Christian would conclude, that the orthodox trinity of the ancient Christian church did herein agree with the genuinely Platonic trinity, that it was not Mono-ousian, one sole singular essence, under three notions, conceptions, or modes only, but three hypostases or persons. As likewise, the right Platonic trinity does agree with the trinity of the ancient orthodox Christians in this, that it is not Hetero-ousian, but Homo-ousian, "co-essential" or "consubstantial;" none of their three hypostases being creatures, or particular beings, made in time; but all of them uncreated, eternal, and infinite.

Notwithstanding all which, it must be granted, that though this Homo-ousiotes, or co-essentiality of the three persons in the trinity, does imply them to be all God, yet does it not follow from thence of necessity that they are therefore one God. What then? shall we conclude that Athanasius himself also entertained that opinion before mentioned and exploded, of the three persons

[4] These words of Athanasius are from his Epistle to Serapion, wherein he demonstrates Spiritum Sanctum non esse rem creatam, "that the Holy Ghost is not a created thing," tom. 1. opp. p. 202.

* Ad. Serap. Ep. p. 202.

the trinity being but three individuals under the same species as Peter, Paul, and Timothy) and having no other natural unity or identity, than specifical only? Indeed some have confidently fastened this upon Athanasius, because in those "Dialogues of the Trinity,"[5] published amongst his works, and there entitled to him, the same is grossly owned, and in defence thereof this absurd paradox maintained, that Peter, Paul, and Timothy, though they be three hypostases, yet are not to be accounted three men, but only then when they dissent from one nother, or disagree in will or opinion. But it is certain, from several passages in those dialogues themselves, that they could not be written by Athanasius; and there hath been also another father found for them, to wit, Maximus the martyr. Notwithstanding which, thus much must not be denied by us, that Athanasius, in those others his reputedly genuine writings, does sometime approach so near hereunto, that he lays no small stress upon his homo-ousiotes, this co-essentiality and common nature of the Godhead, to all the three persons, in order to their being one God. For thus, in that book entitled, "Concerning the Common Essence of the Three Persons," and the chapter inscribed, Ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶ τρεῖς θεοὶ, "That there are not three Gods," doth Athanasius lay his foundation here. When to that question proposed, "How can it be said that the Father is God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, and yet that there are not three Gods?" the first reply which he makes is this: Ὅπου κοινὰ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, κοινὸν καὶ ὄνομα τῆς ἀξίας· οἷον ὁ θεὸς τὰ εἰς πλήθη διῃρημένα ἀπὸ μιᾶς φύσεως, ἑνὶ ὀνόματι καλεῖ· καὶ ὅτε ὀργίζεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τὸν πάντα ἄνθρωπον τῇ ὀργῇ ὑποκείμενον, ἕνα ἄνθρωπον καλεῖ· καὶ ὅτι διαλλάσσεται τῷ κόσμῳ, ὡς ἑνὶ ἀνθρώπῳ

[5] Dialog. 1. p. 160. tom. 2. opp. To enable the reader more readily to understand the whole question, it may be worth while to subjoin the very words. In a colloquy between an Arian and an orthodox believer, the former asks, how there can be three persons in one divine nature. The latter answers: Ὡς Πέτρου καὶ Παύλου καὶ Τιμοθέου τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, καὶ μία ἀνθρωπότης, "As of Peter, Paul, and Timothy, there are three hypostases, but only one ἀνθρωπότης or humanity." From which it follows, replies the Arian, that there are three Gods. This the orthodox believer denies, and in his defence asserts positively that Peter, Paul, and Timothy are not three men but one only, as long as they do not disagree: Ὅτι τρεῖς εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι, ὅταν ἀνόμοιον ἔχωσι καρδίαν, ὡς Ἕλλην, καὶ Ἰουδαῖος, καὶ Χριστιανός· ὅταν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ λέγωσι, καὶ μή ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς σχίσματα, τρεῖς μέν εἰσιν ὑποστάσεις, εἷς δὲ ἐν Κυρίῳ, μίαν ψυχὴν ἔχοντες καὶ μίαν καρδίαν· καὶ τρεῖς μέν εἰσιν ἀριθμῷ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἑτερότητι φύσεως ἢ καρδίας, "Because they are then three men, when they have an unlike heart, as a Greek, a Jew, and a Christian: but when they are of the same mind and there is no dissension between them they are three hypostases indeed, but one in the Lord, having one soul and one heart: and they are three in number, but not by a difference of nature or heart." What remarks I may have to offer on this passage, as well as on the whole of Dr. Cudworth's disputation on the opinions of Athanasius and others respecting the Divine Trinity, I shall reserve for the Preface. As to the author of these Dialogues critics are not yet agreed, although they all pronounce them not to be the work of Athanasius.

διαλλάσσεται, "Where there is a communion of nature, there is also one common name of dignity bestowed. And thus doth God himself call things, divided into multitudes from one common nature, by one singular name. For both when he is angry with men doth he call all those who are the objects of his anger by the name of one man; and when he is reconciled to the world is he reconciled thereto as to one man." The first instances which he gives hereof are in Genesis vi. 3, 4: "My spirit shall not always strive with man," and "I will destroy man whom I have created." Upon which Athanasius makes this reflection: Καίτοι οὐκ ἦν εἷς, ἀλλὰ μυριάδες ἄπειροι· ἀλλὰ τῷ ὀνόματι τῆς φύσεως, τὸν πάντα ἄνθρωπον ἕνα ἐκάλεσεν ἄνθρωπον διὰ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς οὐσίας, "Though there was not then only one man, but infinite myriads of men, nevertheless by the name of one nature doth the Scripture call all those men one man, by reason of their community of essence or substance." Again, he commenteth in like manner upon that other scripture passage, Exodus xv. 1: "The horse and his rider hath he thrown in the sea:"* Ὅτε ἐξῆλθε Φαραὼ κατὰ τὴν θάλασσαν, πίπτων μετὰ μυρίων ἁρμάτων ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ, καὶ ἦσαν πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι οἱ βυθισθέντες μετ' ἐκείνου, καὶ ἵπποι πολλοί· ὁ δὲ Μωσῆς εἰδὼς, ὅτι πάντων τῶν βυθισθέντων μία ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἵππων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν λέγει, ἵππον καὶ ἀναβάτην ἔρριψεν εἰς θάλασσαν· τὰ πλήθη τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκάλεσεν ἕνα ἄνθρωπον, καὶ τὰ πλήθη τῶν ἵππων ἐκάλεσεν ἵππον ἕνα, διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς φύσεως, "When Pharaoh went out to the Red Sea, and fell with infinite chariots in the same; and there were many men that were drowned together with him, and many horses; yet Moses knowing that there was but one common nature of all those that were drowned, speaketh thus both of the men and horses; The Lord hath thrown both the horse and the rider into the sea: he calling such a multitude of men but one singular man, and such a multitude of horses but one horse." Whereupon Athanasius thus concludeth:† Εἰ οὖν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅπου συγκέχυται τὰ τῆς φύσεως· ὅπου διάφορα τὰ τῆς μορφῆς καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ βουλῆς· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν οὔτε γνώμη ἴση, οὔτε μορφὴ, οὔτε ἰσχύς· καὶ διάφοροι γλῶτται, διὸ καὶ ἄνθρωποι μέροπες λέγονται· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως πᾶσα ἡ οἰκουμένη εἷς ἄνθρωπος ἐκλήθη· ὅπου δὲ ἀμέριστος ἡ ἀξία, μία βασιλεία, μία δύναμις, καὶ βουλὴ, καὶ ἐνέργεια, ἰδιάζουσα τὴν τριάδα ἀπὸ τῆς κτίσεως, Ἕνα λέγω Θεόν, "If therefore amongst men, where the things of nature are confounded, and where there are differences of form, power and will (all men not having the same disposition of mind, nor form, nor strength), as also different languages (from whence men are

* Page 213. 214. † Page 214.

called by the poets Meropes), nevertheless, by reason of the community of nature, the whole world is called one man; might not that Trinity of persons, where there is an undivided dignity, one kingdom, one power, one will, and one energy, be much rather called one God?" But though it be true, that Athanasius in this place (if at least this were a genuine fœtus of Athanasius) may justly be thought to attribute too much to this *κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως καὶ οὐσίας*, "a common nature, essence, or substance," of all the three persons, as to the making of them to be truly and properly one God; and that those scripture passages are but weakly urged to this purpose: yet it is plain, that he did not acquiesce in this only, but addeth other things to it also, as their having not only one will, but also one energy or action; of which more afterwards. Moreover, Athanasius elsewhere plainly implieth, that this common essence or nature of the Godhead is not sufficient alone to make all the three hypostases one God. As in his fourth oration against the Arians,* where he tells us, that his trinity of divine hypostases cannot therefore be accounted three gods nor three principles, because they are not resembled by him to three original suns, but only to the sun, and its splendour, and the light from both.[6] Now three suns, according to the language of Athanasius, have *κοινόν τῆς φύσεως καὶ οὐσίας*, "a common nature, essence, and substance," and therefore are co-essential or consubstantial; and since they cannot be accounted one sun, it is manifest, that, according to Athanasius, this specific identity or unity is not sufficient to make the three divine hypostases one God. Again, the same Athanasius, in his Exposition of Faith, writeth thus: *Οὔτε τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, μεμερισμένας καθ' ἑαυτὰς, ὥσπερ σωματοφυῶς ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ, λογίσασθαι, ἵνα μὴ πολυθεΐαν ὡς τὰ ἔθνη, φρονήσωμεν*, "Neither do we acknowledge three hypostases, divided or separate by themselves (as is to be seen corporeally in men) that we may not comply with the pagan polytheism." From whence it is evident, that neither three separate men, though co-essential to Athanasius, were accounted by him to be one man, nor yet the community of the specific nature and essence of the Godhead can alone, by itself, exclude polytheism from the trinity. Where-

* Page 467.

[6] To save the reader the trouble of referring to Athanasius, I shall again cite his own words: *Οὐδὲ γὰρ——τρεῖς ἀρχὰς, ἢ τρεῖς πατέρας εἰσάγομεν, ὡς οἱ περὶ Μαρκίωνα καὶ Μανιχαῖον, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τριῶν ἡλίων ὑπεθέμεθα τὴν εἰκόνα, ἀλλὰ ἥλιον καὶ ἀπαύγασμα καὶ ἓν τὸ ἐξ ἡλίου ἐν τῷ ἀπαυγάσματι φῶς· οὕτω μίαν ἀρχὴν οἴδαμεν, τὸν δὲ δημιουργὸν φάσκομεν οὐχ ἕτερόν τινα τρόπον ἔχειν θεότητος, ἢ τὴν τοῦ μόνου Θεοῦ, διὰ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ πεφυκέναι*, "For we do not introduce three principles or three fathers, like the Marcionists and Manichæans, since we do not bring into the comparison three suns, but one sun and its splendour, and one light from both: so we acknowledge one principle, and say that the Creator has no other mode of divinity than that of the only God, because of his having been produced from him."

fore the true reason why Athanasius laid so great a stress upon this homo-ousiotes, or co-essentiality of the trinity, in order to the unity of the Godhead in them, was not because this alone was sufficient to make them one God, but because they could not be so without it. This Athanasius often urges against the Arians, as in his fourth oration, where he tells them: Πολλοὺς ἂν εἰσάγοιεν [θεοὺς] διὰ τὸ ἑτεροειδὲς αὐτῶν, "That they must needs introduce a plurality of gods, because of the heterogeneity of their trinity." And again afterwards determining, that there is ἓν εἶδος τῆς θεότητος, "one species of the Godhead," in Father, Son, and Spirit, he adds: Οὕτω καὶ ἕνα διὰ τῆς τριάδος ὁμολογοῦμεν εἶναι τὸν θεόν· καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον εὐσεβέστερον λέγομεν τῆς πολυειδοῦς τῶν αἱρετικῶν θεότητος, ὅτι τὴν μίαν ἐν τριάδι θεότητα φρονοῦμεν· εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ποίημα καὶ κτίσμα ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος . . . . ἀνάγκη λέγειν αὐτοὺς δύο θεοὺς, ἕνα μὲν κτιστὴν, τὸν δὲ ἕτερον κτιστόν, "And thus do we acknowledge only one God in the Trinity; and maintain it more religiously than those heretics do who introduce a multiform Deity, consisting of divers species; we supposing only one universal Godhead in the whole. For if it be not thus, but the Son be a creature, made out of nothing, however called God by these Arians, then must he and his father of necessity be two gods; one of them a creator, the other a creature." In like manner, in his book of the Nicene council,* he affirmeth concerning the Arians: Τρεῖς θεοὺς τρόπον τινὰ κηρύττουσιν εἰς τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις ξένας, ἀλλήλων παντάπασι κεχωρισμένας, διαιροῦντες τὴν ἁγίαν μονάδα, "That they make in a manner three gods, dividing the holy monad into three heterogeneous substances, separate from one another." Whereas, the right orthodox Trinity, on the contrary, is elsewhere thus described by him:† Τριὰς τοίνυν ἁγία καὶ τελεία ἐστὶν, ἐν πατρὶ, καὶ υἱῷ, καὶ τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι θεολογουμένη, οὐδὲν ἀλλότριον ἢ ἔξωθεν ἐπιμιγνύμενον ἔχουσα, οὐδὲ ἐκ δημιουργοῦ καὶ γεννητοῦ συνεστα-μένη, ἀλλ' ὅλη τοῦ κτίζειν καὶ δημιουργεῖν οὖσα, "The holy and perfect Trinity theologized in the Father, Son, and Spirit, hath nothing alien, foreign, or extraneous intermingled with it; nor is it compounded of heterogeneous things, the creator and creature joined together." And whereas the Arians interpreted that of our Saviour Christ, "I and my Father are one," only in respect of consent or agreement of will, Athanasius showing the insufficiency hereof, concludeth thus: Ἀνάγκη λοιπὸν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν νοεῖν καὶ τὴν υἱοῦ καὶ πατρὸς ἑνότητα, "Wherefore besides this consent of will, there must of necessity be another unity of essence or substance also, acknowledged in the Father and the Son." Where, by unity of essence or substance, that Athanasius

* Page 275. † Ep. ad Serap. p. 202.

lid not mean a unity of singular and individual, but of general or universal essence only, appears plainly from these following words;* Τὰ μὲν γὰρ γεννητὰ κἂν συμφωνίαν ἔχῃ πρὸς τὸν πεποιηκότα, ἀλλ' ἐν κινήσει καὶ μετουσίᾳ ταύτην ἔχει, ὥσπερ ὁ μὴ φυλάξας ἐκβέβληται τῶν οὐρανῶν· ὁ δὲ υἱὸς ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ὢν γέννημα, οὐσίᾳ καὶ ἕν ἐστιν αὐτὸς καὶ ὁ γεννήσας πατήρ, "For those things which are made or created, though they may have an agreement of will with their Creator, yet have they this by participation only, and in a way of motion; as he, who retaining not the same, was cast out of heaven. But the Son, being begotten from the essence or substance of the Father, is essentially or substantially one with him." So that the opposition here is betwixt unity of consent with God in created beings, which are mutable, and unity of essence in that which is uncreated, and immutably of the same will with the Father. There are also many other places in Athanasius, which, though some may understand of the unity of singular essence, yet were they not so by him intended, but either of generic or specific essence only, or else in such other sense as shall be afterwards declared. As for example, in his fourth oration:† Τὴν μίαν ἐν τριάδι θεότητα φρονοῦμεν, "We acknowledge only one Godhead in the Trinity;" where the following words plainly imply this to be understood, in part at least, of one common or general essence of the Godhead, Εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ποίημα καὶ κτίσμα ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, &c., "Because if it be not so, but the Word be a creature, made out of nothing, he is either not truly God, or if he be called by that name, then must they be two gods, one a creator, the other a creature." Again when in the same book it is said:‡ Ἓν εἰσιν ὁ υἱὸς καὶ ὁ πατὴρ τῇ ἰδιότητι καὶ οἰκειότητι τῆς φύσεως, καὶ τῇ ταυτότητι τῆς μιᾶς θεότητος, "That the Son and the Father are one thing in the propriety of nature, and in the sameness of one Godhead;" it is evident from the context, that this is not to be understood of a sameness of singular essence, but partly of a common and generical one, and partly of such another sameness or unity, as will be hereafter expressed. Lastly, when the three hypostases are somewhere[7] said by him to be μία οὐσία, "one essence or substance," this is not to be understood neither in that place, as if they had all three the same singular essence, but in some of those other senses before mentioned.

* Ep. de Syn. Arim. et Sel. p. 923. † Page 468. ‡ Page 456.

[7] Dr. Cudworth, I suspect, is here alluding to those questions which occur in tom. 2. opp. Athanasii, p. 436. but are denied by most critics to be Athanasius'. Of these the sixth question is as follows: Ἐπὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ πόσας οὐσίας ὁμολογεῖς; "How many essences do you acknowledge to be in God?" To this he answers: Μίαν οὐσίαν λέγω, μίαν φύσιν, "I say one essence, one nature." Then follows the seventh question: Ὑποστάσεις δὲ πόσας ὁμολογεῖς; "How many hypostases do you acknowledge?" To which he replies: Τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις ὁμολογῶ, τρία πρόσωπα, "I acknowledge three hypostases, three persons."

But though Athanasius nowhere declares the three hypostases of the Trinity to have only one and the same singular essence, but, on the contrary, denies them to be mono-ousian; and though he lay a great stress upon their εἰδικὴ ἑνότης, their "specific" or "generic unity," and co-essentiality, in order to their being one God, forasmuch as without this they could not be God at all; yet doth he not rely wholly upon this, as alone sufficient to that purpose, but addeth certain other considerations thereunto, to make it out, in manner as followeth. First, that this Trinity is not a trinity of principles, but that there is only one principle or fountain of the Godhead in it, from which the other are derived. Thus doth he write in his fifth oration: Μία ἀρχὴ, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο εἷς Θεὸς, "There is but one principle, and accordingly but one God." Again, in his book against the Sabellianists:* Οὔκ εἰσι δύο θεοὶ, ὅτι μηδὲ δύο πατέρες, μηδὲ ἑτερούσιος τοῦ γεννήσαντος ὁ γεγεννημένος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὰς εἰσάγων δύο, δύο κηρύττει θεούς, αὕτη Μαρκίωνος ἡ δυσέβεια, "There are not two gods, both because there are not two fathers, and because that which is begotten is not of a different essence from that which begat. For he that introduceth two principles, preacheth two gods; which was the impiety of Marcion." Accordingly, the same Athanasius declareth:† Τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ Πατρὸς ἀρχὴν καὶ ῥίζαν καὶ πηγὴν εἶναι τοῦ Υἱοῦ, "That the essence or substance of the Father is the principle, and root, and fountain of the Son." And in like manner doth he approve of this doctrine of Dionysius: Ὅτι πηγὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων ἐστὶν ὁ Θεὸς, ποταμὸς δὲ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ προχεόμενος ὁ Υἱός, "That God (the Father) is the first fountain of all good things, but the Son a river poured out from him." To the same purpose is it also, when he compareth the Father and the Son to the water and the vapour arising from it; to the light and the splendour; to the prototype and the image. And he concludeth the unity of the Godhead from hence, in this manner:‡ Τὴν θεῖαν Τριάδα εἰς ἕνα, ὥσπερ εἰς κορυφήν τινα, τὸν Θεὸν τῶν ὅλων τὸν παντοκράτορα λέγω, συγκεφαλαιοῦσθαι καὶ συνάγεσθαι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη. "The divine Trinity must needs be collected and gathered up together, under that omnipotent God of the whole world, as under one head." But the chief force of this consideration is only to exclude the doctrine of the Marcionists, who made more independent and self-existent principles and gods. Notwithstanding which, it might still be objected, that the Christian Trinity is a trinity of distinct subordinate gods; in opposition whereunto, this argument seems only to prepare the way to what follows; namely, of the close conjunction of these three hypostases into one God: forasmuch as, were they three independent principles, there could not be any coalescence of them into one.

* Page 656. † Et Syn. Arim. De Sel. p. 920. ‡ De Syn. Nic. p. 275.

In the next place therefore, Athanasius further addeth, that these three divine hypostases are not *μεμερισμέναι* and *κεχωρισμέναι*, "separate" and "disjoined" beings, but *ἀδιαίρετοι*, "indivisibly united to one another." Thus in his fifth oration: *Πατέρα καὶ Υἱὸν ἓν ὄντας τῇ θεότητι, καὶ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀμέριστον καὶ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἀχώριστον εἶναι τὸν Λόγον ἀπὸ τοῦ Πατρός*, "The Father and the Son are both one thing in the Godhead, and in that the Word, being begotten from him, is indivisibly and inseparably conjoined with him." Where, when he affirmeth the Father and the Son to be one in the Godhead, it is plain, that he doth not mean them to have one and the same singular essence, but only generical and universal; because in the following words he supposes them to be two, but indivisibly and inseparably united together. Again, in his book De Sent. Dionys.: *Ἔστιν ἀδιαίρετος τοῦ Πατρὸς ὁ Υἱὸς, ὥς ἐστι τὸ ἀπαύγασμα πρὸς τὸ φῶς*, "The Son is indivisible from the Father, as the splendour is from the light." And afterwards, in the same book, he insisteth further upon this point, according to the sense of Dionysius, after the same manner: *Ὁ δὲ ἴδιον καὶ ἀδιαίρετον τῆς τοῦ Πατρὸς οὐσίας τὸν Υἱὸν εἶναι διδάσκει, ὥς ἐστιν ὁ Λόγος πρὸς τὸν νοῦν καὶ ποταμὸς πρὸς τὴν πηγήν· εἰ μὲν οὖν διαιρεῖν καὶ ἀποξενοῦν τὸν λόγον καὶ τὸν νοῦν τις δύναται, ἢ τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ τὴν πηγὴν μερίσαι καὶ τειχίσας διελεῖν, ἢ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα ἅμα διελεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ φωτὸς*, &c. "Dionysius teacheth, that the Son is cognate with the Father, and indivisible from him, as reason is from the mind, and the river from the fountain. Who is there, therefore, that would go about to alienate reason from the mind, and to separate the river from the fountain, making up a wall between them? or to cut off the splendour from the light? Thus also in his epistle to Serapion, that the Holy Ghost is not a creature:* * *Ἡ διελέτωσαν πρῶτον αὐτοὶ τοῦ ἀπαυγάσματος τὸ φῶς, ἢ τὴν σοφίαν τοῦ σοφοῦ, ἢ μὴ εἰπάτωσαν, πῶς ἐστι ταῦτα*, "Let these men first divide the splendour from the light, or wisdom from him that is wise; or else let them wonder no more how these things can be." Elsewhere Athanasius calls the whole Trinity, *Τριάδα ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἡνωμένην πρὸς ἑαυτὴν*, "a Trinity undivided and united to itself." Which Athanasian's indivisibility of the Trinity is not so to be understood, as if three were not three in it; but first of all, that neither of these could be without the other, as the original light or sun could not be without the splendour, nor the splendour without the original light, and neither the one nor the other of them without a diffused derivative light. Wherefore, God the Father being an eternal sun, must needs have also an eternal splendour and an eternal light. And secondly, that these are so nearly

* Page 194.

and intimately conjoined together, that there is a kind of *συνέχεια*, "continuity," betwixt them; which yet is not to be understood in the way of corporeal things, but so as is agreeable to the nature of things incorporeal.

Thirdly, Athanasius ascendeth yet higher, affirming the hypostases of the Trinity not only to be indivisibly conjoined with one another, but also to have a mutual inexistence in each other, which later Greek fathers[8] have called *ἐμπεριχώρησιν*, their "circuminsession." To this purpose does he cite the words of Dionysius:* *Ἀπόῤῥοια γὰρ νοῦ λόγος, καὶ ἀπὸ καρδίας διὰ στόματος ἐξοχετεύεται, ἕτερος γενόμενος τοῦ ἐν καρδίᾳ λόγου· καὶ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἑκάτερος ἐν ἑκατέρῳ· ἕτερος ὢν θατέρου, καὶ ἓν εἰσιν ὄντες δύο· οὕτω καὶ ὁ Πατὴρ καὶ ὁ Λόγος ἓν, καὶ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐλέχθησαν εἶναι.* "For reason is the efflux of the mind, which in men is derived from the heart into the tongue, where it is become another reason or word, differing from that in the heart; and yet do these both mutually exist in each other, they belonging to one another; and so, though being two, are one thing. Thus are the Father and the Son one thing, they being said to exist in each other." And Athanasius further illustrates this also by certain similitudes; as that again of the original light and the splendour, he affirming *φῶς εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἀπαυγάσματι, καὶ ἀπαύγασμα ἐν τῷ ἡλίῳ*, "That the original light is in the splendour, and again the splendour in the sun," and also that of the prototype and the image, or the king and his picture; which he thus insisteth upon:† *Ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι τοῦ βασιλέως τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ μορφή ἐστι, καὶ ἐν τῷ βασιλεῖ τὸ ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι εἶδός ἐστιν*, "In the picture is contained the form and figure of the king, and in the king the form and figure of the picture. And therefore, if any one, when he had seen the picture, should afterward desire to see the king, the picture would by a prosopopœia bespeak him after this manner:‡ *Ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς ἓν ἐσμεν, ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἰμὶ, κἀκεῖνος ἐν ἐμοί· καὶ ὃ ὁρᾷς ἐν ἐμοὶ, τοῦτο ἐν ἐκείνῳ βλέπεις, καὶ ὃ ἑώρακας ἐν ἐκείνῳ, τοῦτο βλέπεις ἐν ἐμοί· ὁ γὰρ προσκυνῶν τὴν εἰκόνα, ἐν αὐτῇ προσκυνεῖ τὸν βασιλέα*, I and the king am one, for I am in him, and he is in me; and what you take notice of in me, the same you may observe in him also; and what you see in him, you may see likewise in me: he therefore, that worshippeth the image, therein worshippeth the king, the image being nothing but the form of the king." Elsewhere, in the fourth oration, he thus insisteth upon this particular:§ *Ἔστι γὰρ ὁ Υἱὸς ἐν τῷ Πατρὶ, ὥσγε νοεῖν ἔξεστιν, ἐπειδὴ σύμπαν τὸ εἶναι τοῦ Υἱοῦ, τοῦτο τῆς πατρὸς οὐσίας ἴδιόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἐκ φωτὸς*

[8] Whose testimonies are collected and illustrated by Dion. Petavius, Lib. 4. de Trinitate, cap. 16. p. 263. tom. 2. Dogm. Theolog.

* Page 665. [Tom. 1. opp. Libro de Sentent. Dionys. p. 565.]

† Orat. 4. p. 457. ‡ Ibid. § Page 456.

ἀπαύγασμα, καὶ ἐκ πηγῆς ποταμὸς, ὥστε τὸν ὁρῶντα τὸν Υἱὸν ὁρᾷν τὸ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἴδιον. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ Πατὴρ ἐν τῷ Υἱῷ, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἴδιον, τοῦτο ὁ Υἱὸς τυγχάνει ὤν, ὡς ἐν τῷ ἀπαυγάσματι ὁ ἥλιος, καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποταμῷ ἡ πηγή, "The Son is in the Father, as may be conceived from hence; because the whole being of the Son is proper to the essence of the Father, he being derived from it, as the splendour from the light, and the river from the fountain: so that he who sees the Son, sees that which is the Father's own and proper. Again, the Father is in the Son, because that which is the Father's own and proper, that is the Son; accordingly as the sun is also in the splendour, the mind in reason, and the fountain in the river." What cavils the Arians had against this doctrine, Athanasius also informs us:* Ἤρξαντο διασύρειν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ Κυρίου λεγόμενον, Ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ Πατρὶ, καὶ ὁ Πατὴρ ἐν ἐμοί· λέγοντες, πῶς δύναται οὗτος ἐν ἐκείνῳ, κἀκεῖνος ἐν τούτῳ χωρεῖν; ἢ πῶς ὅλως δύναται ὁ Πατὴρ μείζων ὢν ἐν τῷ Υἱῷ ἐλάττονι ὄντι χωρεῖν; καίτοι τί θαυμαστὸν, εἰ ὁ Υἱὸς ἐν τῷ Πατρὶ; ὅπουγε καὶ περὶ ἡμῶν γέγραπται, Ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζῶμεν καὶ κινούμεθα καί ἐσμεν, "Here the Arians begin to quarrel with that of our Lord, I am in the Father, and the Father in me; objecting, How is it possible, that both the former should be in the latter, and the latter in the former? or how can the Father, being greater, be received in the Son, who is lesser? And yet what wonder is it, if the Son should be in the Father; since it is written of us men also, That in him we live, and move, and have our being?" In way of reply whereunto, Athanasius first observes, that the ground of this Arian cavillation was the grossness of their apprehensions, and that they did τὰ ἀσώματα σωματικῶς ἐκλαμβάνειν, "conceive of incorporeal things after a corporeal manner." And then does he add: Οὐ γὰρ, ὡς ἐκεῖνόι νομίζουσιν, ἀντεμβιβαζόμενοι εἰς ἀλλήλους εἰσὶν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἀγγείοις κενοῖς ἐξ ἀλλήλων πληρουμένοις, ὥστε τὸν μὲν Υἱὸν πληροῦν τὸ κοῖλον τοῦ Πατρός, τὸν δὲ Πατέρα πληροῦν τὸ κοῖλον τοῦ Υἱοῦ, καὶ ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν μὴ εἶναι πλήρη καὶ τέλειον, "For the Father and the Son are not, as they suppose, transvasated and poured out one into another, as into an empty vessel; as if the Son filled up the concavity of the Father, and again, the Father that of the Son; and neither of them full or perfect in themselves. For all this is proper to bodies: wherefore though the Father be, in some sense, greater than the Son; yet notwithstanding may he be in him after an incorporeal manner." And he replieth to their last cavil thus: 'That the Son is not so in the Father, as we ourselves are said to live and move, and be in God:" Αὐτὸς γὰρ ὡς ἐκ πηγῆς τοῦ Πατρός ἐστι ζωὴ, ἐν ᾧ τὰ πάντα ζωογονεῖται καὶ συνέστηκεν, οὐ

* Orat. 4. [P. 453.]

γὰρ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν ζωῇ ζῇ, &c. "For he himself, from the fountain of the Father, is that life, in whom all things are quickened and consist; neither does he, who is the life, live in another life, which were to suppose him not to be the life itself. Nor (saith he) must it be conceived, that the Father is no otherwise in the Son, than he is in holy men corroborating of them; for the Son himself is the power and wisdom of God, and all created beings are sanctified by a participation of him in the Spirit." Wherefore this perichoresis, or mutual in-being of the Father and the Son, is to be understood after a peculiar manner, so as that they are really thereby one; and what the Son and Holy Ghost doth, the Father doth in them, according to that of Athanasius: Ἡ τοῦ Υἱοῦ θεότης τοῦ Πατρὸς θεότης ἐστί· καὶ οὕτως ἐν τῷ Υἱῷ τὴν τῶν πάντων πρόνοιαν ποιεῖται, "The Godhead of the Son is the Godhead of the Father; and so the Father exercises a providence over all things in the Son."

Lastly, the same Athanasius, in sundry places, still further supposes those three divine hypostases to make up one entire divinity, after the same manner as the fountain and the stream make up one entire river; or the root, and the stock, and the branches one entire tree. And in this sense also, is the whole Trinity said by him to be μία θεότης, and μία φύσις, and μία οὐσία, and εἷς Θεὸς, "one divinity," and "one nature," and "one essence," and "one God." And accordingly the word "Homoousios" seems here to be taken by Athanasius, in a further sense, besides that before mentioned; not only for things agreeing in one common and general essence, as three individual men are co-essential with one another; but also for such as concurrently together make up one entire thing, and are therefore jointly essential thereunto. For when he affirmeth: Τὸ φυτὸν εἶναι ῥίζης ὁμοφυὲς, and τὰ κλήματα ὁμοούσια τῆς ἀμπέλου, "That the tree is congenerous or homogenial with the root," and "the branches co-essential with the vine;" his meaning is, that the root, stock, and branches, are not only of one kind, but also all together make up the entire essence of one plant or tree. In like manner, those three hypostases, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are not only congenerous and co-essential, as having all the essence of the Godhead alike in them, but also as concurrently making up one entire divinity. Accordingly whereunto, Athanasius further concludes, that these three divine hypostases have not a consent of will only, but essentially one and the self-same will, and that they do also jointly produce ad extra, μίαν ἐνέργειαν, "one and the self-same energy, operation, or action;" nothing being peculiar to the Son as such, but only the economy of the incarnation:* Ὁμοία ἑαυτῇ καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστι τῇ φύσει ἡ

* Ep. ad Serap. p. 202.

Τριάς· καὶ μία ταύτης ἡ ἐνέργεια· ὁ γὰρ Πατὴρ διὰ τοῦ Λόγου, ἐν τῷ Πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ τὰ πάντα ποιεῖ· καὶ οὕτως ἡ ἑνότης τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος σώζεται· καὶ οὕτως εἷς Θεὸς ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ κηρύττεται, ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων, καὶ διὰ πάντων, καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν· ἐπὶ πάντων μὲν ὡς Πατὴρ, ὡς ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγή· διὰ πάντων δὲ διὰ τοῦ Λόγου· ἐν πᾶσι δὲ ἐν τῷ Πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ, "The Trinity is like itself, and by nature indivisible, and there is one energy or action of it; for the Father by the Word, in the Holy Ghost, doth all things. And thus is the unity of the whole Trinity conserved, and one God preached in the church: namely, such as is above all, and by or through all, and in all. Above all, as the Father, the principle, and fountain; through all, by the Word; and in all, by the Holy Spirit." And elsewhere he writeth often to the same purpose. Thus have we given a true and full account, how, according to Athanasius, the three divine hypostases, though not "mono-ousios," but "homo-ousios" only, are really but one God or divinity. In all which doctrine of his there is nothing but what a true and genuine Platonist would readily subscribe to. From whence it may be concluded, that the right Platonic trinity differs not so much from the doctrine of the ancient church, as some late writers have supposed.

Hitherto hath the Platonic Christian endeavoured partly to rectify and reform the true and genuine Platonic trinity, and partly to reconcile it with the doctrine of the ancient church. Nevertheless, to prevent all mistakes, we shall here declare that wheresoever this most genuine Platonic trinity may be found to differ, not only from the Scripture itself, (which yet notwithstanding is the sole rule of faith) but also from the form of the Nicene and Constantinopolitan councils; and further from the doctrine of Athanasius too, in his genuine writings, (whether it be in their inequality, or in any thing else) it is there utterly disclaimed and rejected by us. For as for that creed, commonly called Athanasian, which was written a long time after by some other hand; since at first it derived all its authority, either from the name of Athanasius, to whom it was entitled, or else because it was supposed to be an epitome and abridgment of his doctrine; this (as we conceive) is therefore to be interpreted according to the tenor of that doctrine, contained in the genuine writings of Athanasius. Of whom we can think no otherwise, than as a person highly instrumental and serviceable to divine providence, for the preserving of the Christian church from lapsing by Arianism, into a kind of paganic and idolatrous Christianity; in religiously worshipping of those which themselves concluded to be creatures; and by means of whom especially, the doctrine of the Trinity, (which before fluctuated in some loose uncertainty) came to be more punctually stated and settled.

Now the reason why we introduced the Platonic Christian here thus apologizing, was first: because we conceived it not to be the interest of Christianity that the ancient Platonic trinity should be made more discrepant from the Christian than indeed it is. And secondly, because, as we have already proved, the ancient and genuine Platonic trinity was doubtless anti-Arian, or else the Arian trinity anti-Platonic; the second and third hypostases in the Platonic trinity, being both eternal, infinite, and immutable. And as for those Platonic βαθμοὶ, or "gradations," so much spoken of, these (by St. Cyril's[9] leave) were of a different kind from the Arian, there being not the inequality of creatures in them to the Creator. Wherefore Socrates, the ecclesiastic historian, not without cause wonders, how these two presbyters, Georgius and Timotheus, should adhere to the Arian faction, since they were accounted such great readers of Plato and Origen:* *Θαυμάσαι οὖν μοι ἔπεισι, πῶς οὗτοι οἱ ἄνδρες, τῇ Ἀρειανῶν ἁρησκείᾳ παρέμειναν, ὧν ὁ μὲν Πλάτωνα ἀεὶ μετὰ χεῖρας εἶχεν, ὁ δὲ τὸν Ὠριγένην ἀνέπνεεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ Πλάτων τὸ Δεύτερον καὶ τὸ Τρίτον αἴτιον, ὡς αὐτὸς ὀνομάζειν εἴωθεν, ἀρχὴν ὑπάρξεως εἰληφέναι φησί· καὶ Ὠριγένης συναΐδιον παντα χοῦ ὁμολογεῖ τὸν υἱὸν τῷ πατρί,* "It seems to me wonderful how those two persons should persist in the Arian persuasion; one of them having always Plato in his hands, and the other continually breathing Origen. Since Plato nowhere affirmeth his first and second cause (as he was wont to call them) to have had any beginning of their existence; and Origen every where confesseth the Son to be co-eternal with the Father."

Besides which, another reason for this apology of the Christian Platonist was, because as the Platonic Pagans after Christianity did approve of the Christian doctrine concerning the Logos, as that which which was exactly agreeable with their own; so did the generality of the Christian fathers, before and after the Nicene council, represent the genuine Platonic trinity as really the same thing with the Christian, or as approaching so near to it, that they differed chiefly in circumstances, or the manner of expression. The former of these is evident from that famous passage of Amelius, contemporary with Plotinus, recorded by Eusebius, St. Cyril, and Theodoret:† *Καὶ οὗτος ἄρα ἦν ὁ Λόγος, καθ' ὃν αἰεὶ ὄντα, τὰ γινόμενα ἐγίνετο, ὡς ἂν καὶ ὁ Ἡράκλειτος ἀξιώσειε, καὶ νὴ Δί' ὃν ὁ Βάρβαρος ἀξιοῖ ἐν τῇ τῆς ἀρχῆς τάξει τε καὶ ἀξίᾳ καθεστηκότα, πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι, καὶ Θεὸν εἶναι· δι' οὗ πάντ' ἁπλῶς γεγενῆσθαι· ἐν ᾧ τὸ γενόμενον ζῶν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ὂν πεφυκέναι· καὶ εἰς τὰ σώματα πίπτειν καὶ σάρκα ἐνδυσάμενον,*

[9] Who lib. 8. adv. Julianum, p. 270. and lib. 1. p. 34. compares the Porphyrian and Platonic Trinity with the Arian.

* Lib. 7. cap. 6. [P. 343.] ‡ Præp. Evan. lib. 11. cap. 9. [Cap. 19. p. 540.]

φαντάζεσθαι ἄνθρωπον, μετὰ καὶ τοῦ τηνικαῦτα δεικνύειν τῆς φύσεως τὸ μεγαλεῖον ἀμέλει· καὶ ἀναλυθέντα πάλιν ἀποθεοῦσθαι, καὶ Θεὸν εἶναι, οἷος ἦν πρὸ τοῦ εἰς τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον καταχθῆναι, "And this was the Logos or Word, by whom existing from eternity, according to Heraclitus, all things were made, and whom that barbarian also placeth in the rank and dignity of a principle, affirming him to have been with God, and to be God: and that all things were made by him, and that whatsoever was made, was life and being in him. As also that he descended into a body, and being clothed in flesh, appeared as a man, though not without demonstration of the divinity of his nature. But that afterwards being loosed or separated from the same, he was deified, and became God again, such as he was before he came down into a mortal body." In which words, Amelius speaks favourably also of the incarnation of that eternal Logos. And the same is further manifest from what St. Austin writeth concerning a Platonist in his time,* Initium sancti evangelii, cui nomen est secundum Johannem, quidam Platonicus, sicut à sancto sene Simpliciano, qui postea Mediolanensi ecclesiæ præsedit episcopus, solebamus audire, aureis literis conscribendum, et per omnes ecclesias in locis eminentissimis proponendum esse dicebat, "We have often heard from that holy man Simplicianus, afterward bishop of Milan, that a certain Platonist affirmed the beginning of St. John's gospel deserved to be writ in letters of gold, and to be set up in all the most eminent places throughout the Christian churches." And the latter will sufficiently appear from these following testimonies: Justin Martyr, in his apology, affirmeth of Plato,† Δευτέραν χώραν τῷ παρὰ Θεοῦ λόγῳ δίδωσι· τὴν δὲ τρίτην τῷ λεχθέντι ἐπιφέρεσθαι τῷ ὕδατι πνεύματι, &c., "That he gave the second place to the Word of God; and the third to that Spirit which is said to have moved upon the waters." Clemens Alexandrinus, speaking of that passage in Plato's second epistle to Dionysius, concerning the first, second, and third, writeth thus:‡ Οὐκ ἄλλως ἔγωγε ἐξακούω, ἢ τὴν ἁγίαν τριάδα μηνύεσθαι, τρίτον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα· τὸν υἱὸν δὲ δεύτερον, δι' οὗ πάντα ἐγένετο κατὰ βούλησιν τοῦ πατρός, "I understand this no otherwise, than that the Holy Trinity is signified thereby, the third being the Holy Ghost, and the second the Son, by whom all things were made, according to the will of the Father." Origen also affirmeth the Son of God to have been plainly spoken of by Plato, in his epistle to Hermias and Coriscus:§ Ὁ πάντ' ἐπαγγελλόμενος εἰδέναι Κέλσος, καὶ πολλὰ τῶν Πλάτωνος παρατεθέμενος, ἐκὼν, οἶμαι, σιωπᾷ τὸν περὶ υἱοῦ θεοῦ λόγον, τὸν παρὰ Πλάτωνι λεγό-

* De Civitate Dei, lib. 10. cap. 29. [P. 202. tom. 7. opp. † P. 93. [Apol. 2.]
‡ Stromat. lib. 5. p. 598. [P. 710. Edit. Potteri.] § Lib. 6. c. Cels. [P. 280.]

μενον ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἑρμείαν καὶ Κορίσκον ἐπιστολῇ, "Celsus, who pretendeth to know all things, and who citeth so many other passages out of Plato, doth purposely (as I suppose) dissemble and conceal that which he wrote concerning the Son of God, in his epistle to Hermias and Coriscus,[10] where he calls him the God of the whole universe, and the prince of all things, both present and future: afterwards speaking of the Father of this prince and cause." And again, elsewhere in that book, he writeth to the same purpose:* Ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐβουλήθη τὸ παρὰ Πλάτωνι ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς λελεγμένον, οὗ ἐν τοῖς ἀνωτέρω ἐμνήσθημεν, περὶ τοῦ διακοσμήσαντος τόδε τὸ πᾶν, ὡς ὄντος υἱοῦ θεοῦ, παραθέσθαι· ἵνα μὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, ὃν πολλάκις ἐσέμνυνεν, ἀναγκασθῇ παραδέξασθαι, ὅτι ὑμὲν δημιουργὸς τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς υἱός ἐστι τοῦ θεοῦ, ὁ δὲ πρῶτος καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεὸς πατήρ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ, "Neither would Celsus (here speaking of Christians making Christ the Son of God) take any notice of that passage in Plato's epistle before mentioned, concerning the framer and governor of the whole world, as being the Son of God; lest he should be compelled by the authority of Plato, whom he so often magnifieth, to agree with this doctrine of ours, that the Demiurgus of the whole world is the Son of God; but the first and supreme Deity, his Father." Moreover, St. Cyprian, or whoever were the author of the book inscribed De Spiritu Sancto,[1] affirmeth the Platonists first and universal Psyche, to be the same with the Holy Ghost in the Christian theology, in these words: Hujus sempiterna virtus et divinitas, cum in propria natura ab inquisitoribus mundi, antiquis philosophis, propriè investigari non posset; subtilissimis tamen intuiti conjecturis compositionem mundi, et distinctis elementorum affectibus, præsentem omnibus animam adfuisse dixerunt; quibus, secundum genus et ordinem singulorum, vitam præberet et motum, et intransgressibiles figeret metas, et stabilitatem assignaret; et universam hanc vitam, hunc motum, hanc rerum essentiam, animam mundi vocaverunt.† In the next place Eusebius Cæsariensis gives a full and clear testimony of the concordance and agreement of the Platonic, at least as to the main, with the Christian trinity, which he will have to have been the Cabala of the ancient

[10] The following are not Origen's words, but Dr. Cudworth's, who thus explains the passage of Plato cited by Origen.

* Contra Cels. lib. 6. p. 308.

[1] This book, De Spiritu Sancto, is part of a work, De Cardinalibus Christi Operibus, formerly ascribed to St. Cyprian, but at the present day, much more correctly, to the Abbè Arnaldus, a writer of the twelfth century. See Casim. Oudinus' Commentar. de Scriptor. Eccles. tom. 2. p. 1290. It is still added, however, as an Appendix to the genuine works of St. Cyprian. The words here cited occur not far from the beginning of the book, De Spiritu Sancto, p. 114. ed. Baluzii. This witness, therefore, is to be excluded from the list of those ancient ecclesiastical fathers who supposed the Platonic Trinity to be closely allied to the Christian.

† Præp. Evan. lib. 11. cap. 20. [P. 541.]

Hebrews, thus: Τῶν παρ' Ἑβραίοις λογίων μετὰ τὸν περὶ πατρὸς καὶ Ὑιοῦ λόγον, ἐν τρίτῃ τάξει τὸ Ἅγιον Πνεῦμα καταλεγόντων· καὶ τήν γε ἁγίαν καὶ μακαρίαν Τριάδα τοῦτον ὑποτιθεμένων τὸν τρόπον, ὡς ἂν τῆς τρίτης δυνάμεως πᾶσαν ὑπερβεβηκυίας γεννητὴν φύσιν· οὖσαν πρώτην μὲν τῶν διὰ τοῦ Ὑιοῦ συστασῶν νοερῶν οὐσιῶν, τρίτην δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου Αἰτίου· θέα ὅπως καὶ ὁ Πλάτων τοιαῦτά τινα ἠνίξατο διὰ τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον ἐπιστολῆς, &c. "The oracles of the Hebrews, placing the Holy Ghost after the Father and the Son, in the third rank, and acknowledging a holy and blessed trinity after this manner, so as that this third power does also transcend all created nature, and is the first of those intellectual substances, which proceed from the Son, and the third from the first cause: see how Plato enigmatically declareth the same things in his epistle to Dionysius, in these words, &c. These things the interpreters of Plato refer to a first God, and to a second cause, and to a third the soul of the world, which they call also the third God. And the divine Scriptures in like manner rank the holy Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in the place or degree of a principle." But it is most observable what Athanasius affirmeth of the Platonists; that though they derived the second hypostasis of their trinity from the first, and the third from the second, yet they supposed both their second and third hypostases to be uncreated; and therefore does he send the Arians to school thither, who, because there is but one Ἀγέννητος, "one self-originated Being," would unskilfully conclude that the Word or Son of God must therefore needs be a creature. Thus, in his book concerning the decrees of the Nicene council:† Ἐχρήσαντο παρ' Ἕλλήνων λοιπὸν τὴν λέξιν τοῦ Ἀγεννήτου· ἵνα προφάσει καὶ τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος, ἐν τοῖς γεννητοῖς πάλιν καὶ τοῖς κτίσμασι συναριθμῶσι τὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγον· δι' οὗ αὐτὰ τὰ γεννητὰ γέγονεν· εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοοῦντες τὸ ὄνομα οὕτως ἀναισχυντοῦσιν, ἔδει μαθεῖν αὐτοὺς παρὰ τῶν αὐτοῖς δεδωκότων αὐτὸ, ὅτι καὶ ὃν λέγουσιν ἐκ τοῦ Ἀγαθοῦ Νοῦν, καὶ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Νοῦ ψυχὴν· καίτοι γινώσκοντες τὸ ἐξ ὧν εἰσιν, οὐκ ἐφοβήθησαν, ὅμως, καὶ αὐτὰ εἰπεῖν Ἀγέννητα· εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο λέγοντες οὐκ ἐλαττοῦσι τὸ πρῶτον, ἐξ οὗ καὶ ταῦτα πέφυκε· καὶ ἢ καὶ αὐτοὺς οὕτω λέγειν, ἢ μηδόλως λέγειν, περὶ ὧν οὐκ ἴσασιν, "The Arians, borrowing the word Agennetos from the Pagans, (who acknowledge only one such) make that a pretence to rank the Word or Son of God, who is the creator of all, amongst creatures or things made. Whereas they ought to have learned the right signification of that word Agennetos from those very Platonists who gave it them. Who, though acknowledging their second hypostasis of Nous or Intellect to be derived from the first, called Tagathon, and their third hypostasis or Psyche from the

* Page 278.

second; nevertheless doubt not to affirm them both to be agenета or uncreated, knowing well, that hereby they detract nothing from the majesty of the first, from whom these two are derived. Wherefore the Arians either ought so to speak as the Platonists do, or else to say nothing at all concerning these things which they are ignorant of." In which words of Athanasius, there is a plain distinction made betwixt ἀγέννητος and ἀγένητος, that is "unbegotten" and "uncreated;" and the second person of the Trinity, the Son or Word of God, though acknowledged by him, not to be Ἀγέννητος, "unbegotten," (he being begotten of the Father, who is the only "Agennetos") yet is he here said to be Ἀγενητος, "uncreated;"[2] he declaring the Platonists thus to have affirmed the second and third hypostases of their trinity not to be creatures, but uncreated. Which signal testimony of Athanasius concerning the Platonic trinity, is a great vindication of the same. We might further add St. Austin's* confession also,[3] that God the Father, and God the Son, were by the Platonists acknowledged in like manner, as by the Christians; though concerning the Holy Ghost, he observes some difference betwixt Plotinus and Porphyrius, in that the former did postponere animæ naturam paterno intellectui, the latter interponere; "Plotinus did postpone his Psyche, or soul, after the paternal Intellect; but Porphyrius interponed it betwixt the Father and the Son, as a middle between both." It was before observed, that St. Cyril of Alexandria affirmeth nothing to be wanting to the Platonic trinity, but only that Homo-ousiotes of his and some other fathers in that age, that they should not only all be God, or uncreated, but also three co-equal individuals, under the same ultimate species, as three individual men: he conceiving that gradual subordination that is in the Platonic trinity, to be a certain tang of Arianism. Nevertheless, he thus concludeth,[4] Πλὴν οὐκ ἠγνόηκεν ὁλοτρόπως τὸ ἀληθὲς. "That Plato notwithstanding was not altogether ignorant of the truth, but that he had the knowledge of the only begotten Son of God, as likewise of the Holy Ghost, called by him Psyche; and that he would have every way expressed himself rightly, had he not been afraid of Anitus and Melitus, and that poison which Socrates drunk." Now, whether this were a fault or no in the Platonists, that they did not suppose their hypostases to be three

[2] On these words, ἀγέννητος and ἀγένητος, and on their varied signification and distinction, as well as synonymous use, in ancient Christian writers, consult the copious and erudite commentary of Dion. Petavius, Dogmat. Theol. tom. 2. De Trinitate, lib. 5. cap. 1. &c. p. 270. &c.

[3] De Civitate Dei. [Lib. 10. cap. 23.]

[4] De Civitate Dei, lib. 10. cap. 23. On this passage of St. Augustine we have discoursed at some length above, and have shown that he misapprehended the meaning of the Platonists on the middle nature of the third principle.

[4] Adv. Julianum, lib. 1. p. 34.

individuals under the same ultimate species, we leave to others to judge. We might here add the testimony of Chalcidius, because he is unquestionably concluded to have been a Christian;[5]

[5] Of this opinion, besides Dr. Cudworth, are many most eminent and learned men, enumerated by J. Alb. Fabricius, Biblioth. Latin. lib. 3. cap. 7. p. 554. who himself also not only adopts it, but also professedly endeavours to show throughout his Annotations on Chalcidius, that this philosopher was wholly imbued with Christian precepts. On the contrary, there are not a few others who hold this erudite interpreter of Plato to have adhered to the religion of Plato, and not to have passed over to the ranks of the Christians. Not long ago, a learned writer [Guzetus, according to Fabricius, Biblioth. Latin. Med. Ævi. p. 1032. where he states it to be his purpose to examine into the matter some other time] put forth in P. des Molets Memoires de Litterature, tom. 1. par. 1. p. 138. a Dissertation on Chalcidius, wherein he warmly supports this opinion: although the author brings forward scarcely any thing new, and does not prove Chalcidius to have been a Pagan so much as expose the weakness of the arguments of those who rank him among Christians. For myself, I adopt the views of neither party, but consider Chalcidius to have been, like many Platonists of that period, an eclectic, who did not approve entirely either of the Pagan or the Christian religion, but compounded a sort of religion out of both, or selected from each what he held to be true, and repudiated the rest. To those who are acquainted with the history of Christianity in the fourth and fifth centuries, it is well known that among the philosophers of that period there were some who took upon themselves the office of mediator as it were between the Christians and Pagans, and endeavoured to bring about a sort of harmony of the two religions: to which class if I show Chalcidius to have belonged, I fancy I shall be doing a not altogether unprofitable service. For we can scarcely know what weight is to be attached to the authority of any witness, till we have first of all ascertained his religion. Wherefore, as we have sometimes occasion to make use of Chalcidius' testimony in matters of no small moment, it is manifestly our interest to know to what religion he belonged. I shall first, therefore, adduce the arguments of the most erudite J. Alb. Fabricius, upon the strength of which he considers Chalcidius is to be ranked among the professors of Christianity, collected from his Annotations on that writer, and interspersing the observations of others, shall examine into the force of each: afterwards, I shall point out such traces as I have met with in Chalcidius of a superstition foreign to the discipline of Christ; from which it will appear that this man was thoroughly neither a Pagan nor a Christian, but intermediate between both. But lest the ambiguity of the word Christian should occasion any obscurity in this disputation, I shall here state in the outset, that I call him a Christian who holds the books of the Old and New Testament to be divinely inspired, confesses Christ to be the sole Redeemer of the human race, and in short, adopts all those dogmas in which all sects of Christians put faith, and on the other hand, rejects every thing which tends to weaken or subvert the first foundations of Christianity. But a Pagan I call one who believes in many gods, and holds that these gods are to be worshipped; who denies Christ to be the only Saviour, and despises and repudiates the books which Christians consider divine, or even inculcates such doctrines as would necessarily lead to conclusions of the kind. The reason why I adopt such wide definitions in this question will be easily understood by every intelligent man conversant with these matters. If it be made appear, therefore, that neither of these definitions applies to Chalcidius, it will be evident, at the same time, that neither Christians nor Pagans can claim this philosopher exclusively to themselves.

I. Chalcidius calls the Jews a *more holy sect*. Quod quidem, says he, cap. 4. sect. 54. p. 299. verum esse testatur eminens quædam doctrina sectæ sanctioris et in comprehensione divinæ rei prudentioris, quæ perhibet Deum, absoluto illustratoque sensili mundo, genus humanum instituentem, corpus quidem ejus, parte humi sumta, juxta hanc effigiem ædificasse formasseque, vitam vero eidem ex convexis accersisse cœlestibus, "Which is proved to be true by an eminent doctrine of that more holy, and in the comprehension of divine matters more prudent sect, which says, that God having finished and adorned the sensible world, in making man, took a portion of earth and formed his body according to this image, but gave him life from heaven." The epithet here applied to the Jews, is considered by Fabricius to be a sign of Christian sentiments: Judæos, says he, sanctioris sectæ titulo non appellaturus fuisset,

though his language indeed be too much paganical, when he calls the three divine hypostases, a chief, a second, and a third God:* Istius rei dispositio talis mente concipienda est; originem quidem

nisi Christianus, "Had he not been a Christian, he would not have called the Jews by the title of more holy sect." I consider however, that there is not so much in this name as the excellent writer supposes. For, although I grant it to be a proof that Chalcidius was not wholly enslaved by pagan superstition, inasmuch as he praises a nation held in the greatest detestation by the Pagans; still, we cannot, I think, infer from it that he was altogether devoted to Christian principles. For I see no reason why a Platonic philosopher who believes in God and in his providence over human affairs, may not suppose a portion of divine and true wisdom to have been formerly in Moses, and at the same time repudiate Christ and his doctrine. A sort of friendship had long ago grown up, especially in Egypt, between the Jews and the philosophers who called themselves followers of Plato. The Jews who studied philosophy, did not scruple to adopt the institutes of Plato, and lest this might appear to be done against the authority of Moses, not only sought for traces of the Platonic doctrines in Moses' writings, but affirmed also that Plato had borrowed a great portion of them from Moses. For evidence of this, consult Philo, an author read by Chalcidius, and on whose philosophy we have discoursed above, cap. 13. sect. 266. p. 381. Among the Platonists, doubtless, there were some who considered this not to be incredible: to which number I suspect Chalcidius to have belonged, who so often appeals to the philosophy of the Hebrews. And even the present passage supplies me with two things not a little confirmatory of this opinion. 1. As Chalcidius was not ignorant that the Christians agreed with the Jews in attributing divine authority to Moses, it is strange he cites only Hebrew, and not also Christian testimonies. Learned men who have read Chalcidius, are aware that his work is addressed to a Christian, whoever he was, named Osius. His discourse, therefore, would have had much greater weight with this man, whom he was desirous of conciliating, if he had asserted that both Hebrews and Christians, as acknowledging the divine authority of Moses, approached closely to the doctrine of Plato. Nevertheless, he quotes to this Christian only Hebrew testimonies; which is a clear proof that he did not think so favourably of the Christians as of the Jews, whose philosophy he held to be in accordance with the precepts of Plato. 2. The opinion here attributed by Chalcidius to the Hebrews is not Moses', but that of certain Jews who interpreted Moses according to the sense of Plato. Thus he asserts a twofold soul in man: one *vital* and the other *rational*. The former he tells us was derived from God, when he formed man, from the stars and heavenly bodies, and placed in man; the latter was breathed into him afterwards by the same Creator, from himself or from his own nature. Postque, says he, (Deum Hebræi docent) intimis ejus (hominis nimirum recessibus) inspirationem proprio flatu intimasse, "And afterwards that God breathed into his (man's) inmost recesses an inspiration by his own breath." Compare cap. 9. sect. 217. p. 357. and cap. 13. sect. 298. p. 388. This philosophy of a double soul, one derived from the stars, the other from God himself, would be in vain looked for in the writings of Moses. From which it is easy to understand that Chalcidius had not read Moses himself, which a Christian would naturally do, but rather had lent too ready an ear to the Platonic Jews, especially Philo, in their interpretations of Moses' doctrines. And that the Jews long prior to the time of Chalcidius, had cherished this doctrine and ascribed it to Moses, is shown both by many other things, and also by the fact, that Josephus, Antiq. Judaic. lib. 1. cap. 1. sect. 2. p. 6. thus speaks of the soul given by God to man: Καὶ ΠΝΕΥΜΑ ἐνῆκεν αὐτῷ καὶ ΨΥΧΗΝ, "He placed in him a spirit and a soul." In which words ψυχὴ undoubtedly means the *natural* and *vital soul*, and πνεῦμα the *rational soul* of Chalcidius.

II. From these remarks my opinion will be already evident as to the second argument advanced by learned men in proof of Chalcidius being a Christian. Chalcidius, in many places speaks in laudatory terms of the Hebrew philosophy: the passages themselves in which he mentions these doctrines have been carefully collected by Fabricius, Biblioth. Latin. lib. 3. cap. 7. p. 555. 556. This they consider would

* Page 277. [Cap. 7. sect. 186. p. 346. 347. Edit. Fabricii.]

rerum esse summum et ineffabilem Deum; post providentiam ejus secundum Deum, latorem legis utriusque vitæ tam æternæ quam temporariæ; tertium esse porro substantiam, quæ

scarcely have been done by him unless he had been a Christian. For my part, I think otherwise, and am satisfied that he might have commended the Jews, and still disagreed with the Christians. Besides, as I have already intimated, in appealing to the Hebrews and their philosophy, he sometimes attributes to them dogmas which are neither to be met with in Moses, nor in the other books of the Old Testament; from which it was manifest that he was little conversant with the facts and opinions handed down to the Jews upon divine authority, that is, was indebted for what he records of the Hebrew philosophy to the Jewish masters rather than to Moses. Thus, cap. 13. sect. 298. 388. 389. the Hebrews, he informs us, taught: Deum mutis et agrestibus animantibus animam rationis expertem ex silva dedisse, "That God gave to the mute animals of the field a soul devoid of reason from matter." Which every one knows is nowhere written by Moses. Cap. 7. sect. 129. p. 328. he says that according to the Hebrews, astra esse signa futurorum proventuum, "the stars are signs of future events:" which even Fabricius himself disapproves of, and denies to belong to Moses. To avoid prolixity, I pass over others of the same kind. But why Chalcidius, in writing to a Christian, should have so repeatedly appealed to the evidence and authority of the Jews, will readily be understood by those who are not unacquainted with the circumstances of the period in which he lived. The later Platonists, as they are called, before Constantine took upon himself the protection of the Christian religion, had inflicted various evils and injuries upon its professors, and had not only openly attacked the doctrine of Christ in their writings, but excited the civil authorities and the multitude against those that were devoted to it. Hence, after Constantine had given peace and external security to the Christian community, this sect was in the highest degree obnoxious to most Christians, nor could many of the prelates easily persuade themselves to look favourably upon the Platonic name and discipline. To avert in some measure this odium, Chalcidius no doubt considered it as his wisest course to fortify himself on all occasions by the authority of the Hebrews, and with Philo, Josephus, and others, for his guides, to remind the Christian doctor, Osius, that the Platonists inculcated scarcely any thing more than had before been inculcated by Moses, an author whom Christians by universal consent acknowledged to be divine.

III. Chalcidius sometimes quotes the testimony of Moses, see cap. 7. sect. 152. p. 336. This is brought forward by learned men as a third argument to show that this philosopher was a follower of Christ; with whom I cannot agree, for this reason, that it is manifestly possible for any one to hold Moses in high estimation, and still to reject Christ and his precepts. All those, indeed, who take Christ for their master, must necessarily recognize Moses and his authority: but all who hold Moses to be divine, do not consider themselves obliged to admit the authority of Christ also. Besides, to say the least of it, it is still very doubtful and uncertain whether Chalcidius did hold Moses to be a man divinely inspired. No slight ground for doubting on this matter is afforded by a remarkable passage occurring in cap. 13. sect. 274. p. 380. Hebræi silvam generatam esse confitentur: quorum sapientissimus Moses non humana facundia, sed divina, *ut ferunt*, inspiratione vegetatus, in eo libro, qui de genitura mundi censetur, ab exordio sic est profatus, "The Hebrews acknowledge matter to have been generated: the wisest of whom, Moses, moved not by human eloquence, but, *as they say*, by divine inspiration, declared so at the beginning of the book on the generation of the world." All those who deny that Chalcidius is to be ranked among Christians, appeal to this passage in particular, and insist upon its being manifest from the phrase, *as they say*, that he at least entertained a doubt as to the divine authority of Moses: if which were the case, there is no one who would not exclude him from the Christian community. Fabricius, however, has laboured to show on the authority of Josephus, Agathias, and St. Basil, that the Greek phrase, ὡς φασι, is not always a sign of doubting, but used by the best writers even of those things which they believed to be most certain. See Biblioth Græc. vol. 6. lib. 5. cap. 5. p. 261. Not. in Chalcidium, p. 380. But supposing this to be so, still this passage of Chalcidius will not on that account be free from all suspicion. For setting aside that the illustrious scholar has produced no example from Latin authors to show that the expression, *ut ferunt*, is usually

secunda mens intellectusque dicitur, quasi quædam custos legis æternæ. His subjectas esse rationabiles animas, legi obsequentes, ministras verò potestates, &c. Ergo summus Deus jubet, se-

applied by them in the same sense as the Greek, ὡς φασι, no one, I imagine, will deny that *ut ferunt* is frequently an indication of doubt in the mind of the writer, and of the thing he is speaking of being left undetermined. And this being unquestionable, it must be manifest at the same time, that these words of Chalcidius admit of being taken in a twofold sense, and that both sides of the question: whether they imply doubt or asseveration, may be maintained from them. Hence, it will at least be matter for endless controversy, whether or not Chalcidius believed Moses to be divinely inspired, nor will this philosopher ever be entirely freed from suspicion. However, it being the common and certainly the most rational rule of all interpreters to understand the words of an author in the usual and ordinary sense, when there is no necessity for the contrary, most men, I am afraid, will consider that there is much more probability in the opinion of those who hold Chalcidius to have doubted, than of those who suppose him in this case to have made a positive affirmation.

IV. Somewhat greater stress is laid by those who contend for Chalcidius having been a Christian on that striking passage of his wherein he speaks of the Magi, and of the star which was seen by them, cap. 7. sec. 125. p. 325. Est quoque alia sanctior et venerabilior historia, quæ perhibet ortu stellæ cujusdam non morbos mortesque denunciatas, sed descensum Dei venerabilis ad humanæ conservationis rerumque mortalium gratiam. Quam stellam quum nocturno itinere suspexissent Chaldæorum profecto sapientes viri et consideratione rerum cœlestium satis exercitati, quæsisse dicuntur recentem ortum Dei: repertaque illa majestate puerili veneratos esse, et rota tanto Deo convenientia nuncupasse, quæ tibi multo melius sunt comperta, quam ceteris, "There is also another more sacred and venerable history which says that the rising of a certain star foretold, not diseases and death, but the descent of the glorious God for the sake of human salvation and mortal affairs. Which star having been beheld by the wise men of the Chaldeans, versed in the contemplation of celestial things, they are said to have sought for the recent birth of God: and having found the august child, to have worshipped him, and presented unto him gifts suitable to so great a God; which things are much better known to thee than to others." So far Chalcidius. Hoc, says Fabricius, satis perspicue Christianum se prodit Chalcidius, "By this Chalcidius sufficiently declares himself to be a Christian." Others, however, think differently, and among these W. Cave, Histor. Litter. Scriptor. Eccles. tom. 1. p. 106, who considers that Chalcidius' Christianism may be overthrown even by this passage: Semel meminit stellæ Christum recens natum præmonstrantis, cujus in historia Evangelica fit mentio: de quibus nihilominus haud satis pro Christiani scriptoris more loquitur, "He makes mention once of the star that foreshowed the recent nativity of Christ, an account of which is given in the gospel history: of which matters, however, he does not speak sufficiently in the spirit of a Christian writer." For myself, I assent to neither party, considering the passage to be of little avail either to those who rank Chalcidius among the Pagans, or those who maintain him to have been a Christian. The philosopher relates the history of the star seen by the Magi: which history, however, he neither rejects nor admits. To me, however, it seems probable, I confess, that had Chalcidius been devoted to Christian doctrines, he would have spoken somewhat more confidently of this star. If he had been writing to a man imbued with pagan superstitions it perhaps might have been prudent in him to make mention of this matter in such a way as not to incur the censure of his friend. But the book is addressed to a Christian, and one too, as these very words intimate, a doctor and teacher of the Christians. Why does he not therefore freely speak out his sentiments, and assert that the sacred volumes have fully convinced him of the truth of this history? But some one perhaps will say: Chalcidius however calls this history *more sacred and venerable*, which he would hardly have done if he had not considered it to be true. But the words which precede sufficiently show that this history is so termed by him comparatively, and by no means simply and absolutely. For he had been narrating certain things out of the works of the Egyptians and out of Homer; and to these narratives he prefers this history, not signifying thereby that it is entirely free from controversy, but merely that it is more worthy to be believed than the figments of the Egyptians and Homer. But in order to throw clearer light upon the subject, and to

cundus ordinat, tertius intimat. Animæ verò legem agunt. "This thing is to be conceived after this manner; that the first original of things is the supreme and ineffable God; after his

make it appear that Chalcidius did not hold every thing to be true, which he relates and yet does not openly impugn and repudiate, I wish it to be observed that he considered it to be the part of a wise man to relate every thing handed down by grave and illustrious authors without doubt or hesitation, although it may be of such a character as not easily to admit of being believed. This opinion he openly declares in the words which follow, cap. 7. sect. 126. p. 326. Plato exponit ea, quæ Orpheus et Linus et Musæus de divinis potestatibus vaticinati sunt, non quo delectaretur, *aut crederet*, sed quod tanta esset auctoritas vaticinantium, ut iis asseverantibus parcius credi non oporteret, "Plato gives an account of those things which Orpheus and Linus and Musæus sung on the divine powers, not that he was satisfied with *or believed* them, but because the authority of those poets was so great, that on their assertion it was necessary to pay no slight credence to them." Chalcidius therefore, according to this saying, thought it right that things recorded by great men, although appearing to us to be at variance with the truth, should nevertheless be related and expounded by us in such a way as to imply that we believe them. For although he speaks only of what he considers Plato to have done; still no one would say, that the man whose sole delight was in Plato condemned this custom of his master, or did not consider himself at liberty to do what in Plato he held to be blameless. Wherefore, if Chalcidius had even narrated this history of the Magi so as to indicate his own recognition and approval of it, still we could by no means infer from thence that the man entertained no doubts as to its truth. For as this narrative had come from men at that time held in vast estimation and respect, and moreover, as Chalcidius' book is addressed to a man who was convinced of the divine origin of that history, the laws of what he considered to be philosophical prudence would seem to him to require that he should so relate it as not to to give the least ground for suspicion that he harboured any doubts on the matter.

V. What Chalcidius has left on record every where regarding angels, affords another argument to those who number him among Christians. Fabricius does not deny, Not. in Chalcid. p. 313. that mention is sometimes made of the ἀγγελικὸν γένος, or angels, even by those writers who were notoriously opposed to the Christian religion: nevertheless he considers certain things to be said respecting angels by Chalcidius, that clearly indicate a mind devoted to the Christian doctrine. The passage chiefly relied on by him is this, cap. 7. sect. 131. p. 328. Hujus porro generis illud est æthereum, quod in secundo loco commemoravimus positum, quos Hebræi vocant sanctos angelos, stareque eos dicunt ante Dei contemplationem venerabiles, summa atque acri intelligentia, ... iidemque speculatores et exsequutores, dæmones opinor, tamquam δαήμονες dicti, "Of this class, moreover, there is that ethereal one which we have spoken of as occupying the second place, and which the Hebrews call angels, and say that they stand before the contemplation of God venerable and endowed with consummate intelligence, ... and also sentinels and ministers, called demons, I suppose, as being δαήμονες." After something more on the same subject, our Platonist proceeds as follows, sect. 132. p. 329. Nec nos terreat nomen, promiscue bonis et improbis positum: quoniam nec angelorum quidem terret, quum angeli partim Dei sint ministri, et qui ita sunt, sancti vocantur: partim adversæ potestatis satellites, ut optime nosti. Igitur juxta usurpatam penes Græcos loquendi consuetudinem tam sancti sunt dæmones, quam polluti et infecti, "Nor let us be terrified at the name applied promiscuously to the good and the bad; for neither does that of angels terrify us, as angels are partly ministers of God, and those who are so are called holy; partly the minions of an adverse power, as thou knowest right well. Therefore, according to the usage of language among the Greeks, there are holy as well as polluted and infected demons." On these words, the illustrious man comments as follows: Ex hoc autem loco clarissime opinor patere, Christianum esse Chalcidium, qui hæc scribit: nam et Christianam de angelis bonis malisque doctrinam dilucide proponit, et eam distinguit a Græcorum consuetudine, quibus dæmones non semper malos spiritus denotant, sed æque late patet hoc nomen, ut nostris nomen angelorum, "From this passage I consider it to be most manifest that Chalcidius who writes so was a Christian: for he both clearly propounds the Christian doctrine of good and bad angels, and distinguishes it by a reference to the Greek usage, according to which demons do not always denote evil spirits, the word

providence, a second God, the establisher of the law of life both eternal and temporary; and the third (which is also a substance, and called a second Mind or Intellect) is a certain keeper of this

being equally extensive in meaning as the name of angels with ourselves." Now the excellent author will pardon me when I confess myself to be by no means convinced by this observation that Chalcidius is to be enrolled among Christians. He expounds the Christian doctrine concerning angels, and, I will add, approves of it too. But both might have been done by a man who otherwise had nothing in common with Christians. For in the first place, this doctrine was not at that time so abstruse and recondite as to be known only to those who were initiated in our religion; neither, in the second place, ought any one that adopts and approves of the whole Christian doctrine respecting angels, to be necessarily regarded on that account as a professor of Christianity. For it is not one of the fundamental doctrines of our religion, and therefore might be admitted by men who in other respects are violently opposed to the precepts and institutions of Christ. The Platonic sect, as every one at all acquainted with ancient matters must be aware, had many things in common with the Christians: for which reason their principal philosophers were bold enough to pretend that our Saviour had borrowed many things from Plato. Consult Origen, Adv. Celsum, lib. 6. p. 283. and others. To these belonged the doctrine concerning angels; which, considered on the whole, is the same with Christians as with Platonists. Both acknowledged that there are good and bad genii; both that the evil genii plot against good men and dwell in the evil and wicked, and that the good are a protection to the pious and are the messengers of God. What first separated the two sects was the difference of words by which they explained their respective opinions. For the Platonists, with Plato for their guide, used the name δαίμων in so wide a sense as to apply it both to good and bad genii: which custom of theirs is here excused by Chalcidius to Osius. But the Christians, following the authority of sacred writ, always employed the word δαίμων in a bad sense, and designated by it only the evil genii. See Origen, Adv. Celsum, lib. 5. p. 234. In process of time, however, after the Christian religion had taken deeper root in the world, the Platonists themselves chose to adopt the Christian usage rather than retain the more extensive meaning of the word δαίμων. On this we have the testimony of St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, lib. 9. cap. 19. p. 178. tom. 7. opp. Nos autem, sicut scriptura loquitur, secundum quam Christiani sumus, angelos quidem partim bonos, partim malos, nunquam vero bonos dæmones legimus. ..... Et hanc loquendi consuetudinem in tantum populi usquequaque sequuti sunt, ut eorum etiam, qui Pagani appellantur, et deos multos ac dæmones colendos esse contendunt, nullus fere sit tam litteratus et doctus, qui audeat in laude vel servo suo dicere: dæmonem habes: sed cuilibet hoc dicere voluerit, non se aliter accipi, quam male dicere voluisse, dubitare non possit, "Now we, keeping to the language of scripture, according to which we are Christians, read of angels both good and bad, but never of good demons. ..... And the nations everywhere have so far followed this custom, that scarcely one of those even who are called Pagans, and who contend for the worship of many gods and demons, is so learned as to dare to praise even his own servant by saying to him: Thou hast a demon; not doubting but that to whomsoever he should think proper to say so, he would not be understood otherwise than as meaning to speak ill of him." Add cap. 14. p. 155. And such being the case, I consider it to be quite clear that the fact of any Platonist understanding, and explaining and commending the Christian dogma concerning angels is of little or no weight towards proving his attachment to the Christian religion. A little after the words we have hitherto been discussing, Chalcidius calls the evil genii *fallen angels*; which learned men take to be a sign of his being well versed in the language of scripture, as the same term occurs in the Epistle of Jude, ver. 6. and 2 Pet. ii. 4. But the words themselves show that it is altogether uncertain whether this Platonist borrowed the name from the sacred volume or from some other source; it being well known that malignant spirits were so designated by others also, besides Christian writers. I shall quote the very passage from cap. 7. sect. 134. p. 330. which seems to me to refute rather than assist those who make Chalcidius to have been a Christian: Hos quidam et hujusmodi dæmones proprie vocant *desertores angelos*, quibus nulla quæstio referenda est super nomine, "These and suchlike demons some properly call *fallen angels*, with whom no question is to be started in respect to the name.";

eternal law. Under these three are rational souls, subject to that law, together with the ministerial powers, &c. So that the sovereign or supreme God commands, the second orders, and the

VI. The remaining arguments brought forward by learned men in proof of Chalcidius having been imbued with Christian principles, are of less moment. He makes mention, cap. 7. sect. 174. p. 343. of the *divine law*. Nos vero, says he, divinam legem sequentes, repetemus ab exordio, digesto ordine, quæ de fato Plato veritatis ipsius instinctu (ut mihi quidem videtur) loquutus est, "But we, following the divine law, shall repeat from the beginning, in digested order, what Plato, inspired (I consider) by truth itself, has said of fate." In these words they suppose the *divine law* to mean the *holy scripture*. Etiam hoc loco, says Fabricius, Christianum Chalcidius profitetur, refutatoque fato astrologico, divinam præfert legem, hoc est sacræ scripturæ de providentia divina res humanas moderante certissimam doctrinam, "Even in this passage Chalcidius professes himself to be a Christian, and having shown the fallacy of the astrological fate, prefers the divine law, that is, that most certain doctrine of scripture concerning divine providence controling human affairs." But I am either altogether mistaken, or the divine law in this passage by no means denotes sacred writ. In the first place, if what the illustrious scholar supposes were the case, Chalcidius' discourse would be manifestly foolish and absurd. For he would say this: Ego, viam mihi monstrantibus sacris litteris, Platonis de fato sententiam enarrabo, "Following the path pointed out by scripture, I shall explain Plato's opinion respecting fate." Let others, if they are able, inform us how Plato's doctrine of fate can be explained by the authority of scripture: to me it is altogether incomprehensible. Again, throughout the whole of this disputation on fate, he adduces not a single testimony from scripture in order to show and illustrate Plato's opinion. Hence, if the divine law meant the sacred writ of Christians, he would have said absolutely nothing, and would not have fulfilled his promise. Lastly, Chalcidius himself is his own best interpreter, and clearly indicates what he means by the divine law, sect. 175. p. 343. Sequitur hanc providentiam fatum: *divina lex* promulgata intelligentiæ sapienti modulamine ad rerum omnium gubernationem, "This providence is followed by fate, the divine law promulgated by the wise regulation of intelligence for the government of all things." And afterwards, sect. 178. p. 344. Talis est, opinor, etiam *lex* illa *cœlestis*, quæ fatum vocatur, sciscens hominibus honesta, prohibens contraria, "Such in my opinion is that heavenly law called fate, which points out things honourable to men, and prohibits the contrary." With Chalcidius then the *divine law* is *fate*; but fate, as far as it pertains to man, is nothing else with him but *right reason*, as the latter words show beyond all controversy, or the *law of nature*, by the light of which mortals know what is just and unjust. The meaning, therefore, of his words is this: Nos vero, recta sanaque ratione duce, Platonis de fato decreta explanabimus, "But we, with right reason for our guide, shall explain Plato's doctrine on fate."

VII. Lastly, it is reckoned also among the signs of Chalcidius' leaning to Christian tenets, that he sometimes appeals to the testimony of scripture. Cap. 13. sect. 275. p. 381. Quod autem cœlum, quamve terram *scriptura* loquatur, intelligendum, "But we must understand of what heaven or of what earth the scripture speaks." A little after: Aliud igitur verum cœlum, et aliud quiddam esse soliditatem, *scriptura* testatur, "Scripture therefore testifies that the true heaven is one thing, and solidity something else." They add also, that in the same place he calls Moses a prophet. For my part I consider neither of the two to be of any weight. Of Moses I have already spoken above. In my opinion, a man unquestionably may call Moses a prophet, and still not profess the Christian faith. And the word scripture is continually in the mouth even of those who openly repudiate Christ and his doctrine, when they are discussing matters pertaining to Christians. It occurs hundreds of times in Spinoza's Tractatus Theologica-politicus, and yet no one on that account would rank this man among Christians.—Such are the chief grounds upon which learned men profess themselves to be led to a favourable opinion of Chalcidius' religion. For my own part, conceding it to be manifest from them that this philosopher did not belong to the enemies of Christians and to the superstitious worshippers of many gods, still I deny that they are of sufficient weight to warrant us in placing him among the professors of the Christian faith.

In corroboration of this view, I shall now proceed to quote passages from Chalcidius'

third executes. But souls are subject to the law." Where Chalcidius, though seeming indeed rather more a Platonist than a Christian, yet acknowledgeth no such beings as Henades and

book, which are indicative of a man still struggling in the most intense darkness, and inculcating opinions altogether hostile to Christian precepts. In this class of opinions I shall by no means include those which, although deviating entirely from the rule of scripture, are nevertheless not thoroughly subversive of the very foundations of Christianity and were formerly espoused by men who are well known to have lived and died in the Christian faith. Of this kind is the dogma concerning the eternity of the world, of which in more passages than one he clearly indicates his approval. See cap. 1. sect. 23. p. 284. 285. Mundus sensilis, says he, among other things, est opus Dei: origo igitur ejus causativa, non temporaria. Sic mundus, sensilis licet et corporeus, a Deo tamen factus atque institutus, æternus est, "The sensible world is the work of God: its origin therefore is causative not temporary. Thus the world, although sensible and corporeal, yet being made and produced by God, is eternal." In another passage, cap. 13. sect. 281. p. 333. the opinion of Aristotle, qui mundum dixit esse sine genitura et sine interitu, "who asserted the world to be without generation and without corruption," is affirmed by him to be, et nobilem et præclaram, et ad Platonici dogmatis considerationem satis accommodatam, "noble and excellent, and sufficiently accommodated to the consideration of the Platonic dogma." Such also are his opinions on souls migrating from one body to another, and passing through various bodies, cap. 7. sect. 195. p. 349. on souls existing before the bodies, cap. 9. sect. 172. p. 360. on the soul of the world, cap. 1. sect. 26. p. 285. on the souls of men being generated from the divine nature itself, cap. 1. sect. 23. p. 284. and the like. All these dogmas argue him to be ignorant of the genuine and unadulterated religion of Christ, and yet they do not prevent him from being a Christian in the sense above-mentioned. Wherefore we shall dismiss them entirely from this disputation, being determined to confine ourselves to those dogmas of his which will not admit of his being called a Christian even in the wider acceptation of the term.

In the first place, then, I hold it to be no slight confirmation of my opinion, that Chalcidius, while he so often quotes the testimony of the Jews, Solomon, Moses, never once appeals to any of the divine authors of the new covenant, although having numerous opportunities of doing so; that he in no one instance mentions the name of Christ; and lastly, that in writing to a Christian Doctor he does not let fall a single word indicative of his being a professor of the Christian faith. This philosopher was writing at a time when the Christian religion had prevailed over the gods of the nations, and was addressing his book to a man to whose keeping this religion was intrusted. Why therefore does he give not the slightest intimation of being a follower of those rites which at that time were sanctioned by the support of emperors? When a man has nothing whatever to lose, but every thing to hope, from declaring himself to be devoted to a certain religion, and moreover has excellent and various opportunities of testifying his sentiments, if, notwithstanding, he so acts as though he were altogether ignorant of that religion, he condemns himself by his own silence, and proves that he has no part nor share in it.

Another argument for thinking unfavourably of Chalcidius' religion is afforded by what he says in many places of the three principles of things: which I am the more anxious should be carefully attended to because Dr. Cudworth numbers this philosopher among those authors from whom we may learn the affinity existing between the Platonic and Christian Trinity. I shall first cite those passages on the subject that are more striking than the rest, and shall then offer some comments in illustration. The most remarkable one occurs cap. 7. sect. 174. p. 343. Principio cuncta, quæ sunt, et ipsum mundum contineri regique, principaliter quidem a summo Deo, qui est summum bonum, ultra omnem substantiam omnemque naturam, existimatione intellectuque melior, quam cuncta expetunt, quum ipse sit plenæ (probably plenus) perfectionis, et nullius societatis indigus: de quo plura dici nunc, exorbitare est: deinde a providentia, quæ est post illum summum secundæ eminentiæ, quam νοῦν Græci vocant. Est autem intelligibilis essentia æmulæ bonitatis propter indefessam ad summum Deum conversionem: estque ei ex illo bonitatis haustus, quo tam ipsa ornatur, quam cetera, quæ ipso auctore honestantur. Hanc igitur Dei voluntatem tamque sapientem tutelam rerum omnium Providentiam homines vocant, non, ut plerique existimant, ideo

Noes; but only three divine hypostases, and under them rational souls. But we shall conclude with the testimony of Theodoret in his book De Principio: Τὴν Πλάτωνος διάνοιαν ἀναπτύσσοντες

dictam, quia præcurrit in videndo atque intelligendo proventus futuros, sed quia proprium est divinæ mentis intelligere, qui est proprius mentis actus, et est mens Dei eterna. . . . . Sequitur hanc providentiam fatum. . . . . Obsequitur huic ea, quæ secunda mens dicitur, id anima mundi tripartita, ut supra comprehensum est: ut si quis periti legislatoris animam legem vocet, " In the first place, that all things in existence, and even the world itself, are contained and governed principally by the supreme God; who is the supreme good, transcending all substance and all nature, superior to thought and intellect, whom all things desire, as he is full of perfection, and in want of no society; of whom it is superfluous to say more at present: secondly, by providence, which is of the second eminence next to the supreme, which the Greeks call νοῦς. It is the intelligible essence of emulous goodness, because of an unwearied conversion to the supreme God; and it has from him a delibation of goodness, by which it is itself adorned, as well as other things, which are beautified by its agency. Therefore, this will of God and wise protection of all things, mankind call Providence, not, as most men suppose, because it goes before in seeing and understanding future events, but because to understand which is the proper action of mind, is a property of the divine mind, and is the eternal mind of God. . . . . This providence is followed by fate. . . . . And this is obeyed by what is called the second mind, that is the tripartite soul of the world, as is comprehended above; just as if any one should call law the soul of a wise legislator." Another passage, on precisely the same subject, occurs cap. 7. sect. 186. p. 346, 347. which I shall not quote here as it has already been given by Dr. Cudworth. The remaining sayings of the kind are much less copious and explicit than these, and therefore to avoid unnecessary prolixity, shall be passed over. Now these statements of Chalcidius respecting the three principles of things, if they do not prove him to have been totally opposed to the Christian religion, at least show us that he cannot with any justice be classed in the number of Christians properly so called. In the first place, it is an evidence of the badness of his cause that in discoursing of these principles, although he congratulates himself wonderfully upon the concurrence of the Hebrews, he never once mentions either the Christian Trinity, or the Son, or the Holy Ghost. This philosopher must have known that the Christians of that period asserted the dogmas of Plato on the three principles to be closely allied to their own doctrine on the three persons in the godhead, and that any one would necessarily gain great favour with most of them who should endeavour to prove and substantiate this affinity. Undoubtedly, therefore, had he been tinctured with Christian precepts, he would have availed himself of so favourable an opportunity to show that the doctrines taught by Plato were either the same as those inculcated by Christians, or at least very similar to them, especially as he scrupled not in so many passages to appeal to the testimony of the Jews in confirmation of Plato's opinions. As he does not do this, however, it certainly will warrant us in supposing him to have had not the least regard for the religion of Christians, or that most holy dogma of our discipline respecting the three persons in the divine nature. Again, these words of Chalcidius concerning three principles are evidence of a vast distinction between the Trinity of the Platonists of that period and that of the Christians; far different from what the learned Doctor imagines, who, contenting himself with one ambiguous passage, has neglected the much more perspicuous one which we have quoted. The Christians hold the three persons in their godhead to be equal to each other, in eternity as well as in nature and dignity. But Chalcidius, as is clear from the above passage, so disjoins and disconnects his three principles as entirely to destroy all equality between them. Of the first and second I shall speak presently, and shall now merely touch upon the third. This he asserts to be the second mind, the tripartite soul of the world, which obeys fate or the divine law. Consequently, this nature is altogether different from the two former, and is much inferior to them. For whilst the two former natures, the supreme God and his Providence or Reason, are unquestionably, according to the sense of Chalcidius, most simple, wholly devoid of all concretion and partition, and lastly, placed above

[s] Or rather De Principiis or Sermone secundo de Affection. Græcor. Curand. tom. 2. opp. p. 496.

ὁ Πλωτῖνος καὶ ὁ Νουμήνιος, τρία φασὶν αὐτὸν εἰρηκέναι ὑπάρχοντα καὶ ἀΐδια, τἀγαθὸν, καὶ νοῦν, καὶ τοῦ παντὸς τὴν ψυχήν· ὧν μὲν ἡμεῖς Πατέρα καλοῦμεν, Τἀγαθον ὀνομάζοντα, Νοῦν δὲ ὃν

all matter and the world; the soul of the world, on the contrary, which is this third nature, in the first place is diffused through the universe and combined, as it were, with matter; secondly, is made and compounded by God out of many things, which is wholly inconsistent with perfection; and lastly is distributed, as it were into certain parts, which is altogether foreign to the simplicity of the Supreme Being and his mind. Chalcidius calls the soul of the world *tripartita*, and the sense in which he understood the phrase is clear from the following words, cap. 7. sect. 142. p. 333. At vero in substantia positum fatum *mundi animæ est*, tripartita in ἀπλανῆ sphæram, inque eam, quæ putatur erratica, et in sublunarem tertiam: quarum elatum quidem ad superna dici Atropon, mediam Clotho, imam Lachesin: Atropon, quod aplanes in nulla sit deflexione; Clotho propter varie perplexam tortuosam vertiginem, qua proveniunt ea, quæ diversæ naturæ devius motus importat; Lachesin vero, quasi sortitam id munus, ut omnia prædictarum opera effectusque suscipiat, "But the fate placed in substance is the *soul of the world*, divided by a threefold division into the ἀπλανὴς sphere, and that which is supposed to be erratic, and the third or sublunary: of which the one elevated to the highest regions is called Atropos, the middle Clotho, and the lowest, Lachesis: Atropos, because the aplanes is subject to no deflexion; Clotho, on account of the variously perplexed and tortuous winding, from which proceed those things which the irregular motion of diversified nature produces; but Lachesis, from being, as it were, allotted the office of receiving all the works and effects of the aforementioned." If which were true, the universe would be inhabited not so much by one as by three souls, of a totally distinct nature. For as those three regions of the world here spoken of are altogether different in nature and constitution: so they each would require a soul distinct in office and nature from the other souls. This same soul of the world, Chalcidius having Plato for his guide tells us at great length, is concreted and compounded of the divisible and the indivisible, that is, of the essence of God himself, and of matter and the elements of things. Out of much that he says on the subject I shall here quote that portion in which he briefly explains both the dogma itself and its cause, cap. 1. sect. 33. p. 288. Ista ergo descriptio, quæ partium, ex quibus anima dicitur constare, geniturarn seu *coagmentationem* delineat, ostendit, rationem animæ corporisque conjungi. Quippe corpus animalium quod inspiratur animi vigore, habet certe superficiem, habet etiam soliditatem. Quæ igitur cum vitali vigore penetratura erat tam superficiem, quam soliditatem, *similes soliditatis, similes etiam superficiei vires habere debuit, siquidem paria paribus congregantur*, "This description, therefore, which delineates the generation and *coagmentation* of the parts of which the soul is said to consist, shows that reason is united both with soul and body. For the body of animals which is inspired with the vigour of soul has surface and it has also solidity. Consequently, that which was to penetrate with vital vigour both the surface and solidity, necessarily had powers similar to the solidity, and similar also to the surface, since like combines with like." Now, no one, I imagine, who reads this, will venture to assert for the future that Chalcidius entertained sentiments on the Trinity similar to those of Christians, although in the passage here quoted by the learned Doctor, he applies the word *God* to each of his principles. For his third nature is separated by a vast interval from the two former ones. But lastly, it is not even certain whether Chalcidius' three Gods are three persons truly so called, or three principles, or merely three virtues of God, or three modes of conceiving and comprehending one and the same God. There are certainly those who maintain the latter opinion. The third principle, which he calls *fate*, and the *soul of the world*, I shall pass over for the present, and admit it to be a person: although Chalcidius himself tells us, cap. 7. sect. 142. p. 333. that there are some who deny that *providence* (that is, the second person of the divine nature) and *fate* are different, and maintain them to be one and the same. But what I shall now adduce prevents me saying the same of the second person. Our Platonist supposes the supreme God and first principle of all things to be devoid of both intelligence and will, as do Plotinus and the rest of that class, who affect subtleties they themselves are unable to unravel: of whom we have already spoken before. For he expressly states that he is *better than thought and intellect*: and a little afterwards calls the second person of the divine nature the *will* of God. Which have the same meaning as if he had declared explicitly: *The principal God*

ἡμεῖς Λόγον προσαγορεύομεν, τὴν δὲ τὰ πάντα ψυχοῦσαν καὶ ζωποιοῦσαν δύναμιν, Ψυχὴν καλοῦντα, ἣν Πνεῦμα ἅγιον οἱ θεῖοι προσαγορεύουσι λόγοι· καὶ ταῦτα δὲ ἐκ τῆς Ἑβραίων φιλο-

has neither intelligence nor will. But as no one can form a conception of a nature altogether destitute of *will* and *intelligence*, it is most probable that those Platonists who referred will and intelligence to the second person, and excluded them from the principal God, did not profess two distinct principles, but merely separated intelligence and will from the supreme God in thought, and considered him in a two-fold respect, first as a nature self-existent from all eternity and the best, and then as intelligent and having volition. Therefore, that mind of Chalcidius which he calls an *intelligible essence emulous of goodness*, will not be a person, but only a mode of considering God or a perfection separated from the divine nature in thought. Which opinion any one will much more readily estimate the probability of, who shall attentively examine the remarks made by us above on the custom common to Philo and the other Platonists, of speaking of things in the same way as of persons. Another consideration that induces me to regard Chalcidius' second principle not as a real person, but merely as a motion or divine virtue, is this, that he not only calls it *providence*, but also the *mind* of God. Now, the mind of God he defines in these words: Mens Dei est æternus actus de intelligendo, "The mind of God is an eternal act regarding understanding," or as Fabricius rightly expounds these words, "an eternal act of understanding." Neither providence, nor the mind of God, nor the eternal act of understanding signifies a person, but a thing rather and a virtue, which was in the supreme God from all eternity, and yet can in a certain way be separated from his nature in thought; as the mind of man and his act of understanding cannot in reality be separated from his nature. Moreover, our Platonist in another passage says, that the mind or intellect of God, and what Plato calls *idea*, are the same. Est enim hæc, says he, cap. 13. sect. 329. p. 398. posita inter naturam vere existentem constantem, eamdemque semper, nimirum ideam, quæ intellectus Dei æterni est æternus, et inter eam naturam, quæ est quidem, sed non eadem semper, id est, silvam, "For this is placed between the really existing nature, which is constant and always the same, namely, the *idea*, *which is the eternal intellect of the eternal God*, and that nature which is indeed, but not always the same, that is matter." But as is evident from numerous passages, Chalcidius did not hold the *idea* to be a person, but placed it in the mind and intelligence of the supreme Being. See sect. 337. p. 401, where he comments largely upon the *idea*, and says, among other things, juxta nos esse primum intelligibile, juxta Deum intellectum ejus, juxta silvam mensuram rerum corporearum, "that with respect to us it is the first intelligible, with respect to God his intellect, with respect to matter, the measure of corporeal things." If, therefore, the *idea* and the mind of God, or Chalcidius' second God differ in nothing but the name only, this second principle will not be a person, but merely a notion and divine virtue. Against all these things those who entertain a different opinion will scarcely be able to bring forward any thing except this one, that Chalcidius, notwithstanding, speaks explicitly of mind as of a person. But I have over and over again intimated and proved by examples that it was very customary with the Platonists after the example of their master to imitate the poetic style of speaking, and to personify notions and virtues.

One who holds the existence of more gods than one, ought undoubtedly to be excluded from the community of Christians, although he may suppose these gods to be inferior to the supreme Deity. Those vulgar and commentitious gods of ancient nations, such as Jupiter, Saturn, Mars, and the rest, as also the demi-gods and heroes, are openly repudiated by Chalcidius, see cap. 7. sect. 127. p. 326. This indeed exempts the man from the number of those whose minds were darkened by the deeper shades of superstition. But still, he acknowledges certain other gods, and sets up a second supreme Deity: for he represents the sun and stars not only as endowed with soul, but also as gods or divine natures. After speaking of the inconstancy apparent in the motions of the stars, he thus proceeds, cap. 5. sect. 76. p. 309. Quæ quidem inconstantia non ita, ut nobis videtur, provenit. Nulla enim in *divinis actibus* inconstantia: sed, ut ita videatur, fit exeo. Which inconstancy does not take place, as appears to us. For there is no inconstancy in divine acts: but its appearing so is occasioned by this," &c. The motions of the stars he scruples not to call *divine acts*. A little lower down, p. 310. he speaks of the sun in particular in these

σοφίας καὶ θεολογίας σεσύληται, "Plotinus and Numenius, explaining Plato's sense, declare him to have asserted three supertemporals or eternals, Good, Mind, or Intellect, and the Soul of

words: Fieri tamen non potest, ut contra *naturam suam divinitatis praditum* facit aliquid aut patiatur inordinatum, "It is, however, impossible for it to do or suffer any thing irregular, *contrary to its own divine nature.*" In another passage, cap. 7. sect. 129. p. 327. he says of the stars, prudentis naturæ esse ob æternam actam suorum constantiam, nulli pœnitudini obnoxiæ, "that they are of a prudent nature, by reason of the eternal constancy of their acts, and subject to no repentance." Having explained these and other things he goes on to demons, and declares them to be of a middle nature between the stars or the gods residing in the stars and men; whence it is again self-evident that he ranked the stars as gods. For what but gods are more excellent than the demons themselves? But it will be worth while to quote the very commencement of this disputation, as possessing no inconsiderable weight towards determining the present question, sect. 130. p. 328. Quare quum sit *divinum quidem et immortale genus animalium cæleste, siderum*; temporarium vero et occiduum passionique obnoxium terrenum,———necesse est, aliquod genus medium fore, quod tam cœlestis, quam terrenæ naturæ sit particeps, idque et immortale esse et obnoxium passioni. Talis porro natura dæmonum est, opinor, habens cum *divinitate* (stellis) consortium propter immortalitatem, habens etiam cum occiduis cognationem, "Wherefore, since the *celestial and starry race of animals are divine and immortal*, but the terrestrial temporary and perishable, and subject to passion,———there must needs be a certain middle race, partaking both of the celestial and terrestrial nature, and immortal as well as subject to passion. Such, moreover, I consider, is the nature of demons, having connexion with divinity (the stars) by reason of immortality, and also having affinity to the perishable." Chalcidius, therefore, counted as many gods as the heavens have stars. I shall add also what he records of the sun, from Plato, cap. 11. sect. 245. p. 368. Idem auctor (Plato) solem quidem simulacrum esse ait invisibilis Dei, oculum vero solis et solstitiale quiddam, ut sit eminens sol intelligibili mundo suus, huic similis in sensili globus iste ignitus lucifer, cujus simulacrum id lumen, quo illustratur visus animalium, "The same author (Plato) says that the sun indeed is the image of the invisible God, but the eye of the sun and a something solstitial, so that he is *his own eminent sun to the intelligible world*; similar to this in the sensible world is that fiery luminous globe, whose image is that light by which the sight of animals is illumined." Chalcidius, indeed, seems here to be merely explaining Plato's opinion: but no one can entertain a doubt of his having himself approved of it, as he adopts all Plato's decrees. Therefore, in the world which the Platonists call νοητὸς, or comprehensible to the mind, he supposes there is a certain *intelligible* sun, and that this is God, to which the sun that is visible to our eyes corresponds. For Plato's saying: *The sun is the image of the invisible God*, means, he tells us, that he is *his own eminent sun to the intelligible world:* which shows that he held that sun which he denominates *eminent* to be God.

That Chalcidius in several places notices and commends the arts of divination, I consider to be another sign of profane and unchristian principles. I am far from supposing that no one can ascribe any importance to divination and the science of things future, without repudiating the whole discipline of Christ: nor am I ignorant of there being many who place a great value on astrology, chiromancy, and other absurdities of the kind, and yet do not on that account abandon the Christian faith. But a man who is smitten with those modes of divination, which, prior to the birth of our Saviour, contributed not a little towards upholding the superstition prevalent among the Greeks and Romans, such as oracles, augurics, auspices, and not only attributes great virtue to them, but even supposes propitious demons to preside over them, cannot in any way, that I can understand, hold a place among those who are properly called followers of Christ. But such was our Chalcidius, as the following words of his will testify, cap. 7. sect. 183. p. 346. Aut enim alitum volatu, aut extis, aut oraculis homines præmonentur, prædicente *aliquo propitio dæmone*, qui sit eorum omnium, quæ deinceps sequuntur, socius: perinde ut si medicus juxta disciplinam medendi prædicat vel exitium vel sanitatem, "Mankind are forewarned either by the flight of birds, or by entrails, or by oracles, the prediction proceeding from a certain propitious

the universe; he calling that Tagathon, which to us is Father; that Mind or Intellect, which to us is Son or Word; and that Psyche, or a power animating and enlivening all things, which our Scriptures call the Holy Ghost. And these things (saith he) were by Plato purloined from the philosophy and theology of the Hebrews."

demon, who is associated with all those things that are to follow hereafter: just as if a physician according to the science of medicine should predict either death or recovery." He who considers that oracles, auguries, and auspices are not to be made light of, and tells us that a propitious demon exerts his own influence and virtue in these kinds of divination, attacks the very foundations of Christianity, to which nothing can be more opposed, and tacitly acknowledges that he is not displeased with the rites, ceremonies, and worship, by which the priests were accustomed to appease the demons presiding over oracles and divination. But this amounts to an approval of what constituted the very soul and vitality, as it were, of the pagan religion.

Lastly, if I shall make it appear that Chalcidius dissents from Moses, or what he supposes to be Moses' opinions, nay combats and refutes them, every one, I should imagine, will be convinced that he neither held Moses to be an author inspired by the supreme Being, nor his books to be divine. But to reject the divine authority of Moses is tantamount to making war against the first principles of the Christian religion. This I shall prove, therefore, by a clear and indisputable example. He commences an inquiry, cap. 13. sect. 298. p. 388. &c. into Plato's real opinion concerning matter. Towards the beginning of the disputation, however, he confesses that this question is an obscure and doubtful one, inasmuch as the Platonists are divided into a great variety of opinions on the subject. Wherefore he first enumerates the chief of these opinions, and among the rest reviews also the dogma, copiously discussed by us in another place, of those who maintain that Plato ascribed a twofold soul to the world, one a maleficent, turbulent, and disorderly soul, and therefore proper to matter. But this opinion, he tells us, was common also to the Hebrews or to Moses. Quibus, says he, Hebræi concinunt, quum dicunt, homini quidem a Deo datam esse animam ex inspiratione cœlesti, quam rationem atque animam rationalem appellant: mutis vero et agrestibus ex silva rationis expertem, jussu Dei, vivis animantibus et bestiis, terræ gremio profusis: quorum in numero fuerit etiam illa serpens, quæ primitias generis humani malis suasionibus illaqueaverit, "With whom the Hebrews agree when they say that to man a soul was given by God from heavenly inspiration, which they call reason and the rational soul: but to dumb animals and beasts of the field scattered over the bosom of the earth, by God's command, an irrational soul from matter: in the number of which was also that serpent, which by evil persuasion ensnared the first parents of the human race." If Chalcidius had believed the philosophy of the Hebrews to be entirely unexceptionable, and Moses to have been instructed by God himself, he would not have considered himself at liberty to dissent from this opinion, and to espouse another in opposition to it. This, however, he thinks proper to do, and not only asserts matter to be devoid of all soul, form, and quality, but even refutes this opinion of the Hebrews as he supposes along with others. Recta igitur, says he among other things, sect. 314. p. 392. nostra est opinio, neque ignem, neque terram, neque aquam, neque spiritum esse silvam; sed materiam principalem et corporis primam subjectionem, in qua non qualitas, non quantitas, non figura, non forma sit ex propria natura; sed virtute opificis hæc ei conjuncta et connexa sunt, ut ex his universo corpori et singillatim perfectio, et communiter varietas comparetur, "Our opinion, therefore, is right, that matter is neither fire, nor earth, nor water, nor spirit; but the principal material or first subject of body, in which there is not of its own nature, either quality, or quantity, or figure, or form: but by the virtue of the opificer these have been combined and connected with it, so as from them to give to body universally and individually a perfection and common variety.—From these considerations I am led to the opinion that Chalcidius is neither to be classed altogether among those who held the whole of the Christian religion in detestation and abhorrence, nor, on the other hand, among its genuine supporters, but is to be referred rather to that middle class of philosophers, who neither wholly liked nor disliked the Christians, but selected for themselves what seemed probable out of both religions, and constructed for themselves a peculiar philosophy on divine matters, founded, however, principally upon the authority of Plato.

Wherefore, we cannot but take notice here of a wonderful providence of almighty God, that this doctrine of a trinity of divine hypostases should find such admittance and entertainment in the pagan world, and be received by the wisest of all their philosophers, before the times of Christianity; thereby to prepare a more easy way for the reception of Christianity amongst the learned Pagans. Which that it proved successful accordingly, is undeniably evident from the monuments of antiquity. And the junior Platonists, who were most opposite and adverse to Christianity, became at length so sensible hereof, that besides their other adulterations of the Trinity before mentioned, for the countenancing of their polytheism and idolatry, they did in all probability, for this very reason, quite innovate, change, and pervert the whole Cabala, and no longer acknowledge a trinity, but either a quaternity, or a quinary, or more of divine hypostases; they first of all contending, that before the Trinity, there was another supreme and highest hypostasis, not to be reckoned with the others, but standing alone by himself. And we conceive the first innovator in this kind to have been Jamblichus, who in his Egyptian Mysteries,[7] where he seems to make the Egyptian theology to agree with his own hypothesis, writeth in this manner: Πρὸ τῶν ὄντως ὄντων, καὶ τῶν ὅλων ἀρχῶν, ἐστι θεὸς εἷς, πρώτος καὶ τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ καὶ βασιλέως· ἀκίνητος ἐν μονότητι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἑνότητος μένων· οὔτε γὰρ νοητὸν αὐτῷ ἐπιπλέκεται, οὔτε ἀλλό τι· παράδειγμα δὲ ἵδρυται τοῦ αὐτοπάτορος αὐτογόνου καὶ μονοπάτορος θεοῦ τοῦ ὄντως ἀγαθοῦ· μεῖζον γάρ τε καὶ πρῶτον καὶ πηγὴ τῶν πάντων, καὶ πυθμὴν τῶν νοουμένων πρώτων ἰδεῶν ὄντων· ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς τούτου ὁ αὐτάρκης θεὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐξέλαμψε, διὸ καὶ αὐτοπάτωρ καὶ αὐτάρκης· ἀρχὴ γὰρ οὗτος καὶ θεὸς θεῶν· μονὰς ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς, προούσιος καὶ ἀρχὴ τῆς οὐσίας, "Before those things, which truly are, and the principles of all, there is one God superior to the first God and king, immoveable,

[7] Sec. 8. cap. 2. p. 158. But the learned Doctor has not examined this passage of Jamblichus. For there is not the least mention in it of the Platonic doctrine of three principles of things, nor of one supreme and most simple God, which some of that sect placed above their three principles. Jamblichus speaks only of two principles or divine hypostases, one the most simple God who is superior to every thing that can be conceived, the other produced and generated from this God. From these two principles, he tells us, sprung the ethereal, empyrical, and celestial gods: Αὗται μὲν οὖν, says he, εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ πρεσβύταται πάντων, ἃς Ἑρμῆς πρὸ τῶν αἰθερίων καὶ ἐμπυρίων θεῶν προτάττει καὶ ἐπουρανίων, "These, therefore, are the oldest principles of all, which Hermes places before the ethereal, empyrical, and celestial gods." But the modes of expression made use of by this philosopher in reference to the generation and origin of the second god from the first, very much resemble the phrases by which the Christian doctors of that period were accustomed to explain the eternal generation of the Son of God from the Father; as might easily be shown, if necessary, from many passages of St. Basil, St. Cyril, and others. Wherefore I am inclined to consider that Jamblichus borrowed both the thing itself which he was treating of concerning the generation of the second from the first god, and the phraseology which he employs, from the Christians, and imitated their doctrine in this as he did also in many other matters.

and always remaining in the solitude of his own unity; there being nothing intelligible, nor any thing else mingled with him; but he being the paradigm of that God truly good, which is self-begotten and his own parent. For this is greater, and before him, and the fountain of all things, the foundation of all the first intelligible ideas. Wherefore, from this one did that self-sufficient God, who is Autopator, or his own parent, cause himself to shine forth; for this is also a principle, and the God of gods, a monad from the first one, before all essence." Where, so far as we can understand, Jamblichus's meaning is, that there is a simple unity in order of nature, before that Tagathon, or monad, which is the first of the three divine hypostases. And this doctrine was afterwards taken up by Proclus, he declaring it in this manner:* Πανταχοῦ ὁ Πλάτων ἀπὸ τοῦ πλήθους ἐπὶ τὰς ἑνάδας ἀνατρέχειν εἰωθεν· μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος κατὰ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων τάξιν πρὸ τοῦ πλήθους ἓν ἀεί ἐστι, καὶ πᾶσα θεία τάξις ἀπὸ μονάδος ἄρχεται· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τριάδος προϊέναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τὸν θεῖον, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τῆς τριάδος ἡ μονάς· ἔστω μὲν οὖν καὶ οἱ δημιουργικοὶ τρεῖς ἀλλά τις ὁ πρὸ τῶν τριῶν εἷς, οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν θείων τάξεων ἐκ πλήθους ἄρχεται· οὐκ ἄρα ἀπὸ τριάδος ἄρχεσθαι δεῖ τὸν δημιουργικὸν ἀριθμὸν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μονάδος, "Plato every whereas cends from multitude to unity, from whence also the order of the many proceeds; but before Plato, and according to the natural order of things, one is before multitude, and every divine order begins from a monad. Wherefore, though the divine number proceed in a trinity, yet before this trinity must there be a monad. Let there be three demiurgical hypostases; nevertheless, before these must there be one, because none of the divine orders begins from multitude. We conclude, that the demiurgical number does not begin from a trinity, but from a monad, standing alone by itself before that trinity." Here Proclus, though endeavouring to gain some countenance for this doctrine out of Plato, yet, as fearing lest that should fail him, does he fly to the order of nature, and from thence would infer, that before the trinity of demiurgic hypostases, there must be a single monad or henad, standing alone by itself, as the head thereof. And St. Cyril of Alexandria, who was junior to Jamblichus, but senior to Proclus, seems to take notice of this innovation in the Platonic theology, as a thing then newly crept up, and after the time of Porphyry:† Ἀλλ' οἵ γε προειρημένοι καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀντιλέγουσι, φάσκοντες μὴ δεῖν ΤΑ'ΓΑΘΟ'Ν συναριθμεῖν τοῖς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ· ἐξῄρησθαι γὰρ ἀπὸ πάσης κοινωνίας διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἁπλοῦν πάντη καὶ ἄδεκτόν τινος συμβάσεως· Ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ΝΟΥ (ἀρχὴ γὰρ οὗτος) τὴν τριάδα μίαν σωθῆναι, "But those before mentioned contradict this doctrine

* In Timæo, lib. 2. p. 93.

† Contra Julian. lib. 8. p. 271.

(of Porphyrius and the ancient Platonists) affirming, that the Tagathon ought not to be connumerated or reckoned together with those which proceed from it, but to be exempted from all communion, because it is altogether simple, and incapable of any commixture or consociation with any other. Wherefore these begin their trinity with Nous or Intellect, making that the first." The only difference here is, that Jamblichus seems to make the first hypostasis of the trinity after a monad to be Tagathon, but St. Cyril, Nous. However, they both meant the same thing, as also did Proclus after them. Wherefore it is evident, that when, from the time of the Nicene Council and Athanasius, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity came to be punctually stated and settled, and much to be insisted upon by Christians, Jamblichus and other Platonists, who were great antagonists of the same, perceiving what advantage the Christians had from the Platonic trinity, then first of all innovated this doctrine, introducing a quaternity of divine hypostases, instead of a trinity, the first of them being not co-ordinate with the other three, nor consociated or reckoned with them; but all of them, though subordinate, yet universal, and such as comprehend the whole; that is, infinite and omnipotent; and therefore none of them creatures. For it is certain, that before this time, or the age that Jamblichus lived in, there was no such thing at all dreamed of by any Platonist, as an unity before and above the trinity, and so a quaternity of divine hypostases; Plotinus positively determining, that there could neither be more nor fewer than three; and Proclus himself acknowledging the ancient tradition, or Cabala, to have run only of three gods; and Numenius, who was senior to them both, writing thus of Socrates:* Τρεῖς θεοὺς τιθεμένου Σωκράτους, that he also (before Plato) "asserted three gods;" that is, three divine hypostases, and no more, as principles; therein following the Pythagoreans.[8]

* Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. 14. cap. 5. [P. 728.]

[8] At what time this dogma of Proclus and others of the Platonic school, which acknowledges a supreme God above the divine Triad of the other Platonists, first made its appearance, and from what authors it sprung, I would by no means undertake to determine. I cannot agree, however, with the learned Doctor, who supposes it to have been invented by Platonists hostile to Christianity subsequently to the period of the Nicene Council. For at that time when the Christian religion was now every where flourishing, it is very improbable that Platonists would purposely pervert the ancient doctrine of their sect in order that it might not appear to have any thing in common with the precepts of Christians. For it was greatly to the interest of this sect that they should not seem to be totally at variance with the Christian discipline, which then reigned triumphant, and was supported by the authority of the most powerful potentates. For which very reason their principal masters and leaders, Hierocles, Themistius, and others, laboured with much greater diligence to accommodate their doctrines to the standard of the Christian religion than to show that the two disciplines were irreconcilably at variance. Of the doctrine now in question, however, there exist traces long prior to the time of Jamblichus and Proclus. I shall not now speak of Philo: who nevertheless, as I have already shown before, reckoned not three, but four divine natures: but

Moreover, the same Proclus, besides his Henades and Noes before mentioned, added certain other fantastic trinities of his own also; as this, for example, of the first essence, the first life, and the first intellect (to omit others), whereby that ancient

I shall produce a passage of Hermes preserved by St. Cyril of Alexander, in which I fancy I can discover that one God who is superior to the three secondary principles. *Λέγει δὲ καὶ Ἑρμῆς ἐν λόγῳ τρίτῳ τῶν πρὸς Ἀσκλήπιον· οὐ γὰρ ἐφικτόν ἐστιν εἰς ἀμυήτους τοιαῦτα μυστήρια παρέχεσθαι· ἀλλὰ τῷ νοῒ ἀκούσατε ἓν μόνον ἦν φῶς νοερὸν πρὸ φωτὸς νοεροῦ, καὶ ἔστιν ἀεὶ νοῦς νοὸς φωτεινὸς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἦν, ἢ τούτου ἐνότης, αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ ὤν, ἀεὶ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ* ΝΩΙ˜, *καὶ* ΦΩΤΙ˜, *καὶ* ΠΝΕΥ˜ΜΑΤΙ *πάντα περιέχει*, "Hermes also says in the third discourse to Asclepius: It is impossible that such mysteries should be divulged to the rude and uninitiated; but hear in thy mind: There was only one intellectual light before intellectual light, and it is always mind of mind clear and luminous, nor was there any thing else than the unity of this, always existing in itself, always by its own mind, and light, and spirit embracing and containing all things;" Cyrillus, lib. 1. adv. Julian. p. 35. I would not assert that these words proceeded from Hermes himself: but no one, I imagine, who is acquainted with Hermes' writings, will doubt that this testimony is anterior to the age of Jamblichus. Now this Hermes, whoever he was, speaks of one most simple and supreme light, which he calls *νοῦς νοὸς*, "mind of mind." To this light he afterwards subjects three others, *νοῦς*, *φῶς*, and *πνεῦμα*, "mind, light," and "spirit," since he states that the supreme light governs and contains all things *by his mind, light*, and *spirit*. We have here, therefore, one God whom nothing surpasses, and three minor natures, to which he has entrusted the government and control of the world. To which doctrine the more eminent of the Platonists themselves do not seem to have been very averse. We have seen above that Plotinus, Porphyry, and Amelius imagined a twofold soul of the world, one celestial and remote from all matter, the other immersed in and diffused through matter. But they who dissect and divide the soul of the world into two natures, certainly differ very little if at all from those who place one supreme God over the three principles: both hold four principles, although they explain their notions of them in not one and the same manner. It must be owned, therefore, that this opinion did not spring either from Jamblichus after the Nicene period, or from Proclus, as Dion. Petavius, De Trinit. lib. 1. cap. 1. sec. 4. &c. p. 15. &c. supposes, but was many years anterior to these philosophers. Should any one ask me the cause of the Platonists coming to this opinion, my answer would be, that they were led to it by that immoderate love of subtleties and desire of expounding unknown things, which always characterized this sect. Let learned men, however, say whether they will be satisfied with what I am now about to adduce on this subject. In the first place the Platonists were certain of there being three demiurgic powers, as they called them, or three divine natures placed over the construction and government of this universe. But whatever makes, takes care of, protects, governs, and contains any thing, or contributes towards its construction and administration, must necessarily possess a certain power of understanding and operating. When the Platonists, therefore, raised themselves so high by their intellectual acumen as to inculcate that the Supreme Being is devoid of all intelligence, wisdom, care, and operation, which as we have more than once remarked, was done by many of them, it was a consequence of this opinion that they should separate him altogether from the control of the world, and remove him from the creative natures, which they however still held to be three. Again, there was an ancient opinion of the Egyptians and the oriental philosophers generally, which had been adopted by the Platonic sect, that the nature of the supreme Deity is so abstruse and recondite as not to admit of being discussed and explained by mortals. But of what they called the three *archical hypostases*, good, mind, and spirit, they had long ago been disputing, and still continued to do so every day. Wherefore that they might not seem to be inconsistent with themselves and to violate that primary doctrine of their master concerning the divine reason, they placed the nature of the Supreme Being above their three hypostases; and commanded their disciples to be silent rather than speak of it, as being wholly incomprehensible to mortals. I might perhaps, if I were so inclined, elicit other reasons from the interior recesses of the Platonic philosophy. But what is the use of enumerating all the reasons and causes of the absurd doctrines professed by the Platonic school?

Cabala and θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία, "theology of divine tradition," of "three archical hypostases," and no more, was disguised, perverted, and adulterated.

But besides this advantage from the ancient pagan Platonists and Pythagoreans, admitting a trinity into their theology, in like manner as Christianity doth (whereby Christianity was the more recommended to the philosophic Pagans), there is another advantage of the same extending even to this present time, probably not unintended also by divine providence; that whereas bold and conceited wits precipitantly condemning the doctrine of the trinity for nonsense, absolute repugnancy to human faculties, and impossibility, have thereupon some of them quite shaken off Christianity, and all revealed religion, professing only theism; others have frustrated the design thereof, by paganizing it into creature-worship or idolatry; this ignorant and conceited confidence of both may be returned, and confuted from hence, because the most ingenious and acute of all the Pagan philosophers, the Platonists and Pythagoreans, who had no bias at all upon them, nor any scripture revelation, that might seem to impose upon their faculties, but followed the free sentiments and dictates of their own minds, did notwithstanding not only entertain this trinity of divine hypostases eternal and uncreated, but were also fond of the hypothesis, and made it a main fundamental of their theology.

It now appears from what we have declared, that as to the ancient and genuine Platonists and Pythagoreans, none of their trinity of gods, or divine hypostases, were independent, so neither were they γενητοὶ θεοὶ, "creature gods," but uncreated; they being all of them not only eternal, and necessarily existent, and immutable, but also universal, that is infinite and omnipotent: causes, principles, and creators of the whole world. From whence it follows, that these Platonists could not justly be taxed for idolatry, in giving religious worship to each hypostasis of this their trinity. And we have the rather insisted so long upon this Platonic trinity, because we shall make use of this doctrine afterwards, in our defence of Christianity, where we are to show, that one grand design of Christianity being to abolish the pagan idolatry, or creature-worship, itself cannot justly be charged with the same from that religious worship given to our Saviour Christ, and the Trinity (the Son and Holy Ghost), they being none of them, according to the true and orthodox Christianity, creatures; however the Arian hypothesis made them such. And this was indeed the grand reason why the ancient fathers so zealously opposed Arianism, because that Christianity, which was intended by God Almighty for a means to extirpate pagan idolatry, was thereby itself paganized and idolatrized, and made highly guilty of that very thing which it

so much condemned in the Pagans, that is, creature-worship. This might be proved by sundry testimonies of Athanasius, Basil, Gregory Nyssen, Gregory Nazianzen, Epiphanius, Chrysostom, Hilary, Ambrose, Austin, Faustinus, and Cyril of Alexandria; all of them charging the Arians as guilty of the very same idolatry with the Gentiles or Pagans, in giving religious worship even to the Word and Son of God himself (and consequently to our Saviour Christ), as he was supposed by them to be but a creature. But we shall content ourselves here only to cite one remarkable passage out of Athanasius, in his fourth oration against the Arians:* *Διὰ τί οὖν οἱ Ἀρειομανῖται, τοιαῦτα λογιζόμενοι καὶ νοοῦντες, οὐ συναριθμοῦσιν ἑαυτοὺς μετὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ· γὰρ κἀκεῖνοι ὥσπερ οὗτοι τῇ κτίσει λατρεύουσι παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα τὰ πάντα Θεόν——εἰ δὲ οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες ἑνὶ ἀγενήτῳ καὶ πολλοῖς γενητοῖς λατρεύουσιν, οὗτοι δὲ ἑνὶ γενητῷ καὶ ἀγενήτῳ, οὐδ' οὕτω διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων· ὅ τε γὰρ παρ' αὐτῶν λεγόμενος εἷς γενητὸς ἐκ πολλῶν ἐστι, καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ πάλιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ ἑνὶ τούτῳ φύσιν ἔχουσι, καὶ οὕτως γὰρ κἀκεῖνοι κτίσματά εἰσιν· ἄθλιοι καὶ πλέον ὅσον ἐβλάβησαν κατὰ Χριστοῦ φρονοῦντες· ἐξέπεσον γὰρ τῆς ἀληθείας· καὶ τὴν μὲν Ἰουδαίων προδοσίαν ὑπερέβησαν ἀρνούμενοι τὸν Χριστόν· τοῖς δὲ Ἕλλησι συγκυλίονται, κτίσμασι καὶ διαφόροις θεοῖς λατρεύοντες οἱ θεοστυγεῖς,* "Why therefore do not these Arians, holding this, reckon themselves amongst the Pagans or Gentiles, since they do in like manner worship the creature, besides the Creator? For though the Pagans worship one uncreated and many created gods, but these Arians only one uncreated, and one created, to wit, the Son or Word of God; yet will not this make any real difference betwixt them; because the Arians' one created is one of those many pagan gods; and those many gods of the Pagans or Gentiles, have the same nature with this one, they being alike creatures. Wherefore these wretched Arians are apostates from the truth of Christianity, they betraying Christ more than the Jews did, and wallowing or tumbling in the filth of pagan idolatry; worshipping creatures, and different kinds of gods." Where, by the way, we may take notice, that when Athanasius affirmeth of the Arians, what St. Paul doth of the Pagans, that they did *τῇ κτίσει λατρεύειν παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα*, his meaning could not well be, that they worshipped the creature more than the Creator; forasmuch as the Arians constantly declared, that they gave less worship to Christ the Son or Word of God, he being by them accounted but a creature, than they did to the Father the Creator; but either that they worshipped the creature besides the Creator, or the creature instead of the Creator, or in the

* Pages 468, 469.

room of him, who was alone of right to be religiously worshipped. Again, when the same Athanasius declareth that the Greeks, Gentiles, or Pagans, did universally worship ἑνὶ ἀγενήτῳ, "only one uncreated," he seems to imply that the Platonic trinity of hypostases, affirmed by him to be all uncreated, were by them looked upon only as one entire divinity.[9]

But the principal things which we shall observe from this passage of Athanasius, and those many other places of the fathers where they parallel the Arians with the Pagans, making the former guilty of the very same idolatry with the latter, even then, when they worshipped our Saviour Christ himself, or the Word and Son of God, as he was by them supposed to be nothing but a creature, are these following; first, that it is here plainly declared by them, that the generality of the Pagans did not worship a multitude of independent gods, but that only one of their gods was uncreated or self-existent, and all their other many gods looked upon by them as his creatures. This, as it is expressly affirmed by Athanasius here, that the Greeks or Pagans did ἑνὶ ἀγενήτῳ καὶ πολλοῖς γενητοῖς λατρεύειν, "worship only one uncreated and many created gods;" so is it plainly implied by all those other forementioned fathers, who charge the Arians with the guilt of Pagan idolatry: because, had the Pagans worshipped many uncreated and independent gods, it would not therefore follow, that the Arians were idolators, if the Pagans were. But that this was indeed the sense of the fathers, both before and after the Nicene council, concerning the Pagan polytheism and idolatry, that it consisted not in worshipping many uncreated and independent gods, but only one uncreated and many created, hath been already otherwise manifested; and it might be further confirmed by sundry testimonies of them; as this of St. Gregory Nazianzen in his thirty-seventh oration;[10] Τί δαί; οὐχὶ καὶ παρ' Ἕλλησι, φαῖεν ἄν, Μία Θεότης; ὡς οἱ τὰ τελεώτερα παρ' ἐκείνοις Φιλοσοφοῦντες, "What then, would some say, is there not one divinity also amongst the Pagans, as they who philosophize more fully and perfectly amongst them, do declare?" And that full and remarkable one of Irenæus,[1]

[9] We have already more than once repeated what will be sufficient in explanation of this subject.

[10] Page 601. tom. 1. opp.

[1] Either a too great partiality for the opinion he had himself adopted or a lapse of memory at the time of writing, has caused the learned Doctor to exhibit this passage of Irenæus differently from the reading of all the editions. Irenæus' own words, as they stand in the Latin version, are these: Illi enim creaturæ potius, quam creatori, servientes, et his, qui non sunt Dii, verumtamen primum deitatis locum attribuunt fabricatori hujus universitatis Deo, "For they, serving the creature and those who are not gods, rather than the Creator, did notwithstanding attribute the first place of the deity to God the maker of this universe." The passage, if read even in this manner, is not a little calculated to prove the learned Doctor's position; still it is less so than it would be, were it such as he has here given it.

where he plainly affirmeth of the Gentiles:* "Ita creaturæ potius quam Creatori serviebant, et his qui non sunt dii, ut primum deitatis locum attribuerent uni alicui et summo fabricatori hujus universitatis Deo, "That they so served the creature, and those who are not gods, rather than the Creator; that notwithstanding they attributed the first place of the Deity to one certain supreme God, the maker of this universe." The second thing is, that Athanasius, and all those other orthodox fathers who charged the Arians with pagan idolatry, did thereby plainly imply, those not to be incapable of idolatry who worship one sovereign Numen, or acknowledge one supreme Deity, the maker of the whole world; since not only the Arians unquestionably did so, but also, according to these fathers, the very Pagans themselves. The third thing is, that in the judgment of Athanasius, and all the orthodox Anti-Arian fathers, to give religious worship to any created being whatsoever, though inferior to that worship which is given to the supreme God, and therefore according to the modern distinction, not λατρεία, but δουλεία, is absolutely idolatry. Because it is certain, that the Arians gave much an inferior worship to Christ, the Son or Word of God, whom they contended to be a mere creature, made in time, mutable and defectible, than they did to that eternal God who was the Creator of him. As those fathers imply the Pagans themselves to have given much an inferior worship to their πολλοὶ γενητοὶ θεοὶ, their "many gods," whom themselves looked upon as creatures, than they did ἑνὶ ἀγενήτῳ, to that "one uncreated God."

Now if the Arians, who zealously contended for the unity of the Godhead, were nevertheless by the fathers condemned as guilty of idolatry, for bestowing but an inferior kind of religious worship upon Christ, the Son or Word of God himself, as he was supposed by them to be a creature; then certainly cannot they be excused from that guilt who bestow religious worship upon these other creatures, angels and souls of men, though inferior to what they give to the supreme omnipotent God, the Creator of all. Because the Son or Word of God, however conceived by these Arians to be a creature, yet was looked upon by them as the first, the most glorious, and most excellent of all creatures, and that by which, as an instrument, all other creatures, as angels and souls, were made; and therefore, if it were idolatry in them to give an inferior kind of religious worship to this Son and Word of God himself, according to their hypothesis, then can it not possibly be accounted less, to bestow the same upon those other creatures made by him as angels and men deceased. Besides which, the Word and Son of God, however

* Lib. 2. cap. 9. [Page 129. Edit. Grabii, p. 126. Edit. Massueti.]

supposed by these Arians to be a creature, yet was not really such; and is in scripture unquestionably declared to be a true object of religious worship ("Worship him, all ye gods;") so that the Arians, though formally idolators, according to their own false hypothesis, yet were not materially and really so: whereas these religious angel and saint worshippers must be as well materially as formally such. And here it is observable, that these ancient fathers made no such distinction of religious worship, into Latria, as peculiar to the supreme God, it being that whereby he is adored as self-existent and omnipotent, or the Creator of all; and Doulia, such an inferior religious worship as is communicable to creatures; but concluded of religious worship universally, and without distinction, that the due object of it all was the Creator only, and not any creature. Thus Athanasius plainly in his third oration: *Εἰ γὰρ ὡς τῇ δόξῃ ὑπερέχων προσεκυνεῖτο, ἔδει καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποδεεστέρων τὸν ὑπερέχοντα προσκυνεῖν· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐστιν οὕτως, κτίσματι γὰρ κτίσμα οὐ προσκυνεῖ, ἀλλὰ κτίσμα Θεόν,* "If the Son or Word of God were to be worshipped (though a creature) because transcending us in glory and dignity, then ought every inferior being to worship what is superior to it: whereas the case is otherwise; for a creature doth not religiously worship a creature, but only God the Creator." Now they who distinguish religious worship into Latria and Doulia, must needs suppose the object of it in general to be that which is superior to us, and not the Creator only; which is here contradicted by Athanasius. But because it was objected against these orthodox fathers by the Arians, that the humanity of our Saviour Christ, which is unquestionably a creature, did share in their religious worship also; it is worth the while to see what account Athanasius gives of this:* *Οὐ κτίσμα προσκυνοῦμεν, μὴ γένοιτο· Ἐθνικῶν γὰρ καὶ Ἀρειανῶν ἡ τοιαύτη πλάνη· ἀλλὰ τὸν Κύριον τῆς κτίσεως σαρκωθέντα τὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγον προσκυνοῦμεν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ σὰρξ αὐτὴ καθ' ἑαυτὴν μέρος ἐστὶ τῶν κτισμάτων, ἀλλὰ Θεοῦ γέγονε σῶμα, καὶ οὔτε τὸ τοιοῦτον σῶμα καθ' ἑαυτὸ, διαιροῦντες ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου, προσκυνοῦμεν, οὔτε τὸν Λόγον προσκυνῆσαι θέλοντες, μακρύνομεν αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῆς σαρκὸς· ἀλλ' εἰδότες τὸ, ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο, τοῦτον καὶ ἐν σαρκὶ γενόμενον ἐπιγινώσκομεν Θεόν,* "We give no religious worship to any creature, far be it from us; for this is the error of the Pagans and of the Arians: but we worship the Word of God, the Lord of the creation incarnated. For though the flesh of Christ, considered alone by itself, were but a part of the creatures, nevertheless was it made the body of God. And we neither worship this body by itself alone, divided from the Word, nor yet intending to worship the Word,

* Ad. Adelph. page 157. [Tom. 1. opp.]

do we remove it at a great distance from this flesh; but knowing that of the scripture, 'the Word was made flesh,' we look upon this Word even in the flesh as God." And again to the same purpose:* Καὶ γινωσκέτωσαν, ὅτι τὸν Κύριον ἐν σαρκὶ προσκυνοῦντες, οὐ κτίσματι προσκυνοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν κτίστην, ἐνδυσάμενον τὸ κτιστὸν σῶμα, "Let these Arians know at length, that we who worship the Lord in flesh, worship no creature, but only the Creator clothed with a creaturely body." And for the same cause was it, that Nestorius afterwards, dividing the Word from the flesh, the divinity of Christ from the humanity, and not acknowledging such an hypostatic union betwixt them as he ought, but nevertheless religiously worshipping our Saviour Christ, was therefore branded by the Christian church with the name of Ἀνθρωπολάτρης, "a man-worshipper," or "idolator." To conclude, they who excuse themselves from being idolators no otherwise, than because they do not give that very same religious worship to saints and angels which is peculiar to God Almighty, and consists in honouring him as self-existent, and the Creator of all things, but acknowledge those others to be creatures; suppose that to be necessary to idolatry which is absolutely impossible, viz., to acknowledge more omnipotents, as creators of all, than one, or to account creatures as such creators; as they imply all those to be incapable of idolatry who acknowledge one supreme God the Creator of the whole world: which is directly contradictious to the doctrine of the ancient church.

Hitherto in way of answer to an atheistic objection against the naturality of the idea of a God, as including oneliness in it, from the pagan polytheism, have we largely proved, that at least the civilized and intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged one sovereign Numen; and that their polytheism was partly but fantastical, nothing but the polyonymy of one supreme God, or the worshipping him under different names and notions, according to his several virtues and manifestations; and that though, besides this, they had another natural and real polytheism also; yet this was only of many inferior or created gods, subordinate to one supreme ἀγένητος, or "uncreated."

Which, notwithstanding, is not so to be understood, as if we did confidently affirm that opinion of many independent deities never to have so much as entered into the mind of any mortal. For since human nature is so mutable and depravable as that, notwithstanding the connate idea and prolepsis of God in the minds of men, some unquestionably do degenerate and lapse into atheism, there can be no reason why it should be thought absolutely impossible for any ever to entertain that false conceit of more independent deities. But as for independent gods in-

* Page 160.

visible, we cannot trace the footsteps of such a polytheism as this any where, nor find any more than a ditheism, of a good evil principle; only Philo and others seem to have conceived, that amongst the ancient Pagans, some were so grossly sottish as to suppose a plurality of independent gods visible, and to take the sun, and moon, and all the stars for such. However, if there were any such, and these writers were not mistaken, as it frequently happened, it is certain that they were but very few; because, amongst the most barbarian Pagans at this day, there is hardly any nation to be found without an acknowledgment of a sovereign Deity, as appears from all those discoveries which have been made of them since the improvement of navigation.

Wherefore, what hath been hitherto declared by us, might well be thought a sufficient answer to the forementioned atheistic objection against the idea of God. Notwithstanding which, when we wrote the contents of this chapter, we intended a further account of the natural and real polytheism of the Pagans, and their multifarious idolatry, chiefly in order to the vindication of the truth of Christianity against Atheists; forasmuch as one grand design hereof was unquestionably to destroy the pagan polytheism and idolatry, which consisted in worshipping the creature besides the Creator.

But we are very sensible, that we have been surprised in the length of this chapter, which is already swelled into a disproportionate bigness; by means whereof we cannot comprehend, within the compass of this volume, all that belongs to the remaining contents, together with such a full and copious confutation of the atheistic grounds, as was intended. Wherefore we shall here divide the chapter, and reserve those remaining contents, together with a further confutation of atheism, if need be, for another volume, which, God affording life, health, and leisure, we intend shall follow. Only subjoining, in the mean time, a short and compendious confutation of all the atheistic arguments proposed.

CHAPTER V.

SECTION I.

1. The first atheistic argument, that there is no idea of God. That in answer to this, the idea of God hath been already declared; viz. a perfect, understanding Being, unmade, or self-existent from eternity, and the cause of all other things. In which, nothing inconceivable nor contradictious. That these confounded Atheists themselves, who deny, that there is any idea of God at all, must notwithstanding, of necessity, suppose the contrary; because otherwise, denying his existence, they should deny the existence of nothing. And that they agree also with Theists in the same idea; the one denying the existence of that which the other asserteth, that an understanding Nature is the original of all things. This idea of God, as containing oneliness and singularity in it, not only largely defended and made good against that objection from the pagan polytheism; but also proved, that the generality of mankind have a natural prolepsis or "anticipation" in their minds concerning the real and actual existence of such a Being. Atheists but monsters and anomalies of mankind. This a sufficient confutation of the first atheistic argument. 2. Nevertheless, that Atheists may not pretend any of their strength to be concealed, all their particular exceptions against the idea of God here declared, being five. Their first exception, that we can have no idea nor thought of any thing not subject to sense; much less any evidence of the existence thereof. The answer. First, that whereas the atheists suppose sense to be the only knowledge, or at least original knowledge; sense, as such, is not knowledge or understanding; because if it were, then every one that sees light and colours, or feels heat and cold, would understand light and colours, heat and cold. Plainly proved also from that atomic philosophy (which the Epicurean atheists so much pretend to) that there is a higher faculty of the soul, which judges of sense, detects the fantastry thereof, resolves sensible things into intelligible principles, &c. No passion able to make a judgment, either of itself or of other things. The confounded Democritus himself sometimes acknowledged sense to be but seeming and fantasy, and not to reach to the absolute truth and reality of things. He therefore exploded qualities out of the rank of entities, because unintelligible; concluding them to be but our own fantasms. Undeniably evident, that we have ideas, notions, and thoughts of many things, that never were in sense, and whereof we have no genuine fantasms. Atheists attend not to their own cogitations. That opinion, that there is nothing in the understanding which was not before in sense, false and atheistical. Men having a notion of a perfect, understanding Being, the cause of all things, as the object of their devotion; the Atheists, notwithstanding, would here persuade them that they have none, and that the thing is a nonentity, merely because they have no sensible idea, or fantasm thereof. And so may they as well prove, not only reason and understanding, appetite and volition, to be nonentities, but also fancy and sense itself; neither of these falling under sense, but only the objects of them. Were God indeed corporeal, as some

mistaken Theists suppose, yet his essence chiefly consisting in mind and understanding, this of him could not possibly be subject to sense. But that there is also substance incorporeal, which therefore in its own nature is insensible, and that the Deity is such, will be elsewhere demonstrated. 3. Though the evidence of singular bodies existing depend upon the information of sense, yet the certainty of this very evidence, not from sense alone, but a complication of reason and understanding with it. Sense fantastical, not reaching to the absolute truth of things, and obnoxious to delusion. Our own imaginations, taken for sensations and realities in sleep, and by melancholized persons when awake. Atomic Atheists themselves assert the existence of such things as they have no sense of; atoms, membranes, or exuvious images of bodies, nay incorporeal space. If the existence of nothing, to be acknowledged, which falls not under sense, then not the existence of soul and mind. God the great mind that rules the whole universe; whence our imperfect minds derived. The existence of that God whom no eye can see, demonstrated by reason from his effects. 4. The second atheistic pretence against the idea of God, and his existence, from Theists' own acknowledging him to be incomprehensible; from whence they infer him to be a non-entity. Here perhaps it may be granted, in a right sense, that whatsoever is altogether inconceivable, is either in itself, or at least to us, nothing. How that of Protagoras, that every man is the measure of all things to himself, in his sense false. Whatsoever any man's shallow understanding cannot clearly comprehend, not therefore to be presently expunged out of the catalogue of beings. Nevertheless, according to Aristotle, the soul and mind in a manner all things. This a crystalline globe, or notional world, that hath some image in it of whatsoever is contained in the real globe of being. 5. But this absolutely false, that whatsoever cannot be fully comprehended by us is therefore utterly inconceivable and consequently nothing. For we cannot fully comprehend ourselves, nor have such an adequate conception of any substance as perfectly to master and conquer the same. That of the sceptics so far true, that there is something incomprehensible in the essence of every thing, even of body itself. Truth bigger than our minds. Proper to God Almighty (who alone is wise) perfectly to comprehend the essences of all things. But it follows not from hence, that therefore we have no idea nor conception at all of any thing. We may have a notion or idea of a perfect Being, though we cannot fully comprehend the same by our imperfect minds, as we may see and touch a mountain, though we cannot enclasp it all round within our arms. This therefore a false theorem of the Atheists, that what cannot be fully comprehended by men's imperfect understandings, is an absolute non-entity. 6. Though God more incomprehensible than other things, because of his transcendent perfection, yet hath he also more of conceptibility: as the sun, dazzling our sight, yet hath more of visibility also than any other object. The dark incomprehensibility of the Deity, like the azure obscurity of the transparent ether, not any thing absolutely in itself, but only relative to us. 7. This incomprehensibility of the Deity, so far from being an argument against its existence, that certain, on the contrary, were there nothing incomprehensible to our imperfect minds, there could be no God. Every thing apprehended by some internal congruity. The scantness and imperfection of our narrow understandings must needs make them asymmetral or incommensurate to what absolutely perfect. 8. Nature itself intimates, that there is something vastly bigger than our mind and thoughts, by those passions implanted in us, of devout

veneration, adoration, and admiration, with ecstacy and pleasing horror. That of the Deity, which cannot enter into the narrow vessels of our minds, must be otherwise apprehended, by their being plunged into it, or swallowed up and lost in it. We have a notion or conception of a perfect Being, though we cannot fully comprehend the same; because ourselves being imperfect, must needs be incommensurate thereunto. Thus no reason at all, in the second atheistic pretence, against the idea of God, and his existence, from his confessed incomprehensibility. 9. The third follows, that infinity, supposed to be essential to the Deity, is a thing perfectly inconceivable, and therefore an impossibility and nonentity. Some passages of a modern writer to this purpose. The meaning of them. That there is nothing of philosophic truth in the idea or attributes of God, nor any other sense in the words, than only to signify the veneration and astonishment of men's own minds. That the word infinite signifies nothing in the thing itself so called, but only the inability of our understandings and admiration. And since God, by Theists, is denied to be finite, but cannot be infinite, therefore an inconceivable nothing. Thus another learned well-willer to atheism, that we have no idea of infinite, and therefore not of God. Which, in the language of Atheists, all one as to say, that he is a nonentity. Answer. This argument, that there can be nothing infinite, and therefore no God, proper to the modern and neoteric Atheists only; but repugnant to the sense of the ancients. Anaximander's ἄπειρον, "infinite matter," though Melissus' ἄπειρον, "the true Deity." Formerly both Theists and Atheists agreed in this, that there must be something or other infinite, either an infinite mind or infinite matter. The ancient Atheists also asserted a numerical infinity of worlds. Thus do Atheists confute or contradict Atheists. 10. That the modern Atheists do no less contradict plain reason also, and their very selves, than they do their predecessors, when they would disprove a God from hence, because there can be nothing infinite. For first, certain, that there was something or other infinite in duration, or eternal without beginning: because if there had been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. But hardly any Atheists can be so sottish, as in good earnest to think there was once nothing at all, but afterwards senseless matter happened to be. Notorious impudence in them who assert the eternity of matter, to make this an argument against the existence of a God, because infinite duration without beginning an impossibility. 11. A concession to the Atheists of these two things; that we neither have a fantasm of any infinite, because there was never any in sense; and that infinity is not fully comprehensible by finite understandings neither. But since, mathematically certain, that there was something infinite in duration, demonstrated from hence, against Atheists, that there is something really existing, which we have neither any fantasm of, nor yet can fully comprehend in our minds. 12. Further granted, that as for infinity of number, magnitude, and time, without beginning; as we have no fantasm, nor full comprehension of them, so have we neither any intelligible idea, notion, or conception: from whence it may be concluded, that they are nonentities. Number infinite in Aristotle, only in a negative sense, because we can never come to an end thereof by addition. For which very reason also there cannot possibly be any number positively infinite, since one or more may always be added. No magnitude so great neither but that a greater may be supposed. By infinite space, to be understood nothing but a possibility of more and more body, further and further infinitely, by divine power; or that the world could never be made so great, as

that God was not able to make it still greater. This potential infinity, or indefinity of body, seems to be mistaken for an actual infinity of space. Lastly, no infinity of time past, because then there must needs be time past, which never was present. An argument of a modern writer. Reason therefore concludes, neither world, nor time, to have been infinite in past duration. 13. Here will the Atheist think he has got a great advantage for disproving the existence of a God; they who thus take away the eternity of the world, taking away also the eternity of a God. As if God could not be eternal otherwise, than by a successive flux of infinite time. 14. But we say, that this affordeth a demonstration of a God; because, since both the world and time had a beginning, there must of necessity be something whose duration is not successive, but permanent, which was the Creator of them both. Wherefore the Atheists can here only make grimaces, and quibble upon nunc-stans; as if this standing eternity of the Deity was nothing but a pitiful moment of time standing still; and as if all duration must needs be the same with ours, &c. 15. Concluded, that infinite and eternal are not words which signify nothing in the thing itself, but only the idle progress of our minds, or our own ignorance, stupid astonishment, and veneration; not mere attributes of honour and compliment, but attributes belonging to the Deity (and that alone), of the most philosophic truth. And though we have no adequate comprehension thereof, yet must we have some notion of that, which we can demonstrate to belong to something. 16. But the thing which the Atheists principally quarrel with is infinite power or omnipotence; which they pretend also to be utterly inconceivable, and impossible, and a name of nothing. Where indeed our modern Atheists have the joint suffrage of the ancients also, who concerned themselves in nothing more than disproving omnipotence, or infinite power. 17. This omnipotence, either wilfully or ignorantly misrepresented by Atheists, as if it were a power of doing things contradictious. An irony of a modern Atheist, that God could turn a tree into a syllogism. The absurd doctrine of Cartesius, that God could have made twice two not to have been four; or the three angles of a triangle not to have been equal to two right. This to make one attribute of the Deity devour and destroy another; infinite will and power, infinite understanding and wisdom. To suppose God to understand and be wise only by will, really to give him no understanding at all. God not so omnipotent as that he can destroy the intelligible natures of things; which were to baffle and befool his own wisdom. Infinite power, that which can do all that is possible; that is, conceivable, or implies no contradiction. The very essence of possibility, conceptibility. And thus all the ancient Theists. Absurd for Atheists to say, that a power of doing nothing but what is conceivable is inconceivable. 18. But because Atheists look upon infinity as such a mormo, we shall take off the vizard from it, by declaring, that it is really nothing else but perfection. Infinite understanding and knowledge, perfect understanding, without any defect, and the knowledge of all things knowable. Infinite power, perfect power, or a power of doing all things possible. Infinite duration, perfection of essence. Because infinity, perfection; therefore nothing which includeth any thing of imperfection in the essence of it, can be truly and properly infinite; as number, magnitude, and time: all which can but counterfeit infinity. Nothing one way infinite, which is not so every way, or a perfect being. 19. Now, that we have an idea of perfection, plain from that of imperfection. Perfection first in order of nature, as the rule and measure. This not the want of imperfection, but imperfection the want

of perfection. A scale, or ladder of perfections in nature, perceived by means of that idea which we have of a being absolutely perfect, the measure of them. Without which, we could not take notice of imperfection in the most perfect of all those things which we ever had sense of. Boëthius, that whatsoever is imperfect in any kind, implies something in that kind perfect from whence it was derived. And that the nature of things took not beginning from any thing incomplete and imperfect; but descended downward, from what was absolutely perfect, by steps and degrees, lower and lower. 20. Wherefore, since infinite the same with perfect, we having a notion of the latter must needs have of the former. And though the word infinite be negative, yet is the sense positive. Finite the negation of infinite, as which in order of nature is before it; and not infinite of finite. However, in things incapable of true infinity, infinity being here a mere imaginary thing and nonentity, can be only conceived by the negation of finite, as nothing is, by the negation of something. An infinite being nothing but a perfect being, such as never was not, and could produce all things possible or conceivable. 21. The fourth atheistic pretence against the idea of God, that it is an arbitrarious compilement of contradictious notions. Where first we deny not, but that as some religionists extend the divine power to things contradictious, so may others compound contradictions together in the nature of the Deity. But it does not follow from thence, that theology itself is therefore contradictious, no more than that philosophy is so, because some philosophers also hold contradictious things; or that nothing is absolutely true, neither in divinity nor philosophy, but all seeming and fantastical; according to the Protagorean doctrine. 22. But though it be true, that whatsoever really implies a contradiction, is a nonentity; yet is this rule obnoxious to much abuse, when whatsoever men's shallow understandings cannot reach to, is therefore presently cried down by them as an impossibility, or nothing. As when the Atheists, and Materialists, explode incorporeal substance upon this pretence; or make it only an attribute of honour, expressing the veneration of men's minds, but signifying nothing in nature, nor having any philosophic truth. But the Atheists' true meaning in this objection, and what kind of contradictions they are, which they impute to all theology, may appear from a passage of a modern writer: namely such as these; when God is said to perceive sensible things, and yet to have no organs of sense; as also to understand, and yet to have no brains. The undisguised meaning of the writer, that religion is not philosophy, but law, and all mere arbitrary constitution; nor God a subject of philosophy, as all real things are; he being no true inhabitant of the world or heaven, but only of men's brains and fancies; and his attributes signifying neither true nor false, nor any thing in nature, but only men's reverence and devotion, towards what they fear. And so may any thing be said of God, no matter what, so it be agreeable to civil law. But when men mistake attributes of honour for attributes of philosophic truth; that is, when they will suppose such a God really to exist; then is all absurd nonsense and contradiction. God's understanding without brains, no contradiction. 23. Certain, That no simple idea, as of a triangle, or a square, can be contradictious to itself; much less can the idea of a perfect Being, the most simple of all. This indeed pregnant of many attributes, which, if contradictious, would render the whole a nonentity; but all the genuine attributes of the Deity, as demonstrable of a perfect Being, as the properties of a triangle, or a square; and therefore can neither be contradictious to it, nor one another. Nay, the genuine attributes of the Deity, not only not contradictious,

but also all necessarily connected together. In truth all the attributes of the Deity, but so many partial and inadequate conceptions of one and the same perfect Being, taken into our minds, as it were by piecemeal. 24. The idea of God, neither fictitious, nor factitious. Nothing arbitrarious in it; but a most natural and simple idea, to which not the least can be added, nor any thing detracted from it. Nevertheless, may there be different apprehensions concerning God; every one that hath a notion of a perfect Being, not understanding all that belongeth to it; no more than of a triangle, or of a sphere. Concluded therefore, that the attributes of God, no confounded nonsense of religiously astonished minds huddling up together all imaginable attributes of honour, courtship, and complement; but the attributes of necessary philosophic truth; and such as do not only speak the devotion of men's hearts, but also declare the real nature of the thing. Here the wit of a modern atheistic writer ill placed. (Though no doubt but some either out of superstition, or ignorance, may attribute such things to the Deity, as are incongruous to its nature.) Thus the fourth atheistic pretence against the idea of God, confuted. 25. In the next place, the Atheists think themselves concerned, to give an account of this unquestionable phenomenon; the general persuasion of the existence of a God, in the minds of men, and their propensity to religion; whence this should come, if there were no real object for it in nature. And this they would do by imputing it, partly to the confounded nonsense of astonished minds, and partly to the imposture of politicians. Or else to these three things; to men's fear, and to their ignorance of causes; and to the fiction of law-makers and civil sovereigns. 26. In the first of these atheistic origins of religion; that mankind, by reason of their natural imbecility, are in continual solicitude and fear concerning future events, and their good and evil fortune. And this passion of fear raises up in them for an object to itself, a most affrightful phantasm; of an inviable, understanding Being, omnipotent, &c. They afterwards standing in awe of this their own imagination, and tremblingly worshipping the creature of their own fear and fancy. 27. The second atheistic origin of theism and religion; that men having a natural curiosity to inquire into the causes of things, wheresoever they can discover no visible and natural causes, are prone to feign causes invisible and supernatural. As Anaxagoras said, never to have betaken himself to a God, but only when he was at a loss for necessary material causes. Wherefore no wonder, if the generality of mankind, being ignorant of the causes of all, or most things, have betaken themselves to a God, as to a refuge and sanctuary for their ignorance. 28. These two accounts of the phenomena of religion; from men's fear and solicitude, and from their ignorance of causes and curiosity, joined together by a modern writer. As if the Deity were but a mormo or bugbear, raised up by men's fear, in the darkness of their ignorance of causes. The opinion of other ghosts and spirits also deduced from the same original. Men's taking things casual for prognostics, and being so addicted to omens, portents, prophecies, &c., from a fantastic and timorous supposition that the things of this world are not disposed of by nature, but by some understanding person. 29. But lest these two accounts of the phenomenon of religion should prove insufficient; the Atheists superadd a third, imputing it also to the fiction and imposture of civil sovereigns; who perceiving an advantage to be made from hence, for the better keeping men in subjection, have thereupon dexterously laid hold of men's fear and ignorance; and cherished those seeds of religion in them, from the infirmities of their nature: confirming their belief of ghosts and spirits,

miracles, prodigies, and oracles, by tales, publicly allowed and recommended. And that religion might be every way obnoxious to their designs, have persuaded the people that themselves were but the interpreters of the gods, from whom they received their laws. Religion an engine of state; to keep men busily employed; entertain their minds; render them tame and gentle, apt for subjection and society. 30. All this not the invention of modern Atheists. But an old atheistic cabal; that the gods made by fear. Lucretius; that the causes of religion, terror of mind and darkness; and that the empire of the gods owes all its being to men's ignorance of causes, as also, that the opinions of ghosts proceeded from men's not knowing how to distinguish their dreams, and other frightful fancies from sensations. 31. An old atheistic surmise also; that religion a political invention. Thus Cicero; the Atheists in Plato, that the gods are not by nature, but by art and laws only. Critias, one of the thirty tyrants of Athens, his poem to this purpose. 32. That the folly and falseness of these three atheistic pretences, for the origin of religion, will be fully manifested. First, as to that of fear and fancy. Such an excess of fear, as makes any one constantly believe the existence of that for which no manner of ground, neither in sense, nor reason, highly tending also to his own disquiet; nothing less than distraction. Wherefore, the generality of mankind here affirmed by Atheists, to be frighted out of their wits, and distempered in their brains; only a few of themselves, who have escaped this panic terror, remaining sober, or in their right senses. The sobriety of Atheists nothing but dull stupidity and dead incredulity; they believing only what they can see or feel. 33. True, that there is a religious fear, consequent upon the belief of a God; as also, that the sense of a Deity is often awakened in men's minds by their fears and dangers. But religion no creature of fear. None less solicitous about their good and evil fortune than the pious and virtuous; who place not their chief happiness in things alien, but only in the right use of their own will. Whereas the good of Atheists wholly in things obnoxious to fortune. The timorous complexion of Atheists, from building all their politics and justice upon the foundation of fear. 34. The Atheists' grand error here; that the Deity, according to the general sense of mankind, nothing but a terriculum, a formidable, hurtful, and undesirable thing. Whereas men every where agree in that divine attribute of goodness and benignity. 35. Φθονερὸν τὸ δαιμόνιον, in the worst sense, taken by none but a few ill-natured men, painting out the Deity according to their own likeness. This condemned by Aristotle in the Poets (he calling them therefore liars), by Plutarch in Herodotus, as spoken universally; Plutarch himself restraining the sense thereof to his evil principle. Plato's ascribing the world to the divine goodness, who therefore made all things most like himself. The true meaning of this proverb; that the Deity affecteth to humble and abase the pride of men. Lucretius' hidden force, that hath, as it were, a spite to all overswelling greatnesses, could be no other than the Deity. Those amongst Christians who make the worst representations of God, yet fancy him kind and gracious to themselves. 36. True, that religion often expressed by the fear of God. Fear prima mensura Deitatis, the first impression that religion makes upon men in this lapsed state. But this not a fear of God, as mischievous and hurtful, nor yet as a mere arbitrary Being, but as just, and an impartial punisher of wickedness. Lucretius' acknowledging men's fear of God to be conjoined with a conscience of duty. A natural discrimination of good and evil, with a sense of an impartial justice presiding over the world, and both rewarding and punishing. The fear of God, as either a

hurtful or arbitrary and tyrannical being (which must needs be joined with something of hatred), not religion, but superstition. Fear, faith, and love; three steps and degrees of religion, to the son of Sirach. Faith better defined in scripture than by any scholastics. God such a being, as if he were not, nothing more to be wished for. 37. The reason why Atheists thus mistake the notion of God, as a thing only to be feared, and consequently hated; from their own ill-nature and vice. The latter disposing them so much to think that there is no difference of good and evil by nature, but only by law; which law, contrary to nature, as restraint to liberty. Hence their denying all natural charity, and acknowledging no benevolence or good will, but what arises from imbecility, indigency, and fear. Their friendship at best no other than mercatura utilitatum. Wherefore, if there were an omnipotent Deity, this (according to the atheistic hypothesis) could not have so much as that spurious love or benevolence to any thing, because standing in need of nothing, and devoid of fear. Thus Cotta in Cicero. All this asserted also by a late pretender to politics; he adding thereunto, that God hath no other right of commanding than his irresistible power; nor men any obligation to obey him, but only from their imbecility and fear, or because they cannot resist him. Thus do Atheists transform the Deity into a monstrous shape; an omnipotent Being, that hath neither benevolence nor justice in him. This indeed a mormo, or bugbear. 38. But as this a false representation of theism, so the atheistic scene of things most uncomfortable, hopeless, and dismal, upon several accounts. True, that no spiteful designs in senseless atoms; in which regard, Plutarch preferred even this atheistic hypothesis before that of an omnipotent, mischievous Being. However, no faith, nor hope neither, in senseless atoms. Epicurus' confession, that it was better to believe the fable of the gods, than that material necessity of all things, asserted by the other atheistic physiologers, before himself. But he not at all mending the matter, by his supposed free will. The panic fear of the Epicureans, of the frame of heaven's cracking, and this compilement of atoms being dissolved into a chaos. Atheists running from fear plunge themselves into fear. Atheism, rather than theism, from the imposture of fear, distrust, and disbelief of good. But vice afterwards prevailing in them makes them desire there should be no God. 39. Thus the Atheists, who derive the origin of religion from fear, first put an affrightful vizard upon the Deity, and then conclude it to be but a mormo or bugbear, the creature of fear and fancy. More likely of the two that the opinion of a God sprung from hope of good than fear of evil; but neither of these true, it owing its being to the imposture of no passion, but supported by the strongest and clearest reason. Nevertheless, a natural prolepsis, or anticipation of a God also, in men's minds, preventing reason. This called by Plato and Aristotle a vaticination. 40. The second atheistic pretence to solve the phenomenon of religion, from the ignorance of causes, and men's innate curiosity (upon which account the Deity said by them to be nothing but an asylum of ignorance, or the sanctuary of fools) next to be confuted. 41. That the Atheists, both modern and ancient, here commonly complicate these two together, fear and ignorance of causes; making theism the spawn of both; as the fear of children in the dark raises bugbears and spectres. Epicurus' reason why he took such great pains in the study of physiology; that by finding out the natural causes of things he might free men from the terror of a God, that would otherwise assault their minds. 42. The Atheists thus dabbling in physiology, and finding out material causes for some of those phenomena which the unskilful vulgar solve only from a Deity;

therefore confident that religion had no other original than this ignorance of causes: as also, that nature, or matter, does all things alone without a God. But we shall make it manifest that philosophy and the true knowledge of causes lead to a Deity; and that Atheism, from ignorance of causes, and want of philosophy. 43. For first, no Atheist, who derives all from senseless matter, can possibly assign any cause of himself, his own soul, or mind; it being impossible that life and sense should be naturally produced from what dead and senseless; or from magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions. An atheistic objection nothing to the purpose; that laughing and crying things are made out of not-laughing and crying principles: because these result from the mechanism of the body. The Hylozoists never able neither to produce animal sense and consciousness, out of what senseless and inconscious. The Atheists, supposing their own life and understanding, and all the wisdom that is in the world, to have sprung merely from senseless matter and fortuitous motions; grossly ignorant of causes. The philosophy of ourselves, and true knowledge of the cause of our own soul and mind, brings to God. 44. Again, Atheists ignorant of the cause of motion, by which they suppose all things done; this phenomenon being no way solvable, according to their principles. First, undeniably certain that motion not essential to all body or matter as such, because then there could have been no mundane system, no sun, moon, earth, &c., all things being continually torn in pieces, and nothing cohering. Certain also, that dead and senseless matter, such as that of Anaximander, Democritus, and Epicurus, cannot move itself spontaneously by will or appetite. The Hylozoists further considered elsewhere. Democritus could assign no other cause of motion than this, that one body moved another from eternity infinitely; without any first cause or mover. Thus also a modern writer. To assert an infinite progress in the causes of motion, according to Aristotle, to assign no cause thereof at all. Epicurus, though an exploder of qualities, forced here to fly to an occult quality, of gravity. Which, as absurd in infinite space, and without any centre of rest; so indeed nothing but to make his own ignorance, and he knows not why, to be a cause. The motion of body, from the activity of something incorporeal. Though motion taken for translation, be a mode of matter; yet as it is taken for the vis movens, a mode, or energy, of something that is incorporeal and self-active. The motion of the whole corporeal universe originally from the Deity. Thus the ignorance of the cause of motion another ground of atheism. 45. Thirdly, the Atheists also ignorant of the cause of that grand phenomenon, the τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, the "regular and artificial frame of the mundane system," and of the bodies of animals; together with the harmony of all. They, who boast they can give causes of all things, without a God, able to give no cause of this, but only that it happened by chance so to be. This, either to make the absence of a cause, a cause (chance being but the absence of an intending cause); or their own very ignorance of the cause, and they know not why, to be a cause; or to make one contrary, the cause of another; (confusion of order and harmony, chance of art and skill,) or lastly, to deny it to have any cause at all, since they deny an intending cause. 46. But here the Atheists make several pretences for this their ignorance. First, that the world is not so well made, but that it might have been much better; and many flaws to be found therein: whereas a God, or perfect being, would have bungled in nothing, but have made all things after the best manner. But this a twelfth atheistic argumentation, and the confutation thereof to be expected afterward. Reason, why some modern Theists give Atheists so much advantage here,

as to acknowledge things be ill made; whilst the ancient Pagan Theists stood their ground, and generously maintained, that Mind being the Maker of all things, and not blind fortune or chance, nor arbitrary will, and irrational human omnipotent; the τὸ βέλτιστον, that which is absolutely the best, in order to the good of the whole, (so far as the necessity of things would admit) the measure and rule of nature and providence. 47. Again, the Atomic and Epicurean Atheists pretend, that though many things serve for uses, yet it does not therefore follow, that they were made intentionally for those uses; because things that happen by chance, may have uses consequent. Thus Lucretius, and the old atheistic philosophers before Aristotle, of the parts of the bodies of animals, and all other things. The answer, that when things consist of many parts, all artifically proportioned together, with much curiosity, as for example, the eye; no man who considers the anatomy thereof, and its whole structure, can reasonably conclude, that it happened so to be made; and the use of seeing followed: but that it was made intentionally for the use of seeing. But to maintain that not only eyes happened to be so made, and the use of seeing followed, but also ears, and a mouth, and feet, and hands, and all the other parts organical and similar, (without any of which, the whole would be inept or useless) all their several uses, un-intended, following; gross insensibility and stupidity. Galen of the use of parts. 48. Democritus' dotages; countenanced also by Cartesius' book of Meteors, (first written with design to solve all those phenomena without a God,) but unsuccessfully. Nevertheless, we acknowledge, that God and nature do all things in the most frugal and compendious way; and that the mechanic powers are taken in, so far as they will serviceably comply with the intellectual platform. But nature not mechanical and fortuitous only, but also vital and artificial; the Archeus of the whole world. 49. Again, Atheists further pretend, that though it may well seem strange, that matter fortuitously moved, should, at the very first, fall into such a regularity and harmony, as is now in the world; yet not at all strange, that atoms, moving from all eternity, and making all manner of combinations and contextures, and trying all experiments, should after innumerable other inept and discongruous forms, at length fall into such a system as this. They say, therefore, that the earth, at first, brought forth divers monstrous and irregular shapes of animals; some wanting feet, some hands, some without a mouth, &c. to which the ancients added Centaurs, Scyllas, and Chimeras; mixedly boviform and hominiform animals. Though Epicurus, ashamed to own these, would seem to exclude them, but without reason. But because we have now no such irregular shapes produced out of the earth, they say, that the reason is, because none could continue and propagate their kind by generation, but only such as happened to be fitly made. Thus Epicurus, and the Atheists before Aristotle. They also add hereunto their infinite worlds; amongst which they pretend, not one of a thousand, or of ten thousand, hath so much regularity in it as this of ours. Lastly, they presage likewise, that this world of ours shall not always continue such, but after a while, fall into confusion and disorder again; and then we may have Centaurs, Scyllas, and Chimeras, as before. 50. Nevertheless, because this universal and constant regularity of things, for so many ages together, is so puzzling; they would persuade us that the senseless atoms, playing and toying up and down, from eternity, without any care or thought, were at length taught, by the necessity of things, and driven to a kind of trade, or habit of artificialness and methodicalness. 51. To all which atheistic pretences replied first, That this is an idle dream, or

impudent forgery, that there was once an inept mundane system ; and in this world of ours, all manner of irregular shapes of animals : not only because no tradition of any such thing ; but also because no reason possibly to be given, why such should not be produced out of the earth still, though they could not continue long. That also another atheistic dream, that in this world of ours, all will quickly fall into confusion and nonsense again. And as their infinite worlds an impossibility, so their assertion of the irregularity of the supposed other worlds well enough answered, by a contrary assertion ; that were every planet a habitable earth, and every fixed star a sun, having all more or fewer such habitable planets moving round about them, and none of them desert or uninhabited, there would not be found so much as one ridiculous or inept system amongst them all ; the divine act being infinite. 52. Again, that the fortuitous motions of senseless atoms should, in length of time, grow artificial, and contract a habit, or trade of acting as regularly, as if directed by perfect art and wisdom : this atheistic fanaticism. 53. No more possible, that dead and senseless matter, fortuitously moved, should at length be taught, and necessitated by itself, to produce this artificial system of the world ; than that a dozen or more persons, unskilled in music, and striking the strings as it happened, should at length be taught, and necessitated to fall into exquisite harmony ; or that the letters in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, though having so much philosophic sense, should have been all scribbled at random. More philosophy in the great volume of the world, than in all Aristotle's and Plato's works : and more of harmony than in any artificial composition of vocal music. That the divine art and wisdom hath printed such a signature of itself upon the matter of the whole world, as fortune and chance could never counterfeit. 54. But in the next place, the Atheists will, for all this undertake to demonstrate, that things could not possibly be made by any intending cause, for ends and uses ; as eyes for seeing, ears for hearing ; from hence because things were all in order of time as well as nature, before their uses. This argument seriously propounded by Lucretius in this manner ; if eyes were made for the use of seeing, then of necessity must seeing have been before eyes : but there was no seeing before eyes ; therefore could not eyes be made for the sake of seeing. 55. Evident, that the logic of these Atheists differs from all other mortals ; according to which, the end, for which any thing is designedly made, is only in intention first, but in execution last. True, that men are commonly excited from experience of things, and sense of their wants, to excogitate means and remedies ; but it doth not therefore follow, that the maker of the world could not have a preventive knowledge of whatsoever would be useful for animals, and so make them bodies intentionally for those uses. That argument ought to be thus framed : whatsoever is made intentionally for any end, as the eye for that of seeing, that end must needs be in the knowledge and intention of the maker, before the actual existence of that which is made for it : but there could be no knowledge of seeing before there were eyes ; therefore eyes could not be made intentionally for the sake of seeing. 56. This the true scope of the premised atheistic argument, however disguised by them in the first propounding. The ground thereof, because they take it for granted that all knowledge is derived from sense, or from the things known, pre-existing without the knower. And here does Lucretius triumph. The controversy therefore at last resolved into this ; whether all knowledge be in its own nature junior to things : for if so, it must be granted, that the world could not be made by any antecedent knowledge. But this afterwards

fully confuted; and proved, that knowledge is not in its own nature, ectypal, but archetypal; and that knowledge was older than the world, and the maker thereof. 57. But Atheists will except against the proving of a God, from the regular and artificial frame of things; that it is unreasonable to think there should be no cause in nature for the common phenomena thereof; but a God thus introduced to solve them. Which also, to suppose the world bungled and botched up. That nature is the cause of natural things, which nature does not intend, nor act for ends. Wherefore, the opinion of final causality for things in nature but an idolum specûs. Therefore rightly banished by Democritus out of physiology. 58. The answer: Two extremes here to be avoided, one of the atomic Atheists who derive all things from the fortuitous motion of senseless matter; another of bigotical religionists, who will have God to do all things himself immediately, without any nature. The middle betwixt both, that there is not only a mechanical and fortuitous, but also an artificial nature, subservient to the Deity, as the manuary opificer, and drudging executioner thereof. True, that some philosophers have absurdly attributed their own properties, or animal idiopathies, to inanimate bodies. Nevertheless, this no idol of the cave, or den, to suppose the system o the world to have been framed by an understanding Being, according to whose direction, nature, though not itself intending, acteth. Balbus' description of this artificial nature in Cicero. That there could be no Mind in us, were there none in the universe. That of Aristotle true, that there is more of art in some things of nature, than in any thing made by men. Now the causes of artificial things, as a house or clock, cannot be declared without intention for ends. This excellently pursued by Aristotle. No more can the things of nature be rightly understood, or the causes of them fully assigned, merely from matter and motion, without intention or mind. They who banish final or mental causality from philosophy, look upon the things of nature with no other eyes than oxen and horses. Some pitiful attempts of the ancient Atheists to solve the phenomena of animals, without mental causality. Democritus and Epicurus so cautious as never to pretend to give an account of the formation of the fœtus. Aristotle's judgment here to be preferred before that of Democritus. 59. But nothing more strange, than that these Atheists should be justified in this their ignorance by professed Theists and Christians; who atomizing likewise in their physiology, contend that this whole mundane system resulted only from the necessary and unguided motion of matter, either turned round in a vortex, or jumbled in a chaos, without the direction of any mind. These mechanic Theists more immodest than the atomic Atheists themselves; they supposing these their atoms, though fortuitously moved, yet never to have produced any inept system, or incongruous forms; but from the very first, all along, to have ranged themselves so orderly, as that they could not have done it better, had they been directed by a perfect Mind. They quite take away the argument for a God, from the phenomena, and that artificial frame of things, leaving only some metaphysical arguments; which, though never so good, yet by reason of their subtlety, cannot do so much execution. The Atheists gratified to see the cause of theism thus betrayed by its professed friends; and the grand argument for the same totally slurred by them. 60. As this great sensibility of mind, to look upon the things of nature with no other eyes than brute animals do; so are there sundry phenomena, partly above the mechanic powers, and partly contrary to the same, which therefore can never be solved, without mental and final causality. As in animals, the motion of the diaphragma in respiration, the systole and diastole of the heart (being a muscular constriction

and relaxation) to which might be added others in the macrocosm ; as the intersection of the planes of the equator and ecliptic ; or the earth's diurnal motion upon an axis not parallel with that of its annual. Cartesius' confession, that according to mechanic principles, these should continually come nearer and nearer together ; which, since they have not done, final or mental causality here to be acknowledged, and because it was best it should be so. But the greatest phenomenon of this kind, the formation and organization of animals ; which these mechanists never able to give any account of. Of that posthumous piece of Cartesius, De la Formation du Fœtus. 61. Pretended, that to assign final causes, is to presume ourselves to be as wise as God Almighty, or to be privy to his counsels. But the question, not whether we can always reach to the ends of God Almighty, or know what is absolutely best in every case, and accordingly conclude things therefore to be so ; but whether any thing in the world be made for ends, otherwise than would have resulted from the fortuitous motion of matter. No presumption nor intrusion into the secrets of God Almighty, to say, that eyes were made by him intentionally for the sake of seeing. Anaxagoras' absurd aphorism, that man was therefore the most solert of all animals, because he chanced to have hands. Far more reasonable to think, (as Aristotle concludeth) that because man was the wisest of all animals, therefore he had hands given him. More proper to give pipes to one that hath musical skill, than upon him that hath pipes to bestow musical skill. 62. In the last place, mechanic Theists pretend, and that with some more plausibility, that it is below the dignity of God Almighty to perform all those mean and trivial offices of nature himself immediately. This answered again : that though the divine wisdom itself contrived the system of the whole for ends, yet is there an artificial nature under him, as his inferior minister and executioner. Proclus' description hereof. This nature, to Proclus, a god or goddess ; but only as the bodies of the animated stars were called gods, because the statues of the gods. 63. That we cannot otherwise conclude concerning these mechanic Theists, who derive all things in the mundane system, from the necessary motions of senseless matter, without the direction of any Mind, or God ; but that they are imperfect Theists, or have a certain tang of the atheistic enthusiasm, (the spirit of infidelity) hanging about them. 64. But these mechanic Theists counterbalanced by another sort of Atheists, not fortuitous nor mechanical ; namely, the Hylozoists, who acknowledge the works of nature to be the works of understanding, and deride Democritus' rough and hooky atoms, devoid of life ; they attributing life to all matter as such, and concluding the vulgar notion of a God to be but an inadequate conception of matter, its energetic nature being taken alone by itself as a complete substance. These Hylozoists never able to satisfy that phenomenon of the one agreeing and conspiring harmony throughout the whole universe ; every atom of matter, according to them, being a distinct percipient ; and these unable to confer notions with one another. 65. Nor can the other cosmo-plastic Atheists (to whom the whole world, but one huge plant or vegetable, endowed with a spermatic artificial nature, orderly disposing the whole, without sense or understanding), do any thing towards the solving of this or any other phenomena ; it being impossible that there should be any such regular nature, otherwise than as derived from, and depending on a perfect mind. 66. Besides these three phenomena, of cogitation, motion, and the artificial frame of things, with the conspiring harmony of the whole, (no way solvable by Atheists) here further added, that those who asserted the novity of the world,

could not possibly give an account neither of the first beginning of men and other animals, not now generated out of putrefaction. Aristotle sometimes doubtful and staggering concerning the world's eternity. Men and all other animals not produced at first by chance, either as worms out of putrefaction, or out of eggs, or wombs, growing out of the earth; because no reason to be given why chance should not as well produce the same out of the earth still. Epicurus' vain pretence that the earth, as a child-bearing woman, was now grown effete and barren. Moreover, men and animals, whether first generated out of putrefaction, or excluded out of wombs or egg-shells, supposed by these Atheists themselves, to have been produced in a tender, infant-like state, so that they could neither supply themselves with nourishment, nor defend themselves from harms. A dream of Epicurus, that the earth sent forth streams of milk after those her new-born infants and nurslings, confuted by Critolaus in Philo. Another precarious supposition, or figment, of Epicurus; that then no immoderate heats, nor colds, nor any blustering winds. Anaximander's way of solving this difficulty; that men were first generated and nourished in the bellies of fishes, till able to shift for themselves; and then disgorged upon dry land. Atheists swallow any thing rather than a god. 67. Wherefore here being dignus vindice nodus, a Θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς reasonably introduced in the Mosaic cabala, to solve the same. It appearing from all circumstances put together, that this whole phenomenon surpasses, not only the mechanic but also the plastic powers; there being much of discretion therein. However, not denied, but that the ministry of spirits (created before man, and other terrestrial animals) might be here made use of. As in Plato, after the creation of immortal souls by the supreme God, the framing of mortal bodies is committed to junior gods. 68. Furthermore, Atheists no more able to solve that ordinary phenomenon, of the conservation of species, by the difference of sexes, and a due proportion of number kept up between males and females. Here a providence also, superior as well to the plastic as mechanic nature. 69. Lastly, other phenomena, as real, though not physical; which Atheists cannot possibly solve, and therefore do commonly deny; as of natural justice or honesty, and obligation; the foundation of politics, and the mathematics of religion. And of liberty of will, not only that of fortuitous self-determination, when an equal eligibility of objects; but also that which makes men deserve commendation and blame. These not commonly distinguished as they ought. Epicurus' endeavour to solve liberty of will, from atoms declining uncertainly from the perpendicular, mere madness and phrenzy. 70. And now have we already preventively confuted the third atheistic pretence, to solve the phenomenon of theism from the fiction and imposture of politicians; we having proved that philosophy and the true knowledge of causes infer the existence of a God. Nevertheless, this is to be here further answered. 71. That statesmen and politicians could not have made such use of religion, as sometimes they have done, had it been a mere cheat and figment of their own. Civil sovereigns in all the distant places of the world could not have so universally conspired, in this one piece of state-craft or cosenage; nor yet have been able to possess the minds of men every where, with such a constant awe and dread of an invisible nothing. The world would long since have discovered this cheat, and suspected a plot upon their liberty, in the fiction of a god; at least governors themselves would have understood it; many of which, notwithstanding, as much awed with the fear of this invisible nothing as any others. Other cheats and juggles, when once detected, no longer practised. But religion, now as much

in credit as ever, though so long since decried by Atheists for a political cheat. That Christianity, a religion founded in no human policy, prevailed over the craft and power of all civil sovereigns, and conquered the persecuting world by suffering deaths and martyrdoms. This presignified by the prophetic spirit. 72. Had the idea of God been an arbitrarious figment, not conceivable, how men should have universally agreed in the same, and the attributes belonging thereunto (this argument used by Sextus): not that civil sovereigns themselves should so universally have jumped in it. 73. Furthermore; not conceivable how this thought or idea of a God should have been formed by any, had it been the idea of nothing. The superficialness of Atheists, in pretending that politicians, by telling men of such a thing, put the idea into their minds. No notions or ideas put into men's minds by words, but only the phantasms of the sounds. Though all learning be not remembrance, yet is all human teaching but maieutical or obstetricious; not the filling of the soul as a vessel, by pouring into it from without; but the kindling of it from within. Words signify nothing to him that cannot raise up within himself the notions or ideas correspondent to them. However, the difficulty still remains; how statesmen themselves, or the first inventor of this cheat, could have framed any notion at all of a nonentity. 74. Here the Atheists pretend that, there is a feigning power in the soul, whereby it can make ideas and conceptions of nonentities; as of a golden mountain or a centaur: and that by this, an idea of God might be framed, there be no such thing. Answer: That all the feigning power of the soul consisteth only in compounding ideas of things, that really exist apart, but not in that conjunction. The mind cannot make any new conceptive cogitation, which was not before; as the painter or limner cannot feign foreign colours. Moreover, the whole of these fictitious ideas, though it have no actual, yet hath it a possible entity. The Deity itself, though it could create a world out of nothing, yet can it not create more cogitation or conception than is, or was always contained in its own mind from eternity; nor frame a positive idea of that which hath no possible entity. 75. The idea of God no compilement or aggregation of things, that exist severally, apart in the world; because then it would be a mere arbitrarious thing, and what every one pleased; the contrary whereunto hath been before manifested. 76. Again: some attributes of the Deity, nowhere else to be found in the whole world; and therefore must be absolute nonentities, were there no God. Here the painter must feign colours, and create new cogitation, out of nothing. 77. Lastly: upon supposition that there is no God, it is impossible, not only that there should be any for the future, but also that there should ever have been any; whereas all fictitious ideas must have a possible entity, since otherwise they would be unconceivable, and no ideas. 78. Wherefore, some Atheists will further pretend, that besides this power of compounding things together, the soul hath another ampliating or amplifying power; by both which together, though there be no God existing, nor yet possible, the idea of him might be fictitiously made; those attributes, which are nowhere else to be found, arising by way of amplification or augmentation of something found in men. 79. Answer: First, that, according to the principles of these Atheists, that all our conceptions are nothing but passions from objects without, there cannot possibly be any such amplifying power in the soul, whereby it could make more than is. Thus Protagoras in Plato: No man can conceive of any thing but what he suffers. Here also (as Sextus intimateth), the Atheists guilty of that fallacy, called a circle or diallelus. For having first undiscernedly made the idea of imperfection from

perfection, they then go about again, to make the idea of perfection out of imperfection. That men have a notion of perfection, by which as a rule, they judge things to be imperfect, evident from that direction given by all theologers, to conceive of God, in way of remotion or abstraction of all imperfection. Lastly: finite things added together can never make up infinite; as more and more time backward can never reach to eternity without beginning. God differs from imperfect things, not in degree, but kind. As for infinite space, said to consist of parts finite; we certain of no more than this, that the finite world might have been made bigger and bigger infinitely; for which very cause it could never be actually infinite. Gassendus' objection, that the idea of an infinite God might as well be feigned as that of infinite worlds. But infinite worlds are but words or notions ill put together or combined; infinity being a real thing in nature, but misapplied, it being proper only to the Deity. 80. The conclusion, that since the soul can neither make the idea of infinite, by amplification of finite; nor feign or create any new cogitation, which was not before; nor make a positive idea of a nonentity; certain, that the idea of God no fictitious thing. 81. Further made evident, that religion not the figment of civil sovereigns. Obligation in conscience the foundation of all civil right and authority. Covenants, without this, nothing but words and breath. Obligations, not from laws neither, but before them; or otherwise they could not oblige. Lastly, this derived, not from utility neither. Were obligation to civil obedience made by men's private utility, then could it be dissolved by the same. Wherefore, if religion a fiction or imposture, civil sovereignty must needs be so too. Had religion been a fiction of politicians, they would then have made it every way pliable and flexible; since otherwise it would not serve their turn, nor consist with their infinite right. But religion in its own nature, a stiff, inflexible thing, as also justice, it being not factitious, or made by will. There may therefore be a contradiction betwixt the laws of God and of men; and in this case does religion conclude, that God ought to be obeyed rather than men. For this cause atheistic politicians of latter times declare against religion as inconsistent with civil sovereignty; it destroying infinite right, introducing private judgment, or conscience, and a fear greater than that of the leviathan; to wit, of him who can inflict eternal punishment. Senseless matter the Atheist's natural god; the leviathan, or civil sovereign his artificial one. Religion thus disowned and disclaimed by politicians, as inconsistent with civil power, could not be the creature of political art. Thus all the three atheistic pretences to solve the phenomenon of religion, from fear, ignorance of causes, and fiction of politicians, fully confuted. 82. But because, besides those ordinary phenomena, before mentioned, there are certain other extraordinary ones that cannot be solved by Atheists, which, therefore, they will impute, partly to men's fear and ignorance, and partly to the fiction and imposture of civil governors (viz. apparitions, miracles, and prophecies); the reality of these also to be briefly vindicated. 83. First, as for apparitions; though much of fabulosity in these relations, yet unquestionably something of truth. Atheists, imputing these things to men's mistaking their dreams and fancies for sensations, contradict their own fundamental principle, that sense is the only criterion of truth; as also derogate more from human testimony than they ought. 84. That some Atheists, sensible hereof, have acknowledged the reality of apparitions, concluding them nevertheless to be the mere creatures of imagination; as if a strong fancy could produce real substances or objects of sense. The fanaticism of Atheists, who will

rather believe the greatest impossibilities than endanger the being of a God. Invisible ghosts permanent easily introduced one supreme Ghost of the whole world. 85. Democritus yet further convinced, that there were invisible beings superior to men, independent upon imagination, and permanent (called by him idols) but having nothing immortal in them; and therefore that God could be no more proved from the existence of them than of men. Granted by him, that there were, not only terrestrial, but also aëreal and ethereal animals; and that all those vast regions of the universe above were not desert and uninhabited. Here something of the fathers, asserting angels to have bodies; but more afterwards. 86. To this phenomenon of apparitions may be added those two others, of witches and demoniacs; both of these proving, that spirits are not fancies, nor inhabitants of men's brains only, but of the world: as also, that there are some impure spirits, a confirmation of the truth of Christianity. The confident exploders of witchcraft suspicable for atheism. As for demoniacs or energumeni, certain from Josephus, that the Jews did not take these demons or devils for bodily diseases, but real substances, possessing the bodies of men. Nor probable that they supposed, as the Gnostics afterward, all diseases to be the infestation of evil spirits; nor yet (as some think), all demoniacs to be madmen. But when there were any unusual and extraordinary symptoms, in any bodily distemper, but especially that of madness, they supposing this to be supernatural, imputed it to the infestation of some devil. Thus also the Greeks. 87. That demoniacs and energumeni are a real phenomenon; and that there are such also in these times of ours, asserted by Fernelius and Sennertus. Such maniacal persons, as not only discover secrets, but also speak languages, which they had never learned, unquestionably demoniacs or energumeni. That there have been such in the times since our Saviour, proved out of Psellus; as also from Fernelius. This for the vindication of Christianity, against those who suspect the scripture demoniacs for figments. 88. The second extraordinary phenomenon proposed: that of miracles and effects supernatural. That there have been such things amongst the Pagans, and since the times of Christianity too, evident from their records. But more instances of these in scripture. 89. Two sorts of miracles. First, such as, though they cannot be done by ordinary causes, yet may be effected by the natural power of invisible spirits, angels, or demons. As illiterate demoniacs speaking Greek. Such amongst the Pagans that miracle of the whetstone cut in two with a razor. Secondly, such as transcend the natural power of all second causes and created beings. That late politico-theological treatise, denying both these sorts of miracles, inconsiderable, and not deserving here a confutation. Supposed in Deuteronomy, that miracles of the former sort might be done by false prophets, in confirmation of idolatry. Wherefore, miracles not sufficient to confirm every doctrine. Accordingly, in the New Testament do we read of τέρατα ψεύδους, "lying miracles;" that is, miracles done in confirmation of a lie, and by the power of Satan, &c. God permitting it, in way of probation of some, and punishment of others. Miracles done for the promoting of creature-worship or idolatry, instead of justifying the same, themselves condemned by it. 90. Had the miracles of our Saviour been all of the former kind only, yet ought the Jews, according to Moses' law, to have acknowledged him for a true prophet, he coming in the name of the Lord, and not exhorting to idolatry. Supposed in Deuteronomy that God would not permit false prophets to do miracles, save only in the case of idolatry, or when the doctrine is discoverable to be false by the light of nature,

because that would be an invincible temptation. Our Saviour, that eximious prophet, foretold, by whom God would again reveal his will to the world; and so more out of flaming fire. Nevertheless, some miracles of our Saviour Christ's such also as could be done only by the power of God Almighty. All miracles evince spirits; to disbelieve which is to disbelieve sense, or unreasonably to derogate from human testimony. Had the Gentiles entertained the faith of Christ without miracles, this itself would have been a great miracle. 91. The last extraordinary phenomenon, divination or prophecy. This also evinces spirits (called gods by the Pagans); and thus that of theirs true; if divination, then gods. 92. Two sorts of predictions likewise, as of miracles. First, such as might proceed from the natural presaging power of created spirits. Such predictions acknowledged by Democritus, upon account of his idola. Not so much contingency in human actions by reason of men's liberty of will, as some suppose. Another sort of predictions of future events imputable only to the supernatural prescience of God Almighty. Epicurus' pretence, that divination took away liberty of will; either as supposing or making a necessity. Some Theists also denying the prescience of God Almighty, upon the same account. Certain, that no created being can foreknow future events, otherwise than in their causes. Wherefore predictions of such events, as had no necessary antecedent causes, evince a God. 93. That there is foreknowledge of future events, unforeknowable to men, formerly the general persuasion of mankind. Oracles and predictions amongst the Pagans, which evince spirits, as that of Actius Navius. Most of the Pagan oracles, from the natural presaging power of demons. Nevertheless some instances of predictions of a higher kind amongst them; as that of Vectius Valens, and the Sibyls. Thus Balaam divinely assisted to predict our Saviour. Scriptures triumphing over pagan oracles. Predictions concerning our Saviour Christ, and the conversion of the Gentiles. Amongst which that remarkable one of the seventy weeks. 94. Other predictions concerning the fates of kingdoms, and of the church. Daniel's fourth ten-horned beast, the Roman empire. This prophecy of Daniel's carried on further in the Apocalypse. Both of them prophetic calendars of times, to the end of the world. 95. That this phenomenon of Scripture prophecies cannot possibly be imputed by Atheists, as some others, to fear, or ignorance of causes, or to the fiction of politicians. They not only evince a Deity, but also the truth of Christianity. To this purpose, of more use to us, who now live, than the miracles themselves recorded in Scripture. These five extraordinary phenomena all of them evince spirits to be no fancies, but substantial inhabitants of the world; from whence a God may be inferred. Some of them immediately prove a Deity. 96. Here have we not only fully confuted all the atheistic pretences from the idea of God, but also, by the way, already proposed several substantial arguments for a Deity. The existence whereof will now be further proved from its very idea. True, that some of the ancient Theists themselves declare God not to be demonstrable. Thus Alexander Aprodis. Clemens Alexand. But their meaning therein no more than this, that God cannot be demonstrated à priori from any antecedent necessary cause. Not follow from hence, that therefore no certainty, or knowledge of the existence of a God; but only conjectural probability, faith, and opinion. We may have a certain knowledge of things, the διότι whereof cannot be demonstrated à priori; as, that there was something or other eternal, without beginning. Whensoever a thing is necessarily inferred from what is altogether

undeniable, this may be called a demonstration. Many geometrical demonstrations such: or of the ὅτι only. 97. A special position of Cartesius; that there can be no certainty of any thing, no not of geometrical theorems, nor common notions; before we be certain of the existence of a God, essentially good, who therefore cannot deceive. From whence it would follow, that neither Atheists, nor such Theists as assert an arbitrary Deity, can ever be certain of any thing; as that two and two are four. 98. However some appearance of piety in this assertion; yet is it a foundation of eternal scepticism, both as to all other things, and the existence of a God. That Cartesius here went round in a circle, proving the existence of a God from our faculties, and then the truth of our faculties from the existence of a God; and consequently proved nothing. If it be possible that our faculties might be false, then must we confess it possible that there may be no God; and consequently remain for ever sceptical about it. 99. Wherefore a necessity of exploding and confuting this new sceptical hypothesis, of the possibility of our faculties being so made, as to deceive us in all our clearest perceptions. Omnipotence itself cannot make any thing to be indifferently true or false. Truth not factitious. As to the universal theorems of abstract science, the measure of truth no foreign or extraneous thing, but only our own clear and distinct perception. Here whatsoever is clearly perceived, is; the very essence of truth, perceptibility. Granted by all, that there can be no false knowledge or understanding. The perception of the understanding never false, but only obscure. Not nature, that erreth in us, but we ourselves, in assenting to things not clearly perceived. Conclusion; that omnipotence cannot create any understanding faculties, so as to have as clear and distinct conceptions of all falsehoods and nonentities, as of truths; because whatsoever is clearly and distinctly perceived, hath therefore an entity; and omnipotence itself (to speak with reverence) cannot make nothing to be something, or something nothing. This no more, than that it cannot do things contradictious. Conception the measure of power. True, that sense as such is but fantastical and relative; and were there no other perception, all truth would be private, relative, and seeming, none absolute. This probably the reason, why some have suspected the same of knowledge also. But mind and understanding reaches beyond fancy and appearance, to the absoluteness of things. It hath the criterion of truth within itself. 100. Objected; that this an arrogance, for creatures to pretend to an absolute certainty of any thing. Answer; that God alone is ignorant of nothing, and infallible in all things: but no derogation from the Deity, to suppose, that he should make created minds such, as to have a certainty of something; as the whole to be greater than the part, and the like: since otherwise they would be but a mere mockery. Congruous to think, that God hath made men so, as that they may possibly attain to some certainty of his own existence. Origen, that knowledge is the only thing that hath certainty in it. 101. Having now some firm ground or footing to stand upon, a certainty of common notions, without which nothing could be proved by reason; we shall endeavour, by means hereof, to demonstrate the existence of a God from his idea. 102. Cartesius' undertaking to do this with mathematical evidence; as this idea includeth in it necessary existence. This argument hitherto not so successful, it being by many concluded to be a sophism. That we shall impartially set down all that we can, both for it and against it; leaving others to make a judgment. 103. First, against the Cartesian demonstration of a God. That because we can frame an idea of a necessarily existent being, it does not at all follow that it

is; since we can frame ideas of things that never were, nor will be. Nothing to be gathered from hence, but only that it is not impossible. Again, from this idea, including necessary existence, nothing else inferrible, but that what hath no necessary existence, is not perfect; and that if there be a perfect being, its existence always was, and will be necessary; but not absolutely that it doth exist. A fallacy, when from the necessity of existence affirmed only hypothetically, the conclusion is made absolutely. Though a perfect being must exist necessarily, yet not therefore follow, that it must and doth exist. The latter a thing indemonstrable. For the Cartesian demonstration of a God. As from the notion of a thing impossible, we conclude, that it never was nor will be; and of that, which hath a contingent schesis to existence, that it might be, or might not be; so from that, which hath necessary existence in its nature, that it actually is. The force of the argumentation not merely hypothetical, if there be a perfect Being, then is its existence necessary; because this supposes, that a necessary existent being is contingent to be, or not to be: which a contradiction. The absurdity of this will better appear, if, instead of necessary existence, we put in actual. No Theists can otherwise prove, that a God, though supposed to exist, might not happen by chance to be. Nevertheless God, or a perfect Being, not here demonstrated à priori, when from its own idea. The reader left to make a judgment. 104. A progymnasma, or prelusory attempt, towards the proving of a God from his idea, as including necessary existence. First, from our having an idea of a perfect being, implying no manner of contradiction in it, it follows, that such a thing is possible. And from that necessary existence included in this idea, added to the possibility thereof, it further follows that it actually is. A necessary existent being, if possible, is; because upon the supposition of its non-existence, it would be impossible for it ever to have been. Not so in contingent things. A perfect being is either impossible to have been, or else it is. Were God possible, and yet not, he would not be a necessary, but contingent being. However, no stress laid upon this. 105. Another plainer argument, for the existence of a God, from his Idea. Whatsoever we can frame an idea of in our minds, implying no contradiction, this either actually is, or else, if it be not, is possible to be. But if God be not, he is not possible to be. Therefore he is. The major before proved, that we cannot have an idea of any thing, which hath neither actual nor possible existence. 106. A further ratiocination from the idea of God, as including necessary existence, by certain steps. First, certain, that something or other did exist of itself from eternity, without beginning. Again, whatsoever did exist of itself from eternity, did so exist naturally and necessarily, and therefore there is a necessary existent Being. Thirdly, nothing could exist of itself from eternity naturally and necessarily, but what contained necessary self-existence in its nature. Lastly, a perfect Being, and nothing else, containeth necessary existence in its nature. Therefore it is. An Appendix to this argument; that no temporary successive being could be from eternity without beginning. This proved before. 107. Again, the controversy betwixt Atheists and Theists first clearly stated from the idea of God, and then satisfactorily decided. Premised; that as every thing was not made, so neither was every thing unmade. Atheists agree in both. The state of the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists; whether that, which being itself unmade, was the cause of all other things made, were the most perfect, or the most imperfect being. A certain kind of Atheistic Theism, or Theogonism, which acknowledging a God, or soul of the world, presiding over the whole, sup-

posed him, notwithstanding, to have emerged out of Night and Chaos; that is, to have been generated out of senseless matter. 108. The controversy thus stated easily decided. Certain, that lesser perfection may be derived from greater, or from that which is absolutely perfect; but impossible, that greater perfection, and higher degrees of entity, should rise out of lesser and lower. Things did not ascend, but descend. That life and sense may naturally rise from the mere modification of dead and senseless matter, as also reason and understanding from sense; the philosophy of the kingdom of darkness. The Hylozoists so sensible of this, that there must be some substantial unmade life and understanding; that atheizing, they thought it necessary to attribute life and understanding to all matter, as such. This argument a demonstration of the impossibility of atheism. 109. The controversy again more particularly stated, from the idea of God, as including mind and understanding in it; viz. whether all mind were made or generated out of senseless matter; or whether there were an eternal unmade mind the maker of all. This the doctrine of Theists, that Mind the oldest of all things; of Atheists, that it is a post-nate thing, younger than the world, and an umbratile image of real beings. 110. The controversy thus stated again decided. Though it does not follow, that if once there had been no corporeal world or matter, there could never have been any; yet it is certain, that if once there had been no life nor mind, there could have never been any life or mind. Our imperfect minds, not of themselves from eternity, and therefore derived from a perfect unmade mind. 111. That Atheists think their chief strength to lie here, in their disproving a God, from the nature of understanding and knowledge. According to them, things made knowledge, and not knowledge things. All mind and understanding the creature of sensibles, and a fantastic image of them; and therefore no mind their creator. Thus does a modern writer conclude, that knowledge and understanding is not to be attributed to God, because it implieth dependence upon things without; which is all one, as if he should have said, that senseless matter is the more perfect of all things, and the highest Numen. 112. A compendious confutation of the premised atheistic principles. Knowledge not the activity of sensibles upon the knower, and his passion. Sensible things themselves not known by the passion, or fancy of sense. Knowledge not from the force of the thing known, but of the knower. Besides phantasms of singular bodies, intelligible ideas universal. A late atheistic paradox, that universals nothing but names. Axiomatical truths in abstract sciences no passion from bodies by sense, nor yet gathered by induction from many singulars; we at once perceiving it impossible that they should be otherwise. An ingenious observation of Aristotle's, that could it be perceived by sense, the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right; yet would not this be science, or knowledge properly so called: which is of universals first, and from thence descends to singulars. 113. Again, we have conceptions of things incorporeal, as also of such corporeals as never did exist, and whose accuracy sense could not reach to; as a perfect straight line, and plain superficies, an exact triangle, circle, or sphere. That we have a power of framing ideas of things, that never were nor will be, but only possible. Inferred from hence, that human science itself, not the mere image and creature of singular sensibles, but proleptical to them, and in order of nature before them. But since there must be *νοητὸν* before *νοῦς*, "intelligibles" before "intellection;" the only true account of knowledge and its original is from a perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own power, or the possibilities of all

things, their relations and immutable truths. And of this one perfect mind all imperfect minds partake. Knowledge therefore, in the nature of it, supposeth the existence of a perfect omnipotent Being, as its νοητὸν, or "intelligible." This comprehending itself, the first original knowledge, a mind before the world, and all sensibles, not ectypal, but archetypal, and the framer of all. Wherefore not atheism, but theism, demonstrable from knowledge and understanding. This further confirmed from hence; because there are eternal verities, such as were never made, nor had any beginning. That the diagonal of a square incommensurable to the sides, an eternal truth to Aristotle, Justin Martyr's *αἰώνια δίκαια*, or "eternal morals," geometrical truths, not made by any man's thinking, but before all men; as also before the world and matter itself. 114. Now if there be eternal verities, the simple reasons and intelligible essences of things must needs be eternal likewise. These called by Plato things, that always are, but were never made, ingenerable and incorruptible. However Aristotle quarrels with Plato's ideas, yet does he also agree with him in this, that the forms or species of things were eternal, and never made; and that there is no generation of them; and that there are other things besides sensibles, the immutable objects of science. Certain, that there could be no immutable science, were there no other objects of the mind, but sensibles. The objects of geometrical science no material triangles, squares, &c. these, by Aristotle, said to be no where. The intelligible natures of things to Philo, the most necessary essences. 115. Now if there be eternal truths, and intelligibles, whose existence also is necessary; since these can be no where but in a mind; there must be an eternal necessarily existing mind, comprehending all these ideas and truths at once, or being them. Which no other than the mind of a perfect, omnipotent Being, comprehending itself, and all possibilities of things, the extent of its own power. 116. Wherefore there can be but one only original mind; which all other minds partake of. Hence ideas, or notions exactly alike in several men; and truths indiviaibly the same: because their minds all stamped with the same original seal. Themistius; that one man could not teach another, were there not the same notion both in the learner and teacher. Nor could men confer together, as they do, were they not one Mind, that all partaked of. That anti-monarchial opinion, of many understanding beings eternal and independent, confuted. And now have we not only asserted the idea of a God, and confuted all the atheistic pretences against it; but also, from this idea, demonstrated his existence.

HAVING in the second chapter revealed all the dark mysteries of atheism, and produced the utmost strength of that cause; and in the third made an introduction to the confutation of those atheistic grounds, by representing all the several forms and schemes of atheism, and showing both their disagreements amongst themselves, and wherein they all agree together against Theists; we have been hitherto prevented of that full and copious confutation of them intended by us, by reason of that large account given of the pagan polytheism: which yet was no impertinent digression neither, it removing the grand objection against the naturality of the idea of God, as including oneliness in it; as also preparing a way for that defence of Christianity

edsigned by us against Atheists. Wherefore that we may not here be quite excluded of what was principally intended, we shall subjoin a contracted and compendious confutation of all the premised atheistic principles. The *first* whereof was this, that either men have no idea of God at all, or else none but such as is compounded and made up of impossible and contradictious notions; from whence these Atheists would infer him to be an *inconceivable nothing.* In answer whereunto, there hath been something done already, it being declared in the beginning of the fourth chapter, what the idea of God is, viz. a perfect understanding nature, necessarily self-existent, and the cause of all other things. And as there is nothing either inconceivable, or contradictious in this idea, so have we showed, that these confounded Atheists do not only, at the same time when they verbally deny an idea of God, implicitly acknowledge and confess it, forasmuch as otherwise, denying his existence, they should deny the existence of nothing; but also that they agree with Theists in this very idea; it being the only thing which Atheists contend for, that the first original and head of all things is no perfect understanding nature, but that all sprung from Tohu and Bohu, or dark and senseless matter fortuitously moved. Moreover, we have not only thus declared the idea of God, but also largely proved, and made it clearly evident, that the generality of mankind in all ages have had a prolepsis or anticipation in their minds concerning the real and actual existence of such a being; the Pagans themselves, besides their other many gods (which were understanding beings superior to men), acknowledging one chief and sovereign Numen, the Maker of them all, and of the whole world. From whence it plainly appears, that those few Atheists, that formerly have been, and still are, here and there up and down in the world, are no other than the monsters and anomalies of human kind. And this alone might be sufficient to repel the first atheistic assault made against the idea of God.

Nevertheless, that we may not seem to dissemble any of the Atheists' strength, we shall here particularly declare all their most colourable pretences against the idea of God, and then show the folly and invalidity of them. Which pretences are as follow: first, *That we have no idea nor thought of any thing not subject to corporeal sense; nor the least evidence of the existence of any thing, but from the same.* Secondly, *That Theists themselves, acknowledging God to be incomprehensible, he may be from thence inferred to be a nonentity.* Thirdly, *That the Theists' idea of God including infinity in it, is therefore absolutely inconceivable and impossible.* Fourthly, *That theology is an arbitrarious compilement of inconsistent and contradictious notions.* And lastly, *That the idea and existence of God owes all its being, either to the confounded*

nonsense of astonished minds, or else to the fiction and imposture of politicians.

We begin with the first; that we can have no idea, conception, or thought of any thing, not subject to sense; nor the least evidence of the existence of any thing, but from the same. Thus a modern atheistic writer:[1] "Whatsoever we can conceive, hath been perceived first by sense, either at once or in parts; and a man can have no thought representing any thing not subject to sense." From whence it follows, that whatsoever is not sensible and imaginable, is utterly inconceivable, and to us nothing. Moreover, the same writer adds: "That the only evidence[2] which we have of the existence of any thing, is from sense;" the consequence whereof is this, that there being no corporeal sense[3] of a Deity, there can be no evidence at all of

[1] He means Hobbes, whose words here quoted are to be found in the Leviathan, part 1, on Man, chap. 1. p. 3. But I wish it here to be observed, that Cudworth is accustomed commonly to quote Hobbes' words translated into English, and does not render them literally, but often explains them somewhat freely, and also at times joins together words written by him in different places. Whence it happens (more especially since he does not point out the exact passages in Hobbes' books) that I have spent much labour in searching for them, and have sometimes even doubted which of several passages similar to each other was most accordant with the English words. What is here quoted by Cudworth runs thus in English:—"Whatsoever we can conceive hath been perceived by sense, either at once or in parts: and a man can have no thought representing anything not subject to sense." I find nothing in Hobbes more exactly correspondent to this than what I have here produced: Nulla est animi conceptio, quæ non fuerat anteà genita in aliquo sensuum, vel tota simul, vel per partes. Ab his autem primis conceptibus omnes postea derivantur. A similar passage is to be found chap. 3. p. 9: Ut nullam habemus imaginationem, quæ non antè fuit in sensione, vel tota, vel per partes; ita nulla est transitio ab unà cogitatione ad aliam, cujus similis non extiterat antè in sensione. "That we have no imagination (or idea) which was not previously in the sensation, either whole or in parts; so that there is no transition from one thought to another, the like of which had not before existed in sensation." In chap. 2. p. 5. he thus speaks: Imaginatio earum rerum tantùm est, quas antè simul vel per partes sensù perceperimus, "Imagination is only of those things which we have before perceived by sense, either at once or in parts." Hobbes gives so wide a meaning to the word *imaginatio*, as to comprehend under it that power of understanding and forming ideas which is found in the human mind. Imaginatio, says he, Leviathan, chap. 2. p. 8. quæ in homine a sermone vel aliis signis voluntariis nascitur, appellatur intellectus, "The *imagination* which is produced in man by discourse or other voluntary signs is called understanding."

[2] These words I cannot find in Hobbes' Latin works. I have therefore translated them myself from the English, almost word for word.

[3] I almost think that the admirers of Hobbes, who will not allow that he was among the deniers of a Supreme Deity, will have some objections to make to what is here stated. 1. Hobbes teaches that all the ideas that are in our minds arise from some one of the senses, and that what cannot be perceived by the senses is a nonentity. Many passages of his place this beyond a doubt. But from this tenet it does not immediately follow that God does not exist; but all that can be fairly drawn from it is that he who enforced it either altogether abrogated the divine nature, or imagined to himself a God perceptible to the senses, that is, a corporeal Deity. Hobbes certainly did the latter, and professes his belief in a Deity furnished with a very ethereal body. See Leviathan, part 1. on Man, chap. 12. p. 66. part 3. chap. 34. p. 184. and also in the Appendix to the Leviathan, chap. 1. p. 345. 2. It is also true that Hobbes has declared that all the evidence we have of any existence arises from the senses. But those who favour him will again deny that from this it can be inferred that the existence of the Deity is not admitted by him, or the reality of a great Supreme placed by

his existence. Wherefore, according to the tenor of the atheistic philosophy, all is resolved into sense, as the only criterion of truth, accordingly as Protagoras in Plato's Theætetus[4] concludes "knowledge to be sense;" and a late writer of our own determines "sense to be original knowledge."[5] Here have we a wide ocean before us, but we must contract our sails. Were sense knowledge and understanding, then he that sees light and colours, and feels heat and cold, would understand light and colours, heat and cold, and the like of all other sensible things: neither would there be any philosophy at all concerning them. Whereas the mind of man remaineth altogether unsatisfied, concerning the nature of these corporeal things, even after the strongest sensations of them, and is but thereby awakened to a further philosophic inquiry and search about them, what this light and colours, this heat and cold, &c. really should be; and whether they be indeed qualities in the objects without us, or only phantasms and sensations in ourselves. Now it is certain, that there could be no suspicion of any such thing as this, were sense the highest faculty in us; neither can sense itself ever decide this controversy; since one sense cannot judge of another or correct the error of it; all sense, as such (that is, as fancy and apparition) being alike true. And had not these Atheists been notorious dunces in that atomic philosophy which they so much pretend to, they would clearly have learned from thence, that sense is not knowledge and understanding, nor the criterion of truth as to sensible things themselves; it reaching not to the

him among doubtful questions. That though the very nature of God does not meet our senses, but escapes our sight, still that all knowledge of the Deity may in a certain manner be said to proceed from the senses, because from a contemplation of the divine works which are exposed to our senses we attain to a knowledge of their author, that is, God; and that therefore he who shall declare that our senses alone make known God to us is not to be accounted altogether absurd and irrational, provided only he rightly understand this; though at the same time by this opinion he may entirely disallow that idea of God which we call interior and innate. Certainly Hobbes has expressed his own opinion in this way. "The knowledge," says he, Leviathan, part 1. chap. 12. p. 55. "of one eternal, infinite, omnipotent Deity, may more easily be gathered from an investigation of the causes, powers, and operations of natural bodies than from an anxiety about futurity."

[4] Page 118. Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε, πάντων χρήματων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων, ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστι, "Protagoras said that man is the measure of all things, of existences as they are, of nonexistences as they are not." Socrates explains the force and meaning of this saying in the same place: Δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ὁ ἐπίσταμενός τι αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο, ὃ ἐπίσταται· καὶ ὥς γε νυνὶ φαίνεται, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἴσθησις, "It appears to me that whatever any one knows, he perceives by sense what he knows; and, as it now appears, knowledge is nothing else than sensible perception."

[5] The English words are: "Sense to be original knowledge." I suspect that some passage of this kind is found among the writings of Sir Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam, of whose piety towards God Cudworth had but a poor opinion. But Bacon's doctrine concerning sense was very different from Hobbes' opinion, as appears from his *Novum Organon Scientiarum*, in which he sometimes refutes those who say that "sense is the measure of things." See p. 44. and elsewhere.

essence or absolute nature of them, but only taking notice of their outside, and perceiving its own passions from them, rather the things themselves: and that there is a higher faculty in the soul, of reason and understanding, which judges of sense; detects the phantastry and imposture of it; discovers to us that there is nothing in the objects themselves like to those forementioned sensible ideas; and resolves all sensible things into intelligible principles; the ideas whereof are not foreign and adventitious, and mere passive impressions upon the soul from without, but native and domestic to it, or actively exerted from the soul itself; no passion being able to make a judgment either of itself or other things. This is a thing so evident, that Democritus himself could not but take notice of it, and acknowledge it, though he made not a right use thereof; he, in all probability, continuing notwithstanding a confounded and besotted Atheist; Sextus Empiricus having recorded this of him:[6] Ἐν τοῖς κανόσι δύο φησὶν εἶναι γνώσεις, τὴν μέν διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῆς διανοίας· ὧν τὴν μὲν διὰ τῆς διανοίας γνῶσιν κατάγει, προσμαρτυρῶν αὐτῇ τὸ πιστὸν εἰς ἀληθείας κρίσιν, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων σκοτίην ὀνομάζει, ἀφαιρούμενος αὐτῆς τὸ πρὸς διάγνωσιν τοῦἀ ληθοῦς ἀπλανές· λέγει δὲ κατὰ λέξιν, Γνώμης δὲ δύο εἰσὶν ἰδέαι· ἡ μὲν γνησίη· ἡ δὲ σκοτίη· καὶ σκοτίης μὲν, τάδε σύμπαντα, ὄψις, ἀκοὴ, ὀδμὴ, γεῦσις, ψεῦσις· ἡ δὲ γνησίη ἀποκεκρυμμένη δὲ ταύτης, "Democritus in his Canons affirmeth, that there are two kinds of knowledges, one by the senses, and another by the mind. Of which that by the mind is only accounted knowledge, he bearing witness to the faithfulness and firmness thereof for the judgment of truth. The other by the senses he calleth dark, denying it to be a rule and measure of truth. His own words are these: There are two species of knowledge, the one genuine, the other dark and obscure. The dark and obscure knowledge is seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching. But the genuine knowledge is another more hidden and recondite." To which purpose there is another fragment also of this Democritus preserved by the same Sextus:[7] Νόμῳ γλυκὺ, καὶ νόμῳ πικρὸν, νόμῳ θερμὸν, νόμῳ ψυχρόν· νόμῳ χροιή· αἰτία δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν· ὅπερ νομίζεται μὲν εἶναι καὶ δοξάζεται τὰ αἰσθητὰ, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ταῦτα, "Bitter and sweet, hot and cold, are only in opinion or fancy. Colour is only in opinion; atoms and vacuum alone in truth and reality. That which is thought to be, are sensibles; but these are not according to truth, but atoms and vacuum only." Now the chief ground of this rational discovery of the ancient atomists, that sensible things, as heat and cold, bitter and sweet, red and green, are no

[6] Lib. 7. advers. Mathemat. sect. 138. 139. page 400.
[7] Id. ibid. sect. 135. page 399.

real qualities in the objects without, but only our own fancies, was because in body there are no such things intelligible, but only magnitude, figure, site, motion and rest. Of which we have not only sensible ideas, passively impressed upon us from without, but also intelligible notions, actively exerted from the mind itself. Which latter notwithstanding, because they are not unaccompanied with sensible phantasms, are by many unskilfully confounded with them. But besides these, we have other intelligible notions, or ideas also, which have no genuine phantasms at all belonging to them. Of which whosoever doubts, may easily be satisfied and convinced, by reading but a sentence or two, that he understands, in any book almost, that shall come next to his hand; and reflexively examining himself, whether he have a phantasm, or sensible idea, belonging to every word, or no. For whoever is modest and ingenuous, will quickly be forced to confess, that he meets with many words, which though they have a sense or intelligible notion, yet have no genuine phantasm belonging to them. And we have known some, who were confidently engaged in the other opinion, being put to read the beginning of Tully's Offices, presently nonplussed and confounded in that first word quanquam; they being neither able to deny, but that there was a sense belonging to it, nor yet to affirm, that they had any phantasm thereof, save only of the sound or letters. But to prove, that there are cogitations not subject to corporeal sense, we need go no further than this very idea or description of God; a substance absolutely perfect, infinitely good, wise and powerful, necessarily self-existent, and the cause of all other things. Where there is not one word unintelligible to him, that hath any understanding in him, and yet no considerative and ingenuous person can pretend, that he hath a genuine phantasm, or sensible idea, answering to any one of those words, either to substance, or to absolutely perfect, or to infinitely, or to good, or to wise, or to powerful, or to necessity, or to self-existence, or to cause; or indeed to all, or other, or things. Wherefore it is nothing but want of meditation, together with a fond and sottish dotage upon corporeal sense, which hath so far imposed upon some, as to make them believe, that they have not the least cogitation of any thing not subject to corporeal sense; or that there is nothing in human understanding or conception which was not first in bodily sense; a doctrine highly favourable to atheism. But since it is certain, on the contrary, that we have many thoughts not subject to sense, it is manifest, that whatsoever falls not under external sense, is not therefore inconceivable and nothing. Which whosoever asserts, must needs affirm life and cogitation itself, knowledge or understanding, reason and memory, volition and appetite, things of the greatest moment and reality, to be nothing

but mere words without any signification. Nay, fancy and sense itself, upon this hypothesis, could hardly escape from becoming nonentities too, forasmuch as neither fancy nor sense falls under sense, but only the objects of them; we neither seeing vision, nor feeling taction, nor hearing audition, much less hearing sight, or seeing taste, or the like. Wherefore though God should be never so much corporeal, as some Theists have conceived him to be; yet since the chief of his essence, and as it were his inside, must by these be acknowledged to consist in mind, wisdom, and understanding, he could not possibly, as to this, fall under corporeal sense (sight or touch) any more than thought can. But that there is substance incorporeal also, and therefore in itself altogether insensible, and that the Deity is such is demonstrated elsewhere.

We grant indeed, that the evidence of particular bodies, existing hic et nunc, without us, doth necessarily depend upon the information of sense; but yet nevertheless, the certainty of this very evidence is not from sense alone, but from a complication of reason and understanding together with it. Were sense the only evidence of things, there could be no absolute truth and falsehood, nor certainty at all of any thing; sense, as such, being only relative to particular persons, seeming and fantastical, and obnoxious to much delusion. For if our nerves and brain be inwardly so moved and affected, as they would be by such an object present, when indeed it is absent, and no other motion or sensation in the mean time prevail against it and obliterate it; then must that object of necessity seem to us present. Moreover, those imaginations that spring and bubble from the soul itself, are commonly taken for sensations by us when asleep, and sometimes in melancholic and fanciful persons also, when awake. That atheistic principle, that there is no evidence at all of any thing as existing, but only from corporeal sense, is plainly contradicted by the atomic Atheists themselves, when they assert atoms and vacuum to be the principles of all things, and the exuvious images of bodies to be the causes both of sight and cogitation: for single atoms, and those exuvious images, were never seen nor felt; and vacuum, or empty space, is so far from being sensible, that these Atheists themselves allow it to be the one only incorporeal. Wherefore they must here go beyond the ken of sense, and appeal to reason only for the existence of these principles: as Protagoras, one of them, in Plato, professedly doth:* Ἄθρει περισκοπῶν μή τις τῶν ἀμυήτων ἐπακούῃ· εἰσὶ δὲ οὗτοι, οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο οἰόμενοι εἶναι, ἢ οὗ ἂν δύνωνται ἁπτὴ ταῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι, πᾶν τὸ ἀόρατον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι, ὡρ ἐν οὐσίας μέρει, "Have a care, that none of the profane and uninitiated in

* Theæt. p. 155. Steph.

the mysteries overhear you. By the profane, I mean (saith he) those who think nothing to exist but what they can feel with their fingers, and exclude all that is invisible out of the rank of being." Were existence to be allowed to nothing, that doth not fall under corporeal sense, then must we deny the existence of soul and mind in ourselves and others, because we can neither feel nor see any such thing. Whereas we are certain of the existence of our own souls, partly from an inward consciousness of our own cogitations, and partly from that principle of reason, that nothing cannot act. And the existence of other individual souls is manifest to us, from their effects upon their respective bodies, their motions, actions, and discourse. Wherefore since the Atheists cannot deny the existence of soul or mind in men, though no such thing fall under external sense, they have as little reason to deny the existence of a perfect mind, presiding over the universe, without which it cannot be conceived whence our imperfect ones should be derived. The existence of that God, whom no eye hath seen nor can see, is plainly proved by reason[8] from his effects, in the visible phenomena of the universe, and from what we are conscious of within ourselves.

[8] No one, I think, will deny, that much has been here well and acutely said by this learned man against those who measure all knowledge and human understanding by sense. But I am almost inclined to think, that the point in dispute is not explained with sufficient aptitude and accuracy, and that many things are confounded together which, in my opinion, had better have been kept distinct. For this great man sometimes seems as if he disputed against those who will have all the existing universe to be corporeal; of which opinion indeed was Hobbes, whom he principally opposes. Sometimes he uses arguments applicable only to those who maintain, that no idea can be formed in our minds excepting of corporeal existences; and these, indeed, he reduces to the last push. But sometimes he seems to have to do with those who contend that all our inward ideas are primarily derived from the assistance of our senses, but are afterwards cherished, strengthened, increased, and amplified by reflection. But it is proper, in my opinion, carefully to distinguish these three things, lest what ought to separated should be confounded, and an injury should be done to those who are not plainly ill-intentioned.

Those who hold the *first* of these opinions, and assert the whole universe to be corporeal, must admit that knowledge is nothing else than sense, or that we have no entire and true ideas, properly so called, of any other than corporeal objects. But they must (1.) at the same time, unless they are far gone in folly, allow to our minds a power of understanding and judging, an ability to connect and separate ideas, nor can they deny that, by the assistance of this faculty and the help of the imagination, a man can form in his mind and can make use of abstract ideas of things. Thus they must admit, that by the power of thought figures can be disjoined from the things to which they belong, affections and powers from the things and persons in which they inhere, and can be treated of in the same manner as if they had a separate existence. Certain it is, that whenever any one treats, teaches, and disputes about any thing whatsoever, he must have some idea of it formed in his mind. But Hobbes, though he avers that all things are corporeal, subtlely reasons concerning geometrical figures, and in the Leviathan itself copiously explains the nature of the imagination, the memory, virtues, and vices; which he could not by any possibility have done unless he were sure that the mind could form abstract ideas of things, and subject these to contemplation and discussion in the same manner as real existences. From which it is evident, that he who asserts that no perfect ideas of any other than corporeal objects exist in our minds, does not on that account abrogate and deny all rational mental ideas. 2. The same persons will not disallow the existence of some very

The second pretence of Atheists against the idea of God, and consequently his existence, is, because Theists themselves acknowledging God to be incomprehensible, it may be from thence

subtle bodies which escape the power and penetration of all our senses, and can be known by us in no other way than by their effects. There can be no doubt that Hobbes entertained this view; nor do I think there is any one, ancient or modern, among those who have confined universal existence to corporeality, but what has been of the same opinion. But they will not deny that we have some idea though perhaps an imperfect one, of these more subtle bodies. For who will say, that we have in us no form or image whatever of a thing we certainly know to exist? It is therefore further evident, that by this class of reasoners a power is granted to our minds of imagining and forming an idea of things which affect none of our senses, and whose existence is known only by reasoning. Those who rightly weigh this will perceive, I think, that much is said by Dr. Cudworth here which does not bear on Hobbes and his friends. They will say that the idea of a powerful, able, learned man, is an adventitious thing drawn from external objects, and brought by the senses into the mind; and that this is no reason why our minds should not collect together all the visible effects of power, and form for themselves an idea of power abstracted from man, which may afterwards be copiously reflected upon and discussed.

Those who entertain the *second* opinion, and allow of no internal images of any but corporeal existences, are pressed by so many arguments of our author, that what they can object I do not understand. But I have for a long time doubted whether any wise man ever did hold this opinion. Certain I am, that many of those who have had this sentiment ascribed to them, have differed rather in words than in reality from those who think otherwise. Those who seem to favour this doctrine either deny that any thing except corporealities exists, or they admit of some natures destitute of all bodily substance. If they intend the *former*, they will still allow (to give one example out of many), that there is in mankind an invisible power of reasoning and judging; that they understand the nature of this power from its effects, and hence can form some idea of it in their minds. But if they grant this, they will at the same time concede that there may be and exist in us the forms and representations of things which our senses cannot realize. If, however, they approve of the *latter* supposition, and will not deny that there are other natures than corporeal in the universe, I cannot at all imagine how they can affirm that there are no ideas in our minds excepting of corporeal objects. To speak candidly, I fear that most of those who dispute whether or not there are any ideas in our minds of aught else than corporeal things, only disagree because they do not both assign the same meaning to the words *notion* and *idea*. Those who deny that we have any other than corporeal ideas, seem to understand by the word *notion* or *idea*, a full and complete representation of something actually having an external existence. If this be the case, their meaning will be this: that we have in us no real representations and perfect images of any thing but what affects the senses, or is corporeal. This opinion, however, does not prevent their granting that other notions (though imperfect and incomplete) may be formed and imagined of other things, which do not meet our senses. But they who maintain that there are in our minds ideas of other than corporeal existences, assign a wider meaning to the word *notion*, *idea*, or *image*, and intend by it, every form that can be framed by the mind, and every mental conception of whatever sort it be. If this conjecture of mine be incorrect, it will at least admonish those who enter into controversy on subjects of this nature, that above all things the words they wish to use should be defined and restricted within their own limits before commencing the discussion.

The *third* opinion, namely, of those who consider that all ideas proceed primarily from the senses, and are afterwards amplified by reasoning, is also here confuted by Dr. Cudworth, though in rather a covert and obscure manner. For since he follows the doctrines of the Platonists, and makes no doubt but that by our very nature we have innate and internal forms and representations of many things, it was impossible but that he should repudiate and reject this opinion. It is however plain, that those who favour this sentiment are not so utterly devoid of reason as to assert all knowledge to be nothing else than sense. For although they think that our senses give rise to all the knowledge we have, yet they do not therefore assert that we have no ideas except of objects coming under the cognizance of our senses. Which if indeed they affirmed,

inferred that he is a nonentity. Which argumentation of the Atheists supposes these two things: first, that what is incomprehensible is altogether inconceivable; and then, that what is inconceivable is nothing. The latter of which two, perhaps, may be granted to them, that what is so utterly inconceivable, as that no man can frame any manner of idea or conception of it, is therefore either in itself, or at least to us, nothing. Because, though that o Protagoras be not true, in his sense:* Πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων, ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, "That man is the measure of all things, either as existing or not existing;" he meaning indeed nothing else thereby, but that there was no absolute truth or falsehood of any thing, but all was relative to particular persons, and fantastical or seeming only. And though it must not be granted, that whatsoever any man's shallow understanding cannot easily and fully comprehend, is therefore presently to be expunged out of the catalogue of beings; which is the reason, or rather infidelity of the Anti-trinitarians; yet is there notwithstanding some truth in that of Aristotle, that ψυχή πως πάντα, "the rational soul or mind is in a manner all things;" it being able to frame some idea and conception or other of whatsoever is in the nature of things, and hath either an actual or possible existence, from the very highest to the lowest. Mind and understanding is, as it were, a diaphanous and crystaline globe, or a kind of notional world, which hath some reflex image, and correspondent ray, or representation in it, to whatsoever is in the true and real world of being. And upon this account may it be said, that whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely inconceivable, is indeed a nonentity.

But the former is absolutely denied by us, that whatsoever is incomprehensible is inconceivable; and therefore when we affirm, that God is incomprehensible, our meaning is only this, that our imperfect minds cannot have such a conception of his nature, as doth perfectly master, conquer, and subdue that vast object under it; or at least is so fully adequate and commensurate to the same, as that it doth every way match and equalize

they would overthrow their own tenets, and destroy that empire of reason to which they ascribe so much.

None of these opinions, I must ingenuously confess, seems to me to be of such a nature that no one can embrace it without being an enemy to God and to all religion. Those who conclude the whole universe to be corporeal, and maintain that none but bodily substances exist, will perhaps be rash enough to affirm, that God himself is partaker of some kind of body, though perhaps a most subtle one; which indeed Hobbes, and many others better than he, have done. The same may be said of the second sect, if indeed such a sect ever existed. But the third opinion has been embraced by so many able and worthy men, who have in several other ways testified their piety towards God, that it seems to me highly unjust indiscriminately to reckon among Atheists all those who believe that the whole of human knowledge has its origin in corporeal existences.

* Plato Theæt. [p. 118.]

it. Now it doth not at all follow from hence, because God is thus incomprehensible to our finite and narrow understandings, that he is utterly inconceivable by them, so that they cannot frame any idea at all of him, and he may therefore be concluded to be a non-entity. For it is certain, that we cannot fully comprehend ourselves, and that we have not such an adequate and comprehensive knowledge of the essence of any substantial thing, as that we can perfectly master and conquer it. It was a truth, though abused by the sceptics, that there is ἀκατάληπτόν τι, "something incomprehensible" in the essence of the lowest substances. For even body itself which the Atheists think themselves so well acquainted with, because they can feel it with their fingers, and which is the only substance that they acknowledge either in themselves or the universe, hath such puzzling difficulties and entanglements in the speculation of it, that they can never be able to extricate themselves from. We might instance also in some accidental things, as time and motion. Truth is bigger than our minds, and we are not the same with it, but have a lower participation only of the intellectual nature, and are rather apprehenders than comprehenders thereof. This is indeed one badge of our creaturely state, that we have not a perfectly comprehensive knowledge, or such as is adequate and commensurate to the essences of things; from whence we ought to be led to this acknowledgment, that there is another perfect Mind or understanding Being above us in the universe, from which our imperfect minds were derived, and upon which they do depend. Wherefore, if we can have no idea or conception of any thing, whereof we have not a full and perfect comprehension, then can we not have an idea or conception of the nature of any substance. But though we do not comprehend all truth, as if our mind were above it, or master of it, and cannot penetrate into, and look quite through the nature of every thing, yet may rational souls frame certain ideas and conceptions, of whatsoever is in the orb of being proportionate to their own nature, and sufficient for their purpose. And though we cannot fully comprehend the Deity, nor exhaust the infiniteness of its perfection, yet may we have an idea or conception of a Being absolutely perfect; such a one as is nostro modulo conformis, "agreeable and proportionate to our measure and scantling;" as we may approach near to a mountain, and touch it with our hands, though we cannot encompass it all round, and enclasp it within our arms. Whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely inconceivable, is nothing; but not whatsoever is not fully comprehensible by our imperfect understandings.

It is true indeed, that the Deity is more incomprehensible to us than any thing else whatsoever, which proceeds from the fulness of its being and perfection, and from the transcendency

of its brightness; but, for the very same reason may it be said also, in some sense, that it is more knowable and conceivable than any thing. As the sun, though, by reason of its excéssive splendour, it dazzle our weak sight, yet it is notwithstanding far more visible also, than any of the nebulosæ stellæ, "the small misty stars." Where there is more of light there is more of visibility; so where there is more of entity, reality, and perfection, there is there more of conceptibility and cognoscibility; such an object filling up the mind more, and acting more strongly upon it. Nevertheless, because our weak and imperfect minds are lost in the vast immensity and redundancy of the Deity, and overcome with its transcendent light and dazzling brightness, therefore hath it to us an appearance of darkness and incomprehensibility; as the unbounded expansion of light, in the clear transparent ether, hath to us the apparition of an azure obscurity; which yet is not an absolute thing in itself, but only relative to our sense, and a mere fancy in us.

The incomprehensibility of the Deity is so far from being an argument against the reality of its existence, as that it is most certain on the contrary, that were there nothing incomprehensible to us, who are but contemptible pieces, and small atoms of the universe; were there no other being in the world, but what our finite and imperfect understandings could span or fathom, and encompass round about, look through and through, have a commanding view of, and perfectly conquer and subdue under them; then there could be nothing absolutely and infinitely perfect, that is, no God. For though that of Empedocles be not true in a literal sense, as it seems to have been taken by Aristotle:[9] Γαίᾳ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν, &c. "That by earth we see earth, by water water, and by fire fire; and understand every thing by something of the same within ourselves:" yet is it certain, that every thing is apprehended by some internal congruity in that which apprehends, which perhaps was the sense intended by that noble philosophic poet. Wherefore it cannot possibly otherwise be, but that the finiteness, scantness, and imperfection of our narrow understandings must make them asymmetral, or incommensurate, to that which is absolutely and infinitely perfect.

And nature itself plainly intimates to us, that there is some such absolutely perfect Being, which, though not inconceivable, yet is incomprehensible to our finite understandings, by certain passions which it hath implanted in us, that otherwise would want an object to display themselves upon; namely, those of devout veneration, adoration, and admiration, together with a kind of ecstasy and pleasing horror; which, in the silent language of nature, seem to speak thus much to us, that there is some object in the world, so much bigger and vaster than our mind

[9] De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 3. tom. 2. opp.

and thoughts, that it is the very same to them that the ocean is to narrow vessels; so that when they have taken into themselves as much as they can thereof by contemplation, and filled up all their capacity, there is still an immensity of it left without, which cannot enter in for want of room to receive it, and therefore must be apprehended after some other strange and more mysterious manner, viz. by their being as it were plunged into it, and swallowed up or lost in it.[10] To conclude, the Deity is indeed incomprehensible to our finite and imperfect understandings, but not inconceivable; and therefore there is no ground at all for this atheistic pretence, to make it a nonentity.[1]

[10] I. What is here observed by our learned author respecting the testimony of our secret passions of the mind to the being of a God, though true, seems not sufficiently calculated for refuting the madness of Atheists. For in this method of argumentation he begs the question, and takes for granted, that there are in us certain innate ideas, and that these are given us by nature with a specific design. If this were conceded by those who deny the existence of a Deity, they would contradict themselves, and at once confess that existence of God which they disallow. But those who are averse to the admission of the divine existence, pertinaciously deny that the case is thus, and contend that these passions are the results of opinions and sentiments inculcated into us from early infancy. But to draw arguments from premises to which the opponents deny all authority, is to act contrary to reason, and to violate the laws of controversy. II. What he adds respecting the mind of man and the Deity mutually absorbing each other, savours of the Platonic school, and is not sufficiently clear for general comprehension. The Platonists, to whose works Dr. Cudworth was much addicted, are accustomed, when they treat theologically of the Deity, to use many such forms of speech, which, by an appearance of sublimity, strongly affect the mind. But if they be more accurately examined, they give rise to such confused ideas that their authors seem not to understand their own meaning. Indeed, I think it greatly preferable clearly to explain the sensations of one's own mind, than by figurative expressions of this kind to give occasion of error to those who labour under a certain superfertility of imagination.

[1] That among the number of those who have thought there was no God, there are and have been some who have disputed as foolishly as they are here supposed to do by our learned author, I will not deny; but I have myself met with no one expressly using this argument against the divine existence, as it is here set forth. There are, besides Dr. Cudworth, several respectable and learned men who recount this very argument as among the first and principal reasons of the Atheists; to all whom I think it rash to refuse confidence. See John Francis Buddeus' Theses de Atheismo et Superstitione, cap. 6. p. 512. and Peter Poiret's Cogitationes Rationales de Deo, Animâ, et Malo, lib. 3. cap. 6. But an adherent of that party encountered me a few years since, who, as he seemed to himself to be acute, and to excel his associates in ability, not only felt the want of many things in the reasonings of his own partizans, but also complained, that the defenders of a supreme Deity did not always bring to the controversy all the candour that was requisite. He confidently denied that this argument, of which we are now speaking, was rightly explained by those who advocate the existence of God, and also that there were any, at least of the more intelligent of his own persuasion, who made use of it as it is explained by those on our side. He granted that no rational person could reason thus: Whatever cannot be in all its parts conceived of by our minds is nothing and non-existent; for that the internal nature of innumerable things is unknown to us, the existence of which nevertheless can be denied by no one who would not be thought mad. But he said the question ought to be stated thus. That is nothing and non-existent, the idea of which is made up of particulars that mutually contradict and destroy each other. But the generally received idea of God is made up of particulars thus mutually repugnant and contradictory. Infinite justice contradicts infinite mercy; infinite power is directly repugnant to infinite goodness. Therefore the antitype of this idea is a nonentity. If this be the true and genuine opinion of this profane sect, it can be overturned as easily as Dr. Cudworth has destroyed the other argumentation here exposed. For, I. This argument does not refer to God, but only to

We come to the third atheistic argumentation: That because infinity (which according to theology is included in the idea of God, and pervadeth all his attributes) is utterly inconceivable, the Deity itself is therefore an impossibility, and nonentity. To this sense sound sundry passages of a modern writer:[2] as, "Whatsoever we know, we learn from our phantasms; but there is no phantasm of infinite, and therefore no knowledge or conception of it." Again,[3] "Whatsoever we imagine is finite,

that idea of God which exists in most men's minds. For if there be any force at all in it, it will only amount to this: that so great is the depravity of human nature, that it has thoughts of God widely different from what are accordant with reason. From which indeed it would follow, if the premises were correct, that God is not such a being as most men imagine him to be. But those who think that it can also hence be inferred that there is no God, argue as ridiculously as if it were to be contended that there is no country of Abyssinia, or no emperor of the Abyssinians, because only very few formerly had true and correct ideas of that country and emperor. The errors of mankind respecting certain things neither destroy the things themselves, nor the truth of them; and therefore it does not follow, even if all mankind laboured under the grossest error respecting God, that this universal error would cause the Deity to be nonexistent. II. I do not understand in what way those who follow this method of reasoning, can prove that the idea of God is made up of conflicting and entirely irrelevant particulars. It is necessary that those who conclude that any two things are mutually repugnant, should have a perfect knowledge and clear view of the nature of both. No one could determine a triangle and a square to be reciprocally inconsistent with each other, unless he were acquainted with both figures. But we confess that all the attributes of Deity are infinite; that is, that the amplitude and greatness of the divine powers and perfections far exceed the grasp of our understanding. Wherefore Atheists, if they wished to show that the attributes ascribed by us to God are mutually repugnant, and that therefore the very idea of God is a nullity, should either affirm as an axiom that there is nothing boundless and infinite, or assert for themselves a power of declaring a repugnancy and discord between things that are incomprehensible. If they prefer the former of these alternatives, they turn their own arms against themselves; since, take which way they will, they cannot dispense with something *infinite* in explaining the causes and origins of things; if they prefer the latter, they show themselves worthy of being classed among the veriest tiros in logic.

[2] These are the words of Hobbes in his Physica, part 4. cap. 26. p. 204. Dr. Cudworth has made two omissions. First, after the words, "phantasm of infinite," he has left out the words, "either in magnitude or in time;" and secondly, he has omitted after "conception of it," the words, "for neither man nor any other being, excepting what is itself infinite, can have any conception of the infinite." In order that the meaning of this writer may be rendered clearer to every reader, I have thought it best to quote the entire passage of which Dr. Cudworth merely gives the sense.

[3] Hobbes's Leviathan, part 1. cap. 3. p. 12. Dr. Cudworth again extracts only a summary of Hobbes's words; but I have preferred to give the passage entire. "Whatever we imagine is finite. There is therefore no idea or conception that can arise from this word '*infinite*.' The human mind cannot comprehend the idea of infinite magnitude, nor can it conceive of infinite swiftness, infinite force, infinite time, or infinite power. When we say that any thing is infinite, we merely mean that we cannot conceive of its bounds or limits: and can have no other idea than that of our own incapacity. Therefore the name of God is not used that we may conceive of him (for he is incomprehensible, and his greatness and power inconceivable) but that we may honour him." In order fully to understand the author's meaning, these passages should be compared with the 15th chapter of his book De Cive, where he speaks of "the kingdom of God in nature," and in sect. 14. p. 117, among other things he thus speaks: "Though the word '*infinite*' signifies a conception of the mind, yet it does not follow that we have any conception of an infinite being. For when we say that any thing is infinite we do not intend any quality in the thing itself, but a want of power in our

and therefore there is no conception or idea of that which we call infinite. No man can have in his mind an image of infinite time, or of infinite power. Wherefore the name of God is used not to make us conceive him, but only that we may honour him." The true meaning whereof (as may be plainly gathered from other passages of the same writer) is thus to be interpreted; that there is nothing of philosophic truth and reality in the idea or attributes of God; nor any other sense in those words, but only to signify the veneration and astonishment of men's own confounded minds. And accordingly the word infinite is declared to signify nothing at all in that which is so called (there being no such thing really existing), but only the inability of men's own minds, together with their rustic astonishment and admiration. Wherefore when the same writer[4] determines that God must not be said to be finite, this being no good courtship nor compliment; and yet the word infinite signifieth "nothing" in the thing itself, nor hath any conception at all answering to it; he either does plainly abuse his reader, or else he leaves him to make up this conclusion, that since God is neither finite nor infinite, he is an unconceivable nothing.[5] In like manner,

own minds; as if we should say that we know not whether it has limits or where. Nor can it be reverently said of God, that we have an idea of him in our minds; for an idea is our conception, and there is no conception of any thing but what is finite." See also Element. Philos. sect. 1. or Physics, cap. 26. p. 204.

[4] There can be no doubt that our author here refers to that passage of Hobbes which is to be found in his book De Cive, cap. 15. sect. 14. p. 117. Hobbes is there refuting, in the first place, those who say that "the universe is God;" who, he affirms, deny that God is the first cause of the world, and therefore actually deny his existence. He also refutes those who assert the world to be eternal, or who deny the providence of God. He then proceeds thus: "Moreover in those attributes which signify greatness and power, any thing signifying finitude or limitation is far from being a mark of veneration. For we do not properly honour God if we attribute to him less power or greatness than it is possible for us to do. But all finite degrees are less than is possible for us to attribute to him; for it is always easy for us to assign and attribute to him more than any given finite quantity. Therefore shape is not attributed to God; for all shapes are finite; nor can he be said to be conceived or comprehended by the imagination of any faculty of our minds; for whatever we conceive of is finite." See also Hobbes's Leviathan, cap. 31. p. 170. wherein he expresses the same opinion.

[5] So several other learned and able men besides Dr. Cudworth have interpreted Hobbes's meaning, and make no doubt but that the whole of his philosophy tends to the highest impiety towards God. But though I feel certain that this writer was opposed to religion, yet I think it more cautious, and more worthy of a wise man, to leave all decisive judgment on his motives to him who alone searches the recesses of our hearts, and only to judge of his intentions from his words. It is unworthy, I will not deny, of any one zealous for the honour of God and of religion, to make apologies for those who in many ways plainly show that they are not so much concerned for religion and for God; but nothing is further from propriety and justice than to interpret any author's words, which are susceptible of a favourable construction, in the worst possible sense, for no other reason than that he who indited them betrays in other passages a mind tainted with profane opinions. If, therefore, we only regard Hobbes's words, and dismiss all suspicious feelings, I think we shall find he has said nothing but what may be favourably understood, and what has been said by many others who have incurred no accusation for irreligion. First of all, he does not affirm that the word *infinite* has no power or signification whatever; but he only maintains that *we have no conception of infinitude*, or that our minds are unable to conceive of the bounds and limits of those things

another learned well-willer[6] to atheism declareth, that he who calleth any thing infinite, doth but rei quam non capit, attribuere nomen, quod non intelligit, "attribute an unintelligible name

which we call infinite. He confesses, therefore, that the word *infinite* possesses a certain power, and signifies that our minds cannot comprehend the limits of that existence to which it is applied. Nor does he therefore assert the attributes and perfections assigned to God to be mere words and names. On the contrary, he plainly enough declares, that when we ascribe infinite power and other attributes to God, we are sufficiently acquainted with the fact itself, but do not understand the measure or limit of what we term power, &c. I know that many, and among them that venerable and now sainted man, John Francis Buddeus, in his Theses de Atheismo et Superstitione, cap. 5. p. 515. have found fault with Hobbes because he denies a *positive* conception of the infinite, and allows only a *negative* one. "What Hobbes asserts," says he, "is therefore most false; that the word *infinite* only signifies that we cannot conceive the limits of what is so called. For he erroneously passes over what is positive in the idea of an infinite being, and allows only of what is negative." How this should be understood he explains just before in these words: "For first of all we conceive of a certain supreme degree of perfection: then we confess that this perfection is so great that we cannot reach its bounds and limits." The fault of Hobbes is therefore determined by this great man to consist in his not having a mental conception of the highest degree of perfection when he says that God and his perfections are infinite. To me it seems quite otherwise, nor do I think that there is any real difference in this matter between Hobbes and this worthy man himself, if I properly understand the meaning of each. For Hobbes, as appears from his own words, when he speaks of infinite power, swiftness, or strength, first of all has a mental conception of the highest degree of perfection, that is the highest degree of power, strength, or swiftness. But at the same time he denies that he can understand how far the limits of this highest degree of power may extend. He confesses that when we speak in this way we can conceive of the nature of the thing itself to which infinity is ascribed, but that the limits or measure of it are not understood by us. If Hobbes had said that when we call any thing infinite we mean that we cannot attain to its limits, and yet at the same time had been of opinion that we have no plain *positive conception* of the thing or being that we call infinite, he would have spoken in a manner worse than foolish or idiotic; for he would have affirmed that we cannot reach the boundaries and limits of a thing that is nothing and non-existent; a more irrational supposition than which it is impossible to conceive of. I do not lay any stress on this further consideration—that this worthy author seems to me to speak less to the point than the case requires, when he says that "when we call any thing infinite we confess we cannot attain to its limits." This is the very opinion of Hobbes which this great man rejects. Though we do indeed use the word *infinite* in this sense respecting some things, yet when we apply it to the Deity and the divine perfections we not only mean that we cannot reach the limits of God and his attributes, but we also declare that God and his attributes have no bound or limits. I do not say this for the sake of opposing, but only of explaining the opinion of this late author, which I feel certain was in itself correct. From these considerations it is therefore plain, that if in other respects the English philosopher had reasoned correctly respecting God and religion, his sentiments respecting infinity would have left his friends sufficient room for his defence. It is also evident, that neither did Hobbes contradict himself when in one place he denied the propriety of calling the Deity finite, and in another determined that being to be infinite, to the limits of which we are not able to attain; nor is there any sufficient reason to conclude positively that by his dissertation on infinity he wished to induce others to believe in the non-existence of God. For if it be the duty of a wise man always to take care not to be led to accuse others on mere suspicions, it is of the greatest importance to pay attention to this when he brings any one into question respecting atheism, than which there can be no weightier crime, no fault more disgraceful to a rational human being.

By the way, I know not how it has happened that very acute authors, who have so

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[6] Who this was I have not, with all my pains, been able to discover; so that I cannot tell whether he is here justly accused, or whether any defence can be made for him.

to a thing inconceivable; because all conception is finite, and it is impossible to conceive any thing that hath no bounds or limits. But that which is mistaken for infinite, is nothing but a confused chaos of the mind, or an unshapen embryo of thought; when men going on further and further, and making a continual progress, without seeing any end before them, being at length quite weary and tired out with this their endless journey, they sit down, and call the thing by this hard and unintelligible name, infinite." And from hence does he also infer, that because we can have no idea of infinite, as to signify any thing in that which is so called; we therefore cannot possibly have germanam ideam Dei, "any true and genuine idea or notion of God." Of which they who understand the language of Atheists, know very well the meaning to be this: that there is indeed no such thing, or that he is a nonentity.

Now since this exception against the idea of God, and consequently his existence, is made by our modern and neoteric Atheists; we shall, in the first place, show, how contradictious they are herein to their predecessors, the old philosophic Atheists; and consequently how inconsistent and disagreeing Atheists in several ages have been with one another. For whereas these modern Atheists would have this thought a sufficient confutation of a Deity, that there can be nothing infinite; it is certain, that the ancient philosophic Atheists were so far from being of this

strenuously and ingeniously disputed with this philosopher, have not observed in his sentiments respecting the nature of infinity another latent error, which, though it does not lead to the denial of a Deity, is yet very derogatory to his supreme perfection. When we say that God and his attributes are *infinite*, we mean that in reality they have no bounds or limits, no limitation whatever. But with Hobbes the word *infinite* only means that being whose limits the human mind cannot conceive of or attain to. In philosophical language we attribute to God and the divine perfections an *absolute infinitude*, but Hobbes seems to acknowledge in the supreme Deity nothing but a *relative infinitude*. Thus it appears that God and his attributes are called by Hobbes infinite only because our weak minds cannot comprehend their extent, or discern their bounds and limits. Therefore in his definition of infinity, and determination that God is infinite, he tacitly insinuates that there is nothing properly infinite, but that whatever is called infinite is so termed only because it is infinite relatively to our understanding, or because neither our reason nor our imagination can reach its limits. For though the limits of any thing may escape the penetration of our minds, yet this does not prevent it from having limits and being finite. Certainly the general tenor of Hobbes's writings, in reference to the Deity, leads us to believe that the supreme Being which he imagined was finite, and that all the properties of that Being were in his view circumscribed by bounds and limitations. For he plainly says as much when he speaks thus of infinitude: "When we say that any thing is infinite, *we do not mean any property in the thing itself*, (that is, if I mistake not, we do not assert that that thing has really no bounds), but only point out a deficiency in our own minds (that is, we confess we cannot reach the limits of that thing); as though we should say we know not *whether or where it terminates*." De Cive, cap. 15. sect. 14. p. 117. He who in calling God infinite simply means by this expression that "he knows not whether or where God terminates," certainly does not assert that God is actually unconfined by bounds or limits, or that his power, wisdom, and other perfections are entirely unlimited; but merely informs others that though it is possible God may be finite, yet he himself knows not how far his limits may extend.

persuasion, that some of them, as Anaximander expressly, made Ἄπειρον, or "infinite," the "principle" of all things; that is, "infinitely extended and eternal matter, devoid of all life and understanding." For though Melissus' Ἄπειρον, or "infinite," which he made the first principle, was a most perfect being, eminently containing all things (as hath been already showed) and therefore the true Deity; Anaximander's Ἄπειρον, or "infinite," yet however called Θεῖον, or divine by him (it being the only divinity which he acknowledged) was nothing but senseless matter, an atheistic Infinite. Wherefore both Theists and Atheists in those former times did very well agree together in this one point, that there was something or other infinite, as the first principle of all things; either infinite mind or infinite matter; though this latter atheistic infinity of extended matter be indeed repugnant to conception (as shall be proved afterwards) there being no true infinite, but a perfect Being, or the holy Trinity. Furthermore, not only Anaximander, but also, after him, Democritus and Epicurus, and many others of that atheistic gang, heretofore asserted likewise a numerical infinity of worlds, and therefore much more than an infinity of atoms, or particles of matter. And though this numerical infinity of theirs were also inconceivable and impossible; yet does it sufficiently appear from hence, that these ancient philosophic Atheists were so far from being abhorrent from infinity, as a thing impossible, and a nonentity, that they were on the contrary very fond thereof; and therefore never went about to disprove a Deity after this manner, because there can be nothing infinite.[7]

[7] If indeed any Atheist in his senses ever argued in this manner; which however I greatly doubt. Unless I am very much mistaken, there is not so great a difference respecting *infinity* between ancient and modern Atheists as our learned author seems to think. All who formerly denied the existence of God, yet admitted the existence of something infinite, although in different ways; nor can their modern followers, unless they wish to be considered mad, do otherwise than grant, in some way or other, something to be infinite. No individual of this party was ever so stupid and foolish as to dare to deny that something, of whatever kind, has existed from all eternity. For whoever should go so far as this, as our learned author himself shows a little farther on, would offend more grievously than even schoolboys against the first rudiments of reasoning; and would affirm that this world produced itself out of nothing; than which it is impossible to imagine any thing more absurd. Therefore all Atheists will admit of something infinite in duration and time, nor do any of them deny all infinity. As regards Hobbes in particular, against whom our author principally disputes, so far is he from denying all infinity, that he not only teaches that time and space are unlimited, but also adopts the same opinion respecting unlimited time as Dr. Cudworth himself; that it is destitute of all succession, nor can be divided in any way into parts; which seems to me much the same as if he had said with the schoolmen, that "eternity is all duration existing at once." To quote his own words, Element. Philos. part 2. cap. 7. p 53. "Respecting unlimited space and time it cannot be said that they are wholes or units. Not wholes, for they cannot be made up of any number of parts; forany number of finite parts whatever, taken together, will only make a finite whole. Not units, for a unit is so called only as compared to something else; but two infinite spaces or two infinite times cannot be supposed to exist." The learned Doctor seems therefore, I think, to have given a little more scope than was necessary to his hatred of this profane and

But, in the next place, we shall make it manifest, that these modern Atheists do no less contradict plain reason and their very selves also, than they do their predecessors in that impiety, when they thus go about to disprove the existence of a God, because there can be nothing infinite, neither in duration, nor in power, nor in any other regard. For first, though it should be doubted whether there be a God or no, yet must it needs be acknowledged to be as indubitable, as any thing in all geometry, that there was something or other infinite in duration, or eternal, without beginning: because, if there had been once nothing at all, there could never have been any thing, that common notion, or principle of reason, having here an irresistible force, that nothing could ever come from nothing. Now, if there were never nothing, but always something, then must there of necessity be something infinite in duration, and eternal without beginning. Wherefore it cannot be accounted less than extreme sottishness and stupidity of mind in these modern Atheists, thus to impugn a Deity from the impossibility of infinite duration without beginning. But in the next place, we must confess it seems to us hardly conceivable, that any Atheist whatsoever could possibly be so prodigiously sottish, or so monstrously infatuated, as really to think, that once there was nothing at all, but that afterwards senseless matter happened (nobody knows how) to come into being, from whence all other things were derived. According to which hypothesis it would follow also, that matters might as well some time or other happen again to cease to be, and so all things vanish into nothing. To conclude therefore, these Atheists must of necessity be guilty of one or other of these two things; either of extreme sottishness and stupidity, in acknowledging neither God, nor matter, nor any thing, to have existed infinitely from eternity without beginning; or else, if they do acknowledge the pre-eternity of matter, or its infinite past-duration without beginning, then, of the most notorious impudence, in making that an argument against the existence of a God, which themselves acknowledge to matter.[8]

Nevertheless, we shall here readily comply with these modern Atheists thus far, as to grant them these two following things:

wicked herd, when he asserts that they deny all infinity, and thence argue against the existence of God, because there can be nothing infinite. But, nevertheless, almost all who have undertaken in modern times to enumerate or confute the arguments of Atheists against a Deity, have in this particular followed him. Thus the authority of one great man is often the occasion of error to many. Yet at the same time Dr. Cudworth has on this occasion given so many excellent and learned observations, that this ought to be reckoned among his minor faults, into which he was perhaps led by the ardour of disputation.

[8] But our learned author might as well have omitted the whole of this discussion, since no Atheist ever denied the existence of something from all eternity. If any of them even let drop aught at all resembling this, he indeed must either have been crazy or entirely ignorant and foolish.

First, That we can have no proper and genuine phantasm of any Infinite whatsoever, because we never had corporeal sense of any, neither of infinite number, nor of infinite magnitude, and therefore much less of infinite time or duration, and of infinite power; these two latter things, time and power, themselves not falling under corporeal sense. Secondly, That as we have no phantasm of any infinite, so neither is infinity fully comprehensible by our human understandings, that are but finite. But since it is certain, even to mathematical evidence, that there was something infinite in duration, or without beginning, insomuch that no intelligent Atheist, upon mature consideration, will ever venture to contradict it; we shall from hence extort from these Atheists an acknowledgment of the falseness of these two theorems of theirs, that whatsoever we have no phantasm or sensible idea of, as also whatsoever is not fully comprehensible by us, is therefore a pure nonentity or nothing; and enforce them to confess, that there is something really existing in nature, which we have neither any phantasm of, nor yet can fully comprehend with our imperfect understandings.

Nay, we will yet go further in compliance with them, and acknowledge likewise, that as for those infinities of number, of corporeal magnitude, and of time or successive duration, we have not only no phantasm, nor full intellectual comprehension of them, but also no manner of intelligible idea, notion, or conception. For though it be true, that number be somewhere said by Aristotle[9] to be infinite, yet was his meaning there only in such a negative sense as this, that we can never possibly come to an end thereof by addition, but may in our minds still add number to number infinitely; which is all one as if he should indeed have affirmed, that there can be no number actually and positively infinite, according to Aristotle's own definition of Infinite, elsewhere given,[10] namely, that to which nothing can be added; no number being ever so great, but that one or more may still be added to it. And as there can be no infinite number, so neither can there be any infinity of corporeal magnitude; not only because if there were, the parts thereof must needs be infinite in number, but also because, as no number can be so great, but that more may be added to it; so neither can any body or magnitude be ever so vast, but that more body or magnitude may be supposed still further and further; this addition of finites never making up infinite. Indeed infinite space, beyond the finite world, is a thing which hath been much talked

[9] Metaphys. lib. 11. cap. 11. p. 434. tom. 4. opp. et Phys. Auscultat. lib. 3. cap. 5. p. 486. tom. 1. opp. et cap. 8. p. 491.

[10] Phys. Auscultat. lib. 3. cap. 9. p. 492. tom. 1. opp. Οὐ γὰρ οὗ μηδὲν ἔξω, ἀλλ' οὗ ἀεί τι ἔξω ἐστι, τοῦτο ἄπειρόν ἐστι, "For not that which hath nothing beyond, but that which has always something beyond, is infinite."

of; and it is by some supposed to be infinite body, but by others to be an incorporeal infinite; through whose actual distance notwithstanding (mensurable by poles and miles) this finite world might roll and tumble infinitely. But as we conceive, all that can be demonstrated here is no more than this, that how vast soever the finite world should be, yet is there a possibility of more and more magnitude and body still to be added to it, further and further, by divine power, infinitely; or that the world could never be made so great, no not by God himself, as that his own omnipotence could not make it yet greater.[1] Which potential infinity, or indefinite increaseableness of corporeal magnitude, seems to have been mistaken for an actual infinity of space. Whereas, for this very reason, because more could be added to the magnitude of the corporeal world infinitely, or without end, therefore is it impossible, that it should ever be positively and actually infinite; that is, such as to which nothing more can possibly be added. Wherefore we conclude concerning corporeal magnitude, as we did before of number, that there can be no absolute and actual infinity thereof; and that how much vaster soever the world may be, than according to the supposition of vulgar astronomers, who make the starry sphere the utmost wall thereof; yet is it not absolutely infinite, such as really hath no bounds or limits at all, nor to which nothing more could, by divine power, be added. Lastly, We affirm, likewise, concerning time, or successive duration, that there can be no infinity of that neither, no temporal eternity without beginning: and that not only because there would then be an actual infinity, and more than an infinity of number; but also because, upon this supposition, there would always have been an infinity of time past, and consequently an infinity of time past which was never present. Whereas all the moments of past time must needs have been once present; and if so, then all of them, at least save one, future too; from whence it will follow, that there was a first moment, or beginning of time. And thus does reason conclude, neither the world, nor time itself, to have been infinite in their past duration, nor eternal without beginning.[2]

Here will the Atheist think presently, he hath got a great advantage to disprove the existence of a God: Nonne, qui æter-

[1] Our author here touches on a most subtle question, which, like all other philosophical disputations concerning infinity, is surrounded by innumerable difficulties: whether God, possessing infinite power, can create an infinite magnitude. We shall give our own opinion on this and similar questions by and by, when we come to the end of the whole discussion on infinitude.

[2] All this seems to differ widely from the opinions respecting infinity commonly received among philosophers Wherefore Dr. Cudworth has lately incurred the censure of of the learned Le Clerc, whose stricture on this discussion respecting the nature of infinity may be seen in the Bibliothèque Choisie, tom. 5. p. 48. &c. I will hereafter, if I can, explain clearly what I consider to be the most correct view of this very difficult and very obscure question.

nitatem mundi sic tollunt, eâdem operâ etiam mundi conditoris æternitatem tollunt? "Do not they who thus destroy the eternity of the world, at the same time destroy also the eternity of the Creator? For if time itself were not eternal, then how could the Deity, or any thing, be so?" the Atheist securely taking it for granted, that God himself could not be otherwise eternal, than by a successive flux of infinite time; but we say that this will, on the contrary, afford us a plain demonstration of the existence of a Deity. For since the world and time itself were not infinite in their past duration, but had a beginning, therefore were they both certainly made together by some other being, who is, in order of nature, senior to time, and so without time, before time; he being above that successive flux, and comprehending in the stability and immutable perfection of his own being, his yesterday, and to-day, and for ever. Or thus: something was of necessity infinite in duration, and without beginning; but neither the world, nor motion, nor time, that is, no successive being was such; therefore is there something else, whose being and duration is not successive and flowing, but permanent, to whom this infinity belongeth. The Atheists here can only smile, or make faces, and show their little wit in quibbling upon nunc-stans, or a "standing now" of eternity; as if that standing eternity of the Deity (which with so much reason hath been contended for by the ancient genuine Theists) were nothing but a pitiful small moment of time standing still, and as if the duration of all beings whatsoever must needs be like our own; whereas the duration of every thing must, of necessity, be agreeable to its nature: and therefore, as that whose imperfect nature is ever flowing like a river, and consists in continual motion and changes one after another, must needs have accordingly a successive and flowing duration, sliding perpetually from present into past, and always posting on towards the future, expecting something of itself, which is not yet in being, but to come; so must that, whose perfect nature is essentially immutable, and always the same, and necessarily existent, have a permanent duration, never losing any thing of itself once present, as sliding away from it, nor yet running forwards to meet something of itself before, which is not yet in being; and it is as contradictious for it ever to have begun, as ever to cease to be.[3]

[3] This dispute, respecting the eternity of God, whether it be immutable and free from all succession, or whether it includes in itself difference of time, is one of those questions which are attended with great difficulty. Most modern theologians agree with Dr. Cudworth, and follow the whole school of the Platonists, and the most renowned of the fathers. But since eternity is a thing far beyond all comprehension or understanding, it is not wonderful that there should be some, and those not of the lowest class of mankind, nor yet hostile to the divine perfections, who deny that they can understand this notion of eternity. I shall have presently, I dare say, an opportunity of saying something on this point.

Now whereas the modern Atheists pretend to have proved that there is nothing infinite, neither in duration nor otherwise, and consequently no Deity, merely because we have no sense nor phantasm of Infinite, nor can fully comprehend the same; and therefore will needs conclude, that the words infinite and eternal signify nothing in the thing itself, but either men's own ignorance and inability to conceive when, or whether, that which is called eternal began; together with the confounded nonsense of their astonished minds, and their stupid veneration of that which their own fear and fancy has raised up as a bugbear to themselves; or else the progress of their thoughts further and further backward indefinitely (though they plainly confute themselves in all this, by sometimes acknowledging matter and motion infinite and eternal, which argues either their extreme sottishness or impudence):[4] we have showed, with mathematical evidence and certainty, that there is really something infinite in duration, or eternal; by which therefore cannot be meant men's own ignorance, or the confounded nonsense of their devotion, nor yet the idle progress of their minds further and further indefinitely, which never reaches infinite, but a reality in the thing itself, namely this, that it never was not, nor had any beginning. Moreover, having demonstrated concerning this infinity and eternity, without beginning, that it cannot possibly belong to any successive being, we confidently conclude against these Atheists

[4] Unless I am mistaken, this very observation of our author, that Atheists often treat of the eternity of matter and motion, might have led him to reflect that none of that sect were ever so stupid and foolish as to deny all infinity and affirm that there was no God because there is nothing infinite. There exists, I am aware, not unfrequently in the minds of those who take upon themselves to contend with God himself, an incredible degree of ignorance, which leads them to confound black and white, and mingle together things most widely different. But I can scarcely persuade myself that any one who had not entirely renounced the use of his understanding, ever attained to such a pitch of folly as himself to oppose and overthrow the very foundations of his own opinions. To give one example out of many, nothing is held more sacred among the sect of Atheists than this axiom: "Out of nothing, nothing is produced." But if there is nothing infinite, this maxim, in whatever way it be understood, will be altogether puerile and absurd. But nevertheless, let us suppose that any one so far forgot himself as to deny the Divine existence by such an argument as this: "Nothing is infinite; therefore there is no God;" what shall we reply to him? Will a long disputation be necessary in order to convince him of the existence of something infinite? I can scarcely think so. For whoever can so far impose upon his own mind as to reject all infinity, could also easily persuade himself that all arguments urged against him were merely captious and sophistical. The more subtlely we might reason against him, the more cautious he would become, and the more uniformly suspicious of unfairness. We will therefore take a shorter way, as I think, by which, if he have any sense left, we may silence him and convict him of folly. Let there be nothing infinite. We will not deny it. What then? Is there no God? Nonsense! As if that of which men form a wrong idea must necessarily be nonexistent. The argument would be tolerable if it were stated thus: Nothing is infinite; therefore the Being we call God is not infinite. But he who thus reasons: There is no God, because nothing is infinite, argues as accurately and as much to the point, as one who should reason in this way: There is no such devil as is represented by painters; therefore there is no devil at all.

also, that it was not matter and motion, or this mundane system, but a perfect immutable nature, of a permanent duration (that is, a God) to whom it belonged. To sum up all, therefore, we say, that infinite and eternal are not words that signify nothing in the thing itself, nor mere attributes of honour, compliment, and flattery, that is, of devout and religious nonsense, error, and falsehood; but attributes belonging to the Deity, and to that alone, of the most philosophic truth and reality. And though we, being finite, have no full comprehension and adequate understanding of this infinity and eternity (as not of the Deity) yet can we not be without some notion, conception and apprehension thereof, so long as we can thus demonstrate concerning it, that it belongs to something, and yet to nothing neither but a perfect immutable nature. But the notion of this infinite eternity will be yet further cleared in the following explanation and vindication of infinite power.

For the Atheists principally quarrel with infinite power, or omnipotence, and pretend, in like manner, this to be utterly inconceivable and impossible, and subjected in nothing. Thus a modern atheistic writer[5] concludes, that since "no man can con-

[5] It belongs to considerate and impartial judges to decide whether our author has here correctly expressed Hobbes' mind and meaning, or has allowed himself to be carried away by the heat of controversy. I will quote that philosopher's own words, on which Dr. Cudworth no doubt had his eye, out of the Leviathan, c. 3. p. 12. "The human mind cannot comprehend the idea of infinite magnitude, nor can it conceive of infinite swiftness, infinite force, infinite time, or *infinite power*. Therefore the name of God is not used that we may conceive him (for he is incomprehensible, and his greatness and *power* inconceivable) but that we may honour him." A little after he thus proceeds: "No one can conceive anything excepting as in some place, indeed with some finite magnitude, and divisible into parts; nor can any thing be altogether in one place and altogether in another at the same time. For none of these suppositions have ever taken place, or can possibly occur in sensation; but they are unmeaning expressions, made use of on the authority of certain erring philosophers and fallacious schoolmen." Dr. Cudworth seems to have been of opinion that these last words of Hobbes' have reference also to "infinite power;" and that therefore the phrase "infinite power" is enumerated by him as being among "unmeaning expressions." And into this opinion he has drawn after him the worthy Buddeus, who in his Theses de Atheismo et Superstitione, chap. 5. p. 516. plainly writes that "infinite duration and infinite power are reckoned by Hobbes among unmeaning expressions." But (not to insist on what I have already stated) Hobbes is sufficiently vindicated by the context and current of the discourse, from which it incontrovertibly appears that he only says that those use "unmeaning expressions" who say that "any thing can be altogether in one place and altogether in another at the same time," or who profess that they can "conceive something which is in no place, and endued with no finite magnitude." He does not therefore say that "infinite power" is an unmeaning phrase, but only ranks the language of those who say that they can conceive of and mentally comprehend infinite magnitude, or affirm that a thing can be in several places at the same time, among expressions that have nothing in them but sound. For if Hobbes' opinion were such as is here attributed to him by Dr. Cudworth, and the divine omnipotence were entirely rejected by him, he would contradict himself, since in another passage he assigns to omnipotence the second place among the divine attributes. For in the Leviathan, chap. 31. p. 170. he speaks thus: "Among the attributes which by the light of nature we know to belong to God, the first is existence, the second is *omnipotence*, in that he is the maker and ruler of all things. Those therefore who say that the world is eternal do not honour God as much as is possible,

ceive infinite power, this is also but an attribute of honour, which the confounded nonsense of astonished minds bestows upon the object of their devotion, without any philosophic truth and reality." And here have our modern Atheists indeed the suffrage and agreement of the ancient philosophic Atheists also with them, who, as appears from the verses before cited out of Lucretius, concerned themselves in nothing more than asserting all power to be finite, and omnipotence, or infinite power, to belong to nothing.

First, therefore, it is here observable, that this omnipotence, or infinite power, asserted by Theists, has been commonly either ignorantly mistaken, or wilfully misrepresented by these Atheists, out of design to make it seem impossible and ridiculous, as if by it were meant a power of producing and doing any thing whatsoever, without exception, though never so contradictious; as a late atheistic person,[6] seeming to assert this divine omnipotence and infinite power, really and designedly, notwithstanding, abused the same, with this sceptic irony, "That God, by his omnipotence, or infinite power, could turn this tree into a syllogism." Children indeed have sometimes such childish apprehensions of the divine omnipotence; and Ren. Cartesius[7] (though

nor do they who deny that he takes care of human affairs. Thirdly," he proceeds, "those do not give God all possible honour who say that he is *finite*, for what is finite is capable of addition," &c. It may perhaps be said, that this was written to save appearances, and to entrap his readers; but to this I would answer, that none but God could positively know whether this were the case or not. We must estimate a man's meaning by his words; God alone can tell whether his mind and his words correspond.

[6] Who this is I can by no means find out. That similar things have been said by some who despise God and religion, I am not unaware.

[7] Vide Respons. ad Objectiones sextas, sect. 6. p. 160. edit. Amstel. 1685. 4to. The passage runs thus: "It is inconsistent to suppose that the will of God was not from eternity indifferent towards all things that ever have or ever will take place; for nothing good or true, nothing to be believed, done, or passed over, can be imagined, the idea of which was in the Divine intellect before his will determined to make it such as it is. Nor do I here speak of priority of time, but that it was not prior in order even, or by nature, or by consecutive reasoning, as we say, in such a way as that any idea of goodness should impel God to choose one thing rather than another. As, for example, he did not will to create the world in time because it would be better so than if he had created it from eternity; nor did he will that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two right angles because he knew it could not possibly be otherwise. But, on the contrary, because he willed to create the world in time, therefore it is better than if it had been created from eternity; and because he willed that the three angles of a triangle should be necessarily equal to two right angles, therefore this is now true, and cannot be otherwise; and so on of other things." A little after, sect. 8. p. 163. he adds as follows: "Nor is there any need to inquire how God from eternity could have made it true that twice four should not be eight, &c.; for I confess that this cannot be understood by us." See also his Epistles, vol. 1. ep. 110. p. 351. and ep. 115. p. 372; and vol. 2. ep. 6. p. 21. ed. Amsterdam, 1682. 4to. Some think that Des Cartes embraced this sentiment, lest he should seem by his opinions to deny what the Romanists call "transubstantiation." See Le Clerc's Ontologia, chap. 4. sect. 8. p. 351. and chap. 14. sect. 11. p. 406. Nor are they, I think, far wrong in this supposition. Nevertheless some learned men have remarked, in order to save this great man's credit, that Des Cartes has in other places reasoned more correctly, as in the fifth of his Metaphysical Meditations, p. 31. where he clearly declares that "the

otherwise an acute philosopher) was here no less childish, in affirming, that all things whatsoever, even the natures of good and evil, and all truth and falsehood, do so depend upon the arbitrary will and power of God, as that, if he had pleased, twice two should not have been four, nor the three angles of a plain triangle equal to two right ones, and the like; he only adding, that all these things, notwithstanding, when they were once settled by the divine decree, became immutable; that is, I suppose, not in themselves, or to God, but unto us: than which no paradox of any old philosopher was ever more absurd and irrational. And, certainly, if any one did desire to persuade the world, that Cartesius, notwithstanding all his pretences to demonstrate a Deity, was indeed but an hypocritical Theist, or personated and disguised Atheist, he could not have a fairer pretence for it out of all his writings, than from hence; this being plainly to destroy the Deity, by making one attribute thereof to devour and swallow up another; infinite will and power, infinite understanding and wisdom. For to suppose God to understand, and to be wise only by his will, is all one as to suppose him to have really no understanding at all. Wherefore we do not affirm God to be so omnipotent, or infinitely powerful, as that he is able to destroy or change the intelligible natures of things at pleasure; this being all one as to say, that God is so omnipotent and infinitely powerful, that he is able to destroy, or to baffle and befool his own wisdom and understanding, which is the very rule and measure of his power. We say not therefore, that God, by his omnipotence, or infinite power, could make twice two not to be four, or turn a tree into a syllogism; but we say, that omnipotence, or infinite power, is that which can produce and do all whatsoever is possible, that is, whatsoever is conceivable, and implies no manner of contradiction; the very essence of possibility being no other than conceptibility. And

natures of things are eternal and immutable." If this be indeed the case, Des Cartes is inconsistent with himself, and most evidently confirms the opinion of those who think that he was actuated by religious partiality in speaking otherwise in the places we have pointed out. But on a careful and attentive perusal of this fifth Meditation, I cannot at all discover that Des Cartes in it differs from himself or from those passages in which he affirms the natures of things to be mutable. For although he there determines the natures of things to be "true, eternal, and immutable," yet he means this to be understood, not in respect to God, but only as regards mankind, who, he avers, cannot possibly imagine to themselves any other forms or essences of the things than such as they were once formed and appointed by God. According to Des Cartes, the natures of things are eternal and immutable, because God has from eternity willed them to be such as they now are; not that they are such, if we take into the account his own power, which is so great as to be able to change them. But this dogma of Des Cartes' which some of his followers have rejected and others have approved, is for the most part explained by them in such a perplexed and confused manner, that the authors themselves seem not to have understood their own meaning. Nor is this very wonderful, since it is of that description that its falsehood is apparent as soon as it is explained in clear and perspicuous expressions.

thus has the point been stated all along, not only by Christian Theists, but even the ancient pagan Theologers themselves, that omnipotence, or infinite power, is that which can do all things that do not imply a contradiction, or which are not inconceivable. This appearing from that of Agatho, cited before out of Aristotle,[8] "That nothing is exempted from the divine power, but only to make *πεπραγμένα ἀγένητα*, "what hath been done to be undone," or the like hereunto. Now infinite power being nothing else but a power of doing whatsoever is conceivable, it is plainly absurd to say, that a power of doing nothing but what is conceivable is inconceivable.[9]

[8] Lib. 6. ad Nicomach. cap. 2. p. 98. tom. 3. opp. *Τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι· διὸ ἀγαθῶς Ἀγαθὼν*

Μόνου γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ Θεὸς στερίσκεται,
Ἀγένητα ποιεῖν, ἅσσ' ἂν ᾖ πεπραγμένα,

"But what is done cannot be made to be undone; as Agathon well says:

'One thing alone the power of God can shun,
That things once done shall ere be made undone.'"

See also that famous passage of Celsus in Origen, Contra Celsum, lib. 5. p. 240. where he expressly states that God can do nothing either contrary to holiness or contrary to the nature of things: *Ἀλλ' οὔτε γε τὰ αἰσχρὰ ὁ Θεὸς δύναται, οὐδὲ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν βούλεται*, "For God can neither do any thing disgraceful, nor will any thing contrary to nature." What Celsus calls *τὰ παρὰ φύσιν*, are the same as others call things mutually repugnant or contradictory. Origen himself approves this opinion of Celsus, and says it also had the approbation of all Christians, pp. 246. 247. He says, among other things, that when Christians assert that God can do all things, they always except *τὰ ἀνύπαρκτα* and *ἀδιανόητα*. The interpreter obscurely renders the first word *nonexistentia*, "non-existences." More properly it should be, "things that cannot be brought to pass."

[9] Our author here ingeniously and learnedly disputes against Des Cartes and those of his disciples who think it a part of piety and reverence towards God to affirm that he can cause to be simultaneously existent things which are in their own nature entirely incongruous. But it is easy to prove by the best authorities that he is incorrect in his supposition that Des Cartes was the originator and author of this opinion, before whom it was unknown both to Christian and heathen philosophers. In this however he is supported by that respectable philosopher Gerard de Vries, who in his Philosophemata Miscellanea, subjoined to his Exercitationes Rationales de Deo, Divinisque Perfectionibus, Utrecht, 1685, 4to. in a Dissertation entitled, De Contradictoriis Deo Possibilibus, sect. 1. p. 336. confidently avers that not one person before Des Cartes ever held so absurd an opinion, except an enthusiast named Valentine Weigel, who was acutely confuted by John Crocius, in his Anti-Weigelium, quest. 2. preliminary sections 2. 3. p. 27. Speaking of Des Cartes, De Vries says, "He was the founder of a most absurd opinion which still prevails among his followers." How little almost all authors differ from this opinion is evident from the fact that whenever they touch upon this controversy, whether God can or cannot effect things contradictory, they name none but the Cartesians as maintaining the affirmative. See, among others, Zachary Grapius, in his Theologia Recens Controversa, part 1. quest. 24. p. 92. and Peter Bayle, Pensées sur les Comètes, part 2. sect. 114. p. 554. and Peter Van Maestricht, in his Gangræna Novitatum Cartesianarum, last sect. chap. 9. p. 246. &c. I will undertake to show that this supposition is incorrect, and that many others besides Des Cartes, and who had no connexion with him, have taught the same thing. But I will leave out of the consideration those (and they are a great number) who have left on record their opinion that "God is able to do impossibilities," the passages relating to which opinion have been collected out of ancient authors by Dionysius Petavius in his Dogmata Theologica, vol. 1. book 5. De Deo, cap. 7. sect 6. p. 223. For I grant that this expression may be understood of those things which to us appear to be

But, because the Atheists look upon infinity as such a desperate and affrightful thing, we shall here render it something more easy, and take off that frightful vizard from it, which makes

beyond possibility, or which in regard to us are actually impossible; nor is it necessary to understand it of those things which on their own account are unaccomplishable, or are impossible in their own nature. Nor do I now allude to those who have affirmed that "God can do all things, except lie," which is asserted by Clemens Romanus in his First Epistle to the Corinthians, chap. 27. p. 164. in the first volume of the Patres Apostolici, and has been repeated by many after him. For I think it too dangerous, from any such generalities of expression to deduce the opinion of any one, which might perhaps have been correctly enough expressed by the authors, had they still survived. I shall name as the principal among the ancient Christian divines, who have advocated the opinion mentioned above, Tertullian, who in his book against Praxeas, chap. 10. p. 351. plainly avers that it is in God's power to make himself to be his own son, that is, that God could at the same time be both Father and Son; which is immediately seen to be a self-contradictory proposition. The "Monarchians," against whom Tertullian is there disputing, drew from the infinite power of God this argument to defend their cause: "Nothing is difficult to God; therefore it was not difficult for God to make himself both Father and Son, contrary to the usual course of human affairs." To cut this knot Tertullian first of all grants that nothing is difficult to God; but then he adds that God does not do all that he is able to accomplish. "For," says he, "it does not follow that because he can do all things, that therefore he has done them." He confesses then that there is nothing to prevent the truth of the assertion made by the Monarchians, "that God could make himself to be both Father and Son;" but he denies that God willed to do this. And this is most plainly apparent from the following words, with which he closes his disputation against this mode of reasoning: "According to this reasoning, something will be difficult to God, namely, whatever he has not done, not because he could not, but because he would not. Therefore because, if he willed to make himself son to himself, he could have done it, and because if he could have done it he has done it, you will then prove that he both could and would, if you have proved that he has done it." Whoever can persuade himself that the divine power is so great that God could beget and procreate himself from all eternity, will as easily believe that he could make a triangle be at the same time a square, and a mountain at the same instant a valley. After Tertullian, I have met with no one who thus boldly decides upon what God can do, previously to the age in which Paschasius Radbertus, more plainly than had before been done, defended that conversion of the bread and wine into the body and blood of our Saviour which is commonly called Transubstantiation. For this dogma cannot be defended, except we allow that God can make those things to be simultaneously true, which by the very nature of things cannot be so, as, for example, that the accidents should remain when the substance is gone; that is, that that which is a nonentity should nevertheless exist, and not only exist, but be long, broad, moist, round, sweet, heavy, or hard, and many other things of the same kind, which have been more ably than elsewhere enumerated, by the most acute of English divines, William Chillingworth, in his well-known book, The Religion of Protestants a safe Way to Salvation, vol. 2. chap. 4. p. 277. &c. Wherefore, not only Paschasius Radbertus, at the beginning of his book, De Sacramento Cœnæ, cap. 1. but also those who have embraced his views, plainly avow their approbation of this opinion. Subsequently, several of the schoolmen, as they are called, have freely disputed on this subject, and as the error of transubstantiation constantly increased among Christians, not a few of this sect have maintained that God can unite into one whole things that are in their nature entirely opposite. And the whole university of Paris, which formerly possessed a decided pre-eminence, has plainly given in its adhesion to this tenet, since it enumerates among the principal errors of Thomas Aquinas, his affirmation that God cannot perform things self-contradictory. The words of the Parisian divines are quoted by John Launoy, in his work, De Variâ Aristotelis Fortunâ in Academiâ Parisiensi, cap. 10. pp. 214. 215. "Whence they also say, that in the philosophical determinations and natural principles in cap. 15. of the same book, he has manifestly erred, where in showing how God Almighty may be said to be unable to do certain acts, among other things he has said that God is not able to

it seem such a mormo, or bugbear to them, by declaring, in the next place, that infinity is really nothing else but perfection. For infinite understanding and knowledge is nothing else but

make one and the same thing to be and not to be, that is, contradictories co-existent; and afterwards adds that a contradiction is involved in contraries, and things which so oppose as mutually to destroy each other. For if a thing be white and black, it follows that is white and not white." Who can doubt that previously to the Reformation there were a great number of the most celebrated doctors who favoured the same opinion, since in those times the authority of the Parisian divines was so great that their enunciations and decrees were regarded as equal to divine revelations? Nor at the present time can any who adopt the Romish doctrine of the Lord's supper be of a different opinion, unless they wish to be inconsistent with themselves. For though perhaps some of them, impelled by the force of truth, may deny it, yet they are accustomed, as soon as the controversy has made any progress, immediately to betake themselves to the infinite power of God as to their sheet-anchor. Whence it is evident that they *implicitly* (to speak scholastically) believe that God can perform contradictory things, though they are unwilling *explicitly* to confess it, for fear of being caught in those snares which, as they are aware, are laid for those who are of this opinion. I do not precisely know whether in the number of our own divines, [Lutherans] there has been any one who has openly and without circumlocution declared that the power of God was so great as to be able to accomplish what is impossible in the very nature of things. But there are some whose sentiments do not seem very widely to differ from this. Among those indeed who are called "Reformed" [Calvinists] some have accused us all of this error, since we maintain a real presence of the body and blood of Jesus Christ in the Lord's Supper; but it is evident that these learned men do us an injury. For we do not assert that God can do contradictory things; but only entertain such a reverence of the Deity as not to hesitate to believe his words, even when the thing promised appears to rank among impossibilities. Let those who think us in this to be in fault, take care lest they attribute more power to their own minds than is proper, and consider every thing to be contradictory which exceeds our comprehension. Peter Van Maestricht, in his Gangræna Novitatum Cartesianarum, p. 267. expressly accuses that most worthy divine, John Gerard, of the error we have been alluding to. Nor can it be denied that this good man has given some occasion for this suspicion with regard to him. For in his Theological Common Places, vol. 1. De Naturâ Dei, sect. 127. p. 274. he says, "We do not deny this rule, that God cannot do, or *more properly speaking, would not do*, things really contradictory." The meaning of which sentence seems to be, that God could indeed do things of this kind, but does not do them, that is, wills not to do them; which opinion we have shown above to be that of Tertullian. But since I am ignorant whether Gerard may not more clearly have expressed his meaning in other places, I can say nothing decisive upon the matter, but must leave it in doubt. Some have entertained a similar suspicion in reference to John Hülsemann, who, though in other respects a very acute theologian, is well known to have averred that "God can perform things contradictory, both materially and formally." But he is defended by the late John Hermann von Elswich, in his notes on John Launoy's De Variâ Fortunâ Aristotelis, &c. p. 215; and who has also observed in his Vindiciæ Scripturarum, art. 5. that Hülsemann most correctly treated of the divine power. Whether Brentius can be cleared with equal facility, I very much doubt; for in his Confessio Wurtembergica de Eucharistiâ, contained in Christian Matthew Pfaff's Acts and Monuments of the Church of Wurtemburg, p. 197. he has not hesitated to affirm that so great is the power of God that "he can change the substance of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ. We also believe," he adds, "that God's omnipotence is such, that it can in the Eucharist either annihilate the substance of bread and wine, or can change it into the body and blood of Christ. But that God has exercised this his absolute omnipotent power in the Eucharist, does not seem to be declared." But perhaps this excellent man held the same sentiments as all the modern divines of our purer communion; but at the time when he wrote this he did not perceive all the consequences which at the present day we see to be connected with the doctrine of transubstantiation, and therefore did not rank it among opinions that may be called self-contradictory. It may certainly happen that a person may have imbibed correct principles, and yet be mistaken in the

perfect knowledge, that which hath no defect or mixture of ignorance with it or the knowledge of whatsoever is knowable. So in like manner, infinite power is nothing else but perfect power, that which hath no defect or mixture of impotency in it; a power of producing and doing all whatsoever is possible, that is, whatsoever is conceivable. Infinite power can do whatsoever infinite understanding can conceive, and nothing else; conception being the measure of power, and its extent, and whatsoever is in itself inconceivable being therefore impossible. Lastly, Infinity of duration, or eternity, is really nothing else but perfection, as including necessary existence and immutability in it; so that it is not only contradictious to such a Being to cease to be, or exist, but also to have had a newness or beginning of being, or to have any flux or change therein, by dying to the present, and acquiring something new to itself, which was not before. Notwithstanding which, this Being comprehends the differences of past, present, and future, or the successive priority and posteriority of all temporary things: and because infinity is perfection, therefore can nothing, which includeth any thing of imperfection in the very idea and essence of it, be every truly and properly infinite, as number, corporeal magnitude, and successive duration. All which can only, mentiri infinitatem, "counterfeit and imitate infinity," in their having more and more added to them infinitely, whereby notwithstanding they never reach it, or overtake it. There is nothing truly infinite, neither in knowledge, nor in power, nor in duration, but only one absolutely perfect Being, or the holy Trinity.

Now, that we have an idea or conception of perfection, or a perfect Being, is evident from the notion that we have of imperfection, so

application of general rules. Among the divines of the Reformed Church, besides those who on this subject follow Descartes, I have at hand one whom I may with the utmost propriety term a favourer of this error respecting the divine power, namely, Henry Burton, whose Annotations on Clement's Epistle to the Corinthians, first published at London, 1647, were translated into Latin by Le Clerc, and appended to the second volume of the Patres Apostolici. For at p. 479. of that volume, he asserts that God of his own accord does not do things self-repugnant, because he wills not to do so; but that yet he is able to do them; for which opinion he is corrected by Le Clerc. To Burton may also be joined Sir Thomas Browne, an English author of great but dubious reputation, who, in his Religio Medici, part 1. sect. 26. p. 29. adopts the same opinion, whether sincerely or feignedly I cannot tell. "Whoever," says he, "measures the divine power by the capacity of his own mind, restrains it within too confined limits. I believe that God can do all things. How God can do those things which *imply a contradiction* I do not understand, but I do not therefore venture to deny his ability to do them. I do not deny his ability, but I only say that he wills not to do those things which we commonly assert that he is utterly unable to perform. This is certainly the most respectful way, nor do I in this give any countenance to paradoxes." We have spoken above of the fanatical Weigel; and at present I do not recollect any more to associate with Des Cartes: but no more are needed to prove what I have already asserted; that it is a mistake to suppose that Des Cartes was the first broacher of this opinion, or that none have embraced it but his followers and friends.

familiar to us; perfection being the rule and measure of imperfection, and not imperfection of perfection; as a straight line is the rule and measure of a crooked, and not a crooked line of a straight: so that perfection is first conceivable, in order of nature, before imperfection, as light before darkness, a positive before the privative or defect. For perfection is not properly the want of imperfection, but imperfection of perfection. Moreover, we perceive divers degrees of perfection in the essences of things, and consequently a scale or ladder of perfections, in nature, one above another, as of living and animate things above senseless and inanimate, of rational things above sensitive; and this by reason of that notion or idea which we first have of that which is absolutely perfect, as the standard; by comparing of things with which, and measuring of them, we take notice of their approaching more or less near thereunto. Nor indeed could these gradual ascents be infinite, or without end, but they must come at last to that which is absolutely perfect as the top of them all. Lastly, we could not perceive imperfection in the most perfect of all those things which we ever had sense or experience of in our lives, had we not a notion or idea of that which is absolutely perfect, which secretly comparing the same with, we perceive it to come short thereof. And we might add here, that it is not conceivable neither, how there should be any lesser perfection existent in any kind were there not first something perfect in that kind, from whence it was derived; this of Boëtius [10] being the very sense and language of nature in rational beings: Omne, quod imperfectum esse dicitur, id diminutione perfecti imperfectum esse perhibetur. Quò fit, ut, si in quolibet genere imperfectum quid esse videatur, in eo perfectum quoque aliquid esse, necesse sit. Etenim sublatâ perfectione, unde illud, quod imperfectum perhibetur, exstiterit, ne fingi quidem potest. Neque enim a diminutis inconsummatisque natura rerum cepit exordium; sed ab integris absolutisque procedens, in hæc extrema, atque effœta dilabitur, "Whatsoever is said to be imperfect, is accounted such by the diminution of that which is perfect; from whence it comes to pass, that if in any kind any thing appear imperfect, there must of necessity be something also, in that kind, perfect. For perfection being once taken away, it could not be imagined from whence that which is accounted imperfect should have proceeded. Nor did the nature of things take beginning from inconsummate and imperfect things, but proceeding from things absolute and complete, thence descended down to these lower, effete, and languid things." But of this more elsewhere.[1]

[10] De Consolat. Philos. lib. 3. p. 69. 70. Edit. Vallini.

[1] Our author has here expressed the opinion of the Platonists, whom he closely followed. For they maintain that all men naturally have impressed and implanted in their minds an idea of an absolutely perfect nature. Of which number also was

Wherefore, since *infinite* is the same with *absolutely perfect*, we having a notion or idea of the latter, must needs have of the former. From whence we learn also, that though the word

Boetius, with whose words our author closes his discussion. But most others think differently, and contend that by the contemplation of things not entirely perfect, we attain by degrees to a knowledge of an absolutely perfect nature, and therefore deny that we bring with us into the world any innate idea of the kind. Wherefore it is no wonder that Dr. Cudworth's opinion has had few favourers, and has been controverted by some, especially by Le Clerc, in the Bibliothèque Choisie, vol. 5. p. 59. What my opinion is will be manifest from the following remarks. 1. It is of little or no consequence, in this controversy against the Atheists, whether we agree with Dr. Cudworth, or embrace the opposite opinion. All that we seek to maintain against that profane sect is, that no man in his senses but must confess that there is an absolutely perfect nature of the kind in question, from which all other things have proceeded. Whence it follows by the very fact itself, that an idea of the kind, though perhaps imperfect, is to be found in the minds of all the rational part of mankind. Now, if an Atheist will grant us this, it will be of no importance to us whether he supposes this idea to be born with us, or to have come from without, and to have been occasioned by the contemplation of the existences with which we are surrounded. 2. If our learned author supposes that there is really innate in the minds of all men an explicit idea of an absolutely perfect nature (which was indeed the opinion of the Platonists, whose follower he is), he will be opposed both by experience and by reason. The idea of an absolutely perfect being properly consists of two propositions, one of which is, that there is an eternal cause of all things, and the other, that this eternal cause of all things is possessed of infinite perfections. But our daily observation shows that there are many men and not of contemptible understandings, who have made no doubt of the first proposition, but constantly affirm that there is a God, or an eternal cause of all things, though they have often conjoined many imperfections with the idea they entertain of God. Some have believed that God is corporeal; some have measured him by their own mental capacity; some have contaminated and obscured their idea of God by the gravest errors. Whence could so many and such great mistakes arise in the minds of men, if they had always present within them an interior and innate idea of an absolutely perfect nature? Would not this idea of an absolutely perfect nature have resisted all the aberrations of the mind, have prevented all persons from any unworthy thoughts of God, and have taken away all the disagreement that at present subsists among men, respecting the nature of God? Perhaps it will be said that this idea is indeed present, but through the fault of mankind it cannot exert its power, nor cure the errors of the mind. How can it be proved, I should like to know, that this idea is present? We can know what is concealed in our minds only by its operations and effects. Since then this idea has no operation, nor gives any token of its presence in this way, by what proof can we be certified that it really is present, and is concealed within our own minds? Moreover, since in our author's opinion perfection is the same as infinity, if there be in all mankind an explicit idea of perfection, there must also be in them a mental representation of infinity; but how a finite and limited mind can take in a full idea of infinity, is beyond my comprehension, and perhaps that of all others, who unanimously confess that we have no absolute idea of infinity; which Dr. Cudworth himself does not deny, as is plain from what has already preceded. By far the most preferable opinion, therefore, is that which supposes that the inward idea of God which manifests its influence as soon as we begin to use our reasoning powers, is not at first complete in all its parts, but is perfected and improved by meditation, education, and an attentive consideration of the works of Deity. Nor, 3. are the arguments here adduced by our author of sufficient weight to induce us to give up this opinion. His first position is, that perfection is the measure of imperfection, but that imperfection is not the measure of perfection. This is an old dogma of the Platonists, the meaning of which no doubt is, that no one can know what is imperfect, without first knowing what is perfect; wherefore, unless we had within us an idea of an absolutely perfect nature, none of us could know that the things we behold were devoid of perfection. But though we do not wish to detract any thing from the correctness of this tenet, it does not thence necessarily follow that we are endued by nature with an idea of an absolutely perfect

infinite be in the form thereof negative, yet is the sense of it, in those things which are really capable of the same, positive, it being all one with absolutely perfect; as likewise the sense of the word finite is negative, it being the same with imperfect. So that finite is properly the negation of infinite, as that which in order of nature is before it; and not infinite the negation of finite.[2] However, in those things which are capable of no true infinity, because they are essentially finite, as number, corporeal magnitude, and time, infinity being there a mere imaginary thing, and a non-entity, it can only be conceived by the negation of finite; as we also conceive nothing, by the negation of something; that is, we can have no positive conception thereof.

We conclude, to assert an infinite being, is nothing else but to assert a being absolutely perfect, such as never was not, or had no beginning, which could produce all things possible and conceivable, and upon which all other things must depend. And

being. It is indeed evident from it, that those who judge of the excellency and utility of things have within them a standard of something perfect, according to which they form their decisions; but this will by no means prove that this standard is implanted by nature and innate; for it may, notwithstanding, be collected and produced within us from meditation and a contemplation of outward existences. A similar answer may be given to the second argument: That men are accustomed to distribute the beings found in the universe into various classes, and to prefer and esteem some rather than others; but this they could by no means do, unless they had within them some idea of perfection with which they could compare and contrast visible objects. This reasoning will indeed prove that there is in the minds of those who distinguish created beings into their several grades a certain standard or rule of perfection, to which they look when they wish to set upon any thing its proper value; but it does not prove that this standard or rule is actually present in all minds, as they are born into the world. Nor is his third argument of greater weight: That nothing is seen by us in so perfect a form, but that we may observe some deficiency in it; but that we could not observe this unless our minds were imbued with an idea of that which is complete and perfect. We can easily admit all this argumentation; for it does not at all make against us. For this argument shows indeed the presence of the idea in question, in the minds of those who discover the faults and blemishes even of those things which approach nearest to perfection; but it does not point out its origin and causes, or prove that it is coeval with ourselves. But 4. our author concludes not amiss, that since we have an idea of an absolutely perfect being, we must necessarily also have some notion of something infinite.

[2] To the best of my apprehension, neither of the two words, *finite* and *infinite*, can be absolutely said to be positive, or absolutely *negative*. But a twofold idea is common to them both, of which the one denies and the other affirms something. For these words have a double meaning and power, one *grammatical* and the other *philosophical*, as is the case with nearly all the words used in philosophical explanations. The grammatical sense is the individual power and purport of the word, but the philosophical sense is the explanation of the nature of the thing to which the words are applied. If the words *infinite* and *finite* are regarded grammatically, there can be no doubt but that the former has a negative, the latter an affirmative signification. For the *infinite* properly means that which is without bounds, and the *finite* that which is contained by limits. But the case is different if we regard the philosophical ideas attached to these words. For the *infinite*, with philosophers, is identical with the most complete and perfect nature; but *finite* existences are those which are at the greatest distance from perfection. So that if these words are viewed under this aspect, *infinite* will doubtless have a *positive* sense, and *finite* a *negative*: and in this last sense Dr. Cudworth uses these two words in this passage.

this is to assert a God; one absolutely perfect Being, the original of all things: God, and Infinite, and Absolutely Perfect, being but different names for one and the same thing.[3]

[3] This discussion on the nature of infinity will appear to many novel and singular, since it widely departs from the common and usual method of treating this argument. Our ears are accustomed to the words, infinite time, infinite magnitude, infinite number, and many propositions are constantly laid down by philosophers respecting these infinities. So that he who denies all infinity whatever to magnitude, time, and number, and will by no means admit that any of these can possibly be infinite, cannot but appear to those who have been otherwise instructed as prone to what Cicero once called admirabilia, "paradoxes." Hence also Le Clerc, who, as I have already said, was in other respects a subtle and most acute genius, plainly professes his dissent from Dr. Cudworth on the nature of infinity, and many since have thought that the matter was explained by our author with more subtlety than truth. But if his remarks be more attentively examined and tried by our internal first principles of reasoning, it will be apparent that they possess much more truth than they seem at first sight to have. Several who have undertaken to philosophize respecting infinity (as might be instanced in many examples) have only had in view the grammatical import of the word *infinite*; whence it has resulted that they have confounded those things which are truly infinite with those which are only improperly so called, merely in respect to ourselves; and they have reasoned as if something actually existed infinite in magnitude, time, or number. But Dr. Cudworth has in this discussion almost entirely laid aside this grammatical meaning, and has only had regard to the internal nature of the thing really designated by this word; on which account he seems widely to differ from other philosophers. I could wish that he had explained and expanded his meaning with less intricacy and more order, and then it would have been involved in less obscurity. But doubtless a desire of brevity prevented him from going into more of length and detail. I will therefore endeavour to treat more simply these matters, which are in other respects surrounded with great difficulties, and will try to explain them apart from those subtleties which have occurred to my mind while thinking about them. I shall proceed as if nothing had been written on the subject; in which course, if perchance I may fall into error, I shall be easily pardoned by those who reflect that in nothing do finite minds sooner fail than in discussions respecting infinity; which reason Des Cartes alleged for his own silence on the subject. "Since we ourselves are finite," says he, "it were absurd for us to determine aught respecting infinity, and thus to endeavour to limit and comprehend it," Princip. Philos. part 1. sect. 26. p. 7.

In the first place, every rational person will admit, that something has existed from all eternity, and that whatever has thus eternally existed must exist necessarily and without a cause. This is so certain, that no one can deny it, consistently with reason. For though no mortal may understand what it is that has been eternally existent by an absolute necessity, yet that this is its nature is as certain as that two and two make four. From this idea, of which it is impossible to divest the mind, immediately arises the idea of infinity. For two consequences are plain and evident. 1. That which is necessarily and self-existent cannot be contained and confined within any particular locality, but must be every where, or if we may so speak, must be universally and equally present throughout infinity. For if this nature were absent from any locality, or were contained within specific limits, some cause would have immediately to be assigned why it were not present in a particular spot. But then this nature would not be necessarily uncaused and self-existent; but there would be another cause, apart from it, by means of which it was confined and restrained; that is, it would not be what it is. This reflection leads us to that infinity which some call that of *fulness*, or *plenitude*, and which we more correctly call with theologians *immensity*. No human mind indeed has penetration enough to explain and comprehend the nature and mode of this infinity; for if any one possessed sufficient penetration he would no longer be a human being, circumscribed within certain limits, both as regards his mind and body. But no one, I think, will deny the proposition who has learned the art of reasoning, and understands the properties necessarily attaching to particular existences. 2. What is necessarily and self-existent must be fraught with all the perfections of which we can form any idea. For should any perfection be wanting to this

We come now to the fourth atheistic objection: That theology is nothing but an arbitrarious compilement of inconsistent and contradictious notions. Where, first, we deny not, but that

external nature, or should any limit be assigned to the perfections it possesses, doubtless there would be some cause why something was deficient in it. But as soon as we imagine the presence of any such cause, we deny that the subject of discussion is necessarily and self-existent, without any cause, and allow that there was something pre-existent and more powerful. From which considerations it is again manifest that *infinity of perfection* is what no one can deny without renouncing his reason. The *infinite* therefore is properly that which has existed necessarily from all eternity; and since what has existed by necessity and without a cause cannot but be immense and absolutely perfect, and immensity is undoubtedly to be reckoned among perfections, it is evident that it may be properly said that *infinite* and *absolutely perfect* are words of like signification. Wherefore, if Dr. Cudworth gives so wide an acceptation to the word *perfection*, as to comprehend under it an infinity of locality (as I suspect he does), I do not see how he is wrong in saying that *infinity* is nothing else than *perfection*, and on the other hand, that *perfection* is nothing else than *infinity*. His language is indeed rather different from what is usual among those who discuss this subject; but still he has expressed the matter itself with propriety and accuracy. From these considerations proceed the following corollaries, which will, I think, tend to throw some light on this argument.

1. There is in all human minds an idea of *infinity;* for they possess an idea of an eternal and necessary existence. Whoever therefore denies that there is aught infinite either in regard to locality, or in respect of attributes and perfections, denies that any thing is eternal, that is, they speak absurdly, and overthrow the first foundations of reason.

2. Whatever is necessary and self-existent is also infinite; and on the other hand, whatever is not necessary and self-existent cannot be infinite. For what is not necessarily existent must have some cause; and what is produced by any cause, must of necessity be bounded by its cause. Therefore it can neither possess universal perfection, nor can be universally present, nor can have existed from eternity.

3. Matter cannot be infinite, either as regards duration or locality: for it is destitute of several perfections, as is universally known by daily experience. But what is deficient even in one attribute is manifestly bounded by some cause. Whatever then is finite and limited in respect of perfection, can by no means be unlimited and infinite with respect to duration and locality. Whatever doctrines are different from these are self-repugnant and contradictory; for they affirm that matter is bounded by some cause, and yet that it possesses properties which are consistent only with a nature that is necessary and self-existent.

4. Those who grant that any thing has necessarily existed from all eternity, and yet deny the existence of a God, are ignorant of their own meaning, and are as much in error as if any one should say, that there was a king in the commonwealth, and yet should deny that any one in it had the power of making and administering laws. That nature, in which all imaginable virtues and perfections are inherent, is God. To deny, therefore, the existence of such a nature, is precisely to contend that there is nothing but what is bounded by some cause, and contained within definite limits. But whoever entertains this persuasion must at the same time admit that nothing has a necessary and uncaused existence. But if there is nothing necessary and uncaused, there is at the same time nothing eternal; and those who deny the existence of any thing eternal will do well to take care that they do not afford matter of ridicule to all rational persons. To deny a God is therefore completely to overthrow and destroy the foundations of all rational discussion, and to sin against the first axioms of reason.

I might, if I chose, make further deductions from what has been already said; but since I do not wish to be more subtle or more protracted than is proper, I will content myself with these. I know that many other questions are usually started by those who are called philosophical doctors concerning the nature of infinity; and I will readily permit those who are so inclined, to employ their minds about them, if they will allow to me and others the liberty of saying, that it is safer for mankind to measure themselves by their own standard, than to wish to know every thing which by

as some Theologers (or bigotical Religionists) of later times extend the divine omnipotence to things contradictious and impossible, as to the making of one and the same body, to be all of it, in

common consent is allowed to be above our ability, and of a peculiarly abstruse nature. I am also aware that some philosophers have not hesitated to circumscribe within certain definitions what they term *infinity*; but I am persuaded that many of these have disguised their own ignorance by words to which they themselves have not attached any meaning. Some have magisterially declared, that "infinite locality is but a point; infinite duration is a moment." But those who speak thus seem to me either to speak without meaning, or to utter contradictory assertions. "A point" and "a moment" are doubtless words having a finite signification, and therefore they who call infinity either "a point" or "a moment," at once say that it is finite. But if they do not wish these words to be taken in this acceptation (which must certainly be the case if they would not appear ridiculous), they should either clearly explain to us what ideas they attach to these words when applied to infinity, or must at least confess that they have ventured to explain a subject, the nature of which they do not comprehend, in words of whose force and power they are ignorant; that is, that they have endeavoured to throw upon a most obscure topic light drawn from the densest gloom.

Thus much being premised, I will now proceed in order to the consideration of those things, to which Dr. Cudworth (differently from other philosophers) denies that infinity can in any way be ascribed; namely, *magnitude* or *extension*, *number*, and *time*. Whoever will remember that the word *infinite* is taken by him in the philosophical sense, and is used by him as synonymous with *absolutely perfect*, will immediately perceive that nothing whatever has been committed by him worthy of reprehension. For since the things in question are nothing in themselves, but only *properties*, *modes*, *and relations* of real existences, it is plain that they are not of a kind to partake of the highest imaginable perfection. He therefore who inquires, "whether number be infinite or not?" does not mean, "whether there be in number all the perfections and attributes we can possibly conceive of?" but only inquires, "whether there be any number without bound or limit?" The same may be said of space, magnitude, and time. In short, those who call God *infinite* use the word in the sense we have called philosophical; but those who treat of infinite magnitude, time, space, and number, have in their minds the grammatical meaning, and simply seek to ascertain whether these things are confined within definite limits. But Dr. Cudworth seems to have expressly denied to these things all infinity whatever, whether in the philosophical or grammatical sense of the word; so that it remains to be seen by us whether time, magnitude, and number are without limit or not.

I will begin with *magnitude* or *extension*. Magnitude or extension, as all are aware, is the property of all things. But there are two classes of existences that can possess this property, *body* or *matter*, and *space*. We will speak of each separately. The first inquiry then will be, Whether body or matter is infinite in extension? or, Whether infinity is, or is not, inconsistent with the nature of matter? Or again, to change the mode of expression, Whether that nature which we call matter is as widely extended as it possibly can be, and as much so as we suppose the divine nature and essence to be? To solve this question, I would first observe, that those who maintain that matter is infinite must choose one of two alternatives: either, that matter is, by its own nature, infinite, or what is the same thing, that it has been necessarily and in itself infinite from all eternity; or, on the contrary, that God has formed and created out of nothing an infinite quantity of matter. If they adopt the first view, they are easily convicted of error. For, since what is necessarily and self-existent cannot but possess all possible and imaginable perfections, while matter is, on the contrary, of that kind of existences which are subject to defects and changes, it is plain that it cannot have been self-existent from all eternity. I pass over other arguments, by which very acute authors have lately proved that the dictates of right reason are violated by those who suppose matter to be self-existent. See Jacques Abbadie, De la Vérité de la Religion Chrétienne, sect. 1. cap. 6. sect. 4. p. 49. &c. Dion. Petavius, Dogmata Theol. vol. 1. lib. 3. cap. 5. 6. p. 143. &c. and many others besides. But if they prefer the latter supposition, the controversy will take a widely different turn. I am not unaware of what has been said from Des Cartes' time downwards on the infinity of

several distant places at once; so may others sometimes unskilfully attribute to the Deity things inconsistent or contradictious to one another, because seeming to them to be all perfections.

matter, in which I must confess are many subtle and acute thoughts; but I am at the same time aware that the controversy has been sometimes carried on on both sides as if our puny and narrow minds were adequate to the comprehension of the infinite. Some, therefore, of Des Cartes' followers (from whom their master does not widely differ) have denied that matter is finite, because its limits are beyond the comprehension of our minds. But there have been others again, who, by nearly the same argument, have sought to prove that matter is finite, because no matter can be imagined so great that nothing can be added to it. In my opinion, neither of these are right. For what wise man, I should like to know, would be so presumptuous as to measure all truth by the power and compass of his own mind, and would deny the existence of any thing because his own mental weakness prevented him from forming a complete idea of it? I will take a simpler method, and will at once deny that matter can possibly be infinite, for this reason alone, that infinity and matter are entirely inconsistent with each other, or, in a word, *contradictory*. Every one, I suppose, will admit that matter consists of parts, and is therefore divisible. (See Bibliothèque Française, vol. 21. p. 254.) But what is infinite, as it has no bound, so also it cannot consist of parts, nor can be in any way divisible. For if it could be divided and separated into parts, it would then have a boundary, and would not be infinite. Those, therefore, who hold that matter was made infinite by God, maintain the following supremely absurd proposition: That God has done things utterly impossible to be done, namely, has made the same thing divisible and indivisible, possessed and not possessed of parts, infinitely extended, and yet definitively circumscribed. I will explain my meaning more clearly. Those who assert that matter was created infinite by God, will not deny that he can, by his wondrous might and power, subtract and take away something from this infinite matter, or annihilate some part of it. For who would be so mad as to affirm that God could educe from nothing an infinite quantity of matter, and deny that he could again destroy and reconvert into nothing any portion of it? But if God could do this, must there not be some boundary to that matter which we have been calling infinite? For whatever can have any part subtracted and broken off must necessarily have some boundary, which if it had not, not infinite power itself could take aught from it. But what has any boundary, or what can be deprived even of the smallest part, will be termed infinite only by those who are ignorant of the meaning of the word. To proceed. Let us suppose God to restore to the material universe that part of it which he had taken away: what then? Will matter, which was finite when that part was taken away, again become infinite when it is restored? Those who maintain the infinity of matter cannot but admit this. But then they will oppose their own views, and fall into difficulties from which they cannot escape but by the renunciation of their opinion. That portion which we suppose God to have removed and separated from infinite matter is certainly finite; therefore, if it be again added to the matter from which it was taken, it will still be finite; for assuredly it would be absurd and irrational to suppose that this portion would be converted from finite to infinite on being added to its whole. But if this be admitted will it not be the same thing as granting matter to be finite? For we have two finites; the finite part separated from its whole, and the finite whole depriyed of its part. These two finites are supposed to be again joined and united by God. Is it possible, then, that this union of two finites can make an infinite? Can that matter which was finite become infinite by the addition of a finite portion? Certain I am, that no sane and rational person can ever imagine that from two finites joined and united, that is from two things circumscribed by bounds and limits when combined and associated, can result an infinite existence, destitute of all bounds. It would be much less absurd to affirm, that the riches of Crœsus could be made up from the halfpence of two beggars, or that the union of two candles could compose the sun. It appears then that those who call matter infinite make use of words without any real ideas, and that the thing itself is to be reckoned among those which cannot by any means be done and are called *contradictory*. Wherefore I think that Dr. Cudworth is correct in supposing that not even the infinite power of God can create any magnitude to which nothing further can be added. For since infinity is entirely repugnant to the nature of matter, and God himself cannot do what

As for example, though it be concluded generally by theologers, that there is a natural justice and sanctity in the Deity, yet do some notwithstanding contend, that the will of God is not de-

is contradictory, it is plain that those who suppose the Deity able to create matter without bound or limit, do not so much honour and reverence God as they overthrow those first principles of reasoning from which all deductions respecting the divine attributes are drawn; since, while they appear to themselves to make many affirmations, they in reality affirm nothing at all. Many arguments to the same purpose occur to my mind: but since they are more abstruse, and require more explanation than I have room for here, I prefer to defer them until another occasion.

Respecting *space* Dr. Cudworth seems to me to have reasoned no worse than he has respecting magnitude, whatever may be thought by those who are opposed to his philosophy. First of all, I grant the existence of a nature in which bodies move and revolve, that is, space. For though I endeavour with all my power to imagine the abrogation of space after the subtraction of corporeal beings, as Des Cartes and many other philosophers have supposed, I am unable to accomplish it. I might almost say, that in the same way that all human minds have an idea of an eternal and self-existent being, they have also implanted in them an innate idea of space, which it is impossible for any one entirely to eject and extirpate. If any one inquire of me the nature of this existence which I have called space, I must answer that I am ignorant of it, but yet am certain of the existence of the thing so designated. If it be more closely demanded to what class of beings space belongs, I must refer for my answer to Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, lib. 2. cap. 13. p. 192. Peter Gassendi's Physics, sect. 1. lib. 2. cap. 1. p. 182. of the first volume of his works, Newton, Clarke, and others. Is space then finite or infinite? (See on this subject the Bibliothèque Germanique, tom. 37. p. 127.) I know that some famous authors, to whose merits and learning I in other respects pay deference, have not hesitated to attribute infinity to space. Nor is this a modern opinion, but derived from those whose piety and virtue are now above suspicion. But I think Dr. Cudworth has acted more wisely in departing from this opinion, and denying that space can possibly be called infinite. Space, of whatever kind it may be, must either have been self-existent from all eternity, or must have been created and made by God. If the former alternative be taken, either it will not differ from God himself, or rather from the immensity of God, or else will exist apart from God. But I think no person who is aware that to be self-existent is one and the same thing as to be possessed of every perfection, will affirm that space is necessarily and self-existent apart from and exclusive of God; and therefore that nothing can be self-existent except God. Since therefore this is the case, if space be not made or created, then it will be nothing else than the divine immensity, or God himself. Certainly some of the most eminent Christian fathers have been of this opinion, as Theophilus of Antioch, Arnobius, and others, and among the Jews, long before these, Philo, in his book De Profugis, p. 360. who has said that God τόπον εἶναι πάντων, "is the place of all things." See what has been collected on this subject by J. Alb. Fabricius upon the tenth book of Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, p. 639. Nor does the sentiment of Johannes Damascenus seem to me at all different, when he says, De Orthodoxâ Fide, lib. 1. cap. 13. p. 149. of the first volume of his works: Ὁ Θεὸς ἑαυτοῦ τόπος ἐστὶ, τὰ πάντα πληρῶν, καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰ πάντα ὢν, καὶ αὐτὸς συνέχων τὰ πάντα, "God is his own place, filling all things, and being over all things, and himself containing all things." Since the authority of Damascenus was very great in the Greek church, it is not wonderful that a considerable number of the Greek divines have after him inculcated this doctrine, and that it is even expressed, almost in the very words of Damascenus, in the Confession of the Greek Church, edited by Laurence Norman, quæst. 15. p. 34. ed. Lips. 1695, 8vo. Among modern philosophers this sentiment has been unhesitatingly avowed by David Derodon, a very famous author of the last century, in his Principles of Philosophy, as has been remarked by Peter Bayle, Lettres Choisies, tom. 3. n. 256. p. 373. And perhaps there is no real difference between this opinion and that of some recent philosophers, who suppose God "to have, in infinite space as in his sensorium, a thorough perception of all things, and to embrace them all as present within his own presence." See the immortal Sir Isaac Newton's Optics, quæst. 20. p. 315. of the Latin edition. See also some extracts in the Bibliothèque Anglaise of Armand de la Chapelle, tom. 10.

termined by any antecedent rule or nature of justice, but that whatsoever he could be supposed to will arbitrarily, would therefore be ipso facto just; which is called by them the divine

part 2. p. 358. &c. taken from the 31st volume of the Transactions of the Royal Society, or rather from a Dissertation of the great Dr. Edmund Halley's, contained in those Transactions. John Raphson has openly advocated this sentiment in his Demonstration of a Deity, p. 36. &c. London, 1712, 8vo.; and so have others, whose names are of less importance. I will pass over the very great difficulties with which this opinion is encumbered, and of which its own advocates are not ignorant; for it will be sufficient for my present purpose if I show that it is not inconsistent with Dr. Cudworth's doctrine respecting infinity. If God himself, or the divine immensity, be infinite space, the state of our question is altogether changed; for it is no longer an inquiry respecting the infinity of space, but respecting the nature of God himself, whom neither Dr. Cudworth nor any one else, who has learned the right use of reason, will deny to be infinite. Those who inquire into the limits and boundaries of space regard it as a thing separate and distinct from God; which if they did not, they need not trouble themselves with the solution of the question, whether space is circumscribed by bounds or not. Thus far have we replied to those who deny that space was made or created by God. But those who prefer the second alternative, and grant that space was thus made and created, will be more quickly hampered in their opinion by those difficulties in which we have just now seen those entangled who attribute infinity to matter. God either is or is not able to withdraw and abstract some portion from the infinite space he has made. If space cannot be thus diminished, the absurd result will follow, that God cannot destroy what he has made. But if God can detract aught from space, it will not be infinite but finite. For not another Solomon could understand how what is without any bound or limit could be either augmented or decreased. On this subject also we may therefore follow Dr. Cudworth, and take it for granted that more investigations and assertions than proofs, respecting space and its infinity, have commonly been in vogue.

I now come to *number*; which, unless I am mistaken, I shall prove with equal or greater ease, to be utterly incapable of being termed *infinite*. It is well known that number is nothing in itself, but only as applied to objects and actions; whence it is evident that when we speak of the infinity of number we only inquire whether the multiplicity of certain objects or actions be so great as to be absolutely without bound or limit. But even this statement of the question will at once show how those who do not hesitate to ascribe infinity to number involve themselves in contradictions. This will, however, appear much more clearly, if we more accurately investigate the force and meaning of the words *number* and *numbering*. I know not what number means if it be not a multiplicity of objects or actions, each of which separately is finite and limited. And *to number* means to examine how great is the multiplicity of any finite objects or actions, so that it may be known what are the bounds or limits of this or that multiplicity. He who numbers an army investigates within what limits is included a multitude of men whom he sees before him. He who numbers a flock seeks to know by what number or amount is limited the flock that he has in view. Whoever will compare these definitions with the meaning of the word *infinite* will doubtless immediately perceive that the word *infinite* cannot, without manifest contradiction, be joined with the word number, and that these two words are of such a kind that they mutually abrogate and destroy each other. What, pray, is infinity? Is it not that which is destitute of all bound or limit? But what is number? A multiplicity circumscribed within its own bounds. What is numbering? The ascertainment and investigation of the bounds and limits of any aggregation or multiplicity. What is meant then by the expression, *an infinite number*? Unless I am greatly mistaken, it implies that there is some multiplicity at once finite and infinite, divisible and indivisible, numerable and innumerable. What is the meaning of one who talks of numbering infinity? Certainly this, that he seeks to ascertain the boundaries of that which has no bounds. I cannot tell what error it is that is called in logic "a contradiction in terms," if those who speak in this fashion are free from it. I think I shall be able to throw further light on this subject, if I sum up the whole matter in a few questions. I will therefore first inquire of those who do not think infinity to be inconsistent with the nature of numbers, whether there must not be in every number some

sovereignty, and looked upon as a great perfection; though it be certain, that these two things are directly contradictious to one another, viz. that there is something *φύσει*, in its own nature

extreme from which any one who is about to ascertain the extent of the number may begin? They will answer in the affirmative. Certainly to affirm that any number is destitute of an extreme, or that any thing entirely destitute of a beginning can be numbered, is it to deny and affirm the same thing in a breath. But what is infinite has no extreme whatever, is equally destitute of beginning and of end. Aristotle correctly observes, in the 8th book of his Physics, cap. 5. sect. 4. p. 587. Τῶν ἀπείρων οὐκ ἐστὶν οὐδὲν πρῶτον, "Infinites have no beginning." What then is an *infinite number?* A number that is not a number, a thing bounded and not bounded at one extremity, finite and infinite. Secondly, I ask, does not number consist of several things, each of which is finite? This again will be allowed, I think, by all wise men. But if this be granted, I proceed to inquire, Can a number of finites make up an infinite? This will be denied, unless they grant the absurd conclusion that there is finitude in infinity. Indeed, if I have any knowledge at all of these matters, he who affirms that an infinite whole can be made up of several finite existences, affirms and denies in the same breath that it is infinite at all. What then is an infinite number? A finite infinity, that is nothing whatever. Thirdly, I inquire whether number be not a multiplicity of separate parts? which I think no one will deny. For if number has no parts, or be a continuous whole, it could not by any means be numbered, and therefore would not be number. Let those then who think that number can be infinite tell me whether infinity admits of parts and division. This I must deny; for if infinity had any parts there would be throughout it aggregation, finiteness, and bounds; while, on the contrary, reason informs us that what is properly infinite is the most simple thing imaginable. Therefore an infinite number is the same thing as a number that is not a number, or an innumerable number.

Two plausible objections to what has been said have, however, occurred to me. First, it is possible that some will recall to our memory the actions of the Deity; and will say that as God has always been in action, and has acted from all eternity, therefore the number of the divine actions must be boundless and infinite. But it will be sufficient to reply to any one making this objection, that we are not here discussing any thing respecting the Deity and divine things, which we allow and profess to be infinite. Again, the very persons who urge this against us deny that the actions and works of God can be numbered; in which denial they also deny that what is infinite and destitute of limit can be numbered. It is therefore a very improper and inaccurate expression to say, that the number of the divine actions is infinite; for that which is in itself innumerable cannot with propriety be called a number. Those who wish to wear the appearance of rationality in their words should admit that no number can be made of the operations of Deity, and that it is impossible in any way to bring the divine actions under the category of number. Finally, although in our mind and intellect we distinguish the divine operations into separate portions, and in some sense may be said to number them, yet those who measure divine things by an accurate standard, and not according to human modes of thought, are well aware that there is in them nothing of divisibility, but that the divine volition and power has willed and performed all things in one continuous and undivided action. For if the divine actions and operations were mutually divided and disjoined, and therefore really could be numbered just as human actions can, the divine nature would be subject to the same imperfections as the human, and the attributes of Deity would be separate and distinct from his essence.

In the next place perhaps the *mathematical* or *physical infinity* may be objected to us. It is indeed a well-known fact that the most eminent mathematicians and physical philosophers have laid it down as a principle that matter can be infinitely divided; or, what, as I imagine, amounts to the same thing, have contended that the number of particles of which matter consists is infinite. If any dare to call this doctrine into doubt, they are condemned by many of this class as guilty of ignorance and stupidity. If it might be permitted me to cut this knot rather than untie it, I should say that nothing is clear to me on this subject, since I have little time to spend in this literary trifling. Nor do I say thus much without the authority of a very great name. Des Cartes, whom mathematicians will never assert to have halted in the porch of their

just and unjust, or a natural sanctity in God; and that the arbitrary will and command of the Deity is the only rule of justice and injustice. Again, some theologers determining, That what-

temple of science, says, in his Epistles, part 1. ep. 67. ad Dr. Henr. More, p. 187 (see Bibliothèque Germanique, vol. 37. p. 124), "As respects the extent of the universe, the number of parts into which matter is divisible, and similar particulars, whether they be actually infinite or not, I must confess I do not know. I only know that I can perceive no limit to them; and therefore, with respect to myself, I call them indefinite." Not to rely however upon this reply, I might boldly deny that there is any infinity of this kind, which has been not inaptly called "infinity by section" by the Jesuits of Conimbra in their Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, lib. 6. cap. 9. p. 148. and elsewhere. Nor should I want arguments or precedents from most acute writers to support my position, and to make my opponents confess the connexion of inextricable difficulties with this kind of infinity. Perhaps if I urged nothing else than this single proposition, "The parts of a finite whole must also be finite," I should find work enough even for those whose reasoning powers in other respects I should greatly prefer to my own. But I take a plainer course, and laying aside all subtleties, I shall observe that this "infinity by section" (or, if the term be preferred, "mathematical infinity") is improperly called infinite, and widely differs from the metaphysical infinity which is here alone in question. For the metaphysical infinity is one continuous whole, and unbounded (if we may so speak) in both directions. But the infinity spoken of above differs in this, that it is not without beginning, although it may be said to have no end, and consists of innumerable parts. Thus much of *number*. It now only remains for me to speak of *time*, which Dr. Cudworth and several other learned men have denied to be capable of infinity.

It is well known that *time* and *eternity* are commonly opposed to each other. But all who so far disjoin these two as to imagine the one to be entirely opposite to the other, in so doing deny infinity to time. For eternity is infinite duration; and therefore if time be altogether different from eternity, it must in every respect be inconsistent with infinity. So that if I wished to finish the discussion in a few words, I might adduce that universal consent with which time and eternity are regarded as essentially different. But since universal agreement and common parlance are not the best preceptors of truth it will be proper for me more accurately to unfold and more clearly to explain the matter. First then, to prevent any ambiguous ideas in my readers' minds, I will plainly declare the proper point of investigation. *Time* may be regarded in a *double* aspect, either simply in itself, or as compared with those things which advance, glide, and proceed uniformly with time. *Time* considered in itself is a simple entity which is only rendered more obscure by definitions. As no one, however acute, can explain what space is apart from corporeal matter, since its nature is so simple as to elude the subtlety and comprehension of all; so also time can be the subject of no mental operation apart from those things which time contains. It is then usually called *duration;* but I could wish those who do so to consider that this word is by no means a definition of time abstractedly considered, but rather as referring to things which *endure*, or continue to exist. For *duration*, without any thing to *endure*, or to be a partaker of duration, is an empty sound, void of all signification. Let the acutest minds try their strength, whether it be equal to the task of explaining the nature of time in words that shall exclude all reference to the things that take place in time; which, if they do, I will gladly profess myself their disciple, and allow that what I have written has been rashly premature. I am not unaware that some very acute authors have been induced by this difficulty in pointing out the true nature and essence of time, to determine that time considered in itself is nothing else than a mental conception, "an entity of reason," as it is commonly called, or a mode of conceiving things. But I think they have, in order to avoid one difficulty, run into many others that are entirely inextricable. Thus it is the practice of many to reckon among mental delusions any thing that appears more simple and abstract than their own minds can comprehend. But it will, I imagine, be universally admitted, that should all men cease thinking, and even all motion come to a close, there would still be some duration in the world; whence it incontrovertibly follows, that it is a mistake to reckon it among rational entities. If *time* be regarded in connexion with the things we see or know, it is nothing else than the duration or continuance of their

soever is in God, is God, or essential to the Deity; they conceiving such an immutability to be a necessary perfection thereof, seem thereby not only to contradict all liberty of will in the

existence. But this duration comprehends a succession, and is distinguished into several intervals mutually exclusive of and separate from each other. Whence it follows that time, as related to the things which exist in time, is also divided into sections, moments, intervals, and changes; and is a certain kind of continuous existence capable of being divided and measured out into parts. In like manner, *eternity* may be considered by us under a double aspect, either abstractedly in itself or as it relates to God whom we conceive as existing in eternity. Of eternity considered absolutely and in itself we may say the same that we have of time regarded in the abstract; that we cannot tell what it is; nor do I think St. Peter or St. Paul could have given any other answer as long as they continued in this mortal life. Our minds are dazzled and, as it were, carried out of themselves, whenever they turn their view to that immeasurable duration which we call eternity; nor can they find words to express their feelings. But if eternity be viewed in connexion with God, there is no reason why we should not define it to be the unbounded and endless duration of the divine existence. But while I thus divide eternity into itself abstractedly and as viewed in connexion with God, I do not intend to enter upon the abstruse question, whether eternity considered in itself is or is not identical with the Deity. On the contrary, I leave this discussion to the consideration of those whose especial duty it is to philosophize. It will be sufficient for me at present, that the question be stated as if eternity were something distinct from God himself, in the same way as time is conveniently conceived of as existence apart from the things that take place in time.

With these explanations we will now proceed to the point. And first it will be necessary to examine what kind of time is spoken of when time is declared not to be infinite, or, what comes to the same thing, when time is opposed to eternity. If time in the abstract be meant, no account being taken of the things which endure and continue to exist, I do not see any reason why infinity should not be ascribed to time. For the very time in which we live, and in which the works of God exist, does not in its essence differ from eternity; but belongs to infinite duration, and according to our usual mode of conception is part and parcel of eternity, although, properly speaking, there are no parts of eternity or infinite duration. Those therefore who disallow the infinity of time must necessarily mean that kind of time which is connected with created things, since they deny the possibility of comparing time with infinity. But this kind of time, it is at once evident, is entirely inconsistent with infinity, if the nature of each be mutually compared. For eternity is entirely destitute of beginning and of end; but time, considered in the relation already spoken of, did not begin previously to the existence of the things of time. But the matter is not yet settled. Another most intricate question still remains, in the explanation of which many have found toil enough who have however never been suspected of dulness and stupidity; whether that kind of time which on a consideration of its limits is entirely separate from infinity, can in respect to its extent be in no possible way reconcileable with it? To put the same thing in different words: Is there an entire and absolute inconsistency between time and infinity? Is the internal measure of time the same as the measure of eternity? Does God exist in eternity in the same way as his works exist in time? Is there in eternity no succession whatever, no continuance of duration, no moments or intervals, all which are well-known to exist in time? The meaning of all these questions, if attentively examined, will be found to be one and the same; the only difference between them being that one and the same thing is presented to our notice under various aspects. In the examination of this question much labour and ingenuity has been expended during many centuries. Some have contended that the measure of eternity and that of time are altogether different; others have admitted of some succession in eternity, with a reservation however in favour of the divine immutability; others again have held that eternity is a certain fixed point or moment, which is as a whole coexistent with all the intervals of time, and has nothing prior or subsequent to it; while another class have altogether denied the truth of this, and averred that both time and eternity consist alike of successive moments.

The principal ancient philosopher who has expressly taught that eternity is not evolved by portions, but is destitute of all difference between present and future, is, so

Deity, which themselves notwithstanding contend for in a high degree, that all things are arbitrarily determined by divine decree; but also to take away from it all power of acting ad

far as I know, Plato, who has been followed by several of his own school, and, among the Jews, by Philo. Quotations of this description have been collected by Dionysius Petavius, Dogmata Theol. vol. 1. lib. 3. de Deo. cap. 4. p. 138, &c. to which, were it necessary, many more might easily be added. The only one I will mention is Chalcidius, in his comment on Plato's Timæus, sect. 25. p. 265. and sect. 199. p. 250. Equally great is the number of Christian divines who have entertained the same view; the principal of whom are also mentioned by Petavius, ubi supra. But this opinion almost universally prevailed from the sixth century after Christ, among the divines of the Christian church. In this age Boëthius acutely and ingeniously contended for the fixed and immoveable nature of eternity, in his fifth book De Consolatione Philosophiæ, p. 137, and expresses his meaning in this definition: "Eternity is the entire, simultaneous, and perfect possession of endless life." This reasoning, together with many similar doctrines of his, was so pleasing to posterity, that all subsequent schoolmen and theologians, as if by common consent, gave in their adherence to these his words. From the schoolmen this tenet passed over to those who have taught and guided the Lutheran church; and not to us only, but also to those who call themselves "Reformed" [the Calvinists]. The first founders indeed both of our own and the "Reformed" churches, though they have taught that God is eternal and infinite, have not decided on the mode of the divine eternity. Melancthon has said nothing of it in his Commonplaces, nor Calvin in his Institutes. Nor do I recollect that Luther himself has any where expressly said aught with a view to throw light on this question. For since these great men were decidedly averse to the dry and disputatious method of treating theology which had been followed by the schoolmen, they thought they had nothing to do with certain doctrines which they saw it was scarcely possible to explain in a popular way. But their followers were compelled by the craftiness of the Socinians and other opponents of divine truth to bring this doctrine again into notice. These latter having attempted to contract all religion within the compass of their own intellect, and presuming to estimate the nature of God in accordance with their own (whence originated many pestilential and deadly errors), a more subtle and acute discussion than had previously taken place was commenced respecting the Divine attributes, and the eternity of God was also, among other things, subjected to a more rigorous examination. Servetus himself, who held the whole race of schoolmen in such detestation, could find nothing in their doctrine concerning eternity worthy of blame, a fact which I think it worth while to prove out of his own writings. For in his second book De Trinit. Erroribus, p. 53. *a*, he says, "Besides, the idiom or custom of prophetic diction makes it manifest that there is in God no difference of times; for they speak of future things as being already past, and on the other hand, sometimes put one tense for another, not only to signify the certainty of the event, but also to show that in God there are not these three differences of times, as present, past, and future; for things seen are already fixed and perpetual to him who sees them." Much more is said in the same place by this author, who had his lucid intervals and was sometimes very acute; which, for the sake of brevity, I omit. But a widely different view, as I have already observed, has been taken up by those who in other respects are great admirers of Servetus: I mean the Socinians; as well as by Conrad Vorstius, in his well-known book, De Deo et Attributis Divinis, which gave rise to so many controversies. And since the followers of Arminius have not distinctly renounced this sentiment, sharp contests have been occasioned with Vorstius and the Arminians on this account. And hence it has arisen that not only the doctrine of an unchangeable eternity, destitute of all succession, has been introduced into nearly all systems of theology, both Lutheran and Reformed, composed since that time, but also the opinion of a succession in eternity is ranked among the tenets by which the Arminians are distinguished from other Christians. See the venerable and most excellent Gustavus George Zeltner's Breviarium Controversiarum cum Remonstrantibus, quæst. 7. p. 56. I very much doubt whether all who have contended for what is called *a fixed* eternity, have been influenced simply by reason in their adherence to that opinion. It is evident that many discuss the point in so confused a manner as to make it apparent that they *are not* sufficiently aware of all the importance of the argument in dispute. But the

extra, and of perceiving or animadverting things done successively here in the world. But it will not follow from these and the like contradictions of mistaken theologers, that therefore

Platonists, unless I am much mistaken, have been compelled to embrace this opinion as much by a consideration for the immunity of their sect and of their other tenets as by the power of truth and reason. This party have laid it down as an axiom that the universe had no beginning, or that it existed from all eternity as well as the Deity. One of the principal arguments of those who opposed this doctrine was, that it either abolished all distinction between God and the universe, or that it involved the supposition of two infinite and eternal beings; both of which alternatives they affirmed to be inexcusable errors, altogether unworthy of philosophers. In order to meet this objection, it was absolutely necessary for the Platonists to discover some difference between the eternity of the universe and of the Deity; and they thought they had sufficiently supplied this by saying that the eternity of God was no other than a certain point or moment, while the perpetuity of the universe was to be regarded as a successive duration.

We have thus seen by what weighty authorities has been supported the opinion which denies all succession in eternity. It will now be proper to point out a few who consider it no error to allow that difference of times is consistent with the nature of eternity. Of all sects the Socinians have been most decided on this subject, and their opinions have been collected by John Adam Scherzer, in his Collegium Anti-Socinianum, disp. 5. thes. 4. p. 47. &c.; though even among them some are more guarded, and do not scruple to approach towards the opinion commonly received among ourselves. Those who are called Remonstrants or Arminians, have been more cautious; for though they acutely and ably dispute against those who hold eternity to be *fixed*, yet for the most part usually confess at the end of the discussion, that this is a very subtle question, on which opposite opinions may be entertained, without any grievous offence against truth. Simon Episcopius, in his Theological Institutes, cap. 9. p. 287. &c. of the first volume of his works, is the most comprehensive writer against a *simultaneous* kind of eternity, and has exhibited nearly all the resources of his genius upon the argument. But when he afterwards recurs to the same subject, cap. 14. p. 298 *a*, he thus terminates his dissertation:—"Though the method we have pointed out appears to me the safer and easier of the two, yet it is safest of all to believe in the existence of eternity, and to leave its nature to God and the disclosures of time, maintaining peace and concord among the disputants." But what, after all, will be the use of so many words in explaining the nature of eternity, if the safest way is to be entirely silent on the subject? Authors who have been more confident on this subject are Stephen Curcellæus, in his Institutes of the Christian Religion, lib. 2. cap. 3. p. 45. of his works, and Le Clerc, Ontologia, chap. 5. p. 352. and Bibliothèque Choisie, vol. 5. p. 56. &c. But on the other hand, Philip Limborg, in his Christian Theology, lib. 2. cap. 5. sect. 2. &c. p. 56. closely follows Episcopius, and after an exposition of the difficulties on both sides in sect. 10. p. 57. professes his "unwillingness to determine whether eternity be fixed or successive, since the Scripture does not decide the point." Others, however, who have nothing in common with the Socinians, advocate the successiveness of eternity; as Peter Gassendi, in his Physics, sect. 1. lib. 2. cap. 7. p. 227, of his works; and the able and eloquent Archbishop Tillotson, vol. 7. serm. 13. and vol. 6. serm. 6. whose words are quoted by Dr. Samuel Clarke, in his Demonstration of the Existence and Attributes of God, chap. 6. p. 65. and Clarke himself not obscurely manifests his own tendency to the opinion that admits a succession in eternity. To these may be added, Peter Bayle, who in his Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, vol. 4. art. Zabarella, p. 2901, 2902. brings many arguments against those who approve of Boëthius' definition of eternity; not indeed, by affirming any thing as certain, but in his usual way showing that we know nothing on the subject; but with this peculiarity, that he pronounces the Romish dogma of transubstantiation much easier of comprehension than this definition. It is not necessary for me to name any more advocates of this opinion.

I am not so presumptuous as to think that I am able to produce any new or solid observations, after the labours of so many able men; but to fill up my plan, I will ingenuously disclose my own thoughts on an attentive consideration of what has been said on both sides; not indeed to assume a magisterial or philosophical air, but, to give

theology itself is contradictious, and hath nothing of philosophic truth at all in it; no more than because philosophers also hold contradictory opinions, that therefore philosophy itself is con-

my opinion as one individual among many, seeking after probability and truth. I. The disputants in this controversy do not seem to me to have explained their meaning as plainly and perspicuously as is usually done in the discussion of abstract subjects. Sometimes it is doubtful whether they treat of eternity absolutely and separately considered, or as it is related to God. Episcopius seems clearly to speak of the eternity of God; but Limborg on the contrary says, "We do not inquire into the divine essence, but into the nature of eternity considered in the abstract. . . . There is no reason why we should not consider the idea of eternity in the abstract, which idea involves a succession of universal duration," *ubi supra*, sect. 7. p. 57. I am afraid that if this supposition be correct, the whole controversy will be found to have in it more subtlety than truth, and will turn out at last to be not on the subject itself, but on the power of our mental faculties. In like manner, it is uncertain whether those who hold a succession in eternity, mean a succession in respect to ourselves or to God. For they often speak as if they only meant that our mental weakness is such, that we cannot at all conceive of an eternity destitute of all succession. But it is of great consequence to the discussion that this point should be previously decided; for no one perhaps will deny that eternity as related to us may in a certain sense be said to have a succession. II. If the words *succession*, *moment*, *instant*, and *point* were banished from the controversy, I am much mistaken if it would not be relieved from much of the difficulty and obscurity that attends it. For when these words, which are taken from finite things, are applied to those that are infinite, the opinions of authors are often incorrectly apprehended, because they excite in the minds of others ideas not at all accordant with perfect and eternal existences. At the mention of a *succession*, our minds immediately think of such a succession as is to be found amongst created and visible realities. In like manner, the words *space*, *point*, *instant*, *moment*, at once recall to mind the things thus denominated among mankind at large. Thus, it sometimes happens that we attribute opinions to those whom we hear or whose works we read, to which they are entire strangers; they being through the poverty of human language, and the want of proper terms to express abstract ideas, obliged to make use of words appropriated to finite and visible things, but taken in a higher and more sublime sense; while we, on the other hand, heedlessly append to their expressions, the ideas usually associated with them, and thus give rise to many subsequent errors in disputation. Certain I am that those who maintain a succession in eternity, use the word *succession* in a far more abstract sense than the common; but those who are on the contrary side, being either ignorant or unmindful of this circumstance, reason as if the point in question were such a succession as is usually so termed amongst mankind. Again, I imagine that those who call eternity a point, an instant, or a moment, have better ideas than words; which opinion I am led to entertain from the answers they give to their opponents' arguments. For if we closely attend to these, they will not appear properly to mean that eternity is nothing but a *moment* or a *point*; for if they did so, they would make an infinite existence to be finite; but they only intend, I suppose, that eternity may be compared with a point or moment, in respect to the manner of duration, and not in regard to the duration itself. In short, they seem to me simply to say, that as there is no succession in a moment, so neither is there in eternity; though, at the same time, I am aware that some of them fancied they said much more; and certainly, if this be the case, I must enrol myself amongst those who cannot see the propriety of this definition. But its opponents argue as if its advocates supposed a moment and eternity to be one and the same thing. I could therefore wish that disputants on this subject would abstain from words of this kind, which are often incorrectly understood; and most of all, I could desire that the words *point* and *moment* were entirely excluded from the controversy, as they afford no explanation, as I have already observed, but rather tend to confuse the matter. Least of all are they to be tolerated, whose presumption I have already animadverted upon, who think they have given a clear definition of eternity when they call it a point or moment, when at the same time, if they are closely pressed, they themselves are afterwards forced to confess that they do not understand the meaning of these words as applied to eternity. But since it is too much to expect that all words of this kind, calculated to perplex the

tradictious, and that there is nothing absolutely true or false, but, (according to the Protagorean doctrine) all seeming and fantastical.

mind and to introduce error, should be entirely rejected, controversialists should always be careful to distinguish between their ordinary and their special import. III. Whoever entertains a constant recollection of the nature of infinity, cannot but perceive, if they follow out the idea, that those who exclude and separate from eternity all succession, approach much more nearly to the truth than the opposite party. What is infinite is stable, destitute of all bound, origin, or beginning, a simple, continuous, indivisible unit, in which there can be no reduplication, increase, nor junction; so that it can by no means be disunited, divided, dissected, or broken up. Therefore, eternity or infinite duration admits of no division, and it necessarily follows, that it has no parts, no dimensions, and consequently no moments or subdivisions. And this will not be denied even by some of those who maintain the *successiveness* of eternity, since they grant that subdivisions of time do not exist essentially in time, but only in the human mind. If this indeed be the case, I know not how eternity can be a series of successive moments. For where no parts exist, there can be no order or succession; where there are no moments properly so called, no subdivisions of time, there no sequence or series can possibly take place. The reason why human and created things glide, flow, and pass sensibly away, is that they are circumscribed by finite bounds. Infinity, therefore, if it gradually glided and flowed away, would not be infinite, but would involve some degree of finitude. I fear, therefore, that in this controversy some learned men will fall into the same error that often happens to us in other things, namely, imagining that what arises only from our own minds and senses, exists actually in external things themselves. We do indeed mark out eternity into certain portions, and imagine to ourselves in it certain divisions of time. These imaginary portions and divisions we then conceive of as having a real existence in eternity itself, when, on the contrary, they exist only in our own minds, and since we ourselves, whether in time or in eternity, perceptibly glide and pass along, we on that account imagine that eternity itself flows, glides, and passes along with us; which, however, if it were thus fluctuating and transitory, would not be eternity, but a limited existence. We may imagine a vast, immense space, entirely quiescent and destitute of all internal motion; and in this space we may conceive of a great number of rational creatures, gradually and perceptibly proceeding and moving onwards. The space itself is entirely indivisible, but the creatures contained in it measure it out in their own minds, and by reasoning fix in it various bounds and limits. Are these boundaries then in the space itself? No one will reply in the affirmative, for it is entirely destitute of parts. Where then are they? In the understanding of the imaginary creatures already mentioned. But still they persuade themselves that what is delineated in their minds actually exists in the space of which they occupy a certain part. The space itself is quiescent, and not in any way moved or disturbed. But these creatures, because they themselves change place, and have motion, unfoundedly suppose that the space moves and proceeds in unison with themselves. The very same thing happens to ourselves as often as we regard that immeasurable space of time which we call eternity. We inadvertently transfer to eternity itself that succession and order which we have in our own minds, and fancy that what belongs solely to ourselves pertains to eternity. It will perhaps be said that this illustration does not throw any light on the nature of eternity, but leaves it still involved in irremediable obscurity. But our answer is easy; that we do not pretend to disclose the essence of eternity; for if we could do this, we should no longer be men, whose minds are confined within limits, and those very narrow. Let it be sufficient for us, during the present state of existence, to understand and know the truth of things themselves; but let us be less eager about the investigation of the mode of existence, and do not let us forget that we are human. Nothing I am sure can be plainer than this axiom: that to conceive of order and succession in what is infinite, is to abrogate its infinity; but of the internal nature of an infinity destitute of succession, I must beg permission to continue ignorant, since a kind of dizziness seizes me whenever I attempt to scrutinize this vortex. What has been already said of eternity in the abstract, applies still more forcibly to it, as regarded in relation to God. For since he is infinite, it is evident that he cannot at all exist in eternity in the same way that created beings exist in time. IV. By the good leave,

But in the next place we add, that though it be true that the nature of things admits of nothing contradictious, and that whatsoever plainly implies a contradiction, must therefore of necessity be a nonentity; yet is this rule, notwithstanding, obnoxious to be much abused, when whatsoever men's shallow and gross understandings cannot reach to, they will therefore presently conclude to be contradictious and impossible. As for example, the Atheists and Materialists cannot conceive of any

therefore, of those whom I must confess to be more highly endowed than myself, I will say that it will be of use towards the settlement of this controversy, if we distinguish eternity into that which is *abstract*, and that which is *related* to ourselves. Eternity, *relatively to us*, is not without succession, for our mental faculties are not of so high an order that we can entirely divest ourselves of all ideas of succession when reasoning about it. As it is with those on board ship, so it is with us. To them the shore seems to recede, flee, and depart when the ship is speeding on its way, and cutting through the waves; but though the land is at perfect rest and totally unmoved, yet the most ingenious mind cannot so regulate its sight and ideas, though perfectly conscious of the true state of the case, as to emancipate itself from the deception. Thus we, as we fly with rapid wing towards the close of our lives, fancy that eternity (the most fixed of all things) and even God himself have the same constant and rapid motion that is impressed on ourselves. But eternity *in the abstract* rejects all succession, order, dimension, and division; and there can be little doubt but that those who warmly contend for the immutability, immensity, and infinity of the Deity, but at the same time deny that eternity is without order and succession, only mean that if eternity be regarded by our own mental faculties, we cannot but distribute it into successive periods and moments. V. Whatever else has been said on this argument I leave to its authors. It is sufficient for me to know that the divine essence and eternity are stable; I willingly pass by as unintelligible to me the assertions, more subtle than clear, that have been made respecting the nature of this stability. Boëthius' definition has more boldness than perspicuity, and moreover offends those who in other respects have the same views of eternity that we have. Let those who define eternity to be a *point* and a *moment*, see to it how they will explain their definition, and vindicate it from objections. I am determined to leave these expressions to others, lest I should appear to implicate in fresh difficulties an argument in its own nature sufficiently embarrassed, and by obscure phraseology to involve rather than explain a matter especially intricate and difficult of comprehension. Many theologians have, in accordance with the schoolmen, asserted that "eternity completely co-exists with all beings and all intervals of time;" which I cannot persuade myself to receive, since it appears to me to be entirely repugnant to my mental nature. These authors have endeavoured by the above words to explain the nature of the stability belonging to eternity; but for my own part I must ingenuously confess that that nature is entirely unknown to me; and I think it more creditable to avow one's own ignorance than to make a great show of wisdom in words that no mortal can possibly understand. This one conclusion appears to me plain and incontrovertible: that the succession and order which appear to us to exist in eternity are not in eternity itself, but only in our own minds; just as colours are not properly in the things we behold, but only in our own eyes. With this I am content. If any one says he can see further into the question, I do not envy him the knowledge he claims, and in return beg of him not to impugn my own diffidence. Thus much I thought proper to say, in order to defend and illustrate Dr. Cudworth's opinion on the nature of infinity, in which if I have erred, as may perhaps have happened, or if I have improperly expressed my meaning, let the candid reader reflect that the matter in question is the most abstruse and difficult that can possibly come under our notice. What may be the case with others when thinking of infinity, I know not; but for my own part I seem, when attentively contemplating eternity, to experience effects similar to those occasioned by looking stedfastly at the sun. As by the latter vision is destroyed, and the eyes greatly impaired, so my mind is dazzled and blunted, and I therefore grow weary of the continued effort of attention.

other substance besides body, and therefore do they determine presently, that incorporeal substance is a contradiction in the very terms, it being as much as to say, incorporeal body:[4] wherefore when God is said by theologers to be an incorporeal substance, this is to them an absolute impossibility. Thus a modern writer: "The universe, that is, the whole mass of things, is corporeal; that is to say, body. Now every part of body is body, and consequently every part of the universe is body; and that which is not body, is no part thereof. And because the universe is all, that which is no part of it, is nothing. Therefore when spirits are called incorporeal, this is only a name of honour, and it may with more piety be attributed to God himself, in whom we consider, not what attribute best expresseth his nature, which is incomprehensible, but what best expresseth our desire to honour him."[5] Where, incorporeal is said to be an attribute of honour, that is, such an attribute as expresseth only the veneration of men's minds, but signifieth nothing in nature, nor hath any philosophic truth and reality under it; a substance incorporeal being as contradictious as something and nothing. Notwithstanding which, this contradiction is only in the weakness and childishness of these men's understandings, and not the thing itself; it being demonstrable that there is some other substance besides body, according to the true and genuine notion of it. But because this mistake is not proper to Atheists only, there being some Theists also who labour under this same infirmity of mind, not to be able to conceive any other substance besides

[4] Hobbes' Leviathan, cap. 34. p. 183. "Body and substance," says he, "signify the same thing; and therefore the compound expression, *incorporeal substance*, is an unmeaning phrase, as if any one should say, *an incorporeal body*." See also, cap. 12. p. 56, and cap. 45. p. 307.

[5] I have here closely and almost literally translated Dr. Cudworth's English into Latin. For in all Hobbes' works that I have read (and I have read all that are of any consequence), I cannot point out a passage that exactly corresponds to these words. Dr. Cudworth seems here, in his usual way, to have quoted, not his words, but his meaning; and that this was Hobbes' meaning is apparent from several passages of his writings, and particularly from the thirty-fourth chapter of the Leviathan, in which are to be found many expressions similar to those here adduced. In p. 183, for instance, he says, "Body universally signifies what fills or occupies some particular place, and does not depend (as place itself does) on our own imagination, but is a real part of what we call the universe. For since the universe is an aggregate of all bodies whatever, it has no part which is not also body; nor can any thing properly be called body which is not some part of the universe." After which he proceeds to give the meaning of the word *spirit*, according to his own ideas; of which word after a review of some meanings of it taken, but with great inaccuracy, from the scriptures, he goes on to say, p. 184, "I find no other meanings of the word *spirit* in the sacred scriptures. If therefore there be any scripture text to which none of these significations will apply, that passage must be considered as being above our comprehension. Nor is this wonderful; since the nature of God is incomprehensible, and the names given to him are not so much applicable to his nature as to the honour that is due to him." In cap. 12. p. 56, there are some expressions which convey nearly the same meaning: "Some have said that God is an incorporeal spirit, perhaps not dogmatically as defining the divine nature by these words, but from a pious intention of honouring the Deity by an attribute excluding from him all the grossness of visible bodies."

body, and who therefore assert a corporeal Deity; we shall in the next place show, from a passage of a modern writer, what kind of contradictions they are which these Atheists impute to all theology; namely, such as these, that it supposes God to perceive things sensible, without any organs of sense; and to understand and be wise without any brains. "Pious men (saith he) attribute to God Almighty, for honour's sake, whatsoever they see honourable in the world, as seeing, hearing, willing, knowing, justice, wisdom, &c. But they deny him such poor things as eyes, ears, and brains, and other organs, without which we worms neither have, nor can conceive, such faculties to be: and so far they do well. But when they dispute of God's actions philosophically, then do they consider them again, as if he had indeed such facultics. This is not well, and thence is it that they fall into so many difficulties. We ought not to dispute of God's nature. He is no fit subject of our philosophy. True religion consisteth in obedience to Christ's lieutenants, and in giving God such honour, both in attributes and actions, as they in their several lieutenancies shall ordain."[6] Where the plain

[6] I have here again literally translated what is quoted by Dr. Cudworth as the very words of Hobbes. But I must once more repeat what I have just before observed, that this sentence is nowhere exactly to be found in Hobbes' writings, but is collected and arranged by our author out of several passages of his works. Nay, I rather think that some parts of it are rather deductions from Hobbes' opinions, than his own expressly recorded conclusions and determinations. I will adduce the principal passages of the English philosopher from which I suppose this quotation is made up, so that all may have a better opportunity of deciding respecting his views. In his Elementa De Cive, cap. 15. sect. 14. p. 118, he thus speaks: "When we attribute to God sight and other senses, or knowledge and intellect, which in ourselves are only a tumult of the mind raised by external things pressing on our organs, it is not to be supposed that any thing of this kind is the case with the Deity; for it is a mark of a power dependent on another being for its existence; which is inconsistent with the highest perfection. Those therefore who would give God no other names than are accordant with reason, must either use negative appellations, as *infinite*, *eternal*, *incomprehensible*, or superlatives, as *best*, *greatest*, *mightiest*, &c., or indefinites, as *good*, *just*, *mighty*, *creator*, *king*, and so on, not in order to declare what he is (for that were to limit him within the bounds of our own imagination), but to acknowledge our own admiration and obedience, which is the part of humility and of a mind rendering him all possible honour. For reason dictates only one name of the Deity significant of his nature, which is *the Existent*, or simply *the Being*, and one signifying relation to us, namely *God*, in which is contained King, Lord, and Father." Clearly similar to this is the following extract from the Leviathan, cap. 31. p. 170: "Those who say that God sees, perceives, knows, and understands (which facultics in mankind are nothing else than a tumult of the mind raised by external agents through the organical parts of the human body), unless by these words they understand the divine and incomprehensible power, do not give God due honour. Those who wish to give God no name but what is conformable to natural reason, must either use negative appellations, as *infinite*, *eternal*, *incomprehensible*; or superlatives, as *most high*, *greatest*; or indefinites, as *good*, *just*, *holy*, *creator*; and this, not in order to declare what God is, but how much we ought to adore and venerate him. For he has only one name of his nature—the BEING." And a little further on, p. 171, he thus proceeds: "To dispute concerning the Divine nature is contrary to the honour due to God; for it is to be remembered that nothing can be known of God's empire but by natural reason, that is by physical principles, which are so far from disclosing the Divine nature, that they cannot inform us of our own nature, or of that of the smallest thing in existence. In regard therefore

and undisguised meaning of the author seems to be this; that God is no subject of philosophy, as all real things are (accordingly as he declareth elsewhere, that[7] religio non est philosophia, sed lex, "Religion is not a matter of philosophy, but only of law and arbitrary constitution"), he having no real nature of his own, nor being any true inhabitant of the world or heaven, but (as all other ghosts and spirits) an inhabitant of men's brains only, that is, a figment of their fear and fancy, or a mere political scarecrow. And therefore such attributes are to be given to him, without any scrupulosity, as the civil law of every country shall appoint, and no other; the wise and nasute very well understanding that all this business of religion is nothing but mere

to the Divine attributes, the definitions of the words are not to be regarded, but the honorary intention that they imply." Analogous to these last sentiments are those which he has let fall in his Elementa De Cive, cap. 15. pp. 118, 119: "It is not proper to dispute respecting the divine nature. For it is to be remembered, that in the empire of God all things are to be investigated by natural reason alone, that is, by the principles of natural science. But these, so far from disclosing to us the nature of the Deity, will not even fully inform us of the properties of our own bodies, or of any created being. From discussions of this kind, therefore, nothing can result except the imposition of names on the Divine Majesty accordant with our own contracted conceptions." Here also properly belong the following words taken from his book De Homine, cap. 14. sect. 4. p. 78: "But in these disputations [respecting religion], while we seek for a knowledge of those things which do not fall within the range of knowledge, so far as in us lies we annihilate faith in God. For knowledge being supposed, faith is done away with; just as fruition being supposed, hope is done away with. . . . . Therefore questions concerning the nature of God the Creator are too full of curiosity, and are not to be accounted equal to works of piety; and those who dispute respecting God do not desire so much to inculcate faith in God (in whom all already believe) as to gain it for themselves." Nor ought I to omit the following, from the Leviathan, cap. 3. p. 12: "The name of God is not used that we may conceive of him (for he is incomprehensible, and his greatness and power inconceivable), but that we may honour him." The last part of the words here abscribed by Dr. Cudworth to Hobbes is illustrated by the following passage, among others, which is to be found in the Elementa De Cive, cap. 15. sect. 17. p. 121: "It may therefore be concluded that the interpretation of natural laws, both sacred and profane (since God reigns in nature alone), depends on the authority of the state; that is, it belongs to that person or assembly to whom is given the supreme command of the state, both that God should by his or their voice issue all his commands; and on the contrary that what is commanded by them both respecting the mode of worshipping God and respecting secular things is commanded by God." It is needless to adduce more expressions to the same purpose. I think it most evident that in all these there was concealed no small quantity of poison, and that the philosopher of Malmesbury had no other object in view than an attack and injury to the very fundamentals of religion. I must candidly confess my doubts whether it be equally clear from them that Hobbes ridiculed theologians because they said that God perceived without eyes, and understood and knew without a brain; and that he regarded this opinion as among those by which all modern theology is defaced. (See on this opinion, which some have certainly defended, Bishop Berkeley's Alciphron, vol. 1. p. 259.) Nor do I know whether the more detailed explanation of Hobbes' opinion subjoined by our author is in all respects correct, and in accordance with his meaning. For God alone can unerringly decide respecting the thoughts of particular individuals.

[7] De Homine, cap. 14. p. 78. "If religion," says Hobbes in this place "(excepting that which consists in natural piety) does not depend on private individuals, then necessarily (since miracles have now ceased) it must depend on the laws of the state; therefore religion is not philosophy but a law in every state, and on this account is not to be disputed about but practised."

pageantry), and that the attributes of the Deity indeed signify neither true nor false, nor any thing in nature, but only men's reverence and devotion towards the object of their fear; the manner of expressing which is determined by civil law. Wherefore to say that God sees all things, and yet hath no eyes; and that he hears all things, and yet hath no ears; and that he understands, and is wise, and yet hath no brains; and whatsoever else you will please to say of him, as attributes of honour, and only as signifying devotion, is thus far well enough. But when men, not understanding the true cabala, will needs go further, they mistaking attributes of honour for attributes of nature, and of philosophic truth, and making them premises to infer absolute truth, and convince falsehood from, or matters to dispute and reason upon; that is, when they will needs suppose such a thing as a God really to exist in the world, then do they involve themselves in all manner of contradiction, nonsense and absurdity; as for example, to affirm seriously that this God really sees all things in the world, and yet hath no eyes; and that he indeed hears all things, and yet hath no ears; and, lastly, that he understands and is wise, and yet hath no brains, which things are all absolutely contradictious, inconceivable, and impossible. The sum of all is this, that when religion and theology, which is indeed nothing but law and phantastry, is made philosophy, then is it all mere jargon and insignificant nonsense. And now we see what those contradictions are, which the Atheists charge upon theology: such as owe all their being only to the grossness, sottishness, and brutishness of these men's own apprehensions. From whence proceedeth likewise this following definition of knowledge and understanding,[8] that it is nothing but a tumult of the mind, raised by external things, pressing the organical parts of man's body. "O ye brutish among the people, when will ye understand? and ye fools, when will ye be wise? He that planted the ear (and gave men's soul a power of hearing thereby), shall not he (though himself have no ears) hear? He that formed the eye (and gave the human soul a power of seeing by it as an instrument) shall not he (though himself have no eyes) see?" Lastly, "he that teacheth man knowledge (or gave him an understanding mind, besides brains), shall not he (though himself be without brains) know and understand?"

It is certain, that no simple idea, as that of a triangle or a square, of a cube or sphere, can possibly be contradictious to itself; and therefore much less can the idea of a perfect being (which is the compendious idea of God), it being more simple than any of the other. Indeed this simple idea of a perfect being is pregnant of many attributes; and therefore the idea of

[8] Leviathan, cap. 31. p. 170, and Elementa de Cive, cap. 15. sect. 14. p. 118.

God, more fully declared by them all, may seem to be in this respect a compounded idea, or one idea and conception, consisting or made up of many; which if they were really contradictious, would render the whole a nonentity. As for example, this, a plain triangle, whose three angles are greater than two right ones, it being contradictious and inconceivable, is therefore no true idea, but a nonentity. But all the genuine attributes of the Deity, of which its entire idea is made up, are things as demonstrable of a perfect being, as the properties of a triangle or a square are of those ideas respectively, and therefore cannot they possibly be contradictious, neither to it, nor to one another, because those things which agree in one third, must needs agree together amongst themselves.

Nay, the genuine attributes of the Deity, namely, such as are demonstrable of an absolutely perfect Being, are not only not contradictious, but also necessarily connected together, and inseparable from one another. For there could not possibly be one thing infinite in wisdom only, another thing infinite only in power, and another thing only infinite in duration or eternal. But the very same thing which is infinite in wisdom, must needs be also infinite in power, and infinite in duration, and so vice versâ. That which is infinite in any one perfection, must of necessity have all perfections in it. Thus are all the genuine attributes of the Deity not only not contradictious, but also inseparably concatenate; and the idea of God no congeries either of disagreeing things; or else of such as are unnecessarily connected with one another.

In very truth, all the several attributes of the Deity are nothing else but so many partial and inadequate conceptions of one and the same simple perfect being, taken in as it were by piecemeal, by reason of the imperfection of our human understandings, which could not fully conceive it all together at once; and therefore are they really all but one thing, though they have the appearance of multiplicity to us. As the one simple light of the sun, diversely refracted and reflected from a rorid cloud, hath to us the appearance of the variegated colours of the rainbow.

Wherefore the attributes of God are no bundle of unconceivables and impossibles, huddled up together; nor attributes of honour and compliment only, and nothing but the religious nonsense of astonished minds, expressing their devotion towards what they fear; but all of them attributes of nature, and of most severe philosophic truth. Neither is the idea of God an arbitrarious compilement of things unnecessarily connected, and separable from one another; it is no factitious, nor fictitious thing, made up by any feigning power of the soul, but it is a natural and most simple uncompounded idea; such as to which

nothing can be arbitrariously added, nor nothing detracted from. Notwithstanding which, by reason of the imperfection of human minds, there may be, and are, different apprehensions concerning it. For as every one that hath a conception of a plain triangle in general, doth not therefore know that it includes this property in it, to have three angles equal to two right ones; nor doth every one who hath an idea of a rectangular triangle, presently understand that the square of the subtense is equal to the squares of both the sides: so neither doth every one who hath a conception of a perfect being, therefore presently know all that is included in that idea. Moreover, men may easily mistake things for absolute perfections, which are not such, as hath been partly already showed.

And now, whereas the Atheists pretend, in the next place, to give an account of that supposed contradictiousness in the idea and attributes of God, namely, that it proceeded principally from fear, or the confounded nonsense of men's astonished minds, huddling up together all imaginable attributes of honour, courtship, and compliment, without any philosophic truth, sense, or signification; as also, in part, from the fiction and imposture of politicians: all this hath been already prevented, and the foundation thereof quite taken away, by our showing that there is nothing in the genuine idea of God and his attributes, but what is demonstrable of a perfect being, and that there cannot be the least either added to that idea, or detracted from it, any more than there can be any thing added to or detracted from the idea of a triangle, or of a square. From whence it follows unavoidably, that there cannot possibly be any thing either contradictious or arbitrarious in the divine idea, and that the genuine attributes thereof are attributes of necessary philosophic truth; namely, such as do not only speak the piety, devotion, and reverence of men's own minds, but declare the real nature of the thing itself. Wherefore, when a modern atheistic writer affirmeth of all those who reason and conclude concerning God's nature from his attributes, "That, losing their understanding in the very first attempt, they fall from one inconvenience (or absurdity) to another, without end; after the same manner as when one, ignorant of court ceremonies, coming into the presence of a greater person than he was wont to speak to, and stumbling at his entrance, to save himself from falling, lets slip his cloak; to recover his cloak, lets fall his hat; and so, with one disorder after another, discovers his rusticity and astonishment:"[8] we say, that though there be something of wit and fancy in this, yet, as it is applied to theology and the genuine attributes of the Deity, there is not the least of philosophic truth. However,

[8] On these words of Hobbes' see my note cap. 2. sect. 4. above.

we deny not but that some, either out of superstition, or else out of flattery (for thus are they styled by St. Jerome,[10] stulti adulatores Dei, "foolish flatterers of God Almighty), have sometimes attributed such things to him as are incongruous to his nature, and, under a pretence of honouring him, by magnifying his power and sovereignty, do indeed most highly dishonour him; they representing him to be such a Being as is no way amiable or desirable.

But the Atheists are most of all concerned to give an account of that unquestionable phenomenon, the general persuasion of the existence of a God in the minds of men, and their propensity to religion in all ages and places of the world; whence this should come, if there be really no such thing in nature: and this they think to do in the last place also, partly from men's own fear, together with their ignorance of causes, and partly from the fiction of law-makers and politicians, they endeavouring thereby to keep men in civil subjection under them; where we shall first plainly and nakedly declare the Atheist's meaning, and then manifest the invalidity and foolery of these pretences to solve the forementioned phenomenon.

First, therefore, these Atheists affirm, that mankind, by reason of their natural imbecility, are in perpetual solicitude, anxiety, and fear concerning future events, or their good and evil fortune to come; and this passion of fear inclining men to imagine things formidable and fearful, and to suspect or believe the existence of what really is not; I say, that this distrustful fear and jealousy in the minds of men concerning their future condition, raises up to them the phantasm of a most affrightful spectre, an invisible understanding Being, arbitrarily governing and swaying the affairs of the whole world, and at pleasure tyrannizing over mankind. And when men's exorbitant fear and fancy has thus raised up to itself such a Mormo, or bugbear, such an affrightful spectre as this, a thing that is really no inhabitant of the world, or of heaven, but only of men's brains, they afterward stand in awe of this their own imagination, and tremblingly worship this creature and figment of their own fear and fancy, as a thing really existing without them, or a God; devising all manner of expressions of honour and reverence towards it, and anxiously endeavouring, by all ways conceivable, to propitiate and atone the same. And thus have they brought

[10] Comment. in Habacuc. lib. 1. p. 148. tom. 6. opp. This well known passage runs thus: "It is absurd to draw out the greatness of God to such a degree as to say that he knows how many gnats are born and die every moment, how many bugs and fleas and flies there are in the world, how many fishes swim in the sea, and which of the small ones are to be devoured by the larger. Let us not be such *foolish* flatterers of God Almighty as, while we bring down his power to the most insignificant objects, to be injurious to ourselves, and suppose that his providence has charge of irrational rather than of rational beings."

upon themselves a most heavy yoke of bondage, and filled their lives with all manner of bitterness and misery.

Again, to this fear of future events the Atheists add also ignorance of causes, as a further account of this phenomenon of religion, so generally entertained in the world. For mankind (say they) are naturally inquisitive into the causes of things; and that not only of the events of their own good and evil fortune, but also of the phenomena of the world, and the effects of nature: and such is their curiosity, that wheresoever they can discover no visible and natural causes, there are they prone to feign and imagine other causes, invisible and supernatural. As it was observed of the tragic dramatists, that, whenever they could not well extricate themselves, they were wont to bring in a God upon the stage: and as Aristotle[11] recordeth of Anaxagoras, that he never betook himself to Mind, or Understanding, that is, to God for a cause, but only then when he was at a loss for other natural and necessary causes. From whence these Atheists would infer, that nothing but ignorance of causes made Anaxagoras to assert a Deity. Wherefore it is no wonder (say they) if the generality of mankind, being ignorant of the causes almost of all events and effects of nature, have, by reason of their natural curiosity and fear, feigned or introduced one invisible power or agent omnipotent, as the supreme cause of all things; they betaking themselves thereto, as to a kind of refuge, asylum, or sanctuary for their ignorance.

These two accounts of the phenomenon of religion, from men's fear and solicitude about future events, and from their ignorance of causes, together with their curiosity, are thus joined together by a modern writer:[12] "Perpetual fear of future evils always accompanying mankind, in the ignorance of causes, as it were in

[11] Metaphys. lib. 1. cap. 4. p. 267. tom. 4. opp.

[12] Hobbes, Leviath. cap. 12. p. 55, &c. But Hobbes himself saw that these words were bolder than was proper, if they were taken in their naked, simple acceptation; wherefore, to meet objections, he simply adds, that he only wished them to be understood of the religion and gods of the ancients, previously to the birth of our Saviour; for that the knowledge of the one supreme God does not arise from fear, but from a contemplation of the nature of things. "This," says he, immediately after the words here quoted, "is true of the gods [that is, the numerous gods of the heathen]. But the knowledge of one eternal, infinite, omnipotent God can be more easily derived from an investigation into the causes, powers, and operations of natural bodies, than from an anxiety about futurity. For whoever, from any effect he sees, shall reason back to its proximate cause, and shall thence proceed to the proximate cause of that cause, and then profoundly dive into the succession of causes, will at length discover (with the more rational of the ancient philosophers) that there is one first mover, that is, one eternal cause of all things, which all men call God. And this will take place apart from any knowledge of his own destiny, anxiety about which both produces fear and turns off the mind from the inquiry into natural causes, and affords at the same time an opportunity for imagining almost as many gods as there are men to imagine them." Whether this cunning and crafty man said this sincerely from his heart or merely to avoid odium, God only knows; and whichever it was, it will not prevent its being *true*.

the dark, must needs have for object something. And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse for their evil fortune, but some power or agent invisible." Moreover, it is concluded, that from the same originals sprang, not only that vulgar opinion of inferior ghosts and spirits also, subservient to the supreme Deity (as the great ghost of the whole world, apparitions being nothing but men's own dreams and fancies taken by them for sensations) but also men's taking things casual for prognostics, and their being so superstitiously addicted to omens and portents, oracles, and divinations and prophecies; this proceeding likewise from the same fantastic supposition, that the things of the world are disposed of, not by nature, but by some understanding and intending agent or person.[1]

But lest these two forementioned accounts of that phenomenon of religion, and the belief of a Deity, so epidemical to mankind, should yet seem insufficient; the Atheists will superadd a third to them, from the fiction and imposture of civil sovereigns, crafty law-makers, and designing politicians, who, perceiving a great advantage to be made, from the belief of a God and religion, for the better keeping of men in obedience and subjection to themselves, and in peace and civil society with one another (when they are persuaded, that besides the punishments appointed by laws, which can only take place upon open and convicted transgressors, and are often eluded and avoided, there are other punishments, that will be inflicted even upon the secret violators of them, both in this life and after death, by a divine, invisible, and irresistible hand) have thereupon dexterously laid hold of men's fear and ignorance, and cherished those seeds of religion in them (being the infirmities of their nature) and further confirmed their belief of ghosts and spirits, miracles and prodigies, oracles and divinations, by tales or fables, publicly allowed and recommended; according to that definition of religion given by a modern writer,[2] "Fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publicly allowed, religion; not allowed, superstition." And that religion, thus nursed up by politicians, might be every way compliant with, and obsequious to their designs, and no way refractory to the same; it hath been their great care to persuade the people, that their laws were not merely their own inventions, but that themselves were

[1] This is levelled against Hobbes, De Homine, cap. 13. p. 78. &c. and Leviathan, cap. 12. p. 56, &c.

[2] Leviathan, cap. 6. p. 29. Dr. Cudworth's English words do not exactly correspond to the Latin I have given. [Metus potentiarum invisibilium, sive fictæ illæ sint, sive ab historiis acceptæ sint publice, religio est; si publice acceptæ non sint, superstitio.] But a careful comparison will show that the sense is the same. I think it proper to observe, that Hobbes has here again (whether to avoid odium or to declare his real opinion, I know not) added the following words to this definition: "But when the powers are really such as we have supposed them to be, true religion."

only the interpreters of the gods therein, and that the same things were really displeasing to the gods which were forbidden by them; God ruling over the world no otherwise than in them, as his vicegerents; according to that assertion of a late writer:* Deum nullum regnum in homines habere, nisi per eos, qui imperium tenent, "That God reigneth over men, only in the civil sovereigns." This is therefore another atheistic account of religion's so generally prevailing in the world, from its being a fit engine of state, and politicians generally looking upon it as an arcanum imperii, "a mystery of government," to possess the minds of the people with the belief of a God, and to keep them busily employed in the exercises of religion, thereby to render them the more tame and gentle, apt to obedience, subjection, peace, and civil society.

Neither is all this the mere invention of modern Atheists, but indeed the old atheistic cabal, as may appear partly from that known passage of the poet:[3] "That the gods were first made by fear;" and from Lucretius' so frequently insisting upon the same, according to the mind of Epicurus. For in his first book he makes terrorem animi, et tenebras, "terror of mind, and darkness," the chief causes of theism; and in his sixth, he further pursues the same grounds, especially the latter of them, after this manner:†

> Cætera, quæ fieri in terris cœloque tuentur
> Mortales, pavidis quom pendent mentibu' sæpe,
> Efficiunt animos humiles formidine divûm;
> Depressosque premunt ad terram, propterea quod
> IGNORANTIA CAUSARUM conferre deorum
> Cogit ad imperium res; et concedere regnum, et,
> Quorum operum causas nullâ ratione videre
> Possunt, hæc fieri divino numine rentur.

To this sense: "Mortals, when with trembling minds they behold the objects both of heaven and earth, they become depressed and sunk down under the fear of the gods; ignorance of causes setting up the reign and empire of the gods. For when men can find no natural causes of these things, they suppose them presently to have been done by a divine power."

And this ignorance of causes is also elsewhere insisted upon by the same poet, as the chief source of religion, or the belief of a God:‡

* Tract. Theol. Polit. [Ben. Spinozæ, cap. 9. p. 214.]

[3] Petron. in Fragment. p. 676. edit. Burman. The same thing had been previously said by Statius; whom those best acquainted with these matters think Petronius imitated. But it has been observed by the learned Le Clerc, in his Sylvæ Philologicæ, appended to his edition of Æschines' Dialogues, cap. 7. sect. 10. p. 256. that the same doctrine had been taught prior to the time of either of these poets, by Democritus, and partly also by Aristotle.

† Lamb. 528. [Verse 49.]

‡ Lib. 5. Lamb. p. 500. [Verse 1182.]

Præterea cœli rationes ordine certo
Et varia annorum cernebant tempora verti;
Nec poterant quibus id fieret cognoscere causis.
Ergo PERFUGIUM sibi habebant, omnia divis
Tradere, et illorum nutu facere omnia flecti.

Moreover, when a modern writer declares the opinion of ghosts to be one of those things in which consisteth the natural seeds of religion; as also that this opinion proceedeth from the ignorance how to distinguish dreams, and other strong fancies, from vision and sense; he seemeth herein to have trod likewise in the footsteps of Lucretius, giving, not obscurely, the same account of religion in his fifth book:[4]

Nunc quæ causa deûm per magnas numina gentes
Pervolgarit, et ararum compleverit urbes, &c.
Non ita difficile est rationem reddere verbis.
Quippe etenim jam tum divûm mortalia secla
Egregias animo facies vigilante videbant,
Et magis in somnis, mirando corporis auctu.
His igitur sensum tribuebant, &c.

That is, "How the noise of the gods came thus to ring over the whole world, and to fill all places with temples and altars, is not a thing very difficult to give an account of; it proceeding first from men's fearful dreams, and their phantasms when awake, taken by them for visions and sensations. Whereupon they attributed not only sense to these things as really existing, but also immortality and great power." For though this were properly an account only of those inferior and plebeian gods, called demons and genii, yet was it supposed that the belief of these things did easily dispose the minds of men also to the persuasion of one supreme omnipotent Deity over all.

Lastly, that the ancient Atheists, as well as the modern, pretended the opinion of a God and religion to have been a political invention, is frequently declared in the writings of the Pagans; as in this of Cicero:[5] Ii, qui dixerunt totam de diis immortalibus opinionem fictam esse ab hominibus sapientibus, reipublicæ causâ, ut quos ratio non posset, eos ad officium religio duceret; nonne omnem religionem funditùs sustulerunt? "They who affirmed the whole opinion of the gods to have been feigned by wise men for the sake of the commonwealth, that so religion might engage those to their duty whom reason could not, did they not utterly destroy all religion?" And the sense of the ancient Atheists is thus represented by Plato:[6] Θεοὺς, ὦ μακάριε, εἶναι πρῶτόν φασὶν οὔ τοι τέχνῃ, οὐ φύσει, ἀλλά τισι νόμοις, καὶ τούτους ἄλλους ἄλλοις, ὅπῃ ἕκαστος συνωμολόγησαν νομοθετούμενοι, "They first of all affirm, that the gods are not by nature,

[4] Verse 1160.
[5] De Nat. Deor. lib. 1. cap. 42. p. 2945. tom. 9. opp.
[6] De Leg. lib. 10. [P. 666.]

but by art and laws only; and that from thence it comes to pass, that they are different to different nations and countries, accordingly as the several humours of their law-makers did chance to determine." And before Plato, Critias, one of the thirty tyrants of Athens, plainly declared religion at first to have been a political intrigue, in those verses of his recorded by Sextus[6] the philosopher, beginning to this purpose: "That there was a time at first, when men's life was disorderly and brutish, and the will of the stronger was the only law: after which, they consented

[6] Lib. 8. Advers. Mathemat. sect. 54. p. 562. The first of these quotations from Critias is given by Dr. Cudworth only in an English translation; of the second he has given only the Greek. I shall therefore add the Greek to the first:

Ἦν χρόνος, ὅτ' ἦν ἄτακτος ἀνθρώπων βίος
Καὶ θηριώδης, ἰσχύος θ' ὑπηρίτης·
Ὅτ' οὐδὲν ἆθλον οὔτε τοῖς ἐσθλοῖσιν ἦν,
Οὔτ' αὖ κόλασμα τοῖς κακοῖς ἐγίνετο.
Κἄπειτά μοι δοκοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι νόμους
Θέσθαι κολαστάς·

And to the second the version of Hugo Grotius, in his Excerpta Veterum Comicorum et Tragicorum, p. 402. "Therefore he introduced a reverence of the Deity; namely, that God bloomed in perpetual life, having a higher nature and an attentive mind, who knows and understands all things that are done, and immediately hears what is said by men, and sees their actions, being an infallible judge."

But it is very uncertain, whether these verses are Critias' or not. For Plutarch, De Placitis Philosophorum, lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 880. vol. 1. of his Works, and Eusebius, Præparatio Evangel. lib. 14. sect. 16. refers them to Euripides, the famous tragic poet; and Plutarch especially expressly says they are taken from a tragedy by him, called Sisyphus. The learned Peter Petit, in his Miscellaneous Observations, lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 5. has not hesitated to follow Plutarch, and in support of his opinion to suppose that the manuscripts of Sextus Empiricus are corrupt and mutilated. But his arguments generally, and this supposition in particular, have been learnedly refuted by Peter Bayle, in his Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, vol. 1. art. Critias, note, p. 937, &c. And indeed the integrity of the manuscripts of Empiricus is evident from this single consideration: that ancient writers have spoken in a very doubtful manner respecting some other of the tragedies of Euripides, some attributing them to Critias, and others to Euripides. See Hugo Grotius' Excerpta Veterum Comicorum et Tragicorum, p. 452, and John Albert Fabricius' Bibliotheca Græca, lib. 2. cap. 18. p. 621. and cap. 19. p. 642. What wonder then is it, that there should also formerly have been some disagreement respecting the author of the Tragedy of Sisyphus? But concerning the main point in dispute, I must admit that I agree with Petit. For although I grant the unsatisfactory nature of the reasons he has adduced, yet another argument makes it very probable that these verses could not have been written by Critias, but must have proceeded from Euripides. Who can believe that Critias the tyrant, whose principal object it was to establish his own power at Athens, would have been so foolish as to have caused to be recited, in the hearing of the Athenian people, a piece of poetry admirably exposing the stratagems and tricks of tyrants? Who can suppose that he could wish the Athenians to be taught, in a tragedy, that religion was nothing but a fraudulent contrivance of wise men, invented for the purpose of keeping the multitude in check. He would have been silly indeed, and would himself have scattered the seeds of sedition, if he had with his own pen instilled such doctrines as these into the minds of those whom he wished despotically to rule. But since some have thought the opinion contained in these verses consistent enough with the character and disposition of a tyrant, and have been aware that Critias composed some tragedies, they have been easily brought to suppose that the drama whence these verses are taken was his rather than Euripides'. (Zimmermann, in his Musæum Helveticum, vol. 4. p. 422. denies that these arguments in favour of Critias are free from exception.) Thus much is sufficient upon a matter concerning which ignorance is no detriment.

and agreed together to make civil laws;" that so the disorderly might be punished. Notwithstanding which, it was still found that men were only hindered from open, but not from secret injustices: whereupon some sagacious and witty person was the author of a further invention, to deter men as well from secret as from open injuries:

Ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τὸ θεῖον εἰσηγήσατο·
Ὃς ἐστι δαίμων ἀφθίτῳ θάλλων βίῳ,
Νόῳ τ' ἀκούων, καὶ βλέπων, φρονῶν τ'· ὑφ' οὗ
Πᾶν μὲν τὸ λεχθὲν ἐν βροτοῖς ἀκούεται·
Ὃς δρώμενον δὲ πᾶν ἰδεῖν δυνήσεται.

Namely, "By introducing or feigning a God immortal and incorruptible, who hears, and sees, and takes notice of all things." Critias then concluding his poem in these words:

Οὕτω δὲ πρῶτον οἶομαι πεῖσαί τινα
Θνητοὺς νομίζειν δαιμόνων εἶναι γένος,

"And in this manner do I conceive some one at first to have persuaded mortals to believe that there is a kind of gods."[7]

[7] To these passages of the ancients, wherein the origin of all religion is ascribed to state policy, add Seneca, Quæst. Natur. lib. 2. cap. 42. p. 536. tom. 2. opp. and Sextus Empiric. lib. 8. Advers. Mathemat. p. 551. "If you ask me," says Seneca, "what I think (of thunder), I do not think that they [the ancients, who said that thunder came from Jupiter] were so stupid as to believe that Jove was of partial inclinations, or was at least unprepared. ..... What object then had they in saying this? *The wisest men thought some inevitable source of terror necessary for restraining the minds of the vulgar, that we might have a fear of something above us.* It was of great use, in the midst of such audacious wickedness, that there should be some existence, which no one should imagine himself powerful enough to resist. Therefore, to terrify those who could only by fear be kept free from crime, they placed above them an armed avenger." The passage of Sextus Empiricus is as follows: Ἔνιοι τοίνυν ἔφασαν, τοὺς πρώτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων προστάντας καὶ τὸ συμφέρον τῷ βίῳ σκεψαμένους πάνυ συνέτους ὄντας ἀναπλάσαι τὴν περί τε τῶν θεῶν ὑπόνοιαν καὶ τὴν περὶ τῶν ἐν ᾅδου μυθευομένων δόξαν, "Some have said, that the first rulers of mankind, and the wisest men who studied what was best for human life, contrived the supposition of there being gods, and the fabulous opinion concerning the infernal regions."

For my own part, I could cite many more authors, if I thought proper to mention here those Greek and Latin writers who have not hesitated to assert that the opinions commonly received and established by law among the Greeks and Romans were only invented by wise men in order to keep the multitude within the bounds of duty. But since the question is here concerning religion universally, and as I suppose, it cannot be denied that in the formation and corroboration of false religions, great scope was given for craft and fraud, I pass over these authorities for the present. Several quotations of this sort have been collected by Bayle, in his Pensées sur les Comètes, vol. 2. sect. 71, p. 356. &c. As regards modern authorities (to say nothing of Nic. Machiavel, respecting whom particulars may be seen in the late John Francis Buddeus' Theses de Atheismo et Superstitione, cap. 1. sect. 24. p. 132. &c.), Benedict Spinoza has endeavoured, in his Tractatus Theologico-politicus, cap. 5. p. 59. &c. to prove (by arguments indeed that are foolish and destitute of reason) that religion, and particularly the Mosaic, was expressly contrived "for the preservation and strengthening of government." The same writer afterwards, in a treatise entitled De Optimâ Reipublicæ Formâ, or Tractatus Politicus, to be found among his posthumous works, plainly persuades magistrates to accommodate religion to the necessities and nature of the state; as may be manifest from an attentive consideration of the following passage, found in cap. 8. sect. 46. p. 339: "It is of great consequence [namely, to the state] that the temples dedicated to the religion of the country should be spacious and

Thus have we fully declared the sense of the Atheists, in their account of the phenomenon of religion and the belief of a God; namely, that they derive it principally from these three springs or originals: First, from men's own fear and solicitude concerning future events, or their good and evil fortune. Secondly, from their ignorance of the causes both of those events, and the phenomena of nature; together with their curiosity. And lastly, from the fiction of civil sovereigns, law-makers, and, politicians. The weakness and foolery of all which, we shall now briefly manifest.[8] First, therefore, it is certain that such an excess of fear, as makes any one constantly and obstinately to believe the existence of that, which there is no manner of ground neither from sense nor reason for, tending also to the great disquiet of men's own lives, and the terror of their minds, cannot be accounted other than a kind of crazedness or distraction. Wherefore, the Atheists themselves acknowledging the generality of mankind to be possessed with such a belief of the Deity, when they resolve this into such an excess of fear, it is all one as if they should affirm the generality of mankind to be frighted out of their wits, or crazed and distempered in their brains: none but a few Atheists, who being undaunted and undismayed have escaped this panic terror, remaining sober and in their right senses. But whereas the Atheists thus impute to the generality of mankind, not only light-minded credulity and phantastry, but also such an excess of fear, as differs nothing at all from crazedness and distraction or madness; we affirm, on the contrary, that their supposed courage, stayedness and sobriety, is really nothing else but the dull and sottish stupidity of their minds, dead and heavy incredulity, and earthly diffidence or distrust; by rea-

splendid, and that none but persons noble by birth or office should be allowed to have aught to do with its worship; so that none but the aristocracy should be permitted to baptize, or to celebrate matrimony, or lay on hands, or give absolution, that they may thus be recognized as the priests of the national temples, the defenders and expounders of the national religion. For preaching, however, and the administration of the treasury and ordinary affairs of the church, plebeians might be chosen out of the parliament, as its vice-regents, and to which assembly, therefore, they should be obliged to render an account of all things." Any one must be very dull and obtuse not to perceive at once that the meaning of these words is, that magistrates should always especially take care to keep religious matters and divine worship in their own power, and make use of them to terrify the people and strike them with a kind of sacred awe.

[8] That fear is the origin of religion has been unblushingly averred by Spinoza, in his Preface to his Tractatus Theologico-politicus. For though he only inveighs against superstition, yet it is easy to perceive that the word *superstition* is used by him in the same sense as we are in the habit of using the word *religion*. It will be proper to quote his words, that it may be rendered manifest that Hobbes had, in his own day, associates in this opinion. "We see," says he, among other observations, "that those are most addicted to all kind of superstition, who have an immoderate desire after uncertain good; and that all (especially when in the midst of peril and incapable of helping themselves), with prayers and effeminate tears, implore divine aid, and call reason blind and human wisdom vain..... So much madness does *terror* inject into men. The cause, therefore, which gives rise to, preserves, and nourishes superstition, *is fear*.

son whereof they can believe nothing but what they can feel or see.

Theists indeed have a religious fear of God, which is consequent from him, or their belief of him (of which more afterwards); but the Deity itself, or the belief thereof, was not created by any antecedent fear, that is, by fear concerning men's good and evil fortune; it being certain, that none are less solicitous concerning such events, than they who are most truly religious. The reason whereof is, because these place their chief good in nothing that is ἀλλότριον, "alien," or "in another's power," and exposed to the strokes of fortune; but in that which is most truly their own, namely, the right use of their own will. As the Atheists, on the contrary, must needs, for this very reason, be liable to great fears and solicitudes concerning outward events, because they place their good and evil in the πάθος ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης, "the passion of pleasure and pain;" or at least, denying natural honesty, they acknowledge no other good but what belongs to the animal life only, and so is under the empire of fortune. And that the Atheists are indeed generally timorous and fearful, suspicious and distrustful things, seems to appear plainly from their building all their politics, civil societies, and justice (improperly so called), upon that only foundation of fear and distrust.

But the grand error of the Atheists here is this, that they suppose the Deity, according to the sense of the generality of mankind, to be nothing but a mormo, bugbear, or terriculum, an "affrightful, hurtful," and "most undesirable thing:" whereas men every where invoke the Deity in their straits and difficulties for aid and assistance, looking upon it as exorable and placable; and by their trust and confidence in it, acknowledge its goodness and benignity. Synesius affirms, that though men were otherwise much divided in their opinions, yet ἀγαθὸν τὸν Θεὸν ὑμνοῦσιν ἅπαντες ἀπανταχοῦ καὶ σοφοὶ καὶ ἄσοφοι, "They all every where, both wise and unwise, agree in this, that God is to be praised, as one who is good and benign."*

If among the Pagans there were any who understood that proverbial speech, φθονερὸν τὸ δαιμόνιον, in the worst sense, as if God Almighty were of an "envious and spiteful nature;" these were certainly but a few ill-natured men, who therefore drew a picture of the Deity according to their own likeness. For the proverb, in that sense, was disclaimed and cried down by all the wiser Pagans; as Aristotle, who affirmed the "poets to have lied in this, as well as they did in many other things;"†

* De Regno, p. 9. [Oper. edit. Petavii.]

† Metaph. lib. 1. cap. 2. [Page 263. tom. 4. opp.] Οὔτε τὸ θεῖον φθονερὸν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί.

and Plutarch,* who taxeth Herodotus for insinuating, τὸ θεῖον πᾶν φθονερόν τε καὶ ταραχῶδες, "the Deity universally (that is, all the gods) "to be of an envious and vexatious or spiteful disposition;" whereas himself appropriated this only to that evil demon or principle asserted by him, as appeareth from the life of P. Æmilius,[9] written by him, where he affirmeth, not that τὸ θεῖον πᾶν φθονερὸν, "the Deity universally was of an envious nature;" but, "that there is a certain deity or demon, whose proper task it is, to bring down all great and overswelling human prosperity, and so to temper every man's life, that none may be happy in this world, sincerely and unmixedly, without a check of adversity;" which is as if a Christian should ascribe it to the devil. And Plato[10] plainly declares the reason of God's making the world at first, to have been no other than this: Ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος, "Because he was good, and there is no manner of envy in that which is good." From whence he also concluded: Πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια αὑτῷ, "That God therefore willed all things should be made the most like himself;" that is, after the best manner. But the true meaning of that ill-languaged proverb seems, at first, to have been no other than what, besides Hesiod, the scripture itself also attributes to God Almighty, that he affecteth to humble and abase the pride of men, and to pull down all high, towering and lofty things, whether as noxious and hurtful to the men themselves, or as in some sense invidious to him, and derogatory from his honour, who alone ought to be exalted, and no flesh to glory before him. And there hath been so much experience of such a thing as this in the world, that the Epicurean poet himself could not but confess, that there was some hidden force or power, which seemed to have a spite to all overswelling greatnesses, and affect to cast contempt and scorn upon the pride of men:†

* De Herod. Malign. [P. 857. tom. 2. opp.]

[9] Tom. 2. opp. p. 273. In this passage, Plutarch, after observing that Æmilius was hated by no good man, adds these words: Πλὴν εἴ τι δαιμόνιον ἄρα τῶν μεγάλων καὶ ὑπερόγκων εἴληχεν εὐτυχιῶν ἀπαρύττειν, καὶ μιγνύναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον, ὅπως μηδενὶ κακῶν ἄκρατος εἴη καὶ καθαρός, "Unless indeed some god has the office of detracting from singular and extraordinary felicity, and of mingling human life, so that it cannot be pure and free from evils." Plutarch indeed speaks here with sufficient caution, and seems to offer a conjecture rather than an opinion. But a little further on he shows that his mind was strongly biassed in favour of this sentiment. For when, in p. 274, he introduces Æmilius himself speaking, he makes him say that in the midst of prosperity he always feared some evil from divine powers or this malignant demon already mentioned: Ἔφη γὰρ, ὅτι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων οὐδὲν οὐδέποτε δείσας, τῶν δὲ θείων, ὡς ἀπιστότατον καὶ ποικιλώτατον πρᾶγμα, τὴν τύχην ἀεὶ φοβηθείς, "Whilst from men, said he, I have never feared aught, I have never ceased to fear from divine powers, nor that most faithless and variable thing called fortune." Æmilius in these words speaks of Τύχη, or Fortune, as of a goddess that always threatened human affairs, and rarely allowed mortals to pursue a prosperous course. Who can doubt, then, that Plutarch, as is common with historians who make speeches for their heroes, put his own sentiments into the mouth of Æmilius?

[10] In Timæo, cap. 14. p. 237. edit. Fabricii. † Lamb. 503. [Lib. 5. v. 1232.

Usque adeo res humanas vis abdita quædam
Obterit, et pulchros fasces sævasque secures
Proculcare ac ludibrio sibi habere videtur.

Where he plainly reeled and staggered in his atheism, or else was indeed a Theist, but knew it not; it being certain, that there can be no such force as this, in regno atomorum, "in the reign or empire of senseless atoms."[1] And as for those among Christians who make such a horrid representation of God Almighty, as one who created far the greatest part of mankind for no other end or design but only this, that he might recreate and delight himself in their eternal torments; these also do but transcribe or copy out their own ill nature, and then read it in the Deity; the scriptures declaring on the contrary, that God is love. Nevertheless these very persons, in the mean time, dearly hug and embrace God Almighty in their own conceit, as one that is fondly good, kind, and gracious to themselves; he having fastened his affections upon their very persons, without any consideration of their dispositions or qualifications.[2]

[1] Lucretius certainly believed in the existence of a force he calls *occult* as existing in the empire of atoms, as will at once appear from a comparison of these verses with the preceding. For just before, he had been relating how naval commanders, in the midst of a raging sea and terrific tempest, often with vows and sacrifices apply to the gods, or, as he says, Divom pacem votis adire, but that most frequently no good result followed, but they were miserably overwhelmed by the waves. Then he gives the reason why this happened, namely that there was a certain occult force in human affairs against which even the highest power could not prevail. The recondite or *occult force* therefore of which this poet speaks, is opposed by him to the gods; whence it is plain, that this force of which he speaks has in it nothing of a divine nature, but lies concealed in the very nature of things. In short, this occult force of Lucretius is nothing else than a certain fortuitous concourse of atoms, the causes of which are not known to mankind. If the poet had plainly declared his opinion in accordance with the tenets he professed, apart from the poetic figures to which he was addicted, it would have been, that many commanders, notwithstanding their utmost diligence in pacifying Neptune with vows and victims, perish in the sea; and that this happened because no Neptune, no Divine Providence, was in existence; but that all events are the consequences and results of the natural impulses of certain masses of matter, and the various disturbance of atoms, the causes of which we cannot discover; for that a storm is nothing else than a certain violent excitement of invisible particles and atoms, which cannot be stopped by prayers or sacrifices. Lucretius sometimes expresses himself in a clear and philosophical manner; but at other times he adorns his master's doctrines with poetic figures; whence it happens that in some passages he seems to have a certain leaning towards religion, which was however very far from being the case. What has now been said in opposition to Dr. Cudworth applies also against Bayle, who in his Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, vol. 2. art. Lucrèce, not. F. p. 1804. argues against Lucretius in the same way as Dr. Cudworth does, and explains his *occult force* of some undefinable divine power.

[2] The first person who made use of this proverb: Τὸ δαιμόνιον φθονερὸν, doubtless attached to it a very bad meaning, and was imbued with the foolish errors of the ancient Greeks respecting the Divine nature. The old inhabitants of Greece, as is plainly apparent from Homer and Hesiod, had the same ideas of the gods whom they worshipped as of the kings and tyrants to whom they were themselves in subjection, and therefore did not hesitate to ascribe to these deities all the passions and vices by which they saw their own magistrates actuated. No one, however, acquainted with Grecian history can be unaware that the tyrants and petty kings of Greece were accustomed, if they perceived any one of their citizens to excel the rest in wealth or fortune,

It is true indeed, that religion is often expressed in the scripture by the "fear of God," and fear hath been said to be prima mensura Deitatis, "the first measure of the Divinity in us," or

to depress him either by fraud or force, and if they did not put him to death, at least to deprive him of all his honours and banish him from their dominions. For neither envy, nor a fear of losing their authority, would allow them to tolerate in the state a citizen equal in influence and dignity to themselves. The Greeks then conceived of their gods as of kinglings, whose power they dreaded; and thought them of such a disposition that they envied the success and prosperity of mankind, and would not suffer any one securely to retain the height of honour and dignity. On which account they used to admonish those who seemed to have all things happen according to their wish, to remember that the gods were envious, and could not endure the constant felicity of mankind; to avert whose indignation they should act as prudent citizens used to do, who wished not to offend the tyrants; and to cast away part of the prosperity they enjoyed. The truth of this is sufficiently evidenced by the exhortation which Herodotus (lib. 3. sect. 40. p. 176. ed. Gronov.) relates to have been sent by Amasis, king of Egypt, to Polycrates, the singularly prosperous tyrant of Samos: Αἱ σαὶ μεγάλαι εὐτυχίαι οὐκ ἀρίσκουσι τῷ ΘΕΙΟΝ ἱστασμένῳ Ὡς ἘΣΤΙ ΦΘΟΝΕΡΟΝ.....οὐδένα γάρ κεν λόγῳ οἶδα ἀκούσας, ὅστις ἕτερος οὐ κακῶς ἐτελεύτησε πρόῤῥιζος, εὐτυχέων τὰ πάντα, "Your great prosperity pleases me not, since I know *how envious the Deity is*.....For I never remember to have heard of any one, who, after he had been prosperous in all things, did not at length miserably and completely perish." This passage itself may be more clearly understood from what is said by Xerxes, as related by the same author Herodotus, lib. 7. sect. 10. p. 385. where among other things he says: Φιλέει ὁ Θεὸς τὰ ὑπερέχοντα πάντα κωλύειν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ στρατὸς πολλὸς ὑπὸ ὀλίγου διαφθείρεται κατὰ τοιόνδε, ἐπειάν σφι ὁ Θεὸς φθονήσας φόβον ἐμβάλῃ.....οὐ γὰρ ἰᾷ φρονέειν ἄλλον μέγα ὁ Θεὸς, ἢ ἑαυτόν, "God delights to throw obstacles in the way of whatever is most exalted; so that a great army is put to flight by a small one as often as the envious Deity injects into them a panic.....For God suffers none but himself to excel in wisdom." It would be vain, I think, to endeavour so to explain this passage as to make it contain nothing but what was honourable to the Deity. I am aware that some learned men are of opinion that Xerxes here speaks of avenging justice, and suppose him to mean that divine retribution usually punished the more powerful. But this is sufficiently refuted by the fact that Xerxes or Herodotus supposes the Deity to depress what is most exalted, because he can bear no equal to himself, or because, beside himself, he is averse to having any one excel in wisdom. To allow no equal to one's self, even when nothing is thence to be feared, is indeed the height of envy. Besides, if the subject here under discussion were the infliction of punishment upon pride by divine justice, Herodotus would have plainly accused the Deity of a fault very nearly allied to envy; for he says that God is angry with the more powerful, because he wishes no one to have the same mental affections that he has. But even those who had such absurd ideas of the gods did not deny that human affairs were ordered by them, and, as is apparent from Hesiod's Works and Days, firmly believed that they were the distributors of the good and evil that usually fell to the lot of mortals. Some therefore will perhaps deem it singular that the Greeks should think the gods capable of envying mankind the very good that the gods themselves conferred. But a more accurate examination of Grecian customs and opinions will make the explanation of this circumstance easy. First of all, it must be remembered that they believed in one supreme God, or Parent of gods and men, whom they called Jupiter; but beside him they had several minor gods, under the dominion and authority of this supreme God. They asserted that this supreme God enjoyed the power of doing good to men; nor did they deny to the inferior deities the power of rendering many good offices to mankind, and granting very great favours to their worshippers. In their opinion a person might become very fortunate by the help of Apollo, Mercury, or Pluto alone, provided only that this individual were greatly distinguished above others. Keeping this in remembrance, the meaning of the Greek proverb abovementioned will be obvious. The word δαιμόνιον in it signifies the supreme God; for, as has already been shown in another place by sufficient authorities, the Greeks frequently use the word in this sense, nor can it in this saying be very well taken in any other signification. Besides,

the first impression, that religion makes upon men in this obnoxious and guilty state, before they have arrived to the true love of God and righteousness. But this religious fear is not a

Herodotus, in the other passage I have adduced, calls the envious god he speaks of by the name of ὁ Θεός: so that this supreme God is said to be envious; that is, not indeed that he would prevent the minor gods from loading their worshippers and friends with great wealth and gifts, but that he could by no means endure that the felicity of these mortals should go beyond bound, or should be like his own. If therefore the fortunes of those favoured by a minor god should unduly increase, it is supposed that by his power, exceeding that of all the gods, he usually overthrew all their plans. And this view seems to me to be confirmed by the history of Polycrates in Herodotus. This person, whom the father of history relates to have had for his principal aim the dominion of the sea (lib. 3. sect. 122. p. 206.) undoubtedly in order to obtain his desire, worshipped Neptune more ardently than he did the other gods. He also, according to the same author (sect. 47. p. 178.) sent as a present a very valuable breastplate to Minerva in Lindus; whence is apparent his particular regard for that goddess. But after Polycrates had perished by a cruel death, Mæandrius, viceroy of Samos, erected a monument to Jupiter the Liberator. See Herodotus, lib. 3. sect. 142. p. 215. This monument to Jupiter the Liberator is a proof that the Samians were persuaded that the supreme god Jupiter had deprived Polycrates of his life and felicity together. But if they believed this, they could not have supposed that Jupiter himself was the author of that felicity which Polycrates had enjoyed during so many years. As therefore they held that no one could be remarkably happy without the aid of the gods, doubtless they thought that those gods whom they had well known Polycrates principally to have worshipped, Neptune and Minerva, had rewarded his piety exhibited towards themselves. But still there is no necessity for us to consider this proverb as solely applicable to the highest and principal God; for the Greeks also thought that the minor gods, as the poets taught, were inflamed with mutual enmities, and envied each other's happiness and designs, as may be proved from many examples in Homer and Virgil. Οἱ Θεοί, correctly says Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhonianarum Hypotyposis, lib. 1. cap. 14. p. 39, φθονοῦντες ἀλλήλοις ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν εἰσάγονται, "The gods are introduced by the poets envying one another." Since this was the opinion of the Greeks, it could not but happen that they should fear lest, if they gained the love and kindness of one god, they might incur the envy and hatred of another.

But in the lapse of time, when the light of philosophy had arisen among the Greeks, the wiser part of them easily perceived that envy was a vice entirely inconsistent with the dignity of the immortal gods; on which account they spoke more cautiously respecting the causes of the calamities commonly occurring to distinguished individuals. Plato, whom the later Greeks reverenced as a philosopher almost more than human, assigned the origin of the misfortunes that happened to opulent and powerful persons entirely to their pride. For he says that men abounding in prosperity are generally unduly elated, and are then deserted by the Deity; that when thus deserted they go on from one crime to another, and in this way miserably overthrow themselves and their fortunes through the just judgment of God. It is worth while to transcribe his own words, De Legibus, lib. 4. p. 600: Ὁ δέ τις ἐξαρθεὶς ὑπὸ μεγαλαυχίας, ἢ χρήμασιν ἐπαιρόμενος, ἢ τιμαῖς, ἢ καὶ σώματος εὐμορφίᾳ, ἅμα νεότητι καὶ ἀνοίᾳ φλεγομένος τὴν ψυχὴν μεθ' ὕβρεως, ὡς οὔτ' ἄρχοντος, οὔτε τινὸς ἡγεμόνος δεόμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοις ἱκανὸς ὢν ἡγεῖσθαι, καταλείπεται ἔρημος θεοῦ· καταλειφθεὶς δὲ, καὶ ἔτι ἄλλοις τοιούτοις προσλαβών, σκιρτᾷ, ταράττων πάνθ' ἅμα, καὶ πολλοῖς τισιν ἔδοξεν εἶναί τις· μετὰ δὲ χρόνον οὐ πολὺν ὑποσχὼν τιμωρίαν οὐ μεμπτὴν τῇ δίκῃ, ἑαυτόν τε καὶ οἶκον καὶ πόλιν ἅρδην ἀνάστατον ἐποίησε, "He who is elated with pride, because he excels in wealth, or honours, or personal beauty (by which the youthful mind is inflamed with folly and pride), as if standing in need of no ruler or guide, but rather being capable of guiding others, is entirely deserted by God; and being thus deserted, and associating with others of the same description, he becomes arrogant, throwing all things at once into confusion, and to many indeed he appears to be somebody; but after a short time, being punished by the just judgment of God, he at once overthrows himself, his house, and his city." The proverb itself, indeed, which accuses the Deity of envy, was not abrogated among the Greeks, nor did

fear of God as a mere arbitrary omnipotent Being, much less as hurtful and mischievous (which could not be disjoined from hatred); but an awful regard of him, as of one who is essentially just, and as well a punisher of vice and wickedness, as a rewarder of virtue; Lucretius himself, when he describes this religious fear of men, confessing it to be conjoined with a conscience of their duty, or to include the same within itself:*

> Tunc populi gentesque tremunt, &c.
> Ne quod ob admissum fœdè dictumve superbè,
> Pœnarum grave sit solvendi tempus adactum.

And this is the sense of the generality of mankind, that there being a natural difference of good and evil moral, there is an impartial justice in the Deity, which presideth over the same, and inclines it as well to punish the wicked, as to reward the virtuous: Epicurus himself acknowledging thus much:[3] Ἐνθεν

the poets or other subsequent writers cease to attribute φθόνον, or envy, to the gods; but this they did in a widely different sense from the meaning of their ancestors. For the φθόνος which in the later Greek writings is ascribed to God, most generally signifies the anger and avenging justice of the Deity, his hatred of arrogant and wicked men. This also may be confirmed by a passage of Herodotus, to be found in the eighth book of his History, sect. 109. p. 494: Τάδε οὐχ ἡμεῖς there says Themistocles, κατειργασάμεθα, ἀλλὰ θεοί τε καὶ ἥρωες, οἳ ἘΦΘΟΝΗΣΑΝ, ἄνδρα ἕνα τῆς τε Ἀσίας καὶ τῆς Εὐρώπης βασιλεῦσαι, ἐόντα ἀνόσιόν τε καὶ ἀτάσθαλον, "It is not we who have done these things, but the gods and heroes, *who were envious* that one man should rule both Europe and Asia, who was at the same time impious and wicked." These words plainly show, I think, that the envy ascribed to the gods and heroes was not regarded as criminal or vicious, but only signified the hatred they felt towards a wicked man, a feeling most worthy of the Supreme Deity. And the words, οἱ θεοὶ ἐφθόνησαν, may be most correctly rendered, "The gods were indignant that so impious a man should rule so many countries." Other examples of the same kind have been collected by the learned Elsner in his Observationes ad Novi Testamenti Libros, vol. 2. p. 396. And the famous Ezekiel Spanheim's remarks on the word φθόνος in his Comment. ad Callimachum, p. 112. are well worthy of observation. From the heathen this mode of expression passed over to the Christian fathers, many of whom have said that God is envious, when they mean that the Deity prevents the designs of arrogant and haughty mortals, and often resists the rage and ambition of the powerful. On this subject, see Isaac Casaubon's Observations on Gregory Nyssen's Epistle to Eustathius, p. 70; L. A. Muratori's Anecdota Græca, vol. 1. p. 23; and Henry Dodwell's Fifth Dissertation on Cyprian, p. 26. ed. Brem. The best of men have followed the laws of language which prevailed in the age in which they wrote; and cannot on this account be justly accused of any great crime; but I nevertheless agree with Dr. Cudworth in thinking that this mode of speech is improper, and its repudiation safer than its use. But as it often happens in other things, so also many expressions which at first owed their origin to a bad source, have by degrees lost the disgrace attached to them, and in an improved state of popular knowledge have gradually had appended to them improved ideas corresponding to the new opinions of the people.

* P. 503. [Lib. 5. v. 1223.]

[3] Epist. ad Menœc. p. 46. Gass. [Tom. 5. opp. Vide etiam Diog. Laërtium, lib. 10. sect. 124. p. 665.] In the printed edition the passage stands thus:—Ἐνθεν αἱ μέγισται βλάβαι αἰτίαι τοῖς κακοῖς ἐκ θεῶν ἐπάγονται, καὶ ὠφέλειαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, "Hence the greatest evils are brought on bad men by the gods, and advantages on the good." But Dr. Cudworth has quoted it as emended by Gassendi: see his comment on the 10th book of Diogenes Laërtius, p. 120. vol. 5. of his Works. An attentive reader will easily perceive that this passage is corrupt and vitiated by the negligence of

καὶ μεγίστας βλάβας οἴονται τοῖς κακοῖς ἐκ θεῶν ἐπάγεσθαι, καὶ ὠφελείας τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, "Theists suppose that there are both great evils inflicted upon the wicked from the gods; and also great rewards by them bestowed upon the good." And this fear of God is not only beneficial to mankind in general, by repressing the growth of wickedness, but also wholesome and salutary to those very persons themselves, that are thus religiously affected, it being preservative of them both from moral evils, and likewise from the evils of punishment consequent thereupon. This is the true and genuine fear of religion, which when it degenerates into a dark kind of jealous and suspicious fear of God Almighty, either as a hurtful, or as a mere arbitrary and tyrannical being, then is it looked upon as the vice or extreme of religion, and distinguished from it by the name of δεισιδαιμονία, "superstition." Thus is the character of a superstitious man given by Plutarch:* Οἴεται θεοὺς εἶναι, λυπηροὺς δὲ καὶ βλαβεροὺς, "That he thinks there are gods, but that they are noxious and hurtful;" and ἀνάγκη καὶ μισεῖν τὸν δεισιδαίμονα, καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς θεούς, "a superstitious man must needs hate God, as well as fear him." "The true fear of God (as the son of Sirach speaks[4]) is the beginning of his love, and faith is the beginning of cleaving to him." As if he should have said, the first entrance into religion is an awful regard to God as the punisher of vice;

the copyists. But how it ought to be emended we can now scarcely tell, on account of the paucity of ancient manuscripts. In the codex from which Laërtius is printed, the word ἀγαθοῖς is also wanting. But since the sense itself seemed to require it, Ambrosius Camaldulensis first added it in his version, and this was so much approved by Gassendi, M. Meibomius, and Joachim Kühn, that they did not hesitate to add the word in the text itself. Nor do I feel inclined to differ from such learned men; rather I would observe, that the word αἰτίαι, which here appears to be unmeaning and superfluous, seems to me to have arisen out of ἀγαθοῖς, by an error of the copyist. But what value is to be attached to the other emendations proposed by the above critics, I do not quite understand. Kühn, in his Observationes ad Laërtium, p. 253. alters the passage thus:—Ἐνθεν αἱ μέγισται βλάβαι· ἅπαι (for so he reads instead of αἰτίαι) τοῖς κακοῖς ἐκ θεῶν ἐπάγονται, καὶ ὠφέλειαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, "Hence are the greatest losses. Evils are by the gods brought upon the bad, and advantages upon the good." This I must confess is ingenious and elegant; whether it be correct, I leave others to decide. Though after all, what great need is there of wasting ingenuity in the correction of this passage? Those who differ respecting the words are unanimous on the subject itself. For all confess, even Gassendi himself, a favourer of Epicurus, that this philosopher spoke not his own, but the popular opinion, and reckoned among vulgar errors the sentiment that God punished the wicked and rewarded the good. Nor will the preceding and subsequent context allow us to entertain any other supposition, any more than what is said against a providence by Epicurus in his epistle to Rythocles. Since, therefore, the sense is sufficiently obvious, it will be of little consequence whether we follow Meibomius, or Gassendi, or Kühn.

* Περὶ Δεισιδαιμ. [P. 165. tom. 2. opp.]

[4] Cap. xxv. 12. In some copies of the book of Ecclesiasticus, this text is to be found, but in the majority it is wanting. Hence it is also absent in Luther's German version. It has been inserted by John Drusius in his edition of the book, who has been followed by John Albert Fabricius, in his edition of the Apocrypha, Leipsic, 1691. 8vo. and by others. [Dr. Cudworth's translation is given from the authorized English version.]

the second step forwards therein is faith or confidence in God, whereby men rely upon him for good, and cleave to him; and the top and perfection of all religion is the love of God above all, as the most amiable being. Christianity, the best of religions, recommendeth faith to us, as the inlet or introduction into all true and ingenuous piety; for "he that cometh to God, must not only believe that he is, but also that he is a rewarder of those that seek him."* Which faith is better defined in the Scripture, than by any scholastic, to be the substance of things (that are to be) hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen; that is, a confident persuasion of things, that fall not under sight, (because they are either invisible or future) and which also are to be hoped for. So that religious fear consisteth well with faith, and faith is near of kin to hope, and the result of both faith and hope is love; which faith, hope, and love, do all suppose an essential goodness in the Deity. God is such a Being, who, if he were not, were of all things whatsoever most to be wished for; it being indeed no way desirable (as that noble emperor concluded) for a man to live in a world, void of a God and providence. He that believes a God, believes all that good and perfection in the universe, which his heart can possibly wish or desire. It is the interest of none that there should be no God, but only of such wretched persons, as have abandoned their first and only true interest of being good, and friends to God, and are desperately resolved upon ways of wickedness.

The reason why the Atheists do thus grossly mistake the notion of God, and conceive of him differently from the generality of mankind, as a thing which is only to be feared, and must consequently be hated, is from nothing but their own vice and ill-nature. For first, their vice so far blinding them, as to make them think that the moral differences of good and evil have no foundation in nature, but only in law or arbitrary constitution, which law is contrary to nature, nature being liberty, but law restraint:) as they cannot but really hate that which hinders them of their true liberty and chief good, so must they needs interpret the severity of the Deity so much spoken of against wickedness, to be nothing else but cruelty and arbitrary tyranny. Again, it is a wretched ill-natured maxim, which these Atheists have, That there is nulla naturalis charitas, "no natural charity," but that omnis benevolentia oritur ex imbecillitate et metu, "all benevolence ariseth only from imbecility and fear;"† that is, from being either obnoxious to another's power, or standing in need of his help. So that all that is now called love and friendship amongst men, is, according to these really nothing, but either a

* Heb. xi. 1.

† Cicero de Natura Deor. lib. p. 213. Lamb. [Cap. 43. p. 2948. opp.]

crouching under another's power, whom they cannot resist, or else, mercatura quædam utilitatum, "a certain kind of merchandizing for utilities." And thus does Cotta in Cicero* declare their sense: Ne homines quidem censetis, nisi imbecilli essent, futuros beneficos aut benignos, "You conceive that no man would be any way beneficent or benevolent to another, were it not for his imbecility or indigence." But as for God Almighty, these Atheists conclude that upon the supposition of his existence there could not be so much as this spurious love or benevolence in him neither towards any thing; because by reason of his absolute and irresistible power, he would neither stand in need of any thing, and be devoid of all fear. Thus the forementioned Cotta:† Quid est præstantius bonitate et beneficentiâ? Quâ cùm carere Deum vultis, neminem Deo nec Deum nec hominem carum, neminem ab eo amari vultis. Ita fit, ut non modò homines à diis, sed ipsi dii inter se ab aliis alii negligantur, "What is there more excellent than goodness and beneficence? which when you will needs have God to be utterly devoid of, you suppose that neither any God nor man is dear to the supreme God, or beloved of him. From whence it will follow, that not only men are neglected by the gods, but also the gods amongst themselves are neglected by one another." Accordingly, a late pretender to politics, who in this manner discards all natural justice and charity, determines concerning God,[5] Regnandi et puniendi eos, qui leges suas violant, jus Deo esse à solâ potentiâ irresistibili, "That he has no other right of reigning over men, and of punishing those who transgress his laws, but only from his irresistible power." Which indeed is all one as to say, "That God has no right at all of ruling over mankind, and imposing commands upon them," but what he doth in this kind, he doth it only by force and power, right and might (or power) being very different things from one another, and there being no jus or "right" without natural justice; so that the word "right" is here only abused. And consentaneously hereunto the same writer further adds:[6] Si jus regnandi habeat Deus ab omnipotentiâ suâ, manifestum est obligationem ad præstandum ipsi obedientiam incumbere hominibus propter imbecillitatem, "That if God's right of commanding be derived only from his omnipotence, then it is manifest that men's obligation to obey him lies upon them only from their imbecility." Or, as it is further explained by him: Homines ideò Deo subjectos esse, quia omnipotentes non sunt, aut quia ad resistendum satis virium non habent, "That men are therefore only subject to God,

* Cicero de Naturâ Deor. lib. 1. p. 213. Lamb. [Cap. 43. p. 2948. opp.]
† Cicero, Ibid.
[5] Hobbes, Elem. de Cive, cap. 15. sect. 4. p. 112. et alias.
[6] Ibid. sect. 7. p. 114.

because they are not omnipotent, or have not sufficient power to resist him." Thus do we see plainly how the Atheists, by reason of their vice and ill-nature, (which makes them deny all natural justice and honesty, all natural charity and benevolence) transform the Deity into a monstrous shape; such an omnipotent Being, as if he were, could have nothing neither of justice in him, nor of benevolence towards his creatures; and whose only right and authority of commanding them would be his irresistible power; whom his creatures could not place any hope, trust, and confidence in, nor have any other obligation to obey, than that of fear and necessity, proceeding from their imbecility, or inability to resist him. And such a Deity as this is indeed a mormo or bug-bear, a most formidable and affrightful thing.

But all this is nothing but the Atheists' false imagination, true religion representing a most comfortable prospect of things from the Deity; whereas, on the contrary, the atheistic scene of things is dismal, hopeless, and forlorn, that there should be no other good, than what depends upon things wholly out of our own power, the momentary gratification of our insatiate appetites, and the perpetual pouring into a dolium pertusum, "a perforated and leaking vessel;" that ourselves should be but a congeries of atoms, upon the dissolution of whose compages, our life should vanish into nothing, and all our hope perish: that there should be no providence over us, nor any kind and good-natured Being above to take care of us, there being nothing without us but dead and senseless matter. True indeed, there could be no spiteful designs in senseless atoms, or a dark inconscious nature. Upon which account, Plutarch would grant,* that even this Atheistic hypothesis itself, as bad as it is, were, notwithstanding, to be preferred before that of an omnipotent, spiteful, and malicious being, (if there can be any such hypothesis as this) a monarchy of the Manichean evil principle, reigning all alone over the whole world, without any corrival, and having an undisturbed empire. Nevertheless, it is certain also, that there could be no faith nor hope neither in these senseless atoms, both necessarily and fortuitously moved, no more than there could be faith and hope in a whirlwind, or in a tempestuous sea, whose merciless waves are inexorable, and deaf to all cries and supplication. For which reason Epicurus[7] himself confessed, that it was better to give credit to the fable of the gods,† (as he calls it) than to serve the atheistic fate, or that material necessity of all things, introduced by those atheistic philosophers, Leucippus and Democritus: Κρεῖττον ἦν τῷ περὶ θεῶν μύθῳ κατακολουθεῖν, ἢ τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν

* De Superstit. [P. 164. tom. 2. opp.]
[7] Vide Diog. Laërtius, lib. 10. segm. 134. p. 659.
† Epist. ad Men. p. 49. Gass.

εἱμαρμένῃ δουλεύειν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐλπίδα παραιτήσεως ὑπογράφει θεῶν διὰ τιμῆς· ἡ δὲ ἀπαραίτητον ἔχει τὴν ἀνάγκην, "Because there is hopes, that the gods may be prevailed with by worship and prayer; but the other [necessity] is altogether deaf and inexorable." And though Epicurus thought to mend the matter, and make the atheistic hypothesis more tolerable, by introducing into it (contrary to the tenor of those principles) liberty of will in men; yet this being not a power over things without us, but ourselves only, could alter the case very little. Epicurus himself was in a panic fear lest the frame of heaven should sometime upon a sudden crack, and tumble about his ears, and this fortuitous compilement of atoms be dissolved into a chaos:

Tria talia texta
Una dies dabit exitio; multosque per annos
Sustentata ruet moles et machina mundi.[8]

And what comfort could his liberty of will then afford him, who placed all his happiness in security from external evils? Τέλος τοῦ μὴ νομίζειν θεοὺς, μὴ φοβεῖσθαι, (saith Plutarch),* "The atheistic design in shaking off the belief of a God, was to be without fear;" but by means hereof, they framed such a system of things to themselves, as, under which, they could not have the least hope, faith, or confidence. Thus running from fear, did they plunge themselves into fear; for they who are without hope, can never be free from fear. Endless of necessity must the fears and anxieties of those men be, who shake off that one fear of God, that would only preserve them from evil, and have no faith nor hope in him. Wherefore, we might conclude, upon better grounds than the Atheists do of theism, that atheism (which hath no foundation at all in nature nor in reason) springs first from the imposture of fear. For the faith of religion being the substance or confidence of such things not seen, as are to be hoped for; atheistic infidelity must needs, on the contrary, be a certain heavy diffidence, despondence, and misgiving of mind, or a timorous distrust and disbelief of good to be hoped for, beyond the reach of sense; namely, of an invisible Being omnipotent, that exerciseth a just, kind, and gracious providence over all those who commit their ways to him, with an endeavour to please him, both here in this life, and after death. But vice, or the love of lawless liberty, prevailing over such disbelieving persons, makes them, by degrees, more and more desirous, that there should be no God; that is, no such hinderer of their liberty;

[8] Lucretius, lib. 5. verse 95. &c. p. 238.
* De Superstit. [P. 165. tom. 2. opp.]

and to count it a happiness to be freed from the fear of him, whose justice (if he were) they must needs be obnoxious to.[9]

And now have we made it evident that the Atheists, who make religion and the belief a God to proceed from the imposture of fear, do first of all disguise the Deity, and put a monstrous, horrid, and affrightful vizard upon it, tranforming it into such a thing as can only be feared and hated; and then do they conclude concerning it, (as well indeed they may) that there is no such thing as this really existing in nature, but that it is only a mormo, or bug-bear, raised up by men's fear and fancy. Of the two, it might better be said, that the opinion of a God sprung from men's hope of good, than from their fear of evil; but really, it springs neither from hope nor fear, (however in different circumstances it raises both those passions in our minds;) nor is it the imposture of any passion, but that whose belief is supported and sustained by the strongest and clearest reason, as shall be declared in due place. But the sense of a Deity often preventing ratiocination in us, and urging itself more immediately upon us, it is certain that there is also, besides a rational belief thereof, a natural prolepsis, or anticipation, in the minds of men concerning it, which by Aristotle is called *μαντεία*, "a vaticination."[10]

[9] I am by no means disposed to deny the truth of what is here said by our author respecting the miserable and unquiet state of those who deny the existence of a God. His observation is also correct that Atheism is more the product of fear than religion and the worship of God. For most of those who have denied a Deity have been so bold because they were afraid of being forced to lay a restraint on their depraved propensities and love of vice, if they should allow the existence of a God. But properly speaking, in real Atheists, who have no motives arising from a hope of futurity, there can be no fear of losing what others hope for. For fear is nothing else than an apprehension of losing what we consider to be a part of our happiness. But an Atheist, apart from the delights and pleasures of the present life, has no source of happiness, and reckons what is said respecting the future state of souls, a vain delusive dream; so that he cannot be afraid of losing any part of these things. It may perhaps be said that Atheists are in perpetual fear of losing their temporal and only enjoyments; nor will I deny that some of them may have been so constituted and affected. But whoever reflects that these wretched men first of all believe that there is no infinite Being who can deprive them of the good things they possess, and then that it is a maxim with most of them to enjoy present pleasures and disregard the future, will perceive that they are not usually liable to suffer much from fear. So that I think Plutarch was right in saying that men embraced Atheism in order to free themselves from fear; and in my opinion, they do not altogether fail of their object. Dr. Cudworth here uses the words *hope* and *fear* in a freer sense, and means that Atheists cannot possess any true peace and joy, any tranquillity of mind, or any hope, (without which human life is truly wretched;) but are tossed and disturbed as if by continual tempests; all which is indeed entirely certain and true.

[10] Those who assert that all religion and piety are the result of fear, though using similar expressions, are not unanimous in their opinions, and therefore cannot be refuted in the same way. Some think that mankind seeing the uncertainty of human affairs and fortunes, and fearing the sudden loss of their property and enjoyments, have sought for some Being at once powerful and benign towards the human race, that might assure their fortunes against all the attacks of men and vicissi-

Thus have we sufficiently confuted the first atheistic pretence to solve the phenomenon of religion, and the belief of a God, so generally entertained, from the imposture of fear. We come

tudes of time; that therefore they imagined to themselves a nature exalted far above all visible things, and not only endowed with infinite power, but also imbued with ardent benevolence and love towards human kind; and that to this Being they betook themselves for safety, with prayers and sacrifices. But those who assign this origin to religion, are so far from thinking that God appears to men as a dreadful, terrific, sanguinary being, that they are persuaded of the exact contrary to all this, and believe the Deity is regarded by mankind as an amiable being, worthy of universal worship, on account of his benevolence to the human race. For it is impossible but that the Being to which any one looks for safety against evils and calamities, should be supposed to be possessed both of the will and power to afford assistance. Others again, who in like manner think that fear is the cause of religion, attach a widely different meaning to this tenet, and think that mankind, beholding the lightnings, earthquakes, shipwrecks, destruction of cities, and all the other ills by which we are in this life beset, through fear and ignorance of the real causes, have gone headlong into the opinion that there was a certain invisible being whence all these woes proceeded, which took delight in the misery of mankind, and had more malice to hurt than good-will to help; that therefore being full of solicitude and anxiety, they considered how this irritable and cruel Deity was to be appeased, and decided that he was to be approached with supplications to prevent him from overthrowing their means of happiness. This was the opinion of Democritus, whose words are given by Sextus Empiricus, lib. 8. adversùs Mathematicos, sect. 24. p. 554. as also of Lucretius, Petronius, and many others. The words of Petronius, in his Fragments, p. 676, &c. are as follows:—

Ardua cœlo
Fulmina quum caderent, discussaque mœnia flammis,
Atque ictus flagraret Athos, mox Phœbus ad ortus
Lustratâ dejectus humo, Lunæque senectus
Et reparatus honos: hinc signa [Deorum] effusa per orbem.

"When from high heaven
The vivid lightnings fell, and the scathed walls
And stricken mountains flamed; or when at dawn
The rising sun athwart the glistering glade
Shot forth his beams, or the moon waxed and waned
Then were the statues of the gods diffused
Over the world."

Those who supposed religion in this way to be the product of fear no doubt thought that God appeared to mankind a terrific Being, from whom there was more to be feared than hoped. These opinions are intimately allied to each other, and I think it very possible that an individual hostile to religion and to God, might unite and associate both. Yet they ought not to be confounded together, since it is possible that the one may be retained while the other is rejected, and the same consequences do not alike follow both. For my own part, though I wish not to impose laws on any, but to allow each one to enjoy his own liberty, yet I think that in all disputations respecting truth, and especially in all controversies having reference to religion, it is of primary importance distinctly to explain the ideas in question, and not inadvertently to confound things that are to some extent allied with each other. Some arguments go to demonstrate the folly and emptiness of both these views, while others only point out the absurdity of one. I. First of all, these disputants beg the question at issue, which no one will deny to be a capital error. The question is, whether there is a God or not? But they proceed in the controversy, as if all doubt on this point were done away with, and lay it down as a fundamental axiom that there is no God. For they inquire into the origin of our opinion or error, as they call it; but how could they do this, unless they had taken for granted the non-existence of the Deity. Those who wish to conduct a disputation with rationality and order, and to detract from the authority of any opinion, ought first by proper reasoning to show the trifling and false nature of the doctrine to which they are opposed. If this were done, no one could

now to the second, That it proceeded from the ignorance of causes also, or men's want of philosophy; they being prone, by reason of their innate curiosity, where they find no causes to

properly hinder them from examining into the causes and origin of error. But atheistical opposers of religion first of all omit all this, and take for granted that the only thing they have to do, is to unfold the causes of what they please to call an error; as if no doubt whatever remained in reference to the main point in dispute. Ingenious disputants truly! who like unskilful physicians begin to inquire into the causes and cure of a disease, before they know whether the disease be actually present or not. II. If they should deny that they are chargeable with this fault, and seriously wish to have what they say respecting the origin of religion being traceable to the timidity of mankind, reckoned among arguments against religion and a Deity, they will be involved in a still more flagrant error. This then would be the state of the argument:—Whatever proceeds from fear is false; religion hence originates; therefore it is a vulgar error. It will be proper then for them to prove the minor proposition of this syllogism, and to show that religion is the offspring of fear. Doubtless they will produce this new species of argumentation:—whatever always has united to it any degree of fear arises from fear; but fear is always united with religion; therefore, religion proceeds from fear. Let us imitate this acute method. Atheists wish to persuade us that their minds enjoy an ethereal serenity and peace, free from all sublunary disturbance; and that they have parted company with religion only for the sake of enjoying a gladsome freedom from all kind of terror. Let us suppose that this is the real state of the case. Proceeding then from this beginning, we will argue as follows: Whatever is united with perpetual gratification and voluptuous pleasure arises from a love of gratification and pleasure; atheism is always accompanied by gratification; therefore, atheism is entirely produced, not by reasoning, but by a fondness for pleasure. But atheists either do not or will not perceive that this argument of which they are so enamoured has no other foundation than the following most fragile one:—Whatever may possibly seem to have originated from any passion of the mind, must necessarily have had such an origin; or, in other words, whatever may in any way be traced to any weakness of our minds, must necessarily have thence originated. Does any one fancy that religion originated in fear? Oh! then, that was certainly its origin. There is nothing so well attested, certain, and evident, that it cannot be oppugned and rejected, if this method of reasoning be correct. Who will deny the existence of Alexander the Great and Julius Cæsar? Yet by the same method it will be easy to place the lives of these heroes among fabulous narratives. For I would argue thus:—There is in the human mind a certain fondness for the construction of unheard of fictions; whatever seems to have proceeded from this propensity, must have proceeded from it; the histories of Cæsar and Alexander, being full of unusual and wonderful events, may be referred to this inclination of our minds; therefore, these histories have been devised by certain individuals under the influence of an undefinable love for the singular and the marvellous. We must lay aside all the principles of reasoning handed down from wise and great men, and seek new laws of logic from the foes of religion and of God, if such conclusions as these be allowed any grade above folly and contempt. III. What, after all, is the grand boast of Atheists? Demonstration? Conclusions from principles neither doubtful nor obscure? They themselves will not assert so much. It is the mere guess and conjecture of men who would rather admit any thing than the being of a God. First of all they lay down this principle: there is no God, therefore there is no religion. Afterwards they suspect they ought to explain the origin of religion; and since they see a great part of mankind under the influence of fear, they think they have done a great thing in gravely affirming that this fear is the cause of religion. So great an advantage is it to be possessed of wisdom, and not to flit about like shadows! But in a matter of such moment as are all discussions respecting God and religion, what wise and rational man would trust to suspicions, guesses, and conjectures, the deceitful nature of which is taught us by daily experience? Let us suppose that a person were told that the whole town in which he resided was on fire, and that the conflagration was rapidly approaching his own house; let us imagine that not one or even ten persons, but all the people, with few exceptions, affirmed the truth of this; what kind of person should we think him to be, if he paid no attention to this public announcement, and conjectured that all this supposition

make or feign them; and from their fear in the absence of natural and necessary causes, to imagine supernatural and divine; this also affording them a handsome cover and pretext for their

of a conflagration arose only from a panic fear and fright? But such is the conduct of those whom we are now opposing. The whole human race, with few exceptions, (and those biassed by interest against a Deity,) declare that there is a God, and that he ought to be approached with reverence, and worshipped with devotion. But the small minority, on the contrary, think it quite sufficient for them to suspect that this opinion is the result only of the fear which is natural to mankind. IV. If religion and the belief of a God arose from fear, those, (as many we know there are) who have been endowed by nature with great and dauntless minds, so as not to dread imprisonment or death, or what to other men appears sad and wretched, would have no religion and no idea of a God. But in these boldest of mankind, there is often more piety and religion to be seen than in the timid and fearful. Wicked men themselves, whom, as Lucretius says, lib. 3. verse 1030,

> "Nor prisons, nor the dreadful precipice,
> Nor stripes, nor executioner, nor rack,
> Nor boiling pitch, nor iron heated red,
> Nor flaming torches can affright,"

though they would fain extirpate all belief of a supreme Deity from their minds, can by no means accomplish this. If fear be the cause of our worshipping God, whence did these get their religious feelings? While, on the contrary, men immersed in pleasure, who tremble at the very shadow of approaching evil, often persuade themselves there is no God. If fear be the parent of devotion, why are these without devotion, who thus superabound in fear?

We now come more particularly to those who hold that the fear of losing their possessions prompted men to imagine to themselves a great God, under whose power and goodness they might live in safety. But these give no explanation of what they mean, and do not give even a moderately probable reason of the matter in question. Their series of arguments is as follows:—Mankind are fearful of losing by some casualty their goods and possessions; hence they wish that there were some being that could defend their interests against all the assaults of adverse fortune; what is earnestly desired is easily believed to exist; therefore mankind, being very anxious that there should be such a being as God, have incautiously persuaded themselves that such is the case. Ingenious and acute, certainly! I will not indeed, deny that there are some men so irrational as to persuade themselves of the existence of what they very much desire. But, in the first place, these are very few, indeed, none but those to whom may be with propriety applied those lines of Catullus:—

> Non est sana puella: ne rogate
> Qualis sit: solet ea imaginosum
> Pati aliquid.
>
> "The girl's not sane—it matters not to ask
> What she may be; she often suffers thus
> From freaks of fancy."

But who can believe that a small number of foolish persons have exercised such an influence on the human race as that all, learned and unlearned, sane and insane, wise and stupid, have taken up their absurd opinions, and that the authority of a few simpletons has thus had greater power in the world than right reason? Secondly, how comes it that those who feel the utmost confidence, and fear nothing less than the ruin of their fortunes, those who are free from all depression and disorder of the mind, those whose very hands, as the comic poet says, have eyes, and who believe nothing but what they see, should yet be influenced by the highest degree of reverence towards God?

Nor is the second opinion we have mentioned above any wiser than the first. This supposes that mankind, being terrified by natural phenomena, and ignorant of the causes which gave rise to them, feigned to themselves an almighty Deity dwelling

ignorance: for which cause these Atheists stick not to affirm of God Almighty, what some philosophers do of occult qualities, that he is but perfugium et asylum ignorantiæ, "a refuge and shelter for men's ignorance;" that is, in plain and downright language, "the mere sanctuary of fools."

And these two things are here commonly joined together by these Atheists both "fear," and "ignorance of causes," as which jointly concur in the production of theism; because, as the fear of children raises up bugbears, especially in the dark, so do they suppose in like manner the fear of men, in the darkness of their ignorance of causes especially, to raise up the mormo, spectre, or phantasm of a God; which is thus intimated by the Epicurean poet:[1]

Omnia cæcis
In tenebris metuunt.

And accordingly Democritus* gave this account of the original

beyond the clouds, whom they supposed to be the efficient cause of all natural events. There is indeed no reason why we should deny that this fear, arising from ignorance, has occasionally been the source of many superstitions and errors; for to pass by other particulars, it is well known how much dismay and perverted devotion eclipses of the sun and moon have produced among certain barbarous tribes. But to suppose that all religion and belief of a God has had its origin in fear of this kind, is, I think, as correct as to think that because some individuals, under the influence of sudden fear, have fallen into a fever, therefore all diseases have proceeded only from fear, and that no one is ever ill, except through the influence of fear. The opinion under review is, in the first place, repugnant to reason; for it is incredible that all mankind should unanimously have adopted an opinion proceeding from none but ignorant, inexperienced, and timid individuals. Secondly, this opinion is contrary to experience; for this belief of a God remains after the ignorance of causes is in great part done away with, and most men are much better taught and instructed respecting the true reasons of natural events. And, to pass over many other considerations, what, pray, is the reason why those who have most diligently examined into the causes and origins of things, not only continue in the opinion common among mankind, but are by this very investigation more strongly impelled and urged to the worship of God? We are told that Anaxagoras spent so much time in the discovery of the causes of created things as even to incur the reprehension of Socrates, on account of his industry in this way, which great philosopher was offended at his always betaking himself to aerial, ethereal, and aqueous principles in accounting for any phenomenon. See Plato's Phædon, p. 393. And yet this same Anaxagoras did not doubt the existence of an eternal and almighty mind, by whose will and wisdom all things were at first made and are continually ruled. Who, within the memory of our fathers, more earnestly investigated into the secret recesses of nature than Robert Boyle, that illustrious man and immortal ornament of Great Britain? Who in our own age has shown greater sagacity in the investigation and disclosure of the hidden laws of nature than Sir Isaac Newton, that great man whose memory will never die so long as literature and learning shall have any honour among mankind? But the only result of his study and labour was to make him the more closely to adhere to the belief of a Deity, and to esteem the spread of piety and religion as of primary importance; he both himself directed his own thoughts and efforts, and taught his followers to direct theirs, against the madness of those who deny the being of a God.

[1] Lucret. lib. 2. ver. 54. 55. p. 273. tom. 1. But these words are not applied by Lucretius (as Dr. Cudworth seems to intimate) to the believers in a Deity, but to the children whom the poet here vainly imagines the professors of religion to resemble.

* Steph. Poe. Phil. 153. ex Sexto. [Vide Sextum Empir. lib. 8. advers. Mathemat. sect. 24. p. 554.]

of theism or religion: Ὁρῶντες τὰ ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις παθήματα οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καθάπερ βροντὰς, καὶ ἀστραπὰς, καὶ κεραυνοὺς, ἡλίου τε καὶ σελήνης ἐκλείψεις, ἐδειματοῦντο, θεοῦς οἰόμενοι τούτων αἰτίους, "That when, in old times, men observed strange and affrightful things in the meteors and in the heaven, as thunder, lightning, thunderbolts, and eclipses, they not knowing the causes thereof, and being terrified thereby, presently imputed them to the gods." And Epicurus declares this to have been the reason why he took such great pains in the study of physiology, that, by finding out the natural and necessary causes of things, he might be able to free both himself and others from the terror of a God, which would otherwise invade and assault them; the importunity of men's minds, whenever they are at a loss for natural causes, urging them so much with the fear, suspicion, and jealousy of a Deity.

Wherefore the Atheists thus dabbling in physiology, and finding out, as they conceive, material and mechanical causes for some of the phenomena of nature, and especially for such of them as the unskilful vulgar sometimes impute to God himself, when they can prove eclipses (for example) to be no miracles, and render it probable, that thunder is not the voice of God Almighty himself, as it were roaring above in the heavens, merely to affright and amaze poor mortals, and make them quake and tremble; and that thunderbolts are not there flung by his own hands, as the direful messengers of his wrath and displeasure; they presently conclude triumphantly thereupon, concerning nature or matter, that it doth

Ipsa suâ per se sponte omnia Dîs agere expers,[2]

"Do all things alone of itself without a God." But we shall here make it appear in a few instances, as briefly as we may, that philosophy, and the true knowledge of causes, leads to God; and that atheism is nothing but ignorance of causes and of philosophy.

For first, no Atheist, who derives all from senseless atoms, or matter, is able to assign any cause at all of himself, or give any true account of the original of his own soul or mind, it being utterly inconceivable and impossible, that soul and mind, sense, reason and understanding, should ever arise from irrational and senseless matter, however modified; or result from atoms, devoid of all manner of qualities, that is, from mere magnitude, figure, site, and motion of parts: For though it be indeed absurd to say (as these Atheists allege) that "laughing and crying things" are made out of "laughing and crying principles,"

[2] Lucretius, lib. 2. ver. 1091. p. 450.

Et ridere potest non ex ridentibu' factus ;[3]

yet does it not therefore follow, that sensitive and rational beings might result from a composition of irrational and senseless atoms; which, according to the democratic hypothesis, have nothing in them but magnitude, figure, site and motion, or rest, because "laughing" and "crying" are motions, which result from the mechanism of human bodies, in such a manner organized; but "sense" and "understanding" are neither local motion, nor mechanism. And the case will be the very same, both in the Anaximandrian or Hylopathian, and in the Stratonic or Hylozoic atheism; because "sense" and "conscious understanding" could no more result, either from those qualities of heat and cold, moist and dry, contempered together; or from the mere organization of inanimate and senseless matter, than it could from the

Concursus, motus, ordo, positura, figura,[4]

of atoms devoid of all manner of qualities. Had there been once nothing but senseless matter, fortuitously moved, there could never have emerged into being any soul or mind, sense or understanding; because no effect can possibly transcend the perfection of its cause. Wherefore Atheists supposing themselves, and all souls and minds, to have sprung from stupid and senseless matter, and all that wisdom which is any where in the world, both political and philosophical, to be the result of mere fortune and chance, must needs be concluded to be grossly ignorant of causes; which had they not been, they could never have been Atheists. So that ignorance of causes is the seed, not of theism, but of atheism; true philosophy, and the knowledge of the cause of ourselves, leading necessarily to a Deity.

Again, Atheists are ignorant of the cause of motion in bodies also; by which notwithstanding they suppose all things to be done; that is, they are never able to solve this phenomenon, so long as they are Atheists, and acknowledge no other substance besides matter or body. For first, it is undeniably certain, that motion is not essential to all body as such, because then no particles of matter could ever rest; and consequently there could have been no generation, nor no such mundane system produced as this is, which requires a certain proportionate commixture of motion and rest; no sun, nor moon, nor earth, nor bodies of animals; since there could be no coherent consistency of any thing, when all things fluttered and were in continual separation

[3] Lucretius, lib. 2. ver. 985. p. 432. Some MSS. for *factus* read *aptus*; but the sense is nearly the same.

[4] Lucretius, lib. 1. ver. 686. p. 171.

and divulsion from one another. Again, it is certain likewise, that matter or body, as such, hath no power of moving itself freely or spontaneously neither, by will or appetite; both because the same inconvenience would from hence ensue likewise, and because the phenomena or appearances do plainly evince the contrary. And as for that prodigiously absurd paradox of some few hylozoic Atheists, that all matter as such, and therefore every smallest particle thereof, hath not only life essentially belonging to it, but also perfect wisdom and knowledge, together with appetite, and self-moving power, though without animal sense or consciousness: this, I say, will be elsewhere in due place further confuted. But the generality of the ancient Atheists, that is, the Anaximandrians and Democritics attributed no manner of life to matter as such; and therefore could ascribe no voluntary or spontaneous motion to the same, but fortuitous only; according to that of the Epicurean poet[5] already cited:

> Nam certè neque consilio primordia rerum
> Ordine se quæque atque sagaci mente locarunt;
> Nec, quos quæque darent motus, pepigere profecto.

Wherefore these Democritics, as Aristotle somewhere[6] intimates, were able to assign no other cause of motion than only this, "That one body moved another from eternity infinitely," so that there was no πρῶτον κινοῦν, no "first unmoved mover," ever to be found; because there is no beginning, nor first in eternity. From whence probably, that doctrine of some atheistic Stoics in Alex. Aphrodisius was derived, "That there is no first in the rank and order of causes."[7] In the footsteps of which philo-

[5] Lib. 1. ver. 1020. p. 239.

[6] Vide Physic. lib. 8. cap. 1. sect. 3. p. 796. tom. 1. opp. et sect. 27. p. 579. The first of these passages is as follows: Ὁπόσοι μὲν ἀπείρους κόσμους τε εἶναί φάσι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν γίγνεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν κόσμων, ἀεί φασιν εἶναι κίνησιν, "As many as say there are an infinite number of worlds, and that some worlds come into existence and others perish, say that motion always exists." Here most likely the followers of Democritus are alluded to. The latter is clearer and more to the purpose; since mention is there expressly made of Democritus, and it is said that no other cause of motion is assigned by him than that it always was so. For after Aristotle had said that it was unworthy of a philosopher to give no other reason and cause for natural phenomena than this, ὅτι ἀεὶ ἡ ἔστιν οὕτως, ἢ γίνεται, "that it always was or existed so," he immediately afterwards adds that this was the custom of Democritus: Εἰς ὃ Δημόκριτος ἀνάγει τὰς περὶ φύσεως αἰτίας, ὡς οὕτω καὶ τὸ πρότερον ἐγίνετο· τοῦ δὲ ἀεὶ οὐκ ἀξιοῖ ἀρχὴν ζητεῖν, "To which (principle) Democritus refers natural causes, as that it was so at first; but that the beginning of eternity was not to be sought after."

[7] Alex. Aph. Lib. de Fato, p. [Sect. 25. p. 118. edit. Lond.] Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐν τοῖς αἰτίοις τὸ πρῶτον, "But there is not, according to them, any first among causes." But this is not said by this Alexander concerning a certain kind of Stoics, as Dr. Cudworth thinks, that were more prone to impiety than others of the same sect, but respecting the whole of that school. It is not however necessary on the present occasion to inquire into the meaning of this opinion, which I think is correctly attributed to the Stoics.

sophers a modern writer seemeth to have trodden, when declaring himself after this manner :[8] Si quis ab effectu quocunque, ad causam ejus immediatam, atque inde ad remotiorem, ac sic perpetuò ratiociniatione ascenderit, non tamen in æternum procedere poterit, sed defatigatus aliquando deficiet, "If any one will from whatsoever effect ascend upward to its immediate cause, and from thence to a remoter, and so onwards perpetually, in his ratiocination, yet shall he never be able to hold on through all eternity; but at length, being quite tired out with his journey, be forced to desist, or give over." Which seems to be all one, as if he should have said, one thing moved or caused another infinitely from eternity, in which there being no beginning, there is consequently no first mover or cause to be reached unto. But this infinite progress of these Democritics, in the order of causes, and their shifting off the cause of motion, from one thing to another, without end or beginning, was rightly understood by Aristotle,[9] to be indeed the assigning of no cause of motion at all: Εἰς ἄπειρον εἶσιν, εἰ μή τι ἔσται κατὰ φύσιν κινοῦν πρῶτον, "They acknowledging (saith he) no first mover according to nature, must needs make an idle progress infinitely;" that is, in the language of this philosopher, assign no cause at all of motion. Epicurus therefore, to mend the matter, though according to the principles of the atomic physiology, he discarded all other qualities, yet did he notwithstanding admit this one quality of gravity or ponderosity in atoms, pressing them continually downwards in infinite space. In which, as nothing could be more absurd nor unphilosophical than to make upwards and downwards in infinite space, or a gravity tending to no centre, nor place of rest; so did he not assign any cause of motion neither, but only in effect affirm, the atoms therefore to tend downwards, because they did so; a quality of gravity signifying only an endeavour to tend downwards, but why or wherefore nobody knows. And it is all one, as if Epicurus should have said, that atoms moved downwards by an occult quality, he either betaking himself to this as an asylum, a sanctuary or refuge for his ignorance; or else indeed more absurdly, making his very ignorance itself (disguised under that name of a quality) to be the cause of motion. Thus the Atheists universally either assigned no cause at all for motion, as the Anaximandrians and Democritics; or else no true one, as the Hylozoists; when, to avoid incorporeal substance, they would venture to attribute perfect understanding,

[8] Hobbes, Elem. Philosoph. part 4. cap. 26. p. 204. I cannot however but say that our author seems to me to have given more loose to his suspicions than is proper, in explaining the meaning of this passage. Certainly the words, taken in their proper sense, do not give the sense expressed by him; nor can I perceive what connexion they have with the doctrine of Democritus respecting motion. To say the truth, these words rather seem to oppose the view of Democritus.

[9] Physic. Auscultat. lib. 7. cap. 2. p. 365. tom. 1. opp.

appetite or will, and self-moving power to all senseless matter whatsoever. But since it appears plainly, that matter or body cannot move itself, either the motion of all bodies must have no manner of cause, or else must there of necessity be some other substance besides body, such as is self-active and hylarchicalnor hath a natural power of ruling over matter. Upon which latter account Plato rightly determined, that cogitation, which is self-activity or autokinesy, was in order of nature, before the local motion of body, which is heterokinesy. Though motion considered passively in bodies, or taken for their translation, or change of distance and place, be indeed a corporeal thing, or a mode of those bodies themselves moving; yet, as it is considered actively for the vis movens, that "active force," which causes this translation, or change of place, so is it an incorporeal thing; the energy of a self-active substance upon that sluggish matter or body, which cannot at all move itself. Wherefore in the bodies of animals, the true and proper cause of motion, or the determination thereof at least, is not the matter itself organized, but the soul either as cogitative, or plasticly self-active, vitally united thereunto, and naturally ruling over it. But in the whole world it is either God himself, originally impressing a certain quantity of motion upon the matter of the universe, and constantly conserving the same, according to that of the scripture,* "In him we live and move" (which seems to have been the sense also of that noble Agrigentine poet and philosopher,[10] when he described God to be only "a pure or holy mind, that with swift thoughts agitates the whole world"); or else it is instrumentally an inferior created spirit, soul, or life of nature; that is, a subordinate hylarchical principle, which hath a power of moving matter regularly, according to the direction of a superior perfect mind. And thus do we see again, that ignorance of causes is the seed of atheism,[11] and not of theism; no Atheists being able to assign a true cause of motion, the knowledge whereof plainly leadeth to a God.

* Acts xvii. 28.

[10] Empedocles, cujus versus duos vide apud Ammonium, Comm. in Librum Aristot. περὶ Ἑρμενείας, p. 107. Edit. Aldinæ.

Ἀλλὰ φρὴν ἱερὴ καὶ ἀθέσφατος ἔπλετο μοῦνον
Φροντίσι κόσμον ἅπαντα καταΐσσουσα θοῇσιν.

[11] The candid and considerate reader will perceive, even without my pointing it out, that these words are not to be too closely pressed, but are to be taken in a freer sense. For, properly speaking, ignorance of the causes of things is not the producer and parent of atheism. For who was ever so insane as to reason thus:—There is no God; for the causes of mundane phenomena are to us obscure and unknown. Our author only means that many have taken occasion to deny the being of a God, because they have imagined false and insufficient causes of natural phenomena. Epicurus, for instance, denied a divine Providence because he had heedlessly persuaded himself that all events might be accounted for from the existence and fortuitous concourse of atoms. I have thought proper to say thus much, for the sake of those who sometimes discover in an author's words, which are susceptible of a sufficiently proper and satisfactory explanation, matter of complaint which they cannot find in his actual meaning.

Furthermore, those Atheists who acknowledge no other principle of things but senseless matter fortuitously moved, must needs be ignorant also of the cause of that grand phenomenon, called by Aristotle the τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, "the well and fit in nature;" that is, of the most artificial frame of the whole mundane system in general, and of the bodies of animals in particular, together with the conspiring harmony of all. For they who boasted themselves able to give natural causes of all things whatsoever, without a God, can give no other cause at all of this phenomenon, but only that the world happened by chance to be thus made as it is. Now, they who make fortune and chance to be the only cause of this so admirable phenomenon, the most regular and artificial frame and harmony of the universe, they either make the mere absence and want of a cause to be a cause, fortune and chance being nothing else but the absence or want of an intending cause; or else do they make their own ignorance of a cause, and they know not how, to be a cause; as the author of the Leviathan[1] interprets the meaning hereof: "Many times (saith he) men put for cause of natural events their own ignorance, but disguised in other words; as when they say that fortune is the cause of things contingent; that is of things whereof they know no cause." Or they affirm, against all reason, one contrary to be the cause of another, as confusion to be the cause of order, pulchritude, and harmony; chance and fortune, to be the cause of art and skill; folly and nonsense, the cause of the most wise and regular contrivance: or, lastly, they deny it to have any cause at all, since they deny an intending cause, and there cannot possibly be any other cause of artificialness and conspiring harmony, than mind and wisdom, counsel and contrivance.

But because the Atheists here make some pretences for this their ignorance, we shall not conceal any of them, but bring them all to light; to the end that we may discover their weakness and foolery. First, therefore, they pretend that the world is not so artificially and well made, but that it might have been made much better, and that there are many faults and flaws to be found therein; from whence they would infer that was not made by a God, he being supposed by Theists to be no bungler, but a perfect Mind, or a Being infinitely good and wise, who therefore should have made all things for the best.

But this being already set down by itself, as a twelfth atheistic objection against a Deity, we must reserve the confutation thereof for its proper place. Only we shall observe thus much here by the way; that those Theists of later times, who, either because they fancy a mere arbitrary Deity; or because their

[1] Cap. 11. p. 53, et alias.

faith in a divine goodness is but weak; or because they judge of things according to their own private appetites and selfish passions, and not with a free uncaptivated universality of mind, and an impartial regard to the good of the whole; or because they look only upon the present scene of things, and take not in the future into consideration, nor have a comprehensive view of the whole plot of the divine providence together; or, lastly, because we mortals do all stand upon too low a ground to take a commanding view and prospect upon the whole frame of things; and our shallow understandings are not able to fathom the depths of the divine wisdom, nor trace all the methods and designs of providence; grant that the world might have been made much better than now it is; which indeed is all one as to say that it is not well made: these neoteric Christians (I say) seem hereby to give a much greater advantage to the Atheists than the Pagan Theists themselves heretofore did, who stood their ground, and generously maintained against them, that Mind being the maker of all things, and not fortune or chance, nor arbitrary self-will and irrational humour omnipotent, the τὸ βέλτιστον, that which is absolutely the best in every case, so far as the necessity of things would admit, and in compliance with the good of the whole, was the measure and rule both of nature and providence.[2]

Again, the atomic Atheists further allege, that though there be many things in the world which serve well for uses, yet it does not at all follow that therefore they were made intentionally and designedly for those uses; because though things happen by chance to be so or so made, yet may they serve for something or other afterward, and have their several uses consequent. Wherefore all the things of nature happened (say they) by chance to be so made as they are, and their several uses notwithstanding were consequent, or following thereupon. Thus the Epicurean poet:*

Nil ideò natum est in corpore, ut uti
Possemus, sed quod natum est, id procreat usum.

"Nothing in man's body was made out of design for any use; but all the several parts thereof, happening to be so made as they are, their uses were consequent thereupon." In like manner the old atheistic philosophers in Aristotle† concluded: Τοὺς ὀδόντας ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀνατεῖλαι, τοὺς μὲν ἐμπροσθίους ὀξεῖς, ἐπιτη-

[2] There can be no doubt that this is aimed against Des Cartes and his followers, to whom our author showed very little favour. For he, in his Principles of Philosophy, where he is laying open the causes of natural phenomena, as well as in many other places of his works, plainly intimates that some parts of the universe might have been better arranged.

* Lucretius, lib. 4. p. 367. Lamb. [Verses 832. 833. p. 139. vol. 27.]

† Phys. lib. 2. cap. 8. [Page 475. tom. 1. opp.]

δείους πρὸς τὸ διαιρεῖν, τοὺς δὲ γομφίους πλατεῖς, καὶ χρησίμους πρὸς τὸ λεαίνειν τὴν τροφήν· ἐπεὶ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ συμπεσεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν, ἐν ὅσοις δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἕνεκά του, "That the former teeth were made by material or mechanical necessity, thin and sharp, by means whereof they became fit for cutting; but the jaw-teeth thick and broad, whereby they became useful for the grinding of food. But neither of them were intended to be such, for the sake of these uses, but happened by chance only. And the like concerning all the other parts of the body, which seem to be made for ends." Accordingly the same Aristotle represents the sense of those ancient Atheists, concerning the other parts of the universe, or things of nature, that they were all likewise made such by the necessity of material (or mechanical) motions undirected, and yet had nevertheless their several uses consequent upon this their accidental structure. Τί κωλύει τὴν φύσιν μὴ ἕνεκά τοῦ ποιεῖν, μηδ' ὅτι βέλτιον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ὗει ὁ Ζεύς, οὐχ ὅπως τὸν σῖτον αὐξήσῃ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης; &c. "What hinders but that nature might act without any respect to ends or good and better, as Jupiter, or the heaven, raineth not intentionally to make the corn grow, but from necessity? because the vapours, being raised up into the middle region, and there refrigerated and condensed, must needs descend down again in the form of water. But this happens by mere chance, and without any intention, that the grain is made to grow thereby; as the contrary sometimes happens by the excess of it."[3]

But to this we reply, that though a thing that happens accidentally to be so or so made, may afterwards, notwithstanding, prove often serviceable for some use or other; yet, when any

[3] Aristotle, however, differently from what our author here asserts, does not say that certain philosophers of his time reasoned in this way; but uses the words as if drawn from his own cogitations. It is, however, very likely that there were philosophers in Aristotle's time who chose to reason in this way; for there were men in that age who denied the existence of a God, or of an eternal Being endued with infinite wisdom and goodness. For whoever are so imbecile as to turn the efforts of their minds against God himself, must necessarily fall into the folly of removing all natural distinctions, and holding that nothing is made and created by determinate design, but that, on the contrary, all things have happened by a kind of natural necessity. Hence Spinoza, that ringleader of the Atheists in the last century, spared no pains entirely to eradicate from the human mind the opinion which supposes that God does or has done any thing with a definite determination. For while this opinion was held he easily foresaw that his nefarious philosophy could not stand. See his Ethica Geometrico More Demonstrata, part 1. prop. 36. pp. 36. 37, where he proceeds to such a pitch of impudence and folly as to declare that this opinion "annihilates the divine perfections." But since Dr. Cudworth wrote, so many respectable authorities have placed beyond all controversy the wisdom of God as displayed in his works, both by the strongest reasoning and clearest experiments, that this disgraceful method of philosophizing is now completely trampled under foot. The principal of these authors are pointed out by J. A. Fabricius, in his very useful book entitled Delectus Argumentorum et Syllabus Scriptorum, qui Veritatem Religionis Christianæ asseruerunt, Hamb. 1725. 4to. cap. 7. p. 286. &c. and in other places.

thing consisteth of many parts, that are all artificially proportioned together, and with much curiosity accommodated one to another, any one of which parts having been wanting, or otherwise in the least placed and disposed of, would have rendered the whole altogether inept for such a use; then may we well conclude it not to have been made by chance, but by counsel and design, intentionally, for such uses. As for example, the eye, whose structure and fabric consisting of many parts (humours and membranes) is so artificially composed, no reasonable person, who considers the whole anatomy thereof, and the curiosity of its structure, can think otherwise of it, but that it was made out of design for the use of seeing; and did not happen accidentally to be so made, and then the use of seeing follow; as the Epicurean poet would fain persuade us:*

Lumina ne facias oculorum clara creata,
Prospicere ut possimus,

"You are by all means to take heed of entertaining that so dangerous opinion (to atheism) that eyes were made for the sake of seeing, and ears for the sake of hearing." But for a man to think, that not only eyes happened to be so made, and the use of seeing unintended followed; but also, that in all the same animals, ears happened to be so made too, and the use of hearing followed them; and a mouth and tongue happened to be so made likewise, and the use of eating, and (in men) of speaking, was also accidentally consequent thereupon; and feet were in the same animals made by chance too, and the use of walking followed; and hands made in them by chance also, upon which so many necessary uses depend; besides innumerable other parts of the body, both similar and organical, none of which could have been wanting without rendering the whole inept or useless: I say, to think that all these things should happen by chance to be thus made in every one and the same animal, and not designed by mind or counsel, that they might jointly concur and contribute to the good of the whole; this argues the greatest insensibility of mind imaginable. But this absurd and ridiculous conceit hath been long since so industriously confuted, and the folly thereof so fully manifested by that learned pagan philosopher and physician, Galen, in his book of the use of parts, that it would be altogether superfluous to insist any more upon it.[1]

* Page 367. Lamb. [Lib. 4. verse 823. p. 136.]

[1] Vide Lactant. de Opificio Dei, cap. 6. p. 1003. "Epicurus," says he, "asserted that the eyes were not made for seeing, nor the ears for hearing, nor the feet for walking, since these members were produced before there was any necessity for seeing, hearing, and walking; but that the uses of all these arose from the organs when produced. I fear it will be thought as foolish to refute as to make such absurd and ridiculous assertions as these; but it is permitted sometimes to be foolish in dealing with a fool, lest he should be wise in his own conceit." [Prov. xxvi. 5.]

Wherefore, that the former teeth are made thin and sharp, and the jaw-teeth think and broad, by chance only, and not for use, was one of the Democritic dotages; as also, that nothing in the clouds and meteors was intended for the good of this habitable earth, within whose atmosphere they are contained, but all proceeded from material and mechanical necessity. Which conceit though Cartesius seems to have written his whole book of meteors in favour of, he beginning it with the derision of those who "seat God in the clouds, and imagine his hands to be employed in opening and shutting the cloisters of the winds, in sprinking the flowers with dews, and thunder-striking the tops of mountains;" and closing his discouse with this boast, that he had now made it manifest, there was no need to fly to miracles (that is, to bring in a god upon the stage) to solve those phenomena; yet were it easy enough to demonstrate the defectiveness of those his mechanical undertakings in sundry particulars, and to evince that all those things could not be carried on with such constant regularity by mere fortuitous mechanism, without any superior principle to guide and steer them. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that God and nature do things every where in the most frugal and compendious way, and with the least operoseness; and therefore that the mechanic powers are not rejected, but taken in, so far as they could comply serviceably with the intellectual model and platform; but still so as that all is supervised by one understanding and intending cause, and nothing passes without his approbation, who, when either those mechanic powers fall short, or the stubborn necessity of matter proves uncompliant, does overrule the same, and supply the defects thereof, by that which is vital; and that without setting his own hands immediately to every work too, there being a subservient minister under him, an artificial nature, which, as an Archeus of the whole world, governs the fluctuating mechanism thereof, and does all things faithfully, for ends and purposes intended by its director.[5]

But our atomic Atheists still further allege, that though it might well seem strange that matter fortuitously moved should, at the very first jump, fall into such a regular frame as this is, having so many aptitudes for uses, so many correspondencies between several things, and such an agreeing harmony in the

[5] He means a formative or *plastic* nature, of which he had already copiously treated. What is here said against Des Cartes will appear, I am afraid, to many more invidious than necessary. For there is a wide difference between the blasphemies of Epicurus, who maintained that nothing was created by the Deity or with a specific design, and the opinion of Des Cartes, who taught that all motion proceeds from an allwise and omnipotent Deity. I believe that Des Cartes is throughout treated with undue severity by our author, because those who then opposed and undermined religion in England were favourable to his tenets, and Hobbes, who was then justly abhorred by all wise men in Britain, did not seem widely to differ from him.

whole; yet ought it not to seem a jot strange if atoms, by motion, making all possible combinations and contextures, and trying all manner of conclusions and experiments, should, after innumerable other freaks, and discongruous forms produced, in length of time, fall into such a system as this is. Wherefore they affirm, that this earth of ours, at first, brought forth divers monstrous and irregular shapes of animals:*

> Orba pedum partim, manuum viduata vicissim;
> Multa sine ore etiam, sine voltu cœca reperta,

"Some without feet, some without hands, some without a mouth and face, some wanting fit muscles and nerves for the motion of their members." And the old philosophic Atheists were so frank and lavish herein, that they stuck not to affirm, amongst those monstrous shapes of animals, there were once produced centaurs, and scyllas, and chimæras; βουγενῆ καὶ ἀνδρόπρωρα, "mixtly boviform and hominiform," biform and triform animals. But Epicurus, a little ashamed of this, as that which must needs look oddly and ridiculously, and seeming more cautious and castigate pretends to correct the extravagancy of this fancy:†

> Sed neque Centauri fuerunt, neque tempore in ullo
> Esse queat duplici naturâ, et corpore bino,
> Ex alienigenis membris compacta potestas,

"Nevertheless, there were not then any centaurs, nor biform and triform animals;" he adding, that they who feigned such things as these, might as well fancy "rivers flowing with golden streams, and trees germinating sparkling diamonds, and such vastly gigantean men, as could stride over seas, and take up mountains in their clutches, and turn the heavens about with the strength of their arms."[6] Against all which, notwithstanding, he gravely gives such a reason as plainly overthrows his own principles:‡

> Res sic quæque suo ritû procedit, et omnes
> Fœdere naturæ certo discrimina servant,

"Because things, by a certain covenant of nature, always keep up their specific differences, without being confounded together." For what covenant of nature can there be in infinite chance? or what law can there be set to the absolutely fortuitous motions of atoms, to circumscribe them by? Wherefore it must be

* Lucretius, lib. 5. p. 476. Lamb. [Verse 838. p. 339.]
† Lucretius, lib. 5. p. 479. Lamb. [Verse 876. p. 344.]
[6] Verse 911. p. 349:—

> Trans maria alta pedum nisus ut ponere posset,
> Et manibus totum circum se vertere cœlum.

‡ Page 480. [Verse 920, &c. page 349.]

acknowledged, that, according to the genuine hypothesis of the atomic atheism, all imaginable forms of inanimate bodies, plants and animals, as centaurs, scyllas and chimæras, are producible by the fortuitous motions of matter, there being nothing to hinder it, whilst it doth—

> Omnimodis coire, atque omnia pertentare,
> Quæcunque inter se possint congressa creare,[7]

"Put itself into all kind of combinations, play all manner of freaks, and try all possible conclusions and experiments."[8]

[7] Lucret. lib. 5. verse 191. p. 250.

[8] Our author has here well observed that Lucretius deserted his own philosophical principles, when he contended that centaurs, scyllas, chimæras, and animals partly boviform and partly human could not possibly be produced at the commencement of the world; and that it was much more consistent and accordant with his other opinions to decide, as some did, that such animals both could and really did exist in the nascent world. But it did not accord with his design to point out separately the futility and inconclusiveness of the reasons by which Lucretius endeavoured to attain his object. But as I imagine it may be of some use in arresting those who are still warm admirers of this poet, and regard him as the father of all kind of wisdom, I will here make it evident that Lucretius is not a proper master from whom to derive principles of reasoning. For this poet makes use of three arguments to prove his point, that at the beginning there were no centaurs, scyllas, chimæras, or any similar animals. The first is, that one animal cannot be made up of dissimilar natures and powers; for, if this were the case, it would result that one part of this animal would be vigorous and longlived, while the other part would be shortlived and weak. That therefore a man and a horse cannot be combined, that is, a centaur cannot exist; for that the natures of a horse and of a man are entirely dissimilar; a horse after three years being in the prime of life, while a human being of three years old is still feeble and scarcely weaned. See lib. 5. verse 884, &c.:—

> Post ubi equum validæ vires ætate senectâ
> Membraque deficiunt fugienti languida vita:
> Tum demum pueris ævo florente juventas
> Occipit, et molli vestit lanugine malas.

And that the same might be said of Scylla, whom the poets feign to be a woman surrounded by rapacious dogs, and of the Chimæra, or a fabulous monster compounded of lion, dragon, and goat. For the natures of these animals are evidently so incongruous, that they can by no means be united and associated together. But this reason has nothing to do with the point Lucretius wishes to prove. It is indeed certain from it that animals compounded and made up of such different and inconsistent natures as these could not continue for long, and must necessarily soon perish; but it is impossible thus to prove that such animals might not have once existed and been produced from the fortuitous concurrence of atoms. Empedocles himself and the other ancient philosophers who thought that such animals as these were formerly produced from the surface of the earth, had no doubt respecting all that Lucretius advances against their opinion; on which account they related that these monstrous births immediately perished, because they were made up of contrary and mutually repugnant principles; yet they did not on that account think it necessarily followed that such beasts and monsters never could or never had been produced by the fortuitous concurrence of atoms flying through the void of space. In which indeed they reasoned much better than Lucretius and his master Epicurus; and even Lucretius himself shortly afterwards allows that many kinds of animals were formerly produced which could not continue long on account of the various faults and monstrous shapes of their bodies.

The Epicurean poet derives a second argument from the very absurd conclusions drawn from this opinion. For he says that there was no reason why his opponents should not maintain "that formerly flowed golden rivers, and trees blossomed with

But they pretend, that these monstrous, irregular shapes of animals, were not therefore now to be found, because by reason of their inept fabric, they could not propagate their kind by

gems," verse 905, &c., which he says is stupid and ridiculous; that the opinion therefore which is attended by this consequence is alike foolish and absurd. Lucretius was correct enough in supposing that the supposition of the former existence of many monsters gave rise to these consequences; but he was very dull not to perceive that the same consequences were also deducible from his own views. And it is puerile and entirely unworthy of a philosopher to accuse another of a crime to which he is himself obnoxious. All who maintain that the universe originated in a fortuitous concourse of atoms cannot consistently deny the possibility of the former existence of rivers of gold flowing through the earth, gems depending from trees, and similar phenomena usually assigned by the poets only to the Elysian fields. Why, pray, should not the atoms which form gold be by chance so united with those that are aqueous or igneous as that a golden river should be the result? What obstacle is there to prevent a number of the atoms that constitute gems from being united in several cases to atoms that compose trees? And if a blind fortuitous motion of atoms could produce a human being of the ordinary stature, I do not at all perceive why the same cause might not produce a man such as Atlas is supposed to be, on whose shoulders the heavens are supported. A favourer of Epicurus and Lucretius will perhaps say, that the inconsistent nature of the atoms will prevent this result. But what nature, pray, is there in atoms, which possess only the one quality of weight?—or what incongruity of nature can exist in corpuscules that have no properties except figure, magnitude, position, motion, and rest? The Epicurean must therefore cease to make use of this answer, or must betake himself to the affinity and incongruity of Empedocles, and thereby overthrow the very foundations of his own creed.

There remains a third argument of the poet, which if less trifling is certainly not more weighty than the other two. The sum of it is, that the herbs, fruits, and trees, great numbers of which are now produced by the earth, are never confounded together, or produced in mutual compounds; and that therefore the seeds of various things or different kinds of animals are never mutually aggregated and mixed (ver. 916, &c.):

> Nil tamen est signi, mistas potuisse creari
> Inter se pecudes, compactaque membra animantum:
> Propterea quia, quæ de terris nunc quoque abundant,
> Herbarum genera ac fruges arbustaque læta
> Non tamen inter se possint complexa creari.

Truly a consistent piece of workmanship! Perhaps it may soon be the good pleasure of somebody to prove by the same argument that there was never any Lucretius who put all the abstruse trifles of Epicurus into heroic verse, because at the present time no such poet exists. What if any one should first of all assert that there is a great difference between the seeds of animals and of plants; and some other person should point out the absurdity and folly of concluding that what does not at present take place never did occur? But let us take for granted what Lucretius requires, and allow him the full benefit of the argument, provided only that we have equal liberty ourselves of making use of it. Then, building upon our poet's principles, we will reason thus:—The seeds of plants are not at present confounded; therefore the seeds of animals were not so when the world was young. It is then true that what does not at the present time exist, or of which some few examples at least are not now witnessed, did not take place when the nature of things was first established. But at the present time we do not see that a concurrence of atoms produces a fly, a beetle, a butterfly, or a worm, much less a man; and therefore those who maintain that of old mankind, animals, stars, the sun, and rivers arose out of the fortuitous concourse of individual corpuscules, appear scarcely to have recovered from the effects of their yesterday's debauch. This poet, in other respects ingenious, is so incautious in his argumentation, that he often gives an opportunity to others of destroying with his own weapons the very foundations of his creed; and from this specimen his admirers may learn how great is the philosopher to whom they look up. I should be very glad if some learned man would publish an edition of this poet with notes not so much philo-

generation, as neither indeed preserve their own individuals. Thus does Lucretius declare the sense of Epicurus:*

Quoniam natura absterruit auctum,
Nec potuere cupitum ætatis tangere florem,
Nec reperire cibum, nec jungi per veneris res.

And that this atheistic doctrine was older than Epicurus, appeareth from these words of Aristotle:† "Οπου μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα συνέβη, ταῦτα μὲν ἐσώθη ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου συστάντα ἐπιτηδείως· ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἀπώλετο, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει τὰ βουγενῆ καὶ ἀνδρόπρωρα, "When animals happened at first to be made, in all manner of forms, those of them only were preserved, and continued to the present time, which chanced to be fitly made (for generation) but all the others perished, as Empedocles affirmeth of the partly-ox and partly-man animals." Moreover, the ancient both Anaximandrian and Democritic Atheists concluded, that besides this one world of ours, there were other infinite worlds (they conceiving it as absurd to think, there should be but one only world in infinite space, as that in a vast ploughed and sowed field there should grow up only one ear of corn, and no more); and they would have us believe, that amongst these infinite worlds (all of them fortuitously made) there is not one of a thousand, or perhaps of ten thousand, that hath such regularity, concinnity, and harmony in it, as this world that we chanced to emerge in. Now it cannot be thought strange (as they suppose) if, amongst infinite worlds, one or two should chance to fall into some regularity. They would also confidently assure us, that the present system of things, in this world of ours, shall not long continue such as it is, but after a while fall into confusion and disorder again:[9]

Mundi naturam totius ætas
Mutat, et ex alio terram status excipit alter,
Quod potuit nequeat, possit quod non tulit antè,

"The same wheel of fortune, which moving upward, hath brought into view this scene of things that now is, turning round, will, some time or other, carry it all away again, introducing a new one in its stead;" and then shall we have centaurs, and scyllas, and chimæras again, all manner of inept forms of animals, as before.

logical as philosophical, which might show those who are fond of his writings, and are not unfrequently allured by the elegance of his versification to embrace his errors, how little worthy is this Epicurean of the implicit faith of any wise and rational person. If I mistake not, this was formerly attempted by Barbeyrac, an excellent and highly respectable author, who if he returns to this design, which he seems to have laid aside, will do good service to literature and religion.

* Lamb. p. 476. [Lib. 5. verse 844.]

† Nat. Ausc. lib. 2. cap. 8. [Page 475. tom. 1. opp.]

[9] Lucret. lib. 5. verse 832. &c. page 337. &c.

But because men may yet be puzzled with the universality and constancy of this regularity, and its long continuance through so many ages, that there are no records at all of the contrary any where to be found; the atomic Atheist further adds, that the senseless atoms, playing and toying up and down, without any care or thought, and from eternity trying all manner of tricks, conclusions and experiments, were at length (they know not how) taught, and by the necessity of things themselves, as it were, driven, to a certain kind of trade of artificialness and methodicalness; so that though their motions were at first all casual and fortuitous, yet in length of time they became orderly and artificial, and governed by a certain law, they contracting as it were upon themselves, by long practice and experience, a kind of habit of moving regularly; or else being, by the mere necessity of things, at length forced so to move, as they should have done, had art and wisdom directed them. Thus Epicurus in his epistle to Herodotus:[10] Ἀλλὰ μὲν ὑπολῆπτέον καὶ τὴν φύσιν πολλὰ

[10] Apud Diog. Laërt. lib. 10. segm. 75. p. 633. Gassendi's translation, here quoted by our author, is to be found in his Syntagma Philosophiæ Epicuri, sect. 3. cap. 7. p. 38. vol. 3. of his works. But in his translation of the tenth book of Diogenes Laërtius, he thus renders or rather paraphrases this passage:—"It is also to be maintained that nature has been, by the things themselves, or by a continuous series of things, in a manner taught, or compelled by a certain necessity or concatenation of motions, to produce these various and numerous effects which we call the works of nature." Respecting the meaning of this sentence Gassendi thus speaks in his comment on the place, vol. 5 of his works," p. 82:—"Epicurus seems here to have wished to reach the cause of the propagation of beings, more especially of animals, in order to lessen the wonder we rightly feel respecting that propagation and the structure of their members." The same idea is enlarged and more copiously treated and explained in his Physics, sect. 3. last part of lib. 4. chap. 3. p. 274 of the 2nd volume of his works. And Dr. Cudworth has almost adopted as his own the interpretation given of Laërtius by the ancient translators. But Meibomius, who has given great attention to the elucidation of Laërtius, strongly denies that Gassendi has rightly expounded these words, and thinks that they contain no absurdity or impiety. For he thinks that Epicurus is speaking of the nature of mankind, and merely means that men are gradually taught by custom and experience what they were before ignorant of. To support the probability of which view he conjectures that the word ἀνθρώπων or ἀνθρωπίνην has fallen out of the text after φύσιν, and thinks that the whole passage ought to be read and translated thus: Ἀλλὰ μὲν ὑπολητπτέον καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτὴν περιεστώτων πραγμάτων διδαχθῆναί τε καὶ ἀναγκασθῆναι, "But it is also to be supposed that human nature has been taught and compelled to many and various things by the circumstances that surround it." The word ἀνθρώπων is here Meibomius' own, who has thought proper to add it on his own authority. Whence come the words αὐτὴν περιεστώτων, which are also wanting in Gassendi, I do not know. It seems indeed to be a bold and rash action in Meibomius to insert a word in the text of Laërtius, simply on the authority of his own conjecture; but if his reasons be examined, on account of which he thinks Epicurus's words ought to be understood as above stated, his opinion will be seen to have more probability than is at first sight apparent. First of all he remarks that Gassendi's interpretation is entirely inconsistent with the immediately subsequent context; while his own as exactly agrees with it. And in this indeed he is correct. The words of Epicurus immediately following the above extract are as follows: Τὸν δὲ λογισμὸν τὰ ὑπὸ ταύτης παρεγγυηθέντα καὶ ὕστερον ἐπακριβοῦν, "And they have afterwards more fully unfolded the reasoning taught them by it [nature]." Meibomius insists that these words can be understood only of mankind; for that they alone possess λογισμὸν, or "reason;" that none can be "taught" except rational human beings; that a

καὶ παντοῖα ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων διδαχθῆναί τε καὶ ἀναγκασθῆναι, "It must be held, that nature is both taught and necessitated by the things themselves;" or else, as Gassendus interprets the words, quâdam veluti naturali necessariâque doctrinâ sensim imbuta,* "By little and little imbued with a certain kind of natural and necessary doctrine."

To which atheistic pretences we shall briefly reply: first, that it is but an idle dream, or rather impudent forgery, of these Atheists, that heretofore there were in this world of ours all manner of monstrous and irregular shapes of animals produced, centaurs, scyllas, and chimæras, &c., and indeed at first none but such; there being not the least footstep of any such thing appearing in all the monuments of antiquity and traditions of former times; and these Atheists not being able to give any manner of reason, why there should not be such produced as well at this present time, however the individuals themselves could not continue long, or propagate by generation; or at least why it should not happen, that in some ages or countries there were either all androgyna, of both sexes, or else no animal but of

"fuller unfolding" applies to none except mankind; and that therefore the preceding words, in order to accord with the subsequent, must be understood of mankind or human nature. He adds that Laërtius just afterwards introduces the words τὰς φύσεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων, by which his own emendation is remarkably sustained. This last argument is of little value; but the former appears to have considerable weight. Certainly Epicurus's meaning would be inconsistent and altogether absurd, if he intended to say that "nature had gradually accustomed itself to a particular class of motions, or had in lapse of time acquired a certain habitude of moving itself in a regular manner; and that reason, taught by nature had more fully unfolded all these things." How, pray, can reason and judgment strengthen and more accurately unfold that habit of motion which individual corpuscules have gradually acquired? Have mankind, then, by reasoning, strengthened and extended the uniformity of nature and the laws of motion now observed by atoms? Nonsense indeed! which if Epicurus had let fall from his pen he would justly have exposed himself to ridicule. But his meaning is plain and consistent, if it be supposed to be that "nature itself is first informed of many things by various casualties; which information is afterwards confirmed and dilated by mankind." Nothing can be more true than this, as is attested by the history of all ages and times. But though this is my opinion, I do not think it necessary that the word ἀνθρώπων should be taken into the text of Laërtius, or that this saying of Epicurus should be understood of human nature exclusively. For there is no reason why the word φύσις may not be taken generally for the whole universe of animated and sentient beings; and then the sense would be that "various casualties and events have informed the nature of men and animals concerning several things." Nor is the λογισμὸς, of which Epicurus immediately proceeds to speak, inconsistent with this view. For not to insist on the aptitude of this word to the nature of mankind, it is plain even from Lucretius himself that the Epicureans did not entirely deny the existence of souls and reason in the brutes. I will not however deny that Epicurus is justly chargeable with the sentiment which Dr. Cudworth, following Gassendi and others, supposes to be contained in these words For certainly he could not, except in this way, give a reason for that wonderful uniformity which we see to exist in the generation and propagation of plants, animals, and human beings. See Gassendi's Syntagma Philosophiæ Epicuri, sect. 3. cap. 7. p. 38. vol. 3. of his works; and also Thomas Stanley's Historia Philos. part 12. p. 1029. &c., who has given all the authorities omitted by Gassendi. Consult also Gassendi's Physics, sect. 3. last clause, lib. 4. cap. 3. p. 274. vol. 2 of his works.

* Page 28. Gass.

one sex, male, or female only; or, lastly, none of any sex at all. Neither is there any more reason to give credit to these Atheists, when (though enemies to divination) they would prophecy concerning future times, that in this world of ours, all shall sometime fall into confusion and nonsense again. And, as their infinity of worlds is an absolute impossibility, so to their bold and confident assertion concerning those supposed other worlds, as if they had travelled over them all, that, amongst ten thousand of them, there is hardly one that hath so much regularity in it as this world of ours, it might be replied, with equal confidence, and much more probability of reason, that were every planet about this sun of ours a habitable earth, and every fixed star a sun, having likewise its several other planets or habitable earths moving round about it, and not any one of these desert or uninhabited, but all peopled with animals; we say, were this so extravagant supposition true, that there would not be found any one ridiculous or inept system amongst them all, but that the divine art and wisdom (which being infinite can never be defective, nor any where idle) would exercise its dominion upon all, and every where impress the sculptures and signatures of itself.

In the next place we affirm, that the fortuitous motions of senseless atoms, trying never so many experiments and conclusions, and making never so many combinations and aggregate forms of things, could never be able to produce so much as the form or system of one complete animal, with all the organic parts thereof so artificially disposed (each of these being as it were a little world) much less the system of this great world, with that variety of animals in it; but least of all could it constantly continue such regularity and artificialness every where: for that the fortuitous motions of irrational, senseless, and stupid matter should in length of time grow artificial, and contract a habit of acting as regularly and methodically as if perfect art or wisdom had directed them, this is the most prodigious nonsense imaginable, and can be accounted no other than atheistic fanaticism.

It is no more possible, that the fortuitous motion of dead and senseless matter should ever from itself be taught and necessitated to produce such an orderly and regular system as the frame of this whole world is, together with the bodies of animals, and constantly to continue the same, than that a man perfectly illiterate, and neither able to write nor read, taking up a pen into his hand, and making all manner of scrawls, with ink upon paper, should at length be taught and necessitated, by the thing itself, to write a whole quire of paper together, with such characters, as being deciphered by a certain key, would all prove coherent philosophic sense; or than that we ourselves, writing down the mere letters of the alphabet, transposedly, any how,

without the least thought, either of words or sense, after our scribbling a long time together what was altogether insignificant, should at length have been taught and necessitated by the thing itself, without the least study and consideration of our own, to write this whole volume. Or, to use another instance, this is no more possible, than that ten or a dozen persons, altogether unskilled in music, having several instruments given them, and striking the strings or keys thereof, any how, as it happened, should, after some time of discord and jarring, at length be taught and necessitated to fall into most exquisite harmony, and continue the same uninterruptedly for several hours together.

Wherefore, if it be ridiculous for one that hath read over the works of Plato or Aristotle, or those six books of T. Lucretius Carus, De Naturâ Rerum, to contend, that possibly the letters of those books might be all put together by chance, or scribbled at random, without the least thought or study of the writer, he having also no manner of philosophic skill in him; or for one that hears ten or a dozen persons playing in concert upon instruments of music, and making ravishing harmony, to persuade himself, that none of those players had, for all that, the least of musical art or skill in them, but struck the strings as it happened; it must needs be much more ridiculous and absurd, to suppose this artificial system of the whole world to have resulted from the fortuitous motion of senseless atoms, without the direction of any art or wisdom, there being much more of sense, art and philosophy therein, than in any philosophic volume or poem ever written by men; and more of harmony and proportion than in any composition of vocal music. We conclude therefore with Aristotle,* ἀδύνατον δὲ ταῦτα τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον, "that it is absolutely impossible things should have come to pass after this manner;" that is, by mere fortune and chance, and without the direction of any mind or God. The divine Mind and Wisdom hath so printed its seal or signature upon the matter of the whole corporeal world, as that fortune and chance could never possibly have counterfeited the same.

Notwithstanding all which, the ancient Atheists would undertake, by their wonderful skill in logic, to demonstrate that the frame of nature could not possibly be made by any intending cause, and for the sake of ends and uses; as for example, that eyes could not be first of all made intentionally for the use of seeing, nor ears intentionally for the use of hearing, and so for the rest; because, forsooth, these things were all of them, in order of time and nature, before their several uses. The argument is seriously propounded by Lucretius, after this manner: †

* Nat. Ausc. lib. 2. cap. 8. [Page 475. tom. 1. opp.]
† Lamb. page 367. [Lib. 4. verse 834. p. 139. vol. 2.]

Nec fuit antè, videre, oculorum lumina nata,
Nec dictis orare, prius quàm lingua creata est;
Sed potius longè linguæ præcessit origo
Sermonem, multòque creatæ sunt prius aures,
Quam sonus est auditus; et omnia denique membra
Antè fuere, ut opinor, eorum quàm fuit usus.
Haud igitur potuere utèndi crescere causâ.

To this sense: "There was no such thing as seeing before eyes were made, nor hearing before ears, nor speaking before the tongue. But the original of the tongue much preceded speech: so likewise eyes and ears were made before there was any seeing of colours or hearing of sounds. In like manner, all the other members of the body were produced before their respective uses." The force of which argument consisteth in this proposition: That whatsoever is made for the sake of another thing, must exist in time after that other thing, for whose sake it was made: or, That, for which any thing is made, must not only be, in order of nature, but also of time, before that which is made for it. And this that Epicurean poet endeavours to prove by sundry instances:*

At contrà conferre manû certamina pugnæ,
Antè fuit multò quàm lucida tela volarent, &c.

"Darts were made for the sake of fighting, but fighting was before darts, or else they had never been invented. Bucklers were excogitated and devised for the keeping off of blows, but the declining of strokes was before bucklers. So were beds contrived for the sake of resting and sleeping, but resting and sleeping were older than beds, and gave occasion for the invention of them. Cups were intended and designed for the sake of drinking, which they would not have been had there not been drinking before." According to the force of which instances, the poet would infer, that whosoever affirms eyes to have been made for the sake of seeing, must suppose in like manner, there was some kind of seeing or other before eyes. But since there was no seeing at all before eyes, therefore could not eyes be made for the sake of seeing. And this is the atheistic demonstration, that the parts of men's bodies, and other things of nature, could not be made by any intending cause, for the sake of ends and uses.

But it is evident, that this logic of Atheists differs from that of all other mortals, according to which, the end, or that for which any thing is made, is only in intention before the means, or that which is made for it, but in time and execution after it. And thus was the more effectual way of fighting and doing execution, for whose sake darts were invented, in time after

* Lamb. p. 867. [Lib. 4. verse 834. p. 139. vol. 2.]

darts, and only in intention before them. It is true indeed, that fighting in general was before darts, sleeping before beds, and drinking before cups; and thereby did they give occasion for men to think of means for the more effectual fighting, and more commodious sleeping and drinking; men being commonly excited from the experience of things, and the sense of their needs and wants, to excogitate and provide fit means and remedies. But it doth not therefore follow, that the Maker of the world could not have at once beforehand a preventive knowledge of whatsoever would be useful, and for the good of animals, and so make them intentionally for those uses. Wherefore the argument should have been framed thus: whatsoever any thing is made for, as the end, that must needs be, in the knowledge and intention of the maker, before the existence of that which is made for it. And therefore if eyes were made for the sake and end of seeing, seeing must of necessity be in the knowledge and intention of the maker of eyes, before there were any eyes actually existing. But there could be no knowledge of seeing before there were any eyes. Wherefore eyes could not be made for the sake of seeing.

And this indeed is the genuine scope and drift of the premised atheistic argument, however it were disguised by them in their manner of propounding it. The reason whereof was, because they took it for granted that all knowledge, as such is derived by sense from the things themselves known pre-existing. From whence it follows, that there could be no knowledge of vision or seeing, before there was actual seeing and eyes; and so they think it to be demonstrated that eyes could not be made by any Deity for the sake of seeing before there was seeing; no more than spectacles by men for the sake of eyes, before there were eyes. Thus does the Epicurean poet conclude triumphantly:*

> Illa quidem seorsum sunt omnia, quæ prius ipsa
> Nata, dedere suæ post notitiam utilitatis.
> Quo genere imprimis sensus et membra videmus.
> Quare etiam atque etiam procul est, ut credere possis,
> Utilitatis ob officium potuisse creari.

That is, "The members of men's bodies, and organs of sense, were first made by themselves, and then did they afterwards give the notice or knowledge of their several utilities; none of which could have been had before. Wherefore we affirm again and again, that it is impossible these things should have been made designedly for their uses."

So that the controversy is at last resolved wholly into this: Whether or no, all knowledge and understanding, as such,

* Lib. 3. p. 368. [Lib. 4. verse 851. p. 141.]

universally does arise from things antecedently existing without the knower? Which being asserted by Atheists, they conclude from thence that the things of the world could not be made by the previous counsel, contrivance, and intention of any understanding Deity, but that they all blundered out themselves, one after another, according to the train or sequel of the fortuitous motions of matter; and that from thence knowledge and understanding, counsel and intention, sprung up afterward, as junior to things, and the world. But this being already made the eleventh atheistic argument against a Deity, viz. "That all knowledge and mental conception is the information of the things themselves known, existing before and without the knower, and a passion from them; and therefore that the world must needs be before any knowledge or conception of it, and no knowledge or conception before the world, as its cause;" we shall refer the answer to it, and confutation of it, to its proper place; where we shall plainly demonstrate that knowledge or understanding is not in its own nature ectypal, but archetypal; and that it is older than the world, and the Maker of all things.

But the Atheists yet further urge, against the proving of a God from the τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, "the regular frame of the whole world" in general, and the artificial structure of the bodies of animals, after this manner: That it is altogether unreasonable to suppose there should be no cause in nature for the phenomena thereof, especially for those things which are daily generated, as the bodies of animals; but (as by the tragic poets) a god should be introduced, as it were from a machine, forcibly to solve them. And indeed though there were a God, yet they think he ought not to be detruded to such mean offices as this, viz. to make the body of every the most contemptible animal, as it were with his own hands miraculously; nor ought nature or the world to be supposed so imperfect, as if it must be bungled and botched up every where after this manner. It is nature therefore, which is the cause of these natural productions and generations. Which nature, that it doth not intend nor act designedly for ends and uses, appears not only from hence, because it never consults or deliberates (which Aristotle[1] intimates to have been the reason, why some of old denied the things of nature to have been made for ends), but also because it hath no animal sense or consciousness, no understanding or appetite. Wherefore this opinion of intending, and final causality in nature, can be accounted no

[1] Vide de Nat. Auscultat. lib. 2. cap. 8. p. 477. tom. 1. opp. His words are: *Ατοπον δὲ τὸ μὴ οἴεσθαι ἕνεκα τοῦ γίνεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ ἴδωσι τὸ κινοῦν βουλευσάμενον· καί τοι καὶ ἡ τέχνη οὐ βουλεύεται· καὶ γὰρ εἰ εἴην ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ ἡ ναυπηγική, ὁμοίως ἂν τῇ φύσει ἐποίει,* "It is absurd not to suppose that any thing is done for the sake of aught else, unless the moving agent be seen to have designed it. For even art itself does not act with design. As if in wood there were inherent ship-building, in like manner as by nature it might do."

other than an idolum specus (as some[2] affect to phrase it) or a prejudice of men's minds, when they apply their own properties to things without them, and think because themselves intend, and act for ends, that therefore nature doth the like. And they might as well say, that nature laughs and cries, speaks and walks, syllogizes and philosophizes, because themselves do so. But, as a modern philosopher[3] concludeth, "The universe, as one aggregate of things natural, hath no intention belonging to it." And accordingly, were all final causes rightly banished by Democritus out of physiology, as Aristotle[4] recordeth of him: Τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀφεὶς λέγειν, πάντα ἀνάγει οἷς χρῆται ἡ φύσις, "That he reduced all things to natural and necessary, altogether rejecting final."

To all which we briefly reply; that there are indeed two extremes here to be avoided, the one, of those, who derive all things from the fortuitous motions of senseless matter, which is the extreme of the atomic Atheists; the other, of bigotical religionists, who will needs have God αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα, "to do all things himself immediately;" as if all in nature were miracle. But there is a middle betwixt both these extremes; namely, to suppose that besides God, and in subordination to him, there is a nature (not fortuitous, but) artificial and methodical, which governing the motion of matter, and bringing it into regularity, is a secondary or inferior cause of generations. Now, this natura artificiosa, this "artificial nature," though itself indeed do not understand the reason of what it doth, nor properly intend the ends thereof, yet may it well be conceived to act regularly for the sake of ends understood and intended by that perfect Mind, upon which it depends. As the manuary opificers understand not the designs of the architect, but only drudgingly perform their several tasks imposed by him; and as types or forms of letters, composed together, print coherent philosophic sense, which themselves understand nothing of. (Upon which artificial or spermatic nature, we have largely insisted before, in the

[2] Lord Bacon in his Novum Organon, part 2. sect. 53. p. 47. This term, as is well known to those versed in modern literature, is applied by Bacon to those errors which are usually occasioned by nature, education, and custom. I must confess that better and more appropriate expressions may be found; but still every writer has the liberty of using what names he pleases, provided only he define their signification. But Dr. Cudworth was little inclined to be favourable to the memory of this great man, whom he seems to have reckoned amongst the secret patrons of atheism; on which account he rarely misses an opportunity of finding fault with his words and expressions.

[3] There can be no doubt that Hobbes is here meant, as will be apparent to any one who has read his works. But where in his writings the passage here quoted is to be found I do not know. In the Leviathan, cap. 34. p. 183, the following passage occurs: "The whole corporeal universe has no part that is not corporeal." Perhaps Dr. Cudworth thought himself at liberty to give a free version of these words, according to his usual custom.

[4] De Generat. Animal. lib. 5. cap. 8. p. 713. tom. 2. opp.

appendix to the third chapter.) And thus, neither are all things performed immediately and miraculously by God himself; neither are they all done fortuitously and temerariously, but regularly and methodically for the sake of ends, though not understood by nature itself, but by that higher Mind, which is the cause of it, and doth, as it were, continually inspire it.[5] Some, indeed, have

[5] But, unless I am mistaken, this middle way between those who refer all things to mechanical laws and those who make God the author of every individual thing, though greatly commended by our author, has as many difficulties and obstacles as are found by human reason in other things, and does not much differ from the other extreme which he wishes us to avoid. For of that productive nature which is so strongly advocated by our author, if indeed all its operations be performed under the inspiration and instigation of the Deity, itself being destitute of reason or design, all the performances are properly the performances of God himself, by whose power it is prompted and influenced. Whose faults, then, are those which we sometimes see in the universe? To whom belong the monsters we sometimes see to be produced? Do they not properly belong to the Deity? The typographical errors which occur in books are not attributed to the types themselves, but to the man by whom they are composed and put together; nor is the blame of any grand defect in a house to be assigned to the workmen who carried the materials, but to the architect; nor are the inaccuracies of a letter thought to belong to the amanuensis, but to the person by whom it is indited. So that even if we adopt this method, the difficulty which has impelled many to take refuge in mechanical causes remains the same as at first; for what difference is there between supposing that God himself, without the intervention of any other cause, brings to pass all results and events, and imagining that the Deity acts through a certain unintelligent and insensate instrumentality which he constantly guides and governs? Only as much as exists between penning a letter with one's own hand, and making use of another person's pen, though the words and diction be exactly prescribed; and how insignificant a variation is this, regarded in connexion with the causes and effects connected with it. I do not insist on this consideration, that God cannot have the excuse, sometimes made use of by man, that the amanuensis was not sufficiently careful, since nothing would be easier for him than to take care that this productive nature makes no mistake. Indeed I must candidly confess that were I compelled to choose, I would rather follow those who hold God to be the universal agent than those who unite with him a formative nature. For, in the first place, I see no reason why the supreme Deity should form a nature of such a kind as to be made use of by him in the fabrication and formation of created things. Mankind are induced partly by a fondness for ease and quiet, and partly by the weakness and insufficiency of their nature, to associate with themselves administrators of their affairs; but neither of these motives can have place with the perfect and almighty Deity. It is agreed both by those who refer all things immediately to God, and by those who associate with him a productive nature, that it would be equally easy to divine and infinite power to construct the body of an animal or a man either with or without the assistance of a nature of this description. If this be the case, I should like to know from the advocates of a productive nature, what could be the object of the Deity in dividing his work between himself and such a nature. The hypothesis, therefore, which ascribes all things to God appears to me to be by far the most simple and plain; and it is universally allowed to be the part of wisdom to use the shortest and simplest method of accomplishing an object. No one, I think, then, will deny that one who needs no assistance, and is himself equal to all requirements, will act more wisely and simply by personally performing all things, than by calling in any number of fallible assistants to his aid. Who can believe, therefore, that God, being supremely wise, and requiring no extraneous power, would perform in a circuitous and involved manner what he could himself accomplish with the utmost ease? Or who can imagine that he would devolve a part of his own duties upon a nature that is greatly liable to error? Or indeed, if any were so foolish as to say that the Deity, in order to relieve himself from trouble, called in to his assistance a productive nature, such an assertion would be quite unworthy our attention. God might perhaps have assigned some part of the toil to this nature, if he had made it provident, sagacious, wise, rational, and infallible; but such is not the case. It is destitute of

unskilfully attributed their own properties, or animal idiopathies to inanimate bodies; as when they say that matter desires forms, as the female doth the male; and that heavy bodies descend down by appetite towards the centre, that so they may rest therein; and that they sometimes again ascend in discretion, to avoid a vacuum. Of which fanciful extravagancies if the Advancer of Learning[6] be understood, there is nothing to be reprehended in this following passage of his: Incredibile est quantum agmen idolorum philosophiæ immiserit naturalium operationum ad similitudinem actionum humanarum reductio, "It is incredible how many errors have been transfused into philosophy, from this one delusion, of reducing natural actions to the mode of human; or of thinking that nature acteth as a man doth." But if that of his be extended further, to take away all final causes from the things of nature, as if nothing were done therein for ends intended by a higher mind, then is the very spirit of atheism and infidelity. It is no idol of the cave or den (to use that affected language), that is, no prejudice or fallacy imposed upon ourselves, from the attributing our own animalish properties to things without us, to think, that the frame and system of this whole world was contrived by

reason, wisdom, and sagacity, and is nothing else than a kind of instrument, which ought always to be at hand when the Deity wishes to perform any of his works. But I forbear.

[6] The person here meant is Lord Bacon, whose work here alluded to is his famous treatise On the Advancement of Learning; in which this passage is to be found, lib. 3. cap. 4. p. 288. It will, I am aware, appear strange to many that Dr. Cudworth should find so many opportunities of carping at this great man, who has every where in his writings left on record his reverence and piety towards God, from whom he frequently observes all true philosophy must begin. But the wonder will cease upon a view of the following considerations. I. Bacon constantly depreciates the labours of those who strive to discover the *final causes* of things, a course which he appears almost inclined to consider as futile and vain. In his Novum Organon Scientiarum, lib. 1. part 2. sect. 65. p. 59, he plainly traces the origin of this practice to superstition. "This evil (superstition)," says he, "is also found in other departments of philosophy, by the introduction of abstract forms, *final causes*, and primary causes." And more plainly still, lib. 2. sect. 2. p. 145. "So far is there from being any advantage in the consideration of a *final cause*, that it is injurious to science, excepting in reference to human actions." See also Advancement of Learning, lib. 3. cap. 4. But the abrogation of final causes was justly regarded by Dr. Cudworth as the high road to atheism. See also a learned opponent of Bacon's on this point, Samuel Parker, in his Dissertations on God and a Divine Providence, diss. 3. sect. 16. p. 283. &c. II. Bacon universally displays his dislike to the Platonic philosophy. In his Novum Organon Scientiarum, lib. 1. part. 2. sect. 65. p. 51, after complaining that philosophy had been greatly corrupted by superstition and intellectual ambition, he thus proceeds: "A notable example of this description was displayed among the Greeks, especially in Pythagoras, but connected with a more gross and burdensome superstition; and more dangerously and subtly still in Plato and his followers." It would be tedious and unnecessary to adduce other passages of the same tenor. But Dr. Cudworth was a warm admirer of Plato, and seemed to see but little difference between his philosophy and Christianity. III. Hobbes, to whom Dr. Cudworth was strenuously opposed, often abused Bacon's discoveries and opinions, and even his expressions, to the confirmation and illustration of his own tenets. Perhaps there were other reasons than these for Dr. Cudworth's prejudice against him; which I leave others to investigate.

a perfect understanding Being or Mind (now also presiding over the same) which hath every where printed the signatures of its own wisdom upon the matter. As also, that though nature itself do not properly intend, yet it acteth according to an intellectual platform prescribed to it, as being the manuary opificer of the divine architectonic art, or this art itself as it were transfused into the matter, and embodied in it. Thus Cicero's Balbus[7] long since declared concerning it, that it was not vis quædam sine ratione, ciens motus in corporibus necessarios; sed vis particeps ordinis; tanquam via progrediens, cujus solertiam nulla ars, nemo artifex consequi potest imitando, "Not a force unguided by reason, exciting necessary motions in bodies temerariously; but such a force, as partakes of order, and proceeds as it were methodically; whose cunning or ingeniosity no art or human opificer can possibly reach to by imitation." For it is altogether inconceivable, how we ourselves should have mind and intention in us, were there none in the universe, or in that highest principle, from whence all proceeds. Moreover, it was truly affirmed by Aristotle,[8] that there is much more of art in some of the things of nature, than there is in any thing artificially made by men; and therefore intention, or final and mental causality, can no more be secluded from the consideration of natural, than it can from that of artificial things. Now it is plain, that things artificial, as a house or clock, can neither be understood, nor any true cause of them assigned, without design, or intention for ends and good. For to say, that a house is stones, timber, mortar, iron, glass, lead, &c. all put together, is not to give a definition thereof, or to tell what indeed it is, it being such an apt disposition of all these materials, as will make up the whole fit for habitation, and the uses of men. Wherefore this is not sufficiently to assign the cause of a house neither, to declare out of what quarry the stones were dug, nor in what woods or forests the timber was felled, and the like: nor, as Aristotle addeth:[9] Εἴ τις τὸν τοῖχον γεγενῆσθαι ἐξ ἀνάγκης νομίζει, ὅτι τὰ μὲν βαρέα κάτω πέφυκε φέρεσθαι, τὰ δὲ κοῦφα ἐπιπολῆς· διὸ οἱ λίθοι μὲν κάτω καὶ θεμέλια, ἡ δὲ γῆ ἄνω διὰ τὴν κουφότητα, ἐπιπολῆς δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ξύλα· κουφότατα γὰρ, "If any one should go about thus to give an account of a house from natural necessity (as the atheistic philosophers did of the world and the bodies of animals) that the heavier things being carried down of their own accord, and the lighter upward; therefore, the stones and foundation lay at the bottom, and the earth for the walls, being lighter, was higher; and the timber, being yet lighter, higher than that; but above all the straw, or thatch, it being the highest of all." Nor lastly,

[7] De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 32. p. 3001. tom. 9. opp.
[8] Vide Natur. Auscult. lib. 2. cap. 10. p. 476. tom. 1. opp.
[9] Nat. Auscult. lib. 2. cap. 9. [p. 478. tom. 1. opp.]

if, as the same Aristotle elsewhere[9] also suggesteth, one should further pretend, that a house was therefore made such, ἐμπέσοντος τοῦ ὀργάνου, &c. merely because the hands of the labourers, and the axes, and hammers and trowels, and other instruments, chanced all to be moved so and so; we say that none of all these would be to assign the true cause of a house, without declaring, that the architect first framed in his mind a model or platform of such a thing to be made out of those materials, so aptly disposed into a foundation, walls, roof, doors, rooms, stairs, chimneys, windows, &c. as might render the whole fit for habitation, and other human uses. And no more certainly can the things of nature (in whose very essence final causality is as much included) be either rightly understood, or the causes of them assigned, merely from matter and mechanism, or the necessary and unguided motion thereof, without design or intention for ends and good. Wherefore to say,[10] that the bodies of animals became such, merely because the fluid seed, by motion, happened to make such traces, and beget such stamina and lineaments, as out of which that compages of the whole resulted; is not to assign a cause of them, but to dissemble, smother and conceal their true efficient cause, which is the wisdom and contrivance of that divine Architect and Geometer, making them every way fit for the inhabitation and uses of their respective souls. Neither indeed can we banish all final, that is, all mental causality, from philosophy or the consideration of nature, without banishing at the same time reason and understanding from ourselves, and looking upon the things of nature with no other eyes than brutes do. However, none of the ancient Atheists would ever undertake to assign necessary causes for all the parts of the bodies of animals, and their efformation, from mere matter, motion, and mechanism; those small and pitiful attempts in order thereunto, that have been made by some of them in a few instances (as that the spina dorsi[1] came from the flexure of the bodies of animals,

[9] De Partib. Animal. lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 473. tom. 2. opp.

[10] This seems to have been levelled against Des Cartes' book, De Formatione Fœtûs. I have already observed that our author's strictures on this philosopher have in them more acuteness and boldness than truth, certainty, and wisdom.

[1] Vide Aristot. de Partib. Animal. lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 471. 472. where he gives an account of the fancies of preceding naturalists respecting the causes of the bodily members. He says Empedocles taught as follows respecting the spinal column: Διότιερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἴρηκε, λέγων, ὑπάρχειν πολλὰ τοῖς ζώοις, διὰ τὸ συμβῆναι οὕτως ἐν τῇ γενέσει· οἷον δὲ ῥάχιν τοιαύτην ἔχειν, ὅτι στραφέντος κατεαγῆναι συνέβη, "Wherefore Empedocles incorrectly says that many things exist in animals because they happened so at their birth; and that the spine is as it is because it happened to be broken by contortion." But Dr. Cudworth's representation of the meaning of these naturalists, that the spine was thus formed when animals first emerged from the earth, I cannot find supported in Aristotle or any where else; nor do I think it ever was asserted by any. For this method of accounting for the form of the spine would apply only to the first race of animals and not at all to those born at the present time. What follows is attributed by Aristotle to all the ancient naturalists:

when they first sprung out of the earth, the intestines from the flux of humours excavating a crooked and winding channel for itself, and that the nostrils were broke open by the eruption of breath); these, I say, only showing the unfeasableness and impossibility thereof. And therefore Democritus was so wise, as never to pretend to give an account in this way of the formation of the fœtus, he looking upon it as a thing absolutely desperate; nor would he venture to say any more concerning it (as Aristotle[3] informeth us) than ὅτι οὕτως ἀεὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεται, "that it always cometh so to pass of necessity," but stopped all further inquiry concerning it after this manner: Τὸ ἐρωτᾶν τὸ διὰ τί, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων τινὸς, τὸ ζητεῖν εἶναι τοῦ ἀπείρου ἀρχήν, "That to demand about any of these things, for what cause it was thus, was to demand a beginning of infinite." As if all the motions from eternity had an influence upon, and contribution to, whatsoever corporeal thing was now produced. And Lucretius, notwithstanding all his swaggering and boasting, that he and Epicurus were able to assign natural and necessary causes for every thing without a God, hath no where so much as one word con-

Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν ζώων καὶ τῶν φυτῶν γένεσιν λέγουσιν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι καὶ πρῶτοι φιλοσοφήσαντες περὶ φύσεως· ὅτι ἐν τῷ σώματι, ῥέοντος μὲν τοῦ ὕδατος, κοιλίαν γενέσθαι καὶ πᾶσαν ὑποδοχὴν τῆς τε τροφῆς καὶ τοῦ περιττώματος, τοῦ δὲ πνεύματος διαπορευθέντος, τοὺς μυκτῆρας ἀναῤῥαγῆναι, "In like manner also spoke the ancient and primary natural philosophers. As that through the flow of water the belly and all the receptacles of the food and excrements became such as they are; and when the breath escaped the nostrils were opened." But Aristotle deservedly castigates these vain and foolish opinions; and Gassendi has also well and strenuously argued against these follies, Physics, sect. 3. last clause, lib. 2. cap. 3. p. 232. vol. 2. of his Works.

[3] De Generat. Animal. lib. 2. cap. 6. p. 629. tom. 2. opp. But I should think that this answer of Democritus is not to be understood absolutely and literally, as if that philosopher would not at all inquire into the causes for the sake of which the members of men and animals were formed in the way we see them. For Aristotle's books De Generatione Animalium, and also those De Partibus Animalium, earumque Causis, abound in causes and reasons assigned by Democritus for elucidating the origin of the bones, teeth, parts of generation, and other organs of animals; which causes indeed of Democritus, being for the most part drawn from the necessary motions of matter, are often refuted and exposed by Aristotle. Besides Aristotle himself praises Democritus, and greatly prefers him to Empedocles and Plato, because he had with singular diligence investigated the causes of the limbs, flesh, bones, &c. a branch of inquiry which the other philosophers had entirely neglected. See De Partibus Animalium, lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 475. vol. 2. of his Works, and elsewhere. There can be no doubt then that this saying of Democritus refers to a part only of this inquiry into the causes of animal members. And this is plain from the very passage of Aristotle which contains his opinion, which speaks not of the causes generally which produced individual members, but only of the reason why they are produced in the order in which they are, or why one member preceded another in its production. Democritus therefore thought that this one inquiry might be with propriety neglected, and denied that any clear explanation could be given why, for instance, the heart is produced in animals sooner than other parts; but he thought that this should be referred solely to necessity, that is to the mechanical causes of motion. In short, Democritus thought it entirely useless to dispute from what causes it resulted that animals are framed in the womb in the usual method and order; but in reference to the separate parts and their objects, he was sufficiently ingenious and well-informed.

cerning it.[4] We conclude therefore, that Aristotle's judgment concerning final causes in philosophy is much to be preferred before that of Democritus:[5] Καὶ ἄμφω μὲν τῷ φυσικῷ λεκτέαι αἱ αἰτίαι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἥ τινος ἕνεκα· αἴτιον γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὕτη τοῦ τέλους, "That both kind of causes (material and final) ought to be declared by a physiologer, but especially the final; the end being the cause of the matter, but the matter not the cause of the end. And thus do we see plainly, that the atomic Atheists are utterly ignorant of the cause, τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, "of the regular and artificial frame of the things in nature," and consequently, the whole mundane system, the true knowledge whereof necessarily leadeth to a God.

But it is prodigiously strange, that these Atheists should, in this their ignorance and sottishness, be justified by any professed Theists and Christians of later times, who, atomizing in their physiology also, would fain persuade us in like manner, that this whole mundane system, together with plants and animals, was derived merely from the necessary and unguided motion of the small particles of matter, at first turned round in a vortex, or else jumbled all together in a chaos, without any intention for ends and good, that is, without the direction of any mind; God in the meantime standing by, only as an idle spectator of this lusus atomorum, this "sportful dance of atoms," and of the various results thereof.[5] Nay, these mechanic Theists have here quite outstripped and outdone the atomic Atheists themselves, they

[4] Nor is it precisely true that Epicurus has said nothing at all respecting generation and its causes. He has indeed made a general assertion, though it be foolish and entirely destitute of probability. For he supposes that the atoms have gradually and imperceptibly acquired a habit of arranging themselves according to the law and order in which they are now arranged in animals; on which opinion of his we have recently made some observations, when commenting on the celebrated passage extracted from his Epistle to Herodotus in Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 10. segm. 75. p. 633. (see note 8. p. 596.) Galen, the prince of Greek physicians, has well expressed this insane opinion in his book Περὶ Κνουμένων Διαπλάσεως, or De Fœtuum Formatione, when he says that the Epicureans supposed τὴν ἀκολουθίαν τῆς κινήσεως γενέσθαι τεχνικὴν ὑπό τινος οὐσίας ἀλόγου, "the continual series of motions to be artificially produced by some unintelligent being." For from the words it is plain that Epicurus thought that a heedless and fortuitous concourse of atoms had in the lapse of time gradually become artificial, and that this was attributed by him to a certain unconscious and unintelligent nature. But what this nature or οὐσία ἄλογος could be, except a frequent repetition of one motion or action gradually inducing a habit, I cannot understand. Old Gargettius himself, when driven to the last extremity, still wished to preserve the appearance of reason in his madness, rather than acknowledge the baseness of the sentiments to which he was enslaved.

[5] All intelligent readers who are acquainted with these matters will at once perceive that the opinions of Des Cartes are here aimed at by our author. But perhaps the followers of this philosopher will complain that this representation is calculated only to excite prejudice against their master, while the best and noblest part of his physics, which would at once clear him from suspicion, is omitted. For one fundamental principle of the Cartesian philosophy is, that the matter of which the universe is composed was in the beginning created by God, divided into particles of a certain definite magnitude, and impressed with a certain amount of motion.

[6] Natur. Auscult. lib. 2. cap. 9. [p. 478. tom. 1. opp.]

being much more immodest and extravagant than ever those were; for the professed Atheists durst never venture to affirm, that this regular system of things resulted from the fortuitous motions of atoms at the very first, before they had for a long time together produced many other inept combinations or aggregate forms of particular things, and nonsensical systems of the whole. And they supposed also, that the regularity of things here in this world would not always continue such neither, but that some time or other confusion and disorder would break in again. Moreover, that, besides this world of ours, there are at this very instant, innumerable other worlds irregular, and that there is but one of a thousand, or ten thousand, amongst the infinite worlds, that have such a regularity in them. The reason of all which is, because it was generally taken for granted, and looked upon as a common notion, that τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὐδὲν ἀεὶ οὕτω γίνεται, as Aristotle expresseth it,[6] that "none of those things, which are from fortune or chance, come to pass constantly and always alike." But our mechanic or atomic Theists will have their atoms never so much as once to have fumbled in these their fortuitous motions, nor to have produced any inept system, or incongruous forms at all; but from the very first all along, to have taken up their places, and have ranged themselves so orderly, methodically and discreetly, as that they could not possibly have done it better, had they been directed by the most perfect wisdom. Wherefore these atomic Theists utterly evacuate that grand argument for a God, taken from the phenomenon of the artificial frame of things, which hath been so much insisted on in all ages, and which commonly makes the strongest impression of any other upon the minds of men, they leaving only certain metaphysical arguments for a Deity; which, though never so good, yet by reason of their subtlety, can do but little execution upon the minds of the generality, and even amongst the learned do sometimes beget more of doubtful disputation and scepticism, than of clear conviction and satisfaction; the Atheists in the mean time laughing in their sleeves, and not a little triumphing, to see the cause of theism thus betrayed by its professed friends and assertors, and the grand argument for the same totally slurred by them; and so their work done, as it were, to their hands for them.[7]

[6] Natur. Auscult. lib. 2. cap. 4. p. 469. tom. 1. opp.

[7] Des Cartes, whom our author here places below even the Epicureans and the most virulent opposers of Deity, has been defended by so many others as by no means to stand in need of my assistance. I will rather grant that this great and ingenious philosopher, being carried away by the activity of his mind and the fervour of his thoughts, has fallen into many opinions more bold than correct, which have afterwards been used for their own purposes by the opponents of God and religion. Nevertheless I think the comparison here instituted between Des Cartes and the ancient Atheists has in it less truth than at first sight it appears to possess. For whereas the followers of Democritus and Epicurus thought that the universe came into its present state after

Now, as this argues the greatest insensibility of mind, or sottishness and stupidity in pretended Theists, not to take the least notice of the regular and artificial frame of things, or of the signatures of the divine art and wisdom in them, nor to look upon the world, and things of nature, with any other eyes than oxen and horses do; so are there many phenomena in nature, which being partly above the force of these mechanic powers, and partly contrary to the same, can therefore never be solved by them, nor without final causes, and some vital principle. As for example, that of gravity, or the tendency of bodies downward, the motion of the diaphragma in respiration, the systole and diastole of the heart, which was before declared to be a muscular constriction and relaxation, and therefore not mechanical but vital. We might also add, amongst many others, the intersection of the planes of the equator and ecliptic, or the earth's diurnal motion, upon an axis not parallel with that of the ecliptic, nor perpendicular to the plane thereof. For though Cartesius[8] would needs imagine this earth of ours once to have been a sun, and so itself the centre of a lesser vortex whose axis was then directed after this manner, and which therefore still kept the same site or

infinite and various concursions of atoms, while Des Cartes held that matter, immediately after being endued with a certain quantity of motion, fell into so well arranged a form, it is evident that the former were not more sober and circumspect than the latter, while he was more rash and foolish; but rather it is manifest that *they* were entirely devoid of common sense and reason, and that *he* was at least partly rational and not altogether absurd. For the Epicureans were forced to imagine so many and such various concursions of individual corpuscules in the immensity of space, so great a multitude of pre-existing orders of things before the present, and other similar delusions here enumerated, because they denied to material motions all wisdom and all governance of the Deity, and thought that the atoms were moved and driven by some blind and irrational force. For it was incredible that atoms not under the impulse of any intelligent or designing cause, should have immediately taken so regular and elegant a form as is presented by the existing universe. But Des Cartes stood in need of none of these idle fancies, since he held matter to be a creation of the Deity, from whom also all its motion was derived. For if matter and its motions are alike derived from God, it necessarily follows that the laws according to which it is moved and agitated must be divine. But where laws are in force proceeding from God himself, it is no wonder that order and beauty should immediately arise, and that all things should be wisely and correctly disposed of, from the very commencement of motion. So far then is the difference between Epicurus and Des Cartes from being at all to the disadvantage of the latter, that I rather think it is so far in his favour. Dr. Cudworth seems to have conceived a dislike for Des Cartes principally because, as will be seen hereafter, he wished to reject final causes entirely from his philosophy; which every one imbued with religion and piety will admit to have been on his part a rash and inconsiderate procedure.

[8] Vide Principia ejus Philosoph. part 3. sect. 155. p. 136. and part 4. sect. 2. p. 137. I should perhaps do well here to explain Des Cartes' meaning of these sentiments in his own words; but besides Dr. Cudworth several others have more fully and copiously treated of this unheard of dogma of his, of whom it will be sufficient for me to name Dr. Cudworth's fellow countrymen, Henry More, Enchiridion Metaphysicæ, cap. 14. p. 42. Samuel Parker, Disputationes de Deo et Providentiâ, diss. 3. sect. 28. p. 335. &c. David Gregory, Astronomia Physica et Geometrica, lib. 1. prop. 76. Sir Isaac Newton, and others. The causes which have prompted Des Cartes to entertain this opinion have been well explained by Henry More, in his Epistle on the Cartesian Philosophy, sect. 26. p. 52. ed. Lond. 1711. 8vo. at the end of his Enchiridion Ethici.

posture, by reason of the striate particles, finding no fit pores or traces for their passage through it, but only in this direction; yet does he himself confess, that because these two motions of the earth, the annual and diurnal, would be much more conveniently made upon parallel axes, therefore, according to the laws of mechanism, they should perpetually be brought nearer and nearer together, till at length the equator and the ecliptic come to have their axes parallel to one another; which, as it hath not yet come to pass, so neither hath there been, for these last two thousand years (according to the best observations and judgments of astronomers), any nearer approach made of them to one another. Wherefore the continuation of these two motions of the earth, the annual and diurnal, upon axes different or not parallel, is resolvable into nothing, but a final and mental cause, or the τὸ βέλτιστον, because it was best it should be so, the variety of the seasons of the year depending hereupon. But the greatest of all the particular phenomena is the organization and formation of the bodies of animals, consisting of such variety and curiosity, which these mechanic philosophers being no way able to give an account of from the necessary motion of matter, unguided by mind for ends, prudently therefore break off their system there, when they should come to animals, and so leave it altogether untouched. We acknowledge indeed, that there is a posthumous piece extant, imputed to Cartesius, and entitled De la Formation du Fœtus, wherein there is some pretence made to solve all this by fortuitous mechanism. But as the theory thereof is wholly built upon a false supposition, sufficiently confuted by the learned Harvey in his Book of Generation, "that the seed doth materially enter into the composition of the egg;" so is it all along precarious and exceptionable; nor does it extend at all to the differences, that are in several animals, or offer the least reason, why an animal of one species or kind might not be formed out of the seed of another.[9]

It is here indeed pretended by these mechanic Theists, that final causes therefore ought not to be of any regard to a philosopher, because we should not arrogate to ourselves to be as wise as God Almighty is, or to be privy to his secrets. Thus in the metaphysical meditations:[10] Atque ob hanc unicam rationem totum illud causarum genus, quod à fine peti solet, in rebus physicis nullum usum habere existimo; non enim absque temeritate me puto, investigare posse fines Dei. And again likewise in the Principles of Philosophy:[1] Nullas unquam rationes circa res naturales à fine, quem Deus aut natura in iis faciendis sibi

[9] The history of this book of Des Cartes, De Formatione Fœtûs, may be seen in Adrian Baillet's Life of that Philosopher, vol. 2. lib. 7. cap. 19. p. 398. &c.

[10] Meditat. 4. p. 26. edit. Amstelod. 1685.

[1] Vide part 1. sect. 28. p. 8. and part 3. sect. 2. 3. p. 50.

proposuit, admittimus, quia non tantum nobis debemus arrogare, ut ejus consiliorum participes esse possimus. But the question is not, whether we can always reach to the ends of God Almighty, and know what is absolutely best in every case, and accordingly make conclusions, that therefore the thing is, or ought to be so; but, whether any thing at all were made by God for ends and good, otherwise than would of itself have resulted from the fortuitous motion of matter. Nevertheless, we see no reason at all, why it should be thought presumption, or intrusion into the secrets of God Almighty, to affirm, that eyes were made by him for the end of seeing (and accordingly so contrived as might best conduce thereunto) and ears for the end of hearing, and the like. This being so plain, that nothing but sottish stupidity, or atheistic incredulity (masked perhaps under an hypocritical veil of humility) can make any doubt thereof. And therefore Aristotle[2] justly reprehended Anaxagoras for that absurd aphorism of his: Διὰ τὸ χεῖρας ἔχειν, φρονιμώτατον εἶναι τῶν ζώων τὸν ἄνθρωπον, "That man was therefore the wisest (or most solert) of all animals, because he had hands." He not doubting to affirm on the contrary: Εὔλογον διὰ τὸ φρονιμώτατον εἶναι τῶν ζώων χεῖρας ἔχειν· ἡ γὰρ φύσις ἀεὶ διανέμει, καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος φρόνιμος, τῷ δυναμένῳ χρῆσθαι ἕκαστον· προσήκει γὰρ τῷ ὄντι αὐλητῇ δοῦναι μᾶλλον αὐλούς, ἢ τῷ αὐλοὺς ἔχοντι προσθεῖναι αὐλητικήν, "That it was far more reasonable to think, that because man was the wisest (or most solert and active) of all animals, therefore he had hands given him. For nature (saith he) distributeth, as a wise man doth, what is suitable to every one; and it is more proper to give pipes to one that hath musical skill, than upon him, that hath pipes, to bestow musical skill.[3]

[2] De Partib. Animal. lib. 4. cap. 10. p. 559. 560. tom. 2. opp.

[3] I could here go to some length, were I to enumerate and explain the accusations and excuses brought against and for Des Cartes. But it is unnecessary to repeat what is already well known to all who are versed in these matters. The whole of this argument on final causes has been most laboriously and ingenicusly treated by that greatest of natural philosophers of the last century, Robert Boyle, the eternal honour of Great Britain, in his book De Caussis Finalibus, London, 1688, 8vo. a book which I wish were better known at the present time than it is. In sect. 1. p. 10. &c. of this work he specifically and powerfully opposes Des Cartes. And also John Ray, the famous English naturalist, in his work entitled, The Wisdom of God manifested in the Works of the Creation, part 1. p. 28, has transcribed and approved Cudworth's whole argument, p. 33. All that can be said in favour of Des Cartes has been studiously collected by Peter Poiret, in his Meditationes de Deo, Animâ, et Homine, lib. 3. cap. 15. sect. 8. 9. For my own part I will be content with a few brief observations. I. First, then, I could easily be induced to believe that Des Cartes rejected final causes from his physics, not through any innate depravity of mind or impiety towards God, but principally through his fondness for the philosophy of which he was the author. For since he put forth many conjectures and guesses concerning natural phenomena, and even made many unheard-of and marvellous assertions, he foresaw that many would inquire into the causes why God had constituted nature according to Des Cartes' suppositions. To this philosopher therefore nothing appeared of greater utility in keeping off these troublesome inquirers, and setting his doctrines free from innumerable questions, than to lay down as a fundamental principle of his physical philo-

Wherefore these mechanic Theists would further allege, and that with some more colour of reason, that it is below the dignity of God Almighty to condescend to all those mean and

sophy that attention should be given only to things in themselves, but that no great degree of research should be bestowed on those causes of phenomena which, on account of the weakness of the human mind, cannot be ascertained. He seems therefore rather to have consulted his own ease and credit than to have intended any injury to the cause of God and religion; though at the same time I will not deny that others have been opposed to final causes, only in order that they might in their absence more securely make their attacks upon the existence of a Deity. I remember that this has been already well observed by Henry More, in his Epistle on the Cartesian Philosophy, sect. 2. p. 6. But II. I can hardly persuade myself that Des Cartes had no other reason than this for entertaining the opinion in question. For it would have been sufficient for his purpose of warding off impertinent inquiries, if he had declared, what was most true, that the causes of many of the divine procedures were unknown to mankind. But Des Cartes went much further than this, and freely ventured to maintain the dangerous position that we cannot discover any cause whatever of the works of Deity. For he thus speaks in his Responsio ad Objectiones Gassendi, in Gassendi's Works, tom. 3. p. 359. "Nor can it be imagined," says he, "that any ends of the Deity are more evident than any other possible ones; for *all* are alike concealed in the inscrutable depth of his wisdom." To which remarks Gassendi gives a good answer, ibid. p. 361. Some other motive must therefore have been present to the mind of Des Cartes to prompt him to divert the attention of his followers from the consideration of final causes; and I think an attentive view of the method of his physics will easily show what this is. For, in accordance with the ancient boast of Strato, he dispensed with the divine interposition in the formation of the universe, and taught that all things were made by the weights and velocities inherent in the laws of motion which he had laid down. And he was apprehensive that great injury would ensue to this tenet and his other inventions, in which he had spent so much labour, if it should be admitted that all surrounding corporeal existences were created by God with a settled and fixed design. For every one must perceive that there is so wide a difference between supposing that any thing has been made with great wisdom and deep design for certain uses to the human race, and at the same time entirely separating the government and power of the great Artificer from his work, that no rational method can possibly be found of reconciling these discrepancies. A person who has no doubt that the sun was made for the purpose of giving light to the world, and rendering its surface fertile, cannot possibly avoid believing that an all-wise Being has collected together the particles which compose the sun, and has skilfully arranged and disposed them in such a manner as to be subservient to these uses. And in a similar manner we may reason about other things. As soon as we conceive of the object of any corporeal existence, whatever mental efforts we use to persuade ourselves that nothing was in existence prior to its formation except necessity and the laws of motion, yet a certain internal consciousness will still protest against this, and will not suffer us to be at rest till we have recourse to the wisdom of some intelligent cause. Des Cartes readily perceiving this, and observing that his interests were greatly endangered by this feeling of our minds, thought fit to lay down as a primary law that in his school there should be a perpetual silence observed respecting final causes, as subjects that come not within the cognizance of any. This was a dangerous measure, to say no worse. But what is too hard for an undue fondness for those opinions on the discovery of which we have bestowed long and strenuous labour. Perhaps also Des Cartes was influenced in this decision by the same consideration as Lord Bacon before him. For Bacon, having a strong desire of investigating true natural philosophy, was afraid lest, after final causes were once inquired into and settled, all research after natural causes should be entirely omitted and neglected. See the Advancement of Learning, lib. 3. cap. 4. But Bacon himself would readily confess the groundlessness of this fear, were he to return to earth and see the many excellent volumes of recent naturalists. III. If in the mean time we pay attention to the very first principles of the Cartesian philosophy, and suppose (as equity requires of us) that its acute and ingenious author really meant what he said, he cannot in any way be understood to mean that the universe was not created with a view to certain ends. For he asserted that the amount of motion which actually

trivial offices, and to do the things of nature himself immediately: as also, that it would be but a botch in nature, if the defects thereof were every where to be supplied by miracle.

exists in matter was introduced into it by the Deity, by whom also he held that matter itself was created. Nor did he, I believe, deny that God might have created matter of a different kind, or could have united to it when created a larger or smaller quantity of motion. And doubtless he granted that the Deity foresaw all that would happen through the impartation to matter of the quantity of motion which it actually possessed. But if all these principles be granted, it is most certain that God acted with a specific design in the creation and setting in motion of matter, and is to be accounted the only parent and author of all the events which that motion has produced and is still producing. Suppose that Archimedes really could have performed the imaginary feat of not only moving the earth from its place, but also of impressing on it any quantity and kind of motion that he chose; and imagine further, that he accurately foresaw the ultimate results of the motion he was about to give to the globe; would he not, if he had, after due consideration, preferred an extremely swift circular motion to all others, have acted with the highest propriety and wisdom, and have evidently appeared to be the sole cause and author of the effects produced by the motion described? IV. But I wonder how those philosophers, who with Des Cartes refer all things to mechanical causes, and yet do not deny the existence of an all-wise and omnipotent God, can persuade themselves to assert that the uses of things are known to us, but not their objects or ends. For I would draw out the argument thus:—Since the uses of things are known to us, and God has arranged material existences with the highest degree of wisdom, therefore we cannot be utterly ignorant of the design of the things which have been created by God. For instance, when God created matter which had been previously non-existent, and endowed it with a certain quantity of motion, undoubtedly he foresaw that mankind would be produced furnished with hands, feet, ears, eyes, and other organs; he also foresaw that men would use those eyes for seeing, and ears for hearing. But if he foresaw and perceived this, did he not at the same time allow these organs to be prepared out of matter, and arranged for these uses? I do not so much wonder that a follower of Democritus or Epicurus should grant the uses of things but deny their design; this is required by the philosophy to which they adhere. But that this should be done by one who supposes that God was perfectly acquainted with all the results of the motion impressed by him upon matter, seems to me to be very inconsistent with reason and the nature of the philosophy he professes to believe. On the contrary I believe that every legitimate and rational use of any thing is to be reckoned among the designs of God. If any human architect were so powerful and so wise as to be able to arrange the materials brought by his servants in such a manner as that a compact and well-framed house should be produced from the motions he occasioned, and was at the same time well aware of the purposes to which this house would be applied by its future inhabitants, would he not with the greatest propriety be said to have built that house for those purposes and uses? What then, pray, is the reason why our mechanical philosophers, who make God to have a foreknowledge of all things, and to be the author of all motion, should so cautiously distinguish between uses and designs, and insist that the one are known and the other unknown to us? Is it some secret impiety? or a love of the science to which they are addicted? or some other undefinable reason, perhaps unknown even to themselves? V. But let these philosophers learn (if they will not allow us to have any great acquaintance with their affairs,) from a profane author, ignorant of true religion, whither the way leads in which they are going, and how small is the interval between them and professed Atheists. Plutarch in his book De Facie in Orbe Lunæ, tom. 2. p. 927. opp. so justly castigates the Stoics for admitting the existence of a God and yet attributing all things to mechanical causes, that it is worth while here to transcribe a part of his observations: Εἰ μὲν γὰρ, he says, οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοῦ κόσμου μερῶν παρὰ φύσιν ἔσχεν, ἀλλὰ ἕκαστον ᾗ πέφυκε κεῖται, μηδεμιᾶς μεθιδρύσεως μηδὲ μετακοσμήσεως δεόμενον, μηδὲ ἐν ἀρχῇ δεηθὲν, ἀπορῶ, τί τῆς προνοίας ἔργον ἐστὶν, ἢ τίνος γέγονε ποιητὴς καὶ πατὴρ δημιουργὸς ὁ Ζεὺς ἀριστοτέχνης· οὐ γὰρ ἐν στρατοπέδῳ τακτικῶν ὄφελος, εἴπερ εἰδέη τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἕκαστος ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τάξιν τε καὶ χώραν καὶ καιρὸν, οὗ δεῖ λαβεῖν καὶ διαφυλάσσειν· οὐδὲ κηπουρῶν, οὐδὲ οἰκοδόμων, εἰ πᾶσι μὲν αὐτὸ τὸ ὕδωρ ἀφ' αὑτοῦ πέφυκεν ἐπεῖναι τοῖς δεομένοις καὶ κατάρδειν

But to this also the reply is easy, that though the divine Wisdom itself contrived the system of the whole world for ends and good, yet nature, as an inferior minister, immediately executes the same; I say, not a dead, fortuitous, and merely mechanical but a vital, orderly, and artificial nature. Which nature, asserted by most of the ancient philosophers, who were Theists, is thus described by Proclus:[4*] Ἡ φύσις ἐσχάτη μέν ἐστι τῶν τὸ σωματοειδὲς τοῦτο καὶ αἰσθητὸν δημιουργούντων αἰτίων, καὶ τὸ πέρας τοῦ τῶν ἀσωμάτων οὐσιῶν πλάτους· πλήρης δὲ λόγων καὶ δυνάμεων, δι' ὧν κατευθύνει τὰ ἐγκόσμα· τοιαύτη δὲ οὖσα προελήλυθεν ἀπὸ τῆς ζωογόνου θεᾶς,

Νώτοις δ' ἀμφὶ, θεᾶς φύσις ἄπλετος ὥρηται·

ἀφ' ἧς πᾶσα ζωὴ πρόεισιν, ἥ τε νοερὰ καὶ ἡ ἀχώριστος τῶν διοικουμένων· ἐξηρτημένη δ' ἐκεῖθεν καὶ ἀπηωρημένη, φοιτᾷ διὰ πάντα ἀκωλύτως, καὶ πάντα ἐμπνεῖ, δι' ἣν τὰ ἀψύχωτα ψυχῆς μετέχει τινὸς, καὶ τὰ φθειρομένα μένει διαιωνίως ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, ταῖς ἐν αὐτῇ τῶν εἰδῶν αἰτίαις συνεχόμενα·

Ἄρχει δ' αὖ φύσις ἀκαμάτη κόσμων τε καὶ ἔργων·

Φησὶ τὸ λόγιον,

Οὐρανὸς ὄφρα θεῇ δρόμον ἀΐδιον κατασύρων·

Καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς, "Nature is the last of all causes that fabricate this corporeal and sensible world, and the utmost bound of incorporeal substances. Which being full of reasons and powers, orders and presides over all mundane affairs. It proceeding (according to the Magic Oracles) from that supreme goddess, the divine wisdom, which is the fountain of all life, as well intellectual, as that which is concrete with matter. Which wisdom this nature always essentially depending upon, passes through all things unhinderably; by means whereof even inanimate things partake of a kind of life, and things corruptible remain eternal in their species, they being contained by its standing forms or ideas, as

ἀπιθάνιον, πῇ δὲ πλίνθοι καὶ ξύλα καὶ λίθοι ταῖς κατὰ φύσιν χρώμενα τροπαῖς καὶ νεύσεσιν ἐξ ἑαυτῶν καταλαμβάνειν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἁρμονίαν καὶ χώραν, "If no part of the universe were affected contrary to its nature, but each lie just as it was produced, requiring no motion or alteration, even from the very beginning, I wonder what is the duty of Providence, or of what the creative Father and chief Artificer Jupiter can be the maker. For in an army there would be no need of tactics, if every soldier knew his own rank, place, and station which he ought to take and keep. Nor would there be any necessity for gardeners and builders, if the water would of its own accord flow to the plants that required it, and if the bricks, timber, and stones would by natural turns and motions take their own proper place, and harmonize with each other." Those who are curious in these matters may consult Plutarch further in the context, in which are many very excellent remarks.

[4] Comment. in Timæum Platon. lib. 1. p. 4. edit. Græc.

[*] Step. Poet. Philos.

their causes. And thus does the oracle describe nature, as presiding over the whole corporeal world, and perpetually turning round the heavens." Here have we a description of one universal substantial life, soul, or spirit of nature, subordinate to the Deity: besides which the same Proclus elsewhere[5] supposeth other particular natures, or spermatic reasons, in those words of his: *Μετὰ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν πρώτην, ψυχαί· καὶ μετὰ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν, φύσεις*, "After the first soul, are there particular souls, and after the universal nature, particular natures." Where it may be observed, by the way, that this Proclus, though he were a superstitious Pagan, much addicted to the multiplying of gods (subordinate to one supreme) or a bigotic Polytheist, who had a humour of deifying almost every thing, and therefore would have this nature, forsooth, to be called a goddess too; yet does he declare it not to be properly such, but abusively only (viz. because it was no intellectual thing) as he saith the bodies of the sun, moon, and stars, supposed to be animated, were called gods too, they being the statues of the gods. This is the meaning of those words: *Καὶ θεὸς μὲν τῷ ἐκθεοῦσθαι, καὶ οὐκ αὐτόθεν ἔχουσα τὸ εἶναι θεός· καὶ γὰρ τὰ θεῖα σώματα θεοὺς καλοῦμεν, ὡς ἀγάλματα τῶν θεῶν*, "Nature is a god or goddess, not as having godship properly belonging to it, but as the divine bodies are called gods, because they are statues of the gods."

Wherefore we cannot otherwise conclude concerning these our mechanic Theists, who will thus needs derive all corporeal things from a dead and stupid nature, or from the necessary motions of senseless matter, without the direction of any mind or intention for ends and good; but that they are indeed cousin-germans to Atheists, or possessed, in a degree, with a kind of atheistic enthusiasm, or fanaticism, they being so far forth inspired with a spirit of infidelity, which is the spirit of atheism.

But these mechanic Theists are again counterbalanced by another sort of Atheists, not mechanical nor fortuitous; namely, the Hylozoists, who are unquestionably convinced that opera naturæ sunt opera intelligentiæ, that "the works of nature are works of understanding;" and that the original of these corporeal things was not dead and stupid matter fortuitously moved: upon which account Strato derided Democritus' rough and crooked atoms, as mere dreams and dotages. But these notwithstanding, because they would not admit of any other substance besides matter, suppose life and perception essentially to belong to all matter as such; whereby it hath a perfect knowledge of whatsoever itself could do or suffer (though without animal consciousness) and can form itself to the best advantage, sometimes improving itself by organization to sense in brutes, and to

[5] Comment. in Timæum. Platon. lib. 2. p. 118.

reason and reflexive understanding in men. Wherefore, according to the principles of these Hylozoists, there is not any need of a God at all; that is, of one perfect Mind or understanding Being presiding over the whole world; they concluding, accordingly, the opinion of a God to be only a mistaking of the inadequate conception of matter in general, its life and energetic nature taken alone abstractly, for a complete substance by itself. Nevertheless these Hylozoic Atheists are no way able, by this hypothesis of theirs neither, to solve that phenomenon of the regularity and harmony of the whole universe; because every part of matter being, according to them, a distinct percipient by itself, whose knowledge extendeth only to its own concernment; and there being no one thing presiding over all, the things of the whole world (ἐν ᾧ πάντα συντέτακται, "in which all things are co-ordered together) could never have fallen into one such agreeing and conspiring harmony.

And as for those other Cosmo-plastic Atheists, who suppose the whole world to be as it were but one huge plant, tree, or vegetable, or to have one spermatic, plastic and artificial nature only, orderly and methodically disposing the whole, but without sense and understanding; these can no way do the business neither, that is, solve the forementioned phenomenon, it being utterly impossible that there should be any such artificial and regular nature, otherwise than as deriving from, and depending upon, a perfect mind or wisdom.

And thus do we see plainly, that no Atheists whatsoever can solve the phenomena of nature, and this particularly of the regular frame and harmony of the universe; and that true philosophy, or the knowledge of causes, necessarily leadeth to a God.

But besides these phenomena of cogitation, or soul and mind in animals, local motion in bodies, and the artificial frame of things for ends and uses, together with the conspiring army of the whole, which can no way be solved without a Deity; we might here further add, that the fortuitous, that is, the Anaximandrian and Democritic Atheists, who universally asserted the novity of this mundane system, were not able to give any tolerable account neither of the first beginning of men, and those greater animals, that are no otherwise begotten, than in the way of generation, by the commixture of male and female.

Aristotle, in his book of the generation of animals,* writeth thus: Περὶ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τετραπόδων γενέσεως ὑπολάβοι τις ἂν, εἴπερ ἐγίγνοντό ποτε γηγενεῖς, ὥσπερ φασί τινες, δύο τρόπων γίνεσθαι τὸν ἕτερον· ἢ γὰρ ὡς σκώληκος συνισταμένου τὸ πρῶτον, ἢ ἐξ ὠῶν, "If men and four-footed animals were ever

* Lib. 3. c. ult. [P. 665. tom. 2. opp.],

generated out of the earth, as some affirm, it may be probably conceived to have been one of these two ways, either that they were produced, as worms, out of putrefaction, or else formed in certain eggs," growing out of the earth. And then, after a while, he concludes again:[6] Εἴπερ ἦν τις ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως τῶν τοῖς ζώοις, εὔλογον δυεῖν τούτων εἶναι τὴν ἑτέραν, "That if there were any beginning of the generation of all animals, it is reasonable to think it to have been one of these two forementioned ways." It is well known that Aristotle, though a Theist, elsewhere affirmeth the world's eternity; according to which hypothesis of his, there was never any first male nor female in any kind of animals, but one begat another infinitely, without any beginning: a thing utterly repugnant to our human faculties, that are never able to frame any conception of such an infinity of number and time, and of a successive generation from eternity. But here Aristotle himself seems staggering, or sceptical, about it, "if men were ever generated out of the earth," and "if there were any beginning of the generation of animals;" as he doth also, in his Topics,[8] propound it for an instance of a thing disputable: Πότερον ὁ κόσμος ἀΐδιος, ἢ οὔ; "Whether the world were eternal or no?" he ranking it amongst those, περὶ ὧν λόγον μὴ ἔχομεν, ὄντων μεγάλων, "Those great things, for which we can give no certain reason one way nor other." Now (saith he) if the "world had a beginning," and if men were once γηγενεῖς, or αὐτόχθονες, "earth-born," then must they have been, in all probability, either generated, as worms, out of putrefaction, or else out of eggs; he supposing (it seems) those eggs to have grown out of the earth. But the generality of Atheists in Aristotle's time, as well as Theists, denying this eternity of the mundane system, as not so agreeable with their hypothesis, because so constant and invariable an order in the world, from eternity, hath not such an appearance or semblance of chance, nor can be easily supposed to have been without the providence of a perfect mind presiding over it, and senior to it (as Aristotle conceived) in nature, though not in time; they therefore, in all probability, concluded likewise, men at first to have been generated one of these two ways, either out of putrefaction or from eggs; and this by the fortuitous motion of matter, without the providence or direction of any Deity. But after Aristotle, Epicurus fancied those first men and other animals to have been formed in certain wombs or bags growing out of the earth:

Crescebant uteri terræ radicibus apti;[7]

[6] Comment. in Timæum Platon. p. 666.
[8] Lib. 1. c 9. [Cap. 11. p. 265. tom. 1. opp.]
[7] Lucretius, lib. 5. ver. 806. p. 335.

And this no otherwise than by the fortuitous motion of atoms also.

But if men had been at first formed after this manner, either in wombs or eggs (growing out of the earth) or generated out of putrefaction, by chance; then could there be no reason imaginable, why it should not sometimes so happen now, the motions of atoms being as brisk and vigorous as ever they were, and so to continue to all eternity: so that there is not the least ground at all for that precarious fancy and pretence of Epicurus,[8] that the earth, as a child-bearing woman, growing old, became at length effete and barren. Moreover, the men thus at first excluded out of bags, wombs, or egg-shells, or generated out of putrefaction, were supposed by these Atheists themselves to have been produced, not in a mature and adult, but an infant-like, weak and tender state, just such as they are now born into the world; by means whereof they could neither be able to feed and nourish themselves, nor defend themselves from harms and injuries. But when the same Epicurus[9] would here pretend also, that the earth, which had been so fruitful a mother, became afterward, by chance too, as tender and indulgent a nurse of this her own progeny, and sent forth streams or rivers of milk after them out of those gaps of her wounded surface, which they had before burst out of, as Critolaus long since observed,* he might as well have feigned the earth to have had breasts and nipples too, as wombs and milk; and then what should hinder, but that she might have arms and hands also, and swaddling-bands to boot? Neither is that less precarious, when the same atheistic philosopher adds, that in this imaginary state of the new-born world, there was for a long time neither any immoderate heat nor cold, nor any rude and churlish blasts of wind, the least to annoy or injure those tender earth-born infants and nurslings. all which things being considered, Anaximander[10] seems of the

[8] Vide Lucretius, lib. 5. ver. 823. 824.

> Sed quia finem aliquam pariendi debet habere,
> Destitit, ut mulier spatio defessa vetusto.

et lib. 2. verse 1149.

[9] Vide Lucretius, lib. 5. ver. 810. p. 336.

* In Philo Quod Mund. Incorr. [P. 945.]

[10] Vide Censorinum de Die Natali, cap. 4. p. 26. Edit. Lindenbrogii. "Anaximander, the Milesian, says that it appears to him that from water and earth under the influence of warmth, arose either fishes, or animals very much resembling fishes; and that in these men grew, and embryos that were retained inwardly until mature age; that then at last, they being ruptured, men and women, now able to provide for themselves, came forth." Several opinions, or rather follies, of the ancient poets and philosophers respecting the origin of the human race, have been collected by Lambinus, in his notes on Lucretius, lib. 5. p. 335. Samuel Parker, Disputationes de Deo et Providentiâ Divinâ, disp. 5. sect. 2. p. 433. Franc. Baltus, Jugement des Saints Pères sur la Morale de la Philosophie Payenne, chap. 15. p. 111; and more recently by the late J. F. Buddeus, in his Historia Eccles. Vet. Testamenti, period 1. sect. 1. sect. 8. p. 61. &c.

two to have concluded more wisely that men, because they require a longer time than other animals to be hatched up in, were at first generated in the bellies of fishes, and there nourished up for a good while, till they were at length able to defend and shift for themselves, and then were disgorged and cast up upon dry land. Thus do we see, that there is nothing in the world so monstrous nor prodigiously absurd, which men, atheistically inclined, will not rather imagine and swallow down, than entertain the notion of a God.

Wherefore, here is dignus vindice nodus, and this phenomenon of the first beginning of mankind, and other greater animals, cannot be solved otherwise, than according to the Mosaic history, by admitting of θεὸν ἀπὸ μηχανῆς, "a god out of a machine," that is, an extraordinary manifestation of the Deity, in forming man and other animals, male and female, once out of the earth; and that not in a rude, tender, and infant-like state, but mature and adult, that so they might be able immediately to shift for themselves, multiply and propagate their kind by generation: and this being once done, and now no longer any necessity of such an extraordinary way of proceeding, then putting a stop immediately thereunto, that so no more terrigenæ, nor autochthones, "earth-born men," should be any longer produced. For all these circumstances being put together, it plainly appears that this whole phenomenon surpasses not only the mechanical, but also the plastic powers; there being much of discretion in it, which the latter of these cannot arrive to neither, they always acting fatally and necessarily. Nevertheless, we shall not here determine whether God Almighty might not make use of the subservient ministry of angels or superior spirits, created before man, in this first extraordinary efformation of the bodies of animals out of the earth, in a mature and adult state; as Plato, in his Timæus,[1] introduceth the supreme God (whom he supposeth to be the immediate Creator of all immortal souls) thus bespeaking the junior gods, and setting them a work in the fabrication of mortal bodies: Τὸ δὲ λοῖπον ὑμεῖς, ἀθανάτῳ θνητὸν προσυφαίνοντες, ἀπεργάζεσθε ζῶα καὶ γεννᾶτε, "It is your work now to adaptate the mortal to the immortal, and to generate or make terrestrial animals;" he afterwards adding:[2] Μετὰ τὸν σπόρον, τοῖς νέοις παρέδωκε θεοῖς, σώματα πλάττειν θνητά, "That after the sowing of immortal souls (the supreme God) committed to these junior gods the task of forming mortal bodies." Which of Plato's some conceive to have been derived from that of Moses, "Let us make man after our own image."

Moreover, these Atheists are no more able to solve that other common and ordinary phenomenon neither, of the conservation

[1] Sect. 27. p. 250.

[2] Sect. 29. p. 252.

of the species of all animals, by keeping up constantly in the world a due numerical proportion between the sexes of male and female. For did this depend only upon fortuitous mechanism, it cannot well be conceived, but that in some ages or other, there should happen to be either all males or all females; and so the species fail. Nay, it cannot well be thought otherwise, but that there is in this a providence also, superior to that of the plastic or spermatic nature, which hath not so much of knowledge and discretion allowed to it, as whereby to be able alone to govern this affair.

Lastly, there are yet other phenomena, no less real, though not physiological, which Atheists can no way solve; as that of natural justice, and honesty, duty and obligation; the true foundation both of ethics and politics; and the τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, "liberty of will," properly so called, not that of fortuitous determination, when there is a perfect equality or indifferency of eligibility in objects; but that whereby men deserve commendation and blame, rewards and punishments, and so become fit objects for remunerative justice to display itself upon, a main hinge upon which religion turneth; (though those two be not commonly so well distinguished as they ought.) For when Epicurus, (an absolute Atheist) departing here from Democritus, pretended to solve this by his exiguum clinamen principiorum, this attempt of his was no other than a plain delirancy, or atheistic frenzy in him.

And now have we already preventively confuted the third atheistic pretence also, to solve the phenomenon of religion and the belief of a God, so generally entertained; namely, from the fiction and imposture of politicians: we having not only manifested that there is a natural prolepsis and anticipation of a God, in the minds of men, as the object of their fear, preventing reason; but also that the belief thereof is sustained and upheld by the strongest reason; the phenomena of nature being no way solvable, nor the causes of things assignable, without a Deity; so that religion being founded both upon the instincts of nature, and upon solid reason, cannot possibly be any fiction or imposture of politicians. Nevertheless, we shall speak something particularly to this also. The Atheists therefore conceive, that though those infirmities of human nature, men's fear and ignorant credulity, do much dispose and incline them to the belief of a God, or else of a rank of beings superior to men, (whether visible or invisible) commonly called by the Pagans, gods; yet would not this be so generally entertained as it is, especially that of one supreme Deity, the first original of all things, and monarch of the universe, had it not been for the fraud and fiction of law-makers and civil-sovereigns, who, the better to keep men in peace and subjection under them, and in a

kind of religious and superstitious observation of their laws, and devotion to the same, devised this notion of a God, and then possessed the minds of men with a belief of his existence, and an awe of him.

Now, we deny not but that politicians may sometimes abuse religion, and make it serve for the promoting of their own private interests and designs; which they could not do so well neither, were the thing itself a mere cheat and figment of their own, and had no reality at all in nature, nor any thing solid at the bottom of it. But since religion obtains so universally every where, it is not conceivable how civil sovereigns throughout the whole world, some of which are so distant, and have so little correspondence with one another, should, notwithstanding, all so well agree in this one cheating mystery of government, or piece of state-cozenage; nor, if they could, how they should be able so effectually to possess the generality of mankind, (as well wise as unwise) with such a constant fear, awe, and dread, of a mere counterfeit thing, and an invisible nothing; and which hath not only no manner of foundation neither in sense nor reason, but also (as the Atheists suppose) tends to their own great terror and disquietment, and so brings them at once under a miserable vassalage both of mind and body. Especially since men are not generally so apt to think that how much the more any have of power and dignity, they have therefore so much the more of knowledge and skill in philosophy and the things of nature, above others. And is it not strange that the world should not all this while have suspected or discovered this cheat and juggle of politicians, and have smelt out a plot upon themselves, in the fiction of religion, to take away their liberty, and enthrall them under bondage; and that so many of these politicians and civil sovereigns themselves also, should have been unacquainted herewith, and as simply awed with fear of this invisible nothing, as any others? All other cheats and juggles when they are once never so little detected, are presently thereupon dashed quite out of countenance, and have never any more the confidence to obtrude themselves upon the world. But though the Atheists have for these two thousand years past, been continually buzzing into men's ears, that religion is nothing but a mere state juggle and political imposture; yet hath not the credit thereof been the least impaired thereby, nor its power and dominion over the minds of men abated: from whence it may be concluded, that it is no counterfeit and fictitious thing, but what is deeply rooted in the intellectual nature of man; a thing solid at the bottom, and supported by its own strength. Which yet may more fully appear from Christianity, a religion founded in no human policy, nor tending to promote any worldly interest or design;

which yet by its own, or the divine force, hath prevailed over the power and policy, the rage and madness of all civil states, Jewish and Pagan, and hath conquered so great a part of the persecuting world under it; and that, not by resisting or opposing force, but by suffering deaths and martyrdoms, in way of adherence to that principle,[3] "That it is better to obey God than men." Which thing was thus presignified in the prophetic scripture:[4] "Why do the heathen rage, and the people imagine a vain thing? The kings of the earth set themselves, and the rulers take counsel together, against the Lord and against his Christ, &c. He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh; the Lord shall have them in derision. Then shall he speak unto them in his wrath, &c. Yet have I set my king upon my holy hill of Sion. I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession. Be wise now therefore, O ye kings," &c.[5]

[3] Acts v. 29. [4] Psalm ii. 4.

[5] It is a great and almost incredible piece of folly shamelessly to affirm that religion is an invention of the lawgivers of states. For, I. such ingenious disputants as these beg the question, and take for granted that religion is a fiction and a fable. They inquire into the causes of an error, before they have demonstrated the opinion whose rise and origin they seek to be an error at all; than which I know of nothing that can be considered more foolish and wicked. II. Their only foundation for this conjecture is that they have ascertained from ancient annals and histories, that there were formerly among kings and tyrants, some who perverted religion, or rather superstition, to the confirmation of their own power. No wise man, indeed, can deny this; and if any modern examples of this detestable fraud be required, they may be easily found in abundance among the Papists. But to suppose that this is sufficient to prove that religion is the invention of rulers, is as rational as to suppose that Pythagoras invented lyric poetry, because he taught his disciples to use music as a means for quieting and composing their minds. On the contrary, the principal force of this argument goes to show that religion was in existence before any one thought of politics. For those who wish to circumvent others, usually convert to their own purposes those feelings of the mind which they perceive already to exist, and do not introduce into the mind entirely new ones. Numa, for instance, would never have feigned his colloquies with Egeria, and have pretended that laws and ordinances were given to him by that goddess, unless he had observed in the Roman people some idea of a God, and some propensity towards religion. III. If religion were invented in order to retain the people within their duty, those wise men who easily saw through the tricks and frauds of the rulers, must have been entirely destitute of it. But these, who were best adapted for laying open all fallacies, were often the most strenuous defenders of religion. Lactantius, De Ira Dei, chap. 10, p. 929, not badly observes, "If they invented religion for the sake of deceiving us and all the human race, then they were not wise, since falsehood is inconsistent with wisdom; but if indeed they were wise, what good fortune must they not have experienced in their deception, so easily to delude not only the unlearned, but also Plato and Socrates, Pythagoras, Zeno, and Aristotle, the heads of the greatest sects." IV. If religion proceeded from the magistrates, those who live without laws, and obey only their own wills, would be without religion. But who among literary men can be so ignorant of human nature, as to be unaware that even in the minds of those tribes which are bound together by no civil or social ties, the seeds of true religion are to be found? Other observations are usually made on this subject by those who expressly set themselves to defend the truth of religion; and Thomas Wise, in particular, who made an abridgment of Dr. Cudworth's work, has inserted among that author's reflections a copious digression against these Atheistic triflings, cap. 6. p. 436—452. My only reason for not transcribing these arguments, powerful and excellent as they are, is that Dr. Cudworth's own discussion of

But that theism, or religion is no gullery or imposture, will be yet further made unquestionably evident. That the generality of mankind have agreed in the acknowledgment of one supreme Deity, as a Being eternal and necessarily existent, absolutely perfect and omnipotent, and the maker of the whole world, hath been already largely proved in the foregoing discourse. To which purpose is this of Sextus, the philosopher:[6] Κοινὴν γὰρ πρόληψιν ἔχουσι πάντες ἄνθρωποι περὶ Θεοῦ, καθ' ἣν μακάριόν τί ἐστι ζῶον καὶ ἄφθαρτον καὶ τέλειον ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ, καὶ παντὸς κακοῦ ἀνεπίδεκτον, "All men have this common prolepsis concerning God, that he is a living Being incorruptible, perfectly happy, and incapable of all manner of evil." And the notion of that God, which Epicurus opposed, was no other than this, "An understanding Being, having all happiness, with incorruptibility, that framed the whole world."[7] Now, I say, that if there be no such thing as this existing, and this idea of God be a mere fictitious thing, then was it altogether arbitrarious. But it is inconceivable how the generality of mankind (a few Atheists only excepted) should universally agree in one and the same arbitrarious figment. This argumentation hath been formerly used by some Theists, as appeareth from the forementioned Sextus:* Τελέως δ' ἔστιν ἄλογον, τὸ κατὰ τύχην πάντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπιβάλλειν ἰδιώμασιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ φυσικῶς οὕτως ἐκκινεῖσθαι, "It is altogether irrational to think that all men should by chance light upon the same properties (in the idea of God) without being naturally moved thereunto." Neither is that any sufficient account, which the Atheists would here give, that statesmen and politicians every where thus possessed the minds of men with one and the same idea; the difficulty still remaining, how civil sovereigns and law-makers, in all the distant parts of the world, and such as had no communication nor intercourse with one another, should universally jump in one and the same fictitious and arbitrarious idea.

Moreover, were there no God, it is not conceivable how that forementioned idea should ever have entered into the minds of men, or how it could have been formed in them. And here the Atheists again think it enough to say, that this notion or idea was put into the minds of the generality of mankind by law-makers and politicians, telling them of such a Being, and per-

the subject is abundantly conclusive. Besides, now every one possesses books which learnedly and acutely defend religion from all kinds of antagonists.

[6] Lib. 1. Advers. Physicos, sive lib. 8. Advers. Mathemat. sect. 1. sect. 33. p. 556. Ed. Fabricii.

[7] Epicurus has nowhere said that he opposes this definition of a Deity; but as much as this may be easily collected from his arguments and reasonings against a Divine Being, which may be found collected together in Lucretius.

* Advers. Mathemat. p. 314. [Page 557.]

suading them to believe his existence; or that it was, from the first feigner or inventor of it, propagated all along and conveyed down by oral tradition. But this argues their great ignorance in philosophy, to think, that any notion or idea is put into men's minds from without, merely by telling, or by words; we being passive to nothing else from words but their sounds and the phantasms thereof, they only occasioning the soul to excite such notions, as it had before within itself (whether innate or adventitious), which those words, by the compact and agreement of men, were made to be signs of; or else to reflect also further upon those ideas of their own, consider them more distinctly, and compare them with one another. And though all learning be not the remembrance of what the soul once before actually understood, in a pre-existent state, as Plato somewhere would have it, according to that of Boetius:[8]

> Quod si Platonis musa personat verum,
> Quod quisque discit, immemor recordatur:

yet is all human teaching but maieutical, or obstetricious; and not the filling of the soul as a vessel, merely by pouring into it from without, but the kindling of it from within; or helping it so to excite and awaken, compare and compound its own notions, as whereby to arrive at the knowledge of that which it was before ignorant of: as the thing was better expressed by the forementioned philosophic poet, in these words,

> Hæret profecto semen introrsum veri,
> Quod excitatur ventilante doctrinâ.

Wherefore the mere telling of men, there is a God, could not infuse any idea of him into their minds; nor yet the further giving this definition of him, that he is a being absolutely per-

[8] De Consolat. Philos. lib. 3. p. 79. 80. The passage itself of Plato quoted by Boetius may be found in his Phædon, where Socrates, just before his death, explains this opinion, p. 382. &c. See also his Menon, p. 18, where a boy is introduced giving apt and correct answers to the various questions of Socrates respecting the measurement of the square, which Socrates says was owing to the *ἐννοίας*, or ideas implanted in human minds. Dr. Cudworth has with great propriety abandoned this opinion of Plato, which is supremely adapted to foster fanatic delusion and folly. For if you can firmly persuade any one that there were in his mind, long before he was born, the impressed images of all truths, he will neglect his reason and the education to be derived from others, and will give himself up solely for instruction to the emotions and fancies of his own mind, receiving without hesitation all its products, however false and foolish, for divine verities. Nevertheless many, who deny the existence of any innate ideas, may perhaps think Dr. Cudworth here more attached to the Platonic dogmas than truth will permit. This controversy I will not pretend to decide; since it is not at all to the present purpose, and this subject has been touched upon in some degree several times already. I will merely observe that I think those who dispute respecting internal and innate ideas do not generally express their opinions with sufficient plainness and perspicuity, but make use of words and expressions which are very ambiguous, from which if they were to abstain perhaps there would be less difference between them than at first sight appears.

fect, eternal, and self-existent, make them understand any thing of his nature, were they not able to excite notions or ideas from within themselves, correspondent to those several words. However the difficulty still remains, how those civil sovereigns and law-makers, or how Critias' very first inventor of that cheat of a God, could form that idea within themselves; since upon supposition of his non-existence, it is the idea of nothing, or of a nonentity. And this was judiciously hinted also by the same Sextus:[8] Οἱ δὲ διαμφοδοκοῦντές, φασὶν, ὅτι νομοθέται τινὲς ἐνεποίησαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὴν περὶ Θεοῦ δόξαν, μὴ εἰδότες ὅτι τὸ ἀρχῆθεν ἄτοπον αὐτοὺς περιμένει, ζητήσαντος ἄν τινος, πόθεν δὲ οἱ νομοθέται, μηδενὸς πρότερον παραδόντος, ἦλθον εἰς ἐπίνοιαν Θεοῦ, "The Atheists affirming, that certain law-makers first put this notion of a God into the minds of men, do not consider that they still remain entangled in the difficulty, if any one further demands of them how those law-makers themselves could first form that idea?" From whence it is afterwards concluded:[9] Οὐ τοίνυν θέσει, οὐδὲ κατά τινα νομοθεσίαν, παρεδέξαντο οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἶναι Θεόν, "That therefore the notion of a God sprung not from the arbitrarious fiction of law-makers and politicians."

But some Atheists will yet further reply, that there is a feigning power in the human soul, whereby it can frame ideas or conceptions of such things as actually never were or will be, as of a centaur, or of a golden mountain; and that by such a feigning power as this the idea of a God, though there be no such thing existing, might be framed. And here we deny not but that the human soul hath a power of compounding ideas and things together, which exist severally and apart in nature, but never were, nor will be, in that conjunction: and this indeed is all the feigning power that it hath. For the mind cannot make any new cogitation, which was not before, but only compound that which is. As the painter cannot feign colours, but must use such as exist in nature; only he can variously compound them together, and by his pencil draw the figures and lineaments of such things as nowhere are; as he can add to the head and face of a man the neck, shoulders, and body of a horse. In like manner that more subtle painter or limner, the mind and imagination of man, can frame compounded ideas of things which nowhere exist, but yet his simple colours, notwithstanding, must be real; he cannot feign any cogitation which was not in nature, nor make a positive conception of that which is absolutely nothing; which were no less than to make nothing to be something, or create something out of nothing. And though the whole of these fictitious ideas (as of a golden mountain) does not

[8] Advers. Mathemat. 313. 314. [Page 556.] [9] Ibid. p. 557.

any where actually exist, yet forasmuch as it doth not absolutely imply a contradiction for it so to do, therefore hath it also a possible entity too, and otherwise it could not be conceivable. As a triangular square, for example, being a contradictious thing, hath not so much as a possible entity, and therefore is not conceivable as such (though both a triangle and a square severally be conceivable); it being mere nonsense, nothing, and no idea at all. Nay, we conceive, that a Theist may presume with reverence to say, that God Almighty himself, though he can create more or fewer really existent things, as he pleaseth, and could make a whole world out of nothing, yet can he not make more cogitation or conception, than is, or was before contained in his own infinite mind and eternal wisdom, nor have a positive idea of any thing, which hath neither actual nor possible entity.

But the idea of God is not a compilement or aggregation of things which exist scatteredly and apart in the world; for then would it be a mere arbitrarious thing, and it might be what every one pleased, one adding more things together, and another fewer, but each of them writing the name or title of God, as bungling painters did, under these their several figments;[10] whereas we have already proved that the idea of God is one most simple idea of an absolutely perfect Being, though having several partial and inadequate conceptions, so that nothing can be added to it, nor detracted from it, there being nothing included therein but what is demonstrable of a perfect Being, and therefore nothing at all arbitrarious.

Moreover, many of those partial conceptions contained in the entire idea of God are nowhere else to be found in the whole world, existing singly and apart; and therefore, if there be no God, they must needs be absolute nonentities; as immutability, necessary existence, infinity, and perfection, &c. So that the painter that makes this idea, must here feign colours themselves, or create new cogitation and conception out of nothing, upon the atheistic supposition.

Lastly, if there be no God now existing, it is impossible that ever there should be any, and so the whole idea of God would be the idea of that which hath no possible entity neither; whereas those other fictitious ideas, made by the mind of men, though they be of such things as have no actual existence, yet have they all a possible entity, as was said before.

But that we may conceal nothing of the Atheists' strength, we must here acknowledge that some of them have yet pretended further, that besides this power of compounding things together, the human soul hath also another ampliating, or increasing and

[10] See Ælian, Variæ Historiæ, lib. 10. cap. 10. p. 184, who says that the old painters used to depict animals so badly that they were obliged to write under their pictures, "This is an ox," "That is a horse."

improving power; by both which together, though there be no God existing, nor yet possible, the idea of him may be fictitiously made; those partial ideas, which are nowhere else to be found, arising, as they say, from a *μετάβασις ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων*, "a transition and gradual procession from men, in way of amplification, augmentation, and improvement." Thus do we read in Sextus:* *Τὸ ἀΐδιον εἶναι τὸν Θεὸν, καὶ ἄφθαρτον, καὶ τέλειον ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ, παρῆλθε κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μετάβασιν· ὡς γὰρ τὸν κοινὸν ἄνθρωπον αὐξήσαντες τῇ φαντασίᾳ, νόησιν ἔχομεν Κύκλωπος· οὕτως ἄνθρωπον εὐδαίμονα νοήσαντες καὶ μακάριον καὶ συμπεπληρωμένον πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, εἶτα ταῦτα ἐπιτείναντες, τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις ἄκρον ἐνοήσαμεν Θεόν· καὶ πάλιν πολυχρόνιόν τινα φαντασιωθέντες ἄνθρωπον οἱ παλαιοὶ, ἐπηύξησαν τὸν χρόνον εἰς ἄπειρον, εἶτα ἐντεῦθεν εἰς ἔννοιαν ἀΐδιον παραγενόμενοι, ἔφασαν καὶ ἀΐδιον εἶναι τὸν Θεόν*, "The ideas of the eternity, incorruptibility, and perfect happiness of the Deity, were fictitiously made by way of transition from men: for as, by increasing a man of an ordinary stature in our imagination, we fictitiously make the phantasm of a Cyclops; so when beholding a happy man, that aboundeth with all good things, we amplify, intend, and, as it were, swell the same in our minds higher and higher, we then arrive at length to the idea of a Being absolutely happy, that is, a God. So did the ancients, taking notice of a very longeve man, and increasing this length of age further and further infinitely, by that means frame the notion or idea of eternity, and attribute the same to God."

But to this we reply, first, that according to the principles of the Atheists themselves, there could not possibly be any such amplifying and feigning power of the soul, as whereby it could make more than is; because they suppose it to have no active power at all, but all our conceptions to be nothing but mere passions from the objects without; according to that of Protagoras in Plato's Theætetus:† *Οὔτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατὸν δοξάσαι, οὔτε ἄλλα, παρ' ἃ ἂν πάσχῃ*, "It is neither possible for a man to conceive that which is not; nor any more or otherwise than he suffers." Again, as Sextus[1] the philosopher also inti-

*Adv. Math. p. 317. [Lib. 8. seu adv. Physic. lib. 1. sect. 2. sect. 46. p. 559. 560.] But Dr. Cudworth has not quoted this passage entire; but has omitted some words without which it cannot be clearly understood.

† Page 167. Serr.

[1] Vide lib. 8. adv. Mathemat. sect. 2. sect. 47. p. 560. Since Dr. Cudworth goes on here to paraphrase the passage he refers to out of Sextus Empiricus, it will be only fair here to give Sextus' own words, so that his opinion may be the more plainly apparent. *Οἱ δὲ τοιαῦτα λέγοντες, πιθανῆς μὲν προΐστανται δόξης· ἠρέμα δὲ εἰς τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων ἐμπίπτουσι τρόπον, ὃς ἔσται ἀπορώτατος· ἵνα γὰρ πρῶτον εὐδαίμονα νοήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου κατὰ μετάβασιν τὸν Θεὸν, ὀφείλομεν νοῆσαι, τί ποτέ ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία, ἧς κατὰ μετοχὴν νοεῖται ὁ εὐδαίμων· Ἀλλ' ἦν γε εὐδαιμονία κατ' αὐτοὺς δαιμονία τις καὶ θεῖα φύσις, καὶ εὐδαίμων ἐκαλεῖτο ὁ εὖ τὸν δαίμονα διακείμενον ἔχων· ὥσθ' ἵνα μὲν λάβωμεν τὴν περὶ*

mates, the Atheists are here plainly guilty of that fallacy or error in ratiocination, which is commonly called a circle, or δι' ἀλλήλων. For whereas they could not otherwise judge the

ἄνθρωπον εὐδαιμονίαν, πρότερον ἔχειν ὀφείλομεν νόησιν Θεοῦ καὶ δαίμονος· ἵνα δὲ τὸν Θεὸν νοήσωμεν, πρότερον ἔχειν ὀφείλομεν ἔννοιαν εὐδαίμονος ἀνθρώπου· τοίνυν ἑκάτερον περιμένον τὴν ἐκ θατέρου νόησιν, ἀνεπινόητον γίνεται ἡμῖν, "Those who say these things have indeed a probable opinion to defend, but gradually they fall into the way of proving one thing by another, a way which is most doubtful. For if first of all we are to imagine a happy man, and thence by transition form an idea of God, what is the felicity in the participation of which he is to be esteemed happy? But felicity is according to them a certain superhuman and divine nature, and is called in Greek εὐδαιμονία because it possesses a well disposed demon [or god]; wherefore in order to conceive of human felicity we must first have an idea of God and of a demon. But in order to form an idea of God we must first have a conception of a happy man. Each idea therefore reciprocally depending on the other, both become incomprehensible to us."

I have already fully explained my opinion respecting that idea of supreme perfection which is supposed by Dr. Cudworth to be innate in the human mind; nor do I perceive any thing said here which should move me from that opinion. I. Why our author should deny the faculty of augmenting and amplifying, I do not at all perceive. A faculty of this description certainly exists in our minds, nor is the admission of it injurious, but rather advantageous to the cause of God and of religion. For as soon as we perceive any thing to possess a particular perfection or power, we immediately, under the express guidance of nature itself, conclude that it is produced by some cause, and does not exist necessarily of itself. But when we think of this cause, we cannot refrain from attributing to it a greater degree of perfection than we perceive to exist in what is produced by it, or from amplifying and increasing the perfection found in the effect. From this cause we again ascend to another and different cause, the attributes of which we amplify, until we arrive by meditation at a cause of such a kind as can have nothing added to it. Every one who has only moderately attended to the operations of their own minds will perceive the correctness of these statements. II. But how the existence of this mental faculty of increase and amplification can in any way serve the cause of Atheists, I can indeed by no means discover. Suppose any one to reason thus: Mankind, from the contemplation of imperfect existences, gradually, through dint of reasoning, attain to the formation of the idea of a supremely perfect being: therefore there is no being of this supremely perfect description. How are we to class such a reasoner? among the wise or the foolish? For my own part I think he ought to be made perpetual mayor of Gotham. It would be as wise and rational to conclude that all the clocks of a city have been their own makers, because all who see such machines attribute greater ability and skill to the maker than to the machine itself. What kind of reasoning, pray, is this? Because all mankind feel certain that nothing can take place without a cause, and infer that the cause must be of a more exalted nature than its effect, therefore no cause whatever exists! How can the advocates of such an argument as this claim for a moment a place among the wise? III. I am rather of opinion that the power our minds possess of exalting the perfections and attributes that we encounter is no slight confirmation of religion. For it is plain from it that we have an idea of supreme and infinite perfection which no human being, with his utmost efforts, can possibly expel. For as when any one, after a view of many clocks, skilfully and ingeniously constructed, still desires a higher degree of elegance and finish, he has undoubtedly by some means or other in his mind an inward idea of a firstrate timepiece, so also when a person, after a contemplation of the best and most perfect existences in the universe, still amplifies and exalts the perfections he sees, he must necessarily be endued with the image and idea of a supremely perfect nature. IV. But yet it is not necessary that we should suppose, with our author and the Platonists, that this idea of a supremely perfect Being is innate in all men, and brought with them at their birth into the world. As respects the cause of religion, it is perfectly indifferent whether it be supposed innate or adventitious. It is sufficient to maintain the incontrovertible fact that mankind, as soon as they obtain the use of reason, cannot refrain from adopting this opinion, that there is some supremely perfect Being, unless they be more influenced by their own prejudices than by the doctrines

greatest perfection and happiness, which ever they had experience of in men, to be imperfect, than by an anticipated idea of perfection and happiness, with which it was in their minds compared (by virtue of which idea also it comes to pass that they are able to amplify those lesser perfections of men further and further, and can take occasion, from imperfect things, to think of that which is absolutely perfect); that is, whereas these Atheists themselves first make the idea of imperfection from perfection; they, not attending to this, do again go about to make up the notion or idea of that which is absolutely perfect (by way of amplification) from that which is imperfect. But that men have a notion of absolute perfection in them, by which, as the rule or measure, they (comparing other things therewith) judge them to be imperfect, and which is therefore in order of nature first, may appear from hence, because all theologers, as well Pagan as Christian, gave this direction, for the conceiving of God, that it should principally be done per viam remotionis, "by way of remotion of all imperfection from him." Thus Alcinous:[2] Πρώτη μὲν αὐτοῦ νόησις ἡ κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν, "The first way of conceiving of God is by remotion or abstraction." We add, in the last place, that finite things put together can never make up infinite, as may appear from that instance of human longevity proposed; for, if one should amplify that never so much, by adding of more and more past time or years to it, yet would he never thereby be able to arrive at eternity without beginning. God differs not from these imperfect created things in degrees only, but in the whole kind. And though infinite space may perhaps be here objected, as a thing taken for granted, which being nothing but extension or magnitude, must therefore consist, or be made up, of finite parts, as it was before declared, we have no certainty of any more than this, that the finite world

and dictates of correct reason. But we have already touched upon this more fully above. V. Nor is the opinion of the Platonists more correct, that there is actually in all minds an innate idea of supreme perfection, proving it by the same argumentation which Dr. Cudworth here uses in the investigation of the divine attributes by the method of exclusion. This "method of exclusion," which is very generally followed by theologians, proves indeed that they are certain of the existence of a supremely perfect and eternal Being, and that they themselves have some idea or notion of such a Being; but it can in no way be thence inferred that this idea is actually existent in the infant mind immediately after birth. Let it be supposed that an individual on beholding a book defaced by certain faults, should make use of this "method of exclusion" to discover the idea of an absolutely perfect book, or to conclude that none of these faults existed in an immaculate volume, it would certainly be correct to say that that person had an idea of an immaculate and perfect book; but you can never thence prove that he possessed the idea of a faultless volume from the very time he was first born. I know not how it comes to pass that the Platonists usually confound these two widely different things, the having in the mind an idea of any thing, and the bringing with one into the world an innate notion of it. On this subject our preceding observations may be referred to.

[2] Introduct. in Doctrin. Platon. cap. 10. p. 602, printed at the end of Dan. Heinsius' edition of Maximus Tyrius.

might have been made bigger and bigger infinitely, or without end; which infinity or magnitude is but like that of number, potential; from whence it may be inferred as well of the one as the other, that it can never be actually infinite. Wherefore, were there no infinitely perfect being in nature, the idea thereof could never be made up by any amplifying power of the soul, or by the addition of finites.[3] Neither is that of any moment which Gassendus[4] so much objecteth here to the contrary, that though there were no God, or infinite Being, yet might the idea of him as well be feigned by the mind, as that of infinite worlds, or of infinite matter, was by some philosophers: for infinite worlds, and infinite matter, are but words ill put together, infinity being a real thing in nature (and no fiction of the mind), as well as the world or matter, but yet proper to the Deity only. But it is no wonder, if they, who denied a God, yet retaining this notion of infinity, should misapply the same, as they did also other properties of the Deity, to matter.

To conclude this; our human soul cannot feign or create any new cogitation, or conception, that was not before, but only variously compound that which is; nor can it ever make a positive idea of an absolute nonentity, that is, such as hath neither actual nor possible existence; much less could our imperfect beings create the entity of so vast a thought, as that of an infinitely perfect Being, out of nothing; this being indeed more than for God Almighty, or a perfect Being, to create a real world out of nothing; because there is no repugnancy at all in the latter, as there is in the former. We affirm therefore, that were there no God, the idea of an absolutely or infinitely perfect Being could never have been made or feigned, neither by politicians, nor by poets, nor philosophers, nor any other. Which may be accounted another argument for a Deity.[5]

But that religion is no figment of politicians, will further

[3] Here may be consulted our previous copious observations on the nature of infinity (note 3. p. 541). Dr. Cudworth here follows Des Cartes, who has followed precisely the same line of argument in his Responsiones ad Gassendi Dubitationes, p. 324. vol. 3. of Gassendi's works.

[4] In Disquisit. Metaphys. seu Dubitationibus et Instantiis ad Cartesii Metaphys. Dubit 4. p. 336. tom. 3. opp.

[5] Many remarks might be made here in confirmation, illustration, and qualification of our author's reflections; but since this whole subject of the nature and origin of conceptions and ideas has been already treated of by those who are far superior to myself in ability and learning, and even the wisest can scarcely escape unblemished and uninjured from this strife, I have thought it better to leave the reader to an unbiassed decision on the whole question. I am almost ready to believe, that if all the discussions that have taken place among authors, respecting the idea of God being adventitious or innate, were accurately examined with a view rather to real meaning than to words and phrases, there would be found much less difference than is at first apparent. But if this matter be discussed by those whose contests are like the battles of the pigmies and the cranes of old, destitute of order and method, it is no wonder that mutual misunderstandings take place, and that discord is increased and inflamed rather than extinguished.

unquestionably appear from that which now shall follow. As the religion of an oath is a necessary vinculum of civil society; so obligation in conscience, respecting the Deity as its original, and as the punisher of the violation thereof, is the very foundation of all civil sovereignty: for pacts and covenants (into which some would resolve all civil power) without this obligation in conscience, are nothing but mere words and breath; and the laws and commands of civil sovereigns do not make obligation, but presuppose it, as a thing in order of nature before them, and without which they would be invalid. Which is a truth so evident, that the writer De Cive could not dissemble it (though he did not rightly understand this natural obligation) but acknowledgeth it in these words:* Obligatio ad obedientiam civilem, cujus vi leges civiles validæ sunt, omni lege civili prior est.——Quòd si quis princeps summus legem civilem in hanc formulam conciperet, non rebellabis, nihil efficeret. Nam nisi prius obligentur cives ad obediendum, hoc est, ad non rebellandum, omnis lex invalida est: et si prius obligentur, est superflua, "The obligation to civil obedience, by the force of which all the civil laws become valid, is before those civil laws. And if any prince should make a law to this purpose, that no man should rebel against him, this would signify nothing, because unless they to whom it is made were before obliged to obey, or not to rebel, the law is invalid; and if they were, then is it superfluous."[6] Now this previous obligation to civil obedience cannot be derived (as the forementioned writer De Cive, and of the Leviathan supposes) from men's private utility only; because every man being judge of this for himself, it would then be lawful for any subject to rebel against his sovereign prince, and to poison or stab him, whensoever he could reasonably persuade himself that it would tend to his own advantage, or that he should thereby procure the sovereignty. Were the obligation to civil obedience made only by men's private utility, it would as easily be dissolved by the same. It remaineth therefore, that conscience, and religious obligation to duty, is the only basis, and essential foundation, of a polity or commonwealth: without which there could be no right or authority of commanding in any sovereign, nor validity in any laws. Wherefore religious obligation cannot be thought to be the fiction or imposture of civil sovereigns, unless civil sovereignty itself be accounted a fiction and imposture, or a thing which hath no foundation in nature, but is either wholly artificial or violent.[7]

* Imper. cap. 14. sect. 21. [Page 109.]

[6] These last words are quoted by Dr. Cudworth a little differently from what they are to be read in Hobbes, whose expressions are, "All law is invalid; but an obligation which binds to what was already an obligation is superfluous."

[7] Unless I am much mistaken, this argumentation is not of force against all who

Moreover, had a religious regard to the Deity been a mere figment or invention of politicians, to promote their own ends, and keep men in obedience and subjection under them, then

suppose religion to be a figment of rulers, but only against some who hold this opinion. Our author's reasoning, if I rightly understand it, is as follows:—Religion is not a crafty invention of the first founders of states and governments, for before governments could be established, there must have been in men's minds a strong conviction that they were under an obligation to obey and be submissive to laws. But this strong conviction could arise only from religion. Therefore religion must have been prior to all governments, and if so, it cannot have been invented by rulers. I willingly grant that all real and permanent obligation arises from religion, nor, apart from religion, can any government continue safe and uninjured. But the argument deduced from these premises does not seem to me to be of sufficient force at once to overthrow all the reasoning of those who prate of the frauds and tricks of legislators, in discussing the origin of religion. An Atheist will grant, when opposed in this way, that religion is necessary for the firm establishment of governments, and that magistrates cannot depend upon the obedience of their citizens except in so far as their minds are imbued with a reverence for some Deity, the punisher of wickedness and crime. But he will add that this very thing induced statesmen to instil the principles of religion into the minds of ignorant men; that certain chief men plainly foresaw this previously to the foundation of governments, and therefore took care of religion before politics, and assumed the guise of fanatics before they put on the robes of kings and magistrates. That this was the case with Mohammed, who is well known to have laid the foundations of his empire after he had inculcated into the minds of his followers the opinion that he was a prophet sent from God, whose commands it was wicked to resist. That a like part was played in England by Oliver Cromwell, who opened his way to power by fanaticism rather than by virtue or courage. That therefore there is nothing to prevent religion from preceding government, and yet at the same time being nothing but a deceitful invention of magistrates, and of those who were desirous of power. Perhaps Atheists will say that they do not mean that all religion proceeded from magistrates; that there existed in the minds of most people an amount of superstition which was produced by a fear of futurity and an ignorance of causation, previously to their coalescing in civil societies; and that this superstition was only nourished, amplified, and confirmed by certain laws, through the influence of rulers. But neither will they admit it to be necessary that religion must have preceded government in the history of the human mind; but will assert that fear and other natural causes first induced mankind to give up their personal liberty and submit themselves and their property to the will of a single individual; that these new societies did not at first require the aid of religion, but that the agreements entered into by the magistrates and the people, the sense of past inconveniences, the fear of punishment, and other methods, for a time restrained the people within the bounds of duty; but that in the lapse of time, when ambitious persons, more studious of their own advantage than of the public weal, excited disturbances in the state, rulers then foresaw that a stronger tie was needed for curbing the minds of their citizens; on which account, perceiving the dispositions of the multitude to be prone to receive the belief of a certain unseen Deity, they made use of this propensity, and availed themselves of religion as a defence and protection against seditions and tumults. Nor will the deniers of a Deity be much affected by our author's final observation, that those who reckon religion among the frauds and tricks of rulers, cannot have a better opinion of that government which is supported by religion. For some of this party will be foolhardy enough to assent to the truth of this, and will include to a certain extent opposition to civil institutions in their hostility against religion. All these considerations I admit to be the nonsense and vain fancies of senseless men, which will at once lose all their speciousness and value with any individual possessing the least discernment and furnished with Dr. Cudworth's other arguments; but still they greatly weaken the force of our author's argumentation in this place. Therefore I think it better not to use it against atheists without great caution, more especially since there is more than sufficient force in other arguments to refute all their cavils, as here referred to. Long experience has taught me, that there is never greater need of prudence and wisdom than when disputing against those who employ their talents, to the utmost of their

would they doubtless have so framed and contrived it, as that it should have been every way flexible and compliant; namely, by persuading the world, that whatsoever was commanded by themselves, was agreeable to the divine will, and whatever was forbidden by their laws was displeasing to God Almighty, and would be punished by him; God ruling over the world no otherwise than by and in these civil sovereigns as his vicegerents, and as the only prophets and interpreters of his will to men. So that the civil law of every country, and the arbitrary will of sovereigns, should be acknowledged to be the only measure of just and unjust (there being nothing naturally such) the only rule of conscience and religion: for, from religion thus modelled, civil sovereigns might think to have an absolute power, or an infinite right of doing or commanding whatsoever they pleased, without exception, nothing being unlawful to them, and their subjects being always obliged, in conscience, without the least scruple, to obey.

But this is but a mere larva of religion, and would be but a mocking of God Almighty; and indeed this is the only religion that can be called a political figment.[s] Neither could the generality of mankind be ever yet thus persuaded, that the arbitrary will of civil sovereigns was the only rule of justice and conscience; and that God Almighty could command nothing, nor reveal his will concerning religion to mankind otherwise than by these, as his prophets and interpreters. True religion and conscience are no such waxen things, servilely addicted to the arbitrary wills of men, but immorigerous, stiff, and inflexible; they respecting the Deity only, his eternal or everlasting laws, and his revealed will; with which whensoever human laws clash (a thing not impossible), they conclude, that then God ought to be obeyed, and not men. For which cause the profane politicians declare open war against this religion, as a thing utterly inconsistent with civil sovereignty; because it introduces a fear greater than the fear of the Leviathan, namely, that of

power, in carrying on opposition against God and religion. For since most of them have fallen into this madness not so much through reasoning as through a love of lusts and pleasures, and cannot feel certain that there is no God, but only desire to ascertain this supposition for a truth, in order the more securely to indulge in sin, they therefore eagerly catch at the smallest slip of the advocates of religion, and absurdly judge of the merits of the whole question from one weak point of argumentation. For men believe nothing more readily than what they perceive to correspond with their own wishes and desires. Other observations would have to be made here if the doctrine of civil obedience were now under discussion; but the present is plainly an entirely different question. Some remarks on this passage of Dr. Cudworth have been made by Le Clerc, Bibliothèque Choisie, vol. 5. p. 101. who has shown, first, that religion and the fear of God is not opposed in the administration of civil government to the advantage of mankind, and secondly, that public and not private advantage is the chief end of civil government.

[s] This is aimed at Hobbes, who both in his Leviathan and in his Elementa de Cive, commends that kind of religion here called by Dr. Cudworth a larva of religion.

him who can inflict eternal punishments after death; as also because it clashes with that monstrous, infinite, and unlimited power of theirs, which is such a thing as is not attributed by genuine Theists to God Almighty himself; a power of making their mere arbitrary will the rule of justice, and not justice the rule of their will. Thus does a modern writer of politics condemn it for seditious doctrine, tending to the dissolution of a commonwealth:* "That subjects may make a judgment of good and evil, just and unjust, or have any other conscience besides the law of the land." As also this:† "That subjects may sin in obeying the commands of their sovereign." He likewise adds:‡ "That it is impossible a commonwealth should stand, where any other than the sovereign hath a power of giving greater rewards than life, and of inflicting greater punishments than death. Now, eternal life is a greater reward than the life present, and eternal torment than the death of nature." Wherefore, God Almighty being the dispenser of eternal rewards and punishments, this is all one as if he should have said, it is impossible a commonwealth should stand, where the belief of a God, who can punish with eternal torments after this life, is entertained.[9] Thus does the same writer declare,§ that if the "superstitious fear of spirits"[10] (whereof God is the chief) and things depending thereupon, were taken away, men would be much more fitted than they are, for civil obedience:" and that they who assert the immortality of souls, or their capability of receiving punishments after death,‖ "fright men from obeying the laws of their country, with empty names, as men fright birds from the corn, with an empty doublet, a hat, and a crooked stick." And accordingly he concludes, that civil sovereigns do not only make justice, but religion also; and that no scripture or divine revelation can oblige, unless it be first made law, or stamped with their authority. Now, since that which can make religion and gods, must itself needs be greater than all gods, it follows, according to the tenor of this doctrine, that the civil sovereign is in reality the supreme Numen; or else at least, that the Leviathan (the king

* Leviathan, p. 168. [Cap. 29. p. 152. ed. Batav.]

† De Civ. cap. 12. sect. 2. [Page 83.] ‡ Leviathan, cap. 38. p. 238.

[9] This monstrous conclusion is correctly deduced from Hobbes' doctrines. But that author himself draws a widely different consequence, which I will express in his own words: "It is therefore worthy the utmost attention of those who desire by civil obedience to avoid confusion and the calamities of civil war, to investigate what is meant in the scriptures by eternal life and eternal torments, and also to inquire into the crimes on account of which, and the persons on account of injuries to whom, eternal torments are denounced, as well as into the deeds which ensure everlasting life."

§ Leviathan, page 8.

[10] The word "spirits" does not occur in the Latin edition of Hobbes; but instead of it the word "spectres;" which gives a much less objectionable turn to the whole sentence.

‖ Page 373.

over all the children of pride) is the highest Deity, next to senseless omnipotent matter; the one of these being the Atheists' natural, the other their artificial god. Nevertheless we shall here observe by the way, that whilst these atheistic politicians thus endeavour to swell up the civil sovereign, and to bestow upon him an infinite right, by removing to that end out of his way natural justice, conscience, religion, and God himself, they do indeed thereby absolutely divest him of all right and authority, since the subject is now no longer obliged in conscience to obey him; and so instead of true right and authority, they leave him nothing but mere brutish force. Wherefore, since theism and true religion are thus plainly disowned and disclaimed by these politicians, as altogether inconsistent with their designs, they cannot be supposed to have been the figments of civil sovereigns, or the mere creatures of political art. And thus have we abundantly confuted those three atheistic pretences to solve the phenomenon of religion; from fear, and the ignorance of causes, and the fiction of politicians.

But since, besides those ordinary phenomena before mentioned, which are no way solvable by Atheists, there are certain other phenomena extraordinary, that either immediately prove a God and Providence, or else that there is a rank of understanding beings, invisible, superior to men, from whence a Deity may be afterwards inferred; namely, these three especially, apparitions, miracles, and prophecies (where the Atheists obstinately denying matter of fact and history, will needs impute these things, either to juggling fraud and knavery, or else to men's own fear and fancy, and their ignorance how to distinguish dreams, and other strong imaginations, from vision and sense; or lastly, to certain religious tales or legends, allowed by the public authority of civil sovereigns, for political ends): we shall here suggest something briefly, to vindicate the historic truth of those phenomena against Atheists.

First, therefore, as for apparitions, though there be much of fabulosity in these relations, yet can it not reasonably be concluded, that there is nothing at all of truth in them; since something of this kind hath been averred in all ages, and many times attested by persons of unquestionable prudence, and unsuspected veracity. And whereas the Atheists impute the original of these things to men's mistaking both their dreams, and their waking fancies, for real visions and sensations; they do hereby plainly contradict one main fundamental principle of their own philosophy, that sense is the only ground of certainty, and the criterion of all truth:[1] for if prudent and intelligent

[1] These remarks are principally levelled at Hobbes, who, in his Leviathan, cap. 2. p. 6. 7. after affirming that it is very difficult to distinguish dreams and other phantasms from real appearances, plainly says, p. 8. "From this ignorance of the distinction

persons may be so frequently mistaken, in confounding their own dreams and fancies with sensations, how can there be any certainty of knowledge at all from sense? However, they here derogate so much both from sense, and from human testimonies, as that if the like were done in other cases, it would plainly overthrow all human life.

Wherefore other Atheists, being apprehensive of this inconvenience, of denying so many sensible appearances, and testimonies, or relations of fact, have chose rather to acknowledge the reality of apparitions; nevertheless concluding them to be things caused and created by the power of imagination only: as if the strength of imagination were such, that it could not only create fancies, but also real sensible objects, and that at a distance too from the imaginers, such as whereby the sense of others shall be for the time affected, though they quickly vanish away again.[2] From which prodigious paradox, we may take

of dreams and other vivid hallucinations from actual sense and vision, principally originated the religion of the ancient Pagans, satyrs, fauns, nymphs, and other imaginary beings, and the modern opinion entertained by ignorant people of ghosts and spectres." But a little afterwards he seems not absolutely to deny all such appearances whatever. "There is however no doubt," says he, "but that supernatural appearances can be produced by the Deity; but that he has done this so often is not an article of Christian faith."

[2] Henry More, a friend of Dr. Cudworth, quotes this same opinion with just severity in his "Antidote against Atheism," lib. 3. cap. 16. p. 137; but no one has, like Dr. Cudworth, mentioned the author of so marvellous, portentous, and unheard of a sentiment. Thomas Wise, who has made an abridgment of Dr. Cudworth's work, in cap. 6. p. 460. confounds this opinion with that of Democritus explained by our author a little further on. Le Clerc, who is well known to have made pretty copious extracts from this book, has entirely omitted it, Bibliothèque Choisie, vol. 5. p. 107. as if it were incredible that any one should have entertained so absurd an opinion. It is indeed difficult to believe that any one possessing the least spark of reason should have been so mad as to dream that real and sensible existences could be produced by our own cogitations. I could therefore wish that the writers had been named who have chosen to philosophize in so absurd and silly a manner. I wonder, however, that Atheists have taken so much pains to explain the origin of visions and spectres, that in order to defend themselves they have not feared to descend to the lowest depths of folly. For if they be willing to tread in the steps of their chosen masters, Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Democritus, they may easily by a much shorter way and method free themselves from these embarrassments. For these, as is related by Lucian in his Pseudomantis, p. 758 of the 1st vol. of his works, had an "adamantine" mind against things of this description, which they felt themselves unable to explain; and when they could no longer find an answer they nevertheless boldly averred that every thing alleged by their opponents was false: Τὸ δὲ οὖν πᾶν ψεῦδός ἐστι καὶ γενέσθαι ἀδύνατον, "Whatever it might be it was false and impossible." An audacity certainly worthy of this set of persons, who care neither for God nor man, and which, if it had been imitated by those who in modern times represent their philosophy or rather their impiety, would free them from many troubles, and from the necessity of refuting the arguments of Theists. In reference to the general question, I think the argument against atheism drawn from visions and spectres cannot be made use of by any wise man without great caution and circumspection. For, not to mention the great difficulty there is in freeing narrations of this description from all controversy, and that those who are obstinately incredulous will never want exceptions against the authority and veracity of witnesses, some of the doctrines of atheism are of that description that from them some kind of explanation can be given of visions and spectres. The Epicureans, for instance, who maintain that the human race is made up of chance atoms,

notice of the fanaticism of some Atheists, and that there is nothing so monstrously absurd, which men infected with atheistic incredulity will not rather entertain into their belief, than admit of any thing that shall the least hazard or endanger the existence of a God. For, if there be once any invisible ghosts or spirits acknowledged as things permanent, it will not be easy for any to give a reason why there might not be one supreme ghost also, presiding over them all and the whole world.

In the last place therefore we shall observe, that Democritus was yet further convinced by these relations of apparitions, so as to grant that there was a certain kind of permanent beings, and independent upon imagination, superior to men, which could appear in different forms, and again disappear at pleasure, called by him idols or images; he supposing them to be of the same nature with those exuvious effluxes that stream continually from the surface of bodies; only he would not allow them to have any thing immortal at all in them, but their concretions to be at length all dissolvable, and their personalities then to vanish into nothing. Thus Sextus the philosopher:* Δημόκριτος εἴδωλά τινα φησὶν ἐκπελάζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἀγαθοποιὰ, τὰ δὲ κακοποιά· ἔνθεν καὶ εὔχεται εὐλόγων τυχεῖν εἰδώλων· εἶναι δὲ ταῦτα μεγάλα τε καὶ ὑπερμεγέθη, καὶ δύσφθαρτα μὲν, οὐκ ἄφθαρτα δὲ: προσημαίνειν τε τὰ μέλλοντα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, θεωρούμενα καὶ φωνὰς ἀφιέντα, "Democritus affirmeth, that there are certain idols or spectres, that do often approach to men, some of which are beneficent, and some maleficent. Upon which account he wisheth, that it might be his good hap to meet with fortunate idols. And he addeth, that these are a vast bigness, and very longeve, but not incorruptible; and that they sometimes do foresignify unto men future events, both visibly appearing to them, and sending forth audible voices." Now, though Democritus were much blamed for this concession of his by his fellow Atheists, as giving thereby too great an advantage to

might safely allow that the lighter and subtler atoms sometimes so cohere as to present before the human eye a form such as of men, animals, and other things, and again suddenly vanish and disappear. If, from the fortuitous concourse of atoms in past times bodies were produced such as those of men and animals, why should not bodies of the same shape, but of greater tenuity, and less stable and lasting, be produced at the present time from the same blind coalition? See the observations of Bayle on this subject, in his Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, vol. 2. art. Lucretius, note F. p. 1804. 1805. some of whose remarks, however, have less real solidity than at first view they seem to possess. He has also endeavoured to prove that neither Hobbes nor Spinoza could give any probable reason for denying the existence of visions, ghosts, and spectres. See vol. 2. art. Hobbes, note N. p. 1481. and vol. 3. art. Spinoza, note Q, p. 2642. I do not make these remarks in order to concede anything to those who entirely ridicule and reject all visions and spectres. They appear to me like children, who cannot understand that air is a substance, because they cannot see it. My design is merely to recommend prudence to those who take upon themselves to dispute against atheism.

* Adv. Math. p. 311. [Lib. 8. adv. Physic. sect. 19. p. 552.]

Theists; yet, in his own opinion, did he sufficiently secure himself against the danger of a God from hence, by supposing all these idols of his to be corruptible, they being indeed nothing but certain finer concretions of atoms, a kind of aërial and ethereal animals, that were all body, and without any immortal soul, as he supposed men also to be: so that a God could be no more proved from them, than from the existence of men. For thus he adds in Sextus: Ὅθεν τούτων αὐτῶν φαντασίαν λαβόντες οἱ παλαιοὶ ὑπενόησαν εἶναι Θεὸν, μηδενὸς ἄλλου παρὰ ταῦτα ὄντος Θεοῦ, τοῦ ἄφθαρτον φύσιν ἔχοντος, "Men, in ancient times, having a sense of these apparitions or idols fell from thence into the opinion of a God, although there be, besides these idols, no other God that hath an incorruptible nature. However, though Democritus continued thus grossly atheistical, yet was he further convinced than our modern Atheists will be, that the stories of apparitions were not all fabulous, and that there are not only terrestrial, but also aërial and ethereal animals; nor this earth of ours alone peopled and inhabited, whilst all those other vast regions above lie desert, solitary and waste.[3] Where it may be

[3] I think it worth while to make a few remarks on this opinion of Democritus, especially since I perceive that some worthy and eminent writers, both ancient and modern, have fallen into a mistake respecting it. If no other result should follow from what I am about to say, it will at least prove that the doctrines of the ancient philosophers, and especially of Democritus, are not so well understood by us at the present time that we can dispute about them without fear of mistake; and perhaps it may also be hence apparent, that verbal ambiguities have prevented many from correctly explaining the doctrines of the ancients.

I. Our first object will be to give the whole opinion of Democritus, which is not recorded by Sextus with entire perspicuity. From the passage of Sextus, as given by Dr. Cudworth, it appears that Democritus thought, 1. That there were certain beings composed of very thin and subtle atoms, who appeared to mankind only at certain times, and principally in the dark. There can be no doubt that he supposed that the very nature of these beings prevented their being seen at all times by mankind, but that a certain condition of their bodies and certain affections of our eyes were required in order to their being perceived by us. No doubt much was taught by Democritus concerning these things, of which, since his writings are lost, we are at present ignorant. 2. He supposed that these beings were of large size, greatly exceeding the human stature. 3. That it was much more difficult to dissipate and destroy them than it was the bodies of men; but that after a long time they perished and were dissolved. 4. That they uttered certain sounds and voices, doubtless resembling the human voice and language. For Democritus adds that these spectres informed men of future events; but this they could do in no other way than by a faculty of expressing their thoughts in the words used by those among whom they dwell or to whom they appear. Whence it would seem that Democritus allowed to them a knowledge of human languages, and the use of speech as ordinarily current in the world. 5. He takes for granted that they foresee future events, and sometimes predict and prognosticate them to mankind before they happen. 6. That they were of two kinds, some beneficent and others malevolent, and that the latter possessed the power of injuring mankind. On this account the philosopher wished that benign apparitions might appear to him. To these particulars may here be added what is specified in other places respecting these spectral beings of Democritus. Sextus himself, lib. 8. Adv. Mathemat. sect. 42. p. 559. gives two other characteristics of these beings, viz. 7. That Democritus imagined them to exist and dwell in the circumambient air; and, 8. That they possessed the figure and form of human beings. Τὰ δ' εἴδωλα εἶναι ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι ὑπερφυῆ καὶ ἀνθρωποειδεῖς ἔχοντα μορφὰς, καὶ καθόλου τοιαῦτα, ὁποῖα βούλεται αὐτῷ ἀναπλάττειν Δημόκριτος,

observed again, that divers of the ancient fathers, though they agreed not so far with Democritus, as to make the angelical beings to be altogether corporeal, yet did they likewise suppose

παντελῶς ἐστι δυσπαράδεκτον, "That there are in the surrounding air huge apparitions possessing the human form, in short such as Democritus chose to imagine to himself, is very difficult to believe." Most of these particulars are confirmed by Cicero, although, as will be presently apparent, he is not entirely to be trusted when speaking of Democritus' opinion. He adds, however, 9. that "Democritus thought that some of these beings were of such a size that they could externally comprehend the whole world." How this is to be understood I confess I do not know. Perhaps Cicero, as often happens, did not understand the opinion of Democritus. However this may be, it appears to me obviously ridiculous, and quite inconsistent with the character of so acute a man as Democritus is represented to be, to suppose that there are beings larger and taller than the whole world. Compare St. Augustine's observations against this opinion, Epist. 118. ad. Dioscor. sect. 29. p. 258. vol. 2. of his works. In the mean time I will transcribe the whole passage of Cicero, De Naturâ Deorum, lib. 1. cap. 43. p. 2948. vol. 9. of his works: "Democritus supposes that there are in the universe forms endowed with divinity; he both calls the principles and minds which are in the universe gods, and also animated forms, which are either beneficial or injurious to us, as well as certain shapes so large as externally to comprehend the whole world." To which he adds, in my opinion very justly: "All which things are more worthy of Democritus' country than of himself." I am aware that Bayle, in his Dictionary, vol. 2. art. Democritus, note P. p. 984. has objected to this censure of Cicero's, and has contended, on the other hand, that these opinions are rather the marks and proofs of a great and excellent genius. But at the same time I am not ignorant that this author, out of a love for disputation, often calls things great and excellent which wiser men rightly reckon among the refuse of genius. Yet Democritus would still more justly have deserved the censure if he had indulged as many opinions respecting the nature of God as Cicero here recounts, and had been as slippery and inconstant, as he is by him reported to have been in explaining the natures of the gods. But it will be obvious on a comparison of the passages here quoted from Sextus Empiricus with the remarks of Cicero (to say nothing of other ancient authorities), that one and the same opinion of Democritus is by him divided and torn into several tenets. For these "forms endowed with divinity," "principles and minds," "animated" and "huge forms" of which Cicero speaks as if they were different kinds of beings, are only one description of beings after all, namely what are called by Democritus εἴδωλα, or "apparitions." Perhaps here as in other cases, Cicero has designedly perverted the opinion of this philosopher, in order the more eloquently and with better effect to confute and ridicule him; or perhaps he fell into this error through negligence, or trusted more than was proper to his memory. Another passage of his is extant, De Naturâ Deorum, lib. 1. cap. 12. p. 2896. in which he speaks with no greater accuracy respecting this tenet of Democritus, and moreover falls into another error, which we shall presently point out. This is well worthy of being observed by those who receive as oracular the account given by Cicero of the doctrines of the ancient philosophers. Leibnitz gives an example in the case of Aristotle, Epistles, vol. 11. p. 116.

II. The steps by which Democritus was brought to this opinion are not difficult to discover. It appeared to him bold and rash to repudiate and reject all the relations which have been given with so universal a consent of all nations respecting visions and spectres; nor could he easily persuade himself that the opinion he perceived existing among all mankind originated out of nothing. He therefore thought it devolved upon him to find out a tenet that might so explain both these facts as at the same time to afford no support or confirmation to religion, and to do no injury to the fundamental principles of his own philosophy. But how this opinion agreed with the fundamental principles of his doctrine is not easy to understand, since only a few fragments of his works remain to us. The ancients all agree that the primary principles of his physical philosophy consisted of a vacuum and atoms destitute of all qualities; and that the doctrine of Epicurus subsequently was almost exactly the same. I am not unaware that Augustine and some others suppose that he allowed his atoms to possess some qualities. But I can hardly persuade myself that this is correct, and I prefer to trust to so many ancient authorities who had read the volumes of Democritus, rather than to

them to have their certain subtle ethereal or aërial bodies. In which respect St. Austin in his 115th epistle,[4] calleth angels, æthereos, and devils, aëreos animantes. Thus Psellus, in his

Augustine, whom I shall presently have occasion to show was not over accurate in the explanation of Democritus' philosophy, and blindly followed Cicero. The question therefore is, how the reception of the abovementioned tenets and opinions can be rendered consistent with a fundamental belief of the origination of all things from the fortuitous concourse of atoms. I will therefore try whether in any way it can be shown that, without injury to his atomic theory, Democritus might defend this tenet. And if in this I should err, it will not be easy to convict me of the error, since the numerous monuments of Democritus' genius which once existed have perished by the lapse of time.

In the first place, then, it is nothing extraordinary or incredible that any who circumscribes all nature within the empire of atoms should at the same time maintain that there are certain atomic concretions more subtle than those which are called men and animals, and that these aggregations might bear the human form and figure. For what reason is there to deny that there are atoms much lighter and subtler than those of which we ourselves are composed? And if the heavier and grosser have so coalesced as to form men and animals, why should not the more ethereal have had the same good fortune? Nor is it inconsistent with the atomic hypothesis to endow these more subtle and ethereal concretions with life, reason, and language. For if the heavier and grosser atoms chanced to fall together so fortunately as to produce reason, mind, will, sense, and speech in men and in animals, I see no reason why the same may not be supposed true of the lighter and subtler ones. I will go further, and assert that it is not inconsistent with the philosophy of Democritus to attribute divination and a foreknowledge of future events to his ghosts and apparitions. For without doubt the lighter and subtler atoms might generate senses much more accurate and acute than our own; and if this be the case, these beings might of course see much that was hidden from every human eye, nor is there any reason why they should not inspect the very vessels of our bodies, and perceive the interior motions of the blood and animal fluids. It would not therefore be wonderful if these beings could predict events that were to take place long after. Suppose that any being had so acute a vision as to be able to perceive the interior state of the body of Alexander the Great, and the internal motions of his blood, then certainly, according to the philosophy of Democritus, it could understand his thoughts respecting the Persian war from the motions of the atoms. It might therefore prophetically predict, if it chose, that Alexander would attack Darius; and in the same way it could at its pleasure signify an impending doom to culprits and malefactors, loss of royal favour to courtiers, disease and death to individuals. For the internal motions

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[4] Epist. 9. ad Nebridium, p. 9. tom. 2. opp. edit. Benedict. Augustine's words are to the following effect: "Whence it may be conjectured that our thoughts, though not apparent to ourselves on our own bodies, may yet be visible to *aerial* or *ethereal beings*, whose senses are more acute, and in comparison with which our own are scarcely to be esteemed senses." In these words Dr. Cudworth supposes the "aerial beings" to mean good angels, but the "ethereal," demons or bad angels; and that these names were thus assigned to each by Augustine because they had bodies composed of air and of ether. But I think this interpretation seems more ingenious than correct, and should rather suppose (1) that the "aerial and ethereal beings" signify only one kind of creatures, namely malignant genii or demons; and (2) that these were so called by Augustine not from the material of their bodies, but from their habitation and dwelling-place. For almost all the ancient fathers, on the authority of St. Paul, held that demons lived in the air. This interpretation of the passage is corroborated by another of the same author, analogous in every respect to this, adv. Academicos, cap. 7. sect. 20. p. 194 of the first vol. of his works: "And therefore, since such things occur to our memories, it is no wonder that they can be perceived by certain abominable *creatures of the air*, who are called demons, by whom I grant we may be surpassed in acuteness and subtlety, but not in reason." I shall perhaps have occasion presently to make some remarks respecting the bodies which were supposed by the ancients to be possessed by spirits, both good and bad.

Dialogue:* Περὶ Ἐνεργείας Δαιμόνων· Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀσώματον, ὦ γενναῖε, τὸ δαιμόνιόν ἐστι φῦλον, μετὰ σώματος δέ γε καὶ ἀμφὶ σώματος διατέτρυφε· Καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι μὲν καὶ παρ' αὐτῶν μαθεῖν

of bodies being known, it could easily know and foresee the effects of those motions. In like manner such beings as these, on perceiving the agitations of the air and the various concursions of atoms in it, could easily, if they so pleased, foretell tempests, lightning, thunder, and storms, to sailors or to husbandmen. To this it may be added that the other senses of these genii, hearing, touch, smell, and taste, must necessarily be more perfect and excellent than our own, and it will therefore be less a matter of astonishment if we find Democritus attributing to them a power of divination. Nor will it be more difficult to explain, upon the atomic hypothesis, how it is that these beings should be more longæval than others, though they could not pretend to immortality. For the more ethereal and subtle atoms are, the more closely do they cohere, so that a long time is requisite before such beings as these can be dissolved and dissipated. Perhaps Democritus also gave some reasons, drawn from the shape of the atoms, and of which we are at present ignorant, why his apparitions lived much longer than men or animals. Nor is it again difficult to reconcile the different beneficent and malevolent dispositions assigned to these apparitions and spectres with the philosophy of Democritus. For if individual atoms, of which, according to the theory of this philosopher, all mankind are exclusively composed, could go so far as to form men of wonderful diversities of genius, manners, nature, and propensities, some good and others bad, why should not the lighter and more subtle atoms be supposed to follow a similar course? It will not, I presume, be inquired why Democritus assigned the air to these beings for a habitation. The very necessity of the case required it. It only remains therefore to speak of the lofty stature and gigantic size of the apparitions; and in this there is nothing repugnant to the doctrine of Democritus. For there is no reason why atoms that can produce a pygmy should not also generate a giant if accident and fortune should so order it. But it would be difficult to prove out of his philosophy that he supposed all these spectres to be large and gigantic, and not some to be of a taller and some of a more diminutive stature. I therefore suspect that Democritus, who does not appear to have entirely rejected the popular opinions, here followed the ordinary belief; for it was an ancient opinion, both among the Greeks and Romans, that gods, genii, and heroes usually appeared of a much taller and larger stature than mankind.

III. But until lately this tenet of Democritus has neither been correctly understood nor accurately distinguished from his other doctrines. Before I explain this, I will in the first instance point out the first cause and origin of the error. In the philosophy of Democritus there are two kinds of apparitions, or more properly speaking he called two very different things by the common name of εἴδωλα. In the first place, he called by this term those beings or spectres of which we have already treated; and secondly, he used the same designation for the spectra which he supposed to be given off from all things and to reach our eyes. Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 9. segm. 44. p. 573. says: Ὁρᾶν δ' ἡμᾶς κατ' εἰδώλων ἐμπτώσεις, "That Democritus taught that we see by means of spectra falling upon us." Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, lib. 2. ep. 4. p. 1012. vol. 7. of his works, observes: "For if we see κατ' εἰδώλων ἐμπτώσεις, the εἴδωλα will be in great straits." In which passage he evidently alludes to this tenet of Democritus. Another passage of his is still more to the purpose. Epist. ad Familiar. lib. 15. ep. 16. p. 864. vol. 6. of his works, he says that the opinion of Epicurus was the same as that of Democritus, and observes that these εἴδωλα were in Latin called *spectra*. "For let it not escape you that Catius Insuber, the Epicurean, who died lately, calls by the name of *spectra* what Gargettius, even before Democritus, had called εἴδωλα." For Democritus, in explaining the nature of vision, affirmed that from the surface of bodies were always flowing off images of the bodies themselves, and that these reached our eyes, and produced the sense of vision. See Cicero, De Nat. Deor. lib. 1. cap. 38. p. 2940. The same opinion was afterwards entertained by Epicurus, whose meaning has been explained, among others, by Lucretius, De Naturâ Rerum, lib. 4. line 238. &c. p. 40. &c. These images or representations, called *exuviæ* by others, continually flowing off from the

* Page 29. [Vet. p. 44. 45. edit. Gaulmini.]

τῶν σεμνῶν πατέρων· καὶ Βασίλειος δὲ ὁ Θεῖος, οὐ δαίμοσι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἀχράντοις ἀγγέλοις ἐνεῖναι σώματα διατείνεται, οἷά τινα πνεύματα λεπτὰ καὶ ἀερώδη καὶ ἄχραντα, καὶ ἑξῆς, "But you

surfaces of bodies to our eyes, he also called εἴδωλα. There are therefore these two kind of *spectra*, which will be seen at once to be entirely distinct, and to have nothing in common. But unless I am much mistaken, both ancients and moderns who have expounded Democritus' doctrines, misled by the identity of the name, have confounded these two different sorts together, and what Democritus said of one they have inadvertently understood of the other. This error was committed in particular by Cicero himself, who, as I have already observed, did not explain with sufficient accuracy the tenets of Democritus respecting the gods. "What of Democritus," says he, "who reckons both images and their circuits, and also the being that gives off these images, among the number of the gods?" De Naturâ Deorum, lib. 1. cap. 12. p. 2896. The "images" spoken of in this passage by Cicero are the εἴδωλα, which were called by the Roman Epicureans *exuviæ* and *simulacra*. This is evident not only from the circumstance that he speaks of a certain being or body which gives off these images, which will not at all agree with the other kind of Democritus' εἴδωλα, but also because he attributes "circuits" to them. For these "circuits" are no doubt the very same as Democritus in Greek called ἐμπτώσεις. But it is altogether incorrect to say that Democritus reckoned those *exuviæ* of bodies which he supposed to meet our eyes, among the number of the gods; which if he had done, not even among his own stupid citizens of Abdera could he have retained the least standing. For what could be more egregiously foolish than to say that the spectra given off from the body of a horse or an ass were gods? But the first kind of εἴδωλα, of which we have more copiously treated above, were considered by Democritus to be the same as what men called "gods." Whence it is evident that Cicero incautiously and irrationally transferred what had been said by this philosopher of one sort of spectra to the other. Augustine has fallen into this mistake even more grossly than Cicero; and (as his words here quoted will show) followed Cicero as his chief guide in explaining the philosophy of Democritus. For, in his 118th Epistle to Dioscorus, sect. 27. p. 257. vol. 2 of his works, he says: "For how much better would it have been that I should not have even heard the name of Democritus, than that I should reflect with sorrow on one who was strangely esteemed a great man in his own day, who thought that the images given off from solid bodies were gods, but that the solids themselves were not so; and that the former by circulating to and fro with their own peculiar motion, and gliding into the minds of men, cause the belief of there being a divine power; while at the same time the body from which the image proceeds, as it is more solid, so it is more worthy of being esteemed excellent." Augustine's method of exposing the madness and folly of Democritus would have been weighty and important, if indeed he had been correct in his ideas of the philosopher's opinions. For even schoolboys can understand that a man must be crazy to deny that an ass is a god, and then to allow that the shadow of an ass is worthy the title of a deity. For why should not the ass itself with much greater propriety be held a god, if the image or spectrum flowing from its body, and striking on our eyes, ought to be considered divine? But I am certain that nothing of this kind ever entered the imagination of Democritus. He did not suppose the images flowing from solid bodies to be gods, but spectra, or beings of quite a different kind, more dignified and excellent, longer-lived, and endowed, among other properties, with the faculty of divination. Previously to Augustine Irenæus seems to confound together these two different kinds of the spectra of Democritus; at least he very confusedly explains this tenet of the philosopher, Adv. Hæreses, cap. 14. p. 133. ed. Masset. "Democritus," says he, "first says that many and various figures, expressed from the universe, have descended into this world." Irenæus is here controverting the Valentinians, who drivelled about some undefined resemblances of celestial things, and maintains that they derived this opinion from Democritus and Plato. Which kind of Democritus' spectra he had in mind when he wrote this passage is not immediately apparent from his words; but whichever way we take it, there will still be a difficulty in accommodating the expressions to either, which is a proof that the good father was not sufficiently acquainted with Democritus' philosophy, and confounded together in his thoughts things entirely distinct. If it be supposed that the "figures" here spoken of are the εἴδωλα which Democritus supposed to inhabit the air, and sometimes to

are to know, that demons or devils are not altogether incorporeal, but that they are joined to bodies, and so converse with bodies; which may be learned also from the fathers, the divine Basil contending that there are bodies, not only in devils, but also in the pure angels themselves, as certain subtle, airy, defecate spirits." Where afterwards he shows how the σύμφυὲς ἀγγέλοις σῶμα, that "body which is connate with angels," differs from that which devils are united to, in respect of the radiant splendour of the one, and the dark fuliginous obscurity of the other. Moreover, that devils are not without bodies, he endeavours further to confirm from the words of our Saviour, that

predict future events to mankind, it is certainly a mistake to associate these with the "*species*," or "*ideas*" of Plato; since there is a wide difference between these εἴδωλα and Plato's "ideas." But if the *exuviæ* flowing from corporeal surfaces to our eyes be intended, I know not how it can be said that these "figures, expressed from the universe, have descended into the world;" an expression which can in no sense be understood of those representations by whose ἐμπτώσεις, or "circuits," Democritus supposed the sense of vision was occasioned. If such errors as these were made by the ancients, who lived nearer to the philosopher's own times, and while his works were still extant, it is no wonder that the moderns have erred in the same way. The learned Fabricius, in p. 553 of his notes on the passage of Sextus Empiricus quoted by Dr. Cudworth, influenced, as would appear, by the authority of Cicero, compares the εἴδωλα of Democritus with the forms supposed by Epicurus to flow to us from the gods. With all deference to this great man, who I am well aware was thoroughly versed in ancient philosophy, I think this is hardly correct. There are, I admit, in the philosophy of Epicurus such forms as are found in the doctrine of Democritus; and this I have already observed: but those εἴδωλα of Democritus mentioned by Sextus are widely different from the forms supposed by Epicurus to reach us from the gods and other objects. A still greater error has been committed by Bayle, Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, vol. 2. art. Democritus, note P. p. 984; where he explains the opinion of Democritus respecting the gods as if he not only supposed the representations, but even the notions of things, which we have in our minds, to be gods. "He allowed," he there says, "the name of god to the images and ideas of objects, and to the act of understanding by which we become acquainted with them." In which there are two errors: first that Democritus supposed the images of things to be gods, and, secondly, that he thought the same honour due to the notions of our minds. Both these suppositions are evidently wide of the philosopher's meaning. But Bayle goes still further than this, and proceeds to observe that the opinion of Malebranche, who taught that all things were seen *in* the Deity, was identical with the doctrine of Democritus, and only a further development of it. "I know not," says he, "whether any one has observed, that the opinion of one of the subtlest geniuses of the age, viz. that we see all things in the Infinite Being, in God, is only a development and revival of Democritus' doctrine." But this is mere dreaming. For, as will be evident from what has already been observed, there is greater affinity between the wolf and the lamb than between Democritus and Malebranche. But, not content with this, Bayle pertinaciously contends that the opinion which he supposed Democritus entertained could not have proceeded but from a most perspicacious and finished genius. "I venture to say," he writes, "that this error will never be the product of a small mind, and only great geniuses are capable of producing it." And the comparison he makes is thought a good one by D'Argens, Nouvelle Bibliothèque, vol. 7. p. 191. Yet though I bow to the superior sagacity and acuteness of Bayle, I will freely confess that if any one should bid me believe that the shadows and forms of a horse, a cock, or an ass, and even the notions of my own mind, were gods, I should imitate the example of the Abderites, who sent their citizen Democritus to be cured and purged of his madness by Hippocrates. The greatest blunder of all has been made by Feuardentius, who in his notes on Irenæus, p. 141. ed. Grab. confounds the images of Democritus mentioned by Irenæus, with his indivisible corpuscules or atoms. But it would be tedious any longer to battle with the spectra of Democritus.

they shall be punished with fire; which (saith he) were a thing impossible, were they all of them incorporeal. And some perhaps will attempt to prove the same concerning angels too, from those other words of our Saviour, where, speaking of the resurrection state, he affirmeth that they who shall be accounted worthy thereof, shall neither marry, nor be given in marriage, but be ἰσάγγελοι,[5] "equal to the angels:" which comparative expression of men, as to their bodies with angels, would be thought not so proper were the angels absolutely devoid of all body.[6] But of this we determine not.

To this phenomena of apparitions might be added those two others of magicians or wizards, demoniacs or Energumeni; both of these proving also the real existence of spirits, and that they are not mere fancies, and imaginary inhabitants of men's brains only, but real inhabitants of the world. As also, that among those spirits there are some foul, unclean, and wicked ones (though not made such by God, but by their own apostacy), which is some confirmation of the truth of Christianity, the scriptures insisting so much upon these evil demons or devils, and declaring it to be one design of our Saviour Christ's coming into the world, to oppose these confederate powers of the kingdom of darkness, and to rescue mankind from the thraldom and bondage therefore. As for wizards and magicians, persons who associate and confederate themselves in a peculiar manner with

[5] Luke xx. 34. 36.

[6] Dr. Cudworth here did not hazard a mere conjecture. For since his day John Christian Loerse, a learned divine of Duisburg, who thought fit lately to revive the ancient opinion respecting the bodies of genii, and defended it with a great deal of ability, placed one chief foundation of his argument on this comparison instituted by our Saviour between spiritual beings and mankind after the resurrection. See his "Dissertation on the Bodies of Angels," Duisburg, 1719. 4to. sect. 16. p. 33. &c. But I do not think this comparison of sufficient weight to prove all that some authors think it capable of proving. The laws of sound intrepretation forbid that any comparison should be pushed beyond the limits which the author intended to assign to it, or beyond its "common third," as it is often termed. Before we attempt therefore to prove any thing from this expression of our Saviour's, we ought to endeavour to find out the precise point he had chiefly in view when he compared celestial intelligences with risen men. But this he has plainly expressed in Luke xx. 36, while in the other passages, Matt. xxii. 23, and Mark xii. 18, in which the same comparison is found, his language is concise, and therefore not so plain and perspicuous. In the gospel of Luke, after Jesus Christ has said that there would be no marriages among the inhabitants of heaven, he adds the reason why such unions would not be necessary: Οὔτε γὰρ ἀποθανεῖν ἔτι δύνανται, "Neither can they die any more." For where death reigns, there marriages are requisite to prevent the entire extinction and extirpation of the human race. But from heaven, the habitation of the blessed, death will be for ever excluded, and therefore that holy community will require no marriages for its preservation. He then proceeds to assign a fresh reason why they should not die: Ἰσάγγελοι γάρ εἰσι, "For they are equal to the angels," equally immortal and perpetual with the angels. From this it is plain that the immortality of the angels was their only attribute that the Saviour had in view in making this comparison. We ought not therefore to overstep these limits, and to compare angels and saved men together in other respects, about which Christ himself has maintained silence.

these evil spirits, for the gratification of their own revenge, lust, ambition, and other passions, besides the scriptures, there hath been so full an attestation given to them by persons unconcerned in all ages, that those our so confident exploders of them, in this present age, can hardly escape the suspicion of having some hankering towards atheism. But as for the demoniacs and Energumeni, it hath been wondered, that there should be so many of them in our Saviour's time, and hardly any, or none, in this present age of ours. Certain it is, from the writings of Josephus, in sundry places, that the Pharisaic Jews were then generally possessed with an opinion of these δαιμονιζόμενοι, demoniacs, men possessed with devils, or infested by them. And that this was not a mere phrase or form of speech only amongst them for persons very ill affected in their bodies, may appear from hence, that Josephus[7] declares it as his opinion

[7] De Bello Judaico, lib. 7. cap. 6. sect. 3. p. 417. tom. 2. edit. Havercampii. Josephus there treats copiously of the virtues of the root Baaras, betraying no small degree of superstition, and among other things says it was good for driving away demons: Τὰ γὰρ καλούμενα δαιμόνια, ταῦτα δὲ πονηρῶν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπων πνεύματα, ταῖς ζῶσιν εἰσδυόμενα καὶ κτείνοντα τοὺς βοηθείας μὴ τυγχάνοντας, αὕτη ταχέως ἐξελαύνει, κἂν προσενέχθῃ μόνον τοῖς νοσοῦσι, "For what are called demons are the spirits of wicked men, and enter into living persons, and kill those who do not obtain help; these it quickly drives away if it only be brought near to those thus afflicted." I think it worth while to make a few observations in illustration of these words.

I. I know not how it can be proved that the opinion contained in these words was that of all the Pharisaical Jews. Josephus held many peculiar sentiments, which were approved of perhaps by none of his nation. Besides it is very evident the Pharisees held a variety of tenets among themselves.

II. But neither does it appear to me probable that we have here the opinion of Josephus himself. And indeed I almost think that the words ταῦτα δὲ πονηρῶν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπων πνεύματα are not Josephus's own, but were at first written by some one in the margin, and afterwards interpolated by some unskilful copyist into the text. The sentence will certainly read quite as well without them. Josephus, as is well known, was of the sect of the Pharisees; and in other places he gives an account of the state of the soul after death, according to the Pharisaical doctrine, quite inconsistent with what he here says about demons. In this passage he says that demons are the souls of wicked men, transferred into other bodies, but elsewhere he writes that, according to the Pharisees, transmigration was a privilege granted only to the souls of the good. As in his Antiquities of the Jews, lib. 18. cap. 1. sect. 3. p. 871: Ἀθανάτου τε ἰσχὺν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πίστις Φαρισαίοις εἶναι καὶ ὑπὸ χθονὸς δικαιώσεις τε καὶ τιμάς, οἷς ἀρετῆς ἢ κακίας ἐπιτήδευσις ἐν τῷ βίῳ γέγονε· καὶ τῶν μὲν εἱργμὸν ἀΐδιον προστίθεσθαι, τῶν δὲ ῥᾳστώνην τοῦ ἀναβιοῦν, "The Pharisees also believe in the immortality of souls, and that they are rewarded or punished under the earth, according as they have addicted themselves to virtue or vice in the present life; and that some are shut up in an eternal prison, while others have an opportunity of living again;" that is, as appears from another passage, of transmigration into other bodies; for in his Wars of the Jews, lib. 2. cap. 8. sect. 14. p. 166, he says: Ψυχὴν δὲ πᾶσαν μὲν ἀφθαρτον, μεταβαίνειν δὲ εἰς ἕτερον σῶμα τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν μόνην, τῇ δὲ τῶν φαύλων ἀϊδίῳ τιμωρίᾳ κολάζεσθαι, that the Pharisees believed "that all souls are immortal, but that only the souls of the good pass into other bodies, while those of the wicked are afflicted with everlasting punishment." If then the souls of the wicked had no opportunity of returning to the present state of existence, how could the demons who possessed the bodies of mankind possibly be the souls of wicked men? If therefore Josephus entertained such an opinion as is expressed in the words in question, that demons were the souls of wicked men, he differed widely from the Pharisees and other Jews of his own day.

concerning the demons or devils, that they were πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων πνεύματα τοῖς ζῶσιν εἰσδυόμενα, "the spirits or souls of wicked men deceased getting into the bodies of the living." From hence it was that the Jews, in our Saviour's time, were not at all surprised with his casting out devils, it being usual for them also to exorcise the same; an art which they pretended to have learned from Solomon. Of whom thus Josephus:* Παρέσχε δ' αὐτῷ μαθεῖν ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ τὴν κατὰ τῶν δαιμόνων τέχνην εἰς ὠφέλειαν καὶ θεραπείαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἐπῳδάς τε συντάξαμενος, αἷς παρηγορεῖται τὰ νοσήματα, καὶ τρόπους ἐξορκώσεων κατέλειπεν, οἷς ἐνδούμενα τὰ δαιμόνια ὡς μηκέτ' ἐπανελθεῖν, ἐκδιώκουσι. Καὶ αὕτη μέχρι νῦν ἡ θεραπεία πλεῖστον ἰσχύει, "God also taught Solomon an art against demons and devils, for the benefit and cure of men; who composed certain incantations, by which diseases are cured, and left forms of exorcisms, whereby devils are expelled and driven away. Which method of curing prevails much amongst us at this very day." Notwithstanding which, we think it not at all probable what a late atheistic writer[s] hath asserted, that the heads of the Jews were then all of them so full of demons and devils, that they generally took all manner of bodily diseases, such as fevers and agues, and dumbness and deafness, for devils. Though we grant that this very thing was imputed by Plotinus afterward to the Gnostics, that they supposed all diseases to be devils, and therefore not to be cured by physic, but expelled by

III. And this is more apparent from the writings of the New Testament, in which the opinions of the Jews and Pharisees about demons are often mentioned. There can be no doubt that the Pharisees with whom our Saviour disputed had a very different opinion about demons, and firmly believed that they constituted a peculiar community under the government of a chief. Among other charges, they accuse our Saviour of expelling malignant spirits from human bodies by the power of the chief of the devils. Jesus answers them that this was an absurd accusation, for that it was most improbable that evil spirits would oppose and war against themselves; while at the same time, he does not deny that the chief of the demons possessed considerable power, which, however, he was to terminate by his advent. See Matt. xii. 25, &c. Every impartial person will at once see that our Saviour could not argue in this way against the Pharisees, if they had believed the demons by whom men were possessed to be the spirits of wicked men. But Antony Van Dalen, De Divinationibus Idololatricis sub Vet. Testam. cap. 5. p. 518. bitterly inveighs against Josephus on account of this opinion, and suspects that he spoke so absurdly about demons in order to bring the miracles of Jesus Christ into contempt. I cannot at all agree with this learned author's conjecture; and if he had taken into consideration what we have already observed, he would perhaps rather have supposed that this opinion is incorrectly attributed to Josephus.

* Ant. Jud. lib. 8. cap. 2. p. 419. 420.

[s] Hobbes. See Levinthan, cap. 40. p. 306. The passage is to the following effect:—"The Jews considered every thing remarkably excellent to be the Spirit of God, and every thing extraordinarily evil to be a demon or devil. They therefore called demoniacs those whom we call madmen, insane persons, lunatics, or epileptics, as well as those who spoke unintelligibly. They also said that an unclean man had in him an unclean spirit, and a dumb man a dumb spirit." This opinion, by the way, has been copiously defended by an anonymous writer, respecting whom see Bibliotheca Britannica, vol. 8. part. 2. p. 313, &c.

words or charms. Thus he, Ennead 2. lib. 9. cap. 14:[9] Νῦν δὲ ὑποστησάμενοι τὰς νόσους δαιμόνια εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα ἐξαιρεῖν λόγῳ φάσκοντες δύνασθαι καὶ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι, σεμνότεροι μὲν ἂν εἶναι δόξαιεν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς, οἳ τὰς παρὰ τοῖς μάγοις δυνάμεις θαυμάζουσι, τοὺς μέντοι εὐφρονοῦντας οὐκ ἂν πείθοιεν, ὡς οὐκ αἱ νόσοι τὰς αἰτίας ἔχουσι, ἢ πλησμοναῖς, ἢ ἐνδείαις, &c. δηλοῦσι δὲ καὶ αἱ θεραπεῖαι αὐτῶν· γαστρὸς γὰρ ῥυείσης ἢ φαρμάκου δοθέντος, διεχώρησε κάτω τὸ νόσημα· καὶ αἵματος ἀφῳρημένου καὶ ἐνδείᾳ δὲ ἰάσατο· ἢ πεινήσαντος τοῦ δαιμονίου καὶ τοῦ φαρμάκου ποιήσαντος τήκεσθαι, "Now, when they affirm diseases to be demons or devils, and pretend that they can expel them by words, undertaking to do the same, they hereby indeed render themselves considerable to the vulgar, who are wont not a little to admire the powers of magicians. But they will not be able to persuade wise men, that diseases have no natural causes, as from repletion, or inanition, or putrefaction, or the like; which is a thing manifest from their cure, they being oftentimes removed by purgation, and bleeding, and abstinence; unless perhaps these men will say, that the devil is by this means starved, and made to pine away." Nor can we think that the Jews, in our Saviour's time, either supposed all madmen to be demoniacs, or all demoniacs madmen (though this latter seems to be asserted by an eminent writer of our own) we reading of devils cast out from others besides madmen; and of a woman which had a spirit "of infirmity only, and was bowed together, and could not lift up herself," which is said by our Saviour Christ to have been "bowed by Satan." Wherefore, the sense of the Jews formerly seems to have been this, that when there was any unusual and extraordinary symptoms in any bodily distemper, but especially that of madness, this being looked upon as something more than natural, was imputed by them to the possession or infestation of some devil. Neither was this proper to the Jews only at that time, to suppose evil demons to be the causes of such bodily diseases as had extraordinary symptoms, and especially madness; but the Greeks, and other Gentiles also, were imbued with the same persuasion; as appeareth from Apollonius Tyanæus' curing a laughing demoniac[10] at Athens, he ejecting that evil spirit by threats and menaces, who is said, at his departure, to have tumbled down a royal porch in the city with great noise; as also,[1] from his

[9] Page 212. opp.

[10] Vide Philostrat. de Vitâ Apollonii Tyanæi, lib. 10. cap. 20. p. 157. But the ejected demon did not, as Dr. Cudworth has it, overturn the whole royal portico, but only destroyed one of the statues that stood round it.

[1] Id. Ibid. lib. 4. cap. 10. p. 147. &c. Both these tales prove Apollonius to have been grossly superstitious, and utterly unworthy of the character of a sage. If the last story be true, I have no doubt that this madman caused a harmless old man to be

freeing the city of Ephesus from the plague, by stoning an old ragged beggar, said by Apollonius to have been the plague, which appeared to be a demon, by his changing himself into the form of a shagged dog.[2]

stoned, for the sake of his own credit among the ignorant vulgar, and after this worthy deed persuaded the mob that he had taken the form of a dog that accidentally passed by. If the other event really happened, the demon that overthrew the statue in the royal portico was no doubt Apollonius himself, who being full of craft and cunning, and anxious to deceive the people, had previously so undermined the figure, that it must necessarily fall at a certain moment, and thus produce in the minds of the vulgar a high opinion of the magic powers of Apollonius. But this is a rude and clumsy trick compared to some of those by which certain professing Christians have endeavoured, by means of feigned miracles, to obtain for themselves a faith which they could not claim for their arguments.

[2] I think it very possible to make a few observations on these subjects, if with less learning and ability, at least with rather more distinctness and perspicuity.

I. It is agreed among learned men that the eastern nations, as the Chaldeans, Egyptians, and others, referred natural causes and phenomena to demons. Nor was the natural philosophy prevalent among these nations any thing else, properly speaking, than a doctrine about demons, their various kinds, properties, powers, and offices. For of every event, some demon was supposed to be the author. An endless number of demons were by them supposed to be set over herbs, trees, animals, the human body and its several parts, and what not besides. The Egyptians, according to Celsus, in Origen, lib. 8. adv. Celsum, p. 416. assigned the human body and its various members to the care of no fewer than thirty-six demons. Hence, these nations had no hesitation in ascribing all the diseases that happened to afflict the human body, entirely to the power of malignant demons. If, for instance, they saw any one afflicted with a fever, they did not think it worth while to inquire particularly into the cause and origin of the disease; for they imagined that a demon concealed in the body of the patient was the original source of all the calamity, whose power could be broken only by hymns and incantations, and barbarous words. And similar opinions were entertained respecting many other, especially internal, complaints.

II. From this foolish notion, which anciently pervaded a great part of the east, originated, I think, the very ancient and gross superstition, which was evidently derived from the Chaldeans to the Jews, and from them to the Christians, that diseases could be cured and expelled by certain names, words, verses, gems, and other similar trifles. Many instances of this are given by Robert Keuchen, in his Observationes ad Serenum Sammonicum, p. 54, &c.; William Spencer, ad Origenem contra Celsum, p. 17; Antony Van Dalen, De Divinationibus Idololatricis sub Vet. Test. cap. 5. p. 508. &c. and others. But they have not pointed out the prime origin of so stupid an error, which therefore I shall briefly explain. Almost all superstitious rites and customs are derived from certain popular opinions; and often after the opinions themselves have become obsolete and extinct, through lapse of time, yet the rites and customs which result from them still remain. Thus it comes to pass that the things themselves are well understood, while the causes that gave rise to them are not equally apparent. There was an opinion amongst ancient nations, especially in the east, that certain names and sounds, for the most part of a horrid and barbarous description, were very grateful and acceptable to demons, while others were equally unpleasant and hateful. This opinion is attested by all the ancient authors who touch upon magic and the art of conciliating or expelling demons; Origen, Jamblichus, Synesius, Psellus, and others, the passages from whom, for brevity's sake, I omit. Nor is it worth while to inquire into the causes of this belief, lest we should wander too far from the subject in hand. This persuasion, however, could not but produce a belief that demons could be pleased and attracted by the pronunciation of certain names and words, and could be put to flight, expelled, and affrighted by certain others. Hence arose exorcisms, incantations, excantations, magic verses, and similar follies. For those who desired the favour and help of the demons composed their verses of words supposed to be pleasing to that kind of beings; while those who wished to drive them away from themselves or others, made use against them of words which they had been taught to believe were terrible to them. Those therefore who were persuaded that diseases could be cured by divine names, and obsolete and

But that there is some truth in this opinion, and that at this very day evil spirits, or demons, do sometimes really act upon the bodies of men, and either inflict or augment bodily distempers

barbarous words, or who ordered such names, engraven on gems, or written on paper, to be tied about the necks of invalids, did so, I think, on account of the opinion that some demon was the cause of the disease, to whom such a name was so hateful that upon hearing or seeing it he would immediately depart. Serenus Sammonicus, whose "medical precepts" we have extant in hexameter verse, thought that the word "Abracadabra," written on paper, was a specific for the double-tertian ague, while Marcellinus thought nothing was better than the word Καριάγκων for allaying pain in the heart. Another instance may be seen in Cato, De Re Rusticâ, cap. 160. p. 121. I have no doubt that the first inventors of these excellent cures were of opinion that some demon was the cause of the ague and the heartburn, and that Abracadabra and Καριάγκων were names and sounds which he could not endure to see or hear. But perhaps the physicians themselves who prescribed these remedies were ignorant of this first origin of them; since in their times the absurd philosophy of the Chaldeans had less authority than previously. Superstitious persons are indeed mad and senseless; but still their madness is such as always to have causes for it, however vain and futile they may be. From the same source originated, I think, the profane custom, some vestiges of which are still to be found among Christians, of having fastened to the necks or beds of the sick, words taken from the Scriptures, the beginning of John's gospel, and little gospels, as amulets to expel the disease; a practice universally condemned by the ancient fathers. For they thought that the demons who tormented mankind would immediately take to flight on a sight of these sacred words. A superstition of this kind is still to be found amongst the Jews, a nation which is well known to have retained from the ancient barbaric philosophy several ridiculous and noxious tenets.

III. It is well known that Pythagoras transferred many parts of the ancient oriental philosophy into his own doctrine. Therefore he and his followers adopted the opinion that many, if not all diseases, were occasioned by indwelling demons. This is not only evident from what is here said by Dr. Cudworth out of Philostratus about Apollonius Tyanæus, who mimicked Pythagoras, and adopted all his tenets; but also from what is said by his biographers, that many diseases were cured by the incantations of himself and his disciples. For there can be no doubt that diseases curable by magic verses must have been caused by demons. Jamblichus, in his Life of Pythagoras, sect. 164. p. 129. says of the Pythagoreans: Χρῆσθαι δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἐπῳδαῖς πρὸς ἔνια τῶν ἀῤῥωστημάτων, "That some also cured diseases by incantations." This he repeats again, sect. 243. p. 195. Porphyry, who also wrote a Life of Pythagoras, still extant, gives a similar account, sect. 30. p. 35: Κατεκήλει δὲ ῥυθμοῖς καὶ μέλεσι καὶ ἐπῳδαῖς τὰ ψυχικὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ σώματα, "He soothed the sufferings of the mind and body by songs, melodies, and incantations." And a little further on he says that this method of cure was chiefly used by Pythagoras for diseases of the mind: Καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς δὲ νοσοῦντας παρεμυθεῖτο, τοὺς μὲν ἐπῳδαῖς καὶ μαγείαις, τοὺς δὲ μουσικῇ, "He soothed those who were mentally diseased, some with incantations and magic songs, and some with music." Whence it appears that not only bodily diseases, but also mental perturbations, as melancholy madness, lust, &c. were considered by him to proceed from demons. The distinct mention of music among the remedies of Pythagoras also in some degree corroborates this view of the matter. For it is well known that the ancients attributed great power to music in putting demons to flight. Very similar things are also related of Empedocles, a well-known leader among the Pythagoreans. Of him it is said by Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromata, lib. 6. p. 754: Παρακολουθεῖν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔλεγον τοὺς μὲν μαντοσυνῶν κεχρημένους, τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ νοῦσον σίδηρον δὴ χαλεποῖσι πεπαρμένους. "And they said that some followed him who needed divinations, and others who had been long afflicted with severe diseases." And that Empedocles was supposed to have power over demons is more copiously related by Clemens in the same place. The more recent Platonists, being very favourably disposed towards Pythagoras, argued more subtly than he did respecting the powers and various sorts of demons; so that, as may be easily collected from Jamblichus and others, they also inclined to favour this opinion of his. So that I wonder the more that Plotinus so severely reprehended this opinion in the Gnostics,

and diseases, hath been the judgment of two very experienced physicians, Sennertus and Fernelius. The former in his book De Maniâ, lib. 1. cap. 15. writing thus: Etsi sine ullâ corporis

when at the same time his own disciple Porphyry was not far from holding it, as is evident from his book On Abstinence.

IV. There is, however, no reason to wonder that the Gnostics were addicted to this superstition, and had many tenets about the incantations of demons, amulets, and other similar things. For the whole of this sect, though cut up into several subdivisions, followed the Oriental philosophy, that is the dreams of the Chaldeans, Babylonians, and Egyptians; and their only care was to establish some kind of consistency between this philosophy and the Christian religion. On which account the Extracts of Theodotus, appended to Clemens Alexandrinus, and which are plainly of this description, are entitled "Extracts from the Oriental Philosophy." I will illustrate this by a remarkable passage from the author of the book called the Clementine, a work apparently of the third century. For though he did not approve of the Gnostic doctrine, but formed for himself a singular and unique system of religion, he yet drew from the same impure sources as the Gnostics themselves, namely, the absurd fictions of the Egyptians and Orientals respecting demons and other matters, which it is very evident from the whole of the volume he united with the sacred tenets of Christianity. In homily 9. sect. 12. p. 689. he thus remarks: *Ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν τῶν ταῖς ψυχαῖς αὐτῶν ἐνδομυχούντων δαιμόνων ἐπιζίεται αὐτοῖς ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, ὡς οὐ δαίμονος ἐνοχλοῦντος, ἀλλὰ σωματικῆς νόσου· οἷον ἡ ἔλης ὡμεῖας, ἢ χολῆς, ἢ φλέγματος, ἢ αἵματος ἀμετρίας, ἢ μήτραγγος φλεγμονῆς, ἢ ἄλλου τινος· εἰ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἦν, οὐδὲ αὐτὸ ἀπήλλακται δαίμονος εἶδος εἶναι.* "Therefore it is given them to understand by the demons latent in their minds, that they are not troubled by a demon, but by a bodily disease; as for example by some acrid matter, or bile, or mucus, or an overflow of blood, or inflammation of the brain, or something similar. But even if this were the case, it would not the less on that account be a kind of demon." If Christians then believed this, they would have utterly renounced medical advice, and have sought aid and cure from God alone, the supreme Ruler of demons, for all kinds of diseases.

V. Nor did this opinion remain solely among corrupt heretics, but found several followers and friends among the doctors of the purer part of the church. A few instances will suffice. Tertullian, in his Apology, cap. 22. p. 217. writes thus: "The object of demons is the overthrow of mankind . . . . . Therefore they also inflict corporeal diseases and severe accidents, as well as sudden and extraordinary passions of the mind." And Lactantius, Institut. Divin. lib. 2. cap. 15. p. 253: "Demons, since they are subtle and intangible spirits, insinuate themselves into human bodies, and working secretly in the intestines, spoil the health, excite diseases, terrify the mind with dreams, and bring on madness." The ancient fathers used to avail themselves of this method of accounting for diseases, in order to meet the argument derived by the Pagans from the cure of maladies by the aid of the gods, which was then supposed to be of some force against the Christians. For they granted the correctness of the heathen's premises on this subject, that many had been and then were apparently cured by the gods; but they added that cunning and crafty demons usually excited these diseases, and afterwards, upon vows being made by the sick in the temples of the gods, spontaneously departed; in order that the gods might be believed to be the authors of the cures, and that the nations might be confirmed in their superstitious feelings towards them. Thus Tertullian, in his Apology, cap. 22. p. 222: "They are plainly poisoners even in their cures: for they first of all injure, and then order certain miraculously new or contrary remedies; after which they withdraw their injurious influence, and are believed to have effected a cure." And Minucius Felix, Octavius, cap. 27. p. 275: "Demons draw downwards from heaven, and call off from the true God to matter, disturb the life, disquiet the sleep, and secretly creeping, as subtle spirits, into bodies, *bring on diseases*, terrify the mind, distort the limbs, in order to compel persons to worship them, ... and afterwards relaxing what they have bound, seem to have effected a cure." A similar passage occurs in Cyprian, De Idolorum Vanitate, p. 226 of his Works, ed. Baluz. Tatian, in his Oration against the Greeks, sect. 30. p. 69. says: *Ὁ θαυμασιώτατος Ἰουστῖνος ὀρθῶς ἐξεφώνησεν, ἰοικέναι τοὺς προειρημένους λῃσταῖς· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἔθος ἐστὶ ζωγρεῖν τινας, εἶτα τοὺς αὐτοὺς μισθῷ τοῖς οἰκείοις ἀποκαθιστᾷν· οὕτω καὶ οἱ νομιζόμενοι θεοὶ*

morbosâ dispositione, Deo permittente, hominem obsidere et occupare dæmon possit, tamen quandoque morbis, et præcipuè melancholicis, sese immiscet dæmon; et forsan frequentiùs hoc accidit, quàm sæpè creditur, "Although the devil may, by divine permission, possess men without any morbid disposition, yet doth he usually intermingle himself with bodily diseases, and especially those of melancholy; and perhaps this cometh to pass oftener than is commonly believed or suspected." The other in his De abditis Rerum Causis, where having attributed real effects upon the bodies of men to witchcraft and enchantment, he addeth: Neque solùm morbos, verùm etiam dæmonas, scelerati

τοῖς τινων ἐπιφοιτῶντες μίλεσιν, ἔπειτα δι' ὀνείρων τὴν εἰς αὐτοὺς πραγματευόμενοι δόξαν, δημοσίᾳ τε τοὺς τοιούτους προϊέναι κελεύσαντες, πάντων ὁρώντων, ἐπειδὰν τῶν ἐγκοσμείων ἀπολαύσωσιν, ἀποπτάμενοι τῶν καμνόντων, ἣν ἐπραγματεύσαντο νόσον περιγράφοντες, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἰς τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἀποκαθιστῶσιν, "The most admirable Justin has rightly compared the before-mentioned [demons] to robbers. For as it is the custom with them to take some persons alive, and then upon the payment of a ransom to restore them to their friends; so also those who are thought to be gods, insinuating themselves into the members of certain individuals, afterwards, for the sake of their own glory, command them to go forth into public; and when they have obtained mundane things according to their desires, fly away from the sick, and obliterating the disease produced by their own fraud, restore the persons to their former condition." In subsequent ages, when the minds of most Christian teachers were freed from the corruption of the ancient oriental and Platonic philosophy, we do not find by any means so many to believe that diseases were the tokens of demoniacal possession; but perhaps no age was entirely destitute of some who had a tendency to this sentiment. Not all the light which after the revival of letters was thrown upon the study of medicine, could entirely extinguish this opinion. The memory is still fresh in England, of Valentine Greatrix, an Irishman, who in the last century pretended that all kinds of diseases were produced by demons afflicting mankind, and that he possessed the power of expelling them by his words; and his folly has been condensed by Henry Stubbe, a physician of some standing, into a work of his own. See Œuvres Melées de St. Evremont, vol. 2. p. 219. &c. where the history of this man is well narrated.

VI. To come, after all this circuit, to the Jews, I have no doubt that in the time of our Saviour the common people were considerably imbued with the opinion, that if not all, at least acute and extraordinary diseases were the tokens of demons concealed within mankind, and on this account there existed in that nation so many magicians and impostors, who professed to be able by roots, sacred names, and other similar follies, to destroy the power of diseases, that is, of demons. For, not to mention what has been already quoted from Josephus and others, the Jews brought with them, on returning from the Babylonish captivity, all the oriental absurdities about good and bad spirits, which were wonderfully nourished and strengthened by the frequent communication they held with Egypt. But how this being admitted should prove that all the demoniacs whom our Saviour delivered were only afflicted with natural diseases, I confess I do not understand. What kind of logic, pray, would this be? The Jewish nation erroneously supposed that many diseases proceeding from natural causes were occasioned by demons, therefore there were none in those days really possessed by a devil. It would appear to me to be equally rational to syllogize thus: The Stoics vainly and stupidly believed all that differed from them to be foolish; therefore, none of those who opposed the Stoics were foolish. But except this argumentation, I know not what ground there is for concluding that because the Jews assigned an undue power to demons, therefore no power at all was ever possessed by them over the bodies of mankind. Supposing there was such a superstitious notion among the Jews as is maintained by Hobbes, who is here chiefly aimed at by Dr. Cudworth, it might indeed follow from hence that various errors were prevalent in that nation, but never that all that has been recorded respecting demoniacs is fabulous.

homines in corpora immittunt. Hi quidem visuntur furoris quâdam specie distorti; hôc uno tamen à simplici furore distant, quòd summè ardua obloquantur, præterita et occulta renuntient, assidentiumque arcana reserent, " Neither do these wicked magicians only inflict diseases upon men's bodies, but also send devils into them; by means whereof they appear distorted with a kind of fury and madness, which yet differs from a simple madness (or the disease so called) in this, that they speak of very high and difficult matters, declare things past and unknown, and discover the secrets of those that sit by. Of which he subjoins two notable instances of persons, well known to himself, that were plainly demoniacal, possessed, or acted by an evil demon; one whereof shall be afterwards mentioned. But when maniacal persons do not only discover secrets, and declare things past, but future also, and, besides this, speak in languages, which they had never learned; this puts it out of all doubt and question, that they are not mere madmen, or Maniaci, but demoniacs or Energumeni. And that since the time of our Saviour Christ there have been often such, may be made evident by the records of credible writers. Psellus in his book Περὶ Ἐνεργείας Δαιμόνων, De Operat. Dæm. avers it of a certain maniacal woman, that though she knew nothing but her own mother tongue, yet, when a stranger, who was an Armenian, was brought into the room to her, she spake to him presently in the Armenian language: Ἡμεῖς δὲ τεθηπότες ἤμεν, ὅτι κατ' Ἀρμενίων ἐφθέγγετο, γυνὴ μηδέποτε μηδ' εἰς ὄψιν ἀφιγμένη τούτοις, μηδὲ κερκίδος εἰδυῖα πλέον οὐδέν,* " We all stood amazed, when we heard a woman, that had never seen an Armenian before in all her life, nor had learned any thing but the use of her distaff, to speak the Armenian language readily." Where the relater also affirmeth the same maniacal person to have foretold certain future events, which happened shortly after to himself:† Σὺ δὲ, στραφεὶς πρὸς ἐμὲ, μεγάλων ἐν χρῷ συμφορῶν ὑποστήσῃ· χολᾷ γάρ σοι δεινῶς τὰ δαιμόνια παραλύοντι τὰς αὐτῶν λατρείας· ἀμέλει τοι καὶ χαλεποὺς ἐπιῤῥάψουσι καὶ βαρεῖς κινδύνους, οὓς οὐκ ἂν διαφεύξασθαι δυνηθείης, εἰ μή τις δύναμις κρείττων, ἢ κατὰ δαίμονας, ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐξέλῃ, " Then looking upon me, she (or rather the demon) said, Thou shalt suffer wonderful pains and torments in thy body, for the demons are extremely angry with thee, for opposing their services and worship; and they will inflict great evils upon thee, out of which thou shalt not be able to escape, unless a power, greater than that of demons, exempt thee from them. All which things (saith he) happened shortly after to me, and I was brought very low, even near to death by them; but was by my Saviour wonderfully delivered." Whereupon Psellus concludes: Τίς

* Page 69. [Page 105.] † Page 65. [Page 99.]

οὖν ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρησμὸν ἑωρακὼς, ἐρεῖ τὰς μανίας πάσας, ὕλης πλημμελοῦς κινήσεις, ἀλλὰ πάθη τραγικὰ δαιμόνων, "Who is there therefore, that considering this oracle or prediction, will conclude (as some physicians do) all kind of madnesses to be nothing but the exorbitant motions of the matter or humours, and not the tragic passions of the demons." But because this instance is remoter from our present times, we shall set down another remarkable one of a later date, out of the forementioned Fernelius, who was an eye-witness thereof. A young man of a noble family, who was strangely convulsed in his body, having sometimes one member, and sometimes another, violently agitated, insomuch that four several persons were scarcely able to hold them; and this at first without any distemper at all in his head, or crazedness in brain. To whom Fernelius, with other skilful physicians, being called, applied all manner of remedies; blisters, purgations, cupping-glasses, fomentations, unctions, plasters, and strengthening medicines, but all in vain. The reason whereof is thus given by the same Fernelius: Quoniam omnes longe aberamus à cognitione veri, nam mense tertio primùm deprehensus dæmon quidam totius mali auctor, voce, insuetisque verbis ac sententiis tum Latinis tum Græcis (quanquam ignarus linguæ Græcæ laborans esset), se prodens; is multa assidentium maximaque medicorum secreta detegebat, ridens, quòd irritis pharmacis corpus hoc pænè jugulassent, "Because we were all far from the knowledge of the truth; for in the third month, it was first plainly discovered to us, that it was a certain demon who was the author of all this mischief; he manifesting himself by his speech, and by unusual words and sentences, both in Greek and Latin (though the patient were altogether ignorant of the Greek tongue): and by his revealing many of the secrets of those who stood by him, especially of the physicians, whom also he derided for tormenting the patient in that manner with their frustraneous remedies." Here therefore have we an unquestionable instance of a demoniac in these latter times of ours, and such a one who at first, for two months together, had no manner of madness or mania at all upon him, though afterwards the demon possessing his whole body, used his tongue, and spake therewith. Fernelius concludes his whole discourse in this manner: "These things do I produce, to make it manifest that evil demons (or devils) do sometimes enter into the very bodies of men, afflicting and tormenting them after an unheard-of manner; but that at other times, though they do not enter into, and possess their whole body, yet partly by exagitating and disturbing the profitable humours thereof, partly by traducing the noxious into the principal parts, or else by obstructing the veins and other passages with them, or disordering the structure of the members, they cause innu-

merable diseases. There are many other instances of this kind, recorded by modern writers unexceptionable, of persons either wholly demoniacal, and possessed by evil demons (this appearing from their discovering secrets, and speaking languages which they had never learned) or else otherwise so affected and infested by them, as to have certain unusual and supernatural symptoms; which, for brevity's sake, we shall here omit. However, we thought it necessary thus much to insist upon this argument of demoniacs, as well for the vindication of Christianity, as for the conviction of Atheists; we finding some so staggering in their religion, that from this one thing alone of demoniacs (they being so strongly possessed that there neither is nor ever was any such) they are ready enough to suspect the whole gospel, or New Testament itself, of fabulosity and imposture.[3]

[3] Some great admirers of their own wisdom have lately classed among vulgar errors all the stories of demoniacal possession. The Platonists and those addicted to oriental ideas, both before and after Christ, related wondrous tales of the cunning of demons, and their strong desire of entering into human bodies. Whenever any were addicted to flagrant vices, avaricious, libidinous, revengeful, and vindictive, they were considered to be the prisons and homes of malignant spirits. It is a wonder that these sagacious demon-hunters did not look for them also in animals possessing properties resembling human vices, lions, swine, foxes, and others; for if demons were the authors of human vices, why should they not be believed to be equally so of bestial? The Japanese, indeed, are not far from holding this sentiment; for Kaempfer relates in his History of Japan, that they believe foxes to be possessed by crafty and malignant demons. Nor had they in ancient times a more favourable opinion, as we have already seen, of the sick and deformed. But all were not quite so stupid as to suffer themselves to be persuaded into an approbation of this doctrine. The philosophical emperor, Marcus Antoninus, gratefully acknowledges that he was taught by Diognetus to despise these delusions, and to believe none of the fictions *περὶ ἐπῳδῶν, περὶ γοήτων, καὶ περὶ ἐξορκισμῶν δαιμόνων ἀποπομπῆς*, "about incantations, magicians, and the expulsion of demons," lib. 1. ad Se Ipsum, sect. 6. p. 4. ed. Gataker. Lucian unhesitatingly referred to the senseless delusions of the vulgar all that was said about the art of exorcism; and facetiously observes that he did not at all wonder that the Platonists could see the demons quitting human bodies, when their vision was so acute that they could see the representations or "ideas" of things fly off from surfaces, Philopseudes, tom. 2. p. 337. 338. opp. There can be no doubt at the present day that the ancient fathers transferred many tenets out of Platonism and its cognate systems into Christianity. On which account nearly the same views are found in their works respecting the power of evil spirits over the bodies of mankind, as are to be met with in the writings of the Platonists; nor was there any kind of diseases or vices the blame of which they did not lay upon some demon; a fact that could easily be proved, were it necessary, by innumerable instances and quotations. The "Pastor" of one Hermas, written in the first century, may be consulted on this point, and also Archbishop Potter on Clemens Alexandrinus, p. 174. On due consideration, however, I feel unable to maintain the truth of all that has been written by the Apologists and other ancient Christian writers respecting the power of exorcism, and such multitudes of demons ejected by the words of Christians. Nor can I agree with those who think all the examples given in ancient writings, of persons set free by Christians from the power of demons, are wholly fictitious; an opinion entertained, among others, by Basnage, Antiquités Judaïques, tom. 2. cap. 8. and by Le Clerc, Bibliothèque Choisie, tom. 13. p. 219. For I fear that this being admitted would not only undermine the authority of all the primitive Christians, but would also open the way to profane persons of perverting and corrupting the history of our Saviour himself. But I do not think it inconsistent with truth, or with the reverence due to the ancient Christians, to say that it is probable that among those whom, in accordance with the errors and opinions of their own times, they

thought to be possessed by demons, there were some under the influence of natural calamities and severe diseases; nor is this any derogation from the importance of the miracles recorded to have been done by the ancient Christians. For, as respects the confirmation of the truth of Christianity, it is the same thing whether by the name of the Saviour, inveterate, fatal, and incurable diseases were cured by Christians, or demons were ejected from the bodies of the possessed. [The author of a work, De Dæmoniacis Nov. Test., Bibliotheca Britann. tom. 8. p. 314. seems here to have ploughed with my heifer.] Both these performances exceed human ability, and are a proof of divine interposition. Nor does this error of the Christians, derived from the opinions of their own age, detract from the authority of the religion they professed; for it is evident that some remains of superstition and error might still remain in the minds of those who were imbued with the holiest doctrines. I have, however, no doubt that there were among the Christians wise and respectable men, who perceived that the common opinion was not entirely correct, and that all were not really demoniacs who were vulgarly esteemed so. Certain it is, that in following ages there were some Christians who entirely disbelieved the traditions about the power and dominion exercised by demons over mankind, and were bold to declare that diseases incorrectly ascribed to demoniacal power arose from natural causes. Psellus relates with indignation that some physicians were of this opinion, De Operatione Dæmonum, p. 84.: *Ἀλλ', ὦ Μάρκε, εἶπον, ἕτερ' ἄττα πείθουσιν ἡμᾶς φρονεῖν ἰατρῶν παῖδες οὐ δαιμόνων ἔκγονα τὰ πάθη ταῦτα λέγοντες εἶναι. Χυμῶν δὲ καὶ αὐχμῶν καὶ πνευμάτων μοχθηρῶν ἐχόντων, ἀμέλει φαρμάκοις καὶ διαιτήμασιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπῳδαῖς καὶ καθαρμοῖς ταῦτα θεραπεύειν, ἀποπειρῶνται,* "But, O Mark, I say, physicians endeavour to persuade us other things than these, saying that these affections are not the results of demons; but that the humours, joints, and spirits being affected, they endeavour to cure these maladies by medicine and diet, not by incantations and purifications." But yet I should not suppose that these physicians, and other Christians who herein agreed with them, entirely denied all power of the devil over the human body, or imagined that those who were cured by our Saviour were only diseased persons falsely supposed by the people to be possessed. In the last century the opinion just named was publicly and undisguisedly put forth, and, through the immoderate freethinking of the day, eagerly taken up. To pass over Vaninus, Hobbes, Spinoza, and others, who have evidently seemed desirous of overthrowing all religion, there was published at London in 1676 an octavo volume entitled, The Doctrine of the Devils, whose author, a clergyman of the Church of England, strongly opposed to Socinianism (according to Des Maizeaux, Notes to Bayle's Letters, tom. 2. p. 435), both denies altogether the power of demons, and maintains that the demoniacs of the New Testament were persons diseased and mad. Subsequently the able and learned Benjamin De Daillon, a minister among the French refugees, proceeded further than this, and in his book entitled Examen de l'Oppression des Reformés en France, Amsterdam, 1687. 12mo. held that there is only one devil, and that the demons said to be ejected by our Saviour were simply diseases. Respecting this book consult Le Clerc, Bibliothèque Historique et Universelle, tom. 7. p. 339. And the brother of this Daillon entertained a similar opinion, on which he copiously expatiated in a singular book entitled *Δαιμονολογία*, or a Treatise of Spirits, London, 1723. 8vo. I pass over Balthazar Becker, who deliberately attacked the power of demons; nor is there any necessity of saying much respecting those who have more recently suffered themselves to be drawn into the same opinion, since it is well known that some of them have been well affected towards religion. A number of learned works are extant confuting this rash sentiment; and therefore I do not think it worth while to spend much time about them. Nor shall I undertake to examine and explain the stories and controversies about demoniacal possessions in more modern times; or the discussions among medical men respecting magical diseases. It will be sufficient if, omitting all else, I make the following observations.

I. To refer all that is said in the New Testament respecting the ejection of demons to ordinary diseases or vulgar error, appears to me very dangerous and inimical to the Christian religion. For if this opinion be correct, I think it evident that our Saviour and his apostles and witnesses can scarcely claim the character of wise men, while using language which no sensible person would make use of, if desirous of being understood by his readers. To make this plain, I shall first of all remark that Christ and his disciples were under no necessity of expressing themselves thus. (See Saurin, Discours sur Le Bible, tom. 4. p. 422. and 493.) Jesus Christ, in the twelfth chapter of Matthew, and other places, is disputing against the Pharisees who accused him of per-

forming his miracles by the power and aid of demons; and he answers them just as if all the opinions of the Pharisees at that time about demons were correct. If however all the traditions about demoniacal possession were false, our Saviour would have replied with the utmost truth and propriety that the stories about the craft and power of demons were vulgar errors and old wives' fables. Nor do I see any reason to prevent him from freely avowing this. Such an avowal would not have been unprecedented among the Jews, nor so hateful to them as not to be tolerated. For the Sadducees, who were allowed to speak their sentiments in the supreme council, and to fill the most honourable posts, publicly professed that there were no such beings as demons, and considered it the extreme of folly to believe in their existence; nor did they on this account incur the execrations of the common people. Christ could therefore without invidiousness, or injury to his sacred mission, have opposed and rejected the vulgar fables respecting demons. And our adversaries themselves shall be judges what kind of person he could be, who, urged by no necessity, should not only tolerate in the minds of his hearers the most ridiculous and pestilential errors, but even confirm and strengthen them by his expressions and argumentation. And the same reasoning applies to those sent forth by our Saviour to propagate his religion. There were indeed among the common people, among the Platonists, and among the Jewish doctors, not a few who would have been offended by the apostles' declaring to be false all that was said respecting the nature and power of demons, and their possession of mankind. [For a reply to this, see Bibliotheca Britannica, tom. 8. part 2. p. 326.] But there was a larger rather than a smaller number of philosophers, who gave no credit to any of these tales; such as the Epicureans and Aristotelians, whose systems had very many followers in the time of Christ amongst the nobility and great men, who did not however on that account incur any danger to their safety or reputation. And perhaps many of the wise men of that day would have been gained over by the apostles, had they freely declared their dissent from the popular opinions respecting evil spirits. What wise man then, who foresaw no danger in opposition to vulgar errors, but on the contrary an accession of converts to his cause, would adopt as his own and confirm by his authority the fanatical fancies of the common people?

II. But even supposing that much danger and opposition were the result of a free profession of the truth respecting demons and their nature, I can never persuade myself that our Saviour and his disciples were so timid as on this account not only to tolerate but even openly to approve false and childish tenets. It is well known that the Mosaical rites and ceremonies, so fondly cherished by the Jews, the gods in whom the heathen placed their only trust, and many other popular prepossessions inordinately beloved, were boldly and in spite of all perils by our Saviour and his followers oppugned and condemned. How can it be believed then that men endowed with such courage to attack the strongholds of impiety and superstition, would not have dared to oppose opinions which were neither approved by all, nor even by their admirers reckoned among the fundamental principles of religion? Much more probably would Hercules, after braving Cerberus, have fled at the sight of a boar or a lion.

III. Our opponents will perhaps say that prudence required our Saviour and his disciples not to refute and reprehend all the errors of the people; that Christ in his wisdom bore for a time with certain errors in the minds of the Jews which he perceived to be not altogether opposed to the increase of true religion; and that his apostles followed his example. In a certain sense I would not deny the truth of this; but then this remark throws no light on the matter in hand. Our Saviour indeed bore for a time with some erroneous opinions of his friends and of the multitude; but he neither commended them publicly nor adopted them as his own by his words and phrases. But how evident is it that the opinions of the Pharisees respecting demons and their possessions were by our Saviour adopted, illustrated, and emended? See Matt. xii. 17—30, 43—45; and Luke xi. 24. How can this be attributed to prudence? It is, I allow, the duty of a wise physician to prepare remedies for more serious diseases, and to leave to time the cure of those that are less important, and of a prudent man first to assail the most dangerous errors and to be less concerned about the more trifling; but it must be a mark of folly to provide against the extinction of slighter evils, and to fortify secondary errors with fresh defences. It would have met the requisitions of prudence had our Saviour been entirely silent, and neither openly rejected, adopted, nor approved the false ideas of the Jews about evil spirits, if he perceived any just cause why they should not at that time be confuted.

IV. But, to descend to lower ground, I will grant (but only for the sake of the argument) that prudence required our Saviour to speak according to the popular opinion,

and act in accordance with the errors of the vulgar. I hope it will then be granted by my opponents that it is the part of wisdom to take care that silly errors, while spared for the purpose of avoiding offence, do not become perpetual and descend to the latest generations. Was this then done by our Saviour? The contrary, on their supposition, is apparent. Neither the historians of his life, nor the messengers of his religion, who explained it fully in their epistles, have let fall a word to imply that our Saviour's discourses respecting demons and possessions contained the opinion of the Jews and not his own, and were only adapted to the superstitious commonalty. Therefore if the opinion of the non-existence of any power of demons be correct, I must remain in very great doubt and uncertainty what to think respecting our Saviour's love towards mankind, in leaving them under the influenceof a noxious error, what to think respecting his wisdom and prudence, and even respecting the Christian religion itself.

V. In short, those who entertain these opinions seem to me entirely to abrogate the authority of the sacred writings. For to agree with them we must confess that our Saviour uttered falsehoods when speaking of the power of demons or commanding evil spirits to come out of human bodies; and his discourse, for instance, in Matt. xii. 17—30, 43—45. is a series of empty sounds destitute of import or meaning; we must admit that Paul when saying, Eph. vi. 12. that Christians "wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places," makes use of empty sounds under the appearance of a solemn admonition; lastly, we must allow that the sacred writers sometimes speak so perversely and corruptly that they can be read without danger of error only by those who under the guidance of reason can separate the gold from the dross. But if these things be so, if some parts of the Scriptures contain popular errors under the semblance of truth, if others consist of mere sounds destitute of sense, they can scarcely be esteemed worthy of our entire confidence with reference to our salvation, or our implicit faith in matters of belief. For if the sacred writers depart so far from the common usage of language as Becker and other deniers of the reality of demons and demoniacs maintain, there would be reason to fear that they also used popular and not strictly correct language in parts wherein we imagine to exist the mysteries of salvation and the most sacred doctrines.

VI. Finally, the arguments made use of by those who so strenuously deny the existence of demons seem to me to be self-contradictory. They assume that our Saviour and his disciples accommodated themselves in their speeches and writings to popular opinions, and spoke of demons and their power over the human body, as well as other particulars, just as if there was no doubt on these points, though they well knew that the popular belief was entirely unfounded. And no doubt they think that our Saviour and his followers in this respect acted with prudence and wisdom. I should therefore like to inquire why they will not themselves imitate this example, and not rather depart from the sacred precedent set by Christ and his apostles. At the present day there are perhaps quite as many as in the time of Christ, who believe in the existence of demons and their occasionally inhabiting the human frame. As much offence may be occasioned at the present time by a denial of this position, as could be during the days of our Saviour and the apostles. And, after all, this tenet is not one involving peril of eternal salvation; for if it were, there can be no doubt that our Saviour would have taken care wholly to extirpate it from the minds of men. What reason, then, is there why they should not act in the same manner as they maintain that Christ and the apostles did, and speak like the multitude, while they think with the wise? Why attack with so many objections and cavils an opinion not only shown by our Saviour to be harmless, but even corroborated by him? Unless I am mistaken there will be reason to suspect some occult mischief must be hidden here. Perhaps those who so pervert the words of Christ and his apostles as to suppose they spoke inconsistently with their own sentiments, act by them as they suppose they acted by the demons and the possessed, and speak of them according to popular opinion, while their secret sentiments are far different. I am not so uncharitable as to suppose this to be the case with all who entertain these opinions; but I should wish all persons of this description seriously to consider whither the tenets lead which they so boldly propound and defend.

END OF VOLUME II.

J. Haddon, Printer, Castle Street, Finsbury.

THE TRUE

INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM

OF THE

UNIVERSE:

WHEREIN

ALL THE REASON AND PHILOSOPHY OF ATHEISM IS CONFUTED,
AND ITS IMPOSSIBILITY DEMONSTRATED,

WITH A TREATISE CONCERNING

ETERNAL AND IMMUTABLE MORALITY.

BY

RALPH CUDWORTH, D D.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED,

THE NOTES AND DISSERTATIONS OF DR. J. L. MOSHEIM,

TRANSLATED BY

JOHN HARRISON, M.A.

WITH A COPIOUS GENERAL INDEX TO THE WHOLE WORK.

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THE TRUE

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CHAPTER V.

SECTION I.—Continued.

We come now to the second head proposed, of miracles and effects supernatural. That there hath been something miraculous or above nature, sometimes done even among the Pagans (whether by good or evil spirits), appears not only from their own records, but also from the scripture itself. And it is well known, that they pretended (besides oracles) to miracles also, even after the times of Christianity; and that not only in Apollonius Tyanæus and Apuleius, but also in the Roman emperors themselves, as Vespasian and Adrian, but especially in the temple of Æsculapius; thus much appearing from that Greek table therein hung up at Rome,[1] in which, amongst other things, this is recorded: "That a blind man being commanded by the oracle to kneel before the altar, and then passing from the right side thereof to the left, to lay five fingers upon the altar, and afterwards lifting up his hand, to touch his eyes therewith; all this being done accordingly, he recovered his sight, the people all applauding; that great miracles were done under the emperor Antoninus," &c. But we have in the scripture an account of miracles, both greater in number, and of a higher nature; done especially by Moses, and our Saviour Christ and his apostles.[2]

[1] Vide Gruteri Inscription. tom. 1. p. 71. This marble tablet, or rather fragment of a tablet, is supposed to have been suspended in the temple of Æsculapius in an island in the Tiber at Rome, where instances were recorded of cures effected by Æsculapius. This tablet has been copiously treated of by Daniel Le Clerc, Histoire de la Medicine, pt. 1. lib. 1. cap. 20.

[2] Our author here follows the early fathers, almost all of whom unhesitatingly be-

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Wherefore it seems, that there are two sorts of miracles or effects supernatural. First, such as though they could not be done by any ordinary and natural causes here amongst us, and in

lieved that many miracles and prodigies were anciently done among heathen nations by the power and influence of evil spirits. See Athenagoras, Apology, cap. 20. p. 89; Tertullian's Apology, cap. 22. p. 222; Clement's Recognitions, lib. 4. cap. 21. &c. p. 542. &c. of the first volume of the Patres Apostolici, and several others. But I think our author would have done better to have considered all the miracles reported to have anciently taken place among the Pagans, either as false or uncertain, or to have happened from natural causes, or to have proceeded from the frauds and tricks of the priests. [On this point consult Van Dalen, De Oraculis, who throughout that work enumerates and explains many false miracles.] This has been well demonstrated by Father Anselm, in a remarkable Dissertation in the Histoire de l'Academie des Inscriptions et des Belles Lettres, tom. 8. p. 59; by Freret, in another Dissertation in the same work, tom. 8. p. 76; and previously by Jacques Serces, Traité des Miracles, p. 258. &c. And this view appears to me much more consistent with the divine glory than the one adopted by Dr. Cudworth. For if God allowed such a number of miracles as are on record to be performed among the heathen for the purpose of establishing the pagan religion and worship, he would in some sense himself have caused them to persevere in their ancestral superstitions and ceremonies. Nor is the opinion that I have mentioned altogether destitute of authority from the fathers, some of whom were certainly quicksighted enough in distinguishing miracles and exposing the frauds of the priests. The instances of miracles mentioned in the text rather serve to confirm my view than to oppose it.

I. Respecting the supposed miracles of Apollonius Tyanæus I have already made some observations. They are scarcely worthy of mention, and show their author to have been an ambitious man, somewhat skilled in deceiving the people. Nor do the prodigies of Apuleius deserve a better character; besides which, in his Apology, still extant, he himself expressly disclaims all suspicion of his being a magician.

II. The miracles ascribed to Vespasian and Adrian bear internal marks of falsehood, as has been fully shown by C. A. Heumann, in a remarkable Dissertation, De Miraculis Vespasiani Pœciles, tom. 2. lib. 2. p. 427 ; J. Le Clerc, Historia Ecclesiæ Primorum Duorum Sæculorum, cent. 2. year 138. pp. 610. 611 ; and J. Serces, Traité Des Miracles, p. 276. &c.

III. There remain then only the miracles of Æsculapius, the most celebrated of any, and most relied on by the heathen opponents of Christianity. But it will appear, I think, from the following observations, that no rational credit is due to them. (1.) First, then, I observe, that all the priests of Æsculapius, as I have proved in another place, were skilled in medicine, and having first minutely examined the diseases and the constitutions of those who lay sick in the temple of the god, afterwards prescribed remedies proper for curing their complaints. The invalids who committed the care of their recovery to Æsculapius were not cured by a word or a sentence; but by herbs, juices, and other things such as are used by physicians. Æsculapius' miracles were therefore just such as are done by medical men of the present day. I will prove this by two authentic testimonies, one from a Christian writer, the other from a disbeliever in Christianity. The first is Arnobius, Adv. Gentes, lib. 1. p. 35. 36. who thus writes: Dii, si quando, ut fama est, nonnullis attribuere medicinam, aut cibum aliquem jusserunt capi, aut qualitatis alicujus ebibi potionem, aut herbarum et graminum succos superimponi inquietantibus caussis, ambulare, cessare, aut re aliquâ, quæ officiat, abstinere ; quod esse non magnum, nec admirationis alicujus stupore condignum promptum est, si volueritis attendere; et medici etiam sic curant.....Nulla autem virtus est medicaminibus amovere, quæ noceant; beneficia ista rerum non sunt curationum potestates, " If the gods, as is reported, ever have administered medicine to any persons, or commanded a certain sort of food to be taken, or liquid of a particular kind to be drunk, or the juices of herbs and grains to be applied to the parts affected, to walk, to rest, or to abstain from any thing that may be hurtful, it is obviously no great thing, nor worthy of any extraordinary degree of wonder, if it be properly considered; and physicians use the same method of cure.....For there is no great power in removing what is noxious by means of medicines; such benefits as these are the powers of the things themselves rather than of the cures." The latter is Lucian, who,

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that respect may be called supernatural; yet might notwithstanding be done, God permitting only, by the ordinary and natural power of other invisible created spirits, angels or demons.

Philopseudes, vol. 2 of his works, p. 333. explains the true cause of miracles for which Æsculapius was so famous, in the following words: Ὁ γὰρ Ἀσκληπιὸς αὐτὸς καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῦ ἥπια φάρμακα πάσσοντες, ἐθεράπευον τοὺς νοσοῦντας, "Æsculapius and his children cured the sick by administering wholesome remedies." See the Clementine, hom. 9. sect. 17. p. 690. vol. 1 of the Patres Apostolici. (2.) If it should be thought that any of the cures of Æsculapius, and that of the blind man in particular, related by Dr. Cudworth on the authority of the marble tablet, cannot be rendered consistent with the above observation, it may be replied, that if all the attendant circumstances were accurately examined, it would be apparent that natural remedies or fraud were concerned in the transaction. As regards the blind man, if we grant that he was really deprived of vision, there is at once ground for suspicion in his being ordered by the oracle to place his fingers on the altar of Æsculapius, and after that with them to touch his eyes. For no doubt the cunning priests had placed upon the altar some ointment good for ophthalmic diseases, with which when the blind man had rubbed his eyes, he suddenly recovered his sight. This might perhaps be more satisfactorily shown, were we informed what kind of disease it was under which he laboured. (3.) And this view is abundantly confirmed from the fact that Æsculapius could not cure all, but only some, namely those whose diseases were curable. But if he cured diseases by a divine power, without doubt, as our Saviour Jesus Christ did, he would have healed all kinds of maladies, even those on which physicians had already exhausted all the resources of their art. The author of the Clementine, a not contemptible writer of the third century, has acutely observed, that those who received help from Æsculapius had their names preserved in his temple, but that those who died could not record their misfortune: hom. 9. sect. 17. p. 690: Ἄλλοι δὲ νοσήσαντες, καὶ εὐξάμενοι, ἐξ αὐτομάτου ὑγιάναντες οὓς ἐπεκαλέσαντο ἔγραψαν, καὶ ἀναθήματα ἐποίησαν· οἱ μὲν τοίγε μετὰ εὐχὴν διαφωνήσαντες, τὰς ἀποτυχίας ἀναθῆναι οὐ δύνανται. The same reproach is also urged by Arnobius against the heathen priests, Adv. Gentes, lib. 1. p. 36: Quot millia vultis à nobis debilium ostendi, quot tabificis affectos morbis, nullam retulisse medicinam? cùm per omnia supplices irent templa, cùm Deorum ante ora prostrati, limina ipsa converrerent osculis, cùm Æsculapium ipsum datorem (ut prædicant) sanitatis, quoad illis superfuit vita, et precibus fatigarent et invitarent miserrimis votis..... Quid prodest ostendere, unum aut alterum fortasse curatos, cùm tot millibus subvenerit nemo et plena sint omnia miserorum infeliciumque delubra, "How many thousand invalids, how many labouring under lingering diseases, do you wish us to point out, who have received no cure? while they went as suppliants to all the temples, and prostrate in the presence of the gods swept the very threshold with their kisses; while they fatigued with their prayers and invoked with pitiable vows, so long as life continued, Æsculapius, the vaunted restorer of health.....What is the use of exhibiting one or two persons cured, when no help is afforded to so many thousands, and the temples are all full of wretched and miserable objects?" To meet this objection, the priests of Æsculapius used to reply, that the gods afforded aid only to the good, and neglected the calamities of the wicked. But this answer is evidently futile, and might be used by all the cheats that fraudulently and deceitfully cozen the credulous vulgar of their money. Facts and miracles calculated to establish a religion ought to be free from any such exceptions as these; and our Saviour benefited good and bad indiscriminately who implored his aid.

IV. After all, the priests of Æsculapius could not so cautiously manage their affairs, but that the more discerning could perceive that the fame and reputation of the Deity rested as much upon fraud and trickery as upon medicines and remedies. For they, like the modern worshippers of the saints, sought revenue and riches for their temples, and for themselves the means of a more easy and luxurious life. Sometimes needy men were hired with money to feign sickness, and then boldly to pretend that they had been suddenly cured by Æsculapius; and sometimes patients lying in the temple were deceived by fictitious visions. An instance has been quoted out of Aristophanes, Pluto, act 5. ver. 555. &c. of a slave named Carion being introduced on the stage, who in very plain terms explains a device once set on foot by the priests of Æsculapius to deceive the unwary. I shall only give one passage out of a Christian, or, if you please,

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As, for example, if a stone or other heavy body should first ascend upwards, and then hang in the air, without any visible either mover or supporter, this would be to us a miracle or effect supernatural; and yet, according to vulgar opinion, might this be done by the natural power of created invisible beings, angels or demons; God only permitting, without whose special providence it is conceived they cannot thus intermeddle with our human affairs. Again, if a perfectly illiterate person should readily speak Greek or Latin, this also would be to us a miracle, or effect supernatural; for so is the apostles' speaking with tongues accounted; and yet in demoniacs is this sometimes done by evil demons, God only permitting. Such also amongst the Pagans was that miraculum cotis (as Apuleius calls it) that "miracle of the whetstone," done by Accius Navius, when at his command, it was divided into two with a razor.[3] But secondly, there is another sort of miracles, or effects supernatural, such as are above the power of all second causes, or any natural created being whatsoever, and so can be attributed to none but God Almighty himself, the author of nature, who therefore can control it at pleasure.

As for that late theological politician, who, writing against miracles, denies as well those of the former, as of this latter kind, contending that a miracle is nothing but a name which the ignorant vulgar gives to opus naturæ insolitum, "any unwonted work of nature, or to what themselves can assign no cause of;" as also, that if there were any such thing done contrary to nature, or above it, it would rather weaken than confirm our belief of the divine existence;[4] we find his discourse every way so weak, groundless, and inconsiderable, that we could not think it here to deserve a confutation.

But of the former sort of those miracles is that to be understood, Deut. xiii.: "If there arise among you a prophet, or

a semi-Christian author, from which it will appear that the Christians were not wholly ignorant of the selfish frauds of the priests. The author of the Clementine, hom. 9. sect. 18. p. 691. makes use of these words:—Πόσοι δὲ καὶ καταψεύδονται χρηματισμοὺς καὶ θεραπείας ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀποτελεσθείσας, καὶ ταύτας βεβαιοῦνται μετὰ ὅρκων; πόσοι δὲ ἐπὶ μισθῷ ἑαυτοὺς ἐξέδωκαν, δι' ἐνίων ἐπινοιῶν πάσχειν τινὰ ἀναδεξάμενοι, καὶ οὕτως κηρύξαντες, αὐτῶν τὸ πάθος ἀντιπαθείᾳ ἀποκατασταθέντες, κεχρηματίσθαι τὴν θεραπείαν λέγουσιν, ἵνα τὸ ἀναίσθητον ἐπιγράψωσιν σέβασμα; "How many have convicted of falsehood the oracles, and the cures performed by them, which have even been averred by oaths? How many have given themselves up to hire, who voluntarily assuming certain maladies, and giving this out publicly, when they have been cured of the disease by the remedy, say that the recovery was oracularly promised, in order to corroborate their stupid religion?" And that Origen was not ignorant of these frauds, will be apparent, I think, from an attentive perusal of what he says of the miracles of Æsculapius, Adv. Celsum, lib. 3. p. 124.

[3] Vide Livium, lib. 1. cap. 36. p. 67. It is also mentioned by Cicero and other ancient writers. Our author seems to have thought that an evil spirit was present and divided the whetstone, while Accius only appeared to cut it with the razor.

[4] Vide Spinozæ Tractat. Theologico-politic. cap. 6. p. 67.

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dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a sign or a wonder, and the sign or wonder come to pass whereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us go after other gods, and serve them; thou shalt not hearken to the words of that prophet, or dreamer of dreams; for the Lord your God proveth you, to know whether you love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul." For it cannot be supposed, that God Almighty would himself purposely inspire any man to exhort others to idolatry, and immediately assist such a one with his own supernatural power of doing miracles, in confirmation of such doctrine. But the meaning is, that by the suggestion of evil spirits, some false prophets might be raised up to tempt the Jews to idolatry; or at least, that, by assistance of them, such miracles might be wrought in confirmation thereof, as those sometimes done by the Egyptian sorcerers or magicians, God himself not interposing in this case to hinder them, for this reason, that he might hereby prove and try their faithfulness towards him. Forasmuch as both by the pure light of nature, and God's revealed will, before confirmed by miracles, idolatry, or the religious worship of any but God Almighty, had been sufficiently condemned. From whence it is evident, that miracles alone (at least such miracles as these) are no sufficient confirmation of a true prophet, without consideration had of the doctrine taught by him. For though a man should have done never so many true and real miracles amongst the Jews, and yet should persuade to idolatry, he was by them confidently to be condemned to death for a false prophet.

Accordingly in the New Testament do we read, that our Saviour Christ forewarned his disciples, that "False prophets[5] and false Christs should arise, and show great signs or wonders, insomuch, that if it were possible, they should seduce the very elect." And St. Paul foretelleth concerning the man of sin, or Antichrist,[6] "That his coming should be after the working of Satan, with all power, and signs, and wonders (or miracles) of a lie." For we conceive, that by *τέρατα ψεύδους* in this place, are not properly meant "feigned and counterfeit miracles," that is, mere cheating and juggling tricks, but "true wonders and real miracles" (viz. of the former sort mentioned) done for the confirmation of a lie, as the doctrine of this man of sin is there afterwards called; for otherwise how could his coming be said to be "according to the working of Satan, with all power?" In like manner also, in St. John's Apocalypse, where the coming of the same man of sin, and the mystery of iniquity, is again described, we read chap. xiii. of a two-horned beast like a lamb, "That he shall do great wonders, and deceive those that dwell on the earth, by means of those miracles which

[5] Luke xxiv. 24. [6] 2 Thessalonians ii. 9.

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he hath power to do in the sight of the beast." And again, chap. xvi. "Of certain unclean spirits, like frogs, coming out of the mouth of the dragon, and of the beast, and of the false prophet, which are the spirits of devils working miracles, that go forth to the kings of the earth." And lastly, chap. xix. "Of the false prophet, that wrought miracles before the beast." All which seem to be understood, not of feigned and counterfeit miracles only, but of true and real also, effected by the working of Satan, in confirmation of a lie, that is, of idolatry, false religion and imposture; God Almighty permitting it, partly in way of probation or trial of the faithfulness of his own servants, and partly in way of just judgment and punishment upon those who "receive not the love of the truth, that they might be saved;" as the apostle declareth.[7] Wherefore those miracles, pretended, for divers ages past, to have been done before the relics of saints and images, &c., were they all true, could by no means justify or warrant that religious worship by many given to them; because true and real miracles, done in order to the promoting of idolatry, are so far from justifying that idolatry, that they are themselves condemned by it to be τέρατα ψεύδους, "the miracles of a lie," done by the working of Satan.

But as for the miracles of our Saviour Christ, had they been all of them only of the former kind, such as might have been done, God permitting, by the natural power of created spirits, and their assistance: yet forasmuch as he came in the name of the Lord, teaching neither idolatry nor any thing contrary to the clear light and law of nature, therefore ought he, by reason of those miracles, to have been received by the Jews themselves, and owned for a true prophet, according to the doctrine of Moses himself; who both in the thirteenth and eighteenth chapters of Deuteronomy, plainly supposeth, that God would in no other case permit any false prophet to do miracles by the assistance of evil spirits, save only in that of idolatry, and (which is always understood of) what is plainly discoverable by the light of nature to be false, or evil. The reason whereof is manifest, because if he should, this would be an invincible temptation, which it is inconsistent with the divine goodness to expose men unto. And our Saviour Christ was unquestionably that one eximious prophet, which God Almighty, by Moses, promised to send unto the Israelites, upon occasion of their own desire made to him at Horeb. "Let me not hear again the voice of the Lord my God, nor let me see this great fire any more, that I die not." Whereupon the Lord said: "They have well spoken that which they have spoken; I will raise them up a prophet from among their brethren, like unto thee, and put my words in his

[7] 2 Thessalonians ii. 10.

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mouth, and he shall speak unto them all that I shall command him; and whosoever will not hearken to the words which he shall speak in my name, I will require it of him."* Which is all one as if he should have said, I will no more speak to them with thunder and lightning, nor reveal my will with a terrible voice out of flaming fire; but the next great manifestation of myself, or further revelation of my will, shall be by a prophet from amongst their own brethren, I putting my words into his mouth, and speaking to them by him. Whose words they shall be as much obliged to hearken to as if I had spoken them (as before) from the top of the fiery mount. And that they may have no colour for their disbelieving this great prophet especially, or their disobeying of him, I plainly declare, that whosoever cometh in my name, and does true and real miracles, shall be acknowledged undoubtedly for a true prophet sent by me, and accordingly believed and obeyed; and none rejected under the notion of false prophets, but only such as either do not real miracles, or else if they do, come in the name of other gods, or exhort to idolatry. Nevertheless, our Saviour Christ wrought other miracles also, of a higher nature, by the immediate power of God Almighty himself; as for example, when before himself he raised Lazarus, who had been dead four days, to life, since it cannot be conceived to be in the power of created spirits (whether bad or good) whenever they please to bring back the souls of men deceased to their bodies again, or change the laws of nature and fate. However, it must not be thought, that God will ever set this seal of his to a lie, or that which is plainly contrary to the light and law of nature.

The conclusion is, that though all miracles promiscuously do not immediately prove the existence of a God, nor confirm a prophet, or whatsoever doctrine; yet do they all of them evince, that there is a rank of invisible understanding beings, superior to men, which the Atheists commonly deny. And we read of some such miracles also as could not be wrought but by a power perfectly supernatural, or by God Almighty himself. But to deny and disbelieve all miracles, is either to deny all certainty of sense, which would be indeed to make sensation itself miraculous; or else monstrously and unreasonably to derogate from human testimonies and history. The Jews would never have so stiffly and pertinaciously adhered to the ceremonial law of Moses, had they not all along believed it to have been unquestionably confirmed by miracles; and that the Gentiles should at first have entertained the faith of Christ without miracles, would itself have been the greatest of miracles.[1]

* Deut. xviii. 17—19.

[1] This disputation on miracles will, I doubt not, appear to not a few, as it does to myself, to be wise and profound. The learned Doctor denies that evil spirits have

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The last extraordinary phenomenon proposed was that of divination, oracles, prophecies, or predictions of future events, otherwise unforeknowable to men; which either evince a God,

power sufficient to perform true miracles, that is, either to destroy altogether or even to change the laws of nature laid down by God himself: but he allows that they can do many things which seem to us to be miracles, and exceed the faculties of mankind. Nor has any philosopher or theologian, as far as I know, ever raised a doubt on this matter. On the contrary, they all distinguish between *miracles* and *wonders:* affirming that the latter, but not the former, can be performed by demons. Our learned author adds, that this power cannot be exercised by an evil demon among men at his own will and pleasure, especially where the interests of the true religion are concerned, but only when God suffers it: but that God does not permit it except when he wishes to test the will of mankind towards himself, or to visit with condign punishment such nations as have long despised and neglected the light of truth, and to deliver them over to the bondage of error: and that when he wishes to do the former he does not suffer the evil demon to work miracles for the confirmation of any other doctrines than those, the turpitude and falsehood of which can immediately be detected even by the most simple and inexperienced. This doctrine, in my opinion, has nothing in it which can give offence to any one, or militate against that most powerful argument drawn from the miracles of our Saviour in confirmation of the Christian religion. Wherefore, if the moderation and prudence of our author had been imitated by the philosophers and theologians who succeeded him, probably a controversy would never have been raised upon this question: whether or not it is in the power of an evil demon to seduce men by miracles into the adoption of errors. But the most learned of the English and other theologians who since Dr. Cudworth laboured in the investigation of this subject, have overstepped the limits prescribed by him, and in consequence made others afraid lest the cause of God and religion should suffer from their doctrines. Hence eminent men, Sam. Werenfels, Diss. Num miracula sunt certa veritatis signa? in Dissertat. Theologic. Basil. 1718. in 4to. p. 165. Joh. Alph. Turretinus, Diss. pro Veritate Religionis Christianæ; Joh. Arnold. Noltenius in a specific Dissert. published at Francfort on the Oder, 1718, [Abrah. le Moine. See Biblioth. Raissonnée, tom. 21. par. 1. p. 153. who likewise contends that God alone can work miracles], and others, positively exclude all power of working miracles from evil demons, and maintain that the sayings of sacred writ and testimonies of ancient authors in which mention is made of miracles performed, or hereafter to be performed, by false prophets, are to be understood solely of frauds, deceptions, and juggling tricks; and the learned Jac. Serces, following in their footsteps, in a copious and elegant French work published at Amsterdam, 1729, has professedly defended this opinion, chiefly in confutation of the late illustrious theologian and mathematician, Dr. Sam. Clarke, who of all the more recent English theologians has given the most lucid and forcible exposition of this subject. I trust I shall be excused by the learned men of both sides when I freely and candidly declare that I cannot assent to either opinion, and that I consider Dr. Cudworth's view to be alone calculated to remove all the difficulties that beset this question. My reasons for thinking so will be apparent from the following observations; which if throwing little or no new light upon the controversy will at least bear evidence of my mind being swayed by truth rather than by authority. I shall first of all explain the opinion of miracles entertained by Dr. Sam. Clarke, and approved of by the most eminent theologians and philosophers, Tillotson, Locke, Le Clerc, Stillingfleet, Barrow, Fleetwood, and many others, and shall state my objections to it; I shall then consider the opposite opinion of Jac. Serces and his party; and lastly shall show that Dr. Cudworth's doctrine, which seems also to be that of the most able and learned of our own theologians, is to be preferred to either of them.

I. Dr. Sam. Clarke, in his book, On the Existence and Attributes of God, tom. 2. cap. 19. treats of miracles generally. According to him a miracle is "an effect contrary to the usual order of nature, produced out of the usual course by an intelligence superior in power to man." [Clarke's opinion is defended, against Des Vœux, if I mistake not, by Chapelle, Nouv. Biblioth. tom. 7. p. 499.] According to this definition of a miracle, there is nothing that I can see, to hinder either good or bad demons from being able to work miracles, inasmuch as they are beings more powerful than man, and therefore can do certain things which seem to us to oppose the usual order of nature. Having

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or at least that there are understanding beings superior to men. For if there be any presension or foreknowledge of such future events, as are to human understanding alone altogether unfore-

laid down this definition, the acute writer does not altogether deny that there are some things which exceed all the power of wicked demons, such as the reanimation of the dead, and creation out of nothing: but, with the exception of a few instances of the kind, he denies that we can detect certain marks in any miracle, which will enable us to discern whether it has been performed by God, or by a demon or spirit; for that no mortal knows what limits there are to the power of demons, good or bad, and therefore that no one can decide without danger of error, what they are able and what they are unable to do. Hence he concludes, that miracles of themselves possess not the least efficacy towards proving the truth of any doctrine, and that we must judge from the nature and character of the doctrine itself, whether the miracles which we witness are of heaven and divine, or the work of some malignant demon, who is seeking to lead mankind into error. The doctrines which admit of being confirmed by miracles he distributes into three classes: 1. Those which are manifestly false, impious, and contrary to reason and the law of nature: to which he denies that any miracle whatever can give weight and authority. 2. Those that are *indifferent*, that is, of such a nature that unassisted reason cannot distinguish whether they are true, or false and hollow. When precepts of this kind are put forth by any one, he considers that in this case we are to look to the magnitude of the miracles, and to lean to that side which has the greater and more excellent prodigies in its favour. 3. Those which evidently tend to the advancement of the glory of God, and to the promotion of justice and virtue: when doctrines of this kind are corroborated by miracles, he holds it to be manifest that these miracles are divine and proceed from the supreme Being.

This doctrine, ingenious and plausible as it is, and apparently compact and consistent in itself, nevertheless involves certain points which no reflecting man who is anxious for the truth would easily assent to. I shall not repeat all the copious arguments advanced against it by the learned J. Serces; but shall merely touch upon some of those which, on attentively considering the subject, I hold to be of greatest weight. I. The foundation upon which the whole of this disputation rests is slippery and unsound. The illustrious writer assumes it to be unknown to mortals how far the power given by God to good or bad spirits extends: which no one indeed would readily deny. From this he infers, not only that spirits can work miracles, but also that, with some few exceptions, there is no prodigy, however remarkable, that may not proceed from a spirit. But in reasoning so, the acute man, in the first place, overturns and destroys the very thing he had assumed. He had denied that any one knows the limits of the power of angels: but he who asserts that angels possess such power as to be able to perform even the greatest miracles, acknowledges the power of angels to be known to himself and others. To myself indeed it seems to follow, from the fact of our being ignorant of the limits of those faculties with which angels are endowed, that we cannot know whether angels are able to perform miracles or not. In the next place, he does not perceive how utterly incredible and contrary to reason it appears, that the Deity who, in his supreme wisdom, established and ordained the laws of nature, should have conferred on inferior beings such power that they can violate these laws at will. Certainly that king would not give any great proofs of his wisdom and forethought, who should give to his ministers the power of abrogating or infringing laws which he had himself with great care devised and ratified: and I see no reason why we should think otherwise of the supreme Being. Lastly. Dr. Clarke seems not to have considered that, although the sacred volume does not speak so distinctly on the limits of the power of angels as to remove from our minds all cause for doubt, still it clearly informs us that the power of demons is restrained by the divine will, and that God does not suffer them to abuse it to the destruction of good men or the prejudice of truth, Job i. 12. &c. which indeed is enough for us in this question. For as nothing is greater and more holy than truth and religion, it is evident from thence that the power granted by God to evil demons, how great soever it may be in other respects, is not so great that they can at their own will and pleasure perform miracles in order either to confirm errors or to oppose the heavenly truth. II. The scriptures tell us, that miracles are performed to bear witness to the truth and unexceptionableness of a doctrine, John xx.

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knowable, then is it certain, that there is some more perfect understanding, or knowledge in the world, than that of men. And thus is that maxim of the ancient pagan Theists,[2] in the

31. Heb. ii. 4. Now if this account of miracles be true, miracles do not show the truth of a doctrine, but rather the excellence and truth of the doctrine prove the miracles to be divine. Moses we know performed the greatest prodigies in desert places, to teach the people of Israel that there was one God, and that the deities of the Egyptians and other nations were to be rejected. But if we follow Dr. Clarke, these miracles of Moses did not prove the truth of his doctrine concerning the worship of one God, but the doctrine itself, as being altogether consonant with reason, served as an argument to place the truth of Moses' miracles beyond controversy. III. No one, I imagine, will deny, that these miracles which God causes to be performed, are intended for the conviction and advantage of all. They ought not only to instruct the wise and learned, but more especially to operate as proofs and arguments on the minds of the most simple and uninformed. But if we assent to Dr. Clarke's opinion, we must own that God disturbed the nature of things for the sake of those only who possess strong powers of reasoning and can distinguish truth from falsehood. For the eminent men who support it assume that the nature of the doctrine, in confirmation of which the miracles take place, is alone known, and that by means of this those which are divine can be distinguished from such as are wrought by the power of an evil demon: that if the doctrine be in accordance with reason and virtue, there can be no doubt of the divinity of the miracles; but that if it be repugnant to these, or ridiculous and absurd, the miracles must be attributed to an evil demon. Therefore, before any one can decide whether the miracles which he sees performed are divine or not, he must first gravely and seriously examine into the doctrine which the worker of the miracles propounds. But who is so little acquainted with human affairs as not to know that only a few mortals are qualified to enter into such an examination? For to say nothing of the weakness of our reason, the force of opinions imbibed from infancy, the sway of the passions to which we are subject, the authority of others, the love of gain, and many other well-known causes, so obscure, warp and cramp our minds, that those things sometimes appear to us to be most agreeable to reason, which are least of all in accordance with it; and on the other hand, such as are eminently consistent with reason and the glory of God, seem altogether contrary and repugnant to them. All those that now remain of the ancient Persian nation conceive that they act wisely and rationally in paying homage and worship to fire, as the emblem of the divine nature. If, therefore, a prophet were to go to them and inculcate that God is to be worshipped without any image, and, the sooner to persuade them, were to have recourse to miracles, this nation, warped by preconceived opinions, would doubtless consider such miracles to be the deceptions of an evil demon, if, according to this opinion, they thought they were to judge of the divinity of the miracles from the nature and character of the doctrine. The same unquestionably would be done by the great majority of men, possessing but a moderate share of intellect, and tinctured from early childhood with error and superstition. Moreover, if the doctrines be indifferent and not obvious to reason, learned men tell us we are to consider solely the magnitude of the miracles, and to put our faith in that side which recommends itself by the greater and more remarkable ones. Again, therefore, if such be the case, miracles are of use to none but the acute and perspicacious. For in the first place, none of those who possess but little acumen, or are uninstructed in literature and art, can tell what is and what is not indifferent, or what can and what cannot be proved by reason. The common people do not care about this, much less understand it: and even among the learned themselves no slight controversies often spring up on such a question. Besides, scarcely any doctrine is so absurd that its author and propounder cannot reclaim it from the class of indifferent things, and contend for its being easily susceptible of demonstration by the help of reason. But supposing there is controversy with regard to this matter among those who witness the performance of miracles, how many

[2] Namely the Stoics, who are described by Cicero as reasoning in this manner, De Divinatione, lib. 1. cap. 5. 6. p. 3113. 3114. tom. 9. opp. and elsewhere.

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genuine and proper sense thereof, unquestionably true: Si divinatio est, dii sunt, "If there be divination, or presension of future events (undiscoverable by men), then are there gods:"

of them will be qualified to form a just estimate of these miracles, and to compare them with each other, without error? It is notorious that in no case do dissensions arise more easily than in a question of comparison, and that those who have to estimate the relative excellence of things, are rarely concordant and unanimous. Nor is this much to be wondered at. For setting aside the difficulty of the thing itself, all those impediments which usually preclude us from discerning the truth, are wont to obstruct our sight in such inquiries. The miracle performed by our Saviour in restoring to life the already putrid body of Lazarus, John xi. was of the highest order. But let us suppose, that at that time a false prophet among the Jews had commanded fire to descend from heaven. What a subject of discord would the comparison of these two miracles have been to this nation! For my own part I am convinced, that the Jews would have been torn into factions, and that the false prophet would have had as many followers as our Saviour. Imagine two men to go to the Arabians, who inhabit a district destitute of water, each of them stating his mission to be divine, and each promising a miracle. One restores a dead man to life; the other produces a most pleasant and wholesome fountain in the dry and sterile mountains surrounding Mecca and Medina. To raise a dead man to life is manifestly a greater miracle than to obtain water out of the sand. But if I know any thing of human nature, that incredible love of springs and water which is notoriously innate as it were in the Arabians, and the religion professed by them, which enjoins frequent ablutions of the body, would cause many to give a decided preference to the latter miracle. So great is the wretchedness and blindness in which mankind are involved, that they frequently are unwilling to make use of their reason when they are able, and frequently unable when they are willing: in consideration of which the divine goodness and wisdom has fortified the truth of the heavenly doctrine by such arguments as appeal to the senses and remove us farther from the risk of error. IV. It seems incompatible with the wisdom and benignity of God, to suffer demons hostile to mankind and the truth, freely to exercise the power they have received from him, in order to thwart the divine counsels and lead men into vice and error. No one, I imagine, would call that king wise and anxious for the welfare of the state, who, at the same time that he enacts laws most useful to his subjects, permits his enemies to circulate pernicious doctrines and to pave the way for the destruction of the people, supposing he had the power of resisting these attempts. V. Lastly. To pass over what has been already observed by others, it follows, if I mistake not, as a consequence from this opinion, that miracles are not necessary to all those who call themselves the ambassadors of God, but only to such as propound *indifferent* doctrines, with respect to which unassisted reason is unable to decide any thing. For if the divinity of miracles can only be ascertained by the doctrine, in confirmation of which they are wrought, being consonant with sound reason and virtue, those precepts which are in accordance with reason, for example, the doctrine of one God, would require no miracles. Therefore there is nothing to prevent us from supposing that God may sometimes stir up a man to overthrow superstitions and restore the precepts of reason, and still not arm him with the power of working miracles. But those crafty impostors, I fear, who seek to obtain for themselves fame and authority among a people would be able to abuse this opinion for the furtherance of their own designs. Mohammed, it is well known, principally in this manner silenced the Arabians who demanded of him miracles; nor are some of his followers accustomed to return any other answer to those who object that their prophet was destitute of the power of proving the truth of his doctrine by signs and wonders. See Boulanvilliers Vie de Mahomet, livr. 3. p. 309. Miracles, say they, cannot be required of him who propounds doctrines which no reasonable man can repudiate: and this Mohammed did, who sought to instil into men's minds what nature itself teaches every one, that there is only one God.

II. Such being the case, learned men I think have done wisely in opposing this opinion: but they are wrong, in my opinion, when they go to the other extreme, and deny altogether that a demon is able to work miracles. They advance sufficiently weighty reasons for dissenting from the opinion of those who hold that a demon has the unrestricted power of performing them, and that divine miracles can only be

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which, in their language, was no more than to say, understanding beings superior to men.

Wherefore we must here distinguish of oracles and predictions,

distinguished from those of demons by a consideration of the doctrine itself: but in supporting and explaining their opinion, they seem to me to be sometimes more ingenious and at others less cautious than they ought. To speak candidly, they would be unwilling, I am convinced, to extend to me the same liberty which they have themselves assumed when confuting the dogmas of others.

I. This opinion does not remove all the difficulties besetting this question. All sensible men will admit, what indeed we have already admitted, that the power of evil demons is not so great as to enable them to disturb the laws of nature and perform real miracles. On the other hand, however, I consider it to be unquestionable that demons are stronger and more powerful than men, as is so often shown in scripture, and on that account can do many things which seem to be opposed to the laws of nature, and have the appearance of miracles. Who, I ask, would deny that a demon can keep a man from sinking in the waters, and enable him to walk upright in the sea? And yet to spectators this would appear altogether repugnant to the laws of nature, although in reality it is not so. This example has been already adduced by G. W. Leibnitz, Quatrieme Replique a la troisieme Response de Mr. Clarke, sect. 44. dans le Recueil de diverses Pieces sur la Philosophie par M. Maizeaux, tom. 1. p. 60. add the Cinquieme Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz, sect. 117. p. 144. Amst. 1720—8. For who is not aware that in the eyes of the generality of mortals those wonderful works which exceed the power of man do not differ from real and divine miracles? A people that sees any one fly aloft through the air, which may be done by the assistance of a demon, is equally struck and moved thereby, as it would be by seeing water converted into wine. This opinion, therefore, does not do away with the difficulty which has hitherto harassed so many: namely, by what marks can real and divine miracles be distinguished from those which do not transcend the power of demons? For although sagacious and learned men may not be easily deceived in this matter, the case nevertheless is otherwise with the multitude: and as miracles concern all men, it is necessary that there be such a criterion as is adapted to the comprehension of all. The champions of this opinion, I am aware, can have recourse to three modes of getting out of this difficulty: They will either deny that demons possess the power of doing those things which can excite great wonder, or they will say that the means of distinguishing between the two kinds of prodigies, must be drawn from the nature and character of the doctrine itself, or lastly, they will assert that God would not suffer demons to exercise this power when the interests of religion and truth are at stake. But if they select the last of these modes they in a certain measure will abandon their own cause, and pass over to the opinion entertained by Dr. Cudworth and ourselves: not to mention that the explication they give of the passages of scripture in which mention is made of the miracles of Satan and his ministers, sufficiently prove that they are altogether opposed to this hypothesis. For why should they interpret the whole of them as referring to frauds and deceptions, if they suppose the natural power possessed by demons, of deceiving mankind by prodigies, to be controlled and restrained by the divine goodness and wisdom? For if such were their opinion they might with perfect consistency concede that these passages treat of prodigies performed by evil demons? If they adopt the second mode, they will themselves fall into all the snares which they have laid for their adversaries. Lastly, if they take the first, they will not only offend against common sense and the authority of sacred writ, but will also admit the certainty of that which they themselves deny, that we know the extent of the power possessed by demons, and the limits which are prescribed to it.

II. The advocates of this opinion, although sparing neither ingenuity nor labour, nevertheless do not interpret the passages of Scripture in which the miracles either of the prince of evil spirits himself or his ministers are spoken of, in such a way as to satisfy those who attentively examine the whole matter. They suppose, forsooth, that all passages of the kind refer to the frauds, impostures, and delusions of the enemies of the heavenly truth, but many others as well as myself will not easily be persuaded of this. I shall now pass over the miracles of the magicians in Egypt, and the history of the woman who is said to have raised Samuel from the dead, and shall merely touch upon the sayings of Moses, Christ, and St. Paul, which bear upon this subject, Deut. xiii.

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after the same manner as we did before of miracles, that they may be of two kinds. First, such as might proceed only from the natural presaging power of created spirit superior to men,

1—5 ; Matt. xxiv. 24; 2 Thess. ii. 9. 10. 11. 1. They suppose Moses to have meant to forewarn the Jewish people that in after time prophets would arise by the permission of God who would attempt by frauds and impostures to turn them away from the true religion. Not to speak at present of the meaning of Moses' words, I cannot assent to this interpretation for the following reasons. In the first place, Moses declares that the falsehood of these wonders will be manifest if the Israelites will attend to the doctrine of the man who performs them. He therefore denies that the people can discern from the nature of the miracle itself whether it is true or false. But frauds, impostures, and fallacies can easily be detected by considering them by themselves alone, nor is there any need of comparing the doctrines of these fictitious miracles, in order to expose their absurdity. Again, if the divine man wished to fortify his countrymen against impostures, he undoubtedly would have supplied them with a different rule, namely this: "Do not put faith in those men, but be certain that they are deluding you. Appoint therefore wise and experienced men, and command them to inquire accurately into the nature of the miracle. Those prodigies, believe me, will not bear examination, but the arts by which these impostors seek to delude our minds will immediately be made manifest to the whole people." There is no one, I imagine, but must be sensible that no wiser or better law than this could be given for fortifying the minds of the multitude against imposture. For when once a fraud of the kind is detected and exposed, all hope of deceiving men by them is for the future cut off. Moses, therefore, beyond doubt would have given this law if he had been speaking of fallacies and counterfeit miracles. Besides, Moses says that God will suffer these miracles to be performed in order to prove the minds of the Israelites, and to know whether they still continue to love the Lord, their God. But whatever is to test the piety of a whole people, must necessarily be something superior to those juggling tricks, by which impostors delude a rude and unlettered mob, and of which in populous nations there are always persons fully able to detect and expose the fallacy. Such a temptation would not have pertained to the whole people, to whom Moses however denounces it, but to those only who should be prevented either by their own natural stupidity, or by ignorance, from understanding those impostors' arts. Neither do they gain any thing who suppose that Moses in these words did not foretell things which were assuredly about to happen, but meant merely that if any thing of the kind should happen, the Israelites were to persevere in the love and worship of the Supreme Being. See J. Serces, ibid. p. 199. For it is sufficient for the present question that Moses is speaking of things which can take place, although they may not do so in reality. Wherefore, I have no doubt but that this prophecy is to be understood of such signs and wonders, as have in reference to mankind no less force than true miracles. 2. They assert that our Saviour in like manner, Matt. xxiv. 24. speaks solely of impostures by which false Messiahs were about to induce the people to put faith in them. I will grant that the Greek words admit of this interpretation, and also that the class against which our Saviour is guarding his followers, was numerous and fertile in counterfeit prodigies: as we may learn from Josephus alone: but notwithstanding this, I conceive that something greater is meant. In the first place, it appears to me not at all improbable that our Saviour, if he had meant his words to be understood of mere deceptions, would have signified that nothing more than attention and diligent examination would be necessary for their detection. Again, he foretels that the miracles would be so remarkable that even the *elect* would be deceived by them, unless fortified by divine assistance. The elect I hold to be those saints, who God foresaw would continue in the faith to the end of their lives, and whom he therefore elected to be made partakers of eternal life. If any one takes this word in a more general sense, and supposes it to comprehend all Christians, as many, I am aware do, still this interpretation will not affect the question at issue. In the first place, therefore, it is evident from these words that the miracles spoken of by our Saviour are of such a nature as to produce a greater effect upon those who are without than upon those who possess the true faith. But who is not aware that the impostures of jugglers and quacks do not belong to the class of things which differently affect the followers of Christ and his adversaries? The mists cast before

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whether called angels or demons. For these being supposed to have not only clearer understandings than men, and a greater insight into nature, but also by reason of their agility and in-

men's eyes by impostors are not dispelled by faith and piety, but by reason and attention, which are common to the bad as well as the good. For which reason, as daily experience shows us, those of the faithful who are gifted with only a moderate share of perspicacity, are sometimes much sooner deceived by such arts than unbelievers of cultivated intellect. In the next place, it is clear from the same words, that Christ is speaking in this passage of such prodigies as require divine assistance and grace, to prevent men from being misled by them. And we know that those who wish to expose the impostures of jugglers have no need of the special assistance of providence, but merely of the exercise of the mental faculties which they possess by nature. But the case is far otherwise with those prodigies which counterfeit the form and appearance of true miracles. For the elect, who firmly believe in the wisdom, providence, and goodness of God, who "know whom they have believed," 2 Tim. i. 12, and are no longer "carried about with every wind of doctrine," Eph. iv. 14, more easily overcome the power of these than the rest of mankind, and that not by their own strength, but by virtue of divine grace, which has established their hearts so as no longer to waver, Heb. xiii. 9. The testimony of the Holy Ghost which resides in their minds is more powerful than all the miracles by which the slaves of the evil one may attempt to confirm their own impious errors. "Though we, or an angel from heaven preach any other gospel than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed," Gal. i. 8. Neither, if I am not mistaken, are they more fortunate in evading the force of the passage, 2 Thess. ii. 9. 10. 11. wherein St. Paul is treating of the miracles of Antichrist. For even conceding that the words which the apostle there purposely accumulates together to show the greatness of the miracles of Antichrist, *πάσῃ δυνάμει, καὶ σημείοις, καὶ τέρασι ψεύδους* may conveniently be expounded of frauds and empty imposture, which, however, I should hardly admit; still, as has already been most justly observed by Dr. Cudworth, the words *κατ' ἐνέργειαν τοῦ Σατανᾶ* preclude this interpretation. [Des Vœux, Critique du Livre de M. Montgeron, tom. 1. lett. 2. p. 65. eludes this in a different way, and expounds the word *Σατανᾶς* of Antichrist: he also ranks the miracles of the magicians among frauds, p. 66. But the whole of his argument on the subject, is weak and unsound.] For the practice of imposture and the deception of the unwary vulgar, there is no need of the power of Satan, but simply of a crafty and versatile intellect. Again, God we are told, to punish the sins of men, suffers Antichrist to work such great miracles by the help and power of Satan, in order that those who were unwilling to obey the truth may believe lies. But this temptation would be but slight, and the punishment might be evaded by those for whom it was destined, if God suffered such a farce to be acted by certain crafty impostors. The more sagacious and intelligent, unless God were to dazzle their mental perception by some miracle, would find no difficulty in detecting the frauds of Antichrist, and avoiding his snares. Lastly, the apostle is manifestly predicting that the miracles hereafter about to be performed by Antichrist, in order to draw wicked and impious men to himself, would be strange and wonderful, such as never happened before. But what would there be wonderful and unprecedented in jugglers coming forth, and by certain ludicrous tricks imposing upon the eyes and ears of the people? The same thing was done long before the time of our Saviour, and the history of every nation is full of the false and counterfeit prodigies by which the Pagan priests deceived the people. There was no reason why St. Paul should describe in such splendid language the deeds by which the enemy of Christ was about to signalize his coming, if his prodigies were not to be greater than those which had formerly been performed by the priests of Æsculapius and Serapis. I shall pass over the passages adduced by Dr. Cudworth from the Revelations of St. John, which are still plainer even than the above, for example, chap. xiii. 13. where a certain minister of Antichrist is said to be about to cause fire to come down from heaven; a prodigy which, I imagine, no one would class among fallacies and impostures.

II. Between these two opinions lies the one entertained by Dr. Cudworth, which meets all the doubts besetting this argument, and entirely accords with the passages of sacred writ. [Des Vœux also adopts nearly the same view, Critique Generale du Livre de M. Montgeron, tom. 1. p. 29. 30. &c. where there is a long, but occasionally

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visibility, opportunity of knowing things remotely distant, and of being privy to men's secret machinations and consultations; it is easily conceivable that many future events nigh at hand,

perplexed and inelegant, dissertation on the power and efficacy of miracles.] This opinion leaves to evil demons the power of performing works which strike mankind with the greatest wonder, and have the form and appearance of miracles: but it denies that they can use this power to defeat the divine counsels and assault the true religion. How far God suffers Satan to exercise the power which he possesses, in the kingdom of nature, no mortal would be rash enough to assert. But in the kingdom of grace God never permits him to make use of this power, except in two cases: first, when he considers it necessary to prove those who believe in him, Deut. xiii. 4. &c. secondly, when he has by a most just judgment determined to deliver the men who have long despised the voice of truth into the power of those who are themselves imbued and wish to imbue others with pernicious errors, Matt. xxiv. 24. 2 Thess. ii. 11. But should this happen to take place, God nevertheless takes care that his own people who may be living amongst the wicked, suffer no harm from the miracles performed by the enemies of truth, and strengthens and confirms the elect, so that they remain unshaken in the faith which they have received, Matt. xxiv. 24. Thus neither are evil spirits deprived of the power which according to the authority of scripture they possess, nor is any injury done to the divine virtues and perfections. By adopting this opinion, 1. we get rid of the whole of that otherwise long and very intricate question respecting the distinctive marks of miracles. For it is unnecessary to inquire, by what signs the miracles either of God himself and his angels, or of good and wicked demons, may be distinguished, if we are certain that the supreme Being only very rarely permits evil spirits to make trial of their power, and when he does happen to permit this, he carefully provides for the safety of his own people. 2. It is evident from thence, that miracles of themselves are indubitable signs of the true religion, and that the most simple even may put faith in them without fear of danger or error, and without entering into any examination of the doctrine; a task for which but few are qualified: which being established, all that can be advanced against the argument which we draw from the miracles of Christ in proof of his divine authority, falls at once to the ground. 3. This doctrine is clearly in accordance with all the passages of sacred writ, in which mention is made of the miracles and prodigies both of the prince of darkness and his servants, and supplies an easy as well as neat and apt interpretation of them. This I consider to be already evident from what I have remarked a little above in reference to some of those passages: I shall now, according to my promise, add a few observations upon the miracles of the Egyptian magicians and the raising of Samuel from the dead.

The miracles said to have been performed by the Egyptian magicians, to destroy the efficacy of those of Moses, are considered by some to contain so much matter of doubt and inexplicable difficulty, that they think it better to leave the whole question undecided than to refer to their cause and origin. This has been done not long ago by the most ingenious J. Saurin, Discours sur la Bible, tom. 2. p. 48. who, to speak candidly, however, seems to me to have unnecessarily magnified the difficulties, and to have sought for knots in a rush. The generality of interpreters suppose this class of men to have performed what is recorded of them by the aid of demons. [Far different, however, is the view of Reinbeck in A. Conf. tom. 4. where there is a long dissertation on miracles; who argues that the magicians performed neither true nor false miracles. In which he is most certainly wrong.] Others, however, contend that the magicians made use of no instruments but their own ingenuity and sleight of hand, which opinion has lately been maintained with great skill and acuteness by J. Serces, Traité des Miracles, p. 157. [Le Moine Bibl. Raisonnée, tom. 41. p. 170. which is opposed p. 172.] For my own part, on considering the whole, I incline to the opinion of those who suppose demons to have had some hand in the matter. For, passing over what has been long ago remarked by others, if the magicians had done every thing by fraud and cunning, Moses could not have better consulted the interests of himself and the sacred cause he was defending, than by unmasking the crafty impostors, and exposing their secret arts to Pharaoh and the Egyptians. Thus all their authority would have vanished, and Egypt, being now made aware of the frauds and impostures of the magicians, would no longer have entrusted either their religion

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which cannot be foreknown by men, may be (probably at least) foreseen by them; and that without any miraculous divine revelation, their causes being already in being. As men learned in

or state to so flagitious a brotherhood; in short, there would probably have been no necessity for new and frequently repeated miracles to turn the heart of Pharaoh. [See Tartarotti, Del Congresso Notturno, p. 373. &c.] Therefore as the divine ambassador did not do this, but sought rather to influence the king's mind by the number of his miracles, it may be taken as a proof, I consider, that the magicians in their contest with Moses were fortified not so much with impostures as with the aid of demons. And lest this should appear surprising, I wish it to be remembered in the first place, as it will relieve the question of many difficulties, that the state of Egypt and its king at that time was such that God consistently with his goodness and justice might permit a demon to deceive men's eyes, and to exercise his power for the purpose of misleading this infatuated nation. This is sufficiently evident both from the whole of history and from the words of God himself, in which he threatens that he will "harden Pharaoh's heart," Exod. iv. 21. vii. 3. For God is not wont to harden any but those who obstinately and wickedly resist truth and the divine counsels. Secondly, the miracles of the magicians are not such as subvert the laws of nature, or cannot well be performed by a demon. They first of all cause the rods which they cast down to become serpents, Exod. vii. 11. 12. There is nothing wonderful in this: for I do not suppose that the demons either really changed the rods into serpents, or produced serpents by their own power, or, lastly, suddenly generated these reptiles from the seed of serpents [Le Brun, Histoire Crit. des Practiques Superst. lib. 1. supposes the demon to have performed this by the rapidity of motion]: on the contrary, I grant that none of these could be done by the power of a demon. In my opinion certain demons were at hand to assist them, and having suddenly snatched up the rods, cast down serpents, of which there were at that time immense numbers in Egypt. They next turn water into blood, or rather give it the colour of blood, Exod. vii. 22. This is a sort of prodigy that might be performed in a certain measure by those who are skilled in natural science. Thus after the magicians had struck the water with their rods, one or more demons tinged it with a red colour, so that what appeared water before seemed to the Egyptians to be blood. Thirdly, they fill Egypt with a multitude of frogs, Exod. viii. 7. But what difficulty would it be for a demon to collect a number of frogs from the neighbouring fens, and distribute them through the houses, villages, and towns. Nor is it necessary that we should suppose this to have been done instantaneously. The rest of Moses' miracles the Egyptian sorcerers are not said to have imitated, nor were they able to imitate them, because they surpassed the power of demons.

The witch of Endor, by whom the deceased Samuel is said to have been presented alive before king Saul, 1 Sam. xxviii. was not long ago the subject of a temperate and learned controversy between two eminent scholars, the late J. Fr. Buddeus and the able and erudite Genevese theologian J. Alph. Turretinus. The latter, Dissertat. pro Veritate Religionis Christianæ, supposes the woman to have passed off some optical deception upon Saul. [So also Ant. Van Dalen, De Oraculis, p. 23. 24.] The former, both in his Historia Ecclesiast. Vet. Testam. tom. 2. p. 306. &c. and in a particular Diss. Epistolica ad August. Gotth. Graffium de Pythonissa Endorea, published at Jena in 4to. maintains that she was assisted by a demon, who personated Samuel. Turretinus' opinion is defended at great length and with much elegance by Jac. Serces, Traité des Miracles, p. 203. &c. with whose dissertation, however, it will be worth while to compare what is remarked in illustration as well as in defence of and opposition to it in La Bibliotheque Raisonnée, published at Amsterdam, tom. 4. par. 2. p. 435. J. Saurin, the most eloquent of the Reformed French theologians, espouses an opinion intermediate between these two, the respective arguments of which he also enumerates, Discours sur la Bible, tom. 4. p. 466. &c. For he supposes God himself to have caused Samuel really to appear before Saul. [This opinion is acutely defended by Le Brun, Hist. Critique de Superstit. tom. 4. as also by Launoy. See Biblioth. Nouv. tom. 6. p. 363. &c. See also a specific Diss. in support of this opinion, Memoir. tom. 5. p. 338. &c.] For my own part, having examined the arguments on each side, I profess myself favourable to the opinion, though not to the fullest extent, of those who hold Saul to have been deceived by a demon. Certainly none accords more aptly with the words of Scripture; and God could permit this to be done consistently with

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astronomy can foretell eclipses of the sun and moon, which to the vulgar are altogether unforeknowable; and as princes or statesmen, that are furnished with great intelligence, foreign and domestic, can presage more of war and peace, either at home or abroad, and of the events of kingdoms, than ignorant plebeians. And such were those predictions which Democritus, though otherwise much addicted to atheism, allowed of; Cicero writing thus of him:* Plurimis locis, gravis auctor Democritus præsensionem rerum futurarum comprobat, "Democritus, a grave writer, doth in many places approve of the presension of future events." The reason whereof was, because he supposed certain understanding beings superior to men, called by him idols,[3] which having a larger comprehension of things, and other advantages of knowledge, could therefore foretell many future events that men were ignorant of. And though perhaps it may be thought that Democritus would not have entertained this opinion of the foreknowledge of human events, had he not asserted the necessity of all human actions and volitions, but held liberty of will, as Epicurus afterwards did (as if this were inconsistent with all manner of presage, and probable or conjectural foreknowledge); yet is it certain that there is not so much contingency in all human actions, by reason of this liberty of will, as heretofore was by Epicurus, and still is by many supposed; it being plain that men act according to an appearance of good, and that in many cases and circumstances it may be foreknown, without any divine revelation, what such or such persons would do. As for example, that a voluptuous person, having a strong temptation to satisfy his sensual appetite, and that without incurring any inconvenience of shame or punishment, would readily close with the same. Besides which, such invisible spirits, as angels or demons, may sometimes predict also what themselves cause and effect.

Secondly, there is another sort of predictions of future events, which cannot be imputed to the natural presaging faculty of any

his wisdom and goodness. For Saul's impiety had hitherto been so flagrant that he was not unworthy of being delivered up to the snares and wiles of Satan. Neither is the thing itself that took place too great for a demon to perform. For I do not suppose that the wicked spirit either formed a body resembling Samuel out of air or produced a spectre, but I consider him to have deceived the eyes of Saul by an optical illusion, such as, it is well known, we frequently see practised at the present day, by which the inexperienced can be so far misled as to fancy that they see men when they only behold their images and resemblances. [See Tartarotti, Del Congresso Notturno, p. 383. &c.] The precise nature of this artifice it is not my business to explain: I am satisfied, however, that a demon, if permitted by the supreme Being, is well qualified to perform such deceptions. This opinion is not entirely at variance with the view of those who refer the whole matter to fallacies: neither does it altegether accord with it, but in a certain respect combines those who ascribe it either to human cunning or to the power of demons.

* De Divinat. lib. 1. [Cap. 3. p. 3111. tom. 9. opp.]

[3] On these idols of Democritus we have discoursed largely above.

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such created spirits, but only to the supernatural prescience of God Almighty, or a Being infinitely perfect: as when events remotely distant in time, and of which there are yet no immediate causes actually in being, which also depend upon many circumstances, and a long series of things, any one of which being otherwise would alter the case; as likewise upon much uncertainty of human volitions, which are not always necessarily linked and concatenated with what goes before, but often loose and free; and upon that contingency, that arises from the indifferency or equality of eligibility in objects. Lastly, such things as do not at all depend upon external circumstances neither, nor are caused by things natural anteceding, but by some supernatural power; I say, when such future events as these are foretold, and accordingly come to pass, this can be ascribed to no other but such a being as comprehends, sways, and governs all, and is, by a peculiar privilege or prerogative of its own nature, omniscient. Epicurus, though really he therefore rejected divination and prediction of future events, because he denied providence; yet did he pretend this further reason also against it, because it was a thing absolutely inconsistent with liberty of will, and destructive of the same:[4] Ἡ μαντικὴ ἀνύπαρκτος· εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑπαρκτική, οὐδὲν παρ' ἡμᾶς ἤδη τὰ γινόμενα, "Divination is a thing which hath no existence, nor possibility in nature: and if there were such a thing, it would take away all liberty of will, and leave nothing in men's own power." Thus also Carneades, in Cicero,[5] maintained, Ne Apollinem quidem futura posse dicere, nisi ea, quorum causas natura ita contineret, ut ea fieri necesse esset, "That Apollo himself was not able to foretell any future events, other than such as had necessary causes in nature antecedent." And some Christian Theists[6] of later times have, in like manner, denied to God Almighty all foreknowledge of human actions, upon the same pretence, as being both inconsistent with men's liberty of will, and destructive thereof. For, say they, if men's actions be free, then are they unforeknowable, they having no necessary causes;

[4] Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 10. segm. 135. p. 660. In the published copy, however, this passage is different from the one here given. For in it the opinion of Epicurus finishes with these words: Οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἡγητέον τὰ γινόμενα, "The events which take place are to be considered as not pertaining to us." The meaning of these words, however, does not differ from that expressed by Dr. Cudworth. The words παρ' ἡμᾶς stand in all the editions of Laërtius previous to that of Meibomius; who first gave the emendation πρὸς ἡμᾶς, and, as I consider, advisedly. But upon what authority Dr. Cudworth has changed ἡγητέον into ἤδη, I am unable to say.

[5] De Fato, cap. 14. p. 3281. tom. 9. opp.

[6] That this is the opinion of Socinus' followers and some others is well known to those who have made the various and discordant opinions of Christians their study. See Faustus Socinus, Prælection. Theologic. cap. 8. 9. 10. f. 32. &c. Jo. Crellius, On God and the Divine Attributes, cap. 24. p. 223. of the Dutch version. Val. Schmalzius, Contra Franzium, p. 472. 473.

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and again, if there be any foreknowledge of them, then can they not be free, they being ipso facto necessitated thereby. But as it is certain that prescience does not destroy the liberty of man's will, or impose any necessity upon it, men's actions being not therefore future, because they are foreknown, but therefore foreknown, because future; and were a thing never so contingent, yet upon supposition that it will be done, it must needs have been future from all eternity: so is it extreme arrogance for men, because themselves can naturally foreknow nothing but by some causes antecedent, as an eclipse of the sun or moon, therefore to presume to measure the knowledge of God Almighty according to the same scantling, and to deny him the prescience of human actions, not considering that, as his nature is incomprehensible, so his knowledge may well be looked upon by us as such too; that which is past our finding out, and too wonderful for us. However, it must be acknowledged for an undoubted truth, that no created being can, naturally, and of itself, foreknow any future events, otherwise than in and by their causes anteceding. If therefore we shall find that there have been predictions of such future events as had no necessary antecedent causes; as we cannot but grant such things therefore to be foreknowable, so must we needs from thence infer the existence of a God, that is, a Being supernatural, infinitely perfect and omniscient, since such predictions as these could have proceeded from no other cause.

That there is foreknowledge of future events to men naturally unforeknowable, hath been all along the persuasion of the generality of mankind. Thus Cicero:* Vetus opinio est, jam usque ab heroicis ducta temporibus, eaque et populi Romani, et omnium Gentium firmata consensu, versari quandam inter homines divinationem, quam Græci μαντικὴν appellant, id est, præsensionem et scientiam rerum futurarum, "This is an old opinion derived down all along from the heroic times (or the mythical age), and not only entertained amongst the Romans, but also confirmed by the consent of all nations, that there is such a thing as divination, and presension or foreknowledge of future events." And the same writer elsewhere, in the person of Balbus:† Quamvis nihil tam irridet Epicurus, quàm prædictionem rerum futurarum, mihi videtur tamen vel maximè confirmare, Deorum providentia consuli rebus humanis. Est enim profecto divinatio; quæ multis locis, rebus, temporibus apparet, cùm in privatis, tùm maximè in publicis. Multa cernunt aruspices, multa augures provident, multa oraculis providentur, multa vaticinationibus, multa somniis, multa portentis, "Although Epicurus deride nothing more than the prediction of future

* De Divinat. lib. 1.

† De Natura Deor. lib. 2. p. 239. Lamb. [Cap. 65. p. 3046. tom. 9. opp.]

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things; yet does this seem to me to be a great confirmation of the providence of the gods over human affairs, because there is certainly divination, it appearing in many places, things, and times, and that not only private, but especially public. Soothsayers foresee many things, the augurs many; many things are declared by oracles, many by prophecies, many by dreams, and many by portents." And indeed that there were even amongst the Pagans predictions of future events, not discoverable by any human sagacity, which accordingly came to pass, and therefore argue a knowledge superior to that of men, or that there are certain invisible understanding beings or spirits, seems to be undeniable from history. And that the augurs themselves were sometimes not unassisted by these officious genii, is plain from that of Attius Navius before mentioned, as the circumstances thereof are related by historians; that Tarquinius Priscus having a mind to try what there was in this skill of augury,[7] Dixit ei se cogitare quiddam; id possetne fieri, consuluit. Ille augurio acto, posse respondet. Tarquinius autem dixit se cogitasse cotem novaculâ posse præcidi; tum Attium jussisse experiri: ita cotem in comitium illatam, inspectante et rege et populo, novaculâ esse discissam, "Told Navius, that he thought of something, and he would know of him whether it could be done or no. Navius having performed his augurating ceremonies, replied, that the thing might be done. Whereupon Priscus declared what his thought was, namely, that a whetstone might be cut in two with a razor. Navius willed them to make trial: wherefore a whetstone being brought immediately into the court, it was in the sight of the king and all the people divided with a razor." But the predictions amongst those Pagans were, for the most part, only of the former kind, such as proceeded merely from the natural presaging faculty of these demons; this appearing from hence, because their oracles were often expressed ambiguously, so as that they might be taken either way; those demons themselves, it seems, being then not confident of the event; as also, because they were sometimes plainly mistaken in the events. And from hence it was that they seldom ventured to foretell any events remotely distant, but only what were nigh at hand, and shortly to come to pass; and therefore might be probably conjectured of from things then in being.[8] Notwithstanding which, we acknowledge that there

[7] These are the words of Cicero, De Divinatione, lib. 2. cap. 17. p. 3129. tom. 9. opp.

[8] Whether demons were concerned or not in the predictions and oracles of ancient nations, will be discussed by us by-and-by. At present I cannot but remark that the three reasons here assigned for supposing that divinations and oracles, which were held in such high estimation previously to the birth of our Saviour, could proceed from the presaging faculty of demons and genii, admit of a more extensive application than the learned Doctor intends, and may be employed to the complete overthrow of his opinion. I. He supposes demons, and not God, to have been the authors of those oracles,

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are some few instances of predictions amongst the Pagans of the other kind. Such as that intimated by Cicero in his book of Divination,[9] where he declareth the doctrine of Diodorus con-

because they were frequently ambiguous. Another will maintain it to be evident from hence, and in my opinion with good reason, that all those predictions and prophecies of future events are to be attributed solely to the cunning and craftiness of soothsayers, augurs, and priests. II. He considers this to be clear also from the fact that the ancient prophets predicted only those events which were shortly about to come to pass, but not those which were remote and separated by long intervals of time. Another might argue with great probability that this is a strong argument for supposing the whole affair to be referable to the craft and impudence of impostors. For people are not much taken with predictions of those things which they hear are not to happen till they themselves have been long ago dead: on the contrary, the multitude is always eager to know beforehand the fates and fortunes awaiting themselves and their own times. Wherefore it was not worth while for the priests and augurs to foretell to mankind the events of future ages, although they might have done so without any risk to themselves: but it was greatly to their interest to have the credit of being able to predict the fortunes of living men. Not to mention, that the oracles and diviners generally speaking, merely returned answers to inquirers: and no one was absurd enough to inquire concerning matters about to happen after a lapse of some ages. III. It is scarcely necessary for me to remark the same of the third reason. For no one is so dull as not to perceive that the fact of an oracle not being fulfilled by the event is a stronger proof that it proceeded from the craftiness of men than that a demon was its author. But some one will object, perhaps, that there are many examples of predictions which bear evidence of greater perspicacity than is possessed by any man, and therefore could only have been derived from a being of a superior condition to mankind: and this being the case, that there is much weight in these arguments towards proving the oracles of the ancients to have proceeded from demons. But those of a different opinion will answer, that the examples which are usually brought forward on this question are uncertain and doubtful: that it is possible for many things to have happened by mere accident in the way predicted by the priests and augurs; in short, that we may fairly suppose the historians who mention oracles of the kind, to have frequently attended more to fame and popular rumours, or their own superstition, than to reason. But granting it to be true, as is commonly stated, that formerly not a few things were predicted, which no one could have known beforehand, unless instructed by a being superior to man, still this adds no new weight to these arguments towards proving what they are intended to prove. For I do not understand how a man can be refuted who reasons in this manner: With some predictions of the ancients the facts and events corresponded: with others they did not correspond. Some oracles were clear and perspicuous; others again doubtful and ambiguous. Therefore sometimes demons, with the permission of God, predicted by means of their slaves the events which were about to happen to nations and individuals: but at others the priests and soothsayers beguiled and imposed upon the unwary vulgar. Those responses of the gods and oracles which were confirmed by the event, I consider to have proceeded from demons: but those which I observe to be of another character, I ascribe to the impostures of men. The example of Attius Navius, upon which the learned Doctor lays so much stress, does not properly belong to divinations, but to wonderful deeds which are recorded to have taken place in the heroic times, and are ranked by himself, a little above, among miracles. But this rests upon no adequate and satisfactory authority, but merely upon rumour and popular tradition, as is evident even from Livy, and therefore is classed by me among those miracles which are said to have been performed by St. Geneviève among the French, and by St. Patrick among the Irish. Possibly something of the kind did formerly happen at Rome: upon which however we can determine nothing certain, since the circumstances of the time and other relations, from which we ought to form our judgment on the nature of wonderful actions, are at this day un-

[9] He meant De Fato, in which book, cap. 7. p. 3269. tom. 9. opp. these words occur.

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cerning necessity and contingency: Non necesse fuisse Cypselum regnare Corinthi, quanquam id millesimo antè anno Apollinis oraculo editum esset, "That it was not necessary Cypselus the tyrant should reign at Corinth, though that were a thing predicted by Apollo's oracle a thousand years before." As also this recorded by Varro,[10] of Vectius Valens, an augur in the time of Romulus, who, when Rome was a building, from the flying of twelve vultures, presaged that the continuance of that city would be for twelve hundred years: which seems to have been accordingly fulfilled, in the year of our Lord four hundred and fifty five, immediately after the death of the third Valentinian (whom some make to be the last emperor of the West or Rome) when Gensericus the Vandal took the city the second time, and fired it. But above all, that of the Sibyls; of whose prophecies such things are recorded by pagan writers, as makes it very suspicious, that they did foretell the coming of our Saviour Christ, and the times of Christianity. But were these, and the like pagan prophecies, real, then must they needs have had some higher original than the natural presaging faculty of their demons, especially those of the Sibyls; who, for aught we know, might be as well

known to us. What the more intelligent of the Romans thought of this prodigy of Attius may be learned from these words of Cicero, occurring De Nat. Deor. lib. 3. cap. 6. p. 3058. tom. 9. opp. Non possum Attii Navii, quem commemorabas, lituum contemnere. Sed qui ista intellecta sunt, a philosophis debes discere, præsertim cum isti plurimis de rebus divinis *mentiantur*, "I cannot contemn the staff of Attius Navius you have spoken of. But I ought to learn from philosophers, how such things are to be understood, especially as those men, in reference to a great many divine matters, deal in lies." Add what he says, De Divinat. lib. 2. cap. 38. p. 3223. Omitte igitur lituum Romuli, quem in maximo incendio negas potuisse comburi: contemne cotem Attii Navii: nihil debet esse in philosophia commentitiis fabellis loci, "Say no more, therefore, about the staff of Romulus, which you assert could not be burnt in the great conflagration: despise the whetstone of Attius Navius: in philosophy no place should be given to commentitious fables."

[10] The passage of Varro here touched upon by the learned Doctor is found in the Fragments of lib. 18. of his Antiquitates Rerum Humanarum. The words themselves are as follows: Fuisse Vettium Romæ in augurio non ignobilem, ingenio magno, cuivis docto in disputando parem: eum se audivisse dicentem: si ita essent, ut traderent historici de Romæ urbis condendæ auguriis ac duodecim vulturibus: quoniam centum et viginti annos incolumis præteriisset populus Romanus, ad mille et ducentos perventurum, "That Vettius was an augur of no mean note at Rome, possessing great intellect, and a match for any of the learned in disputation: that he had heard him say, that if what historians recorded of the auguries and twelve vultures, at the time of building Rome were true, the Roman people having passed one hundred and twenty years in safety would last for twelve hundred years." Now it is evident from these words that Dr. Cudworth's memory has twice deceived him in this passage. I. He calls the augur, whose prediction he is speaking of, Vectius Valens. But Varro writes that he had no other name than Vettius. The learned Doctor seems to have confounded Vestius Valens, a diviner and soothsayer of Antioch, who foretold the fortunes of new Rome or Constantinople to Constantine the Great, with that other Vettius mentioned by Varro, who presaged the duration of ancient Rome. Concerning the Antiochian seer, consult Gerh. Jo. Vossius, De Scientiis Mathematicis, cap. 37. 6. II. He supposes Vettius the augur to have been contemporary with Romulus, and to have himself seen those vultures, from whose number he predicted the continuance of the Roman city. But it is clear from the words of Varro, that he lived long after

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assisted supernaturally to predict our Saviour Christ, amongst the Pagans in the West, as Balaam was in the East.[11]

But here the Scripture triumpheth over paganism and all its

Romulus, and in the time of Varro himself, and made his conjecture from what was currently reported respecting the twelve vultures seen by Romulus. The matter itself referred to by Vettius, is recorded by Livy, Hist. lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 7. These errors have already been noticed by the celebrated J. Le Clerc, Biblioth. Choisie, tom. 4. p. 116. &c.

[11] Here a few words will be required in solution of a twofold question. First: Whether the priests who presided over the oracles of the ancients were influenced by evil demons, and by their instruction sometimes predicted future events, or acted a mere farce and deluded those who consulted them by fictitious prophecies? Secondly: Whether the supreme Being ever thought good to grant the faculty of divination to Pagans? The learned Doctor does not hesitate to affirm both these: but there are not a few who will consider this to be done unadvisedly.

Every one who is not entirely ignorant of the history of literature must be acquainted with the ingenious and erudite disputations among the learned of our own times on the subject of the ancient oracles. As most of the ancient Christians, and nearly all theologians after them, had given to oracles an important place among the means by which the prince of darkness, prior to the birth of our Saviour, kept nations in bondage to himself, Ant. Van. Dalen, in a specific work On Oracles, published at the close of the last century, maintained with great copiousness and learning, that no oracle ought to be ascribed to an evil demon, but all of them to the craft and imposture of priests: whose footsteps have been followed by learned men in such numbers, that at this day a man would scarcely escape the stigma of superstition, if he did not pronounce his disbelief, that demons, on some occasions at least, had any concern in these matters. Those who wish to know the history of this controversy may seek it from others: for myself it will be sufficent to notice this one thing, which has escaped those who have recorded it, that to Fr. Baltus, and the others who reject Van Dalen's opinion, an auxiliary arrived not long ago from India, J. V. Bouchet, one of those Jesuists that are sent to India under the auspices of the pope for the purpose of propagating the Christian religion: who, in a tolerably long letter to Balt, recounts examples of oracles seen and witnessed by himself among nations enslaved with the superstition of many gods. See Lettres Edifiantes et Curieuses Ecrites des Missions Etrangeres, tom. 9. p. 61—123. For my own part, on reviewing the whole matter, I am disposed to consider this to belong to that class of controversies upon which it is impossible to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion. Those who dispute upon the matter are agreed as to the existence of demons, or beings superior to man, either as regards intellect, or agility, or the knowledge of recondite causes, or, in short, other things: for if one side were to deny this, there would be an end of the whole disputation, and it would be necessary to inquire concerning demons, before we could come to oracles. They are also agreed that these demons, from various causes, can foresee and predict some things, which no human being can have any foresight of. For if men who excel others in sciences can foretell many things which the less experienced cannot see before they happen, who would deny the same faculty to genii, more powerful and acute than man? Lastly. They both allow that those genii are able to impart to others their knowledge of future events, and that neither God's justice nor goodness always prevents them from doing so. On which matters as those who deliberate upon the causes of oracles are not at issue, I do not understand how it can be proved that demons never predicted future events through the priests, and that all oracles were no better than the idle divinations of soothsayers and the Chaldeans. Those who deny altogether the agency of demons in oracles, in the first place, appeal to the numerous examples in which manifest traces are discernible of fraud and imposture: secondly, they speak of the ambiguity and falsehood of oracles: they then adduce the testimonies of many of the pagan writers themselves, in which these writers ridicule the vanity and fallacy of oracles: lastly, they suppose it to be unworthy of God to suffer evil demons to deceive and delude mankind by their responses. It is unnecessary to enumerate the arguments and observations of minor importance. But the last of these arguments goes too far, and proves more than it is intended to prove. For by parity of reasoning, any one might rightly conclude as follows: It was unworthy of God to suffer priests, sooth-

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oracles and divinations; there being contained in it so many unquestionable predictions of events to follow a long time after, and such as can be imputed to nothing but the supernatural

sayers, seers, magicians, expounders of dreams, to mislead people by their divinations and responses. It is all the same, whether a man is deceived by demons or by their minions. Therefore if the supreme Being, as all acknowledge, does nothing unworthy of his majesty by permitting impostors of the kind and the priests of empty idols to circumvent the multitude, neither can it appear inconsistent with his consummate perfections that, previously to the birth of our Saviour, he sometimes allowed evil genii to predict future events through men devoted to themselves. God has not granted reason to mankind for no purpose: which if they will not make use of, but will suffer themselves to be deceived by artful men, or even by demons, they have no cause for blaming God, but only themselves and their own idleness. This argument, therefore, is of equal force against those who ascribe no oracle to demons, as it is against those who maintain demons to have been present in all the temples. As to the three former, they prove clearly that in many oracles the wickedness of men had more to do than that of demons, and that those who surpassed the vulgar in wisdom and sagacity were conscious of this, but they by no means prove all oracles to have been of this kind. For if I could show six hundred instances of oracles proceeding from the craft and imposture of men, still this would not amount to a proof that all oracles were of the same kind, unless I should first prove by clear arguments, that it is impossible for demons to make men acquainted with future events, either through their ministers or in any other manner. Which being beyond the power of any one to do, I consider it to be evident, therefore, that we cannot assert generally that all the accounts which have come down to us in the books of good authors concerning miracles are to be referred to frauds and impostures. The other side, who hold either all or the major part of oracles to have proceeded from demons, draw the chief support of their opinion, partly from the responses said formerly to have been given, and partly from the testimonies of Christians. But that the Christians of the primitive ages are not men who are implicitly to be believed will be doubted by no one who is not ignorant of the various errors into which they incautiously fell. It is difficult to divest ourselves of those opinions which we have been imbued with from infancy: and therefore it is not to be wondered at that men of great piety and worth in other respects should have clung to many of the popular superstitions which they had imbibed almost with their mothers' milk. As to the oracles themselves, some of them undoubtedly seem to surpass the faculties of men: but any one, I imagine, may perceive that those who entertain the opposite opinion will not long be at a loss for something to bring forward against them. They will reply, that it is possible for the event to have corresponded with the prediction by pure accident; or they will call into question the credibility of the authors; or they will contend that the narratives of the facts are not sufficiently clear and perfect. All this being so, I do not hesitate to declare, that every thing is not so clear in this controversy as to warrant us in pronouncing altogether in favour of either side. That the authors of many oracles were crafty priests and not demons, learned men have demonstrated by arguments as valid as can be produced on such questions. But as it still remains certain that there is nothing absurd or contrary to reason in the opinion of those who suppose demons to have sometimes really delivered oracles, I consider I shall do right, if I refrain from fully assenting to either view. On comparing the two opinions, however, it must certainly be owned, that those who refer all the ancient oracles to the craftiness of men are in a somewhat better position than those who suppose demons to have in former times inspired the priests, or themselves delivered responses to inquirers. For the former, having already produced instances of many frauds of the kind, have by that means not only given some probability to their opinion, but have also proved the possibility of its being altogether true. For that which has happened twice or thrice can happen a hundred times. Whereas the latter, who have not yet established either by indubitable examples or testimonies that a demon was ever really the author of oracles, have nothing to rely upon but this, that their opinion cannot be convicted of falsehood. But in my judgment, an opinion supported by arguments, which if not certain are at least probable, has somewhat more of plausibility in it than the one which has no foundation to rest upon, except merely that nobody can wholly refute it: although a wise man would not give his entire assent to either. Every one, I consider,

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foreknowledge and omniscience of God Almighty. As for example, those concerning the Messiah, or our Saviour Christ, delivered by Jacob, Moses, David, Isaias, Jeremy, Daniel, and

ought to be left at liberty to decide upon such matters as he likes: for religion is not in the least affected by either the one or the other opinion. I have often been surprised to see worthy men, in other respects of high eminence in sacred as well as profane learning, contend on the side of those who refer the origin of oracles exclusively to demons, as though they were combating for the glory of God and the welfare of the church. For I cannot bring myself to consider it to be to the glory of God, for men to believe that, previously to the time of our Saviour, Satan was permitted to wander about at will, and every where to deceive miserable mortals by all sorts of frauds and fallacies. I have thought proper to observe thus much, even for the sake of satisfying the illustrious scholar, Jo. Christoph. Gottscheid, professor of Leipzig, who, without having received any obligation from me, not long ago most courteously dedicated to me a most elegant German version of Fontanelle's History of Oracles, published in French, and publicly requested my opinion concerning this controversy.

I come now to the second question: Whether there were formerly men among the nations ignorant of the true religion, who for certain reasons were gifted by the supreme Being with the faculty of predicting future events. An immense number of the learned do not hesitate to espouse Dr. Cudworth's opinion. And as many as ascribe any thing to the Sibylline verses, which an infinity of persons notoriously do, cannot but entertain it. [Almost all the ancient Christians thought so. See Beausobre, Hist. des Manich. p. 305. &c.] Of the earlier Christian fathers the author of the Quæstiones et Responsiones ad Orthodoxos, which at this day bear the name of Justin Martyr, did not scruple to follow the same opinion, Quæst. 2. p. 392. opp. Justini. For after having asked, "Since there were true prophets among the Greeks as well as among Christians, and divinations of future events were given by both parties, by what marks can we distinguish the Christian prophets to be more excellent?" he answers as follows: *Τοῦ αὐτοῦ Θεοῦ ἔστι πάντα ταῦτά καὶ ἡ προρρήσις τῶν λόγων καὶ ἔκβασις τῶν ἔργων, καὶ τοῦ διὰ τῶν προφητῶν τε καὶ ἀποστόλων προμηνύσαντος, ἃ ἔμελλε ποιεῖν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἔξωθεν τῆς εὐσεβείας αὐτὸς προεμήνυσεν, ἃ ἔμελλε ποιεῖν*, "All these, the prediction of words as well as the event of things, are of the same God; who both foretold by the holy prophets and apostles what he was about to do, and in like manner foreshowed future events by those who were strangers to the true worship." Which having proved, although somewhat inaptly, by the example of Balaam and a certain passage of Ezekiel, he again subjoins the following: *Οὕτως καὶ διὰ τῶν παρ' Ἕλλησι μαντέων ὅσα διὰ τῶν ἔργων τὴν ἔκβασιν ἐδέξατο, αὐτὸς προεμήνυσε*, "In like manner he (God) foreshowed by the Greek prophets, whatever was fulfilled by the event." Let us see how far we can assent to this opinion. In the first place it is evident to us from the authority of sacred writ, that God, consistently with his perfections, can impart to impious and flagitious men extraordinary powers, and among these the faculty of divination. For to pass over the example of Balaam, which Dr. Cudworth himself has cited, and of Caiaphas, John xi. 51. the divine prophet Micah in the words of God accuses the prophets of his time of *divining for money*, Micah iii. 11. and our Saviour himself declares that at the last day he will say to many of those who have prophesied in his name, "I never knew you, depart from me, ye that work iniquity," Matt. vii. 23. All these, however, although leading a wicked life, were yet not entirely devoid of the true religion, but were imbued in a great measure with correct sentiments on religion, and not associated with those who despised the true God and worshipped false deities. Wherefore I should consider it to be not yet proved by these examples, that there is nothing to prevent God from entrusting the power of predicting future events to those who are altogether strangers to the true worship. In the next place it is well known that no nation in times past was so barbarous and so forsaken of God, that he did not now and then raise up in it good and wise men, especially before the promulgation of the law by Moses, who abominated the popular superstitions and the worship of idols, and both recommended to the people and themselves followed a better and more holy religion. There occur in sacred writ illustrious examples in proof of this. Even the Jews by universal consent allow, that prior to the time of Moses other nations as well as themselves had their prophets. See Rich. Simonii Lettres Choisies, tom. 3. ch. 9.

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most of the prophets; foretelling sundry particular circumstances of his coming, and that grand event, which followed after, of the Gentiles or Pagans' so general reception and enter-

p. 49. Wherefore, if those who think with Dr. Cudworth simply mean that no nation was altogether destitute of divinely inspired men, from whom all who were so disposed might learn the knowledge of the true God, and the way of eternal salvation, there would be nothing in this opinion to be found fault with. But these learned men wish us to concede something more, and require us to believe that the supreme Being sometimes disclosed his will and future events even to those whose minds were entirely devoid of true religion, and contaminated with the most perverse sentiments concerning God. Are we therefore to assent to this opinion? For my part I consider we ought to decide that generally God can do, and sometimes for most just and holy reasons did do, the thing in question. I am led to this conclusion by the example, recorded in Scripture, of Nebuchadnezzar, Dan. ii. 1. This king beyond all controversy served vain gods; and yet God by a remarkable dream informed him of the fate of his empire. I should almost add the example of Abimelech, king of Gerar, to whom the supreme Being is likewise said to have signified his will in sleep, Gen. xx. 6. But on considering all that is recorded of this king, he does not seem to me to have been a man wholly ignorant of the true religion, although I willingly grant that he was not in the strict sense a true worshipper of God. It being certain, therefore, that it is not incompatible with the holiness of God, sometimes to disclose future things to the worshippers of idols, it remains for us to inquire, whether examples of such prophets can be produced from the history of ancient nations, especially of the Greeks and Romans. I shall merely take a review of those adduced by Dr. Cudworth; for as those who hold the same opinion do not bring forward any that are better and greater, by ascertaining the estimation reason requires us to form of these, we shall at once know what we are to think of the whole. 1. I shall begin with the last example, that of Balaam. But it will be already evident from what I have stated above, that this is foreign to the matter in hand. For Balaam, as the whole of his history and the prophecy itself show, was not a stranger to the true religion, but a worshipper of one God, and separated from the people of God only by his vices and place of abode, Num. xxiii. 2. The Sibyls, who here occupy the last place but one among the examples, are the subject of endless questions and doubts among the learned, and therefore cannot supply us with any sure argument on this question. If there were women of the kind in former times, which I consider not unlikely, still we are unable to come to any positive decision respecting the faculty possessed by them, as long as we lack their oracles and poems. That any of them are extant at the present day is denied by most men, nor are those which are commonly passed off for Sibylline verses received as such by persons eminent for their skill in criticism or their knowledge of ancient matters. 3. I could wish that the Roman augur Vettius, who lived in the time of Varro, had been altogether excluded by our author from this number. For the augury of this man is not such as could not proceed from any one but a divine prophet. I can imagine this foolish seer to have prophesied with great confidence, because he knew for a certainty that at the time he pointed out neither himself nor any of his auditors would be living. Neither did the event, as the learned Doctor supposes, confirm this oracle. For although the city was taken, and a great part of it burnt down by Genseric, twelve centuries after Romulus, still it did not utterly perish according to the prediction of Vettius, nor cease to be a splendid, illustrious, and magnificent city after that calamity. But above all, what completely deprives Vettius' oracle of all authority is, that this man predicted the duration of the Roman city from the number and flight of the vultures. Therefore, if God was the author of this oracle it follows that he also caused so many vultures to appear to Romulus, and consequently no one can doubt but that the science of augurs, upon the laws of which Vettius' prophecy chiefly rests, was in former times a divine institution. But what man in his senses, and entertaining correct notions of divine matters, would believe this? 4. The oracle concerning Cypselus, which is the one first instanced here, and taken from Cicero's book De Fato, is regarded by me in no higher light. For this is said to have been predicted of Cypselus by the oracle of Apollo; and it is utterly incredible that the supreme and most holy Deity ever prophesied from the Delphic tripod, or employed the mouth of the Pythian priestess to foreshow the fates of nations and empires. Although there

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tainment of Christianity; that is, the belief of the Messiah, promised to the Jews; together with the shaking off of their gods and idols. Amongst which Scripture prophecies, concerning our Saviour Christ, we must needs reckon for one, and none of the least considerable neither, that of Daniel's weeks, or of four hundred and ninety years, to commence from the going forth of the word, or the decree made by Artaxerxes the son of Xerxes, in the seventh year of his reign, for the return of the people of Israel, Priests and Levites, to Jerusalem; and to terminate in the death of the Messiah, and the preaching of the gospel to the Jews only; though we are not ignorant, how some learned men, both of the former and latter times, have stretched their wits, they sometimes using no small violence to divert this prophecy another way. For that these prophecies, concerning our Saviour Christ, could have no other original than the immediate supernatural revelation of God Almighty, is evident from the thing itself; it being such as depended on no natural causes, much less upon those constellations of the astrological Atheists,[1] but only upon his own secret will and counsel.

But besides these prophecies concerning our Saviour Christ, there are others contained in the Scripture, concerning the fates and successions of the chief kingdoms, empires, and polities of the world; as of the rise of the Persian monarchy; of its fall and conquest by the Macedonian Alexander; of the quadripartite division of this Greekish empire after Alexander's death; of the succession of the Seleucidæ and Lagidæ, a prophetic history, so

is no necessity even for this answer. If the learned Doctor had attentively examined Cicero's words he would easily have perceived from them that no oracle of the kind was in fact ever delivered a thousand years before the time of Cypselus, but that Chrysippus, whose opinion and words Cicero is reciting, said merely: Si vel ejusmodi datum fuisset ab Apolline responsum, haud tamen necesse futurum fuisse, ut regnaret Cypselus, "If a response of the kind had been given by Apollo, still it would not have been necessary that Cypselus should reign." The phraseology in these words is similar to that of the apostle St. Paul in 1 Cor. xiii. 1. "Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels;" and Gal. i. 8. "Though an angel from heaven preach any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed." Herodotus removes all doubt on this matter, who Histor. lib. 5. cap. 92. p. 320. 321. narrates the history of Cypselus, and cites this very oracle of the Delphic Apollo which Cicero alludes to. For he not only acknowledges it to be doubtful and ambiguous, ἀμφιδέξιον, but states also that it was delivered not prior to the age of Cypselus, but only at the time when he had already arrived at manhood. There is no doubt but that Cypselus, being desirous of the sovereignty, corrupted the priests of the oracle, so as to make the answer of the god correspond to his wishes. In conclusion, therefore, although I grant that God can impart the knowledge of future events even to those who in other respects entertain the most perverse notions of religion and his worship, yet I deny that, with the exception of Nebuchadnezzar, and perhaps of Abimelech, any clear and unquestionable example can be adduced from the histories of ancient nations.

[1] He alludes to Cardan and some others who were so devoted to astrology as most absurdly to subject even the Christian religion itself to the stars. There are in existence two dissertations of J. Fr. Mayer, a celebrated theologian of former times, on this question: whether the fate of religions depends on the stars, published at Hamb. 1700. in 4to. in which much nonsense of the sort is collected together.

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agreeable with the events, that it was by Porphyrius[2] pretended to have been written after them; and lastly, of the rise and continuance of the Roman empire. For notwithstanding the endeavours of some to pervert all those Scripture prophecies that extend to the present times, it is clearly demonstrable, that this was Daniel's fourth ten-horned beast, or the legs and toes of Nebuchadnezzar's statue, that fourth empire, strong as iron, which came at length to be broken or divided into ten or many principalities, called in the prophetic language, and according to the *eichon*, horns; amongst whom was to start up another "horn with eyes, speaking great words against the Most High, and making war with the saints, and prevailing against them, for a time, times, and half a time." Which prophecy of Daniel's is the ground-work of St. John's Apocalypse, it being there further insisted upon, filled up and enlarged, with the addition of several particulars; so that both Daniel and John have each of them, from their respective ages, set down a prophetic calendar of times, in a continued series (the former more compendiously and generally, the latter more copiously and particularly), to the very end of the world.

And thus do we see plainly, that the Scripture prophecies evince a Deity; neither can these possibly be imputed by Atheists, as other things, to men's fear and fancy, nor yet to the fiction of politicians. Nor do they only evince a Deity, but confirm Christianity also; partly as predicted by them in its several circumstances, a grand one whereof was the Gentiles' reception of it; and partly as itself predicting future events, this spirit of prophecy being the testimony of Jesus. Both which Scripture prophecies, of Christ in the Old Testament, and from him in the New, are of equal, if not greater force to us in this present age, for the confirmation of our faith, than the miracles themselves recorded in the Scripture: we having now certain knowledge ourselves of many of those events, and being no way able to suspect but that the prophecies were written long before.

To conclude; all these extraordinary phenomena of apparitions, witchcraft, possessions, miracles, and prophecies, do evince that spirits, angels, or demons, though invisible to us, are no fancies, but real and substantial inhabitants of the world; which favours not the atheistic hypothesis: but some of them, as the higher kind of miracles and predictions, do also immediately enforce the acknowledgment of a Deity; a Being superior to nature, which therefore can check and control it; and which comprehending the whole, foreknows the most remotely distant, and contingent events.

[2] See St. Jerome's Proœm. Commentar. in Daniel, tom. 5. opp. p. 481.

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And now have we not only fully answered and confuted all the atheistic pretences against the idea of God, tending to disprove his existence; but also occasionally proposed several solid and substantial arguments for a Deity: as, that all successive things, the world, motion, and time, are in their own nature absolutely incapable of an ante-eternity; and therefore, there must of necessity be something else of a permanent duration, that was eternal without beginning: that no Atheist, according to his principles, can possibly give any account of the original of his own soul or mind; that the phenomenon of motion cannot be solved without an incorporeal principle, presiding over the whole; that the τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, "the artificial, regular, and orderly frame of things," together with the harmony of the whole, demonstrate an understanding and intending cause of the world, that ordered things for ends and good. Besides, that there are several other phenomena, both ordinary and extraordinary, which Atheists being no way able to solve, are forced to deny.

True indeed, some of the ancient Theists have themselves affirmed, that there could be no demonstration of a God: which assertion of theirs hath been by others misunderstood into this sense, as if there were therefore no certainty at all to be had of God's existence, but only a conjectural probability; no knowledge or science, but only faith and opinion. Whereas the true meaning of those ancient Theists, who denied that there could be any demonstration of a God, was only this, That the existence of a God could not be demonstrated à priori, himself being the first cause of all things. Thus doth Alexander Aphrodisius, in his Physical Doubts and Solutions, after he had propounded an argument for a God, according to Aristotelic principles, from motion, declare himself:* Ἡ δεῖξις κατὰ ἀνάλυσιν, οὐ γὰρ οἱόντε τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑστέρων τε καὶ φανερῶν ἀρξαμένους, κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα συμφωνίαν ἀναλύσει χρωμένους συστῆσαι τὴν ἐκείνου φύσιν, "That this argument or proof of his was in way of analysis only; it being not possible that there should be a demonstration of the first principles of all. Wherefore (saith he) we must here fetch our beginning from things, that are after it, and manifest; and thence, by way of analysis, ascend to the proof of that first nature, which was before them." And to the same purpose Clemens Alexandrinus, having first affirmed,† ὡς δυσμεταχειριστότατος ὁ περὶ θεοῦ λόγος· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀρχὴ παντὸς πράγματος δυσεύρετος, πάντως που ἡ πρώτη καὶ πρεσβυτάτη ἀρχὴ δύσδεικτος, ἥτις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν αἰτία τοῦ γενέσθαι, καὶ γενομένους

* Lib. 1. cap. 2. [Page 2. Edit. Græc. Venet. 1536. fol.]
† Strom. lib. 5. p. 388. [Cap. 12. p. 695. Edit. Potteri.]

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εἶναι, "That God is the most difficult thing of all to be discoursed of; because, since the principle of every thing is hard to find out, the first and most ancient principle of all, which was the cause to all other things of their being made, must needs be the hardest of all to be declared or manifested;" he afterwards subjoins: Ἀλλὰ οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμῃ λαμβάνεται τῇ ἀποδεικτικῇ· αὕτη γὰρ ἐκ προτέρων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων συνίσταται· τοῦ δε ἀγεννήτου οὐδὲν προϋπάρχει, "But neither can God be apprehended by any demonstrative science: for such science is from things before in order of nature, and more knowable; whereas nothing can exist before that which is altogether unmade." And certain it is, that it implies a contradiction, that God, or a perfect Being, should be thus demonstrated by any thing before him as his cause. Nevertheless it doth not therefore follow, that there can be no certainty at all had of the existence of a God, but only a conjectural probability; no knowledge, but faith and opinion only. For we may have a certain knowledge of things, the διότι whereof cannot be demonstrated à priori, or from antecedent necessary causes: as for example, that there was something eternal of itself, without beginning, is not at all demonstrable by any antecedent cause, it being contradictious to such a thing to have a cause. Nevertheless, upon supposition only, that something doth exist, which no man can possibly make any doubt of, we may not only have an opinion, but also certain knowledge, from the necessity of irrefragable reason, that there was never nothing, but something or other did always exist from eternity, and without beginning. In like manner, though the existence of a God or perfect Being cannot be demonstrated à priori, yet may we notwithstanding, from our very selves (whose existence we cannot doubt of), and from what is contained in our own minds, or otherwise consequent from him, by undeniable principles of reason, necessarily infer his existence. And whensoever any thing is thus necessarily inferred from what is undeniable and indubitable, this is a demonstration, though not of the διότι, yet of the ὅτι of it; that the thing is, though not why it is. And many of the geometrical demonstrations are no other.[3]

[3] The question here touched upon by the learned Doctor: Whether or not there can be any demonstration of God, is one of those which may easily be decided, if discussed by wise and rational men. For taking away the ambiguity of the terms *demonstration* and *à priori*, it will be clear to every one that there is no controversy about the thing itself, but only about the meaning of the words. But still there are some, both among the ancients and moderns, who have denied the demonstrability of God in a sense by no means to be admitted of: to which number I almost suspect Clemens Alexandrinus to have belonged, who at any rate has not expressed himself with sufficient caution on this subject, although he is excused by Dr. Cudworth. Clemens, to show the dignity and excellency of the Christian religion, declares that God cannot otherwise be known and apprehended than by faith and the doctrine inculcated by our Saviour: Λείπεται δή, says he, θείᾳ χάριτι καὶ μόνῳ τῷ παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγῳ τὸ ἄγνωστον εἶναι, "It remains, therefore, that we apprehend the unknown (God) by

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It hath been asserted by a late eminent philosopher,[4] that there is no possible certainty to be had of any thing, before we be certain of the existence of a God essentially good; because we can never otherwise free our minds from the importunity of

divine grace, and the Word alone which is with him." Stromat. lib. 5. cap. 12. p. 696. Which if he intended to mean that a more certain and full knowledge of God, than reason can supply, is given to us by Christ, and that by the Holy Spirit and faith our minds are so confirmed in the knowledge of the divine nature as to be freed from all doubt, there would be no cause for reprehension in that precept. But Clemens goes farther, and leaves to reason no efficacy whatever; nay, he tells us that that very knowledge of God which was possessed by some philosophers, proceeded from a certain innate Word, or from Christ, whom he supposes to dwell by nature in the minds of all men; an opinion indeed very closely bordering upon fanaticism. Those certainly are mistaken who fancy that the well-known fanatical doctrine respecting a certain *inward Word*, was first invented by the Mystics and propagated from their books. This is an old doctrine, which grew up in the very infancy of Christianity, especially in Egypt, and being diffused through the masters of the Alexandrine school, and those Christian fathers who combined the precepts of Plato with the Christian religion, was afterwards more elaborately refined and set forth by the mystics. And there were many of the ancient Christian fathers who on this subject followed in the footsteps of Clemens, and maintained that none of those things which can be understood respecting God are to be referred to reason, but all to faith and a certain inward monitor; a doctrine indeed which afforded matter for cavil and ridicule to philosophers, as appears from what Origen says upon this subject, lib. 1. adv. Celsum, p. 8. and elsewhere. If any one, therefore, denies God to be demonstrable in this sense he is by all means to be opposed, lest we should rush into various snares from which it will be impossible ever to escape. There are other fanatics also, not differing much from these, who affirm that God cannot be known by reason, but only by sense and a certain interior feeling of the mind; whom no one again will agree with who does not wish to reject all reason and that natural knowledge of God, which is so highly spoken of by St. Paul. Some of the later theologians, I must confess, who have written against the Atheists, although in other respects entertaining the best of sentiments, have sometimes however, in my opinion, discoursed without sufficient caution and prudence on this question. For there are those among them who openly assert that the Atheists are not to be opposed by arguments, the power of which is merely human, but only by the sayings of holy writ, as possessing divine virtue. But this opinion I consider to be very dangerous, and open to many baneful inferences, nay injurious to the divine authority of the Scriptures. There is undoubtedly in the sayings of sacred writ an incredible power and efficacy towards rousing and turning the hearts of men; but the mind ought to be prepared and imbued as it were beforehand, to receive this influence, and remove the impediments which oppose it. Admirable and elegant are the precepts of Ern. Salom. Cyprianus on this subject in the Dedication prefixed to the Animadversions on Grotius' book De Veritate Religionis Christianæ. As to Alexander Aphrodisiensis, whom we know to have been devoted to Peripatetic principles, by denying that God can be demonstrated he acted according to the precepts of his master, whose rules on demonstration cannot be [accommodated to those arguments, by which reason apprehends the existence of God. Aristotle, Analyt. Posterior. lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 188. tom. 1. opp. lays down this rule respecting demonstration: *Ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐξ ἀληθῶν τ' εἶναι, καὶ πρώτων, καὶ ἀμέσων, καὶ γνωριμωτέρων, καὶ προτέρων, καὶ αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος· οὕτως γὰρ ἔσονται καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ οἰκεῖαι τοῦ δεικνυμένου,* "It is necessary that demonstrative science should be from what are true, and first, and immediate, and more known, and prior, and the causes of the conclusion; for thus they will be also the proper principles of the thing demonstrated." As Aristotle in these words makes all demonstration proceed from things prior to the thing to be demonstrated, and from its causes, and God has nothing prior to or the cause of himself, it is clear that if we follow the laws of demonstrations laid down by the Stagirite we must deny altogether the possibility of God being demonstrated.

[4] Ren. Des Cartes. See his Meditatio Metaphysica Quarta. p. 25. and Quinta, p. 31. &c.

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that suspicion which with irresistible force may assault them; that ourselves might possibly be so made, either by chance or fate, or by the pleasure of some evil demon, or at least of an arbitrary omnipotent Deity, as that we should be deceived in all our most clear and evident perceptions; and therefore in geometrical theorems themselves, and even in our common notions. But when we are once assured of the existence of such a God as is essentially good, who therefore neither will nor can deceive; then, and not before, will this suspicion utterly vanish, and ourselves become certain that our faculties of reason and understanding are not false and imposturous, but rightly made. From which hypothesis it plainly follows that all those Theists who suppose God to be a mere arbitrary Being, whose will is not determined by any nature of goodness or rule of justice, but itself is the first rule of both (they thinking this to be the highest perfection, liberty, and power) can never be reasonably certain of the truth of any thing, not so much as that two and two are four; because, so long as they adhere to that persuasion, they can never be assured but that such an arbitrary omnipotent Deity might designedly make them such, as should be deceived in all their clearest perceptions.

Now though there be a plausibility of piety in this doctrine, as making the knowledge of a God essentially good so necessary a præcognitum to all other science, that there can be no certainty of truth at all without it; yet does that very supposition, that our understanding faculties might possibly be so made, as to deceive us in all our clearest perceptions, (wheresoever it is admitted) render it utterly impossible ever to arrive to any certainty concerning the existence of a God essentially good; forasmuch as this cannot be any otherwise proved, than by the use of our faculties of understanding, reason, and discourse. For to say that the truth of our understanding faculties is put out of all doubt and question, as soon as ever we are assured of the existence of a God essentially good, who therefore cannot deceive; whilst this existence of a God is in the meantime itself no otherwise proved, than by our understanding faculties; that is, at once to prove the truth of God's existence from our faculties of reason and understanding, and again to prove the truth of those faculties from the existence of a God essentially good: this, I say, is plainly to move round in a circle, and to prove nothing at all; a gross oversight, which the forementioned philosopher seems plainly guilty of.[5]

[5] This hypothesis of Des Cartes certainly seems to labour under some imperfection, although at first sight it would appear to be highly calculated to strengthen the cause of religion and piety. He lays down as follows: It is impossible for me to know whether I am deceived or not in those things which I perceive clearly and distinctly, until I am certain that he who made me is such, that he will not deceive me. Now,

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Wherefore, according to this hypothesis, we are of necessity condemned to eternal scepticism, both concerning the existence of a God, when, after all our arguments and demonstrations for the same, we must at length gratify the Atheists with this confession in the conclusion, that it is possible notwithstanding there may be none; and also concerning all other things, the certainty whereof is supposed to depend upon the certainty of the existence of such a God as cannot deceive.

So that if we will pretend to any certainty at all concerning the existence of a God, we must of necessity explode this new sceptical hypothesis of the possibility of our understandings being so made, as to deceive us in all our clearest perceptions; by means whereof we can be certain of the truth of nothing, and to use our utmost endeavour to remove the same. In the first place therefore we affirm, that no power, how great soever, and therefore not omnipotence itself, can make any thing to be indifferently either true or false, this being plainly to take away the nature both of truth and falsehood, or to make them nothing but words, without any signification. Truth is not factitious; it is a thing which cannot be arbitrarily *made*, but *is*. The divine will and omnipotence itself (now supposed by us) hath no imperium upon the divine understanding: for if God understood only by will, he would not understand at all.[6] In the next place we add, that though the truth of singular contingent propositions depends upon the things themselves existing without, as the measure and archetype thereof; yet as to the universal and abstract theorems of science, the terms whereof are those reasons of things which exist nowhere but only in the mind itself (whose noemata and ideas they are) the measure and rule of truth concerning them can be no foreign or extraneous thing without the mind, but must be native and domestic to it, or con-

if any one should go on and ask: How therefore can I know that there is a cause which made me, and that it is devoid of all wish to deceive me? The philosopher replies: From this, that when I examine myself, I clearly and distinctly perceive that there must necessarily be such a cause. For I think: therefore, I exist: if I exist, there must be some cause of my existence: But that this cause possesses all the perfections which can take place and be conceived, I conclude, from the notion of him which is in my own mind. This is reasoning in a circle, which all philosophers acknowledge to be most vicious. If it be possible for me to be deceived, even when I perceive most clearly and distinctly; who is to convince me that that notion of God, although innate, and apparently most evident to me, is not fallacious and visionary? This opinion of Des Cartes has also been acutely argued against by Pet. Gassendi, Dub. et Instant. ad Cartesii Meditat. Metaphys. Dubitat. 3. p. 383. tom. 3. opp. The same philosopher has been charged with scepticism also by many others; among whom see Pet. Villemandy, Scepticismus Debellatus, cap. 2. p. 9. &c.

[6] Consult what we have already remarked at great length on this subject above. As we have there proved, but few will question what Dr. Cudworth here lays down as the ground-work of his demonstration. But Des Cartes denies it, and maintains, whether sincerely or not I cannot say, that God can cause things altogether repugnant to each other, to be at the time true.

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tained within the mind itself, and therefore can be nothing but its clear and distinct perception. In these intelligible ideas of the mind, whatsoever is clearly perceived to be, is; or, which is all one, is true. Every clear and distinct perception is an entity or truth, as that, which is repugnant to conception, is a nonentity or falsehood. Nay, the very essence of truth here is this clear perceptibility, or intelligibility; and therefore can there not be any clear or distinct perception of falsehood: which must be acknowledged by all those who, though granting false opinions, yet agree in this, that there can be no false knowledge. For the knowledge of these universal abstract truths is nothing but the clear and distinct perception of the several ideas of the mind, and their necessary relations to one another: wherefore, to say that there can be no false knowledge, is all one as to say that there can be no clear and distinct perceptions of the ideas of the mind false. In false opinions, the perception of the understanding power itself is not false, but only obscure. It is not the understanding power or nature in us, that erreth, but it is we ourselves, who err, when we rashly and unwarily assent to things not clearly perceived by it. The upshot of all this is, that since no power, how great soever, can make any thing indifferently to be true; and since the essence of truth in universal abstract things is nothing but clear perceptibility, it follows, that omipotence cannot make anything that is false to be clearly perceived to be, or create such minds and understanding faculties, as shall have as clear conception of falsehoods, that is, of nonentities, as they have of truths or entities. For example, no rational understanding being, that knows what a part is, and what a whole, what a cause, and what an effect, could possibly be so made, as clearly to conceive the part to be greater than the whole, or the effect to be before the cause, or the like. Wherefore, we may presume with reverence to say, that there could not possibly be a world of rational creatures made by God, either in the moon or in some other planet, or elsewhere, that should clearly and distinctly conceive all things contrary to what are clearly perceived by us; nor could our human faculties have been so made, as that we should have as clear conceptions of falsehoods as of truths. Mind or understanding faculties in creatures may be made more or less weak, imperfect, and obscure, but they could not be made false, or such as should have clear and distinct conceptions of that which is not, because every clear perception is an entity; and though omnipotence can make something out of nothing, yet can it not make something to be nothing, nor nothing something. All which is no more than is generally acknowledged by theologers, when they affirm that God Almighty himself cannot do things contradictious; there being no other reason for this assertion,

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but only this, because contradictiousness is repugnant to conception. So that conception and knowledge are hereby made to be the measure of all power, even omnipotence or infinite power itself being determined thereby; from whence it follows that power hath no dominion over understanding, truth, and knowledge; nor can infinite power make any thing whatsoever to be clearly conceivable, for could it make contradictious things clearly conceivable, then would itself be able to do them; because whatsoever can be clearly conceived by any, may unquestionably be done by infinite power.[7]

It is true indeed that sense, considered alone by itself, doth not reach to the absoluteness either of the natures, or of the existence of things without us, it being, as such, nothing but seeming, appearance, and fancy. And thus is that saying of some ancient philosophers to be understood, that, *πᾶσα φαντασία ἀληθὴς*, "every phantasy is true;" namely, because sense and fancy reach not to the absolute truth and falsehood of things, but contain themselves only within seeming and appearance; and every appearance must needs be a true appearance. Notwithstanding which, it is certain that sense often represents to us corporeal things otherwise than indeed they are, which though it be not a formal, yet is it a material falsity. Wherefore sense in the nature of it is not absolute, but *πρὸς τι*, or *τινὶ*, relative to the sentients. And by sense alone, without any mixture of reason or understanding, we can be certain of no more concerning the things without us, but only this, that they so seem to us. Hence was that of the ancient atomic philosophers in Plato:* *Ἢ σὺ διϊσχυρίσαιο ἂν ὡς οἷόν σοι φαίνεται ἕκαστον χρῶμα, τοιοῦτον καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὁτῳ οὖν ζώῳ*, "Neither you nor any man else can be certain, that every other man and brute animal hath all the very same phantasms of colours that himself hath." Now, were there no other perception in us, but that of sense, (as the old atheistic philosophers concluded knowledge to be sense) then would all our human perceptions be merely seeming, fantastical, and relative; and none of them reach to the absolute truth of things. Every one in Protagoras'[8] language would then *τὰ αὐτοῦ μόνον δοξάζειν*, "think or opine only his own things;" all his truths being private and relative to himself. And that Protagorean aphorism were to be admitted also in the sense of that philosopher, that *πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος*, "every man is the measure of all things to

[7] Many I have no doubt would have been glad if this demonstration had possessed greater perspicuity and clearness: to me certainly, on attentively reading and examining it over and over again, it has appeared somewhat perplexed and intricate. For this reason I have determined to dismiss it without any remark, lest I should happen to attribute to our illustrious author an opinion which was foreign to him.

* Theæt. p. 154. [P. 119 Edit. Ficini.]

[8] On these precepts of Protagoras, consult Plato, in his Theætetus, p. 118. &c.

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himself; and, that no one man's opinion was righter than another's," but τὸ φαινόμενον ἑκάστῳ, "that which seemed to every one, was to him true, to whom it seemed;" all truth and perception being but seeming and relative. But here lies one main difference betwixt understanding, or knowledge, and sense; that whereas the latter is fantastical and relative only; the former reacheth beyond fancy and appearance to the absoluteness of truth. For as it hath been already declared, whatsoever is clearly and distinctly perceived in things abstract and universal, by any one rational being in the whole world, is not a private thing, and true to himself only that perceived it; but it is, as some Stoics have called it, ἀληθὲς καθολικὸν, "a public, catholic, and universal truth:" it obtains every where, and, as Empedocles sang of natural justice:

Διὰ τ' εὐρυμέδοντος
Αἰθερος ἠνεκέως τέταται, διὰ τ' ἀπλέτου αὐγῆς.[9]

"It is extended throughout the vast ether, and through infinite light or space." And were there indeed infinite worlds, all thickly peopled with rational animals, it would be alike true to every one of them. Nor is it conceivable that omnipotence itself could create any such understanding beings as could have clear and distinct perceptions of the contrary to all that is perceived by us, no more than it could do things contradictious. But in all probability, because sense is indeed but seeming, fantastical, and relative, this is the reason that some have been so prone and inclinable to suspect the like of understanding, and all mental perception too, that this also is but seeming and relative; and that therefore men's minds or understandings might have been so made, by an arbitrary omnipotent Deity, as clearly and distinctly to perceive every thing that is false. But, if notwithstanding all that hath been said, any will still sing over the old song again: that all this which hath been hitherto declared by us, is indeed true, if our human faculties be true, or rightly made; but we can go no further than our faculties; and whether these be true or no, no man can ever be certain: we have no other reply to make, but that this is an over-stiff and heavy adherence to a prejudice of their own minds; that not only sense, but also reason and understanding, and all human perception is merely seeming, or fantastical, and relative to faculties only, but not reaching to the absoluteness of any truth; and that the human mind hath no criterion of truth at all within itself.

Nevertheless, it will probably be here further objected; that this is too great an arrogance for created beings to pretend to an

[9] These verses of his occur in Aristotle, Rhetoricor. lib. 7. cap. 13. p. 737. tom. 3. opp.

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absolute certainty of any thing, it being the sole privilege and prerogative of God Almighty to be infallible, who is therefore styled in Scripture, ὁ μόνος σοφὸς, "the only wise;" to which we briefly answer, that the Deity is the first original fountain of wisdom and truth, which is said to be the brightness of the everlasting light, the unspotted mirror of the power of God, and the image of his goodness. The divine Word is the archetypal pattern of all truth; it is ignorant of nothing, and knoweth all things infallibly. But created beings have but a derivative participation hereof, their understandings being obscure, and they erring in many things, and being ignorant of more. And it seems to be no derogation from Almighty God to suppose that created minds by a participation of the divine mind, should be able to know certainly that two and two make four; that equals added to equals will make equals; that a whole is greater than the part; and the cause before the effect; and that nothing can be made without a cause; and such-like other common notions, which are the principles from whence all their knowledge is derived. And indeed, were rational creatures never able to be certain of any such thing as this at all; what would their life be but a mere dream or shadow? and themselves but a ridiculous and pompous piece of fantastic vanity? Besides, it is no way congruous to think, that God Almighty should make rational creatures, so as to be in an utter impossibility of ever attaining to any certainty of his own existence; or of having more than an hypothetical assurance thereof, if our faculties be true, (which possibly may be otherwise) then is there a God. We shall conclude this discourse against the Cartesian scepticism with that of Origen's: Μόνον τῶν ὄντων βέβαιον ἐπιστήμη, "Knowledge is the only thing in the world which creatures have, that is in its own nature firm;" they having here something of certainty, but nowhere else.

Wherefore we having now that which Archimedes required, some firm ground and footing to stand upon, such a certainty of truth in our common notions, as that they cannot possibly be false; without which nothing at all could be proved by reason: we shall in the next place endeavour, not to shake or dissettle any thing thereby (which was the undertaking of that geometrician), but to confirm and establish the truth of God's existence, and that from the very idea of him, hitherto made good and defended against all the assaults of Atheists.

It is well known, that Cartesius[10] hath lately made a pretence to do this, with mathematical evidence and certainty, and he dispatches the business briefly after this manner: God, or a perfect Being, includeth necessary existence in his very idea; and

[10] See his Principles of Philosophy, part 1. sect. 13. p. 4. and Meditat. Metaphys. 5. p. 31, and elsewhere.

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therefore he is. But though the inventor of this argument, or rather the reviver of that, which had before been used by some scholastics, affirmeth it to be as good a demonstration for the existence of a God, from his idea, as that in geometry, for a triangle's having three angles equal to two right, is from the idea of a triangle; yet nevertheless it is certain, that, by one means or other, this argument hath not hitherto proved so fortunate and successful, there being many who cannot be made sensible of any efficacy therein, and not a few who condemn it for a mere sophism. As for ourselves, we neither have any mind to quarrel with other men's arguments pro Deo; nor yet would we be thought to lay stress, in this cause, upon any thing which is not every way solid and substantial. Wherefore we shall here endeavour to set down the utmost we possibly can, both against this argument, and for it, impartially and candidly; and then, when we have done, leave the intelligent readers to make their own judgment concerning the same.[1]

Against it in this manner; first, because we can frame an idea in our own minds, of an absolutely perfect Being, including necessary existence in it, it will not at all follow from thence, that therefore there is such a perfect Being really existing without our minds; we being able to frame in our minds the ideas of many other things, that never were, nor will be. All that can be certainly inferred from the idea of a perfect Being seems to be this, that if it contain nothing which is contradictious to it, then it is not impossible, but that there might be such a Being actually existing. But the strength of this argument not lying merely in this, that because we have an idea of a perfect Being, therefore it is; but because we have such an idea of it, as includeth necessary existence in it, which the idea of nothing else besides doth; therefore it may be here further objected in this manner: That though it be very true, that a perfect Being doth include necessary existence in it, because that cannot be every way perfect, whose existence is not necessary, but contingent; yet will it not follow from hence, that therefore there is such a perfect Being actually existing; but all that can be deduced from it, will be no more than this, that whatsoever hath no necessary

[1] The learned Doctor discourses here, as in many other places, with great modesty and prudence. For at the time in which he lived and wrote this, the most eminent of the learned men in Britain were violently opposed to each other respecting the force of this argument: to none of whom Dr. Cudworth wished to give offence by a too great freedom of judgment. His most erudite friend, Dr. Hen. More, openly favoured this argument of Des Cartes, as we may learn from his Antidote against Atheism, lib. 1. cap. 8. p. 22. and Scholia on the same, p. 145. &c. and other places. On the other hand, Dr. Sam. Parker, among others, in his Tentamina Physico-Theolog. de Deo, Lond. 1673. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 37. &c. and Disputations on God and the Providence of God, Diss. 6. sect. 24. p. 567. maintained this to be a vain and futile sophism. Nor is it difficult to perceive that our author leant rather to the side of those who contended for its unsoundness and insufficiency.

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and eternal existence, is no absolutely perfect Being. And again, that if there be any absolutely perfect Being, then was its existence always necessary, and will be always such; that is, it did both exist of itself, from all eternity, without beginning, and must needs exist to eternity incorruptibly; it being never able to cease to be. It seems indeed no more to follow, that because a perfect Being includes necessary existence in its idea, therefore there is such a perfect Being actually existing; than because a perfect Being includes necessary omniscience and omnipotence in it, that therefore there is such a perfect omniscient and omnipotent Being: all that follows in both cases, being only this; that if there be any Being absolutely perfect, then it is both omniscient and omnipotent, and it did exist of itself necessarily, and can never cease to be. Wherefore here lies a fallacy in this argumentation, when from the necessity of existence affirmed only hypothetically, or upon a supposition of a perfect Being, the conclusion is made concerning it absolutely. As some would prove the necessity of all human events, as for example of Adam's sinning, in this manner, that it always was true before, that either Adam would eat the forbidden fruit, or not eat it; and if he would eat it, he would certainly eat it, and not contingently; and again, if he would not eat it, then would he certainly and necessarily not eat it: wherefore whether he will eat it, or not eat it, he will do either necessarily, and not contingently. Where it is plain, that an absolute necessity is wrongly inferred in the conclusion from an hypothetical one in the premises. In like manner, when upon supposition of an absolutely perfect Being, it is affirmed of it, that its existence must not be contingent, but necessary, and from thence the conclusion is made absolutely, that there is such a perfect Being; this seems to be the very same fallacy. From the idea of a perfect Being including necessary existence in it, it follows undeniably, that if there be any thing absolutely perfect, it must exist necessarily, and not contingently: but it doth not follow, that there must of necessity be such a perfect Being existing; these two propositions carrying a very different sense from one another. And the latter of them, that there must of necessity be a God, or perfect Being existing, seems to be a thing altogether indemonstrable, it implying, that the existence of God, or a perfect Being, may be proved *à priori*, or from some antecedent necessary cause; which was before declared to be a thing contradictious and impossible.

And now in justice are we obliged to plead the best we can also on the defensive side. Thus therefore, the idea of God, or an absolutely perfect Being, including in it, not an impossible, nor a contingent, but a necessary schesis, or relation to existence, it follows from thence absolutely, and without any "ifs" and

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"ands," that he doth exist. For as of things contradictious, having therefore in the idea of them an impossible schesis to existence, we can confidently conclude, that they never were, nor will be; and as of other things not contradictious or impossible, but imperfect only, which therefore have a contingent schesis to existence, we can pronounce also, that possibly they might be, or might not be: in like manner, a perfect Being including in the idea of it a necessary schesis to existence, or an impossible one to non-existence, or containing existence in its very essence; we may by parity of reason conclude concerning it, that it is neither impossible to be, nor yet contingent to be, or not to be: but that it certainly is, and cannot but be; or that it is impossible it should not be. And indeed, when we say of imperfect beings, implying no contradiction in them, that they may possibly either be or not be, we herein tacitly suppose the existence of a perfect Being, because nothing, which is not, could be possible to be, were there not something actually in being, that hath sufficient power to cause or produce it. True indeed, we have the ideas of many things in our minds, that never were, nor will be; but these are only such as include no necessary, but contingent existence in their nature; and it does not therefore follow that a perfect Being, which includes necessity of existence in its idea, may, notwithstanding, not be. Wherefore this necessity of existence, or impossibility of non-existence, contained in the idea of a perfect Being, must not be taken hypothetically only or consequentially after this manner, that if there be any thing absolutely perfect, then its existence both was, and will be necessary; but absolutely, that though contradictious things cannot possibly be, and things imperfect may possibly either be, or not be, yet a perfect Being cannot but be; or it is impossible that it should not be. For otherwise were the force of the argumentation merely hypothetical, in this manner: If there be a perfect Being, then its existence both was, and will be necessary; this would plainly imply, that a perfect Being, notwithstanding that necessity of existence included in its nature, might either be, or not be, or were contingent to existence; which is a manifest contradiction, that the same thing should exist both contingently and necessarily. And this hypothetical absurdity will more plainly appear, if the argument be expressed in other words, as that necessity of existence, and impossibility of non-existence, and actual existence, belong to the very essence of a perfect Being; since it would be then ridiculous to go about to evade in this manner, that if there be a perfect Being, then it is, and cannot but be. Which identical proposition is true of every thing else, but absurd. Wherefore there is something more to be inferred from the necessity of existence included in the idea of a perfect Being than so; which can be nothing else

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but this, that it absolutely and actually is. Moreover, no Theists can be able to prove, that God, or a perfect Being (supposed by them to exist) might not happen by chance only to be; if from the necessity of existence included in the idea of God, it cannot be inferred, that he could not but be. Notwithstanding which, here is no endeavour (as is pretended), to prove the existence of a God, or perfect Being, *à priori* neither, or from any necessary cause antecedent; but only from that necessity, which is included within itself, or is concomitant and concurrent with it; the necessity of its own perfect nature. And now we shall leave the intelligent and impartial reader to make his own judgment concerning the forementioned Cartesian argument for a Deity, drawn from its idea, as including necessity of existence in it, that therefore it is; whether it be merely sophistical, or hath something of solidity and reality in it. However, it is not very probable, that many Atheists will be convinced thereby, but that they will rather be ready to say, that this is no probation at all of a Deity, but only an affirmation of the thing in dispute, and a mere begging of the question; that therefore God is, because he is, or cannot but be.[2]

[2] Those fierce and multifarious contentions, heretofore engaged in by men of the highest note, on the argument by which Des Cartes attempted to prove the existence of God, are known to every one possessing even a moderate acquaintance with the transactions of theologians and philosophers. On each side are arrayed men of first-rate talent and perspicacity; the chief of whom are enumerated by P. Bayle, Dictionnaire Histor. et Critique, tom. 4. voce Zabarella, note F. p. 2903. and J. Alb. Fabricius, Delectus Argumentorum pro Veritate Religionis Christianæ, cap. 10. p. 325. &c. [Add Gabr. Daniel, Voyage au Monde de M. des Cartes, tom. 1. p. 120.] I have no inclination to become arbiter of this long and knotty dispute, nor, if I have, am I one that could justly arrogate to myself a full knowledge of the subject. I shall attempt, however, by a few observations to assist the labours of those who consider it worth while to give it a diligent and attentive examination.

I. In the first place, therefore, I would observe, that this argument from an *innate idea* is not ranked by Des Cartes among those, by which the being and existence of God can be proved to an Atheist. This philosopher regarded it as one by which any man can and ought to convince himself, that there must of necessity be an eternal and most perfect Being. Many learned men, I perceive, far superior to myself in perspicacity, suppose him to have meant that any one who wishes to combat successfully with Atheists should make this argument the basis of the disputation: nor do the principal disciples of this great man appear to me to teach otherwise. But on repeatedly perusing all that he has written upon it, I have been unable to put any such construction upon his words. On the contrary, he merely inquires, how a man left to himself, and, on account of the fallaciousness of the senses, doubting about all eternal things, can become satisfied from the very consideration of his own mind, that there is an eternal and most perfect Being, the cause of himself and all things: and this he considers to be possible, if one will only attentively contemplate the notion of God imprinted on one's own mind. Thus he lays down the following as a foundation: No one can be certain of the truth of any thing, unless he knows beforehand that there is a God, who will not deceive us. He then asks, by what means we can arrive at this knowledge, apart from all those things which fall under the senses, and answers that the innate idea of God is of itself sufficient to convince every one of this: inasmuch as the necessity of existing cannot by any means be separated from this idea. All the Metaphysical Meditations of Des Cartes are coherent, and connected with each other; and many, therefore, in explaining, discussing and refuting them, seem to me to have grievously erred, because they have not followed the thread of his reasonings, but have

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Wherefore we shall endeavour to make out an argument, or demonstration, for the existence of a God, from his idea, as including necessary existence in it, some other ways. And first,

considered certain opinions of his separately, paying no regard to their connexion with the rest.

II. Des Cartes himself, in explaining this argument, is neither sufficiently perspicuous, as will be proved by an example presently, nor sufficiently consistent, but, if I mistake not, doubtful and wavering. He does not first give us certain and clear definitions of the words he makes use of; seems occasionally to change the principles from which he draws his conclusions; sometimes concedes to his adversaries what at others he wishes to withhold: now might be said to be striking out a new path for himself; and now again to be merely inculcating what has long since been acknowledged by every body: sometimes, hurried away by the heat and fervour of disputation, he hastens to the conclusion faster than the comprehension of the generality of men can follow him, and passing over certain intermediate propositions, indispensable to the perspicuity of the demonstration, arrives at once at the thing to be proved. In reading this great man's works, indeed, I have observed that he is not always sufficiently cautious and happy in the choice of words intended to express the abstract notions of his own mind, and that he is not unfrequently deficient in the course of the disputation itself, that is, omits and suppresses some things which were necessary to be noticed in order to render the demonstration complete and intelligible. This fault is common to those who discuss metaphysical subjects, who, themselves clearly perceiving the connexion and order of the propositions they are considering, suppose that their readers will be able to see every thing with the same facility, and therefore omit some things, which had much better have been expressed: and thus it happens, that they are imperfectly understood by many, and afford occasion for unnecessary disputes. The followers of Des Cartes also are much at variance with each other in explaining this argument, there probably not being three disciples of his school to be found, who adopt the same method in unravelling it and removing the difficulties with which it is encompassed. Nor is there less discord among their opponents, not a few indeed of whom attack, not the opinion entertained by Des Cartes, but that which they themselves suppose him to have entertained. But we shall be less surprised at this, when we consider how difficult it is to expound a matter altogether removed from the senses and to be drawn from the very inmost recesses of our own minds, especially if the words, by which it is to be expressed, have various meanings and definitions.

III. I fancy I can discover two errors in particular in those who have attempted to refute this argument, and to refer it to the rank of sophisms. In the first place two arguments are drawn by Des Cartes from the innate notion of God: one of which seems to me to be as follows: "There is in me a notion or idea of a most perfect being. This notion I have not received from myself; for I am much too weak and infirm to be able to form in my mind so perfect a notion. There is no doubt, therefore, but that I have received it from some one else. But no one who is not himself most perfect can engender a notion of a perfect Being; for as is the effect such is its cause. There must of necessity, therefore, be such a Being as is that notion which I carry imprinted on my mind." See his Principles of Philosophy, part 1. sect. 17. et p. 5. The other argument is that set forth by Dr. Cudworth: "There is in me a notion of a most perfect Being. This notion contains necessary existence; therefore, that must necessarily exist, the notion of which I feel is in my own mind." Des Cartes' followers do not all admit both these two arguments of their master, which are of a different kind, but some one and some the other; while others again assent to both. But their opponents often neglect all distinction between them in their disputations and confound them with each other. Again, there is a twofold way of combating these arguments. For they can either attack the principles and foundations upon which they rest, or leaving these alone assail merely the conclusions drawn from them. The foundation of both arguments is Des Cartes' doctrine of *ideas*, and their distribution into *innate* and *adventitious*. If, therefore, they adopt the former course, they must enter into an intricate and almost interminable controversy about the origin and nature of ideas, which in our time has exercised the abilities of so many eminent men: but if the latter, they must leave Des Cartes' dogmas on innate forms and images untouched, and prove that, even supposing these to be true and certain, still

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we shall make an offer towards it in this manner. Though it will not follow from hence, because we can frame an idea of any thing in our minds, that therefore such a thing really existeth;

his arguments would be mere sophisms. But this distinction, in my opinion, has not been observed by all those who have impugned these arguments. Some of them act as though they fully agreed with him in the doctrine of ideas; whereas, it is easy to perceive from the disputation itself that they are violently opposed to it. Again, there are others who handle their subject in such a perplexed and confused manner as to make it altogether uncertain which course they meant to adopt. But in contests of this kind above all others, regarding as they do things cognizable to the mind alone, it is necessary to consider what may be granted to an adversary, and what properly be made matter of dispute.

IV. I shall now say something respecting the latter argument itself, which is here principally treated of; and for the sake of greater perspicuity shall express it in Des Cartes' own way: "My mind," says he, "considering that among the various ideas which it has in itself, there is one, by far the principal one of all, namely, that of a being of consummate intelligence, power, and perfection, recognizes in this idea existence, not possible and contingent merely, as in the ideas of all other things, which it distinctly perceives, but absolutely necessary and eternal. And, as for example, from perceiving it to be necessarily contained in the idea of a triangle, that its three angles are equal to two right angles, it plainly convinces itself that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles; so from simply perceiving necessary and eternal existence to be contained in the idea of a consummately perfect Being, it ought to conclude that such a perfect Being exists. And it will believe this the more readily by considering that it has not in itself an idea of any other thing, in which in like manner it perceives necessary existence to be contained. For from this it will understand that this idea of a consummately perfect Being is not a creation of its own, or a representation of any thing chimerical, but of a true and immutable nature, and one which cannot but exist, since necessary existence is contained in it." Principia Philosoph. part 1. sect. 14. p. 4. These words manifestly contain the following argument: "God or a most perfect nature exists. For the notion of God which I have implanted in my mind contains necessary existence, or I clearly conceive that existence cannot but belong to the notion of a most perfect nature." Wherefore the learned opponents of the argument have considered it to be chiefly incumbent upon them to show the fallaciousness of this conclusion: "Because necessary existence belongs to the notion of a most perfect thing, therefore that most perfect thing, the notion of which I have in my mind, exists also." Nor are they mistaken in this. I shall also try whether I can explain in suitable and perspicuous terms what has occurred to my own mind on considering this subject; and I shall do so not so much with a view of teaching as of learning and of exercising my mental faculties. Let us dismiss all question about ideas and the nature of ideas, and concede to Des Cartes that we have imprinted on our minds a certain image of the supreme Being, or resemblance entirely corresponding to the divine nature itself. This notion or idea then is maintained by Des Cartes to contain and comprise the notion of existence, and indeed of necessary existence. But this proposition: The idea of God contains necessary existence, seems to me to be not sufficiently plain, but to involve somewhat of ambiguity; and I am particularly confirmed in this opinion by seeing that mene ven of the highest intellect have not expressed it in one and the same manner. In order to give a clearer insight into this question, I shall first speak of existence generally and then of necessary existence; that is, I shall inquire first what is meant by Des Cartes and several others after him, when they say: "The idea of any thing contains existence:" afterwards, by adding the word *necessary*, I shall examine into the force of this proposition: "The idea of any thing contains necessary existence." By doing so, we shall decide much more easily upon the power and weight of the argument itself. What then do philosophers wish us to understand when they assert: "The idea of this or that thing contains existence"? Existence considered absolutely in itself is a notion or phantasm of the mind, to which nothing in reality corresponds and which we abstract and separate from the thing itself that exists by deep thought alone. And therefore the notion of existence separated by thought from the notion of the thing existing, is properly a nonentity and a shadow. If existence be considered in this point of view, the sense of the precept we are speaking of will be this: "I can by thinking separate existence from

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yet nevertheless, whatsoever we can frame an idea of, implying no manner of contradiction in its conception, we may certainly conclude thus much of it, that such a thing was not impossible

this or that notion, and present it to the mind's eye separately and abstractedly." But it is manifest that this cannot be its meaning in the present question. For setting aside other considerations, all things and the notions of all things are such, that existence can be separated from them by thought: but we are here treating of a peculiar character and property not of all but only of certain notions. It follows therefore that in this proposition we are to consider existence not in the abstract, but in so far as it is in the thing itself or the notion of the thing. But existence regarded as in the thing itself which exists, properly speaking does not differ from the thing existing. For a thing or the notion of a thing can be considered by us in a twofold respect; first, as endowed with certain properties and qualities, and secondly as being and existing. An abstract notion of the former kind, if I mistake not, is usually denominated by metaphysicians *essence*, that of the latter kind *existence*. These two are widely different, when we abstract the mind from the senses and examine the natures of things by the thought alone. But when we come back to the thing, we perceive that they do not differ, but are merely different modes of considering one and the same thing. It is not our intention at present to enter into any subtle investigation upon this point: let us lay it down merely that the "notion of existence" here is "the notion of the thing existing in so far as it is and exists." This being established, the proposition: "The notion of a thing contains the notion of existence," or to express the same in other words: "The existence of a thing cannot be severed from its essence," admits I am aware of a threefold acceptation. The first will be: "Whenever I submit the notion of a thing to intelligence and contemplation, I then cannot but consider it as existing." But I can hardly believe such to have been Des Cartes' meaning; for this is proper to all notions whatever, whether they be true or fictitious and imaginary. For no one can think about the essence of any thing, whatever it may be, without at once attaching to it the notion of existence. Figure to your mind an image of the Elysian fields, of Tartarus, Pegasus, a centaur, or any thing else to be met with in the poets more fabulous even than these; as soon as this image shall be present in your mind, the notion of existence will be immediately associated with it, and unless this were so, it would be impossible for you even to think about it. For whatever does not exist, is nothing: and no man ever reasoned or thought or can think about nothing. Divest the notion of a syren or a centaur of the notion of existence, therefore, and all your speculation will immediately be put an end to, since the notion of essence will at the same time be reduced to a nonentity. I do not deny, that a man cogitating upon such or such things may be satisfied that they do not exist; but still, as long as he subjects them to his mental contemplation, he cannot but conceive and view them as existing. Such being the case, Des Cartes' argumentation would certainly have been amusing enough, if he had reasoned in this wise: "God exists: for when I recall to my mind the notion of God, I conceive him as existing, or I regard the notion of God, as the notion of an existing nature." For by the same rule any one else might fairly conclude that Cerberus, the chimæra, sphinx, and other fictitious monsters of the kind, really exist. Another meaning of the proposition we are speaking of may be the following: "The notion of this or that thing is of that kind, that I can easily believe the thing expressed by it to exist, since there is nothing in the notion contradictory to its existence." Some enunciate the same in these words: "From the notion of this or that thing existence follows:" of which I take this to be the sense: "A notion consists of things not repugnant to each other: therefore there is nothing in it to prevent such a thing as the notion presents to my mind from really existing." But if the proposition be stated in this way, it will not warrant us in inferring the thing itself from the notion. For although this conclusion would be legitimate: "Whatever notion consists of things having a certain connexion with and not contrary to each other, admits of having existence joined to it, or it can take place and exist:" still it would not be fair to reason as follows: "If I perceive that a notion present to mind is not a confused and discordant assemblage, but an aptly connected and coherent image, I ought to decide that the thing corresponding to this notion exists." For many notions can be conceived by us, with which existence may be associated, as they consist of things cognate and compatible with each other, although

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to be; there being nothing to us impossible, but what is contradictious and repugnant to conception. Now the idea of God, or a perfect Being, can imply no manner of contradiction in it,

it is uncertain whether examples corresponding to these notions exist any where in the world. It is easy for me to imagine to myself a golden mountain; in which notion there is nothing repugnant to its existence: but I should be insane, were I to infer from thence, that such a mountain does really exist. There are many grave and highly intelligent men who have interpreted Des Cartes' opinion in this manner: with whom Dr. Cudworth himself is not far from agreeing. But, evidently, if they are right as to the philosopher's meaning, all that they can make of his demonstration drawn from the *idea of God*, is merely that it is possible for God to exist, or that there is nothing in this notion to preclude us from supposing the existence of a most perfect Being. We come now to the third acceptation of this proposition, which may be thus stated: "The notion of this or that thing is such, that as soon as I contemplate it, a certain interior and mental sense compels me to believe that the thing is: whenever I recall that notion to my thoughts and attentively consider its essence, a sort of testimony arises in the inmost recesses of my mind, which compels me to believe, that that external thing, the image of which I am mentally contemplating, really is." If Des Cartes meant this when he asserted that the *notion of existence* cannot possibly be separated from the notion of God, as some eminent disciples of his seem to say, he might have congratulated himself upon his accordance not only with the ancient fathers of the Christian community, but also with many others. A great number of the early Christian fathers employed the same kind of argument, not merely to prove the existence of God, but of one supreme and most perfect God; and this they called reasoning from the *testimony of the mind;* upon which there is extant an express work by Tertullian. I shall not now inquire into the conclusiveness of this argument against Atheists, which would be foreign to my purpose; but I shall observe, that it is not derived from the notion of God innate in the minds of men, from which Des Cartes intends his to be drawn, but from a certain natural testimony of the mind, distinct from the innate notion. For according to those who make use of this argument, the essence of God is perceived and known from the notion itself; whereas his existence is evident from the testimony of the mind, to which all are at once willing to listen, who attentively consider that notion.

Thus much having been said upon the notion of existence generally, I now approach the subject more closely, and proceed to examine with equal care the *notion of necessary existence*, in which lies the chief stress of Des Cartes' argument, as he himself testifies in his Respons. to the first Object. added to Medit. Metaphys. p. 62. In the outset I shall state it, as it is expounded by himself and repeated by those who are generally considered to have gained a clearer insight into his meaning than others: "If the notion of any thing whatever has the notion of necessary existence inseparably connected with it, the thing necessarily exists: but the notion, which I perceive to be imprinted upon my own mind of a most perfect Being or God, contains the notion of necessary existence: therefore a most perfect Being or God necessarily exists." In order to understand the force of this argument, we must first remove all ambiguity from the phrases, *to exist necessarily*, and *necessary existence*. For as most words employed by metaphysicians have not one certain and definite meaning, so these also admit of a two fold acceptation. The phrase "necessary existence" implies in the first place, the necessity of existing, or the abstract notion of that perfection usually called by schoolmen *aseity* or *independence*, in which they contend consists the *first conception* of God. But the same can also express the *very act of necessarily existing*, which seems to differ from the nature in which this perfection resides, in the conception of our own mind alone. Hence it appears that this proposition: "The notion of a most perfect Being includes necessary existence," upon which the force of the whole of Des Cartes' argument depends, can also be taken in a twofold sense. For first it may signify: "To the notion of a most perfect Being belongs also the notion of *aseity* or of the necessity of existing." Secondly: "The notion of a most perfect Being is such, that the very act of necessarily existing or necessary existence itself cannot possibly be separated from it." This latter proposition may be expressed also in different words, which, as being sufficiently obvious, I shall not now dwell upon. On considering all things, I am afraid that Des Cartes, how mighty soever in intellect, occasionally in the subtlety

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because it is only the idea of such a thing as hath all possible and conceivable perfections in it; that is, all perfections which are neither contradictious in themselves, nor to one another.

of meditation confounded these two notions with each other, and used the term *necessary existence* sometimes for the abstract notion of a certain perfection, sometimes for the *very act of existing*, or, in other words, for the notion of *actual existence itself*. And what not a little confirms me in this opinion is, that he has expressed the proposition we are speaking of in ambiguous words. If he had said: "The notion of a most perfect Being contains the notion of the necessity of existing," his meaning would have been plain and clear. But he has abstained from the word *idea* or *notion*, and purposely, as it would appear, employed the abstract noun *necessary existence* itself; so that attentive readers are left uncertain what meaning is to be attached to his words. Almost all his followers tell us, that he has nowhere expressed his mind more clearly and distinctly than in the Respons. to first Objections, subjoined to his Meditat. Metaphysic.; nor would I deny this to be the fact. But after repeatedly reading these Responsions, I am more than ever inclined to believe what I have stated. As will appear however from what we are about to bring forward, it is of little or no consequence as regards the matter in hand, whether *necessary existence* be here taken in one sense or in the other. Only it seems to me to be conducive to a knowledge of the argument itself, and the regularity and order of the disputation, that these two notions should be distinguished.

Let us first assume the words *necessary existence* to have been used by Des Cartes for the *idea* or notion of *aseity*, or *necessary existence* abstractedly considered, and the meaning of his proposition to be this: "From the notion of a most perfect Being it is impossible by any mental operation to disconnect the notion of aseity." This every wise and right-thinking man will acknowledge to be the case. For *aseity* or necessary existence is the highest perfection, and the source and origin as it were of all perfections. Whether it ought to be referred to *positive* or *negative* perfections, as they are called, let those dispute in the dark who delight in verbal contests. To attempt therefore to conceive the notion of a Being absolutely perfect, and exclude from it the notion of necessary existence, would be just as wise as to separate the idea of wings from that of a bird. The idea of a most perfect Being, divested of aseity, is not an image of an absolutely perfect Being at all, but of one that is imperfect and produced from certain causes. This therefore will be Des Cartes' argument. "If the idea of any thing whatever has the notion of necessary existence so connected with it, that on this being taken away the whole notion is at once done away with, that thing necessarily exists externally to my mind: but the idea of a most perfect Being is of such a kind: therefore this Being must necessarily exist externally to the mind." But most men, I am convinced, as soon as they see this syllogism, will complain of the want of sequence in the major proposition: for it does not follow from the fact of existence being connected with any notion, that the thing itself also really exists. Indeed no one I should imagine, according to any rational and legitimate system of philosophizing can infer the thing itself from the notion. To make this more apparent I shall comprise my meaning in the following argument: "The existence of any thing is of the same nature as its essence: but the essence of the idea of a most perfect Being is ideal only: therefore its necessary existence also is not real but ideal only." No reasonable man would question the truth of the major proposition of this syllogism: for existence and essence differ in our own mode of conception rather than in reality. Neither will any one be able to disprove the minor proposition: for what is essence but a vision or fancy of the mind? Consequently it appears obviously to be an error in reasoning to conclude the real existence of a most perfect Being, from the fact that the notion of necessary existence or *ideal necessary existence*, (to use a new phrase) cannot be separated from the idea of such a Being. This probably will be placed in a clearer point of view by our bringing forward and examining a perfectly similar argument. Every body knows that almost all the philosophers of antiquity believed in the eternity of matter: let us suppose one of them to argue as follows: "If the notion of any thing whatever contains the notion of necessary existence, that thing really and necessarily exists: but the notion of eternal matter contains aseity or necessary existence: therefore eternal matter exists." The major proposition of this argument is Des Cartes' own; we have only therefore to inquire into the minor. But how this can be disputed, if the

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And they who will not allow of this consequence, from the idea of a perfect Being, including necessity of existence in it, that it doth therefore actually exist, yet cannot deny but that this at

former be admitted to be true, I am at a loss to perceive. For as soon as I conceive the idea of eternal matter, I am compelled in spite of myself to associate necessary existence with it: divested of this, the whole image vanishes along with it. The friends of Des Cartes will tell us perhaps that this necessary existence, which is attached to the idea of eternal matter is merely *objective, ideal, mental,* or *imaginary*; but that the necessary existence in God is *real.* No wise man, however, will be satisfied with this answer. If the question here had regarded God himself, they would have untied the knot admirably: for who will deny that the existence which is in God himself is *real,* or that God necessarily exists? But it does not refer to God but to the idea of God; and existence as belonging to the notions of things is exactly the same in all, namely, *objective* or *ideal* only; neither does the idea of God differ in this respect from the idea of matter, although, in regard to *essence* it is widely different.

Having explained what follows from the former acceptation of the words *necessary existence* in this question, let us now proceed to the other meaning, and consider necessary existence as signifying not only the notion of aseity or the necessity of existence, but also the very act of necessarily existing, or necessary existence itself. As the whole of this disputation turns upon the idea, and not upon the thing itself corresponding to that idea, it is obvious that *actual* existence itself is not understood here, but only what in the language of metaphysicians, is called *mental, ideal, objective,* or the notion of existence, in so far as it does not differ from the thing existing, or is in that nature which exists. For it would be the height of absurdity to combine real existence, or the *act of existing externally to the mind,* with an idea or image inherent in the mind. If the words necessary existence be taken in this sense Des Cartes' proposition will admit of the following interpretation: "When I contemplate the idea residing in my mind of a most perfect Being, I cannot help regarding it as necessarily and really existing." Such most certainly is the case: nor can any one who is not ignorant of himself, harbour a doubt about the truth of this proposition. Wherefore, the following argument will be deduced from it: "If the idea of any thing is such, that he who contemplates it cannot but conceive the thing, of which it is the image, as existing and necessarily existing, that thing is. But the idea of a most perfect Being is of this kind: Therefore, a most perfect Being or God is." But here I am afraid all thinking and intelligent persons will at once question the truth of the major premise. For, agreeably to what we have already remarked, they will assert this to be the nature of all ideas, that the things represented by them cannot be exhibited to the mind otherwise than as existing. All our cogitation upon any thing, whatever be its nature or character, must necessarily cease as soon as the notion of real existence is excluded from its image. Wherefore, if there be any force in this argument, it will go to prove the existence of all things, of which ideas can be formed in the mind. But here Des Cartes will exclaim: "There is a wide difference between existence and necessary existence. All things are conceived by us as existing indeed, but only one, namely, a most perfect Being, as necessarily existing. From the notion of contingent existence, it is impossible to conclude real existence: but the case is different with necessary existence, from the notion of which real existence cannot but flow." "We must distinguish," says he, in his Answer to the first Objections against his Metaphysical Meditations, p. 60. "between possible and necessary existence, and bear in mind that possible existence is contained in the conception or idea of all those things that are clearly and distinctly perceived, but necessary existence in the idea of God only. For any one who attends minutely to the difference between the idea of God and all other ideas will feel convinced, I have no doubt, that although we never conceive other things except as existing, still it does not thence follow that they do, but merely that they can exist: because we do not perceive it to be necessary that actual existence should be combined with their other properties. But that because we perceive actual existence to be necessarily and invariably combined with the other attributes of God, it follows that God exists." These remarks, subtle and ingenious though they are, seem to me to be not sufficiently sound and conclusive to warrant our concurrence. Contingent and necessary existence most assuredly are as widely distinct as finite and infinite, nor is the difference less between the ideas of these two existences.

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least will follow, from its implying no manner of contradiction in it, that it is therefore a thing possible or not impossible to be. For thus much being true of all other contingent things, whose idea implieth no contradiction, that they are therefore possible; it must needs be granted of that, whose very idea and essence containeth a necessity of existence in it, as the essence of nothing else but a perfect Being doth. And this is the first step that we now make in way of argumentation, from the idea of God, or a perfect Being, having nothing contradictious in it, that therefore God is at least possible, or no way impossible to have been. In the next place, as this particular idea of that which is possible includeth necessity of existence in it; from these two

It is also unquestionable that when I think of a thing simply existing, I am convinced that it can either be or not be: but that when I contemplate the idea of a nature necessarily existent, it is impossible for me to entertain such a conviction. But this is not the subject now in question. It is universally admitted that ideas and notions differ widely from each other in their own intrinsic nature, according to the variety of things to which they correspond: nor are we here discussing the essence and nature of ideas, but only their existence or mode of existing. The thing to be ascertained is: Whether the idea of necessary existence exists in a different way from the idea of contingent existence, and consequently, we can pass on by a fair process of reasoning from the idea of necessary existence to real and actual existence; or, Whether necessary existence belongs to the idea of a most perfect Being in a way different from that in which contingent existence pertains to an imperfect nature. But in relation to existence all notions and ideas, although possessing a thousand differences in other respects, are exactly alike: they all exist in the same manner, namely, in our own minds, and are nothing but mental conceptions. In this point of view, therefore, there is no difference between existence and necessary existence. Both are notions: both belong to the essence of the thing they are assigned to only *objectively* and *ideally:* both exist in our own mind and intelligence alone. Consequently, as real existence does not follow from the idea of existence: so neither is it possible for real external existence to flow from the idea of necessary existence. Let me here repeat the argument already made us of: "The existence of any thing is necessarily of the same nature as its essence: but the essence of that idea to which necessary existence is referred, is *objective* and *mental* only: therefore, we cannot conclude differently of necessary existence, which is a part of it."

Des Cartes' words are capable also of another construction, which is as follows: "As often as I contemplate the idea of a necessarily existing nature, I am assured by an inward voice speaking forth from the secret recesses of my mind, that such a nature really exists." But supposing the philosopher's dogma: "The idea of a most perfect Being contains the idea of necessary existence," to have this meaning, the nature of the whole argument is evidently changed. For this reason is not drawn from the idea and image of God, but from an inward consciousness and testimony of our own mind: which we have already slightly touched upon above. But enough of metaphysical subtleties. I cannot flatter myself so far as to suppose that these observations will be acceptable to those very sagacious men to whom the championship of ideas and mental images more particularly belongs: on the contrary I am willing to allow that, except in the form and manner of adducing them, they are not different from those which others much more acute than myself have long since advanced against this argument of Des Cartes. Nevertheless I do hope they will deem it a redeeming point in my favour, that I arrogate nothing to myself, but leave all to the judgment and decision of those whose province it is to enter more deeply into the investigation of such subjects. Whatever may be the force of this illustrious man's argument, still the angry contentions and endless disputations of the most enlightened writers, who are incessantly wrangling about its nature and efficacy, seem of themselves a convincing proof that it is by no means calculated to silence all objections, and to repress the audacity of the profane and infamous race who deny the existence of God.

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things put together at least, the possibility of such a Being, and its necessary existence (if not from the latter alone) will it according to reason follow, that he actually is. If God, or a perfect Being, in whose essence is contained necessary existence, be possible or no way impossible to have been; then he is: because upon supposition of his non-existence, it would be absolutely impossible that he should ever have been. It does not thus follow concerning imperfect beings that are contingently possible, that if they be not, it was therefore impossible for them ever to have been; for that which is contingent, though it be not, yet might it for all that possibly have been. But a perfect necessarily existent Being, upon the bare supposition of its non-existence, could no more possibly have been, than it could possibly hereafter be; because, if it might have been, though it be not, then would it not be a necessary existent Being. The sum of all is this, a necessary existent Being, if it be possible, it is; because, upon supposition of its non-existence it would be impossible for it ever to have been. Wherefore, God is either impossible to have been, or else he is. For if God were possible, and yet be not, then is he not a necessary but contingent Being, which is contrary to the hypothesis.

But because this argumentation may perhaps run the same fate also with the former, and, by reason of its subtlety, do but little execution neither, if not be accounted sophistical too; men being generally prone to distrust the firmness and solidity of such thin and subtle cobwebs, (as these and the like may seem to be) or their ability to support the weight of so great a truth; and to suspect themselves to be illaqueated and circumvented in them: therefore shall we lay no stress upon this neither, but proceed to something which is yet more plain and downright, after this manner. Whatsoever we can frame an idea of in our minds, implying no manner of contradiction, this either actually is, or else if it be not, it is possible for it to be. But, if God be not, he is not possible hereafter to be; therefore he is. The reason and necessity of the minor is evident; because, if God be not, and yet possible hereafter to be, then would he not be an eternal and necessarily existent Being, which is contradictious to his idea. And the ground of the major, upon which all the weight lies, hath been already declared, where we proved before, that if there were no God, or perfect Being, we could never have had any conception or idea of him in our minds, because there can be no positive conception of an absolute nothing, that which hath neither actual nor possible existence. Here the posture of the argument is only inverted; because we have an idea of God, or a perfect Being, implying no manner of contradiction in it, therefore must it needs have some kind of entity or

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other, either an actual or possible one; but God, if he be not, is not possible to be, therefore he doth actually exist.[3]

[3] Who was the first inventor and author of this argument, which Dr. Cudworth, for perspicuity's sake, has exhibited in a twofold form, I leave to others to discover. But whoever undertakes the task will find his chief difficulties arise from the fact that its advocates and opponents wonderfully vary it, and exhibit in their explanations an admirable diversity, not only of language, but of opinions. It has not been elucidated by so many writings and controversies of the learned, as the preceding one of Des Cartes, which we have just been discussing: and yet there are not wanting a considerable array of great men, and men too that have reached the very utmost limits of human contemplation, by whom it has either been approved or rejected; which very dissension brings us at once to the conviction, a conviction in which Dr. Cudworth himself was not far from sharing, that it is not an argument that needs only to be stated and explained, in order to compel the minds of men, however reluctant, to assent to it. First of all, it was not entirely unknown to Des Cartes himself, as the following passage from his Respons. ad Object. Primas contra Medit. Metaphys. p. 62. will testify, "If we attentively examine whether existence and what kind of existence is suitable to a supremely powerful Being, we shall be able clearly and distinctly to perceive, that first of all, *possible existence* is at least suitable, as it is to all the other things of which we have in us a distinct idea, even in the case of those which are composed by a figment of the intellect. Secondly, because we cannot conceive its existence to be possible, without at the same time being conscious on considering its immense power, that it can exist by its own proper virtue, we shall hence conclude that *it does really exist*, and has existed from all eternity: For it is well known by the light of nature, that that which can exist by its own proper virtue, exists always: And thus we shall understand that necessary existence is contained in the idea of a supremely powerful Being, not by a figment of intellect, but because it belongs to the true and immutable nature of such a Being that it should exist." But it was afterwards refined upon, and expressed in more lucid language by others: among whom our author, for the clearness of his exposition deserves a conspicuous place. Many of Des Cartes' disciples followed in the same track, with the view of being able by this means to support the former demonstration of their master, and prevent its utter repudiation. Out of many, see Jo. Hen. Suicer, in his Epistola Apologetica pro Argumento Cartesii ab Idea Dei, p. 19. Nor among the most eminent of the philosophers even of very recent times is this argument without its patrons. The illustrious G. W. Leibnitz most especially has in several passages proclaimed his opinion of its excellence. See his Cogitationes de Cognitione, Veritate, et Ideis, in the Acta Eruditor. Lips. 1684. for November, p. 539. He has expressed his mind even more clearly in the Principia Philosophiæ, to be found in tom. 7. Supplementor. Act. Erud. Lips. sect. 11. p. 500—514. where, sect. 45. he thus speaks, "God, or a necessary Being, alone enjoys this privilege, that he necessarily exists, if he be possible: And as nothing prevents the possibility of that which is without limits and involves no negation, and consequently no contradiction, this alone is sufficient as a convincing proof, *à priori*, of the existence of a God." His example is followed by the most learned Mich. Gottlieb Hansch, in his Principia Philosophiæ Leibnitianæ, Lips. et Francof. 1728. 4to. who after having propounded this Theorem, p. 112. immediately subjoins a demonstration of it in these words: "In God is discerned a sufficient reason of the existence of any possible world whatever, and therefore, the existence of God owns a sufficient reason in God himself. Wherefore, the non-existence of God is absolutely impossible, and consequently God exists of absolute necessity. But the existence of that which exists of absolute necessity, finds a sufficient reason in this alone, that its essence involves no contradiction. Therefore, the possibility of God is alone the principle of his existence." Nay, not all those even who agree neither with Des Cartes nor Leibnitz, venture altogether to spurn this argument: one of whom, Dr. Samuel Clarke, in his book, On the Being and Attributes of God, part 1. cap. 4. declares "that perhaps it is not easy to confute the subtle arguments which have been advanced to prove that we can reason from the possibility of a most perfect nature to its real existence." But these defenders of the argument, great and numerous though they be, are equalled in intellectual acumen and sagacity, no less than in number, by its adversaries, who contend that it is to be

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But perhaps this argumentation also, how firm and solid soever, may prove less convictive of the existence of a God to the generality; because whatever is received, is received

ranked among sophisms, and excluded from the class of true and legitimate demonstrations. By way of example, I shall mention only two. One is J. Le Clerc, who, Biblioth. Choisie, tom. 5. p. 134. although in other respects bestowing the highest commendations upon Dr. Cudworth, denies that his argument is more conclusive than the preceding one of Des Cartes. For he considers a transition to be erroneously made in it, from the notion of the thing to the thing itself, and the substance of the whole demonstration to be as follows: If there is such a Being, as corresponds to the idea of a most perfect Being, which we have formed in the mind, it must necessarily have existed from all eternity;" but that it can by no means be concluded from hence that there is a most perfect Being of the kind. The other is the most learned divine, Sam. Werenfels, who, Judicium de Argumento Cartesii pro Existentia Dei, p. 657. and Vindiciæ hujus Judicii adversus Suicerum, p. 676. Opusculor. conjunctim Editor. holds the whole of this species of argumentation to be sheer sophistry, and to have originated solely from the author's not having distinguished between what is possible *in itself*, and what is so *in respect to our own knowledge*. It is unnecessary for me to name more.

Where men so illustrious are at issue, it would appear presumptuous on my part to assume the character of arbiter, and attempt a task to which my powers are unequal: but having once entered into a subject so far removed from popular comprehension, I shall offer a few remarks, not by way of pronouncing a decision upon it, but of modestly stating the impressions of my own mind. Whether all those I have named understood this argument in the same sense, I shall not for the present inquire. Some of them, I confess, seem to be separated by no inconsiderable difference: J. Le Clerc in particular deviates, if I mistake not, from the views of him from whom he quotes the argument; but passing over these, I shall follow the guidance of Dr. Cudworth, who appears to me to have given a plainer and more perspicuous exposition of it than most others, and whose opinion and explanation I am satisfied will be concurred in by the generality of its supporters. This, then, is the argument which the learned Doctor and others consider to possess such signal efficacy towards demonstrating the existence of God: "If the idea or notion of any thing consists of things not repugnant to each other, that thing either is or can be: but if God is not, it is impossible for him ever to be: therefore God is." This seems to be one simple argument, but on closer inspection it will appear to contain a succession of arguments, which I consider ought first of all to be distinguished, to enable us more conveniently to inquire into the truth of the whole demonstration. For I have long ago been of opinion that in questions regarding mental conceptions and things removed from sense, we never can dispute with too much precision and clearness, inasmuch as in no others are we more liable to error either in language or opinion. This single demonstration then contains three arguments connected and combined with each other: the first of which is this: "If the idea of any thing is compounded of things not contradictory to each other, that thing either is or can be: but the idea of God or a most perfect Being consists of things not contradictory: therefore God either is or can be." The second will be as follows: "If the idea of any thing contains necessary existence, that thing cannot be and not be: but the idea of God contains necessary existence: therefore God cannot be and not be." There remains the third, which I shall express in these words: "Whatever cannot either be or not be, this, if it can be, is: but God is such that he cannot either be or not be, because his existence is necessary: therefore God is." I am almost convinced that the nature of the whole demonstration is now more apparent, and the drift of all that is briefly discussed by the learned Doctor more clear and intelligible. Let us now examine into these respective arguments, and candidly point out what seems to be defective in each, beginning with that which is the foundation of all. In this argument the minor proposition will readily be admitted by every one who does not pervert the notion of a supreme Being. But the major seems to be ambiguous, and to contain some latent imperfection. For the phrases, *can be*, *can take place*, *is possible*, have a twofold meaning. In the first place that is called *possible*, which I clearly understand to be of such a nature that it can take place and be, although perhaps it never will be.

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according to the capacity of the recipient: and though a demonstration be never so good in itself, yet is it more or less such to particular persons, according to their ability to comprehend it;

Secondly, that also is said to be possible which is in reality such that it can actually take place and happen. The former possibility might not improperly be termed *metaphysical* or *ideal*, the latter *physical* or *real*. Although I shall have no objection to those who may prefer other epithets, and call the former *intrinsic* or *in respect to us*, the latter *extrinsic* or *in respect to the thing itself*. It is *possible* for the parched fields to be refreshed to-day by plentiful showers: for my mind perceives nothing repugnant and contradictory in this. But in reality it is not otherwise possible unless the causes be present by which we know rain is occasioned. It is *possible* for my friend to be carried off in the course of the year by some violent distemper: for there is nothing in my mind to preclude my supposing that such may happen: but in reality this cannot possibly take place unless there be the antecedent causes, which usually produce death. It is possible for Caius to become rich: but this cannot take place unless his relatives die in that order in which it is necessary for them to die, that such a result may be realized. Therefore that which can take place in respect to my knowledge is altogether different from that which can happen in itself and generally does happen. Consequently nothing can be determined upon in reference to the entire proposition till we first understand in what sense the phrase, *can be*, is used in it. If what we have termed metaphysical possibility be meant thereby, every one will admit it to be certain and true; for whatever thing we can form a notion of, not compounded of things discordant and contradictory, this either is or in respect to my intelligence can be. But the same proposition will be false if physical or real possibility be understood. For as is self-apparent, and has just been shown by examples, it is a palpable error to suppose that all those things can actually be or happen, of which plain and clear notions can be formed in the mind. Hence it is already obvious how we are to decide respecting the conclusion of the argument. In this conclusion the words, *God can be*, may be understood either of that which can happen in reference to my own mind, or of real possibility, or in both senses. To interpret them in both senses would be absurd, for if this were done, we should have *more in the conclusion*, as logicians say, than in the premises. But if they be accepted in the sense of physical or real possibility (for perspicuity's sake I do not hesitate to use barbarous terms), we shall be in no better position. For thus, as we have seen before, the conclusion will not correspond with the major proposition, this being false if it be supposed to speak of that which is actually possible. Besides, upon the hypothesis of the words being to be understood of physical possibility, the disjunctive itself would be absurd and foreign to the nature of God. That which can physically and really exist, can do so on account of antecedent causes: for which reason these words admit of being used in that sense of those things only that are imperfect, and are produced from other things: "either are or can be." But when we speak of God or a most perfect Being, we speak of a nature which necessarily exists, and is connected with no other causes; and this being the case, all that we can affirm of it is: "God either is or is not." If you say: "God either is or can be," namely in himself, you predicate that of his nature which is not applicable to it; for "he cannot be." It remains therefore that we expound the words, "God can be," thus: "There is nothing in my mind which precludes me from supposing that such a nature can exist, as the idea of God represents to me." We now perceive this to be the force of the whole argument: "Because the idea of a most perfect Being involves no incongruities or contradictions, therefore my mind must necessarily decide that God, if he be not, is nevertheless possible to be in respect to my intelligence." Some probably among the ranks of those who impiously deny a supreme Being, will cordially assent to this argument, and confess their inability to refute it.

The foundation of the whole demonstration being overthrown, I fear a like fate already appears to threaten the superstructure. Let us proceed in order, and examine each part in detail. The major proposition again of the second argument seems to me to be fallacious; and this, I am confident, when the meaning of the words is explained, will at once be obvious to every one. The phrase, "can be or not be," upon which its force and truth depend, can be understood either of *ideal* and *mental*, or of *real* and *actual existence*. If the former sense be adopted, no

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therefore shall we, in the next place, form yet a plainer demonstration for a God from the idea of him, including necessary existence in it: it being first premised, that unquestionably

one I imagine is so foolish as not to admit it to be unquestionably true. But upon this hypothesis its meaning will be as follows: "If from the notion of any thing I am unable to separate the notion of necessary existence, I never can conceive that that thing is possible either to be or not be: I am absolutely compelled to consider it as one which comprises the necessity of existing in its very nature." But if you take the latter sense, the proposition is utterly destitute of truth: as we cannot legitimately reason from the idea of the thing to the thing itself. For its meaning would be this: "If from the idea of any thing whatever my mind is unable to separate the notion of necessary existence, that thing necessarily exists." Here, however, notwithstanding all my efforts, I can discover no logical connexion, nor do I know what should compel me to conclude that necessary existence itself follows from the notion or idea of it. I fancy I clearly understand rather, that the proposition is devoid of all force and truth, unless the words, "if it is," be added: "With the notion of whatever thing the idea of necessary existence is associated, that thing, if it be, cannot be or not be." But by adding these words, the argument itself is divested of all efficiency towards convicting the enemies of God. To render this more apparent, let us suppose a Manichean reasoning thus: "If the idea of any thing contains necessary existence, we ought to consider that thing as necessarily existing; the idea of a certain evil principle, existing like the good from all eternity, comprehends necessary existence: therefore that evil principle exists." Whatever you could urge against this man, would in my opinion be of equal force towards overthrowing the argument, into the power and efficacy of which we are now inquiring. You will deny, I suppose, the propriety of proceeding from the conceptions of the mind to the things themselves, and you will be right in denying it. Perhaps you will say there is a wide difference between the idea of a most perfect Being and that of an eternal principle of evil: that the former consists of properties not repugnant to each other, while the latter is compounded of contraries, and therefore does not belong to the ideas of those things which can happen. I will grant such to be the case, although I perceive a fierce war might be carried on among the learned upon this question: Whether the idea of an evil principle, considered abstractedly and not in connexion with external things, can be conceived in the mind, or not. It will be sufficient for me to answer, that in the proposition we are considering, we are not speaking of possibility, but only of necessary existence. From what has been said, no one will have any difficulty in forming a correct opinion upon the conclusion of the argument. If the word God signifies in it a *mental, ideal, objective* being, it is adapted to the premises from which it is drawn, although inefficacious towards proving that which is denied by Atheists; but if this word implies a *real* or actually existent nature, it cannot legitimately be deduced from the two former propositions. And this the second argument being demolished, we have no ground for auguring well of the third, which is connected with it. The phrase, "cannot be or not be," which stands in the major premise, ought doubtless to be understood as in the former argument, of *ideal* or *objective* existence: for unless this be the case, the whole proposition will be altogether futile and nugatory. For this would be its sense: "Whatever necessarily and really exists, does exist." A clever proposition truly! It is merely necessary therefore to inquire into the term *to exist*. Suppose it to signify the same as *to exist really*, and you will have this sentence: "Whatever exists necessarily in my mind, exists also out of my mind." But, if I happen not to be wrong in measuring the intellect of others by my own, no reflecting man who looks to the logical consequences of a thing will ever admit this. In the mind of Aristotle and his followers the world existed necessarily and of itself. Were they therefore at liberty to conclude from that, that the world necessarily existed in reality also? But suppose *to exist*, to be the same in this proposition as *to exist in the mind*, and we get the following: "Whatever cannot either be or not be in my mind, is in my mind." But who is so mad as not immediately to perceive the absurdity of such a dogma? I shall say nothing of the minor proposition and the conclusion. For I cannot suppose any of my readers to be so dull as not to know that by these observations the force of the whole argument is destroyed. If in these two propositions the word God denotes the notion of God, there is an end of the whole argumentation: if it means God himself, these two propositions

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something or other did exist from all eternity, without beginning. For it is certain that every thing could not be made, because nothing could come from nothing, or be made by itself; and therefore if once there had been nothing, there could never have been any thing. Whence it is undeniable, that there was always something, and consequently, that there was something unmade, which existed of itself from all eternity. Now all the question is, and indeed this is the only question betwixt Theists and Atheists; since something did certainly exist of itself from all eternity, what that thing is, whether it be a perfect, or an imperfect Being? We say therefore, that whatsoever existed of itself from eternity, and without beginning, did so exist naturally and necessarily, or by the necessity of its own nature. Now, nothing could exist of itself from eternity, naturally and necessarily, but that which containeth necessary and eternal self-existence in its own nature. But there is nothing which containeth necessary eternal existence in its own nature or

are at variance with the first. The same may easily be applied to the words *to be* and to exist. Such being the case, I consider that although this argument may be very subtle and acute, it proves nothing, and that the whole sum and substance of it amounts to this: "Because the idea of God is not compounded of things repugnant to each other, nor contradicts any known truth, therefore there is nothing in my mind to hinder me from believing that God exists, if sufficient arguments be brought forward to convince me of this." Such is the weakness of the human intellect, that even the greatest men are too apt to consider the visions and images of their own minds as things really existing, and very often inadvertently forget the infinite distinction between *to conceive* and *to be*. There is not in the life of men a fault more common than this, especially among metaphysicians. And perhaps I myself, while absorbed in meditation I am pursuing the fleeting notions and shadows of things, have not altogether avoided it. Let the candid and intelligent judge.

Some most acute reasoners of our own time have struck out a new and different path from the others we have mentioned, in order to prove the *existence* of a supreme Being from the notion or idea of it; which, as I have once entered upon this knotty topic, I shall briefly notice. The demonstration is based upon this precept: "If the notions of any thing whatsoever are so deeply implanted in our minds that, do what we will, they cannot by any means be eradicated, those things exist." I will explain this dogma in the words of the illustrious philosopher and mathematician Dr. Sam. Clarke, from his book on the Existence of God, part 1. chap. 4. "If I find the idea of a thing in my mind, and that it is as impossible for me to divest myself of this idea as it is to divest myself of the idea of the equality of twice two and four, it is evident that the certainty of the existence of this thing is the same, and rests upon the same foundation, as the certainty of the relation between twice two and four. For the relation of equality between twice two and four has no other certainty than this, that it is impossible to change or abolish the idea of this relation without falling into a real contradiction." They then assume the notion of a most perfect Being to belong to this class of ideas: from which they conclude that there is a God. But what I consider among other things as particularly fatal to this argument is, that some notions, although altogether crochetty and absurd, nevertheless adhere so pertinaciously to the minds of some persons, that no art nor force nor reason can dislodge them. To confess my own sentiments frankly: Those seem to me to have the best of this controversy who deny the possibility of proving from the mere naked notion or idea of a thing, apart from every thing else, and that too *à priori* by merely contemplating what the notion consists of, that a nature corresponding to this notion really exists externally to the mind. For as every one, I am convinced, must be aware, there is no notion or vision of the mind, to which *real* and *actual* existence belongs.

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essence, but only an absolutely perfect Being; all other imperfect things being in their nature contingently possible, either to be, or not be. Wherefore since something or other must and doth exist of itself naturally and necessarily from eternity unmade, and nothing could do this but what included necessary self-existence in its nature or essence; it is certain that it was a perfect Being, or God, who did exist of himself from eternity, and nothing else; all other imperfect things, which have no necessary self-existence in their nature, deriving their being from him. Here therefore are the Atheists infinitely absurd and unreasonable when they will not acknowledge that which containeth independent self-existence, or necessity of existence (which indeed is the same with an impossibility of non-existence) in its nature and essence, that is, a perfect Being, so much as to exist at all; and yet in the meantime assert that which hath no necessity of existence in its nature, the most imperfect of all Beings, inanimate body and matter, to have existed of itself necessarily from all eternity.

We might here add, as a farther confirmation of this argument, what hath been already proved, that no temporary successive Being (whose duration is in a continual flux, as if it were every moment generated anew) and therefore neither our own souls, nor the world, nor matter moving, could possibly have existed from eternity, and independently upon any other thing, but must have had a beginning, and been caused by something else; namely, by an absolutely perfect Being, whose duration therefore is permanent, and without any successive generation or flux.[4]

But besides all these arguments, we may otherwise from the idea of God (already declared) be able both exactly to state the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists, and satisfactorily to decide the same. In order whereunto, there is yet something again to be premised; namely this, that as it is certain every thing was not made, but something existed of itself from eternity

[4] Who but a fool and a madman would deny the clearness and excellence of this argument? "It is utterly impossible but that something must have existed from all eternity. That which existed from all eternity exists necessarily and of itself. Whatever contains necessary existence in its own nature cannot but be absolutely perfect. Therefore God, or a most perfect Being exists." Certainly every thing whatever is more or less remote from perfection by reason of its not being self-existent, but dependent upon antecedent causes, which are again connected with other causes. Hence it necessarily follows, that all perfections are combined in that nature, from which all cause is absent. But if I am not mistaken, most men will deny this argument to be drawn solely from the innate idea of God, or a most perfect nature; and will assert, on the contrary, that we ascend in it from the idea of an eternal nature to that of a most perfect nature, and that this very idea of an eternal nature is perhaps adventitious, and derived from the contemplation of external things and our own nature. As regards the matter itself, it is of no consequence what this argument is borrowed from or to what class it belongs, provided it possesses sufficient efficacy to refute the profane crew who deny the existence of God.

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unmade; so is it likewise certain, that every thing was not unmade neither, nor existed of itself from eternity, but something was made, and had a beginning. Where there is a full agreement betwixt Theists and Atheists, as to this one point, no Atheist asserting every thing to have been unmade, but they all acknowledging themselves to have been generated, and to have had a beginning; that is, their own souls and personalities, as likewise the lives and souls of all other men and animals. Wherefore, since something certainly existed of itself from eternity, but other things were made, and had a beginning (which therefore must needs derive their being from that which existed of itself unmade), here is the state of the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists, whether that which existed of itself from all eternity, and was the cause of all other things, were a perfect Being and God, or the most imperfect of all things whatsoever, inanimate and senseless matter. The former is the doctrine of Theists, as Aristotle* affirmeth of those ancients, who did not write fabulously concerning the first principles: Οἷον Φερεκύδης, καὶ ἕτεροί τινες, τὸ γεννῆσαν πρῶτον τὸ Ἄριστον τιθέασι, καὶ οἱ Μάγοι· καὶ τῶν ὑστέρων δὲ σοφῶν, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τε καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας, "As namely, Pherecydes, and the Magi, and Empedocles and Anaxagoras, and many others; that they agreed in this, that the first original of all things was the best and most perfect." Where, by the way, we may observe also, that according to Aristotle, the ancient Magi did not acknowledge a substantial evil principle, they making that, which is the best and most perfect Being, alone by itself, to be the first begetter of all.[5] This, I say, is the hypothesis of Theists, that there is one absolutely perfect Being, existing of itself from all eternity, from whence all other lesser perfections, or imperfect beings, did gradually descend, till at last they end in senseless matter or inanimate body. But the atheistic hypothesis, on the contrary, makes senseless matter the most imperfect thing, to be the first principle, or the only self-existent being, and the cause of all other things; and consequently all higher degrees of perfections, that are in the world, to have climbed up, or emerged by way of ascent from thence; as life, sense, understanding, and reason from that, which is altogether dead and senseless. Nay, as it was before observed, there hath been amongst the ancient Pagans a certain kind of religious Atheists, such as acknowledging verbally a God, or soul of the world, presiding over the whole, supposed this notwithstanding to have first emerged also, out of senseless matter, Night and Chaos; and therefore doubtless to

* Met. lib. 12. c. 5. [Cap. 4. p. 446. tom. 4, opp.]

[5] This observation is to be added to the copious disputation in chap. 4. on the religion and theological opinions of the Magians and ancient Persians.

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be likewise dissolvable again into the same. And of these is that place in Aristotle* to be understood: Βασιλεύειν καὶ ἄρχειν φασὶν οὐ τοὺς πρώτους οἷον Νύκτα, καὶ Οὐρανὸν, ἢ Χάος, ἢ καὶ Ὠκεανὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸν Δία, "They suppose, not the first things, as Night, and the Heaven, and Chaos, and the Ocean, but Jupiter (or God) to rule and govern all." Where it is intimated, that the Heaven, Night, Chaos, and the Ocean, according to these, were seniors to Jupiter, or in order of nature before him; they apprehending, that things did ascend upward from that, which was most imperfect, as Night and Chaos, to the more perfect, and at length to Jupiter himself, the mundane Soul, who governeth the whole world, as our soul doth our body. Which same opinion is afterwards again taken notice of, and reprehended by Aristotle† in these words:[6] Οὐκ ὀρθῶς δ' ὑπολαμβάνει οὐδ' εἴτις παρεικάζει τὰς τοῦ ὅλου ἀρχὰς, τῇ τῶν ζώων καὶ φυτῶν· ὅτι ἐξ ἀορίστων δὲ ἀεὶ τὰ τελείοτερα· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι σπέρμα πρῶτον, "Nor would he think rightly, who should resemble the principle of the universe to that of animals and plants: where, from indeterminate and imperfect things (as seeds) do always arise the more perfect. For even here also is the case otherwise than they suppose; for it is a man that generates a man; nor is the seed the first."

The controversy being thus clearly stated betwixt Theists and Atheists, it may now with great ease, and to the full conviction of all minds unprejudiced, and unprepossessed with false principles, be determined; it being, on the one hand, undeniably evident, that lesser perfections may naturally descend from greater, or at least from that which is absolutely perfect, and which virtually containeth all; but, on the other hand, utterly impossible, that greater perfections, and higher degrees of being, should rise and ascend out of lesser and lower, so as that, which is the most absolutely imperfect of all things, should be the first fountain and original of all; since no effect can possibly transcend the power of its cause. Wherefore it is certain, that in the universe things did not thus ascend and mount, or climb up from lower perfection to higher; but, on the contrary descend and slide down from higher to lower: so that the first original of all things was not the most imperfect, but the most perfect Being. But to speak more particularly; it is certain, notwithstanding

* Met. lib. 12. c. 4. [Page 446. tom. 4. opp.]

† Met. lib. 12. c. 5. Du Vall. [Page 448. tom. 4. opp.]

[6] In these words of Aristotle, Dr. Cudworth has omitted a portion which is, however, of no slight importance towards comprehending his full meaning; I shall therefore supply it. After the word τελειότερα the philosopher thus proceeds: Διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων οὕτως ἔχειν φασὶν, ὡς τι μηδὲ ὄντι εἶναι τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ· εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τέλειαι αἱ ἀρχαὶ, ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα. Ἄνθρωπος, κ. τ. λ. "Wherefore they say the like is the case in first principles, and suppose that no entity is of itself one. But here the principles from which all things proceed are perfect."

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all the vain pretences of Lucretius, and other Atheists, or Semi-Atheists, to the contrary, that life and sense could never possibly spring out of dead and senseless matter, as its only original, either in the way of atoms (no composition of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, being ever able to produce cogitation), or in the way of qualities, since life and perception can no more result from any mixture of elements, or combinations of qualities of heat and cold, moist and dry, &c. than from unqualified atoms. This being undeniably demonstrable from that very principle of reason, which the Atheists are so fond of, but misunderstanding abuse (as shall be manifested afterward) that nothing can come from nothing. Much less could understanding and reason in men ever have emerged out of stupid matter, devoid of all manner of life. Wherefore we must needs here freely declare against the darkness of that philosophy, which hath been sometimes unwarily entertained by such as were no Atheists, that sense may rise from a certain modification, mixture, or organization of dead and senseless matter; as also that understanding and reason may result from sense: the plain consequence of both which is, that senseless matter may prove the original of all things, and the only Numen. Which doctrine therefore is, doubtless, a main piece of the philosophy of the kingdom of darkness. But this darkness hath been of late in great measure dispelled by the light of the atomic philosophy, restored, as it was in its first genuine and virgin state, unde flowered as yet by Atheists; this clearly showing how far body and mechanism can go, and that life and cogitation can never emerge out from thence; it being built upon that fundamental principle, as we have made it evident in the first chapter, that "Nothing can come from nothing." And Strato and the hylozoic Atheists were so well aware, and so sensible of this, that all life and understanding could not possibly be generated or made, but that there must be some fundamental and substantial, or eternal unmade life and knowledge, that they therefore have thought necessary to attribute life, and perception (or understanding) with appetite, and self-moving power, to all matter as such, that so it might be thereby fitly qualified to be the original of all things; than which opinion as nothing can be more monstrous, so shall we elsewhere evince the impossibility thereof. In the mean time, we doubt not to aver, that the argument proposed is a sufficient demonstration of the impossibility of atheism; which will be further manifested in our answer to the second atheistic objection against a divine creation, because nothing can come from nothing.[7]

[7] I should say the same almost of this argument as of the preceding one. It is powerful and convincing, and pre-eminently calculated to confound the abettors of atheism; but it is not deduced from the abstract notion of God *à priori*, as the learned

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But this controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists may be yet more particularly stated from the idea of God, as including mind or understanding in it essentially, viz. Whether mind be eternal and unmade, as being the maker of all; or else, Whether all mind were itself made or generated, and that out of senseless matter? For, according to the doctrine of the pagan Theists, mind was προγενέστατος, καὶ Κύριος κατὰ φύσιν, "the oldest of all things senior to the world and elements, and by nature hath a princely and lordly dominion over all." But, according to those Atheists, who make matter, or body, devoid of all life and understanding, to be the first principle, mind must be ὑστερογενής, "a postnate thing," younger than the world; a weak, umbratile, and evanid image, and next to nothing.

And the controversy, as thus stated, may be also clearly and satisfactorily decided. For first, we say, that as it is certainly true, that if there had been once nothing at all, there could never have been any thing; so is it true likewise, that if once there had been no life in the whole universe, but all had been dead, then could there never have been any life or motion in it; and if once there had been no mind, understanding, or knowledge, then could there never have been any mind or understanding produced. Because, to suppose life and understanding to rise and spring up out of that which is altogether dead and senseless, as its only original, is plainly to suppose something to come out of nothing. It cannot be said so of other things, as of the corporeal world and matter, that if once they had not been, they could never possibly have been; because, though there had been no world nor matter, yet might these have been produced from a perfect, omnipotent incorporeal Being, which in itself eminently containeth all things. Dead and senseless matter could never have created or generated mind and understanding, but a perfect omnipotent mind could create matter. Wherefore, because there is mind, we are certain, that there was some mind or other from eternity without beginning; though not because there is body, that therefore there was body or matter from eternity unmade. Now these imperfect minds of ours were by no means themselves eternal or without beginning, but from an antecedent non-existence brought forth into being; but since no mind could spring out of dead and senseless matter, and all minds could not possibly be made, nor one produced from another infinitely;

Doctor seems to suppose. The reasoning altogether proceeds as follows: It is impossible but that many things must have had an origin and beginning. But whatever was the first fountain and original of all must necessarily be more perfect and excellent than the things that sprung from it. Therefore there is a most perfect nature which produced all things. We thus, I consider, ascend by contemplation from the things of which the universe consists to the knowledge of God, or by the process *à posteriori*, which schoolmen formerly called the process of *eminence* and *causality*, but do not prove his existence *à priori* from the abstract notion.

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there must of necessity be an eternal unmade mind, from whence those imperfect minds of ours were derived. Which perfect omnipotent mind was as well the cause of all other things as of human souls.[8]

But before we proceed to any further argumentation, we must needs take notice here, that the Atheists suppose no small part of their strength to lie in this very thing, namely, their disproving a God from the nature of understanding and knowledge; nor do they indeed swagger in any thing more than this. We have already set it for the eleventh atheistic argument, that "knowledge being the information of the things themselves known, and all conception the action of that which is conceived, and the passion of the conceiver; the world and all sensible things must needs be before there could be any knowledge or conception of them, and no knowledge or conception before the world as its cause." Or more briefly thus: the world could not be made by knowledge and understanding, because there could be no knowledge or understanding of the world, or of any thing in it, before it was made. For, according to these Atheists, things made knowledge, and not knowledge things; they meaning by "things" here such only, as are sensible and corporeal. So that Mind and Understanding could not be the creator of the world and these sensible things, itself being the mere creature of them; a secondary, derivative result from them, or a fantastic image of them; the youngest and most creaturely thing in the whole world. Whence it follows, that to suppose mind and understanding to be the maker of all things would be no better sense, than if one should suppose the images in ponds and rivers to be the makers of the sun, moon and stars, and other things represented in them. And upon such a ground as this, does a modern writer presume to determine, that knowledge and understanding are not to be attributed to God Almighty, because they imply imperfection, and dependence upon corporeal things without:* Quoniam scientia et intellectus in nobis nihil aliud sunt, quàm suscitatus à rebus externis organa prementibus animi tumultus, non est putandum aliquid tale accidere Deo. Signum enim est potentiæ ab alio dependentis. Which is again Englished thus:† "Knowledge and understanding being in us nothing else but a tumult in the mind, raised by external things, that press the organical parts of man's body; there is no such

[8] Neither can this reason, strong and powerful as it is in itself, in my opinion be properly ranked amongst what are usually termed *à priori* arguments. For it proceeds from the effects to the cause, and from a consideration of existing things infers the nature of that Being, which was the parent and founder of all things. In this manner the existence of God is not deduced from the notion but rather it is shown from the nature of existing things, what sort of idea we are to form of an eternal nature or God.

* De Cive Rel. c. 15. sect. 14. † Lev. cap. 31.

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thing in God, nor can they be attributed to him, they being things which depend upon natural causes." Where this writer thus denying knowledge and understanding to God, upon pretence that it speaks imperfection, and dependence upon external corporeal things (it being nothing but a tumult raised by the motions and pressures of them) he must needs absolutely deny the first principle of all things to be any knowing understanding nature, unless he had asserted some other kind of knowledge distinct from that of men, and clearly attributed the same to God Almighty. Hitherto the sense of Atheists.[9]

Now we shall, for the present, only so far forth concern ourselves in confuting this atheistic doctrine, as to lay a foundation thereby for the demonstration of the contrary, namely, the existence of a God, or a Mind before the world, from the nature of knowledge and understanding. First, therefore, it is a sottish conceit of these Atheists, proceeding from their not attending to their own cogitations, that not only sense, but also knowledge and understanding in men, is but a tumult, raised from corporeal things without, pressing upon the organs of their body; or else, as they declare themselves more distinctly, nothing but the

[9] The whole of this passage on the nature and origin of human knowledge, which is ably and ingeniously handled by the learned Doctor, I have for cogent reasons determined to leave untouched. On Hobbes' opinion, which Dr. Cudworth himself here in some measure excuses, I remember having already said something in another place. The rest of those who suppose all knowledge either to spring from the senses or to proceed from the interior nature of the mind, are distributable into two classes, and therefore cannot conveniently be comprehended in one and the same argument. Some of those even who contend fiercely with each other upon these matters are probably less at variance in opinions and sentiments than they themselves suppose. I cannot but observe, however, that this is not one of those controversies which form a constituent part of the contest between us and Atheists, and are so connected with the cause of religion, that its welfare depends upon their decision; but that it may be argued on either side without religion being at all affected. For there were many among those who worshipped God most devoutly, and even among the early Christian fathers themselves, for example Tertullian, who considered all knowledge to proceed from a contemplation of external things, and altogether repudiated the doctrine of innate notions. Nor can one be ignorant, that the greatest philosophers of later times, eminent for their piety in other respects, have strenuously maintained the same opinion. On the other hand, some of the most bitter enemies of religion, and particularly of Spinoza's school, have not hesitated to affirm that the seeds of all knowledge are inherent in our minds; nay even have absurdly attempted to deduce from this very doctrine inferences confirmatory of their impiety. I know, indeed, that some have shamefully abused this opinion, which derives all knowledge from the senses, to the overthrow of religion; nor would I wholly exempt Hobbes from this class. But I do maintain that it is by no means a sure and indubitable sign of erroneous sentiments respecting God; and I consider this intimation necessary, lest any one should be induced by Dr. Cudworth's disputation at once to brand all who are favourable to it with the stigma of impiety. If any Atheist ever reasoned in this manner: "All human knowledge springs from things which affect the senses; therefore, there is no God, the maker of all things," he acted foolishly and absurdly, and, in my opinion, was deserving of ridicule rather than a long and serious refutation. This argument is of the same nature and form as the following: "I know by means of my senses alone, that there are cities united together by laws and compacts, that there are watches, that there is an art of constructing convenient and elegant houses: therefore there are no founders of cities, no watchmakers, no architects."

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activity of sensible objects upon them, and their passion from them. For if this were true, then would every thing that suffered and reacted motion, especially polite bodies, as looking-glasses, have something both of sense and of understanding in them. It is plain, that there comes nothing to us from bodies without us, but only local motion and pressure. Neither is sense itself the mere passion of those motions, but the perception of their passions in a way of fancy. But sensible things themselves (as for example light and colours) are not known or understood either by the passion or the fancy of sense, nor by any thing merely foreign and adventitious, but by intelligible ideas exerted from the mind itself, that is, by something native and domestic to it: nothing being more true than this of Boetius,[10] that; Omne, quod scitur, non ex sua, sed ex comprehendentium naturâ, vi, et facultate cognoscitur, "Whatsoever is known, is known not by its own force and power, but by the force and power, the vigour and activity of that thing itself, which knows or comprehends it." Wherefore, besides the phantasms of singular bodies, or of sensible things existing without us (which are not mere passions neither), it is plain, that our human mind hath other cogitations or conceptions in it; namely, the ideas of the intelligible natures and essences of things, which are universal, and by and under which it understands singulars. It is a ridiculous conceit of a modern atheistic writer, that universals are nothing else but names, attributed to many singular bodies, because whatsoever *is*, is singular. For though whatsoever exists without the mind be singular, yet is it plain, that there are conceptions in our minds objectively universal. Which universal objects of our mind, though they exist not as such any where without it, yet are they not therefore nothing, but have an intelligible entity for this very reason, because they are conceivable: for since nonentity is not conceivable, whatsoever is conceivable, and an object of the mind, is therefore something. And as for axiomatical truths, in which something is affirmed or denied, as these are not all passions from bodies without us (for what local motions could impress this common notion upon our minds, that things which agree in one third agree amongst themselves, or any other?), so neither are these things only gathered by induction from repeated and reiterated sensations; we clearly apprehending at once, that it is impossible they should be otherwise. Thus Aristotle ingeniously: Οὐδὲ ἐπίστασθαι δι' αἰσθήσεως ἔστιν, ὅτι καὶ εἰ ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δυσὶν

[10] The learned Doctor quotes this passage of Boetius from memory, and on that account gives his opinion rather than his words, which are as follows, De Consolat. Philos. lib. 5. p. 134: Omne, quod cognoscitur, non secundum sui vim, sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem, "Whatever is known is comprehended not according to its own force but according to the faculty of those that know it."

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ὀρθαῖς ἔχει τὰς γωνίας, ἐζητοῦμεν ἂν ἀπόδειξιν, καὶ οὐχ ὡς φασὶ τινὲς ἐπιστάμεθα· αἰσθάνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη καθ' ἕκαστον, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη τῷ καθόλου γνωρίζειν ἔστι,[1] "It is evident, that there is no knowledge (of the universal theorems of geometry) by sense. For if we could perceive by sense, that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two right; yet should we not rest satisfied in this, as having therefore a sufficient knowledge hereof; but would seek further after a demonstration of it: sense reaching only to singulars, but knowledge to universals." When from the universal idea of a triangle, which is neither here, nor there, nor any where, without our mind, but yet hath an intelligible entity, we see a plain necessity, that its three angles must be equal to two right, then do we know the truth of this universal theorem, and not before: as also we understand, that every singular triangle (so far as it is true) hath this property in it. Wherefore the knowledge of this, and the like truths, is not derived from singulars, nor do we arrive to them in way of ascent from singulars to universals; but, on the contrary, having first found them in the universals, we afterwards descending, apply them to singulars: so that our knowledge here is not after singular bodies, and secondarily or derivatively from them, but in order of nature before them, and proleptical to them.

Now these universal conceptions, some of which are also abstract (as life, sense, reason, knowledge, and the like) many of them are of such things whose singulars do not at all fall under sense; which therefore could never possibly be impressed upon us from singular bodies by local motion: and again some such, as though they belong to corporeal and sensible things, yet, as their accuracy cannot be reached to by sense, so neither did they ever exist in that matter of this lower world which here encompasseth us, and therefore could not be stamped upon us from without: as for example, the ideas of a perfect straight line, and a plain superficies, or of an exact triangle, circle, sphere, or cube; no material thing here amongst us being terminated in so strait lines but that even by microscopes there may be discovered much irregularity and deformity in them; and very probable it is, that there are no perfectly straight lines, no such triangles, circles, spheres, or cubes, as answer to the exactness of our conceptions in any part of the whole material universe, nor never will be. Notwithstanding which, they are not absolute nonentities, since we can demonstrate things concerning them, and though they never were nor will be, yet are they possible to exist, since nothing can be conceived but it either is or else is

[1] Analyt. Posterior. lib. 1. p. 226. tom. 1. opp. These words however are not read in this order in Aristotle, Dr. Cudworth having joined two separate passages together: yet not so as to do any violence to the sense.

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possible to be. The human mind therefore hath a power of framing ideas and conceptions, not only of what actually is, but also of things which never were, nor perhaps will be, they being only possible to be. But when, from our conceptions, we conclude of some things, that though they are not, yet they are possible to be; since nothing that is not can be possible to be, unless there be something actually in being which hath sufficient power to produce it; we do implicitly suppose the existence of a God or omnipotent Being thereby, which can make whatsoever is conceivable, though it yet be not, to exist; and therefore material triangles, circles, spheres, cubes, mathematically exact.[2]

The result of what we have hitherto said is this, that since singular bodies are not the only objects of our mind and cogitation, it having also universal and abstract ideas of the intelligible natures or essences of things (some of which are such, whose singulars do not at all fall under sense; others, though they belong to bodies, yet sense can never reach to them, nor were they ever in matter); moreover, since our mind can conceive of things which nowhere actually exist, but are only possible, and can have such a demonstrative science of universal truths, as sense can never ascend to: that therefore human knowledge and understanding itself is not the mere image and creature of singular bodies only; and so derivative, or ectypal from them, and in order of nature junior to them, but that, as it were hovering aloft over all the corporeal universe, it is a thing independent upon singular bodies, or proleptical to them, and in order of nature before them.

But what account can we then possibly give of knowledge and understanding, their nature and original, since there must be νοητὸν, "that which is intelligible," in order of nature, before νόησις, or "intellection?" Certainly no other than this, that the first original knowledge is that of a perfect Being, infinitely

[2] Some perhaps will deny the conclusiveness of this argument, as a proof of the existence of God or a nature infinitely powerful. It is unquestionable indeed that while we contemplate the possibility of any thing, the mind at the same time conceives some cause capable of producing that which we consider to be possible. But I can see nothing that should compel us to decide that there exists an eternal Being endowed with infinite power. A disciple of Epicurus' school says he clearly understands that the world we inhabit might have been constructed and disposed in a very different manner from what it is at this day: neither does he deny, while asserting so, that this would have been owing to certain causes. But he by no means on that account places an omnipotent Deity over this work, but foolishly imagines that a different concourse of atoms would have produced a different world. No one doubts the possibility of a field being perfectly free from weeds and every useless plant, although nothing of the kind is ever seen; for the idea of such a field contains nothing repugnant and contradictory: yet no man who conceives the idea of such a field in his mind, however certain he may be, that there must be antecedent causes to produce so fertile a soil, ascends at once in thought to an infinite and all-powerful Being. The same may be said of cubes, triangles, spheres, &c. which are here instanced by the learned Doctor. A geometrician who perceives the possibility of a perfect sphere will perhaps look for causes capable of producing this perfection in the motion and nature of matter itself.

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good and powerful, comprehending itself, and the utmost extent of its own fecundity and power, that is, the possibilities of all things; their ideas, with their several relations to one another; all necessary and immutable truths. Here therefore is there a knowledge before the world and all sensible things, that was archetypal and paradigmatical to the same. Of which one perfect mind and knowledge all other imperfect minds (being derived from it) have a certain participation; whereby they are enabled to frame intelligible ideas, not only of whatsoever doth actually exist, but also of such things as never were, nor will be, but are only possible, or objects of divine power.

Wherefore, since it is certain, that even human knowledge and understanding itself is not a mere passion from sensible things, and singular bodies existing without (which is the only foundation of that forementioned atheistic argument, that "things made knowledge," and "not knowledge things"), and consequently it must needs have some other original: moreover, since knowledge and understanding apprehend things proleptically to their existence (mind being able to frame conceptions of all possible entities and modifications) and therefore in their nature do plainly suppose the actual existence of a perfect Being, which is infinitely fecund and powerful, and could produce all things possible or conceivable; the first original Knowledge, or Mind, from whence all other knowledges and minds are derived, being that of an absolutely perfect and omnipotent Being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own power, or of its communicability, that is, the ideas of all possibilities of things, that may be produced by it, together with their relations to one another, and their necessary immutable truths; accordingly as wisdom and understanding are described to be,* *ἀτμὶς τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεως, ἀπόῤῥοια τῆς τοῦ παντοκράτορος δόξης, ἔσοπτρον τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνεργείας, καὶ εἰκὼν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ*, "the breath (or vapour) of the power of God, and an efflux (or emanation) from the glory of the Almighty, a clear mirror (or looking glass) of his active energy or virtue, and the image of his goodness:" I say, the result of all is this, that the nature of knowledge and understanding is so far from being a ground of disproving a Deity (as the Atheists ignorantly pretend) that it affordeth a firm demonstration to us, on the contrary, of the existence of a God, a perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own power, or all possibilities of things; a mind before the world, and senior to all things; no ectypal, but archetypal thing, which comprehended in it, as a kind of intellectual world, the paradigm or platform, according to which this sensible world was made.

* Wisd. cap. 7.

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And this may be further confirmed from what is generally acknowledged, and indeed cannot reasonably be denied by any, viz. that there are eternal verities, such as were never made, nor can ever be destroyed, or cease to be: as for example, such common notions as these, that equals added to equals make equals; that the cause is in order of nature before the effect, &c. together with all geometrical theorems; as Aristotle himself declareth, he writing in his Ethics[3] after this manner: Περὶ ἀϊδίων οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται, οἷον περὶ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι, "Concerning eternal (and immutable) things no man does consult; as for example, concerning the diameter or diagonal of a square, whether it should be incommensurable to the sides, or no." Where he plainly affirmeth this geometrical theorem, that the diameter or diagonal of a square is incommensurable to the sides, to be an eternal truth. Neither are there such eternal truths as these only in mathematics, and concerning quantity, but also in ethics concerning morality; there being here αἰώνια δίκαια, as Justin Martyr[4] calls them, "things eternally just," which were not made such at certain times by law and arbitrary command, but, being such in their own nature immutably, were from everlasting to everlasting, and (as it is said of that eternal Word, which comprehends all truth) "the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever."* For of these is that famous passage of Sophocles in his Antigona:[5]

Θὺ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθὲς, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ πότε
Ζῇ ταῦτα, κούδεὶς οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου φάνη.

"These are not things of to-day, or yesterday, but they ever live, and no man knows their date, or from whence they came." No man can declare the time when all common notions and geometrical truths were first made and generated out of nothing,

[3] Ethic. ad Nicomach. lib. 3. cap. 5. p. 39. tom. 3. opp. But Dr. Cudworth has not quoted the entire passage, having omitted the words περὶ τοῦ κόσμου after οἷον. For it is notorious that Aristotle ranked the world among eternal and immutable things.

[4] There can scarcely be a doubt that the learned Doctor alludes to the following passage of Justin, which occurs in the Dialogue with Tryphon, p. 246. opp.: Ἀλλὰ καὶ Σκύθης ἢ τις, ἢ Πέρσης, ἔχει δὲ τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ γνῶσιν καὶ τοῦ Χρίστου αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὰ ΑΙΩΝΙΑ ΔΙΚΑΙΑ, περιτέτμηται τὴν καλὴν καὶ ὠφέλιμον περιτομὴν, καὶ φίλος ἐστὶ τῷ Θεῷ, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς δώροις αὐτοῦ καὶ ταῖς προφοραῖς χαίρει. "Moreover a Scythian or Persian, if he has a knowledge of God and his Christ, and observes *the thing eternally just*, is circumcised with the good and profitable circumcision, and is acceptable to God, and rejoices in his gifts and offerings." These αἰώνια δίκαια are the precepts of the law of nature, which Justin is in the constant habit of opposing to the law of Moses, in so far as it enjoins rites and ceremonies. In p. 266 of the same dialogue there is another passage of this kind, in which Justin designates what he here calls αἰώνια δίκαια by a different but kindred name: Τὰς αἰωνίας καὶ φύσει δικαιοπραξίας καὶ εὐσεβείας, "Eternal and natural acts of justice and true religion." Compare p. 320 of the same.

* Heb. xiii. 10.

[5] Vers. 467. 468.

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or brought out of antecedent non-existence into being. Certain it is, that such truths as these, that the "diameter and sides of a square are incommensurable, or that the power of the hypotheneuse in a rectangular triangle is equal to the powers of both the sides," were not made by any man's thinking, or by those first geometricians who discovered or demonstrated the same; they discovering and demonstrating only that which was. Wherefore these truths were before there was any man to think of them, and they would continue still to be, though all the men in the world should be annihilated; nay, though there were no material squares and triangles any where in the whole world neither, no nor any matter at all: for they were ever without beginning before the world, and would of necessity be ever after it, should it cease to be.

Now, if there be eternal truths, which were never made, and could not but be, then must the rationes rerum, the "simple reasons" of things also, or their intelligible natures and essences, out of which those truths are compounded, be of necessity eternal likewise. For how can this be an eternal truth, that the diameter of a square is incommensurable with the sides, if the rationes, the "reasons" of a square, diameter, and sides, or their intelligible essences, were not themselves eternal? These are therefore called by Plato[6] (a man of much meditation, and no contemptible philosopher) not only ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα, "things which are always the same, and unchangeable," but also τὰ μὴ γιγνόμενα, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ὄντα, "things which were never made, but always are;" and sometimes, μήτε γιγνόμενα, μήτε ἀπολλύμενα, "things that were neither made, nor can be destroyed;" sometimes, τὰ ἀγέννητα καὶ ἀνώλεθρα, "things ingenerable and incorruptible." Of which Cicero thus:[7] Hæc Plato negat gigni, sed semper esse, et ratione et intelligentiâ contineri, "These things Plato affirmeth to have been never made, but always to be, and to be contained in reason and understanding." And, though perhaps it may seem strange, even Aristotle[8] himself also, notwithstanding his so often clashing with Plato's ideas, here really agreeth in the main, that the forms and species, or the universal intelligible essences of things, which are the proper and immediate objects of science, were

[6] These and other names by which Plato designates his models or *ideas* of things are scattered every where throughout his works.

[7] Oratore ad Brutum, cap. 3. p. 695. tom. 2. opp. where Cicero is speaking of Plato's ideas.

[8] See Metaphys. lib. 7. cap. 8. p. 361. and lib. 14. cap. 3. p. 473. tom. 4. opp. in which two passages the prince of the Peripatetics professes to prove that form properly speaking is neither made nor generated. But I am afraid those who compare this opinion of Aristotle's on form with Plato's doctrine of eternal ideas and truths, will detect a very considerable discrepancy. I have here no opportunity of entering into this disputation, which moreover is too dry and lifeless to be generally acceptable.

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eternal and never made. Thus in his Metaphysics: Τὸ εἶδος οὐδεὶς ποιεῖ οὐδὲ γεννᾶται, "No man makes the form, or species of a thing, nor was it ever generated;" and again: Τοῦ σφαῖρα εἶναι οὐκ ἐστὶ γένεσις, "There is no generation of the essence of a sphere;" and, Ἄνευ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὰ εἴδη, "The forms or species of things are without any generation or corruption." And he sometimes calleth these objects of science ἀκίνητον οὐσίαν[9] or φύσιν, "an immutable essence or nature." Lastly, where he writeth against the Heraclitics, and those other Sceptics, who denied all certainty of science, he first discovers the ground of their error herein to have been this, that they supposed singular bodies, or sensibles existing without, to be the only things or objects of the mind, or knowledge:[10] Αἴτιον τῆς δόξης τούτοις, ὅτι περὶ τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐσκόπουν, τὰ δὲ ὄντα ὑπέλαβον εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητὰ μόνον, ἐν δὲ τούτοις πολλὴ ἡ τοῦ ἀορίστου φύσις ἐνυπάρχει . . . . ἔτι δὲ πᾶσαν ὁρῶντες ταύτην κινουμένην τὴν φύσιν, κατάγε τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος οὐδὲν ἀληθευόμενον, περίγε τὸ πάντως πάντα μεταβάλλον, οὐκ ἐκδέχεσθαι ἀληθεύειν, "The original of these men's mistake was this, because truth was to be looked for in things, and they conceived the only things to be sensibles, in which it is certain there is much of the indeterminate nature. Wherefore they, perceiving all the nature of sensibles to be moveable, or in perpetual flux and mutation, since nothing can possibly be verified or constantly affirmed concerning that, which is not the same but changeable, concluded that there could be no truth at all, nor certainty of science; those things, which are the only objects of it, never continuing the same." And then he subjoins in way of opposition to this sceptical doctrine of theirs, and the forementioned ground thereof:[1] Ἀξιώσομεν αὐτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ἄλλην

[9] On the οὐσία ἀκίνητος and its truth Aristotle discourses copiously in his Metaphys. lib. 14. cap. 2. p. 472. cap. 6. p. 477. But I am inclined to think the learned Doctor is mistaken in his opinion that Aristotle supposed this *immoveable essence* to be the eternal truths which nothing can change. For Aristotle's ἀκίνητος οὐσία is that nature from which he derives all motion in the universe of things, in short it is his God.

[10] Metaphys. lib. 4. cap. 5. p. 313. tom. 4. opp.

[1] That these words occur in Aristotle, and perhaps even in his books of Metaphysics, I have no doubt: but they certainly are not to be found in the place indicated by Dr. Cudworth. Neither have I been able to meet with them in other passages wherein the philosopher is professedly proving the existence of eternal and immoveable things. But in my opinion the learned Doctor is mistaken when he supposes that the things which Aristotle calls eternal, immoveable, and subject to no corruption or generation, are no other than the forms, species, and eternal models of things, and eternal truths. His partiality for the opinions he had himself espoused, seems to me to have had such influence upon his mind as to make him see things in Aristotle to which that philosopher was strongly opposed. The nature which Aristotle declares to be without generation or corruption is *heaven*, or τὸ πᾶν, *the universe*, as I shall prove by a striking passage of his. Thus after inveighing against those who asserted that all things flow, and therefore that there is no true and certain knowledge of any thing, he adds that it is in the highest degree insufferable in these men to affirm the same of heaven as of other things: that sensible things indeed are generated and corrupted, but not likewise τὸ

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οὐσίαν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων, ᾗ οὔτε κίνησις ὑπάρχει οὐτὲ φθορὰ οὔτε γένεσις τὸ παράπαν, "We would have these men therefore to know, that there is another kind of essence of things, besides that of sensibles, to which belongeth neither motion, nor corruption, nor any generation at all." By which essences of things, that have no generation nor corruption, he could understand nothing else but those intelligible natures, species, and ideas, which are the standing and immutable objects of science. And certain it is, that there could be no constant and immutable science at all, were there no other objects of the mind but singulars and sensibles, because these are all mutable. Wherefore the proper and immediate objects of the geometrical science are no singular and material triangles, squares, spheres, and cubes, &c., not only because none of these are found mathematically exact, and because geometricians, in all the several distant ages and places of the world, could not have the same singular bodies before them, but also because they do none of them continue immutably the same; all corporeal things being more or less in perpetual motion and mutation; whereas, that of which any geometrical theorem is verified and demonstrated, must be immutably and unalterably the same. The triangles and circles, spheres and cubes of Euclid, Archimedes, Pappus, Apollonius, and all other ancient and modern geometricians, in all the distant places and times of the world, were both indivisibly one and the same, and also perfectly immutable and incorruptible, the science of geometry being such. For which cause it is affirmed also of these mathematical things, by the forementioned Aristotle, that they

πᾶν and ὁ οὐρανὸς. Metaphys. lib. 4. cap. 5. p. 313. 314. Περὶ ὅλου τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἀπεφήναντο· ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἡμᾶς τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ τόπος, ἐν φθορᾷ καὶ γενέσει διαμένει μόνος ὤν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, μόριον τοῦ παντὸς ἔστιν, "They affirmed the like of the entire heaven. For the place of the sensible, which surrounds us, is alone in generation and corruption, and forms no part, so to speak, of the universe." But the immoveable or ἀκίνητος οὐσία, as he calls it, is God himself, as may easily be learnt from the fourteenth book of the Metaphysics. Still I will not on that account deny that Aristotle approved of Plato's distribution of things into τα ὄντα and τὰ αἰσθητὰ, since I know he every where adopts it; but I do maintain those to be in error who fancy that the τὰ ὄντα of Plato and Aristotle are not different. The τὰ ὄντα of Aristotle are heaven, God, and the genii subordinate to God, whom he has placed over the celestial orbs, in short, all things above the moon: but those of Plato are the eternal forms and exemplars of things. Aristotle, I grant, held the existence of immutable and eternal, or *universal* truths, but I deny that his opinion on these universals can be properly identified with Plato's. For Plato exempted his eternal and universal essences from the nature of things, and supposed them to have nothing in common with the things that fall under the senses: but Aristotle, on the contrary, believed the universals to be immersed as it were in these very sensibles, and to be incapable of being separated from them except in thought. The former held that the ideas and eternal forms of things are innate in the minds of men: the latter, that they are imprinted on the mind by study, and result from the contemplation of external objects. See Metaphys. lib. 12. p. 436. tom. 4. opp. It is superfluous in this place to go into a more detailed demonstration of that, which no one can be ignorant of who has paid due attention to the first principles of Aristotle's philosophy.

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are nowhere as in a place, as all singular bodies are:* Ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸν τόπον ἅμα τοῖς στερεοῖς τοῖς Μαθηματικοῖς ποιῆσαι, ὁ μὲν γὰρ τόπος τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἴδιος· διὸ χωριστὰ τόπῳ· τὰ δὲ Μαθηματικὰ, οὐ ποῦ, "It is absurd to make mathematical things to be in a place, as solid bodies are; for place belongeth only to singulars, which are therefore separable from one another by place; but mathematical things are not any where." Because they being universal and abstract, are only in minds: nevertheless, for the same reason are they also every where, they being in every mind that apprehends them. Lastly, these intelligible essences and ideas of things are called also by Philo,[2] ἀναγκαιότατα οὐσίαι, "the most necessary essences;" as being not only eternal, but having likewise necessary existence belonging to them: for though there be no absolute necessity that there should be matter or body, yet is there an absolute necessity that there should be truth.

If therefore there be eternal intelligibles or ideas, and eternal truths, and necessary existence do belong to them; then must there be an eternal mind necessarily existing, since these truths and intelligible essences of things cannot possibly be any where but in a mind. For by the essences of things, when they are said to be eternal, must not be meant their very substances, as if every thing were in itself eternal and uncreated; or that God in creation did only, as a modern writer abusively expresseth it, sartoris instar, vestire essentias rerum novâ existentiâ, "clothe the antecedent essences of things with a new garment of existence;" but only their esse cognitum, their "possible and intelligible natures," as they were objects of infinite power and understanding, before they were made. There must be a mind senior to the world, and all sensible things, and such as at once comprehends in it the ideas of all intelligibles, their necessary scheses and relations to one another, and all their immutable truths; a mind, which doth not ὁτε μέν νοεῖν, ὁτέ δὲ οὐ νοεῖν (as Aristotle[3] writeth of it), sometimes understand, and sometimes

* Metaphys. lib. 12. cap. 5. [P. 448. tom. 4. opp.]

[2] Legis Allegor. lib. 1. p. 68. opp. But Philo means Plato's ideas, for which he entertained no slight partiality.

[3] In no place that I remember has Aristotle said of mind simply and absolutely that it sometimes understands and sometimes does not understand, much less has he let fall these words in reference to the eternal mind, or God. But the worthy Doctor was thinking no doubt of this passage of the philosopher, Metaphys. lib. 14. cap. 9. p. 483. wherein he declares that the consideration of mind is encompassed with certain difficulties, whether it be conceived as dormant or as understanding: Πῶς δ' ἔχων (νοῦς) τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη, ἔχει τινὰς δυσκολίας· εἴτε γὰρ ΜΗΔΕΝ ΝΟΕΙ, τί ἂν εἴη τὸ σέμνον, ἀλλ' ἔχει ὥσπερ ἂν εἴη ὁ καθεύδων, εἴτε ΝΟΕΙ τοῦτον δ' ἄλλο κύριον . . . οὐκ ἂν ἡ ἀρίστη οὐσία εἴη, "In whatever state such may be, it presents certain difficulties. For if it understands nothing, but is situated as one that sleeps, what of excellence will there be? and if it understands, and something else is its principal . . . it will not be the best substance."

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not understand, as if it were sometimes awake, and sometimes asleep, or like an eye, sometimes open, and sometimes shut; but *οὐσία ἐνέργεια*, such a mind as is essentially act and energy, and hath no defect in it. And this, as we have already declared, can be no other than the mind of an omnipotent and infinitely perfect Being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own power, or how far itself is communicable, that is, all the possibilities of things that may be made by it, and their respective truths; mind and knowledge, in the very nature of it, supposing the actual existence of an omnipotent or infinitely powerful Being, as its *Νοητὸν*, or "Intelligible;" it being nothing but the comprehension of the extent of infinite or divine power, and the measure of the same.

And from hence it is evident also, that there can be but one only original mind, or no more than one understanding Being self-existent; all other minds whatsoever partaking of one original mind; and being, as it were, stamped with the impression or signature of one and the same seal. From whence it cometh to pass, that all minds, in the several places and ages of the world, have ideas or notions of things exactly alike, and truths indivisibly the same. Truths are not multiplied by the diversity of minds that apprehend them; because they are all but ectypal participations of one and the same original or archetypal mind and truth. As the same face may be reflected in several glasses; and the image of the same sun may be in a thousand eyes at once beholding it; and one and the same voice may be in a thousand ears listening to it: so when innumerable created minds have the same ideas of things, and understand the same truths, it is but one and the same eternal light that is reflected in them all ("that light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world"), or the same voice of that one everlasting Word, that is never silent, re-echoed by them. Thus was it concluded by Themistius,[4] that one man, by teaching, could not possibly beget in the mind of another the very same notions, conceptions, and knowledges, which himself had in his own mind, *εἰ μὴ ταὐτὸν ἦν τὸ νόημα τοῦ διδάσκοντος καὶ τοῦ μανθάνοντος*, "were not the minds both of the teacher and of the learner, as it were, printed and stamped alike." As also that men could not possibly so confer together as they do, presently apprehending one another's meaning, and raising up the very same senses in their minds, and that merely by occasion of words and sounds, *εἰ μήτις ἦν Εἷς Νοῦς οὗ πάντες ἐκοινωνοῦμεν*, "were there not some one mind, which all men did partake of." As for that anti-monarchical opinion of many understanding beings, or minds, self-originated, and independent (none of

[4] These passages of Themistius are taken, I suspect, from his Paraphrase on Aristotle's books De Anima, which I have not had an opportunity of consulting.

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which therefore could be omnipotent), is neither conceivable, how such should all agree in the same truths, there being no common measure of truth betwixt them, no more than any common rule of their wills; nor indeed how should they have any knowledge or understanding at all, properly so called, that being the comprehension of the possibilities of things, or of the extent of infinite power: whereas according to this hypothesis, there is no infinite power at all, the power of each of those many supposed principles or deities being limited and finite, and therefore indeed not creative of any thing neither, since that which could create one thing, could create all, and consequently would have all depending upon it. We conclude therefore, that from the nature of mind and knowledge it is demonstrable, that there can be but one original and self-existent Mind, or understanding Being, from which all other minds were derived. And now have we, more copiously than we designed, confuted the first atheistic argument; we having not only asserted the idea of God, and fully answered and refelled all the atheistic pretences against the same; but also from this very idea of God, or a perfect Being, demonstrated his existence. We shall dispatch the following atheistic objections with more brevity.

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CHAPTER V.

SECTION II.

1. A CONFUTATION of the second atheistic argument, against omnipotence and divine creation; that nothing can, by any power whatsoever, be made out of nothing. In answer to which three things to be insisted on. First, that de nihilo nihil, "nothing out of nothing," is in some sense an axiom of unquestionable truth, but then makes nothing against theism, or divine creation. Secondly, that nothing out of nothing, in the sense of the atheistic objectors, viz. that nothing, which once was not, could by any power whatsoever be brought into being, is absolutely false; and that, if it were true, it would make no more against theism than it does against atheism. Lastly, that from this very axiom, "nothing out of nothing," in the true sense thereof, the absolute impossibility of atheism is demonstrable. 2. De nihilo nihil, "nothing from nothing," in some sense, is a common notion of unquestionable truth. For, first, certain that nothing, which once was not, could ever of itself come into being; or, that nothing can take beginning of existence from itself; or, that nothing can be made or produced without an efficient cause. From whence demonstrated, that there was never nothing, or, that every thing was not made, but something did exist of itself from eternity unmade, or underived from any thing else. 3. Again, certain also, that nothing could be efficiently produced by what hath not at least equal perfection, and a sufficient active or productive power. That an effect, which transcends the perfection of its supposed cause, must come from nothing, or be made without a cause. Nor can any thing be produced by another, though having equal perfection, unless it have also a sufficient active or productive power. Hence certain, that were there once no motion at all in the world, and no other substance besides body, which had no self-moving power, there could never possibly be any motion or mutation to all eternity, for want of a sufficient cause, or productive power. No imperfect being hath a productive power of any new substance, which was not before, but only of new accidents and modifications; that is, no creature can create. Which two forementioned senses respect the efficient cause. 4. Thirdly, nothing can be materially produced out of nothing pre-existing or inexisting. And therefore, in all natural generations (where the supernatural power of the Deity interposes not) no new real entity, or substance produced, which was not before, but only new modifications of what substantially pre-existed. 5. Nothing out of nothing, so much insisted on by the old physiologers before Aristotle, in this sense, commonly misunderstood by modern writers, as if they designed thereby to take away all divine creation out of nothing pre-existing. Granted, this to have been the sense of the Stoics and of Plutarch; he affirming the world to have been no otherwise made by God, than a house is by a carpenter, or a garment by a tailor. Plutarch and the Stoics therefore imperfect Theists, but nevertheless zealous religionists. But the ancient Italic philosophers here acted only as physiologers, and not as theologers, or metaphysicians; they not directing themselves against a divine creation out of nothing pre-existing; but only contending, that neither in natural

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generations any new real entity was created, nor in corruptions annihilated; but only the modifications of what before existed, changed: or, that no new real entity could be made out of matter. 6. That this was the true meaning of those ancient physiologers, evident from the use which they made of this principle, "nothing out of nothing;" which twofold. First, upon this foundation, they endeavoured to establish a peculiar kind of physiology, and some atomology or other, either similar or dissimilar; homœomery or anomœomery. Anaxagoras from hence concluded, because nothing could be made out of nothing pre-existing and inexisting, that therefore there were in every body similar atoms, of all kinds, out of which, by concretions and secretions, all natural generations made; so that bone was made out of bony atoms pre-existing and inexisting; flesh out of fleshy, and the like. This the Anaxagorean homœomery, or similar atomology, built upon this principle, "nothing out of nothing." But the ancient Italics, both before and after Anaxagoras (whom Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus here followed), with greater sagacity concluded, from the same principle, "nothing out of nothing," that those qualities and forms of bodies, naturally generated and corrupted, were therefore no real entities, distinct from the substance of matter, but only different modifications thereof, causing different fancies in us; and this an anomœomery, or dissimilar atomology, the atoms thereof being devoid of qualities. Those simple elements or letters (in nature's alphabet) out of which, variously combined, these philosophers spelled out or compounded all the syllables and words (or complexions) of corporeal things, nothing but figure, site, motion, rest, and magnitude of parts. Were qualities and forms real entities distinct from these, and not pre-existing (as Anaxagoras dreamed) they must then have come from nothing, in natural generations; which impossible. 8. Another improvement of this principle, "nothing out of nothing," made by the Italic philosophers; that the souls of animals, especially human, since they could not possibly result from the mere modifications of matter, figure, site, motion, &c. were not produced in generations, nor annihilated in deaths and corruptions; but being substantial things, did pre and post-exist. This set down as the controversy betwixt Atheists and Theists, in Lucretius. Whether souls were generated, or insinuated into bodies. Generations and corruptions of animals, to these Pythagoreans, but anagrammatical transpositions. That those philosophers, who asserted the pre-existence and ingenerability of souls, did not therefore suppose them to have been self-existent and uncreated, but derived them all from the Deity. Thus Proclus, though maintaining the eternity of souls, with the world. The ingenerability of souls in Plato's Timæus, no more than this, that they were not generated out of matter; and for this cause also, were they called principles, in the same sense, as matter was so accounted. Souls therefore, to Plato, created by God, though not in the generation of animals, but before. 9. St. Austin himself sometime staggering and sceptical, in the point of pre-existence. That we have a philosophic certainty of no more than this, that souls were created by God, out of nothing pre-existing, sometime or other; either in generations, or before them. That unless brutes be mere machines, the reason the same also concerning brutish souls; that these not generated out of matter, but created sometime or other, by the Deity; as well as the matter of their bodies was. 10. That all these three forementioned particulars, wherein it is true, that nothing can possibly come from nothing, are reducible to this one general proposition, that nothing can be caused by nothing; which will no way clash with the divine omnipotence or creative power, as shall be showed afterwards; but confirm the same. But those same

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words "nothing out of nothing," may carry another sense; when that ἐκ οὐκ ὄντων, "out of nothing," is not taken causally, but only to signify the terminus à quo, "the term from which," or "an antecedent non-existence:" and the meaning thereof will be, that nothing, which before was not, could afterwards, by any power whatsoever, be brought into being. And this the sense of the Democritic and Epicurean objectors; viz. That no real entity can be made, or brought out of non-existence into being; and therefore the creative power of Theists an impossibility. 11. Our second undertakings in way of answer hereunto; to show, that nothing out of nothing, in this sense, is false; as also, that, were it true, yet it would make no more against theism, than it doth against atheism; and therefore ought not to be used by Atheists as an argument against a God. If this universally true, that nothing at all, which once was not, could ever be brought into being, then could there be no making, nor causing at all, no motion nor action, mutation or generation. But ourselves have a power of producing new cogitation in our minds, and new motion in our bodies. Wherefore Atheists forced to restrain this proposition to substantials only. And here some deceived with the equivocation, in this ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, "out of nothing;" which may be taken either causally, or else to signify the term from which, that is, from an antecedent non-existence; they confounding both these together; whereof the first only true, the latter false. Again, others staggered with the plausibility of this proposition; partly because no artificial thing (as a house or garment) can be made by men, but out of pre-existing matter; and partly because ancient physiologers maintained the same also concerning natural generations, that no new real entity or substance could be therein produced; and lastly, because it is certain, that no imperfect created being can create any new substance; they being therefore apt to measure all power whatsoever, by these scantlings. But as easy for a perfect Being to create a world, matter and all, out of nothing (in this sense, that is, out of an antecedent non-existence), as for us to create a thought, or to move a finger, or for the sun to send out rays. For an imperfect substance, which once was not, to be brought into being by God, this not impossible, in any of the forementioned senses; he having not only infinitely greater perfection, but also sufficient productive or emanative power. True, that infinite power cannot do things in their own nature impossible, but nothing thus impossible but what contradictious: and though a contradiction for any thing, at the same time, to be and not be; yet none at all, for an imperfect being (which is in its nature contingent to existence), after it had not been, to be. Wherefore, since the making of a substance to be, which was not before, is no way contradictious, nor consequently in its own nature impossible; it must needs be an object of perfect power. 12. Furthermore, if no real entity or substance could possibly be brought out of non-existence into being, then must the reason hereof be, because no substance can derive its whole being from another substance. But from hence, it would follow, that whatsoever is substantial, did not only exist from eternity, but also of itself, independently upon any thing else. Whereas, first, the pre-eternity of temporary beings not agreeable to reason; and then, to suppose imperfect substances to have existed of themselves and necessarily, is to suppose something to come from nothing, in the impossible sense; they having no necessary self-existence in their nature. As they, who affirm all substance to be body, and no body to be able to move itself, though supposing motion to have been from eternity; yet make this motion to come from nothing, or be caused by nothing. What in its nature contingently possible to be, or not be, could not exist of itself;

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but must derive its being from something else, which necessarily existeth. Plato's distinction therefore betwixt two kinds of substances must needs be admitted, that which always is, and was never made; and that which is made, or had a beginning. 13. Lastly, if this true, that no substance makeable or producible, it would not only follow from thence (as the Epicurean Atheist supposes) that matter, but also that all souls (at least human) did exist of themselves, from eternity, independently upon any thing else; it being impossible, that Mind or Soul should be a modification of senseless matter, or result from figures, sites, motions, and magnitudes. Human souls substantial, and therefore, according to this doctrine, must have been never made; whereas Atheists stiffly deny both their pre and post-existence. Those pagan Theists, who held the eternity of human minds, supposed them, notwithstanding, to have depended upon the Deity, as their cause. Before proved, that there can be but one understanding Being, self-existent. If human souls depend upon the Deity as their cause, then doubtless matter also. 14. A common, but great mistake, that no pagan Theist ever acknowledged any creative power out of nothing; or else, that God was the cause of any substance. Plato's definition of effective power, in general, and his affirmation, that the divine efficiency is that whereby things are made after they had not been. Certain, that he did not understand this of the production of souls out of matter, he supposing them to be before matter, and therefore made by God out of nothing pre-existing. All philosophers, who held the immortality and incorporeity of the soul, asserted it to have been caused by God, either in time, or from eternity. Plutarch's singularity here. Unquestionable, that the Platonists supposed one substance to receive its whole being from another; in that they derive their second hypostasis or substance, though eternal, from the first; and their third from both; and all inferior ranks of beings from all three. Plotinus, Porphyrius, Jamblichus, Hierocles, Proclus, and others, derived matter from the Deity. Thus the Chaldee Oracles; and the old Egyptian, or Hermaic theology also, according to Jamblichus. Those Platonists, who supposed the world and souls eternal, conceived them to have received their being, as much from the Deity as if made in time. 15. Having now disproved this proposition, "nothing out of nothing," in the atheistic sense, viz. That no substance was caused, or derived its being from another, but whatsoever is substantial, did exist of itself from eternity, independently; we are, in the next place, to make it appear also, that were it true, it would no more oppose theism than it doth atheism. Falsehoods (though not truths) may disagree. Plutarch, the Stoics, and others, who made God the creator of no substance, though not genuine, yet zealous Theists. But the ancient Atheists, both in Plato and Aristotle, generated and corrupted all things; that is, produced all things out of nothing, or non-existence, and reduced them into nothing again; the bare substance of matter only excepted. The same done by the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists themselves, the makers of this objection: though, according to the principles of their own atomic physiology, it is impossible that life and understanding, soul and mind, should be mere modifications of matter. As Theists give a creative power of all, out of nothing, to the Deity; so do Atheists to passive and dead matter. Wherefore this can be no argument against theism; it equally opposing atheism. 16. An anacephalæosis; wherein observable, that Cicero makes de nihilo fieri, and sine causa, "to be made out of nothing," and "to be made without a cause," one and the self-same thing; as also, that he doth not confine this to the material cause only. Our third and last undertaking; to prove, that Atheists produce real

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entities out of nothing, in the first impossible sense; that is, without a cause. 17. A brief synopsis of atheism; that matter being the only substance, is therefore the only unmade thing; and that whatsoever else is in the world, besides the bare substance thereof, was made out of matter, or produced from that alone. 18. The first argument; when Atheists affirm matter to be the only substance, and all things to be made out of that, they suppose all to be made without an efficient cause; which is to bring them from nothing in an impossible sense. Though something may be made without a material cause pre-existing; yet cannot any thing possibly be made without an efficient cause. Wherefore, if there be any thing made which was not before, there must of necessity be besides matter, some other substance, as the active efficient cause thereof. The atheistic hypothesis supposes things to be made without any active or effective principle. Whereas the Epicurean Atheists attribute the efficiency of all to local motion; and yet deny matter or body (their only substance) a self-moving power. They hereby make all the motion that is in the world to have been without a cause, or to come from nothing; all action without an agent; all efficiency without an efficient. 19. Again, should we grant these Atheists motion without a cause, yet could not dead and senseless matter, together with motion, ever beget life, sense, and understanding; because this would be something out of nothing, in way of causality, local motion only changing the modifications of matter, as figure, place, site and disposition of parts. Hence also those spurious Theists confuted, who conclude God to have done no more in the making of the world, than a carpenter doth in the building of a house, (upon this pretence, that nothing can be made out of nothing;) and yet suppose him to make souls out of dead and senseless matter, which is to bring them from nothing in way of causality. 20. Declared before, That the ancient Italics and Pythagorics proved in this manner, that souls could not possibly be generated out of matter; because nothing can come from nothing, in way of causality. The subterfuge of the atheistic Ionics out of Aristotle; that matter being the only substance, and life, sense, and understanding nothing but the passions, affections, and dispositions thereof; the production of them out of matter, no production of any new real entity. 21. Answer: Atheists taking it for granted that there is no other substance besides body or matter, therefore falsely conclude life, sense, and understanding to be accidents or modes of matter; they being indeed the modes or attributes of substance incorporeal and self-active. A mode that which cannot be conceived, without the thing, whereof it is a mode; but life and cogitation may be conceived, without corporeal extension; and indeed, cannot be conceived with it. 22. The chief occasion of this error, from qualities and forms; as because the quality of heat and form of fire may be generated out of matter, therefore life, cogitation, and understanding also. But the Atomic Atheists themselves explode qualities, as things really distinct from the figure, site, and motion of parts, for this very reason, because nothing can be made out of nothing causally. The vulgar opinion of such real qualities in bodies, only from men's mistaking their own fancies, apparitions, passions, affections, and seemings, for things really existing without them. That in these qualities, which is distinct from the figure, site, and motion of parts, not the accidents and modifications of matters, but of our own souls. The atomic Atheists infinitely absurd; when exploding qualities, because nothing can come out of nothing, themselves bring life, sense, and understanding, out of nothing, in way of causality. That opinion, that cogitation is nothing but local motion, and men themselves but mere machines, prodigious sottishness, or intolerable

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impudence. 23. Very observable here, that Epicurus himself, having a mind to assert contingent liberty, confesseth, that he could not do this, unless there were some such thing in the principles; because nothing can be made out of nothing, or caused by nothing: and therefore does he ridiculously feign a third motion of atoms, to solve that phenomenon of free-will. Wherefore, he must needs be guilty of an impossible production, of something out of nothing, when he brings soul and mind out of dead, senseless atoms. Were there no substantial and eternal life and understanding in the universe, there could none have been ever produced; because it must have come from nothing, or been made without a cause. That dark philosophy which educes, not only real qualities and substantial forms, but also souls themselves, at least sensitive, out of the power of the matter, educes them out of nothing, or makes them without a cause; and so prepares a direct way to atheism. 24. They who suppose matter, otherwise than by motion, and by a kind of miraculous efficiency, to produce souls and minds, attribute that creative power to this senseless and inactive matter, which themselves deny, to a perfect Being, as an absolute impossibility. Thus have we demonstrated the impossibility and nonsense of all atheism from this very principle, That nothing can be made from nothing, or without sufficient cause. 25. Wherefore, if no middle betwixt these two, but all things must either spring from a God, or matter; then is this also a demonstration of the truth of theism, by deduction to impossible: either there is a God, or else all things are derived from dead and senseless matter: but this latter is impossible; therefore a God. Nevertheless, that the existence of a God may be further directly proved also from the same principle, rightly understood, "nothing out of nothing" causally, or nothing, caused by nothing, neither efficiently, nor materially. 26. By these steps: first, that there was never nothing, but something or other did exist of itself from eternity, unmade, and independently upon any thing else, mathematically certain; from this principle, "nothing from nothing." Had there been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. Again, Whatsoever did exist of itself from eternity, must have so existed necessarily, and not by any free will and choice. Certain therefore, that there is something actually in being, whose existence is and always was necessary. Now that, which exists necessarily, of itself, must have necessity of existence in its nature; which nothing but a perfect Being hath. Therefore there is a perfect Being; and nothing else besides this did exist of itself from eternity, but all other things whatsoever (whether souls or matter) were made by it. To suppose any thing to exist of itself necessarily, that hath no necessary existence in its nature, is to suppose that necessary existence to have come from nothing. 27. Three reasons, why some Theists have been so staggering and sceptical about the necessary self-existence of matter. First, from an idiotical conceit, that because artificial things cannot be made by men, but out of pre-existent matter, therefore nothing by God, or a perfect Being, can be otherwise made. Secondly, because some of them have supposed ὕλην ἀσώματον, "an incorporeal hyle," or first matter unmade; an older opinion than Aristotle. Whereas this really nothing, but a metaphysical notion of the potentiality or possibility of things, respectively to the Deity. Lastly, because some of them have conceived body and space to be really the same thing; and space to be positively infinite, eternal, and necessarily existent. But if space be not the extension of the Deity itself, as some suppose, but of body, only considered abstractly, from this or that, and therefore immoveably; then no sufficient ground for the positive infinity, or the indefinity thereof, as Cartesius imagined: we being certain of no

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more than this, that be the world and its space, or extension, never so great, yet it might be still greater and greater infinitely; for which very cause, it could never be positively infinite. This possibility of more body and space, further and further indefinitely, or without end, as also its eternity, mistaken, for actual space and distance positively infinite and eternal. Nor is there perhaps any such great absurdity, in the finiteness of actual space and distance (according to this hypothesis), as some conceive. 28. Moreover, the existence of a God may be further proved from this common notion, "Nothing from nothing causally;" not only because were there no God, that idea, which we have of a perfect Being, must have come from nothing, and be the conception of nothing; but also all the other intelligible ideas of our minds must have come from nothing likewise, they being not derived from sense. All minds, and their intelligible ideas, by way of participation, from one perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending itself. 29. However, certain from this principle, "nothing from nothing," or "nothing caused by nothing;" that souls and minds could never have emerged out of dead and senseless matter, or from figures, sites, and motions; and therefore must either have all existed of themselves, necessarily from eternity; or else be created by the Deity, out of nothing pre-existing. Concluded, that the existence of a God is altogether as certain, as that our human souls did not all exist from eternity, of themselves, necessarily. Thus is the second atheistic argumentation against omnipotence or divine creation, from that false principle, "nothing out of nothing," in the atheistic sense (which is, that nothing could be brought out of non-existence into being, or no substance derive its whole being from another substance, but all was self-existent from eternity) abundantly confuted; it having been demonstrated, that unless there be a God, or a perfect omnipotent Being, and Creator, something must have come from nothing in the impossible sense; that is, have been caused by nothing, or made without a cause.

We come, in the next place, to the Achilles of the Atheists, their invincible argument against a divine creation and omnipotence; because, "Nothing could come from nothing." It being concluded from hence that whatsoever substantially or really is, was from all eternity of itself unmade or uncreated by any Deity. Or else thus: by God is always understood a Creator of some real entity or other out of nothing; but it is an undoubted principle of reason and philosophy, an undeniable common notion, that "Nothing can be made out of nothing," and therefore there can be no such creative power as this. And here we shall perform these three things; first, we shall show that in some senses, this is indeed an unquestionable truth, and common notion, that "Nothing can come from nothing," and what those senses are. Secondly, we shall make it evident that in the sense of this atheistic objection, it is absolutely false that "Nothing can come from nothing," or be made out of nothing; and that a divine creation and omnipotence can be no way impugned from the forementioned principle rightly understood. Thirdly and lastly, we shall prove that as from this principle or common notion, "Nothing out of nothing," there can be no

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execution at all done against theism, or a divine creation; so from the very same rightly understood, the impossibility of all atheism may be demonstratively proved, it bringing something out of nothing in an impossible sense; as also the existence of a God evinced.

We grant therefore, in the first place, that this is in some sense an undoubted principle of reason, or an undeniable common notion, that "Nothing can come from nothing." For, first, it is unquestionably true, that "Nothing, which once was not, could ever of itself come into being;" or that "Nothing could bring itself out of non-existence into being;" that "Nothing can take beginning of existence from itself;" or that "Nothing can be be made or produced without an efficient cause." And from hence, as hath been already intimated, is it demonstratively certain that every thing was not made, but that there is something necessarily self-existent, and which could not but be. For had every thing been made, then must something of necessity have been made out of nothing by itself; which is impossible.

Again: As nothing which was not could ever of itself come into being, or be made without any efficient cause; so is it certain likewise, that nothing can be efficiently caused or produced by that which hath not in it at least equal (if not greater) perfection, as also sufficient power to produce the same. We say, nothing which was not could ever be brought into being by that which hath not formally equal perfection in it; because nothing can give what it hath not, and therefore, so much of the perfection or entity of the effect, as is greater than that of the supposed cause, so much thereof must needs come from nothing, or be made without a cause. Moreover, whatsoever hath equal perfection to another thing, could not therefore cause or produce that other thing; because it might either have no active power at all, as matter hath not, it being merely passive, or else no sufficient active and productive power. As for example, though it be not impossible that motion, which once was not, should be produced; yet is it impossible that it should be ever produced without a sufficient cause. Wherefore, if there were once no motion at all in the whole world, nor no life, or self-active power in any thing, but all were dead; then is it certain that there could never possibly arise any motion or mutation in it to all eternity. There being no sufficient cause to produce the same; since nothing can produce motion but that which hath life or self-activity in it; and if motion, or any thing else, should begin to be, without a sufficient cause, then must it needs be caused by itself, or of itself come into being: which is a thing impossible. Now, no imperfect Being whatsoever hath a sufficient emanative power to create any other substance, or produce it out of nothing; the utmost that can be

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done by imperfect beings, is only to produce new accidents and modifications; as human souls can produce new cogitations in themselves, and new local motion in bodies. No imperfect being is substantially emanative, or can produce another substance out of non-existence. Therefore, for any substance to be brought into being by an imperfect substance, which hath not sufficient emanative or creative power, is a thing plainly impossible; it being all one as to say, that a substance might of itself come out of nothing into being. And thus is it granted, that no substance could be created, or brought out of non-existence into being, but by the sole efficiency of an absolutely perfect Being, which hath both greater perfection, (it eminently containing all things in it,) and also a sufficient emanative or creative power.

And now have we given an account of two senses, wherein it is impossible for *any thing to come from nothing;* one, for a thing which was not, to bring itself into being, or to be made without an efficient cause. Another, for a thing to be efficiently caused by that which hath not at least equal perfection in it, or a sufficient emanative or productive power. Both which senses of this axiom respect the efficient cause; and thus was it frequently understood by divers of the ancients, and particularly by Cicero.[5] We shall now propound a third sense, wherein this axiom is also verified, that "Nothing can be made out of nothing," respecting chiefly the material cause. For since no imperfect natural being hath any creative power, or can efficiently produce any new substance, or real entity, which was not before, into being, but only act upon pre-existing matter by motion, and modify the same; and since matter, as such, being merely passive, cannot cause any thing that was not before, or will not result from the composition or modification of it; it follows undeniably, that in all natural generations and productions out of pre-existent matter (without a divine creation) there can never be any new substance or real entity brought out of non-existence into being. And this was that very thing, and no other, which the ancient physiologers meant, when, (as Aristotle[6] tells us) they so much insisted upon this principle: Τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίνεσθαι ἀδύνατον, "That it was impossible that any real entity should be (naturally) made or generated out of nothing; or, as it is also otherwise expressed:[7] Οὐδὲν οὐδὲ γίνεσθαι οὐδὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, "That no real

[5] The learned Doctor adduces a passage to this purport below from Cicero's book, De Fato.

[6] Natural. Auscultat. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 451. tom. 1. opp. See also cap. 8. p. 457. and elsewhere.

[7] Ibid. lib. 1. cap. 8. p. 457. tom. 1. opp. There are some other passages to the same effect in Aristotle, which I consider it superfluous to quote in this place.

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entity was either generated or corrupted." That is, that in natural generations, corruptions and alterations, (where God is supposed not miraculously to interpose) there is no creation of a new substance, or real entity, out of nothing, nor annihilation, or destruction of any into nothing.

We are not ignorant that the generality of modern writers have interpreted this doctrine of the old physiologers in Aristotle into quite different sense; as designing therein to take away all divine creation out of nothing, (or non-existence;) they making all things to have sprung out of matter (existing of itself from eternity) either without a God, or else rather (because Parmenides and Empedocles, and other assertors of this doctrine, were undoubted Theists) with him. So that God could not create any new entity out of nothing, but only make things out of pre-existing unmade matter, as a carpenter doth a house, or a weaver a piece of cloth. And thus is it commonly taken for granted, that no Pagan philosopher ever went so far as to acknowledge a divine creation of any thing out of nothing, in the sense of Christian theologers. And here we grant indeed, that besides the Stoics,[8] there have been some other philosophic Theists amongst the Pagans of this persuasion, that nothing was, nor could be made by God, otherwise than out of something pre-existing; as Plutarchus Cheronensis for one, who in a place already cited positively affirmeth:[9] Τὸν μὲν κόσμον

[8] That the Stoics asserted two principles of things, one active and the other passive, namely, God and eternal matter, is unquestionable. Consult what Justus Lipsius, among others, has collected upon this subject in his Physiologia Stoicorum, lib. 1. diss. 4. p. 9. and lib. 2. diss. 2. p. 57. &c. Wherefore, all the philosophers of this sect must necessarily have rejected the idea of creation out of nothing, although Seneca is generally considered to have had no great aversion to this doctrine: of whom it is our intention to speak elsewhere. But there seems to have been considerable dissension among the Stoics about the nature of matter itself, which they all acknowledged to be eternal. For while some of them, including M. Antoninus, lib. 17. ad se ipsum, sect. 1. maintained matter to be always obedient and subservient to God, so that he can do with it what he pleases, others asserted that it not unfrequently refuses this obedience, and thwarts the wishes of the Creator: from which contumacy of matter, they declared, spring all the evils that afflict mankind and the nature of things. This controversy has been touched upon by Seneca, in his Præfat. Quæst. Natur. and others. For my own part, I consider the whole to be a contest about words; which, if space permitted, I could demonstrate by arguments drawn from the interior philosophy of the Stoics. All the Stoics that ever existed, if they did not wish to contradict themselves, must necessarily have acknowledged: that matter is not adapted to receive all imaginable forms. Consequently, those who insisted upon matter being sometimes refractory, meant merely that it is impossible to make from it every thing that an all-wise mind can conceive. Nor was this denied by those on the other side, who held matter to be always obedient to God; inasmuch as they simply affirmed that matter never hinders God from making those things out of it which its nature permits. What therefore is left of the controversy? In my opinion, very little: or if any thing does remain, it turns altogether upon the divine will, and resolves itself into this question: Whether the supreme Being sometimes wills, and not only wills, but tries to accomplish those things, which he knows to be impossible by reason of the nature of matter. But the Stoics, if I mistake not, would act foolishly and abandon their own principles, were they to condescend to determine this question.

[9] Libro de Procreatione Animæ ex Timæo, p. 1014. tom. 2. opp. The learned Doctor

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ὑπὸ θεοῦ γεγονέναι, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν καὶ ὕλην ἐξ ἧς γέγονεν, οὐ γενομένην, ἀλλὰ ὑποκειμένην ἀεὶ τῷ δημιουργῷ, "That though the world were indeed made by God, yet the substance or matter out of which it was made, was not made." And then he subjoins this very reason for it: Οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γένεσις, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς, μηδ' ἱκανῶς ἔχοντος, ὡς οἰκίας καὶ ἱματίου καὶ ἀνδριάντος, "Because there can be no making of any thing out of nothing, but only out of something pre-existing, not rightly ordered or sufficiently disposed; as in a house, garment, or statue." From which conceit of Plutarch's, though he were otherwise ingenious, it may well be supposed that the dull Bœotic air had too much effect upon him. However, neither Plutarch nor the Stoics, as we conceive, are for this to be accounted absolute and downright Atheists, but only imperfect, mongrel, and spurious Theists. And therefore, were Atheists never so much able to prove that there could be no creation out of nothing pre-existing, which they cannot at all do; yet would not this overthrow theism in general, there being a latitude therein. Nevertheless, it will undeniably appear from what shall follow, that those ancient Italics and Pythagorics were so far from intending here any such thing, to deduce all things out of matter, either without, or with a God, as that they plainly designed the very contrary; namely, to prove that no real entity could be made out of matter, and particularly that souls could not be generated out of the same; which therefore of necessity must, according to them, have another divine original, and be made by God, not out of matter, but out of nothing pre-existing; since it could not be supposed by any, that all souls existed of themselves from eternity unmade. And indeed, all those Pagan philosophers who asserted the incorporeity of souls, must of necessity, in like manner, suppose them not to have been made out of pre-existing matter, but by God out of nothing. Plutarch being only here to be excepted, by reason of a certain odd hypothesis which he had, that was peculiarly his own, of a third principle besides God and matter, a disorderly soul, or evil demon self-existent, who therefore seems to have supposed all particular human souls to have been made neither out of nothing, nor yet out of matter or body pre-existing, but out of a certain strange commixture of the substance of that evil soul, and God, blended together: upon which account does he affirm souls to be not so much ἔργον as μέρος θεοῦ, not so much "the work of God" as "a part of him." And now, let

ought to have added that Plutarch gives this as Plato's, rather than his own opinion, and merely considers it as preferable to the rest of the dogmas put forth by philosophers on the subject of the world. But being a warm admirer of Plato's discipline, and sparing no pains to purge and clear him from all taint of error, he thought proper to omit this altogether.

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any one judge, whether upon Plutarch's account, there be not yet further reason to complain of this Bœotic air.[10] Wherefore we conclude that those old physiologers in Aristotle, who insisted so much upon that principle, that no real entity could be made or generated out of nothing, acted only as physiologers therein, and not as theologers or metaphysicians; they not opposing a divine creation out of nothing pre-existing, but only contending that no new entity could be made out of matter, and that in natural generations and corruptions there was no creation or annihilation of any thing.[1]

But what the true scope and meaning of these physiologers indeed was, will more plainly appear from that use or improvement which themselves made of this philosophic principle; and this was twofold. For first, it is certain that upon this foundation, they all of them endeavoured to establish a peculiar kind of physiology, and some atomology or other, either a homœomery or an anomœomery, a similar or dissimilar atomology, For Anaxagoras, looking upon this maxim of the Italic philosophers, that nothing could be physically made out of nothing, or no real entity generated or corrupted, as an undoubted principle of reason; and being also not able to conceive otherwise of the forms and qualities of bodies, than that they were real entities, distinct from the substance of matter, or its modifications; concluded, that therefore in generations, corruptions, and alterations, these were not created out of nothing, and annihilated into nothing, but that every thing was naturally made, ἐκ προϋπαρχόντων καὶ ἐννπαρχόντων, "out of pre-existent, and inexistent things;" and consequently that there were, in all things, similar atoms and particles of every kind, though by reason of their parvitude, insensible to us, and every thing seemed to be only that which was most predominant and conspicuous in it. To wit, that bone was made out of bony atoms, and flesh out of fleshy, hot things out of hot atoms, and cold things out of cold, black out of black, and white out of white, &c. and nothing out of

[10] On this opinion of Plutarch we have already commented at some length, cap. 4. sect. 12. and our remarks there will show with how much justice it is ascribed to him. At present, I would observe merely, that Plutarch, in his book De Animæ Procreatione ex Timæo, from which the words here censured are extracted, does not bring forward this as his own, but as what he considers to be Plato's doctrine on the soul, as propounded in the Timæus. As to himself, after the manner of the Academics, to which sect he in all probability belonged, he neither altogether rejects it, nor carries his approval so far as to hold it to be unquestionably true. This being the case, the learned Doctor seems here to be somewhat too severe in his invectives against Plutarch.

[1] It is a question of no small importance:- Whether any of the ancient philosophers who followed reason for their guide, ever proceeded so far by thinking and reasoning, as to decide that God formed matter or even souls out of nothing. For the better and more convenient discussion of which we intend to collect and examine all that has been advanced by Dr. Cudworth and others on this argument, in a separate Dissertation, to be appended to this section.

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nothing, but every thing out of pre-existing familiar atoms. Thus was the sense of Anaxagoras plainly declared by Aristotle,[2] that "because contraries were made out of one another, they were therefore before in-existent. For since every thing must of necessity be made either out of something, or out of nothing, and all physiologers agree that it is impossible for any thing to be made out of nothing; it follows unavoidably, that whatsoever is generated, must be generated out of things pre-existing and inexisting, though by reason of their parvitude, insensible to us; that is, out of similar or homogeneal atoms, of which there are some of all kinds in every thing; every thing being mingled in every thing." Here, therefore, have we the Anaxagorean homœomery, or similar atomology, built upon this principle of reason, as its foundation, that "Nothing can naturally be made or generated out of nothing."

But the Italics or Pythagorics, as well before Anaxagoras, as after him, (with whom also hitherto concurred Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, those atheizers of the Italic physiology) did with much better reason from the same fundamental principle conclude, that since these forms and qualities of bodies were unquestionably generated and corrupted, they were therefore no entities really distinct from the substance of matter, or its modifications, but only different dispositions or modifications of the insensible parts thereof, causing in us different phantasms: and this was the first original of the dissimilar atomology. In matter or body therefore, as such, there was nothing else to these philosophers conceivable, but only magnitude of parts, figure, site, and motion, or rest; and these were those few elements, out of which inexisting, and variously combined together, they supposed all those forms and qualities of bodies, (commonly so called) in generations to result, without the production of any new real entity out of nothing. For as out of a few letters in the alphabet of every language, differently placed and combined, do result innumerable syllables, words, and sounds, signifying all the several things in heaven and earth; and sometimes from all the very same letters, neither more nor fewer, but only transposed, are begotten very different phantasms of sounds in us, but without the production of any new

[2] The passage alluded to, which occurs, Natural. Auscult. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 451. tom. 1. opp. is deserving of being transcribed in the original, that a more correct opinion may be formed of its meaning: Ἔτι δὲ ἐκ τοῦ γίνεσθαι ἐξ ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐναντία· ἐνυπῆρχεν ἄρα. Εἰ γὰρ πᾶν μὲν τὸ γινόμενον ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι ἢ ἐξ ὄντων, ἢ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων, τούτων δὲ, τὸ μὲν ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίνεσθαι ἀδύνατον (περὶ γὰρ ταύτης ὁμογνωμονοῦσι τῆς δόξης ἅπαντες οἱ περὶ φύσεως) τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη συμβαίνειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐνόμισαν, ἐξ ὄντων μὲν καὶ ἐνυπαρχόντων γίνεσθαι, διὰ δὲ σμικρότητα τῶν ὄγκων ἐξ ἀναισθήτων ἡμῖν. Διὸ φασὶ πᾶν ἐν παντὶ μεμίχθαι, διότι πᾶν ἐκ παντὸς ἑώρων γινόμενον. How much of truth there is in the learned Doctor's corollary from this passage, will be made apparent below, when we come to the discussion of the whole of this question.

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real entity out of nothing: in the very same manner, from those fewer letters in the alphabet of the corporeal nature, variously combined, or from the different modifications of matter, in respect of magnitude, of parts, figure, site, and motion, are made up and spelled out all those syllables of things that are in the whole world without the production of any new real entity. Many times the very same numerical matter, neither more nor less only differently modified, causing very different phantasms in us, which are therefore vulgarly supposed to be forms and qualities in the things; as when the same water is successively changed and transformed into vapour, snow, hail, and ice. And to this very purpose is the fore-mentioned similitude elegantly pursued by the Epicurean Poet,* in these following verses:

Quin etiam refert nostris in versibus ipsis,
Cum quibus et quali sint ordine quæque locata.
Namque eadem cœlum, mare, terras, flumina, solem,
Significant, eadem fruges, arbusta, animantes.
Sic ipsis in rebus item jam materiaï
Concursus, motus, ordo, positura, figuræ,
Cum permutantur, mutari res quoque debent.

For were those supposed forms and qualities, produced in generations and alterations, entities really distinct from the substance of matter, or its different modifications, in respect of the magnitude, figure, site, and motion of parts (there being no such things before inexisting, as Anaxagoras supposed); then would they materially proceed from nothing, which is a thing impossible. And this dissimilar atomology of the ancient Italics, so far as to these material forms and qualities, seems to be undoubtedly the only true physiology; it being built upon this sure principle of reason, that because nothing can give what it hath not, therefore no new substance or real entity can be materially produced in the generations and alterations of nature as such, but only modifications. As when an architect builds a house, or a weaver makes a piece of cloth, there is only a different modification of the pre-existent matter.

This is the first improvement which the ancient Italic philosophers made of this principle, "Nothing can be (physically and materially) generated out of nothing;" or that "No real entity is naturally generated or corrupted;" that therefore the forms and qualities of bodies were no real entities, but only different modifications. But besides this, there was also another thing which these philosophers principally aimed at herein, as a corollary deducible from the same principle concerning souls; that since the souls of animals, especially human, are unquestionably entities really distinct from matter, and all its modifications (no

* Lib. 2. p. 191. Lamb. [Verse 1012.]

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magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, being ever able to beget cogitation or consciousness, much less a power of understanding eternal verities); that therefore these could not be generated out of matter, nor corrupted into the same. Because forms and qualities are continually generated and corrupted, made out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again; therefore are they no entities really distinct from matter and its different modifications: but because souls, at least human, are unquestionably entities really distinct from matter and all its modifications, therefore can they not possibly be generated out of matter, nor corrupted into the same. For if human souls were generated out of matter, then must some real entity be materially produced out of nothing, there being nothing of life and cogitation in matter; which is a thing absolutely impossible. Wherefore, these philosophers concluded concerning souls, that being not generated out of matter, they were insinuated or introduced into bodies in generations. And this was always a great controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists concerning the human soul, as Lucretius expresseth it:[3]

Nata sit, an contra nascentibus insinuetur,

Whether it were made or generated out of matter (that is, indeed out of nothing), or else were θύραθεν, "from without," insinuated into bodies in generations? Which latter opinion of theirs supposes souls as well to have existed before the generations of all animals, as to exist after their deaths and corruptions; there being properly nothing of them generated, but only their union with those particular bodies. So that the generations and corruptions or deaths of animals, according to this hypothesis, are nothing but an anagrammatical transposition of things in the universe, pre and post existent souls being sometimes united to one body, and sometimes to another. But it doth not therefore follow, because these ancient philosophers held souls to be thus ingenerable, and to have pre-existed before the generation of animals, that therefore they supposed all souls to have existed of themselves from eternity unmade: this being a thing, which was never asserted any more by Theist than Atheist; since even those philosophic Theists, who maintained æternitatem animorum, "the eternity of human minds and souls," together with the worlds, did notwithstanding assert their essential dependence upon the Deity, like that of the lights upon the sun; as if they were a kind of eternal effulgency, emanation, or eradiation from an eternal sun. Even Proclus[4] himself, that great champion for the eternity of the world and souls in this very case, when he

[3] Lib. 1. v. 114. p. 48.
[4] Comment. in Timæum Platon. lib. 2. p. 116

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writes against Plutarch's self-existent evil soul, expressly declaring, that *πᾶσα ψυχὴ γέννημά ἐστι τοῦ Θεοῦ*, "there is no self-existent soul;" but every "soul whatsoever is the work, effect and production of God." Wherefore, when they affirmed souls to be ingenerable, their meaning was no more than this, that they were not mere accidental things, as forms and qualities are, nor any more generated out of matter, than matter itself is generated out of something else; upon which account, as Aristotle[5] informs us, souls were called also by them, *ἀρχαὶ*, "principles," as well as matter, they being both of them substances in the universe alike original; that is, neither of them made out of the other.

[5] The passage here meant, if I mistake not, occurs De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 5. tom. 2. opp. and runs as follows: "Οσοι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τὸ ἔμψυχον ἀπέβλεψαν, οὗτοι τὸ κινητικώτατον ὑπέλαβον τὴν ψυχήν· ὅσοι δὴ ἐπὶ τὸ γινώσκειν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, οὗτοι δὴ λέγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν ΤΑΣ ΑΡΧΑΣ, "As many, therefore, as looked to the motion of the thing animated, considered the soul to be pre-eminently adapted for moving: but those who regarded the knowledge and sense of things that are, call the soul *principles*." I have thought proper to transcribe the whole of this passage of Aristotle, in order to be better able to discuss his opinion: for Dr. Cudworth seems to me to err materially in his exposition of it. He supposes the ancient philosophers, whose opinion the Stagirite is here reciting, to have called souls *ἀρχαὶ*, or principles, because they considered them, like matter itself, to be self-existent natures and principles, as it were, of all things. But in addition to that being exceedingly questionable, which the learned Doctor supposes to be certain, that the philosophers to whom Aristotle attributes this sentiment are Pythagoreans, the meaning of those philosophers was very different from this. Aristotle distributes all philosophers, who had expressed an opinion upon the nature of the soul, into two classes, and tells us, that some regarded the motion produced by the soul in the body, and pronounced the soul to be a nature pre-eminent for the faculty of moving; while others attended rather to the sense and knowledge possessed by the soul, and decided it to be *ἀρχαί*. What was strictly meant by these latter is manifest from the words which follow in Aristotle: for he straightway goes on to say: Οἱ μὲν πλείους ποιοῦντες τὰς ἀρχὰς, οἱ δὲ μίαν ταύτην, "But some make more principles, others this one only." After which, in order to illustrate what he has advanced, he first of all adduces the example of Empedocles, who held the soul to be compounded of all the elements: Ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μὲν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων πάντων· then adds that of Plato, who in his Timæus, he tells us, in like manner made the soul consist of all the elements: Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ Πλάτων τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ. In this disputation of Aristotle's, therefore, *στοιχεῖα* and *ἀρχαὶ* have the same signification, and mean those first principles or elements, from which philosophers suppose the whole nature of things to be derived. Such being the case, it appears that those who, according to Aristotle, called the soul *ἀρχαὶ* or principles, taught that the soul is composed of those elements of which universal nature consists. That many of the philosophers of antiquity held this opinion, is known to every one possessing even a moderate acquaintance with these subjects. But inasmuch as they disagreed among each other as to the number, some supposing one, others two, others four principles of things, it followed as a matter of course, that they should be at issue also respecting the nature of the soul and the elements, whether few or more, that it consisted of. That this is the correct interpretation of Aristotle's passage is evident also from his saying that those philosophers who supposed the soul to be *ἀρχαὶ*, fell into this opinion in consequence of their looking rather to the sense and knowledge possessed by the soul, than to its faculty of moving. For Empedocles himself, by whose example the prince of the Peripatetics confirms and illustrates his position, entertained no doubt of knowledge being a kind of sense, and supposed the perception of the mind to arise from its being compounded of all the principles. I have shown this at greater length on cap. 1. where I have attempted to explain Empedocles' philosophy on the soul and the elements of things. And besides Empedocles, many other philosophers of antiquity were unquestionably imbued with the same doctrine.

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But they did not suppose them to be ἀγεννήτους, "ingenerate" or "unmade" in the other sense, as if they had been self-originated and independent, as Plutarch's second and third principles, his evil soul, and matter, were by him imagined to be; but so doubtless, as that if the world had had any beginning, they should then have been all created together with it out of nothing pre existing. But as for the perpetual creation of new souls, in the successive generations of animals, this indeed is a thing, which these philosophers were extremely abhorrent from, as thinking it incongruous, that souls, which are in order of nature senior to bodies, should be in order of time juniors to them; as also not reasonable, that divine creation (as it were prostituted) should without end perpetually attend and wait upon natural generations, and be intermingled with them.[6]

[6] It is my intention to explain in the sequel, what I consider to be wanting in this disputation of the learned Doctor's, on the meaning and doctrine of the Italic philosophers. For the present I shall briefly notice the arguments, upon which he considers this sect to have founded their notion, that souls existed from all eternity, or at least before bodies. It might be asked first of all, whether these philosophers really did argue in the way Dr. Cudworth mentions, or he himself supplied them with these reasons from conjecture. Certainly no one of the ancient Pythagoreans is stated in ancient authors to have held such an argument: though of the junior Platonists who affected to follow in the footsteps of Pythagoras, some perhaps may have done so: but I never can persuade myself that all the dogmas of these men were derived from the school of Pythagoras. Dismissing these matters for the present, however, I shall inquire merely into the reasons themselves, which I consider to be exceedingly weak and puerile.

I. "It is absurd," say they, "to suppose that souls, which are prior to bodies in the order of nature, are posterior to them in time." If I rightly comprehend their meaning, "to be prior to any thing in the order of nature" is nothing more than "to have a more excellent nature." Thus man is prior in the order of nature to brute animals, which are also inferior to him in perfection and excellence. But by what arguments it can be proved, that "that which is more excellent must have been created before that which is worse and of an inferior order," I am wholly at a loss to understand. Assuredly no Christian would reason in this manner, as he cannot but be aware, that man, the most excellent animal, was not created till the sixth day, subsequently to the beasts of the field, and all inanimate things. Nor will any philosopher even, who hearkens to reason alone, readily admit the truth of this dogma, since it is manifestly possible from various causes, for a thing which is posterior in nature to be made before another that is greater and more excellent. There is no living and animate body that, in respect to nature, is not much more perfect than those which are inanimate and without life: but who is not aware, that the bodies of men and animals, far superior as they are in virtue and dignity, and at the same time endowed with life and sense, are junior, in point of time, to the metals, iron, silver, gold, to earth, water and infinity of other things, which are lower in the scale of nature, and altogether destitute of life? If, therefore, the proposition, "Whatever is prior in nature must also be prior in time," is to be admitted as true, we shall be driven to the conclusion, that all the bodies of men and animals were created before any matter was in existence.

But II. These philosophers consider it to be "unworthy of God, to be present at all natural generations, and perpetually to wait and attend as it were upon each." But acute and sagacious as they are, they do not perceive the full force of this argument, which may be applied with equal efficacy to the overthrow of their own theory, as to the refutation of those who hold the soul to be created by God at the same time as the body. For they themselves, while maintaining the existence of souls from all eternity, confess, nevertheless, that they are introduced by God into bodies in procreation. They therefore attribute to him the very thing which they pronounce to be foreign to his glory and majesty. For, if this be the case, God is in a certain way present at each

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But as for this pre-existence of souls, we have already declared our own sense concerning it, in the first chapter. Though we cannot deny, but that, besides Origen,[7] several others of the ancient fathers before the fifth council, seem either to have espoused it, or at least to have had a favour and kindness for it; insomuch that St. Austin[8] himself is sometimes staggering in this point, and thinks it to be a great secret, whether men's souls existed before their generations or no; and somewhere concludes it to be a matter of indifferency, wherein every one may have his liberty of opining either way without offence. Wherefore, all that can be certainly affirmed in this in this case is, that human souls could not possibly be generated out of matter, but were sometime or other created by God Almighty out of nothing pre-existing, either in generations or before them. Lastly, as for brute animals, we must confess, that if they be not mere machines or automata, as some seem inclinable to believe, but conscious and thinking beings; then from the same principle of reason it will likewise follow, that their souls cannot be generated out of matter neither, and therefore must be derived from the fountain of all life, and created out of nothing by him; who since he can as easily annihilate as create, and does all for the best, no man need at all to trouble himself about their permanency or immortality.

And now have we given a full and particular account of all the several senses, wherein this axiom must be acknowledged to be undeniably true, that "Nothing can possibly be made out of nothing," or "come from nothing;" namely, these three. First, that "Nothing, which was not, could ever bring itself into being," or "efficiently produce itself;" or, that "Nothing can possibly be made without an efficient cause." Secondly, that "Nothing, which was not," could be produced, or "brought into being by any other efficient cause, than such as hath at least equal perfection in it, and a sufficient active or productive power." For if any thing were made by that, which hath not equal perfection, then must so much of the effect as transcendeth

natural generation, and, to adopt their own phraseology, waits and attends upon each, in order to insinuate one of the infinite store of souls into the newly generated body. It is needless to notice, that, in reasoning as they do, they imagine to themselves a God not like himself, but resembling rather the kings of the earth, whose personal attention to all matters is supposed to be derogatory to their majesty. If the advocates of this doctrine, therefore, had nothing besides these two arguments to bring forward in support of it, no reasonable man could be expected to listen to them.

[7] See Pet. Dan. Huet, Origenian. lib. 2. quæst. 6. sect. 4. p. 93. who also, sect. 10. p. 97. produces a long list of ancient fathers, who held the same opinion as Origen on this subject. Add Henr. Norisius, in his Vindiciæ Augustianæ, appended to his Historia Pelagiana, cap. 4. sect. 3. p. 101. &c.

[8] Norisius has collected the passages of St. Augustine on this point, in his Vindic. Augustian. cap. 4. p. 101. &c. and at the same time vindicated his memory from this charge of indecision.

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the cause, be indeed made without a cause (since nothing can give what it hath not) or be caused by itself, or by nothing. Again, to suppose a thing to be produced by that which hath no sufficient productive power, is really to suppose it also to be produced from itself without a cause, or from nothing. Where it is acknowledged by us, that no natural, imperfect created being can create, or emanatively produce a new substance, which was not before, and give it its whole being. Hitherto is the axiom verified in respect of the efficient cause. But in the third place, it is also true in respect of the material likewise. Not that "nothing could possibly be ever made" by any power whatsoever, but only out of pre-existent matter; and consequently, that matter itself could be never made, but was self-existent. For the falsity of this is sufficiently evident from what hath been already declared concerning human souls, their being undoubtedly substances incorporeal, which therefore could never be generated out of matter; and it will be further manifested afterwards. But the third and last sense is this, that "Nothing, which is materially made out of things pre-existing (as some are) can have any other real entity," than what was either before contained in, or resulteth from the things themselves so modified. Or, that there can be no new entities or substances naturally generated out of matter; and therefore that all natural generations are really nothing else but mixtures, or new modifications of things pre-existing.

These, I say, are all the senses, wherein it is impossible, that any thing should be made out of nothing, or come from nothing; and they may be all reduced to this one general sense, that "Nothing can be made out of nothing causally;" or, that "Nothing cannot cause any thing, either efficiently or materially." Which as it is undeniably true, so is it so far from making any thing against a divine creation, or the existence of a God, that the same may be demonstratively proved, and evinced from it, as shall be showed afterward.

But there is another sense, wherein things may be said to be made ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, or "out of nothing," when those words are not taken causally, but only so as to signify the terminus à quo, or "term from which" they are made, to wit, an antecedent non-existence. And then the meaning of this proposition, that "Nothing can possibly be made out of nothing," will be this; that "Nothing, which once was not," could by any power whatsoever be afterwards brought into being. And this is the sense insisted on in this second atheistic argumentation, framed according to the principles of the Democritic or Epicurean atheism; That no real entity, which once was not, could by any power whatsover be made, or brought out of non-existence into being; and consequently, that no creative power out of nothing

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can possibly belong to any thing, though supposed never so perfect.

In answer whereunto, we shall perform these two things. First, we shall make it appear, that "Nothing out of nothing," taken in this sense declared, is so far from being a common notion, that it is not at all true. And secondly, we shall prove, that if it were true, yet would it of the two make more against atheism, than it doth against theism, and therefore ought by no means to be used by Atheists, as an argument against a Deity. First, therefore, it is unquestionably certain, that this cannot be universally true, that nothing, which once was not, could possibly be made, or brought out of non-existence into being; because, if it were, then could there be no such thing as making or causing at all; no action nor motion, and consequently no generation nor mutation in the corporeal universe, but the whole world would be like a stiff immoveable adamantine rock: and this would doubtless be a better argument against motion, than any of Zeno's[9] was. But we have all experience within ourselves of a power of producing new cogitations in our own minds, new intellectual and moral habits, as also new local motion in our bodies, or at least new determinations thereof, and of causing thereby new modifications in bodies without us. And therefore are the Atheists forced to restrain the sense of this proposition to substantial things only, that though there may be new accidents and modifications produced out of nothing, yet there can be no new substances made; however they be not able in the mean time to give any reason, why one of those should be in itself more impossible than the other, or why no substance should be makeable. But that some are so staggered with the seeming plausibility of this argument, is chiefly upon these following accounts. First, by reason of the confusion of their own conceptions; for, because it is certain, that "nothing can possibly be made out of nothing," in one sense, to wit, causally; they not distinguishing senses, nor being aware of the equivocation that is in this ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, "out of nothing," inadvertently give their assent to those words in a wrong sense; that no substance (as matter) could possibly be brought out of nonexistence into being. Secondly, by reason of their unskilful arguing from artificial things; when, because nothing can be artificially made, but out of pre-existing matter, as a house or garment, and the like (there being nothing done in the production of these things, but only a new modification of what before substantially was) they over-hastily conclude, that no power whatsoever could produce

[9] On Zeno's argument against motion, consult in particular, Pet. Bayle, Dictionnaire Histor. et Critique, tom. 4. art. Zeno, not. E. p. 2909.

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any thing otherwise, than out of pre-existing matter, and that matter itself therefore could not possibly be made. In which conceit they are again further confirmed from hence, because the old physiologers maintained the same thing concerning natural generations likewise, that nothing was in them produced ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, "out of nothing" neither; or that there was no new substance or entity made in them really distinct from the pre-existing matter and its modifications; they unwarily extending this beyond the bounds of physics into metaphysics, and unduly measuring or limiting infinite power accordingly. Lastly, because it is undeniably certain concerning ourselves, and all imperfect created beings, that none of these can create any new substance which was not before; men are therefore apt to measure all things by their own scantling, and to suppose it universally impossible, according to human reason, for any power whatsoever thus to create; whence it follows, that theology must in this be acknowledged to be contradictious to the principles of natural light and understanding. But since it is certain, that imperfect created beings can themselves produce some things out of nothing pre-existing, as new cogitations, and new local motion, new modifications and transformations of things corporeal; it is very reasonable to think, that an absolutely perfect Being could do something more, that is, create new substances out of nothing, or give them their whole being. And it may well be thought to be as easy for God, or an omnipotent Being, to make a whole world, matter and all, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, "out of nothing," as it is for us to create a thought, or to move a finger, or for the sun to send out rays, or a candle light; or lastly, for any opaque body to produce the image of itself in glasses or water, or to project a shadow; all these imperfect things being but the energies, rays, images, or shadows of the Deity. For a substance, which once was not, to be made by God, or a Being infinitely perfect, this is not for it to be made out of nothing, in the impossible sense, it coming from him who is all. Nor can it be said to be impossible, for anything whatsoever to be made by that, which hath not only infinitely greater perfection, but also a sufficient active power to produce the same, it being substantially emanative. It is true indeed, that infinite power itself cannot do things in their own nature impossible; and this is therefore the only thing which the Atheists have to prove, that it is in itself absolutely impossible for a substance (though not for an accident or modification) to be produced out of non-existence into being. Whereas nothing is in itself absolutely impossible, but what implies a contradiction; and though it be contradictious for a thing to be, and not to be, at the same time; yet is there no manner of contradiction at all in this, for any imperfect contingent being, which before

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was not, afterwards to be. Wherefore, this being in itself no way impossible, it must be acknowledged to be a due object of infinite power, or that which may be done by a perfect omnipotent Being existing.

If nothing could be made ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, "out of nothing," in this latter sense, that is, "Nothing which before was not," afterwards brought into being; then must the reason hereof be, because no substance or real entity can be caused by any other substance, so as to receive and derive its whole being from it: and consequently whatsoever substance or real entity is in the whole world, was not only from eternity without beginning, but also existed of itself necessarily, and independently upon any thing else. But first, it hath been already declared, that it is repugnant to the human faculties, that any temporary successive being whatsoever, or that time itself, should be eternal without beginning, because upon that hypothesis there would always have been an infinity of time past; and if so, then would there of necessity have been time past, which was never present.* But, to make every substantial thing, not only to have existed from eternity without beginning (which yet hath been done by some mistaken Theists), but also to have existed independently upon any thing else as its cause, or original, and therefore of itself necessarily; this, I say, is itself to make "Something to come from nothing in the impossible sense," to wit, causally. For as when some Atheists affirm, that "Nothing could ever move itself," and yet suppose notwithstanding, that there hath been motion from all eternity, they plainly make this motion (however supposed to be eternal) to come from nothing in the impossible sense: so, in like manner, they who suppose things to have existed of themselves necessarily, which have no self-existence, and necessary existence contained in their nature (as nothing but a perfect Being hath) do make this necessary existence of such things to have come from nothing. Wherefore though it be certain that something did exist of itself necessarily from all eternity, namely, a perfect Being (whose necessary existence is therefore not from nothing, because essentially included in its own nature) yet is it certain likewise, that there can be but one such thing; necessity of existence being natural and essential to no more. But as for all other things, which are in their own nature contingently possible to be or not to be, reason pronounces of them, that they could not exist of themselves necessarily, but were caused by something else; and derived their original from that one absolutely perfect and necessarily existent Being. So that Plato's[10] distinction must needs

* See Enchir. Met. cap. 10.

[10] See the discourse of Socrates in Plato's Phædo, p. 384. 385. Add Plato, De Republica, lib. 4. p. 479. and elsewhere. Where the passage of Aristotle which fol-

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be here allowed of betwixt two kinds of beings: Τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ ὂν, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, "That which always is, and was never made, nor had beginning;" and Τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε, "That which was made, or had beginning, but never truly is;" it having not a permanent, but successive or flowing duration. Accordingly whereunto, Aristotle also affirmeth, "That there is no necessity all things should be unmade or self-originated; but some things might be made from others unmade."[1]

lows is to be found, I am unable to say, nor do I suppose Dr. Cudworth to have given the words, but only the meaning of the philosopher. Perhaps he had in his mind the following passage, occurring De Cœlo, lib. 3. cap. 2. p. 674. tom. 1. opp.: Οὔτε πάντων ἐστὶ γένεσις, οὔθ' ἁπλῶς οὐδενός, "Generation is neither of all things, nor simply of nothing."

[1] As the learned Doctor has truly observed, the opponents of God and religion, if they deny creation out of nothing, will be compelled to decide that one substance cannot possibly generate and produce another. Whether at the time in which he wrote any Atheist had publicly avowed this, I am unable to say; but in the very year in which this book of Dr. Cudworth's made its appearance, the posthumous works of Spinoza were also published, in which this man lays down the following among the first principles of his infamous philosophy: "One substance cannot be produced by another substance." See his Ethica More Geometrico Demonstrata, part 1. prop. 6. p. 4. opp. posthumor. Although satisfied of the insane folly of those who hold this doctrine, still I confess my doubts of the aptitude and efficacy of the objections urged against them by our author. The substance of his argumentation, if I mistake not, is this: "If creation out of nothing be disallowed, it will follow that no substance can be generated and produced by another: but this is a downright absurdity; therefore it must be acknowledged that all things were created out of nothing." But to show the absurdity of supposing that no substance can be produced by another, he observes, that if this be true, all substances must be admitted to have existed from an infinite period without any beginning: but that this is impossible from the very nature of things. He therefore assumes a plurality of substances in the world: but Atheists, I imagine, will deny this: at any rate it was denied by Spinoza, who notoriously inculcated, that there is but one substance, and that all the rest of things are modifications of this one.

Dr. Cudworth himself denies bodies to be substances, and grants them to be mere modifications of matter alone; therefore the substances which he assigns to the world will be atoms or parts of matter, spirits and souls, chiefly human. But these men will deny atoms to be substances, and contend that they are merely particles or modifications of matter; and to one word about spirits no Atheist will listen, as he holds them all to be figments of the human brain. There remain therefore souls, on which he pursues the discussion in the following clause, and that too in such a way that many, I suspect, of those who have not entirely bidden adieu to reason will assent to his opinion. I will give a brief digest of his arguments. "Souls," says he, "are either modifications of matter or substances: but to call them modifications of matter is madness: for life and reason cannot be produced from the affection and disposition of matter. They are therefore self-existent natures or substances: but if they are substances and no substance can produce another, it follows that souls have existed of themselves from all eternity: which indeed is grossly absurd: there is of necessity therefore an eternal nature which produced and created all souls: consequently it is manifest that a substance can be produced by a substance." Clear and satisfactory as I allow this reasoning to be to the understanding of most men, still I question whether it will generally convince the Atheists, or even alter the opinion of all those who acknowledge a God, but repudiate creation out of nothing. The Atheists, especially if they be of the more stubborn sort, and have no predilection for the corpuscular philosophy to which Dr. Cudworth is favourable, will persist in contending, however foolishly, that souls are not substances but mere accidents or modifications of a more subtle matter which is unknown to us. Whereas those who grant the existence of a God, but at the same time hold the eternity of matter, some of whom as is well known are to be found

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Lastly, we shall disprove the truth of this assertion, that whatsoever substantially and really is, did exist of itself from all eternity unmade, after this manner. Because it would follow from thence, that not only matter, and unqualified atoms (as the Democritic Atheists suppose) but also souls, especially human, must needs have existed of themselves too, from eternity unmade. For as no man can be so sottish as to conceive himself, or that which thinketh in him, his own soul or mind, and personality to be no real entity, whilst every clod of earth is such; so is it certain, that mind can never be generated out of dead and senseless matter or body, nor result, as a modification thereof, out of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, and therefore must needs be a thing really distinct from it, or substance incorporeal; the Democritic Atheists being here grossly deceived in thinking, that because forms and qualities of bodies may be resolved into those forementioned elements of matter, and consequently concluded to be no entities really distinct from the substance thereof, but only different modifications of the same, that therefore the like may be said of souls too, the rational not excepted. Wherefore, if no substance or real entity could ever be brought out of non-existence into being, or be caused by any thing else, then must all human souls and personalities, as well as matter and atoms, have existed not only from eternity, without beginning, but also of themselves independently upon any other thing. But the Atheists are so abhorrent from this eternity of human souls, that they will by no means admit of their post-existence or immortality; they apprehending, that if any living understanding being should prove immortal, they could not sufficiently secure themselves against the possibility and danger of a God. Some Theists indeed have asserted æternitatem animorum, not only the pre-existence, but also the eternity of all human minds, together with the world, as Cicero more than once doth; who

among the Christians themselves, will dispute the logical propriety of concluding from souls to matter. They will maintain that souls are allied to the nature of God, and therefore capable of being produced by him from himself; but that matter being entirely of a different nature, it is utterly unintelligible how God could have created it; that though there is nothing inconsistent with reason in the idea of like producing its like, yet the generation of a nature dissimilar to its cause is wholly incomprehensible. It is to be regretted therefore that the learned Doctor did not discourse more fully upon what properly deserves the name of substance, as well as upon other points involved in this controversy, before he adopted this argument: but it may be stated in his excuse, that at that time Spinoza's doctrine of one substance was little known. I have thought proper to offer these remarks as a caution to any one against the indiscriminate use of this reason in contests with Atheists; in which class there are those against whom all that is here said possesses great force and efficacy; and others again who are to be met upon far different grounds. It is hardly possible to express the pleasure afforded to the enemies of God, and the injury done to the cause of religion, by the rashness and imprudence of those who attack all Atheists, though consisting of various grades, with the same weapons, and rush headlong into the encounter before once thinking of the principles from which the whole disputation can be successfully drawn.

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also, in his book of Divination,[2] thus further declares himself concerning it: Animus, quià vixit ab omni æternitate, versatusque est cum innumerabilibus animis, omnia, quæ in naturâ rerum sunt, videt, "Our mind, because it hath existed from all eternity, and conversed with innumerable minds, seeth all things that are in nature." And again: Cum animi hominum semper fuerint futurique sint, "Since the minds of men ever were, and ever will be." Nevertheless, none of these ever maintained, that human minds, and their distinct personalities, were thus all, of themselves, independently upon any thing as their cause or original. And, as it was before demonstrated from the nature of knowledge and understanding (it comprehending the possibilities of all things, and therefore supposing infinite power) that there can be but one mind, or understanding Being, self-existent, all minds partaking of that one mind; so is it hardly possible for any one in good earnest to entertain such a conceit as this, that his own particular soul, mind, and personality, and consequently all human souls, though subject to such laws of fate as now they are, did not only pre-exist before their respective bodies, and were from eternity without beginning, but also existed of themselves necessarily and independently upon any thing else. Wherefore, if human souls, minds, and personalities, being unquestionably substantial things and really distinct from matter (which therefore could not possibly be generated out of it) did not all exist from eternity of themselves, necessarily, and independently, it is certain, that they must derive their whole being from the Deity, or be created ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, "out of nothing," or nonexistence by it. And if human souls were unquestionably thus created, it cannot reasonably be doubted, but that matter or body itself was created likewise out of nothing, or caused by the Deity; forasmuch as that which created one thing out of

[2] De Divinatione, lib. 1. cap. 51. p. 3174. tom. 9. opp. But the learned Doctor is mistaken in attributing this opinion to Cicero. For apart from the fact that Cicero, as an Academic, regarded nothing as certain, he is not speaking here in his own person, but introduces his brother Quintus discoursing upon divination. Quintus, however, as he himself confesses, is defending in this book the Stoical doctrine of divination, and therefore sustains the part of a Stoic, but very frequently employs those arguments which were repudiated by the Stoics and admitted by the Platonists alone. And to these arguments of the Platonic school belongs the very one here drawn from the eternity of souls, upon which he mainly relies as demonstrative of what the Stoics called the natural species of divination. Instead of Cicero, therefore, it would have been more correct to have ascribed this opinion to Plato. It is Cicero's habit, let me observe by the way, on almost all occasions to temper the austere discipline of the Stoics with the milder precepts of Plato, and to accommodate to his own arguments doctrines borrowed either from one school or the other. Hence in those places where he is discoursing according to the Platonic sense, he not rarely intermingles some Stoical tenet, and on the other hand when arguing upon Stoical grounds, he very frequently has recourse to the arguments of Plato: a habit which those who do not attend to, are liable to fall into error, and on the authority of Cicero to attribute either to the Stoics or the Platonists what was altogether foreign to the principles of these sects.

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nothing could create every thing; and there is really more of substance, that is, a higher degree of entity, in minds and souls, conscious self-moving and understanding beings, than in senseless matter, or inactive bulk.

But forasmuch as this doctrine of a divine creation out of nothing pre-existing lies under no small prejudice upon this account, because it is so generally taken for granted, that none of the pagan Theists, who are supposed to have kept close to the simple light of nature, did ever acknowledge in the Deity any such creative power out of nothing, or that God was the cause of any substance; we must of necessity here declare this, how common soever it be, to be a great mistake. For besides that Plato, in his Sophist,[3] having defined the efficient or effective power in general after this manner: *Ποιητικὴν πᾶσαν ἔφαμεν εἶναι δύναμιν, ἥτις ἂν αἰτία γίγνηται τοῖς μὴ πρότερον οὖσιν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι*, "to be a power or causality, whereby that which was not before was afterwards made to be;" and then dividing this efficiency into divine and human, he immediately subjoins concerning the former: *Ζῶα δὴ πάντα*, &c. *μῶν ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ θεοῦ δημιουργοῦντος φήσομεν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα*, "Shall we not then say, that all animals, and other things, were by the divine efficiency alone, after they had not been made to be?" Where thus much at least is certain, that Plato did not at all question the possibility of a thing's being made out of nothing in this sense; that is, brought into being, after it had not been, by a divine power. But because it may be thought, that he meant this no further, than of the first compages of animals, in which notwithstanding every thing, souls and all, might be made out of pre-existing matter; we shall here further add, what in his Timæus[4] he declareth concerning the soul: *Τὴν ψυχὴν οὐχ ὡς νῦν ὑστέραν ἐπιχειροῦμεν λέγειν, οὕτως ἐμηχανήσατο καὶ ὁ θεὸς νεωτέραν, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄρξασθαι πρεσβύτερον ὑπὸ νεωτέρου εἴασεν, ὁ δὲ καὶ γενέσει καὶ ἀρετῇ προτέραν καὶ πρεσβυτέραν ψυχὴν σώματος, ὡς δεσπότην καὶ ἄρξουσαν ἄρξομένου συνεστήσατο*, "That God did not make it after body, and junior to it; since it was not fit that the elder should be ruled or governed by the younger; but he made soul before body, older than it, and superior to it, as well in respect of time, as dignity." Which notion is further pursued by him in his tenth De Legibus:[5] *Ὀρθῶς ἄρα καὶ κυρίως ἀληθέστατα τε καὶ τελεώτατα εἰρηκότες ἂν ἦμεν, ψυχὴν μὲν προτέραν γεγονέναι σώματος ἡμῖν· σῶμα δὲ δευτερόν τε καὶ ὕστερον*

[3] P. 168. opp. edit. Ficini. On this and the other passages of the ancients here quoted we shall comment below.

[4] P. 528. opp. In this passage, however, he is treating of the soul of the world and not of souls universally.

[5] Page 669.

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ψυχῆς ἀρχούσης ἀρχόμενον κατὰ φύσιν, "Wherefore, it was rightly, properly, and most truly affirmed by us, that soul was made first, as that which ruleth; but body afterward, as that which is to be ruled and governed thereby." From whence also he draws this consectary: Ὡς εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ φανείη πρεσβυτέρα σώματος· ὅσα καὶ τὰ ψυχῆς τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔσοιτο πρεσβύτερα· τρόποι καὶ ἤθη καὶ βουλήσεις καὶ λογισμοὶ καὶ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς, ἐπιμέλειαί τε καὶ μνῆμαι, πρότερα μήκους σωμάτων καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους, εἴη γεγονότα ἄν, εἴπερ καὶ ψυχὴ σώματος, "That if the soul be older than the body, then must the things of the soul also be older than those of the body; and therefore cogitation, and the several species of it, must be, in order of nature, not only before local motion, but also before longitude, latitude, and profundity of bodies." From whence it is plain, that Plato's first γένεσις, or production of souls by God, could not be out of any pre-existing body or matter, they being affirmed by him to be before, not only this and that particular body, but all body whatsoever, before longitude, latitude, and profundity. Which may be further confirmed from hence, because in his Sophist[6] he plainly condemns that opinion of some, τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν σῶμά τι κεκτῆσθαι, "that the soul itself had something of body in it;" and he often elsewhere declares the soul to be incorporeal. It is certain also, that not only Plato, but all those other pagan philosophers too, who asserted the incorporeity and immortality of human souls, could not possibly conceive souls to have been made out of pre-existent matter, but either ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, "out of nothing," they being not eternal, but having a newness of being, (as Plato himself seemed to suppose;) or else if they were conceived to be eternal by them, (which was the opinion of most of the junior Platonists, yet) to have derived their whole substance from the Deity, and always to depend upon it; as eternal light would depend upon an eternal sun. Plutarch and his followers, being only here to be excepted, who would neither have souls made out of nothing by God, nor yet out of corporeal matter pre-existing, (they being themselves incorporeal;) but out of a strange commixture of the substance of God himself with the substance of a certain disorderly soul, self-existent and uncreated; of which we have spoken already. But that the genuine Platonists did universally suppose that one substance might be caused by another, and derive its whole being from it, is undeniably evident from hence, because their second divine hypostasis or substance, (though eternal) was according to them derived from or begotten by their first, and their third hypostasis or substance produced both from the first and second; and other inferior orbs of being, as the particular

[6] Page 170.

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souls of demons and men, from that whole trinity of divine hypostases jointly concurring. And as for matter or body itself, it is certain also that Proclus and other Platonists expressly denied it to have been ἀγέννητον, "unmade" or "self-existent," and conceived it to have derived its whole being from the Deity; who accordingly is styled by Proclus,[7] ἄρρητος αἰτία τῆς ὕλης, "the ineffable cause of matter." In like manner have we already shown, that, according to the Chaldee oracles, matter itself was also caused or produced by the Deity, to which purpose is this verse cited by Proclus:[8] Ἔνθεν ἄδην θρώσκει γένεσις πολυποικίλου ὕλης, "From whence (that is, from the Deity) abundantly springs forth the generation of the multiform matter." The metre here requiring that it should be read ἄδην, and not ἄρδην, as it is in Proclus' copy. Moreover, Jamblichus hath recorded in his Mysteries,[9] that Hermes, and the old Egyptian theologers likewise, held matter not to be ἀγέννητον, that is "self-existent, unmade;" or "underived" from the Deity, but to have been caused by it.* Whence does Proclus[10] conclude it probable, that Plato was of the same persuasion also; as likewise Orpheus before had been, he deriving this, as is supposed, with other things, from the Egyptians. It is true indeed, that many of these philosophers asserted matter, souls, and the whole world, to have been eternal without beginning, and consequently not created ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, in that stricter sense, that is, out of an antecedent non-existence in time. Notwithstanding which, they did suppose them to have received their whole being from the Deity, and to have depended on it every jot as much, as if, having once not been, they had afterward been made by it. And that which gives to any substance its whole being, though from eternity, so that it never was not; the same upon supposition, that it once had not been, could unquestionably have produced it, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, "out of nothing," or an antecedent non-existence.[1]

We have now sufficiently disproved the truth of that assertion, that "Nothing could be made out of nothing," in the atheistic

[7] Comment. in Timæum Platonis, lib. 2. p. 116.

[8] Ibid. p. 118. This verse is extant in the Oracles of Zoroaster, as they are now edited, v. 15. p. 370. in the fourth book of Stanley's Philosophia Orientalis, appended to Le Clerc's Pneumatologia, and is emended from Proclus in the way proposed by Dr. Cudworth. We shall inquire into its sense below.

[9] De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. 5. cap. 23. p. 138. sect. 8. cap. 3. p. 159.

* Thus Hierocles in Photius: Δημιουργὸν θεὸν προϋφίστησιν ὁ Πλάτων πάσης ἐμφανοῦς τε καὶ ἀφανοῦς διακοσμήσεως ἐκ μηδενὸς προϋποκειμένου γεγενημένης, &c., Plato censuit mundum à Deo ex nullâ priùs existente materiâ productum, &c.

[10] Comm. in Timæum Plat. lib. 2. On this subject we have already spoken elsewhere. The junior Platonists were anxious to avoid all appearance of dissent from their master. Hence, not only Proclus, but Chalcidius and others as well, spare no efforts to make it appear that Plato held the same doctrine as themselves on the eternity of the world.

[1] On all these matters we shall treat expressly below.

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sense thereof, viz. that "Nothing, which before was not, could afterwards possibly be made to be:" though this should not be extended so far, as to accidental things and modifications, but restrained and confined only to substantials; "That no substance whatever could have a newness of being, or be caused by any other substance:" but whatsoever substantial thing any where is in the world, the same did exist of itself from eternity, and independently upon any thing else; nothing but different modifications being made or produced. Which same assertion has been also sometimes otherwise thus expressed: "Nothing can be made but out of pre-existing substance;" the meaning hereof being this, that nothing can be made but new accidental modifications of what before substantially was; no substance itself being makeable or producible by any other substance, neither in time, (so as to have a newness or beginning of being) nor yet from eternity. Where the Atheists and some others taking it for granted that there is no other substance besides body, or matter, do further limit and restrain the sense of that proposition in this manner: "Nothing can be made but out of pre-existing matter;" that is, nothing can be made but out of corporeal substance pre-existing. An idolum specus[2] (if I may use that language) which in all probability had its first original chiefly from men's measuring the extent of all power by their production of artificial things. Because forsooth, a carpenter or architect cannot make a house but out of pre-existing timber, bricks, and stones; nor a tailor a garment, but out of pre-existing cloth; nor a cook, puddings or pies, but out of pre-existing materials or ingredients; that therefore no power whatsoever, no, not that of God Almighty, can extend any further, than to the new-modifying of pre-existent matter, but not to the production or causing of any substance. We shall in the next place make it appear, that were this assertion true, That no substance or real entity, which once was not, could be caused or produced, yet would it notwithstanding, of the two, more impugn atheism, than theism (it being possible for falsehoods, though not for truths, to disagree) forasmuch as the Atheists do bring more out of nothing, or non-existence, than the Theists do; and therefore ought not to make this an objection against theism. For though, according to the true and genuine theology, God, or a perfect Being, be supposed to be the only necessary self-existent thing, and the cause of all other substance, and consequently to have produced all imperfect things, not only souls, but also matter itself, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, "out of nothing," or an antecedent non-existence; yet is there, by reason of the weakness of human understandings, a

[2] Lord Bacon it is well known, applied this appellation to a certain class of popular opinions.

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latitude in theism. Wherefore some there are, who though imposed upon by that "idolum specus," or imprisoned in it, That "nothing can possibly be made but out of pre-existing matter," by the new modification thereof; do notwithstanding devoutly worship a Deity, according to their notion of it, a perfectly understanding Being unmade; though not the creator of matter, yet the maker of the whole world out of it, and the supreme governor of the same; they thus supposing two principles in the universe, an active and a passive one, God and Matter.[3] Besides which, it is not impossible for others to think, that though matter or body be not the only substance, but human souls are incorporeal, yet the substance of these souls was not created out of nothing, no more than that of body, but they were made either out of some pre-existing common soul, (as their intelligible matter) or out of the substance of the Deity itself; or else existed of themselves from eternity unmade: and yet nevertheless may these acknowledge one supreme understanding Being self-existent also, though neither the creator of matter, nor of souls, yet the supreme governor and orderer of all. And it is certain that Plutarch's God was no better than than this; and yet was that Pagan notwithstanding, a devout religionist in his kind, as well as a hearty moralist. And such a theism or theology, as either of those forementioned, (though not genuine and sincere, but imperfect and mongrel things) would perhaps be to the Atheists little less troublesome and uneasy, than the truth. Thus have we shown that this principle, "That nothing can come out of nothing," or be made, otherwise than out of pre-existing substance or matter, though it be indeed contradictious to the true and genuine theology, yet is it not absolutely inconsistent with all manner of religion; there being certain spurious or imperfect forms of theism built upon this foundation. But now, on the contrary, we shall make it manifest, that this very principle made use of by the Atheists, is in truth and reality contradictious to all manner of atheism, and destructive of the same; the Atheists universally generating and corrupting real entities and substantial things, that is, producing them out of nothing, or non-existence, and reducing them to nothing again: forasmuch as they make all things whatsoever, the bare substance of matter only excepted, (which to them is either no determinate thing, or else nothing but mere bulk, or resisting and divisible magnitude) to come out of nothing, and to go to nothing. Thus does Aristotle,[4] in a place before cited, declare the atheistic sense:

[3] Among whom are to be reckoned not a few of the later Christians, and especially of those who subject all religion to the empire of reason. But as will be shown below, even the earlier church was not altogether free from such men.

[4] De Cœlo, lib. 3. cap. 1. p. 668. tom. 1. opp. But I am almost convinced that this passage of Aristotle is but little calculated either to adorn or strengthen the cause

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Εἰσὶ γάρ τινες, οἳ φασιν οὐδὲν ἀγέννητον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι, "There are certain men who affirm that nothing is unmade, but all things generated or made." Whose

here maintained by Dr. Cudworth. To enable the reader to form a more correct opinion upon the question, I shall transcribe the entire passage. Thus then, the chief of the Peripatetics: *Εἰσὶ γάρ τινες, οἳ φασιν οὐδὲν ἀγέννητον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι· γενόμενα δὲ, τὰ μὲν ἄφθαρτα διαμένειν, τὰ δὲ πάλιν φθείρεσθαι· μάλιστα μὲν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἡσίοδον· εἶτα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οἱ πρῶτοι φυσιολογήσαντες· οἱ δὲ, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα γίνεσθαί τε φασὶ καὶ ῥεῖν, εἶναι δὲ παγίως οὐδέν· ἓν δέ τε μόνον ὑπομένειν, ἐξ οὗ ταῦτα πάντα μετασχηματίζεσθαι πέφυκεν· ὅπερ ἐοίκασι βούλεσθαι λέγειν ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ, καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφήσιος*, "There are some who affirm that nothing is unmade, but that all things are made or generated: and that of things generated, some remain uncorrupted, others are corrupted. So especially Hesiod, and after him the first physiologists. Others assert that all the rest of things are generated and flow, and none of them is firm and stable; but that one alone is permanent, out of which all the others are produced by transformations: which seems to be what Heraclitus, the Ephesian, as well as many others, meant to say." In this passage, it is evident that Aristotle speaks of two opinions of the ancients, on the generation and origin of all things, although he is not sufficiently clear in his distinction of them, or so apt in the choice of his terms, as became a philosopher whose object was the instruction of others. One he states to be the opinion of those who hold that all things are generated, and that of these some are permanent and others corrupted. It would have been difficult at this day to ascertain from his words the nature of this dogma, if he had not declared it by adducing the example of Hesiod. Now Hesiod, as is manifest from his Theogony, supposed that all things were generated from Chaos and Night, not excepting even the gods, but that the gods, though produced in the same way as all other things, are immortal, and never perish. It appears, therefore, that the first class here introduced by Aristotle, are those who formerly believed not only the principles and elements of things and everything compounded of them, but the whole race of the gods also, to be the offspring of Chaos, and nevertheless, invested the gods with immortality. Those who in time past entertained this most foolish and absurd opinion, or who entertain it at the present day (for the sect is not wholly extinct, but still lingers among the Japanese, Chinese, and other Eastern nations) however religious and pious they may wish to appear, are in reality Atheists, and utterly subvert the first principles of all true religion. The other class mentioned by Aristotle consists of those who imagine one stable, constant, and eternal nature, whose various modifications produce all the rest of things, which possess no stability, but perpetually flow, or are generated, changed and finally dissolved. Among these he reckons Heraclitus, the Ephesian. The nature of this doctrine is less difficult to understand. They suppose namely that the only substance in existence is matter, and that probably animate, and that all other things that are produced are nothing more than its various dispositions and modifications. On the whole, this theory does not appear to vary very materially from the one either invented or revived in the last century by Spinoza. But it differs from Hesiod's opinion in two respects. For in the first place, Hesiod supposes the elements of all things to have been intermixed formerly with each other, and afterwards at some finite time, and by some undefined process, disjoined and separated; but the others repudiate this chaos, and acknowledge only one simple and stable matter, which transformed itself into a thousand shapes from all eternity. Again, Hesiod considers that a portion of generated things are permanent, and return not again to their original elements; whereas, these assert all things to flow, and whatever is generated to be also doomed to corruption. But whether or not besides this one matter, from which they educed all things, they held the existence of a certain mind, controlling the motions of matter and presiding over the universe, is neither intimated here by Aristotle, nor is the present an opportunity for us to inquire. On Heraclitus' philosophy we have offered some remarks above, chap. 4. Having illustrated and explained this somewhat obscure passage of Aristotle, which I think will not be altogether an unprofitable labour, we shall have little difficulty in showing in what respects the learned Doctor has here displayed less than his usual sagacity. I. First of all, he is mistaken in confounding these two opinions, which Aristotle speaks of as distinct, with each other and supposing that the

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sense is afterwards more distinctly thus proposed by him: Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ ῥεῖν, εἶναι δὲ παγίως οὐδέν· ἓν δέ τι μόνον ὑπομένειν, ἐξ οὗ ταῦτα πάντα μετασχηματίζεσθαι πέφυκεν, "That all other things are generated and flow, and none of them firmly is, (they being perpetually educed out of nothing, and reduced to nothing) but that there is only one thing, which remaineth; namely, that out of which all the other are made, by the transformation thereof." Which one thing (to wit, matter) as the same Aristotle further adds, they affirmed to be the only substance, and from eternity unmade; but all other things whatsoever, being but πάθη καὶ ἕξεις καὶ διαθ οεις, "passions, affections, and dispositions" thereof, γίγνεσθαι κα. φθείρεσθαι ἀπειράκις, "to be generated and corrupted infinitely; that is, to be produced out of nothing, or non-existence, and reduced again to nothing without end. And doubtless this is the true meaning of that passage in Plato's tenth De Legibus,[5] not understood by the Latin interpreters;

latter words, which treat of a widely different doctrine, are a mere explication of the former. II. Aristotle ascribes neither opinion to Atheists. The former one, namely, that of Hesiod, is hostile to all true religion, as we have already acknowledged, although Aristotle does not by any means say so: and yet Dr. Cudworth himself defends Hesiod in other places, and supposes him to have delighted in the notion of a supreme Being. The other dogma, foul and deformed though it be, and connected with inferences highly injurious to God, is not of that wicked character that none but an Atheist and contemner of God can entertain it: nay, he himself contends in other places, that Heraclitus ought to be ranked among the less genuine Theists. To state my own candid opinion, Dr. Cudworth seems to have been unwilling to quote the entire passage of Aristotle, lest the names of Heraclitus and Hesiod, to whose reputation he is a well-wisher, should interfere with his present purpose. For he wishes to make it appear that Aristotle is recounting the opinions of Atheists in that passage. III. The remark which follows, that those who are stated to have acknowledged but one immutable nature, believed all the rest of things to be its πάθη, ἕξεις and διαθέσεις, "passions, affections," and "dispositions," and so on, is not borrowed from Aristotle, who has nothing of the kind in the part quoted, but added in explanation by himself. IV. If Aristotle were recording no other opinion than that of downright Atheists alone, still the passage would be of little or no importance as respects the design of our author, who is bent upon proving the doctrine of atheism to be wholly indefensible, except upon the admission that "something can come out of nothing." But this is by no means evident from the fact that they refer all things to matter. By the laws of consecutive reasoning indeed, such an inference may be deduced from it, and is clearly so deduced by the learned Doctor afterwards; but this passage, were it even such as he describes it, does not in the least facilitate this conclusion, which depends upon reason alone, and upon no authority, either of Aristotle or any one else. There is no one who holds the memory and character of this great man in higher estimation than myself, but where I find him betraying proofs of human infirmity, I should deem it an abandonment of my own duty to suffer others to be misled by them.

[5] P. 665. opp. But here again I have a few remarks to offer. It is certain that Plato is here treating of the opinion of Atheists and the enemies of all piety and religion: which is abundantly evident from his succeeding words. But, I. I cannot see the reason why this passage has been appealed to: for as far as I have the faculty of judging, it is not of the slightest use towards explaining the opinion of Atheists. Every body well knows, without requiring to be told so by Plato, that they all entertain the hypothesis here ascribed to them; nor, unless absolutely insane, can they possibly entertain any other. Whoever repudiates God, must necessarily come down to the opinion that nature, chance and art are the efficient causes of things; although they

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where being to represent the atheistic hypothesis of the system of the universe, he discovereth their grand arcanum, and that, which they accounted, *σοφώτατον ἁπάντων λόγων*, "the wisest and most mysterious of all doctrines," after this manner: *Λέγουσι ποῦ τινὲς ὡς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα γιγνόμενα καὶ γενόμενα, καὶ γενησόμενα· τὰ μὲν φύσει, τὰ δὲ τέχνῃ, τὰ δὲ διὰ τύχης*, "Certain men affirm, that all things are made, and have been made, and will be made; some by nature, and some by art, and some by fortune or chance." For unquestionably here, Plato's, *Λέγουσι ποῦ τινὲς ὡς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα γιγνόμενα*, "Certain men affirm, that all things are generated or made," &c. is the very same with Aristotle's, *Εἰσὶ γάρ τινες, οἳ φασιν, οὐδὲν ἀγέννητον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι*, "Certain men affirm, that there is nothing unmade, but that all things are made or generated." And perhaps this of Aristotle's was

are not obliged to adopt the same method of explaining it. II. What the learned Doctor means by saying, that the Latin interpreters of Plato have not understood this passage, I know not; certainly the words are so plain and intelligible, that no person even moderately versed in the Greek language can easily make a mistake in translating them. I cannot say how Serranus may have rendered it, as at present I have not his version at hand; but the interpretation of Ficinus very closely resembles his own: Res omnes, nonnulli aiunt, quæ fiunt, quæ futuræ, quæque factæ sunt, vel natura, vel fortuna, vel arte fieri, "Some say, that all things, which are made, and will be made, and have been made, are made either by nature, or by chance, or by art." III. That these words of Plato express the same sentiment as is contained in the passage adduced from Aristotle, would never have been stated by the learned Doctor, had he carefully inspected both at the time. Aristotle, as we have clearly shown before, is glancing at the opinion of Hesiod and the ancient physiologers, who foolishly imagined the whole nature of things, not even the gods excepted, to be the offspring of Chaos; whereas, according to the testimony of Plato himself, those who are represented as believing all things to have been generated by nature, chance and art, were far from entertaining this opinion. For they affirmed, that the four elements, fire, water, earth, air, exist by "nature and chance:" *Πῦρ, καὶ ὕδωρ, καὶ γῆν, καὶ ἀέρα, φύσει πάντα εἶναι, καὶ τύχῃ φασί*, ibid. p. 666. In associating *τύχη* and *φύσις*, and making these the causes of the four elements, which constitute all things, they seem to have meant, that *φύσει*, or by nature, there existed from all eternity a rude and undigested mass or chaos; and that it was brought to pass *τύχῃ*, or by chance, or it fortuitously happened, that things which before lay in confusion and disorder were separated, and each assigned its own fit and suitable place. Those who suppose that chaos formerly existed, and that God took no part in disposing it, cannot help entertaining this idea of the origin of the world. They ascribed the subsequent construction and fabrication of all other natural bodies, the sun, moon, men, animals, to *τύχη* or chance, and excluded God from the work altogether: *Οὕτω γεγενηκέναι τόν τε οὐρανὸν ὅλον καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα κατ' οὐρανὸν, καὶ ζῶα, καὶ φυτὰ ..... οὐ διὰ τέχνην, ἀλλὰ φύσει καὶ τύχῃ*, "That in this manner the entire heaven, and all things that are in it, as also animals and plants ..... were produced; not by art, but by nature and chance." Where, let it be observed, the word *οὐρανὸς* signifies the whole universe of things, a sense in which it is often used by Plato and Aristotle. What things they referred to art, is self-evident. So far there seems to be no great disparity between the doctrines of Hesiod and the Atheists reprehended by Plato; but as respects the gods they are manifestly different. For Hesiod believed in the existence of gods, produced like the rest of things from chaos, and lasting to infinity; whereas nothing of the kind was assented to by the Atheists of Plato, who asserted that all gods are introduced by art and laws, that is, they denied their existence altogether: *Θεοὺς, ὦ μακάριε, εἶναι πρῶτον φασὶν οὗτοι τέχνῃ, οὐ φύσει, ἀλλὰ τίσι νόμοις*, "They assert, my friend, that the gods exist not by nature, but only by art and certain laws."

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taken out of that of Plato's: which yet nevertheless is so to be understood, as it is afterwards explained by Aristotle; all things whatsoever, the bare substance of matter only excepted. Wherefore it is certain, that either there is no real entity in the whole world, besides the bare substance of matter; that is, besides divisible and separable extension, or resisting magnitude, and consequently that life and cogitation, sense and consciousness, reason and understanding, all our own minds, and personalities, are no real entities; or else that there are, according to the atheistic hypothesis, real entities produced out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again. Whereas Theists suppose all the greatest perfections in the universe, as life and understanding, to have been eternal and unmade in a perfect Being, the Deity, and neither brought out of nothing or non-existence, nor reducible to nothing; only imperfect beings to have been made out of nothing, or produced out of non-existence, by this one perfect Being or Deity: the Atheists, on the contrary, supposing the lowest and most imperfect of all beings, matter, bulk, or divisible and resisting extension, to be the only self-existent and unmade thing, conclude all the greatest perfections in the universe, life, cogitation and understanding, to be made out of nothing or non-existence, as also to be reduced to nothing again. Indeed the hylozoic Atheists, being sensible somewhat of this inconvenience of making all life and understanding out of nothing, and that there must of necessity be some fundamental life and perception, which is not accidental but substantial, and which was never generated, and cannot be corrupted, have therefore attributed a kind of life and perception to all matter, as such. Notwithstanding which, even these also, forasmuch as they deny to matter animal sense and consciousness, suppose all animal life or sense, and conscious understanding, to be generated and corrupted, produced out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again. Neither can life, cogitation, and understanding, be reckoned amongst the modes of matter, that is, of magnitude, or divisible and antitypous extension, since they may be conceived without the same; whereas modes cannot be conceived without their substance. Standing, sitting, and walking, cannot be conceived without a body, and that fitly organized too; and therefore are they nothing but different modes of such a body. When that human body, which before did stand, doth afterwards sit, or walk, no man can think, that here is the miraculous production of any new real entity out of nothing; nor when the same matter, which was square or cubical, is made spherical or cylindrical. But when there is life and understanding, which was not before, then is there unquestionably a new real entity produced. But the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists themselves, according to the tenor of the atomic physiology, acknowledge no other modes of matter or body, but only more

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or less magnitude of parts, figure, site, motion, or rest. And upon this very account do they explode qualities, considered as entities really distinct from these modes; because, in the generation and alteration of them, there would be real entities made out of nothing, or without a cause; whereupon they resolve these qualities into mechanism and fancy. But life, cogitation and understanding, are things which have more real entity in them, and can no way be solved by mechanism and fancy; wherefore undoubtedly they are no modes of matter or body, but attributes of another kind of substance incorporeal. All cogitative beings, especially human souls, and personalities, are unquestionably substantial things; and yet do the Atheists bring these, and consequently themselves out of nothing, or non-existence, and reduce them to nothing again. The conclusion is, that these very Atheists, who contend against Theists, that "Nothing can be made out of nothing," do themselves bring all things out of nothing or non-existence, and perpetually reduce them to nothing again; according to whose principles, as once there was no life nor understanding at all in the universe, so may there be none again. They who deny a God, because there can be no creative power belonging to any thing, do themselves notwithstanding attribute to matter (though a mere passive, sluggish, and inactive thing) a creative power of things substantial (as human souls and personalities) out of nothing. And thus is that formidable argument of the Atheists, that there can be no God, because nothing can be made out of nothing, not only proved to be false, but also retorted upon these Atheists themselves, they bringing all things besides senseless and unqualified matter out of nothing.

We have now declared, first, in what sense this proposition is unquestionably true, that nothing can be made out of nothing, or come from nothing, viz. causally, that nothing, which before was not, could afterward be made without a cause, and a sufficient cause. Or more particularly these three ways; first, that nothing, which before was not, could afterward be brought into being by itself, or without an efficient cause. Secondly, that nothing, which once was not, could be made or produced efficiently by any thing, which had not at least equal perfection in it, and a sufficient active or productive power; and consequently that no new substance can be made, but by a perfect Being, which only is substantially emanative. Thirdly and lastly, that when things are made out of pre-existing matter, as in artificial productions and natural generations, there can be no new real entity produced, but only different modifications of what before substantially was; the material cause, as such, efficiently producing nothing. And thus was this axiom understood by Cicero, that "Nothing could be made out of nothing," viz. causally, in

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his book De Fato,[6] where he reprehendeth Epicurus for endeavouring to avoid fate, and to establish liberty of will by that absurd figment of atoms declining uncertainly from the perpendicular. Nec cum hæc ita sint, est causa, cur Epicurus fatum extimescat, et ab atomis petat præsidium, easque de via deducat; et uno tempore suscipiat res duas inenodabiles, unam, ut sine causâ fiat aliquid, ex quo existit, ut de nihilo quippiam fiat; quod nec ipsi, nec cuiquam physico placet, "Nor is there for all that any reason, why Epicurus should be so much afraid of fate, and seek refuge in atoms, he supposing them, in their infinite descents, to decline uncertainly from the perpendicular, and laying this as a foundation for liberty of will; whereby he plunged himself at once into two inextricable difficulties, the first whereof was the supposing of something to be made without a cause, or, which is all one, out of nothing; a thing, that will neither be allowed by any physiologer, nor could Epicurus himself be pleased or satisfied therewith." The reason whereof is, because it was a fundamental principle of the atomic philosophy, that "Nothing (in this sense) could be made out of nothing." Moreover, we have in the next place declared, in what other sense this proposition, that "Nothing can be made out of nothing," is false, namely, when this "out of nothing" is not taken causally, but so as to signify the terminus from which; that nothing can be made out of an antecedent non-existence: that no real entity or substance, which before was not, could by any power whatsoever be afterwards brought into being: or, that nothing can possibly be made, but out of something pre-existing, by the new modification thereof. And it appears from that of Cicero, that the true and genuine sense of this proposition, De nihilo nihil fit (according to the mind of those ancient physiologers, who laid so great stress thereupon), was not, that nothing could by any power whatsoever be brought out of non-existence into being; but only, that "nothing could be made without a cause." Nor did they here by "cause" mean the material only, in this sense, as if nothing could possibly be made, but out of pre-existing matter; Epicurus being taxed by Cicero for introducing that his third motion of atoms, or clinamen principiorum,[7] out of nothing, or without an efficient cause; as indeed all motion also was, to those atomic Atheists, in this sense, from nothing.[8] Neverthe-

[6] Cap. 9. 3273. tom. 9. opp.

[7] Vid. Lucret. De Rerum Natura, lib. 2. vers. 292. p. 216.

[8] If I am not much mistaken, Dr. Cudworth deduces more from this passage than the legitimate rules of consecution will permit. For he supposes it to prove, I. That according to the ancient physiologers, the proposition, "Nothing out of nothing," meant only, that "nothing is made without a cause." But though it is plain enough from these words, that they did sometimes attach such a sense to it, still it is not equally clear that they never understood it in any other. II. It is apparent, he thinks, from the same passage, that by the word *cause* they did not always mean matter only;

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less, we have also showed, that if this proposition, "Nothing out of nothing," in that atheistic sense (as levelled against a Deity) were true; yet would it of the two more impugn atheism itself, than it does theism; the Atheists generating and corrupting all things, the substance of matter only excepted, all life, sense and understanding, human souls, minds and personalities, they producing these, and consequently themselves, out of nothing, and resolving them all to nothing again. We shall now, in the third and last place, make it manifest, that the Atheists do not only bring real entities, and substantial things, out of nothing in the second sense, that is, out of an antecedent non-existence (which yet is a thing possible only to God, or a perfect Being), but also that they bring them out of nothing in the absolutely impossible sense; that is, suppose them to be made without a cause, or "nothing to be the cause of something."

But we must prepare the way hereunto, by setting down, first, a brief and compendious sum of the whole atheistic hypothesis. The Atheists therefore, who contend, that nothing can be made, but only new accidents, or modifications of pre-existing substance; taking it for granted, that there is no other substance besides body or matter, do conclude accordingly, that nothing can be made, but out of pre-existing matter or body. And then they add hereunto, that matter being the only substance, the only unmade self-existent thing, whatsoever else is in the world, besides the bare substance of this matter, was made out of it, or produced by it. So that there are these three things contained in the atheistic hypothesis; First, that no substance can be made or caused by any thing else, but only new modifications. Secondly, that matter or body is the only substance; and therefore whatsoever is made, is made out of pre-existing matter. Thirdly and lastly, that whatsover there is else in the whole world, besides the substance of matter, it is made or generated out of matter. And now we shall demonstrate the absolute impossibility of this atheistic hypothesis, from that very principle of the ancient physiologers, that "nothing can be made out of nothing," in the true sense thereof; it not only bringing real entities, and substantial things, out of an antecedent non-existence (though nothing but an infinitely perfect Being neither can thus create), but also producing them without a cause.

since Cicero finds fault with Epicurus for having introduced a third kind of motion produced without any cause. But I am utterly unable to perceive the force of this reasoning: Cicero reprehends Epicurus, because, while acknowledging the truth of the axiom, "From nothing comes nothing," he at the same time feigned a sort of motion without a cause; and consequently offended against his own precepts, or educed something out of nothing: therefore the ancient physiologers believed in another cause of things besides matter. For Cicero does not say what kind of cause Epicurus ought to assign of this motion in accordance with their system, but simply complains that he has assigned no cause of it at all.

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First, therefore, when they affirm matter to be the only substance, and all things else whatsoever to be made out of that alone, they hereby plainly suppose all things to be made without an efficient cause, which is to bring them out of nothing, in an impossible sense. For though it be not true, that nothing can be made, but out of pre-existing matter (and consequently that God himself, supposed to exist, could in this respect do no more than a carpenter or tailor doth); I say, though it be not universally true, that every thing, that is made, must have a material cause (so that the quaternio of causes in logic is not to be extended to all things caused whatsoever), yet is it certain, that nothing, which once was not, could possibly be made without an efficient cause. Wherefore, if there be any thing made, which was not before, there must of necessity, besides matter, be some other substance existing, as the efficient cause thereof; forasmuch as matter alone could not make any thing; as marble cannot make a statue, nor timber and stones a house, nor cloth a garment. This is our first demonstration of the impossibility of the atheistic hypothesis; it supposing all things, besides the bare substance of matter, to be made out of matter alone, without any other active principle or deity, or to be made without an efficient cause; which is to bring them from nothing in an impossible sense. To which may be added, by way of appendix, that whereas the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists admit of no other efficient causality in nature, than only local motion, and allow to matter or body, their only substance, no self-moving power, they hereby make all the motion that is in the whole world, to be without a cause and from nothing, action without any subject or agent, and the efficiency of all things without an efficient.

In the next place, should we be so liberal, as to grant to the atomic Atheists motion without a cause, or permit Strato and the hylozoic Atheists to attribute to matter a self-moving power; yet do we affirm, that this matter and motion both together could not possibly produce any new real entity, which was not before; matter, as such, efficiently causing nothing, and motion only changing the modifications of matter, as figure, place, site, and disposition of parts. Wherefore, if matter, as such, have no animal sense and conscious understanding, essentially belonging to it (which no Atheists as yet have had the impudence to assert); then can no motion or modification of matter, no contexture of atoms, possibly beget sense and understanding, soul and mind; because this would be to bring something out of nothing, in the impossible sense, or to suppose something to be made by itself without a cause. Which may serve also for a confutation of those imperfect and spurious Theists, who will not allow to God Almighty (whether supposed by them to be

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corporeal or incorporeal) a power of making any thing, but only out of pre-existent matter, by the new modifying thereof; as a carpenter makes a house out of pre-existing timber and stone, and a tailor a garment out of pre-existing cloth. For since animal life and understanding are not by them supposed to belong at all to matter, as such; and since they cannot result from any modifications, or contextures thereof, it would plainly follow from hence, that God could not possibly make animals, or produce sense and understanding, souls and minds, which nevertheless these Theists suppose him to have done; and therefore ought in reason to acknowledge him, not only to be the maker of new modifications of matter (and one, who built the world only as a carpenter doth a house) but also of real entities distinct from the same.[9]

And this was the very doctrine (as we have already declared) of the most ancient atomic physiologers: not that "every thing whatsoever might be made out of pre-existing matter;" but, on

[9] Great as is the force of this reasoning against those who hold the Deity to be incapable of producing any thing without matter, and on that account imagine two principles of things, God and eternal matter; still, if I am not mistaken, it will not effectually silence the whole race. I fear they will yet find some outlet for escape, and require to be met by an entirely new line of argument. They will assert, perhaps, that animal life consists in the motion of the blood and of the most subtle particles of matter; and will refer the origin of souls to a different source. Some of them will maintain, perhaps, that they are formed by God out of a certain celestial and ethereal matter, or out of the most subtle and attenuated particles: nor will they be at any loss for supporters of this opinion, either among ancient or modern philosophers. Indeed, it has long ago appeared very doubtful to me, whether any ancient philosopher ever entertained the same idea of souls as we do at the present day, and entirely divested them of all matter. If this opinion should be met by the learned Doctor's observation, that thought and understanding cannot result from any modification and contexture of matter; they will grant this to be true of that grosser matter we are acquainted with, but will insist that there is nothing to prevent the existence of other matter, endowed with far different affections and properties. Should any one proceed further, and remind them that this opinion goes to overthrow the immortality of souls, since whatever consists of matter can also be dissolved and perish, not even then will they acknowledge themselves vanquished. They will probably espouse the opinion of the ancient philosophers, who supposed two kinds of matter; one of a grosser nature and dissolvable from various causes; the other more subtle, and capable of being destroyed by divine power alone. Some, perhaps, will argue, that the immortality of souls depends not upon their own nature but upon the divine will; for that God is able to prevent the dissolution and annihilation of that which is otherwise destructible; an opinion well known to be held at this day by not a few even of those who are neither deficient in intellectual acumen, nor ill-affected towards God and religion. Others possibly will attempt to evade the argument by saying that souls are effluxions from the divine nature itself, and certain portions as it were of the supreme Being, having nothing in common with matter. In throwing out these suggestions, I have not the slightest intention of giving any support to the cause of those who contend for the eternity of matter; foreign as this would be to my duty, and altogether inconsistent with the sentiments of my own mind; since I shall hereafter prove these persons to be deaf to the voice both of reason and divine revelation. My object has been simply to show, that this argument is not of itself sufficient to put down the whole sect, so as to leave them without the means of further opposition. It is, I consider, much to the interests of Christianity, that its defenders should display no less caution than firmness in the contest, and should not make use of arguments, against which certain exceptions may be taken, as though they were in all respects sound and unobjectionable.

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the contrary, that in all natural generations there is no real entity produced out of the matter, which was not before in it, but only new modifications; and consequently, that souls and minds, being not mere modifications of matter, in respect of magnitude, figure, site, and motion, could never be produced out of it, because they must then of necessity come from nothing; that is, be made either by themselves without a cause, or without a sufficient cause. It hath also been before noted out of Aristotle, how the old atheistic materialists, being assaulted by those Italic philosophers after that manner, that nothing, which was not before in matter, besides its modifications, could possibly be produced out of it, because nothing can come out of nothing, and consequently, that in all natural generations and corruptions, there is no real entity made or destroyed; endeavoured, without denying the words of that proposition, to evade after this manner: Διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε γίνεσθαι οὐδὲν οἴονται, οὔτε ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὡς τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως ἀεὶ σωζομένης, ὥσπερ δὲ τὸν Σωκράτην, &c. That there is indeed nothing generated or corrupted (in some sense), forasmuch as the same substance of matter always remains, it being never made or destroyed. For, as men do not say that Socrates is made, when he is made musical or handsome; nor destroyed, when he loseth these dispositions, because the subject Socrates was before, and still remaineth; so neither is any substantial thing, or real entity in the world, made or destroyed in this sense; because matter, which is the substance of all, perpetually remains;" and all other things whatsoever are but πάθη καὶ ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις, "passions and affections, and dispositions thereof," as musicalness and unmusicalness, in respect of Socrates. Which is all one, as if they should say, that all things whatsoever, besides matter, being but accidents thereof, are generated out of it, and corruptible into it, without the production of any real entity out of nothing, or the deduction of any into nothing, so long as the substance of matter, which is the only real entity, remains always the same. Wherefore, though life, sense, and understanding, all souls and minds, be generated out of matter; yet does it not follow from thence that therefore there is any real entity made or produced, because these are nothing but accidents, and modifications of matter. This was the subterfuge of the old hylopathian Atheists.[10]

[10] The passage here quoted is from Aristotle, Metaphys. lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 264. tom. 4. opp. where he is expounding the opinion of the ancient physiologers, or those usually called Italic philosophers, on the causes of things. But I doubt whether all that Dr. Cudworth considers to be evident from this passage can fairly be inferred from it. I. What he states respecting the contention between the Italic and Ionic philosophers rests solely upon conjecture and the prodigious fertility of his own mind; for it is nowhere recorded that any thing of the kind took place. But being satisfied that the ancient Italic philosophers entertained the same opinion as himself on indivisible corpuscules and the nature of things, and that the Ionics were hostile to God, he easily

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Now it is true, indeed, that whatsoever is in the universe, is either substance, or accidents; and that the accidents of any substance may be generated and corrupted, without the producing of any real entity out of nothing, and reducing of any into nothing; forasmuch as the substance still remains entirely the same. But the Atheists taking it for granted that there is no other substance besides body or matter, do therefore falsely suppose that, which is really incorporeal substance, or else the attributes, properties, and modes thereof, to be the mere accidents of matter, and consequently conclude these to be generable out of it, without the production of any real entity out of nothing. We say therefore, that it does not at all follow, because the same numerical matter (as for example, a piece of wax) may be successively made spherical, cubical, cylindrical, pyramidal, or of any other figure; and the same man may successively stand, sit, kneel, and walk; both without the production of any thing out of nothing; or because a heap of stones, bricks, mortar, and timber lying all together disorderly and confusedly, may be made into a stately palace, and that without the miraculous creation of any real entity out of nothing; that therefore the same may be affirmed likewise of every thing else, besides the bare substance of matter, as namely, life and understanding, soul and mind, that though there be no such thing in matter itself, yet the production of them out of matter would be no production of something out of nothing. One ground of which mistake hath been from men's not rightly considering what the accidents of a substance are, and that they are indeed nothing but the modes thereof. Now, a mode is such a thing as cannot possibly be conceived without that whereof it is a mode; as standing, sitting, kneeling, and walking, cannot be conceived without a body organized, and therefore are but modes thereof; but life and cogitation may be clearly apprehended without body, or any

arrived at the conclusion that they had had frequent skirmishes with each other, and that the Italics assaulted their foes with no other weapons than those with which Atheists were to be assailed by himself. II. It has not yet been placed beyond all controversy, that the Italic philosophers referred the nature of things to atoms, and as the learned Doctor supposes, separated their metaphysics, or theology, from this physical science: neither is it certain that those Ionics were Atheists: on which subject we have commented at some length above on chap. 3. Hence all that is here said about the disputes of these sects appears to be exceedingly doubtful and uncertain. III. He discovers more in the passage itself than I have been able to detect in it: for he supposes it to prove that the Ionics, or ancient physiologers, held all souls to be generated from matter, and to be nothing more than its accidents and modifications; which I do not find expressly stated by Aristotle. Those who defend the Ionics, and seek to rescue their memory from the charge of atheism, of whom there is no inconsiderable number among the learned of the present day, will maintain that the whole passage is to be understood of the generation and corruption of bodies: nor do I see any thing that should compel them to alter their opinion. At all events, as we have shown above on chap. 3. there is not so much truth as many imagine in the opinion, that the Ionics generally are accused by Aristotle of the grossest impiety towards God.

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thing of extension: nor indeed can a thought be conceived to be of such a length, breadth, and thickness, or to be hewed and sliced out into many pieces, all which laid together, as so many small chips thereof, would make up again the entireness of that whole thought. From whence it ought to be concluded, that cogitation is no accident, or mode of matter, or bulky extension, but a mode or attribute of another substance, really distinct from matter, or incorporeal. There is indeed nothing else clearly conceivable by us in body or bulky extension, but only more or less magnitude of parts, figures, site, motion, or rest; and all the different bodies, that are in the whole world, are but several combinations or syllables, made up out of these few letters: but no magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, can possibly spell or compound life and sense, cogitation and understanding, as the syllables thereof; and therefore to suppose these to be generated out of matter, is plainly to suppose some real entity to be brought out of nothing, or something to be made without a cause; which is impossible.

But that which hath principally confirmed men in this error, is the business of sensible qualities and forms, as they are vulgarly conceived to be distinct entities, from those forementioned modifications of matter, in respect of magnitude of parts, figure, site, motion, or rest. For since these qualities and forms are unquestionably generated and corrupted, there seems to be no reason why the same might not be as well acknowledged of life, sense, cogitation, and understanding, that these are but qualities or accidents of matter also (though of another kind), and consequently may be generated out of it, without the making of any real thing out of nothing. But the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists themselves have, from the principles of the atomic philosophy, sufficiently confuted and rectified this mistake concerning sensible qualities; they exploding and banishing them all, as conceived to be entities really distinct from the forementioned modifications of matter, and that for this very reason, because the generation of them would, upon this supposition, be the production of something out of nothing, or without a cause; and concluding them therefore to be really nothing else but mechanism, or different modifications of matter, in respect of the magnitude of parts, figure, site, and motion, or rest; they only causing different fancies and apparitions in us. And in very truth, this vulgar opinion of real qualities of bodies seems to have no other original at all than men's mistaking their own fancies, passions, and affections, for things really existing in the objects without them. For as sensible qualities are conceived to be things distinct from the forementioned modifications of matter, so are they really nothing but our own fancies, passions, and affections; and consequently no accidents or

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modifications of matter, but accidents and modifications of our own souls, which are substances incorporeal. Now if these Democritic and Epicurean Atheists themselves concluded that real qualities, considered as distinct from the modifications of matter, could not possibly be generated out of it, because this would be the production of something out of nothing; they ought certainly much more to have acknowledged the same concerning life and cogitation, sense and understanding, that the generation of these out of senseless matter would be an impossible production of something out of nothing; and consequently, that these are therefore no corporeal things, but the attributes, properties, or modes of substance incorporeal; since they can no way be resolved into mechanism and fancy, or the modifications of matter, as the vulgar sensible qualities may, and ought to be. For though the Democritics and Epicureans did indeed suppose all human cogitations to be caused or produced by the incursion of corporeal atoms upon the thinker; yet did never any of them arrive to such a degree, either of sottishness or impudence, as a modern writer[1] hath done, to maintain that cogitation, intellection, and volition, are themselves really nothing else but local motion or mechanism, in the inward parts of the brain and heart; or that mens nihil aliud præterquam motus in partibus quibusdam corporis organici, "that mind itself is nothing but motion in some parts of the organized body;" who therefore, as if Cartesius had not been sufficiently paradoxical in making brute animals (though supposed by him to be devoid of all cogitation) nothing but mere machines, and not contented herewith, hath advanced much further, in making this prodigious conclusion, that all cogitative beings, and men themselves, are really nothing else but machines and automata; whereas he might as well have affirmed heaven to be earth, colour to be sound, number to be figure, or any thing else in the world to be any thing, as cogitation and local motion to be the very self-same thing. Nevertheless, so strong was the atheistic intoxication in those old Democritics and Epicureans, that though denying real qualities of bodies, for this very reason, because "Nothing could be produced out of nothing," they notwithstanding contradicting themselves, would make sense, life, and understanding, to be qualities of matter, and therefore generable out of it; and so unquestionably produced real entities out of nothing, or without a cause.

Moreover, it is observable, that Epicurus having a mind to

[1] Thom. Hobbes: see his Physica seu Naturæ Phænomena. cap. 25. which is De Sensione et Motu Animali, p. 192. &c. and Leviathan, par. 1. cap. 1. and 2. p. 4. where however I have been unable to find this definition of mind, although the thing itself is expressly declared by him both there and elsewhere.

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assert contingent liberty in men, in way of opposition to that necessity of all human actions, which had been before maintained by Democritus and his followers, plainly acknowledges that he could not possibly do this, according to the grounds of his own philosophy, without supposing something of contingency in the first principles, that is, in the motion of those atoms, out of which men and other animals are made:*

Si semper motus connectitur omnis,
Et vetere exoritur semper novus ordine certo,
Nec declinando faciunt primordia motus
Principium quoddam, quod fati fœdera rumpat,
Ex infinito ne causam causa sequatur;
Libera per terras unde hæc animantibus extat,
Unde est hæc, inquam, fatis avolsa voluntas?

The reason for which is afterwards thus expressed by him, Quoniam de nihilo nil fit, "Because nothing can be made out of nothing." Upon which account he therefore ridiculously feigned, besides his two other motions of atoms from pondus and plagæ, "weight" and "strokes," a third motion of them, which he calls clinamen principiorum, a "contingent" and "uncertain declination," every way from the perpendicular; out of design to solve this phenomenon of free-will in men, without bringing something out of nothing, according as he thus subjoineth:

Quare in seminibus quoque idem fateare necesse est,
Esse aliam præter plagas et pondera causam
Motibus, unde hæc est nobis innata potestas;
De NIHILO quoniam FIERI NIL posse videmus.
Pondus enim prohibet, ne plagis omnia fiant
Externa quasi vi. Sed ne mens ipsa necessum
Intestinum habeat cunctis in rebus agendis,
Et devicta quasi cogatur ferre patique,
Id facit exiguum CLINAMEN PRINCIPIORUM,
Nec ratione loci certa, nec tempore certo.[2]

Now if Epicurus himself conceived, that liberty of will could not possibly be generated in men out of matter or atoms, they having no such thing at all in them (that is, no contingent uncertainty in their motion), without bringing of "something out of nothing;" which was contrary to the fundamental principles of the atomic philosophy (though this were intolerably absurd in him, thus to suppose contingency, and a kind of free-will in the motions of senseless atoms, so that indeed he brought his liberty of will out of nothing[3]), certainly sense and under-

* Lib. 2. p. 134. Lamb. [Ver. 251.]
[2] Lib. 2. ver. 283. p. 315.
[3] The whole of this doctrine of Epicurus on a third motion of atoms, or as Lucretius has it, on a "declination or principles," is childish and trifling, and therefore not undeservedly ridiculed by Cicero and other ancient writers. The assertion however of

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standing, soul and mind in animals and men, could not possibly be generated out of atoms or matter, devoid of all sense and understanding; for the very same reason, "Quoniam de nihilo

Cicero, De Fato, cap. 10. p. 3275. and cap. 20. p. 3288. tom. 9. opp. and De Finibus Bonor. et Malor. lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 2347. tom. 8. opp. and of many others besides Dr. Cudworth after him, that this philosopher had the gross folly to suppose that this declination of atoms is produced *without a cause*, and consequently that free-will in men can arise out of nothing, or at least pointed out no cause of this declination, seems to me to be somewhat too free and unqualified. He has assigned causes, although not such as can be admitted by any sensible man. I will explain this point of his discipline, as neither Cicero, who in other respects makes it the subject of severe invective against him, nor Gassendi, nor any one else, that I am aware of, has cared to give it much attention. And this diligence on my part will, I hope, be in some slight degree instrumental in repressing the ardour of those persons, who even at this day, never cease to extol the consistency and wisdom of the Epicurean philosophy. It appears from Lucretius that he supposed a twofold declination of atoms, one in void and empty space, and external to the bodies of animals, the other in these bodies themselves. The former he introduced for the purpose of more easily demonstrating in what manner the world and its parts could be constructed out of atoms without any efficient cause; the latter, that he might not be compelled to adopt the fate of Democritus, to which according to the testimony of Laërtius, lib. 10. segm. 134. p. 659. he was vehemently opposed. He did not attribute both kinds of declination to the same cause, but assigned a proper and peculiar one to each. The atoms external to animal bodies were supposed by him to decline by a force of their own, or frequently to be carried from the perpendicular into an oblique direction by their own weight. This is testified by Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, lib. 2. ver. 216. &c.

> Illud in his quoque te rebus cognoscere avemus.
> Corpora quom deorsum rectum per inane feruntur,
> *Ponderibus propriis* incerto tempore ferme,
> Incertisque locis spatio se pellere paullum:
> Tantum quod nomen mutatum dicere possis.

After which the poet explains the reason that induced Epicurus to adopt this opinion:

> Quod nisi declinare solerent, omnia deorsum,
> Imbris uti guttæ, caderent per inane profundum:
> ——————Ita nil unquam natura creasset.

Add what he says lower down, ver. 288. on the same subject:

> *Pondus* enim prohibet, ne plagis omnia fiant.

I consider Epicurus to have meant, therefore, that certain atoms larger than the others (for he did not suppose all atoms to be of the same magnitude), are sometimes compelled by their own weight, although at random and fortuitously, to deviate from the straight course, and to be carried not in a perpendicular direction into a lower place. That he did not attribute this declination to all corpuscules, but only to some of the larger of them, is obvious, if I mistake not, from the very nature of the thing itself. For if he had asserted this of all atoms, he would have defeated his own purpose, and would have been unable to explain by means of this third motion the generation of so vast a variety of things. Cicero, indeed, De Finibus Bonor. et Malor. lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 2347. doubts whether he ascribed it to all or only to some: "Nam si omnes atomi declinabunt, nullæ unquam cohærescent: sive aliæ declinabunt, aliæ nutu suo recte ferentur; primum exit hoc quasi provincias atomis dare, quæ recte, quæ oblique ferantur; deinde eadem illa atomorum turbulenta concursio hunc mundi ornatum efficere non poterit," For if all atoms decline, none will ever cohere; and if some decline and others are carried straight along by their own impulse, this in the first place will be to assign to atoms their provinces or departments, as it were, which are to be carried in a

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nil fit, "Because nothing can be made out of nothing." For unquestionably, were all life and understanding, all souls and minds generated out of dead and senseless matter; and

straight and which in an oblique course; secondly, that disorderly concourse of atoms will not be able to produce this beauty and harmony of the world." But the great man doubts without any occasion: for if he had considered the reason why Epicurus invented this devious and erratic commotion of atoms, he would have perceived it to be quite impossible that he could have asserted the declination of all atoms whatever. For Epicurus was not such a fool as not to know what accorded and harmonized with his own principles. We are nowhere informed, however, of the manner in which Epicurus explained this dogma of the declination of atoms being caused by their own gravity: although it is most likely he did so, as he boasted of his being able to assign causes for all things. If conjectures are at all admissible in so very doubtful a matter, I should suppose him to have laid down this law of motion: "It can sometimes happen that bodies larger, and therefore heavier than others, if pressed and urged by many lighter ones, are compelled by their own weight to depart out of their course and proceed in an oblique direction, while the others of less weight descend in a straight line." Perhaps also he attributed some share in this business to the figures of the atoms. Wherefore whoever wished to refute this declination ought to have opposed him with no other weapons than those of natural philosophy and geometry, and to have demolished his insane theory by a reference to the true and universally recognized laws of motion. The manner in which this may be done I leave to geometricians and physiologers: for myself it is sufficient to have shown that Epicurus assigned a cause for the external declination of atoms, namely the greater gravity of the atoms themselves.

The interior declination, however, which takes place in the human body, and gives rise to liberty of will, he ascribed to a far different cause, and inculcated that the soul of man, or the mind and will residing in his breast, cause the atoms to deviate from the straight line, and to enter upon whatever course he himself pleases. But it is right to prove this to have been his opinion.

Thus, then, writes Lucretius, the most able expositor of his entire discipline, De Rerum Natura, ver. 259. &c.

> Declinamus item motus, nec tempore certo
> Nec regione loci certa, sed *ubi ipsa tulit mens:*
> Num dubio procul his rebus *sua quoique voluntas*
> *Principium dat;* et hinc motus per membra rigantur.

Having illustrated this by the example of horses issuing forth from the goal, the poet thus proceeds, ver. 269.

> Ut videas initium motus (obliqui) *a corde oreari*
> *Ex animique voluntate* id procedere primum,
> Inde dari porro per totum corpus et artus.

Shortly afterwards he pursues the subject in these verses:

> Jamne vides igitur, quamquam vis extera multis
> Pellit, et invitis cogit procedere sæpe,
> Præcipitesque rapit, tamen *esse in pectore nostro*
> *Quiddam*, quod contra pugnare, obstareque possit,
> *Quojus ad arbitrium* quoque copia materiai
> Cogitur interdum flecti per membra, per artus
> Et projecta refrænatur, retroque residit?

These verses put it beyond all doubt, that Epicurus traced the oblique motion of atoms in man to the will, soul, heart, and mind residing in his breast, as its principal and efficient cause. But here most certainly, if any where, this philosophy is weak and silly; in short any thing but philosophy, which ought to be based upon clear and satisfactory principles. The soul, says Epicurus, and will of man is the cause why the

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were there no substantial or essential life and understanding in the whole universe; then must it of necessity be all made out of nothing, or without a cause, and consequently real entities and

atoms abandon their natural downward motion, and are carried along in an oblique course. This, as far as the words are concerned, has a smack of philosophy, and appears to have some semblance of reason in it; but if the meaning attached to the words be examined, it is more worthy of an old woman than a philosopher. What is the soul according to Epicurus' theory? It is a coagmentation of round and very light corpuscules scattered through the whole body, of which the part partaking of reason resides in the breast. Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 10. segm. 63. p. 629. Ἡ ψυχὴ σῶμά ἐστι λεπτομερὲς, παρ' ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα παρεσπαρμένον, "The soul is a body consisting of subtle parts, dispersed through the whole mass." A little afterwards, segm. 66. p. 630. he speaks more clearly: Λέγει (Ἐπίκουρος) ψυχὴν ἐξ ἀτόμων συγκεῖσθαι λειοτάτων καὶ στρογγυλωτάτων . . . καὶ τὸ μέντοι αὐτῆς ἄλογον εἶναι, ὃ τῷ λοιπῷ παρεσπάρη σώματι, τὸ δὲ λογικὸν, ὃ ἐν τῷ θώρακι, "Epicurus says that the soul is compounded of the lightest and roundest atoms . . . and that the irrational part of it is dispersed throughout the rest of the body, but the rational is seated in the breast." Add Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, lib. 3. ver. 205. &c. It appears that, like many more things, this opinion on the nature of the soul was borrowed by him from Democritus, who is stated by Cicero among others, Disput. Tusculan. lib. 1. cap. 11. p. 2575. and cap. 18. p. 2589. tom. 8. opp. animum levibus et rotundis corpusculis effecisse concursu quodam fortuito, "to have formed the soul out of light and round atoms by a certain fortuitous concourse." Hence we can clearly understand the meaning of this magnificent verbiage of Epicurus, which amounts to this: a certain concretion of very light, round, and fiery atoms, seated in the human breast, oftentimes presses upon heavier atoms, which are descending perpendicularly by their own impulse, so that they deflect from the straight line, and are carried in a different direction. Most admirable truly! Let us grant it to be possible, first of all, for this impulse and fiery force of atoms, of their own nature most light and swift, to compel other corpuscules to change their course. But what is it, I ask, that impels and incites this most subtle mass of atoms to rush headlong against other atoms, and drive them from their position and motion? Is it some external power and cause, or an internal one? If an external power impels them, we are thrown back upon fate, which Epicurus so greatly abhors, and endeavours to elude by this very figment of the declination of atoms. For unquestionably a motion produced by an external power is necessary; and this external cause will be again connected with other antecedent causes, which entirely put an end to all freedom of will. Cicero has already observed, De Fato, cap. 20. p. 3288. that the doctrine of fate is confirmed rather than overthrown by Epicurus: Nec vero, says he, quisquam magis confirmare mihi videtur non modo fatum, verum etiam necessitatem et vim omnium rerum, sustulisseque motos animi voluntarios, quam hic, qui aliter obsistere fato fatetur se non potuisse, nisi ad has commentitias declinationes confugisset, "No one appears to me to confirm not only fate, but also the necessity and force of all things, and to have done away with all voluntary motions of the mind, more than this man, who confesses that he would otherwise have been unable to withstand the doctrine of fate, unless he had had recourse to these imaginary declinations." Although Cicero, I confess, does not fortify his accusation with those arguments which Epicurus, had he been living at the time, would have found unanswerable; on which subject it would be foreign to my purpose to offer any comment at present. But our philosopher repudiates any such external power or cause, and supposes the light and round atoms to be excited by their own internal power, or *will*, to impinge against the other heavier corpuscules. Let him explain to us, therefore, if he can, what is this internal and inherent power. That light round bodies can decide and determine, that it is their own wish to rush against other atoms, and impede their direct progress, and can execute this purpose, is an enigma inexplicable even to Œdipus, or rather it is a statement utterly destitute of sense or meaning. And what, after all, moves them to decide and determine? An external or internal power? Epicurus will tell us that this will of the atoms is natural, this decision natural, in short, that the motion arising therefrom is natural. For argument's sake, for we have no wish to enter into a long disputation upon so absurd a theory, let us grant it to be natural; but even so it will be fatal. For that which takes place

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substantial things be made out of nothing, which is absolutely impossible. For though we do not say, that life and cogitation, sense and understanding, abstractly considered, are substances; yet do we affirm them to be entities really distinct from matter, and no modifications or accidents thereof, but either accidents and modifications, or rather essential attributes of substance incorporeal; as also that souls and minds, which are the subjects of them, are indeed substantial things. Wherefore, we cannot but here again condemn the darkness of that philosophy, which educes not only species visible and audible (entities perfectly unintelligible) and real qualities, distinct from all the modes of body, and even substantial forms too (as they call them), but also sensitive souls themselves, both in men and brutes, ex potentia materiæ, "out of the power of the matter;" that is, indeed out of nothing. Forasmuch as this prepares a direct way to atheism; because, if life and sense, cogitation and consciousness, may be generated out of dead and senseless matter, then might this well be supposed the first original of all things; nor could there reasonably be any stop made at rational souls, especially by these men, who also conclude them to be rasæ tabulæ, "mere white sheets of paper," that have nothing at all in them, but what is scribbled upon them by corporeal objects from without; there being nothing in the understanding or mind of man, which was not before in sense: so that sense is the first original knowledge, and understanding but a secondary and derivative thing from it, more umbratile and evanid.

Hitherto have we demonstrated that all things whatsoever could not possibly be made out of matter, and particularly that life and sense, mind and understanding, being no accidents or modes of matter, could not by motion be generated out of it, without the production of real entities out of nothing. But because some may possibly imagine, that matter might otherwise than thus by motion, by a miraculous efficiency, produce souls and minds, we shall add in the last place, that nothing can efficiently produce any real entity or substantial thing, that was not before, unless it have at least equal perfection to it, and a substantially emanative or creative power. But scarcely any man can be so sottish as to imagine, that every atom of dust hath equal perfection in it to that of the rational soul in man, or

naturally takes place necessarily. But if the lighter atoms, by the necessity of nature, impinge against the heavier, and stop or change their course, there will be an end of all liberty of will, and not only this impulse of the will which causes the atoms to decline, but this very declination itself also, will take place by the necessity of nature. On the whole, therefore, let us conclude, that although Epicurus mentions a certain cause of each declination of atoms, he properly speaking mentions none, and therefore that Cicero, who is followed by Dr. Cudworth and others, was in a certain sense right, when he asserted that this philosopher supposed this third notion of atoms to be without any cause at all.

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to attribute a creative power to all matter (which is but a passive thing) whilst this is in the mean time denied by him to a perfect Being; both these assertions also, in like manner as the former, producing real entities out of nothing causally. And thus have we demonstrated the impossibility and nonsense of all atheism, from this very principle, by which the Atheists would assault theism, in the true sense thereof, that "Nothing can be made without a cause," or that "Nothing cannot be the cause of any thing."

Now if there be no middle betwixt atheism and theism, and all things must of necessity either spring from senseless matter, or else from a perfect understanding Being; then is this demonstration of the impossibility of atheism a sufficient establishment of the truth of theism; it being such a demonstration of a God, as the geometricians call a deduction ad impossibile, which they allow of for good, and frequently make use of. Thus, either there is a God; or else matter must needs be acknowledged to be the only self-existent thing, and all things else whatsoever, to be made out of it; but it is impossible, that all things should be made out of senseless matter: therefore is there a God. Nevertheless, we shall here, for further satisfaction, show how the existence of a God may be directly demonstrated also from this very principle, which the Atheists endeavour to take sanctuary in, and from thence to impugn theism, De nihilo nihil, that "Nothing can be made out of nothing causally," or that "Nothing cannot be the cause of any thing."

In the first place therefore, we shall fetch our beginning from what hath been already often declared, that it is mathematically certain, that "Something or other did exist of itself from all eternity, or without beginning, and unmade by any thing else." The certainty of which proposition dependeth upon this very principle, as its foundation, that "Nothing can come from nothing," or be "made out of nothing," or that "Nothing, which once was not, can of itself come into being without a cause;" it following unavoidably from thence, that if there had been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. And having thus laid the foundation, we shall in the next place make this further superstructure, that because something did certainly exist of itself from eternity unmade, therefore is there also actually a neces arily existent Being. For to suppose, that any thing did exist of itself from eternity, by its own free-will and choice, and therefore not necessarily, but contingently, since it might have willed otherwise; this is to suppose it to have existed before it was, and so positively to have been the cause of itself; which is impossible, as hath been already declared. When a thing therefore is said to be of itself, or the cause of itself, this is to be understood no otherwise, than either in a negative sense,

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as having nothing else for its cause; or because its necessary eternal existence is essential to the perfection of its own nature. That therefore, which existed of itself from eternity, independently upon any thing else, did not so exist contingently, but necessarily; so that there is undoubtedly something actually in being, whose existence is, and always was necessary. In the next place, it is certain also, that nothing could exist necessarily of itself, but what included necessity of existence in its own nature. For to suppose any thing to exist of itself necessarily, which hath no necessity of existence in its own nature, is plainly to suppose that necessary existence of it to come from nothing, since it could neither proceed from that thing itself, nor yet from any thing else. Lastly, there is nothing, which includes necessity of existence in its very nature and essence, but only an absolutely perfect Being. The result of all which is, that God, or a perfect Being, doth certainly exist; and that there is nothing else, which existed of itself from eternity, necessarily and independently; but all other things whatsoever derived their being from him, or were caused by him, matter or body itself not excepted.

That which hath staggered some Theists here, and made them so inclinable and prone to believe, that matter also existed from eternity unmade, is partly (as hath been already intimated) an idiotical conceit, that because nothing can be artificially made by men, otherwise than out of pre-existing matter, as houses and garments, puddings and pies; therefore there could be no other making of any thing, by any power whatsoever: though even men themselves can produce something out of no pre-existent matter, as cogitations and local motion. And the same partly proceedeth also from certain false opinions entertained concerning matter. For some Theists have supposed ὕλην ἀσώματον, an "incorporeal first matter;" out of which incorporeal matter, together with an incorporeal form joined to it, they conceived the essence of body to have been compounded, and made up. And no wonder, if these same fanciful philosophers have further added also hereunto, that from this incorporeal matter, by an incorporeal form, were begotten likewise incorporeal qualities of body. Now it is not conceivable, what else should be meant by this incorporeal Hyle, or matter, but only a metaphysical notion of the potentiality, or possibility of things, respectively to the Deity; which, because it is indeed eternal, and as much unmade as God himself is, it being nothing but the divine power considered passively, or the reverse of it; therefore, in all probability, were these philosophers so prone to think the physical matter of this corporeal universe to have been eternal and unmade. Neither was this incorporeal Hyle, or matter, a novel opinion, entertained only by some junior Platonists, but older than

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Aristotle himself, as appeareth plainly from these following words of his in his Metaphysics:* Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ὕλην τὴν ἀρχὴν λέγουσιν, ἐάν τε σῶμα, ἐάν τε ἀσώματον τιθῶσιν, "Some speak of the principle as matter; whether they suppose this matter to be body, or to be incorporeal." But this incorporeal matter in physiology can be accounted no better than a kind of metaphysical nonsense.† Again, others seem to have been the

* Lib. 1. cap. 6. [Page 273. tom. 4. opp.] Thus Porphyr. Τῆς ὕλης τὰ ἴδια κατὰ τοῦς ἀρχαίους ράδε· ἀσώματος, &c. Materiæ Proprietates, secundum Veteres, has sunt; Quod sit Incorporea, &c. [In Sentent. ad Intelligibilia Ducentibus, sect. 21. p. 226. Ed. Cantab.]

† Some perhaps will consider our learned author to be a little too severe against those who subtly discoursed in times past upon a certain primary matter of bodies. I have no high opinion of these men, neither do I deny that there is much in the precepts of the ancients on matter, which possesses more of the appearance than of the essence of sound wisdom; still I cannot help thinking, that their adversaries sometimes do them injustice, and that not a few of their tenets admit of an apt and rational interpretation, although at first view they may appear foolish and absurd to ourselves, who make use of other terms, and philosophize in a different manner. And among these, in my opinion, may be ranked this very dogma of the "incorporeity of matter," which here as well as elsewhere is so violently assailed by Dr. Cudworth, and which we hold to be ridiculous for no other reason than because we have rejected the phraseology of the ancients and their prescribed rules of philosophizing. Those who in the last century revived the atoms of Epicurus and Democritus, and to these in conjunction with the laws of motion ascribed the construction and fabrication of the universe, spared no pains to bring the old physical discipline of the Peripatetics into contempt, and, as it were, to overwhelm it with reproaches and maledictions; and as the dogma in question, which to a certain extent was common both to the Peripatetics and Platonists, formed no unimportant part of this discipline, it became the especial object of their rancour. [In this view Leibnits, Epp. vol. 2. p. 126. is not far from coinciding. Compare what he says also in vol. 3. p. 27. &c. Add, however, Thomasius, Resp. ibid. p. 32. &c.] Dr. Cudworth, therefore, having enrolled himself among their number, his motive for the harsh judgment passed upon those who asserted a certain *first matter*, is at once understood. But it is not our present object to expound and defend the whole doctrine of the old physiologers on ὕλη, or first matter; we shall simply offer a few observations in illustration of what is here brought forward, so as at the same time to give some sort of insight into the precepts of the ancient philosophy.

Dr. Cudworth suspects that the absurd opinions of the ancients on first matter led many to the belief that matter is eternal and unmade; for first matter, being nothing more than a metaphysical notion of a certain divine perfection, which, properly speaking, does not differ from God himself, and consequently is eternal, that therefore certain philosophers transferred this property to physical matter also, and concluded it to be eternal. Whatever credit this conjecture may deserve on the score of ingenuity, it seems to me to be little in accordance with the truth. I acknowledge that philosophers very often made a sudden transition from mere mental notions and phantasms to the things themselves, and became satisfied of the real external existence of that which existed only in their own minds; but I much doubt whether the same took place, or could take place, in the matter now before us. The learned Doctor here assumes three things, which probably no one versed in these subjects will admit: first, that first matter is nothing else but a metaphysical notion; secondly, that those philosophers who disputed so acutely upon first matter were not entirely ignorant of this; and lastly, that they asserted a twofold matter, physical and metaphysical, and rashly transferred to the latter what belonged to the former alone. Not one of these, in my opinion, is simply and absolutely true. First matter, I allow, in so far as it is separated from all body, is a certain notion of the mind; but not such as has nothing real and corporeal out of the mind to correspond to it. Those ancients who discoursed upon it were so far from supposing it to be a mere vision of the mind, that they regarded it rather as a really existent and natural object. Neither ought we to forego this opinion, because both the Aristotelians and Platonists use various expressions in reference to it,

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more prone to think matter or body to have been self-existent and unmade, because they both conceived it to be really the same thing with space, and also took it for granted, that space was

which seem to divest it of all real existence. For, as we have intimated before, these expressions are not to be judged of by our own phrases and modes of speech, but examined according to the rule and standard of the ancient philosophers; in which case we shall find them to be much less absurd and foolish than we supposed. Many, for instance, are offended because the Platonists, Plotinus, Porphyry, and some of the Aristotelians are wont to call ὕλη, or "matter," μὴ ὄν, "a nonentity." See Porphyry, in his Sententiæ ad Intelligibilia Ducentes, sect. 21. p. 226. Plotinus, Περὶ ὕλης, Ennead. 2. lib. 4. cap. 16. p. 169. and De Impassibilitate Incorporeor. Ennead. 3. lib. 6. cap. 7. p. 210. For they suppose this term to have the same signification as our word *nothing*; and therefore when they afterwards hear these philosophers discoursing upon matter, as upon something really existent, they appeal to the faith of gods and men, execrate the stupidity of the ancient philosophers, and cry aloud that their *first matter* is altogether a farce, a downright jest, which both exists and does not exist. Far otherwise, however, would they think, did they but recollect that the language of Plato is widely different from our own, and that the Platonic *nothing* and ours have no affinity between them. *Nihil*, says Cicero, Tusculan. Disput. lib. 1. cap. 24. p. 2598. tom. 8. opp. Plato putat esse, quod oriatur et intereat, idque solum *esse*, quod semper tale sit, "Plato supposes that to be nothing, which has a beginning and perishes, and that alone to be an *entity* which is always such." To others it seems not less absurd, that the Platonists should deny it to be possible for ὕλη, or matter, to suffer any thing. See Plotinus, De Impassibilitate Rerum Incorporear. cap. 8. p. 311. But they would cease to be surprised at this dogma, or at least pronounce a milder judgment upon it, did they but know that in this school πάσχειν, or *to suffer*, is equivalent to *being changed* and *corrupted*, and that matter is ranked by them among simple things, which are susceptible of no change. Those who wish correctly to estimate the precepts and doctrines of antiquity will find it necessary first of all to unlearn the phraseology of the later philosophers. The learned Doctor's surmise respecting a twofold matter, physical and metaphysical, and the transition from one to the other, is altogether destitute of foundation; for these philosophers, strictly speaking, held but one, and that physical ὕλη, or matter. I am aware that it was divided by some of the later Platonists into *intelligible* and *sensible*, or into the matter of the world called νοητὸς, and of the visible world. See Plotinus in his book De Materia, cap. 3. &c. p. 160. &c. where he argues at some length that there is also something corresponding to matter in the νοητὸς world. But to pass over many other things, this *intelligible matter* is not what the ancients called ἀσώματος, or "incorporeal:" which at present, however, is alone under consideration.

II. Much greater light will be thrown upon all these points by a more lucid and detailed exposition of the ancient philosophers' doctrine on ἀσώματος, or "incorporeal" matter. All who philosophized in former times were unanimous in supposing a something out of which were compounded the first principles of all sensible things, or ὑποκείμενον τι καὶ ὑποδοχὴν εἰδῶν, "something which is the subject of all bodies, and adapted for the reception of forms," to use the words of Plotinus in his book Περὶ ὕλης, cap. 1. p. 159. By what appellation it was designated by them is at this day unknown; for the name ὕλη is of more recent origin, as is evident even from the fact that neither Ocellus Lucanus in his book on the Universe, nor Plato, makes use of it. In the course of time, however, the word ὕλη, which otherwise usually denoted *artificial* or *mechanical* matter, and is employed even by Plato in this sense, was applied to this *natural* matter; and the example of the Greeks was imitated by the Latins, who in like manner transferred the name *materia*, heretofore belonging to mechanical matter, to this substance, that was supposed to be the subject of all bodies. Others, as Chalcidius, expressed the Greek ὕλη by the Latin term *sylva*. But the nature of this first substance of which they supposed the elements of all bodies to be composed, was not equally known and agreed upon. Hence philosophers were split into various sects, which however may conveniently be classed under two principal heads. For some endowed the primary matter of all things with inherent qualities and affections; while others asserted matter abstractedly considered to be simple, and utterly destitute of quality, although adapted to receive all qualities and forms. The whole of the opinions of antiquity on the nature of things may be referred to one or

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infinite and eternal, and consequently necessarily existent. In answer whereunto, we reply first, that though space and distance should be granted to be positively infinite, or to have no bounds

other of these two classes; but each was again subdivided into various minor sects, which it would be foreign to our present purpose to enumerate in detail. To the former belong all those physiologers who held either water, or air, or fire, or earth, or a nature concreted and compounded out of all these, to be the first principle of things; since they all supposed one or more qualities to be inherent in matter itself. Of the latter we shall speak more particularly by and by. Between these two the discipline of Democritus, Epicurus, and others, who regarded atoms and corpuscules as the first principles of things, holds as it were an intermediate place; for while they divest first matter of qualities, and in that respect approach the latter class, they leave it magnitude and figure; which in some degree connects them with the former. Some of the ancients, however, refer the sect of Democritus to one of the abovementioned classes, as Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch, and others; which, as will be made appear in the sequel, may not unreasonably be done, provided the class to which this school belongs be correctly and accurately distributed into its subordinate sects.

These two classes of physiologers to which, as we before stated, all the others are referable, were commonly distinguished in after times, when philosophy had attained greater maturity, as holding matter to be either *ἀσώματος* or *σῶμα*, "incorporeal" or "body;" the former being said of those who denied, and the latter of those who assigned qualities to matter. This distinction we first meet with in Aristotle, in lib. 1. Metaphys. cap. 6. p. 273. t. 4. opp. the passage adduced by Dr. Cudworth; and as he does not mention it in any other place, it is most probable he was its author. After Aristotle it frequently occurs in the writings of those who have treated of the opinions of the ancients on the nature of things, or who have themselves inquired into this subject. That those who divested matter of all quality and figure were said to make it *ἀσώματος*, will be abundantly manifested from the testimonies about to be produced by and by; for the present I shall quote merely two passages selected out of many, to prove that those who attributed qualities and forms to matter, were formerly regarded as holding it to be *σῶμα*, or "body." The first is from Aristotle, Natural. Auscult. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 451. tom. 1. opp.: Οἱ *μὲν γὰρ ἓν ποιήσαντες τὸ ὂν* ΣΩΜΑ *τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἢ τῶν τριῶν τι, ἢ ἄλλο, ὃ ἐστὶ πυρὸς μὲν πυκνότερον, ἀέρος δὲ λεπτότερον, τἆλλα γεννῶσι*, "Others (of the physiologists) holding some one *body* to be the subject matter of all, namely, either one of the three elements, or something else, which is more dense than fire and more rare than air, produce the rest of things." The other is from Plutarch, who De Placitis Philosoph. cap. 9. p. 882. tom. 1. opp. has the following words: Οἱ *δ' ὕδωρ λέγοντες, ἢ γῆν, ἢ πῦρ, ἢ ἀέρα τὴν ὕλην, οὐκέτι ἄμορφον αὐτὴν λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ* ΣΩΜΑ, "Those who say that matter is water, or earth, or fire, or air, do not hold it to be formless, but *body*." The distribution we speak of is found also in Sextus Empiricus, lib. 9. Adv. Mathematicos, cap. 5. p. 619. who, however, either misunderstood, or purposely perverted it, as, for the sake of having something to dispute against he is sometimes wont to do, when recording the opinions of the ancient philosophers: *Περὶ τῶν*, says he, *ἀνωτάτων καὶ ἀρχικωτάτων στοιχείων δύο μὲν αἱ πρῶται γεγόνασι στάσεις——οἱ γὰρ σώματα ἔλεξαν εἶναι τὰ τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα, οἱ δὲ ἀσώματα*, "Respecting the elements which are highest and have most the nature of principles, there were two principal sects——for some asserted the elements of things to be bodies, others incorporeal." In the former class he ranks almost all the ancient physiologers, even Democritus and Epicurus, which as we have already said is in a certain measure admissible: but when he comes to the other he commits a manifest error: *Τῶν δὲ*, says he, sect. 364. p. 621. *ἀσώματα δογματιζόντων, οἱ μὲν περὶ Πυθαγόραν τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἔλεξαν πάντων ἀρχειν, οἱ δὲ Μαθηματικοὶ τὰ πέρατα τῶν σωμάτων, οἱ δὲ περὶ Πλάτωνα τὰς ἰδέας*, "Of those who held the doctrine of their being incorporeal, the Pythagoreans affirmed numbers, mathematicians the boundaries of bodies, and the Platonists ideas, to be the principles of all things." Most foolishly and erroneously! The men who were stated in former times to hold the principles of things to be incorporeal, were those who divested the first matter of all quality, quantity, and form. Nor was Pythagoras, or Plato, or any geometrician ever so stupid as to regard either numbers, or the forms of things, or the extremities of bodies, as the first matter or principle.

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nor limits at all, as also to have been eternal; yet, according to the opinion of some, would it not follow from thence, that matter was infinite, eternal, and necessarily existent; not as if space or

Plato is one of those who affirm matter to be ἀσώματος, but Sextus is very much deceived if he supposes this ὕλη ἀσώματος to be Plato's ἰδέαι or exemplars of things. Plato classes ideas among those things which he calls ἀσώματα. Plutarch, De Placitis Philos. lib. 1. cap. 10. p. 882. tom. 1. opp. Ἰδέα ἐστὶν οὐσία ἀσώματος, "An idea is an incorporeal substance." But he was by no means so insane as to decide that ideas alone are the principles of things, and wholly to discard all corporeal matter. That spirit, whether of carelessness and negligence, or of perverseness and malignity, which every where prevails in our own day, and leads many to mutilate, falsify, and distort the opinions of others, has flourished in all ages, and formerly invaded and corrupted the minds even of those who are now held forth as perfect paragons of wisdom. By losing sight of which it not unfrequently happens, that many persons suppose the dogmas of the ancients to have been such as not a barber even or ploughman would entertain.

But I shall come to a somewhat closer examination of the subject, and not only explain the origin of this ancient distribution of physiologers, but also show who first asserted matter to be incorporeal, as well as the force and meaning of the dogma itself. For otherwise it will be impossible to know whether this opinion can in a certain sense be tolerated, or is as foolish and absurd as it is considered by Dr. Cudworth and by the generality of those who ascribe the nature of things to atoms and mechanical laws. To begin then with the origin of this division, the reason that induced the ancients to call matter endowed with qualities ἀσώματος or "incorporeal," and the same if divested of qualities and forms, σώματος, or "corporeal," will scarcely be comprehensible unless we first are in possession of their opinion on the nature of body. In the earliest ages the Greeks, from whom the Latins derived all their philosophy, used the word σῶμα in so wide an acceptation as to apply it to every nature which falls under the senses. Hence they did not hesitate to call the first matter of all things σῶμα. This is evident from the most ancient writer Ocellus Lucanus, Περὶ τοῦ παντὸς, cap. 2. p. 516. who thus defines matter: Τὸ πρῶς ἁφὴν ὑφεξόμενον ΣΩΜΑ πᾶσι τοῖς εἰς γένεσιν ἐρχομένοις, "Palpable body, the subject of all things which come to generation." The same, p. 519. calls it: ΣΩΜΑ αἰσθητὸν, "body perceptible to the sense." But afterwards when the philosophy of the Greeks assumed a more accurate and systematic form, they restricted the notion of body, and therefore distinguished between σῶμα and ὕλη. We have among the ancients, as at this day, various definitions of body, on which consult Sextus Empiricus, lib. 1. adv. Physicos, cap. 5. p. 619. In general, however, they almost all pronounce it to be that which consists of form and matter, or, as others say, of matter and quality. To form or quality, for as might be proved by numerous passages of the ancients, these words are here used indiscriminately and signify one and the same thing, belong shape, figure, magnitude, and other properties, which philosophers in a stricter sense usually denominate qualities. According to the ancient physiologers, therefore, body is a certain mass or aggregation of matter, endowed with magnitude, figure, and affections. Cicero, Academicar. Quæstion. lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 2231. tom. 8. opp.: Quod ex utroque, id jam *corpus* et quasi qualitatem quamdam nominabant, "That which consists of both (matter and form) they (the ancient philosophers) called *body* and a sort of quality." Porphyry, in his Ἀφορμαὶ πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ, sect. 22. p. 228. ΣΩΜΑ ἐστὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους, "Body is a compound of matter and form." Plotinus, Περὶ ὕλης, cap. 6. p. 162. Ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους ἕκαστον (σῶμα), "Each body consists of matter and form." Chalcidius, In Timæum Platonis, cap. 13. sect. 317. p. 393. Quod proprie dicitur corpus ex sylva constat et qualitate, "What is properly called body consists of matter and quality." It is not known who first thus circumscribed the meaning of body: but a clear distinction between matter and body is already observed by Timæus Locrus, De Anima Mundi, p. 544. whose example is followed by Plato in his Timæus, who, p. 534. defines matter to be φύσιν τὰ πάντα δεχομένην σώματα, "a nature which receives all bodies," or out of which all bodies are made. Which passage is well calculated to show, of what Plato and the rest of the ancients held the nature of body to consist. For by saying that matter is the recipient of bodies, he evidently implies that that which constitutes body is not inherent in

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distance could exist alone by itself, an accident without a substance, it being plainly impossible, that nothing should have any accidents, modifications and attributes, or be mensurable by

matter, but comes to it from elsewhere. Hence what was formerly called body consists of form and qualities, which the ancients supposed to be introduced into matter. And this in my opinion shows us the reason, why the early philosophers asserted matter to be made *corporeal* by those who assigned qualities to it, and *incorporeal* by those who divested it of all quality. For placing the nature of body in qualities, affections, and figure, they accordingly called that incorporeal which was said to be destitute of all these. Nor is it difficult to understand, after this explanation, how it happened that Democritus and the others who supposed the nature of things to be contained in atoms, were referred by some of the ancients to one or other of the above-mentioned sects. For if body be applied in its more extensive acceptation to every thing which falls under the senses and is endowed with figure, Democritus would certainly belong to those, who were formerly represented as holding matter to be corporeal: but if according to the more circumscribed notion we call nothing body except that in which certain properties and qualities are inherent by nature, he must be classed among those who were said to make it incorporeal: for he held his atoms to be devoid of all qualities. In my own opinion, however, it will be best to assign to this philosopher an intermediate place, as we have already stated, between the two classes: for there is something of each which he adopts, and something again which he rejects and repudiates.

An immense number, however, of the greatest and most illustrious men of former times were always on the side of those who, in the way we have stated, asserted matter to be ἀσώματος, or incorporeal. Cicero tells us that the whole of the philosophers from the time of Plato held this doctrine, Academic. Quæstion. lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 2232. tom. 8. opp. Sed subjectam putant (philosophi) omnibus sine ulla specie, atque carentem omni illa qualitate *materiam* quamdam, ex qua omnia expressa atque efficta sint, "But philosophers suppose a certain matter, the subject of all things, without form or shape, and destitute of all qualities, out of which all things were fashioned and framed." But it was entertained by many of the Pythagoreans long before Plato, as may be understood from Timæus Locrus, an eminent and most ancient philosopher of this school, De Anima Mundi, cap. 1. p. 544. ed. Galei. Τὰν ὕλαν ἄμορφον δὲ καθ' αὐτὰν καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον, δεχόμενον δὲ πᾶσαν μορφάν, "(Timæus said) that matter is of itself devoid of all form and figure, but receives every form." In whose footsteps Plato follows, and in his Timæus, p. 534. opp. clearly and distinctly professes himself to be of the same opinion. I am aware that Aristotle, De Generat. et Corruptione, lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 726. tom. 1. opp. accuses Timæus and Plato of obscurity on this subject, and denies the possibility of forming any opinion upon matter from what is said in the Timæus: Ὡς δ' ἐν Τιμαίῳ γέγραπται, οὐδὲν ἔχει διορισμόν, "What is written (concerning matter) in the Timæus, has nothing certain and definite." But his jealousy and dislike of Plato prevented him, I am afraid, from understanding his meaning, although sufficiently clearly expressed, and from perceiving that on this question at least that philosopher and himself were not at issue. For Aristotle had adopted the opinion of those who held matter to be incorporeal, as is proved by his definition of matter which occurs Metaphys. lib. 7. cap. 3. p. 353. Λέγω δὲ ὕλην, ἣ καθ' αὑτὴν μήτε τι, μήτε πόσον, μήτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν λέγεται, οἷς ὥρισται τὸ ὄν, "I call that matter, which of itself is neither said to be a quiddity, nor quantity, nor any thing else, by which an entity is defined." I am not ignorant of the debates and conflicts to which this definition of the Stagirite has given rise among his disciples, nor of the clamours and cavils it has called forth from the opponents of his philosophy. See out of many Dan. Geo. Morhof, Polyhistor. tom. 2. lib. 2. par. 1. cap. 12. p. 226. In my opinion, however, they both might have remained at peace. Aristotle, although expressing himself somewhat obscurely, said no more than what many other eminent men had inculcated before him and what he had learnt from his master Plato, that matter considered by itself and independently of body is destitute of all those affections and properties which constitute the nature of body, or in other words is *incorporeal*. After Plato and Aristotle, philosophers innumerable adopted the same dogma. On the Stoics in particular see Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 7. segm. 134. p. 449. But most of all the later Platonists, who took especial delight in the more sublime contemplation of

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yards and poles; but because this space is by them supposed, not to be the extension of body, but the infinite and unbounded extension of the Deity.[5] But, in the next place, if space be con-

incorporeal things, were indefatigable in their efforts to polish and refine it. As one example for all, consult Plotinus in his two very subtle and acute treatises, De Materia, and De Impossibilitate eorum, quæ sunt incorporea, the former being the fourth book in the second, and the latter the sixth in the third Ennead: for when once we know his opinion, we are acquainted with the doctrine of the whole sect. Plotinus proves first of all, cap. 6. of the former book, p. 162. that there is a primary matter in bodies: he then, cap. 7. refutes the opinions of others on matter: and thence, cap. 8. proceeds to explain the affections of matter, which, cap. 10. 11. 12. he shows to be destitute of all quantity, and, cap. 13. 14. of all quality, that is, to be *incorporeal*, and lastly, cap. 15. to be *indeterminate*. But these new Platonists, by their excessive ingenuity and subtlety, brought the doctrine into general disrepute, and caused many to rank it among idle and visionary conceits. Still these difficulties did not deter the Christians from receiving it and pronouncing for the incorporeity of matter. I pass over an immense array of ancient fathers who gloried in its avowal, and appeal to the testimony of St. Augustine alone, whose voice in succeeding ages was revered as divine. This holy man, Confession. lib. 12. cap. 3. p. 158. tom. 1. opp. tells us that he learnt it from God himself: "Hast not thou, O Lord, taught me, that before thou didst form and separate that shapeless matter, not any thing was, not colour, not figure, not body, not spirit?" He subsequently deplores his former infatuation, which prevented him from perceiving this truth, and praises God for having revealed it to him, cap. 6. p. 159. "And if my voice and pen were to confess all that thou hast revealed to me on this question, who of my readers would understand it? Nevertheless my heart shall not cease to give thee the glory, and to praise thee for the things which it is unable to dictate." Such are the vicissitudes of human opinions! A dogma which St. Augustine does not hesitate to call divine, which he declares to be comprehensible to no one, unless he be enlightened and instructed by God's mercy, which he ranks in short among the greatest of divine blessings, is at a later period styled foolish, absurd, stupid, fanatical, irrational. That I may not wander too far from my purpose, I shall not descend to succeeding ages and examine into the grave conflicts of schoolmen on primary matter. Suffice it to add, that of the Jews, Philo, De Opificio Mundi, p. 4. maintains the same opinion, and the later masters are not opposed to it.

When in the last century the physical philosophy of the Peripatetics was expelled from our schools, and its place supplied by atoms and mechanical laws, this dogma above all others was exploded and characterized as fraught with the grossest folly. The matter of the Peripatetics and Platonists, it was said, is a thing undefined and incomprehensible, destitute of form, quantity, and quality, totally disconnected from body, and yet not spirit. What is it therefore? strictly *nothing*: and out of nothing do those, who refer the elements of the universe to this matter, create all things. I am almost persuaded however that those who inveighed with such bitterness against it, superior as they are in other respects to all praise of mine, looked rather to the words by which it is usually expounded than to the doctrine itself, and in passing so severe a sentence were influenced in many instances by the insane questions and disputes of schoolmen on primary matter. They who hold matter to be incorporeal mean simply that it is a certain first nature constituting all bodies and devoid of most of the affections of body, to which God or a superior nature, when bodies are generated, imparts form and qualities. I should not consider the doctrine to be so absurd, as to be wholly unworthy the attention of a wise man, were it disincumbered of the usual explanatory phraseology and freed from the idle questions which some over sagacious persons have connected with it. Let us examine it a little more minutely and inquire to what extent its supporters and opponents are at issue. They both agree that there is a first nature or principle, of some description or other, from which all sensible things are produced and generated; they likewise agree, that a philosopher by meditation can

[5] On those who suppose the divine nature and infinite space to be the same, a sect not extinct even at the present day, as also on space itself and its nature, we have spoken above, in discussing the subject of infinity.

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cluded to be certainly nothing else but the extension and distance of body, or matter, considered in general (without respect to this or that particular body) and abstractly in order to the

dissever this first nature from body, although it nowhere exists separately, and contemplate it by itself. This is done certainly by the Atomists; for in thought, like the Platonists and Peripatetics, they abstract their matter from body, place it in a certain shape, and in short variously compound and divide it. So far, therefore, the assertors of incorporeal matter do not offend against reason. Consequently the whole dispute will turn upon the nature of matter. The Platonists and Peripatetics assert matter to be devoid, first of all quality, then of all quantity, all form, and lastly of all body. With respect to the first of these, they cannot be complained of by their adversaries; for these also deprive their corpuscles of all inherent quality. The controversy remains upon the other three. The defenders of the atomic doctrine leave quantity and form to these minute corpuscles: and they are compelled to do so, because they regard matter as divided and separated into innumerable parts. But the Platonists and Aristotelians cannot do this, inasmuch as they look upon it as something continuous and undivided. This alone, therefore, is the chief point of difference between them: that the former contemplate matter as a nature infinitely divided, and the latter as simple and continuous. Such being the case, those who choose to accuse this sect of folly, ought to show that it is absurd and foolish to conceive matter as a nature continuous and separated by no intervals, and yet at the same time, as Timæus Locrus says, De Anima Mundi, p. 544. *μεριστὰν περὶ τὰ σώματα*, "divisible in respect to bodies." For my part, I cannot see any thing at all irrational in this. Besides, those who held matter to be finite, by no means deprived it of what Aristotle calls *continuous quantity*. But surely, they will say, it is madness in them to make matter to be neither body nor spirit, and to call it *ἀσώματος*. Say rather, that it seems madness to us, who are accustomed to attach other significations to the words *σῶμα*, *σώματος*, and *ἀσώματος*. If *body* meant the same with us as it did with the earlier philosophers, this dogma would appear to be sufficiently sound and wise. But having lost the ancient meanings of words, and at the present day designating every thing as body which falls under the senses and is extended, we therefore consider whatever is said to be divested of body either as spirit or nothing. But those ancient philosophers themselves, who held matter to be *ἀσώματος*, carefully guarded against being understood in the sense in which many afterwards understood them, and by a variety of expressions showed, that in denying matter to be body, they by no means denied its close proximity to the nature of bodies. Some asserted matter to be, not indeed *σῶμα*, but yet *σωματικὴ*, or "corporeal." Stobæus, Eclogar. Physicar. lib. 1. cap. 14. *Περὶ ὕλης*, p. 129. *Οὐ σῶμα δὲ τὴν ὕλην φασὶν, οὐχ ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἐστηρῆσθαι δοκεῖ τῶν περὶ σῶμα διαστάσεων, ἀλλὰ ὅτι καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων ἀπολείπεται, κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον, ἃ τοῖς σώμασιν ὑπάρχει, σχηματισμοῦ, χρώματος, βαρύτητος, κουφότητος, ὕλως, πάσης ποιότητος καὶ ποσότητος· εἰ γὰρ τούτων μετεῖχεν, τὸ ποίων ἦν καὶ πόσων· οὐ μετειληφυῖα δὲ κατὰ τὸν λόγον, σῶμα μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ΣΩΜΑΤΙΚΗ δὲ διὰ τὸ πάσαις, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐκμαγεῖον, ὑποκεῖσθαι ταῖς ποιότησιν*, "They deny matter to be body, not only because it appears to want the intervals of body, but also because it is itself destitute of many other things belonging to body, as figure, colour, heaviness, lightness, and in short all quality and quantity. For if it partook of these, it would be of the class of things having a certain quality or quantity. But being in itself destitute of them, it is not body, but corporeal, because, like a mirror, it is the subject or recipient of all qualities." Others called it *σωματοειδῆς*, "similar or allied to body." Plutarch, De Placitis Philosoph. lib. 1. cap. 9. p. 882. tom. 1. opp. *Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Πλάτων τὴν ὕλην ΣΩΜΑΤΟΕΙΔΗ καὶ ἄμορφον, ἀνείδεον, ἀσχημάτιστον, ἄποιον μέν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἰδίᾳ φύσει*, "Aristotle and Plato asserted matter to be allied to body, to be without shape, form, or figure, and of its own nature destitute of all quality." Others again sought to remove all ambiguity from the word *ἀσώματος*, by saying, that matter is different from body. Porphyry, Sententiæ ad Intelligibilia Ducentes, sect. 21. p. 226. *Ὕλη ἀσώματος, ἑτέρα γὰρ σωμάτων*, "Matter is incorporeal; for it is different from body." Plotinus is still more clear in his explication of this term, Ennead. 3. lib. 6. cap. 7. *Περὶ ἀπαθείας τῶν ἀσωμάτων*, p. 210. *Ἔστι μὲν ὕλη ἀσώματος· ἐπείπερ τὸ σῶμα ὕστερον καὶ σύνθετον καὶ αὐτὴ μετ' ἄλλου ποιεῖ σῶμα*, "Matter is called incorporeal; because body is posterior and compound, and in

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conception of motion, and the mensuration of things (for space thus considered is necessarily immoveable, as to the parts thereof respectively; as the two extremes of a yard distance can never

forming body it is joined with something else." St. Augustine, Confession. lib. 12. cap. 6. p. 159. fancied he should best explain the meaning of the word ἀσώματος by defining matter to be "something between a thing formed and nothing, neither formed nor nothing, but almost a formless nothing." Lastly, some of the later Platonists, to preclude all occasion for misinterpreting their dogma, considered that the use of the term ἀσώματος ought to be abstained from altogether; and while denying matter to be body, denied also that it was incorporeal. Among these is Apuleius, De Dogmate Platonico, p. 4. ed. Elmenhorstii: "Plato admits matter to be neither corporeal nor incorporeal. He does not consider it body, because all body possesses some sort of form: and he cannot affirm it to be without body, because nothing incorporeal exhibits body." The same is stated by Alcinous, Introd. in Philosophiam Platonis, cap. 8. But Chalcidius discusses and explains this doctrine the most copiously of any, in Timæum Platonis, cap. 13. sect. 317. &c. p. 393. &c. All these considered, there seems to me to be not so wide a difference of opinion between the Platonists and the assertors of atoms, on the nature of first matter, as many suppose: nor have the latter had much cause, that I can see, for treating the former with contempt and ridicule. The whole controversy between them, if I mistake not, amounts to this: whether it is wiser and more correct to contemplate first matter as a nature divided into infinite particles necessarily possessing form and quantity, or as something continuous and therefore divested of these. Some one, however, will object, perhaps, that there is a great difference between the two, when they come afterwards to account for forms and qualities: that the Atomists deny qualities to be distinct and separate from matter; but that the others affirm this: that the former assign clear and satisfactory causes of qualities, whereas the latter labour hard to show how qualities enter into matter, and arrive at no successful issue. I will grant this in a certain measure to be true, nor will I take upon myself the defence of the Platonists and Aristotelians, although more perhaps might be said in their favour than many imagine. But we are neither inquiring here into the philosophical fitness and utility, nor into the comparative excellence of the two doctrines: the only point under consideration being, whether the opinion of those who held matter to be incorporeal is so ridiculous and childish as many persons consider it, and a pre-eminent specimen of metaphysical folly.

III. I cannot understand the drift of Dr. Cudworth's remark, that the Platonic doctrine of incorporeal matter is nothing but the abstract notion of *potentiality*, or of the *possibility of all things in respect to God*, although I willingly agree with him as to its being a subject for the contemplation of metaphysicians rather than of physiologers. For the inquiry is not about a nature, which really exists separately, as it is conceived in the mind to exist, but simply: what idea ought to be formed in the mind of that thing which enters into the nature of all bodies, although it nowhere exists of itself out of body, so that all the phenomena of bodies can be accounted for. But even on this question, the philosophers who are pleased to contemplate matter in that manner are to a certain extent at variance. For some of them, as Plato and his genuine disciples, suppose this world to have been framed and made out of matter; and in conformity with this opinion, maintain that matter at one time existed of itself, before bodies were produced from it. See Plutarch, in his book, De Animæ Procreatione ex Timæo, p. 1014. tom. 2. opp. But others, with Aristotle at their head, who is followed in this respect by the junior Platonists, deny all beginning of the world, and consider either that God himself created the universe from all eternity, the view taken by the Platonists; or that all bodies were generated from an infinite period by the very necessity of nature, which seems to have been Aristotle's opinion. In this disputation, the former do not merely perform the part of metaphysicians, and deliberate upon a mental notion alone, to which nothing out of the mind corresponds; but also fulfil the office of physiologers, because they contemplate an object which at one time existed really and of itself, before all bodies, although at present, after once being divided, it has no longer an existence separate from them. And here I would apply that celebrated saying of Timæus Locrus, De Anima Mundi, p. 545. which was afterwards adopted by Plato and all the Platonists, but which some expounded in one way and some in another: "Matter is known λογισμῷ νόθῳ, by a spurious reason." In this maxim, Timæus denies that

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possibly come nearer to one another): then do we say, that there appeareth no sufficient ground for this positive infinity of space, we being certain of no more than this, that be the world, or any figurative body, never so great, it is not impossible, but that it might be still greater and greater, without end. Which indefinite increasableness of body and space seems to be mistaken for a positive infinity thereof. Whereas, for this very reason, because it can never be so great but that more magnitude may still be added to it, therefore can it never be positively infinite. Nor is there perhaps so great an absurdity in this, that another world could not possibly be made a mile distant from this, forasmuch as there being nothing between them, they must needs touch; or that this finite world could have no mountains and valleys in the exterior surface of it, since it might be either spherical, cubical, or cylindrical, or of any other regular figure, whatsoever the maker pleased to form it in. To conclude therefore, by space without the finite world, is to be understood nothing but the possibility of body, further and further, without end, yet so as never to reach to infinity; and such a space as this was there also, before this world was created, a possibility of so much body to be produced. But space and actual distance, as really mensurable by yards and poles, though it may be greater and greater without end, yet can it not be positively infinite, so as that there could be no more added to it; and therefore there can be no argument from hence to prove the necessary existence of matter.

Moreover, the existence of a Deity might be further demonstrated from this common notion, That nothing can come from nothing causally; because, if there were no God, as we could not have had any idea of him, or a perfect Being, since it must have come from nothing, and have been the idea or conception of nothing; so neither could there have been indeed any knowledge or understanding at all. For singular bodies existing

matter is comprehended by pure λογισμὸς, by simple intelligence, or νοῷ καϑ' ἑπιστάμαν, as he elsewhere expresses himself, "by mind and intelligence:" and it is easy to understand his motive for doing so. For the forms are images of things alone, which are stable and eternal, have this peculiarity, that they can be contemplated and known by pure reason; whereas matter is not a form and image, but formerly existed as a nature similar to body. And yet he affirms that it can be understood by a spurious kind of reason. For at this day, after it has ceased to exist separately, and God has framed this world out of it, it belongs to the class of forms and images, and therefore is comprehended only by mind and intelligence. But formerly it existed of itself apart from all form: hence it is not perceived by pure mind, but reason is in a certain measure assisted by αἰσθησις and δόξα, "sense" and "opinion." The latter, who hold the world to be eternal, must necessarily deny that matter ever existed out of bodies. Consequently, when they dispute and reason upon this, their thoughts are confined to the mental notion alone, and therefore they merely sustain the part of metaphysicians. But I shall dismiss an argument, which in itself involves many difficult questions admitting of no satisfactory solution, and which has been rendered much more perplexed and complicated by the controversies of those who can suffer no subject to escape them, and will throw all things into confusion rather than confess themselves to be men to whom much must for ever be unknown.

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without us cannot enter into us, and put understanding in us; nor is there any thing but local motions propagated from them to our organs of sense. The mind must have its immediate intelligibles within itself, for otherwise it could not possibly understand any thing; which intelligibles and their relations to one another, or verities, are (as was said before) eternal. Moreover, the mind can frame ideas or conceptions, not only of things actually existing, but also of all possibilities; which plainly implies and supposes the actual existence of a Being infinitely powerful, that could produce them. So that the proper object of mind and understanding is a perfect Being, and all the extent of its power; which perfect Being, comprehending itself and the extent of its own power, or the possibilities of all things, is the first original Mind, of which all other minds partake. Wherefore, were there no perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending itself, and its own power, or all the possibilities of things; the intelligible objects of the mind and ideas must have come from nothing.

However, it hath been already proved from this principle, "Nothing from nothing," that the powers of sense and understanding, or the entities of soul and mind, could never have resulted from any modifications of senseless matter whatsoever. Wherefore, since it is mathematically certain that our human souls and persons could not possibly have been generated out of matter, one of these two things will undeniably follow; that either they must all have existed of themselves, from eternity unmade; or else have been created ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, "out of an antecedent non-existence," by a perfect understanding Being unmade, or at least have derived their whole substance from it. So that it is altogether as certain that there is a God, as that our human souls and persons did not all exist from eternity of themselves. And that there must be some eternal, unmade Mind, hath been already demonstrated also from the same principle, "Nothing out of nothing." Thus have we abundantly confuted the second atheistic argumentation, that there can be no omnipotence, nor divine creation, because nothing can be made out of nothing; we having plainly shown, that this very principle, in the true sense thereof, affordeth a demonstration for the contrary.

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LE CLERC'S OBSERVATIONS

ON THE PRECEDING SECTION, AGAINST THOSE WHO DENY THAT ANYTHING CAN BE MADE OUT OF NOTHING.

I. Those who deny that anything can be made out of nothing, in opposition to what is said by theologians on the subject, sometimes take this expression in a sense not noticed by Cudworth, which sufficiently shows how much occasion for abuse there is in the ambiguity of words and phrases of this description.[1] For they explain it as if divines in making use of it, meant that something could be made out of nothing in the same way as different kinds of vessels are formed out of a particular material; and therefore, they regard "nothing" as the material out of which God formed and framed the whole universe; a most absurd and ridiculous supposition. Perhaps some Atheists have suspected that this meaning was attached by theologians to this dictate of reason, because the Peripatetics speak of the formation of bodies just as if the matter of which they consist were a mere nothing. For to say the truth, the *matter* of the Peripatetic is an undefinable existence; something destitute of all properties and not at all corporeal. And in like manner what they call *form* is an entity of which no conception can be entertained, which when joined and united with matter makes it extensible, divisible, solid, and moveable, adapted to receive not only all shapes but also properties of every kind; though in itself it is neither extensible, divisible, solid, nor moveable, nor adapted to take any shape whatever. This, however, is the same thing as saying that two nothings, united and associated together, can make and constitute something; than which nothing can possibly be more absurd. But the schoolmen have not perceived the folly of this opinion, partly because they use a very obscure style of speaking, and partly because it is their fixed principle to follow the authority of their masters without hesitation. But no absurdity of this kind can be charged upon theologians, who, when they affirm that from nothing, ἐκ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, something

[1] Le Clerc names no Atheist who thus understood this expression; but it is certain that Spinoza, Orobio, and others fell into this error. Perhaps those divines who say that *nothing* is the *negative material of creation* have contributed to this.

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can be made, only mean, as Cudworth has well shown, that the Divine power could make a thing, which did not previously exist, begin to have a being and existence. Apart from this, it is certain that nothing is produced without a cause or by itself.

II. Cudworth also correctly and excellently remarks that the being, whose property it is to make another being commence its existence, must not only be possessed of all the perfections which the being produced by it is supposed to enjoy; but must also have a power of action by which it can be the cause of something. A stone, for example, or any other material substance, could by no means produce an intelligent being, such as an angel or a human soul, because mere material existences are destitute of intelligence. Further, it is utterly impossible that the stone should make another stone, like itself, or even inferior and less than itself, to begin to exist.

III. This being premised, it is plainly impossible that any thing can be produced out of nothing without a cause, or that matter can be the efficient cause of bodies and minds. On which account theologians attribute the creation of these existences to God alone, as the Being who, possessing universal and absolute perfection, contains all perfections or properties (for these words have the same import), and has a power of acting and operating. If then it be inquired how it is known that such perfections belong to God, the tenet itself explained by Dr. Cudworth will supply an answer to this question. For since the perfections of all existences are not inherent in matter, which, for example, is entirely destitute of thought and action; and many natures endowed with the power of thought and action, as for instance, the human mind, have not always existed, but have had some beginning to their existence; it is absolutely necessary that they must have received these properties or perfections from him to whom they owe their orgin, that is to God; for if this were not the case, it would follow that thought and action individually produced themselves out of nothing. If those who are sceptical respecting the existence of a God were carefully and attentively to consider these arguments, I have no doubt they would perceive that the denial of a Deity involves the most absurd admissions, totally unworthy of those who lay claim to superior ability. For nothing can be imagined more irrational than to deny principles and conclusions as inevitable as geometrical propositions.

IV. I will not indeed deny that it is difficult for us to comprehend how God combines in his own nature the perfections of all things, or in what manner he operates in the creation of fresh existences or the changes he wills in others. But these difficulties ought not to induce us to despise and reject those arguments, clearer than noonday, which fully assure us of the creation of all

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things. For though we may be ignorant of the manner in which a fact takes place, yet we are not on that account to deny the fact itself, if it be established by sound and indubitable reasons; for if this were permitted, we might deny the greatest part of the things we see and perceive; since a very partial acquaintance with philosophy is sufficient to show that the mode of existence of most things is wholly inexplicable. Those who are in earnest in their prosecution of truth ought to be endowed with two virtues especially, to say nothing of many others. First, they must be apt and ready for the conception of any demonstration, and its preservation in the mind; for if not, they will either make no proficiency, or if they do, they will shortly afterwards lose the fruit of their labour, and will return to their former state of ignorance. Secondly, they ought to be of such a temperament that they can remain in partial ignorance without being confused and drawn into pernicious consequences. There is an incredibly great number of things, the nature of which is unknown to the human mind; and it is the part of wisdom to regard these with composure, and not to bring them within the bounds of reasoning, lest mere verisimilitude and probability should be mistaken for truth and certainty. Our ignorance of some things does not prove that every thing is uncertain; and on the other hand, from our knowledge of much it does not follow that we can know all. Therefore, let us hold fast what we know for certain, and not be too solicitous about what evades our research; but quietly wait till some light be thrown upon it; and if this our expectation be disappointed, let us remember that another state of existence awaits us, which will entirely dispel all darkness from our minds. These are the precepts, I admit, of logicians; but the matter in hand calls for their repetition, since those with whom we now have to do seem to be forgetful of them.

V. We will endeavour then to the best of our ability to see whether we can in any way explain how it is that God possesses the perfections of all things, and how he produces other natures, to which he imparts just as many properties as are according to his will. Only two kinds of beings are known to us; one capable of thought, among which is to be ranked the human mind, and another corporeal, and therefore extensile, divisible, and solid. We have therefore to show how God possesses the perfections of these different things. First then, I assert that God possesses all the perfections of spirits, that he can understand, judge, will, and act; since from him they draw their beginning and origin. This is as easy to understand as it is to comprehend that there are other intelligent spirits besides the human mind. Nor do we find it more difficult to conceive that there are other spirits much better and more excellent than our

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own, and that of these there may possibly be an infinite number. Moreover we can go further than this, and can form an idea of a spirit knowing all that can possibly be known, disturbed by no commotion of the will, and able to do all that can possibly be done. And reason itself requires us to attribute these perfections to God. For the finite and limited nature of our own perfections arises from the want of will in our Creator to afford us higher powers. If we were self-existent and independent, our perfections would be unlimited, our knowledge unbounded, our power insuperable. The perfections and attributes of God, existing from all eternity, and not being derived from another existence, can be bounded by the power and strength of no being whatever; and he who possesses eternity, which is, so to speak, the most excellent of all things, can be in want of nothing. The Deity therefore not only possesses our perfections, but also so possesses them that they are free from all limit and all imperfection; for imperfection is nothing else than a deficiency or limit to any attribute. Our minds act and operate both in themselves, and externally to themselves upon our bodies; but there is an infinite number of things to which they are not adequate; as for instance, among other things, they cannot bring into existence another mind like themselves. But the omnipotent Being can create spirits much inferior to himself; as is plain from the example of the human mind alone.

VI. But it will perhaps be asked, In what properly consists that action which is called *creation*, by which it comes to pass that what before had not an existence begins to be? First of all, there can be no doubt but that it includes a certain determination of the Divine will, since it is God that wills that any thing should be and exist. Our own minds can perform no action but willing, and therefore we cannot conceive of any other action in another spirit. But God is able to operate in a widely different manner; a manner of which we are ignorant only because we possess not ourselves a similar power. And here we must call to mind the premises laid down in sect. IV. above. Because, in this action of the Deity there is something beyond the grasp of our minds, it does not therefore follow that the certain and indubitable arguments which prove a *creation* are to be despised and rejected. Who can tell how opium produces lethargy? or in what way Peruvian bark cures intermittent fevers? And yet no doubt is entertained of the virtues of these drugs. So ought we also firmly and unwaveringly to abide by those arguments which establish the truth of a creation, though we cannot at all comprehend its mode. Nor ought it to appear marvellous or extraordinary to any rational mind, to require mankind to proceed onward with tranquillity and repose in ignorance of so great and sublime a matter; for there are innumerable particulars in the

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events we see happening around us, of which we remain ignorant without anxiety or solicitude.

VII. If spirits are created by God out of nothing, there is no reason why the same should not be said of bodies. For it is not more difficult to confer the commencement of existence on bodies, than it is to create out of nothing a soul or spirit. But if the subject be regarded in reference to our own understandings, it will be far more difficult to comprehend how God, who is not corporeal, but a mere spirit, includes within his own nature the properties of bodies, than it will be to understand how he comprises spiritual attributes. But nevertheless, since God created bodies he must necessarily contain their perfections, nor ought we to deny this fact because our reason cannot comprehend its mode and nature. It must however be observed that as God possesses the properties of finite spirits without the admixture of any fault or blemish, so also he possesses the properties of bodies without any of their imperfections. Since this is the case, let us see what are the perfections inherent in bodies, and endeavour to distinguish them from those which are not corporeal.

VIII. In the first place, bodies are extensile: but this extension is contained within certain limits, because corporeal matter is imperfect. But God, who is free from all imperfection, cannot (so to speak) be finite, and must therefore necessarily have some attribute corresponding to infinite extension. And this is what is termed by theologians his *immensity* or *omnipresence*. But it is the less wonderful that we are unable to form a distinct and accurate notion of this attribute, since we have not an accurate and complete idea even of matter itself. On this account some philosophers have supposed that what we conceive of as a void and unbounded space, in which all bodies are placed, which is immoveable, immutable, prior to all bodies in existence, and the beginning of which cannot be understood, is nothing else than God himself. This opinion was embraced by Philo Judæus, as is apparent from many passages in his writings. In his book on Dreams,[2] for example, he says that God is to be called "*the Place*, since he contains all things, and is contained by none." I am unwilling to touch upon this thorny and very intricate question; but I must insist that there must necessarily be in God some perfection corresponding to infinite extension.

IX. Matter can be cut and divided; but not so God. For to be divisible is an imperfection, which arises from the finite nature of matter, and its capability of being moved, that is of being subject to the action of another being able to change its state. But God is able to divide bodies, since we ourselves,

[2] Page 575. ed. Paris. On this opinion, which is not yet extinct, we have already offered some observations.—*Mosheim*.

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imperfect as we are, are able to do this. There is however in this respect a great deal of difference between our own power and that of the Deity. God can by dividing and dissecting bodies come to the elements of which they consist. But we can only dissect them to a certain extent, namely so far as our senses can apprehend their particles. What is called solidity in bodies is only a mutual connexion and cohesion of the particles of which they consist, the causes and manner of which are unknown to us. If we are able to render compact and united the particles which otherwise would be dispersed and disjointed, much more is God able to do this; and he alone knows the reason, inscrutable to us, why they mutually adhere to each other. Therefore, though not possessing the attribute of solidity himself, he is able to confer it upon bodies. The adaptation of bodies to take a certain shape and form arises from their being finite, moveable, and visible. These properties being rather *passive* than *active*, cannot inhere in the Deity.

X. It is therefore plain that God contains all the perfections that are to be found in matter, and this would be much more clearly understood by us if we were acquainted with the internal nature of bodies. All that we know of them, however, suffices to prove that God possesses *eminently*, as the schoolmen say, that is in a far more excellent way, and without the admixture of any blemish or imperfection, all that appears in matter to have any appearance or semblance of perfection. Now if it be required to explain and describe that action of the Deity by which he brings into existence a body that was not in being before, and the manner in which he imparts to bodies the properties which we see they possess, we must ingenuously confess that the weakness of our minds will not allow of this; and that we can *à posteriori* ascertain only this one fact, that material beings were created by God. In all matter there is so much imperfection that it is impossible to believe that it has existed from eternity; nor does there appear in it any indication of its being everlastingly existent, and owing none of its properties to another being. It would be ridiculous and foolish presumption to think that the creation of matter was not to be admitted, because we cannot form by reasoning a clear and perspicuous idea of its creation. For there are innumerable things of which we have no clear and perspicuous ideas. And if we were immediately to deny the truth of all of which we could form only a confused and imperfect idea, we must deny almost every thing except the relations that exist between certain abstract ideas. Who can claim an acquaintance with the internal nature either of bodies or spirits? And yet that there are such beings does not admit of a doubt. Who can pretend to a knowledge of the manner in which one of these kinds of beings acts upon the

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other? Who can justly boast that he is acquainted with the causes which give rise to the effects which we see constantly happening in connexion with certain bodies? Yet no one will dare to doubt this operation of the soul on the body, or the effects produced by it. Let us, therefore, hold fast what we know for certainty, and not suffer ourselves to be moved from it because there are on the other hand many things, of the nature of which we are ignorant. Let us rather bear with tranquillity the reflection, that many things escape our faculties and exceed our knowledge.

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A DISSERTATION

BY

JOHN LAURENCE MOSHEIM,

SHOWING WHETHER ANY HEATHEN PHILOSOPHER EVER TAUGHT THAT THE WORLD WAS CREATED BY GOD OUT OF NOTHING.

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1. The doctrine of the creation of the world out of nothing was in force among Christians from the very commencement of Christianity. 2. Yet some disallowed it, particularly the followers of Origen and the Platonists. 3. Whether certain heathen philosophers were of the same opinion, is doubtful. 4. The utility of this question. 5. State of the controversy. 6. Two passages of Aristotle explained, which refer generally to this subject. 7. Opinions of the ancient philosophers respecting the origin of things explained and illustrated. 8. Verses of Empedocles relating to this subject. 9. Passages of Seneca. 10. Whether Orpheus allowed of a creation out of nothing. 11. On Hesiod. 12. On Xeniades, the Corinthian. 13. Certain Pythagoreans who seem to favour this opinion are rather chargeable with Spinozism. 14. Nor is it clear that Philolaus, the Pythagorean, embraced it. 15. Plato is supposed by many to be the favourer of a creation out of nothing. 16. This, however, is easily contradicted out of Plato himself. 17. Nor is any objection to this valid, drawn from his Timæus and Sophist, or from the Philebus. 18. Dacier's reasons in support of the affirmative futile. 19. Matter and sensible objects called "nothing" by the Platonists. 20. Whether a creation out of nothing was held by Aristotle or by the Stoics. 21. Or by the Egyptians. 22. Or by the Chinese. 23. Or by the Japanese. 24. Or by the Modern Hindoos. 25. Or by the ancient Brahmins. 26. Or by the Phœnicians. 27. Or by the ancient or modern Persians. 28. Or by the Etruscans. 29. Many ancients and moderns have supposed that some of the later Platonists have advocated a creation out of nothing. 30. Passages by them on this subject. 31. But all this sect believed the world to have existed from all eternity. 32. Those of them therefore who have said that matter was created, have meant only the "idea" of matter.

I. AMONG the doctrines justly esteemed sacred by Christians, as being taught by our Saviour, not the least important is that which refers the origin of the whole universe solely to the Deity, and inculcates a belief that the world was created and made out of nothing by the infinite power of God. This tenet was in force in the very commencement of Christianity, nor was any one admitted into church-fellowship without a public profession

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that God was the Creator and Author of all things, and even of matter itself, the material of which they consist; which fact alone, even if the scriptures were silent on the subject, would be an argument to candid and considerate persons that the doctrine proceeded from Christ and his apostles. The unknown ancient Christian writer, called Hermas, who lived in the first century, places this very tenet among the principles of the Christian religion which he enjoins all to receive. Πρῶτον πάντων, says he,[1] πιστεῦσον ὅτι εἷς ἐστιν ὁ Θεὸς ὁ τὰ πάντα κτίσας καὶ ποιήσας ἐκ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι, "First of all believe that there is one God, who created and made all things out of nothing." And Christian ministers afterwards constantly maintained the same doctrine, with a few exceptions in which human subtleties were preferred to Christian simplicity; a fact which, if it were necessary, might be proved by innumerable passages out of their writings. There are, moreover, extant long and able disputations of most of the ancient fathers against those who held that matter, like God, had existed from all eternity;[2] which clearly demonstrate what were their views respecting the creation. (There is a discussion by Beausobre on this subject, Histoire des Manichées, vol. 2. p. 166, but not characterized by much diligence or accuracy.) Wherefore those who within our own and our fathers' memory have rashly asserted that this opinion was not in existence previously to the time of the schoolmen, and that it was unknown to the primitive Christians (as it is certain some have done[3]), do not stand so much in need of a refutation as of an admonition to look to their own ignorance, and not to utter any more decisions till they have acquired a greater knowledge of ancient history and philosophy.

II. There can be no doubt that previously to the Christian era the Jews held the same opinion derived from Moses. (See 2 Maccabees vii. 28. This, however, is called in question by Beausobre, Histoire des Manichées, vol. 2. p. 182.) No church indeed is so pure and holy as not sometimes to contain some corrupt members, and therefore I will not deny that there were some, both among the Jews and the primitive Christians, who, rejecting the opinion publicly and generally entertained, preferred their own fancies respecting the origin of nature rather than the reception of the doctrines of holy writ. But it is

[1] Shepherd, lib. 2. commandment 1. p. 85. vol. 1. of Patres Apostolici, ed. Coteler. See also lib. 1. vision 1. p. 75.

[2] See the collections made from various writers by Eusebius, Prepar. Evangel. lib. 7. cap. 19. &c. p. 333. &c.

[3] James Windet, a learned English physician, in his book De Vitâ Functorum Statû, sect. 2. p. 48. says, "A certain madman, however, in his 'Introduction,' p. 19. has thought proper to accuse the schoolmen as having been the first to imagine a creation out of nothing, from an erroneous signification of the Hebrew word בָּרָא." Compare also Burnet's Archæologia Philos. lib. 2. cap. 9. p. 453.

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neither wise nor candid to form an opinion of the whole mass, or of a majority, from a few instances and examples. Procopius Gazæus, a respectable Scripture interpreter of the sixth century, says that in his time there were some who asserted that Moses learned from the Egyptians that the world was made by God out of a certain eternal kind of matter, and that therefore in the Greek Septuagint version of the first chapter of Genesis, the word ἐποίησε, "made," is made use of, which is also usually applied to the formation of things out of some material. I will adduce Procopius' own words from the Greek, which have been quoted by the Jesuit Stephen Souciet,[4] and will give a translation of them; since that of Clauser, published in his Comment on Genesis,[5] is obscure, and not faithful to the original. Τὸ γὰρ ἐποίησεν, ἐπειδὴ λέγεται καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκ τινὸς γιγομένων, οἷον ὅτι ἐκ σιδήρου δρέπανον ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ὁ τεχνίτης ἐποίησε, δέδωκε τισὶ λαβὴν τοῦ λέγειν, ὡς Μωυσῆς ἐξ Αἰγυπτίων μαθὼν ἐξ ὕλης προϋκειμένης γεγονέναι τὸ πᾶν, εἰκότως εἶπεν ἐποίησεν. Ὧν ἀγνοοῦντες τὴν συκοφαντίαν οἱ ἑρμηνεύσαντες ἐποίησεν εἶπαν, "Since the word ἐποίησε is used also of those things which are made from any material, as for instance when a workman makes a scythe out of iron, or any thing of a similar description, hence occasion has been given to some to say that Moses learning from the Egyptians that the universe was made out of pre-existing matter, agreeably to this opinion made use of the word ἐποίησε. Of whose cunning the translators being ignorant, rendered the Hebrew word by ἐποίησε." There were therefore at that time among Christians some, who not only denied the creation of the universe out of nothing, but also endeavoured to claim Moses as being of their opinion. (Several Christian authors holding the eternity of matter have been enumerated by Faydit, Eclaircissements sur l'Histoire Ecclesiastique, p. 35, who is not however implicitly to be trusted. Beausobre has mentioned his doubts respecting Justin Martyr, ubi supra, p. 165. See also p. 234.) I suspect that the disciples and followers of Origen are here aimed at; for since Origen allowed himself to be ensnared by the delusions of the later Platonists, he also followed them in maintaining the eternity of the universe, and asserted that God had from infinite ages always produced matter from himself, as is evident from Methodius,[6] and other passages already adduced

[4] In his "Observations" on the posthumous work of Richard Simon, which was published at Paris, 1730. 4 vols. 8vo. and entitled, Critique de la Bibliothèque des Auteurs Ecclesiastiques de M. Dupin, vol. 1. p. 690. Souciet owned himself to be the author of these "Observations," though his name does not appear on the title-page; so that it is a mistake to ascribe them to Tournemine, a learned antiquarian of the same order.

[5] Page 2 of the Latin edition by Conrad Clauser, Zurich, 1555. folio. This Comment has not yet been published in Greek.

[6] In his book Περὶ τῶν γεννητῶν, in Photius, Bibliothecæ, Codex 235. p. 934.

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by P. D. Huet,[7] by which doctrine he almost abrogated a creation out of nothing. He differed indeed a little from Hermogenes, Marcion, and others, who held that matter was equally eternal with God, and was not at all subject to the Deity; but these the vigilance of Christian ministers never suffered to be ranked among the number of orthodox Christians, but by their acts and writings expelled them from the church. Yet Origen agreed with them so far as to deny that all things were created by God out of nothing, though at the same time he affirmed that matter, out of which all things were made, depended from all eternity upon God. From Origen, whose authority among Christians of the third and fourth centuries was incredible, and from the Platonic philosophers, who enjoyed at that time the highest reputation, this dangerous sentiment was derived to several others, and infected the minds of some, both Greeks and Latins, who were in other respects considered advocates and defenders of purer doctrine. I will give one instance out of many, in a great man who was canonized after his death; I mean Boethius, who exactly followed the Platonists respecting the universe, and disallowed its eternity, while admitting it to have been perpetual. "Therefore," says he, "if we wish to denominate things correctly, following Plato, we say that God is eternal but the world perpetual." So that even among those Christians who were not otherwise chargeable with any serious doctrinal errors, there were some who repudiated the ancient doctrine respecting the origin of the universe; but this is no reason why we should not consider the public and common opinion among the primitive Christians to have been, that through divine power what formerly had no existence began to be and exist at the time when the world was created. I say nothing now of another sort of Christians, among whom there were some eminent men, who formed a kind of connecting link between Platonists and Christians, and who granted that the visible universe was made by God out of nothing, but at the same time held that another and a far better universe, which could not yet be seen, had together with God existed from all eternity;[8] a part of which opinion was also adopted by those among the Greeks who in the fourteenth century were called Palamites, and some later divines among the Roman Catholics.

III. It is not however agreed among the learned whether, besides the Jews and Christians, who derived this tenet from the Scriptures, any heathen or infidel philosophers ever attained so far under the sole guidance of reason as to hold that the whole universe, not only in its form but also in its

[7] In his Origeniana, lib. 2. quest. 12. sect. 4. p. 165.

[8] See Basil the Great's Comment. in Hexaëmeron, hom. 1. sect. 5. p. 5 of the 1st vol. of his works.

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material, was made by God. It is thought by many that the whole crowd of philosophers, Greek, Latin, and Barbarian, all who were not acquainted with divine revelation, either considered the universe itself to be eternal, or at least held that the matter composing the universe had no beginning, supposing that it received the form it now bears by means of some law or natural motion, or else that it was so ordered and arranged by God. "All philosophers," says Gassendi,[9] "agree in the pre-existence of the matter of which the universe is composed, because nothing can be produced from nothing; whereas, however, scripture truth declares that the universe was created out of nothing, and from no material." With him agree many respectable and learned authors, among whom, to prevent tediousness, it will be sufficient for me to name James Thomas,[10] who is known to have been well versed in the doctrines and opinions of the ancients. (Other authorities are given by Beausobre.) Thomas Burnet has gone further still, denying that the Jews believed the creation of the universe out of nothing, and maintaining that this doctrine is not of older date than the Christian religion. "It is to be remarked," says he,[1] "that the ancients believed that out of nothing nothing was produced, and that all substance always did and always will exist in some mode or other. For the doctrine respecting the eduction of beings from nothing and their annihilation was unknown to the philosophers, and seems to have been first introduced by Christian theology." And shortly after: "Creation and annihilation in the modern sense are factitious words; for no single word is to be found either in Hebrew, Greek, or Latin, possessing anciently this signification." This, however, is strenuously opposed by others not inferior in learning; who, though they do not deny that many of the ancient philosophers were ignorant of a creation out of nothing, yet think that some of them, more able than the rest, attained by dint of thought to this opinion, and that others were instructed by their ancestors to entertain the same opinion as Christians respecting the origin of nature. This opinion was mooted by some of the Christian fathers, who are known to have anxiously avoided the appearance of any discrepancy between the doctrines of the philosophers and those of Christianity. Among these Clemens Alexandrinus asserted that not only Plato and Orpheus, but also the Stoics themselves maintained

[9] Physics, sect. 1. lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 163. tom. 1. opp. See also lib. 7. cap. 6. p. 481. 484. &c.

[10] Schediasma Philosophicum, sect. 37. p. 54. 55.

[1] Archæologia Philosophica, lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 326. See also lib. 2. cap. 9. p. 453; and Francis Baltus's Défense des Pères accusés de Platonisme, lib. 3. p. 325. "Neither Plato nor the other ancient philosophers have ever recognized a creation properly so called."

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that the world was made out of nothing.[2] The moderns, however, who have lived since the revival of literature, have defended this view with greater ability and erudition; their object being to give a more favourable aspect in some minds to the Christian religion, by showing that its most difficult doctrines were formerly embraced by those who had no other guide than the light of reason. Augustine Steuchus, bishop of Eugubium, throughout the whole of the seventh book of his well-known work De Perenni Philosophiâ, does nothing but endeavour to prove that all philosophers of every locality and description, among Greeks and Barbarians, admitted that God was the Creator and Architect of the universe. But he is not so explicit as the nature of the case requires, nor does he show with sufficient clearness whether he merely means that these philosophers denied the eternity of the universe, or whether he supposes that they held that matter itself was made out of nothing by God. There is no doubt but that the most eminent and excellent among the ancient philosophers supposed the universe to have had a beginning, that it did not always exist, and even that it was constructed and put together by divine contrivance. But it is very doubtful whether any of them ever said that the matter itself of which the universe is composed had no existence before it was produced by divine omnipotence. Steuchus gives hints here and there, from which it may be with great probability concluded that he was favourable to the opinion which supposes that the material of the universe was an efflux from the Divine nature itself; and it must also be remarked that he supposed a certain divine and uncreated light to have existed from eternity, and to have flowed from the Deity himself; which opinion of his has been severely censured by Dionysius Petavius.[3] Hence it appears, that he himself did not entertain precisely correct opinions concerning the origin of things, and seems in a manner himself to have denied the creation of the universe out of nothing; whence the reason is very obvious why he speaks with such obscurity and confusion on this topic. I mention this for the sake of those who say that Steuchus has shown more copiously than any one else, that there was no difference between the ancient philosophers and Christians on the origin of nature: an assertion which, taken without any modification, is undoubtedly erroneous. Those who have written on this subject since the time of Steuchus have not thrown much more light upon it. Hugo Grotius endeavours to prove[4] that the Phœnicians, Hin-

[2] Stromata, lib. 5. cap. 14. p. 701. 724. See also Eusebius, Demonstratio Evangelica, lib. 3. cap. 3. p. 106.

[3] Dogmat. Theol. tom. 1. lib. 3. De Deo et Proprietatibus Dei, cap. 5. sect. 3. p. 144. &c.

[4] In the notes to his book De Veritate Religionis Christianæ, lib. 1. sect. 16. p. 29.

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doos, Egyptians, and Greeks, agreed with Moses respecting the origin of the universe; but he has left his readers to guess how far he meant this affirmation to extend, and does not clearly signify whether he supposed that even Moses himself taught a creation out of nothing. Peter Daniel Huet, in his Questions on the Accordance of Reason and Faith, which he has entitled Alnetanæ, in a remarkable chapter,[5] has taken upon himself to prove that the most famous philosophers had the same views of the origin of the universe as the ancient Hebrews and Christians; and at the very commencement of his discussion he mentions that three opinions were entertained respecting the universe, the first place among which he assigns to that which supposes that all things were created by God out of nothing. But he afterwards entirely forgets this classification, and does not point out which of the philosophers whose sentiments he mentions he intends to comprehend under the first class, with the single exception of Plato, whom he expressly affirms to have referred the formation of all things to the Deity. Almost the same deficiency is to be met with in Tobias Pfanner, a similar writer. He says[6] that many philosophers, though they held that God was the maker of the universe, yet joined with him an eternal matter; but at the same time he notices that some of them were much better than others, and ascribed a beginning to matter also. But it will be in vain to inquire of him who, out of the long list he has mentioned, those were who entertained the orthodox sentiment. But there are not wanting others who have been less ambiguous in the explanation of this subject, and have mentioned by name those who have thought that not only the form but also the matter of the universe had a beginning. For to pass by those, some of whom I shall hereafter mention, who have proved that one or another of the philosophers have entertained this opinion, Livius Galantes, a professor of both kinds of philosophy at Imola, has endeavoured to prove that not a few of the Platonists had opinions respecting the origin of the universe not inferior to those of Christians.[7] This has been also done by Cudworth, who has given us the occasion of making these observations, and supposes that as in other things so also in this particularly, the later Platonists are not to be considered much below the Christians.[8] Others have gone a little further, and have endeavoured to bring into the association of those who hold this opinion not only the Platonists, but also all the Greek and Barbarian philosophers of any name or standing. Edmund Dickinson, an Englishman, thinks

[5] Lib. 2. cap. 5. p. 109.
[6] Systema Theologiæ Gentilis Purioris, cap. 5. sect. 3. &c. p. 156.
[7] Comparatio Christianæ Theologiæ cum Platonicâ, lib. 9. p. 236. Bologna, 1627, fol.
[8] Intellectual System, cap. 5. sect. 2. p. 73, &c.

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that all the ancient natural philosophers before Aristotle, as well as the Phœnicians, Egyptians, and also Hesiod, supposed the Supreme Deity to be the artificer and creator of matter.[9] Among the divines of our own [Lutheran] communion, Adam Tribbechovius[1] thinks that all the ancients, with few exceptions, entertained no doubt respecting the origin of matter. J. A. Fabricius[2] has also done something towards proving the truth of the same view; and has quoted some passages from the ancients not noticed by others. Very recently the authors of the Universal History, in their Prolegomena, translated last year into French, maintain that not only some of the more excellent of the Greeks, but also the Etruscans, Magi, Hindoos, Japanese, Chinese, and others, were but little different from the Christian religion in this particular.[3] It is not necessary to enumerate any more of the same opinion; since these are by far the principal for weight of authority, extent of learning, and number of quotations.

IV. This disagreement among learned men has induced me to take some pains in the elucidation of this question, which I shall attempt in the present Dissertation. Nor is this inquiry of small importance. For since it is always useful to know how far those who possessed not divine revelation attained in the knowledge of the truth, so at the present time it is requisite to understand how much confidence may be assigned to those who are always talking about the unison of philosophy with Christianity; who are constantly accused by many inimical to all religion of ignorance of antiquity and of pious frauds, while by others they are thought to occasion more injury than advantage to the interests of Christianity. I say nothing of the benefits resulting to those who have to explore the recesses of philosophic or of sacred history, and to ascertain the real nature of the doctrines and opinions which were taught by the founders of philosophic sects and by the bishops of Christian churches. I will therefore go over in order, those to whom learned men have attributed the honour of a uniformity of belief respecting the origin of nature with the followers of our Saviour, and I will candidly inquire whether they merit this degree of commendation. First of all I will bring under notice the Grecian philosophers who have had the credit of this opinion, and from whom the Latins afterwards derived their doctrines; then I will pro-

[9] Physice Vetus et Vera, cap. 12. De Creatione Materiæ, p. 195. 198.

[1] In a Dissertation entitled Veritas Creationis Mundi, prout à Mose descripta est, ostensa in Traditionibus, Gentium ac Vetustissimis Antiquitatis Profanæ Monumentis, Kiel, 1668; which has been reprinted by Thomas Cren, and published in his Fasciculus Dissertationum Historico-Critico-Philologicarum, Rotterdam, 1691, 8vo.; cap. 2, p. 276, and elsewhere.

[2] Bibliotheca Græca, lib. 2. cap. 12. sect. 7. p. 464.

[3] P. 139. ed. Hague, 1731.

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ceed to the nations that are usually termed "barbarous," in accordance with the custom of the Greeks and Romans; and last of all will come in the later Platonists, who founded an entirely new and peculiar sect; the nature of which I have elsewhere explained, and who have more patrons and defenders than the other ancient philosophers; on which account I think it necessary to treat of them separately and more in detail.

V. But before I come to the point in dispute, it will be necessary for me carefully to define what is the precise subject in question, and to be discussed; lest any opening should be left for the unskilful or the contentious. The inquiry is not whether any philosopher or other individual of intellect or ability, but destitute of divine revelation, ever attained so far as to believe that God was the only maker of this world either as regards form or material; nor yet, whether the doctrine of a creation out of nothing be one of those which unassisted human reason could of itself discover. I am persuaded that such is the power of the human mind, especially of those who through the favour of Divine Providence are able to perceive the consequences and the repugnances of things, that even without divine revelation they may be able to know and comprehend that to join with God an eternal matter, and to suppose that from this he formed the world, involves inextricable difficulties, and leads to very absurd and irrational conclusions; and that on this account they might conclude that the universe was altogether created by God, though their mental ability was entirely inadequate to explain how this came to pass. And in this opinion I am supported by those who cannot be accused of ignorance or stupidity, or of an undue partiality for the interests of Christianity. Benedict Pererius, a very learned Jesuit, whose works, though now neglected, are not destitute of ability or eloquence, brings, as I remember, eight arguments from which reason alone might ascertain that in the doctrine of a creation out of nothing, there was no great cause of offence to any wise man.[4] (See Bibliotheca Britannica, vol. 5. sect. 1. p. 145.) And among these there are some that could not fail to strike the mind of any one sincerely desirous after truth. Bayle also[5] endeavours to prove by the most weighty reasons, that no one who wishes to avoid the most absurd opinions can doubt that the material of the universe proceeded from God. Two of the greatest philosophers of our own day, John Locke and Sir Isaac Newton, not only contend that the creation of the universe is consistent with right reason, but also maintain that we can in some sort comprehend the mode of this, if we endeavour to emancipate ourselves from

[4] De Communibus Omnium Rerum Naturalium Principiis et Affectionibus.
[5] Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, vol. 3. art. Ovidius, note C. p. 2140.

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the bonds of popular opinions on the subject.[6] Though this may be rather too bold an assertion, yet since it is made by authorities which few will object to when subjects of a difficult and transcendental nature are in question, it is something in favour of those who hold that the darkness of our minds need not prevent us from ascending up to one Parent and Maker of the whole universe. And who does not know that those who have by their writings confuted infidels, have by weighty arguments convicted them of ignorance and dulness in supposing that the universe, or at least the matter of which it is composed, never had a beginning. I know that no stone has been left unturned by the enemies of God and the foes of religion, to prove that the Christian doctrine respecting the origin and commencement of nature is in the highest degree irrational; among whom Count Boulainvilliers may claim the first place for boldness and cunning.[7] But after all their efforts they can do nothing more than prove what no wise man will deny, that the human mind is too limited to take in and comprehend so great a subject; but it is quite beyond their power to prove, what however they ought to prove in order to gain their point, that to suppose a necessary and self-existent Being capable of forming something out of nothing, involves a contradiction.[8] These things being considered, I will readily grant that not one perhaps, but several formerly existed, unknown to us at the present day, who so far raised themselves by dint of reasoning above the vulgar as to admit that the Deity made the world out of no pre-existing material. The question here, therefore, will be respecting those sects and philosophers whose books or opinions have come down to our own times; nor shall we inquire what they might have thought under the guidance of reason, but what they really did think, and what they inculcated on others. To sum up the whole in a few words: I shall only undertake to examine whether among the ancients or their philosophers, whose tenets and doctrines are recorded in literature, or whose writings are still extant, any were so sober and rational as to conclude that God not only brought the universe into shape, but also by his infinite power formed and created matter which had no previous existence.

VI. Those who are in favour of the affirmative of this proposition, in the first place appeal to some passages of the ancients

[6] Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, lib. 4. cap. 10. sect. 18. p. 566. and also the Observations of Peter Coste on this passage, in a recent edition of the French translation, Amsterdam, 1729. 4to.

[7] Refutation du Système de Spinoza, as his pestiferous book is entitled, which ought rather to have been inscribed Explication et Défense des Sentimens de Spinoza, p. 68.

[8] On this subject it is worth while to consult the remarks of Isaac Orobio, a learned Jew, in his Certamen Philosophicum Propugnatæ Veritatis Divinæ et Naturalis adversus Johannem Bredenberg, p. 400 & 463.

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from which they think this may be generally understood. Two of these are taken from Aristotle, one from Empedocles, and the last from Seneca. Aristotle has left it on record that all the philosophers previously to himself affirmed that heaven was generated or made: Γενόμενον μὲν οὖν ἅπαντες εἶναί φασιν.[9] These words have been interpreted by Dickinson and others as if Aristotle meant that all the ancient sages thought that the world was made out of nothing. But it is obvious that this is an unwarranted assumption. For does the assertion that any thing is made and produced involve at the same time the affirmation that nothing existed from which it could be generated and made? Many of the ancients, indeed, attributed to the universe a beginning and origin; but they did not on that account the less strenuously maintain that matter had existed from eternity. An additional consideration, which entirely refutes this exposition, is, that Aristotle in other passages, which I shall presently adduce, says that all the natural philosophers denied that out of nothing any thing could be produced. The other passage of Aristotle has a more specious appearance, and may occasion a great deal of perplexity to those who estimate the expressions of the ancients according to our own modes of speech. The leader of the Peripatetics is disputing against Xenophanes, who had held that out of nothing, nothing could be produced, and wishes to show that this tenet was neither true nor was approved of by all the philosophers; a point which he proves without much ingenuousness, for, like the sophists, he changes the meanings of words in order to overwhelm his opponent. This however by the bye. Let us now only attend to the manner in which he shows that there were some who thought that from nothing something could be produced: Λέγεταί τε καὶ σφόδρα ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν γίγνεσθαί τε τὰ μὴ ὄντα, καὶ μὴ γεγονέναι πολλὰ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι οἱ τυγχάνοντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν δοξάντων εἶναι σοφῶν τινες εἰρήκασιν,[10] "And it is often said by them that the things that are not exist, and that not many things have existed of things that are not; and this not the vulgar merely, but even some of those who are accounted wise men have said." He then subjoins a passage out of Hesiod; and afterwards passes on to another sect: Πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ ἕτεροι εἶναι μὲν οὐδέν φασι, γίνεσθαι δὲ πάντα· λέγοντες ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων γίνεσθαι τὰ γινόμενα· ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν δῆλον ὅτι ἐν οἷς γε δοκεῖ καὶ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἂν γίνεσθαι, "Many others say that nothing *is*, but that all things *exist*, asserting that existing things exist out of things that are not; so that it is plain that to some it appears that they exist out of things that are not." It is plain that two sects of philosophers are here alluded

[9] Lib. 1. de Cœlo, cap. 10. p. 632. tom. 1. opp.
[10] De Xenophane, Zenone, et Gorgiâ, cap. 1. p. 836. tom. 2. opp.

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to by Aristotle as maintaining that something can be produced out of nothing. Can there then exist a doubt that this doctrine was advocated by some among the ancient sages? Indeed, I still doubt it, and hope to be able show that this passage of the Stagirite is not sufficient entirely to remove all hesitation on this subject. In the first place I will call upon Aristotle himself, who in many other places says that the whole crowd of natural philosophers esteemed nothing to be more ancient and important than the axiom, Ex nihilo nihil fit. On one occasion he says that the first professors of philosophy feared nothing more than the admission of any thing inconsistent with this dogma: Ὅ *μάλιστα φοβούμενοι διετέλεσαν οἱ πρῶτοι φιλοσοφήσαντες, τὸ ἐκ μηδενὸς γένεσθαι προϋπάρχοντος.*[1] In another place he says that "the common opinion of naturalists," *κοινὴν δόξαν τῶν φυσικῶν,*[2] was such as we have mentioned. And many other similar expressions are to be found in Aristotle's writings, which it is not necessary here to transcribe. That Aristotle was correct in making these assertions may be known from the opinions of the naturalists and philosophers which are recorded by him, and explained in other writings of the ancients. How then can he contradict himself, and in the passage which we have under consideration affirm, that an important section of philosophers held that many things were created out of nothing? But it is easy to perceive that this observation will not be sufficient to overturn the views of those who maintain that the ancient philosophers did not greatly differ from the doctrines of Christianity. Therefore I will come more directly to the passage under discussion, and will show that it must be understood in a sense widely different from what it appears to bear to those who annex modern ideas to ancient expressions. And in the first place, I wish to observe that Aristotle is not here speaking of the creation and origin of the universe at large, but only of the production of the things we perceive by daily experience in our own world; whence it is evident that even if these words were to be taken in the sense put upon them, yet they would afford little aid to those who seek for a creation by divine power out of nothing among the tenets of the ancient philosophers. For though to believe that something is made out of nothing when an animal, a tree, or any other being is produced, involves some necessity, for the sake of consistency, of admitting that God once created all things out of nothing; yet still the cases are far from being identical. In the next place, I contend that the very words of Aristotle are opposed to the supposition that any of the ancient philosophers were so acute as to entertain the same sentiments

[1] Lib. 1. De Generatione et Corruptione, cap. 3. p. 705. tom. 1. opp.
[2] Natural. Auscult. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 450.

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as the Christians did respecting the origins of things. Two kinds of philosophers are evidently spoken of by Aristotle; the first of which held, as he says, τὰ μὴ ὄντα γίγνεσθαι, "that the things that are not, exist." If the term τὰ μὴ ὄντα be here taken in the sense of *nothing* or *nonentity*, the opinion mentioned will be most foolish and absurd. For these philosophers would then be made to say that nothing, a nonentity, existed; that is, that what neither does nor can exist, yet began to be and exist. So that, unless we suppose the philosophers so greatly praised by Aristotle to be utterly deranged, we must conclude that the words τὰ μὴ ὄντα must have had with them a very different meaning from that of "nothing." The other kind of philosophers are said by the Stagirite to inculcate "that nothing *is*, but that all things *exist*;" to explain which he adds, that they held that ἐκ μὴ ὄντων "of things that are not all things exist." If in this sentence the phrase τὰ μὴ ὄντα has the same meaning as "nothing," then these teachers would inculcate that all things which now exist and are produced, are made out of no material, but are entirely created and produced, nor is there now any material from which any thing could be produced; for they do not say that all things once existed out of nothing, but that they always do so; nor do they say that there was once a time when nothing *was*, but that nothing *is*. Thus then they would have taught that something *is* and *is* not; for things that exist and are generated, certainly *are*; and they must have entirely annulled the evidence of the senses, and yet at the same time have asserted their infallibility; to say nothing of other consequences equally absurd and ridiculous, for which they must be held accountable if this were their meaning. On which account it is plain that these words of Aristotle are to be explained in a widely different sense from what is assigned to them by those who think they have in them discovered philosophers who are in favour of a creation out of nothing; nor do the words τὰ μὴ ὄντα bear the meaning of "nothing."

VIII. I will now try whether I can so explain the opinions mentioned by Aristotle, and which are at the present day involved in obscurity, as to make his meaning apparent to all. This endeavour will not be without its use, since it will afford me the opportunity of making some observations, of which I perceive many to be ignorant, yet without which it is impossible correctly to explain the doctrines either of the ancient philosophers or primitive Christians. I will begin with the words τὸ ὂν and τὸ μὴ ὂν, which gradually, as often happens, acquired a very different meaning from what they had in earlier Greek periods. Τὸ ὂν, among the most ancient Greek philosophers, meant what is immutable, constant, perennial, fixed, and definite; τὸ μὴ ὂν what does not possess a certain and constant

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nature, but is perpetually flowing, changing, gliding onwards, and altering. If proof of this be required it may be found in Aristotle's Physics, his books De Generatione et Corruptione, and his Metaphysics, and also in Plato's Parmenides and other dialogues; though it will be sufficiently evident from what will be presently adduced. Now, of all the controversies that divided the ancient speculative philosophers, this was among the principal: —whether or not there were any τὸ ὂν, any immutable nature free from all change. The affirmative was held by many great and famous men, and the negative by others. Those who maintained that there was a τὸ ὂν, some abiding nature entirely free from all actual change, were yet divided among themselves as to what kind or description it was of. Those who on the other hand contended that the universe was subject to perpetual changes, and thought that nothing was stable, but every thing transitory, were again very diversified in their opinions when they came to speak more in detail respecting the whole question, and to give an account of natural phenomena. On this discord and variety of opinions which divided the ancient sages, much more might be easily said; but my present purpose compels me to study brevity. But in nothing was there a wider and greater difference between these philosophic sects than in the explanation of the production of all things; a subject which at all times greatly exercised the minds of those who endeavoured to explain the causes of natural events. Those who believed there was a stable and immutable nature, τὸ ὂν, made no doubt but that out of this all things were produced that are in existence, yet in such a manner that this nature should receive no injury, but remain always one and the same, though it were changed into various forms and shapes. Those, on the contrary, who had decided that all things suffered a perpetual flux and eternal mutation, could not but hold that not only external forms and appearances were changed when any thing was brought into existence, but that also the internal nature of the material was changed and altered. And these two sects were parted into several subdivisions, to speak of which particularly would take up a great deal of time. Therefore, although there were many opinions among the ancients respecting the origin and production of things, which are often brought under review by Aristotle[3] and other ancient authors; yet they may all be reduced with propriety to these two general heads. Some taught that all things were produced and created ἐκ τῶν ὄντων, "of things that truly *are*;" which was the opinion of those who believed in the τὸ ὂν, though, as I have already observed, they were not all agreed

[3] Lib. 1. De Generatione et Corruptione, cap. 1. p. 697. cap. 3. p. 704. Physic. Auscult. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 451. lib. 3. De Cœlo, cap. 1. p. 687. tom. 1. opp.

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among themselves, Others, opposed to these, decided that all things were made and produced ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, which is the same thing as if they had said that in production things became what they were not previously, and passed into another nature; and this was the opinion of those who contended that there was nothing immutable or free from change. It will be proper to confirm this difference of opinion among the ancients respecting the generation of things by the words of Aristotle himself, since our principal business at present is to ascertain the force and meaning of his words. Zeno, Parmenides, and Melissus supposed that there was a τὸ ὄν, a stable and immutable nature, as is well known to those who are acquainted with the history of ancient philosophy; therefore they were reckoned among those who taught that all things were produced and created ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος. Aristotle says of Zeno: Πρῶτον μὲν ὂν λαμβάνει καὶ οὗτος τὸ γιγνόμενον γίγνεσθαι ἐξ ὄντος, ὥσπερ ὁ Μέλισσος,[4] "And first indeed he also, like Melissus, supposes that what exists, exists *out of what is*;" that is, that beneath all things that exist there lies concealed one perpetual and immutable nature, which in different ways passes into such various forms. Those who were of this way of thinking were said by ancient writers entirely to annul all generation and corruption; an expression, which not being correctly understood by writers of succeeding ages, led them into an entirely absurd opinion of these philosophers. For they have left it on record, that it was believed by persons of this description, that nothing at all was born or died, and that no motion existed, which if they had maintained they must have been plainly stupid and mad, and more worthy of any name than that of philosophers. So that I am sorry that modern writers of ability and acuteness should have been so incautious as to make no doubt but that this was correctly attributed to them; an error which they might have avoided by greater diligence in the examination of the modes of expression made use of by the ancients. But on this subject I have already made some observations elsewhere;[5] to which I may now add that I was very glad when I understood that great and acute man, Peter Gassendi, not to differ greatly from my own opinion.[6] Those who were opposed to the philosophers of whom I have been speaking, and who denied the existence of any stable and perennial substratum of all things, said that every thing was produced ἐκ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, "from things that *are not*." Aristotle says of this class: Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὁμολογοῦσιν ἁπλῶς γίνεσθαί τι ἐκ μη ὄντος, "For first they confess that any thing simply exists out of what *is not*;" that is, they taught that when things

[4] De Xenophane, Zenone, et Gorgiâ, cap. 4. p. 841. tom. 1. opp.
[5] Notes on Cudworth, vol. 1. pp. 528. 529.
[6] See his Physics, sect. 1. lib. 7. cap. 1. p. 458. tom. 1. opp.

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are produced what was not before, had an existence. Between these two sects, which had however many internal subdivisions, there were certain of a middle way of thinking, who while admitting the being of a τὸ ὄν, yet at the same time asserted the existence of something ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, though even they did not all agree in the way in which this was to be understood. Aristotle in a manner associated himself with these, since it is plain that he taught that all things existed and were produced from matter or *entity*, and an immaterial addition which he termed *nonentity*. This is a subtle opinion, which many say cannot be understood; on which account I will express it in the author's own words: Συντόμως δὲ καὶ νῦν λέκτεον, ὅτι τρόπον μέν τινα ἐκ μὴ ὄντος ἁπλῶς γίνεται, τρόπον δὲ ἄλλον ἐξ ὄντος ἀεί· τὸ γὰρ δυνάμει ὂν, ἐντελεχείᾳ δὲ μὴ ὄν, ἀνάγκη προϋπάρχειν, "For the present we must shortly say that in a manner existence is *from nonentity* and in another manner always *from entity*; for it is necessary that *entity* should pre-exist in power and *nonentity* in action." With these explanations it will be much easier to understand than at first appears, what is the meaning we ought to attach to those words of Aristotle which have given rise to our present observations. A certain sect of philosophers, who believed in the existence of τὰ μὴ ὄντα, and that from these again a few things were created. They evidently then held the belief of a τὸ ὄν, a certain immutable nature, without which no creation could take place; and that from this material were produced τὰ μὴ ὄντα, things which have no innate permanency, but which are transitory, having no stability; which come daily into existence, and are again dissolved and return to their own elements. But what is the meaning of their thinking that out of "the things that *are not*," some things but not many, μὴ πολλὰ, are created and produced? Did these philosophers think that out of those transitory things which are created from a perpetual and immutable material, new natures could rise into existence? This I can never believe; nor can I ascertain the purport and object of this opinion. I could wish Aristotle had spoken more plainly; for here, as well as in innumerable other passages, he writes as if he thought that every body kept a sphinx at home, to which they might apply for divining enigmas. The "few things" which these philosophers are said to have believed to be created "out of the things that *are not*" are not at all things or beings, or, to speak philosophically, *substances*, but only certain *accidents* of things. They therefore taught that in all productions the first portions were to be attributed to a stable and immutable material; but that to every thing produced were added certain things which were not previously in the material, and therefore arise, so to speak, out of nothing. But what were these? Doubtless such as shape, size, position, motion, rest;

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which are not properly inherent in the matter from which things are made, but arise from its concretion and different admixture, and can therefore be said in a manner to be made of things that are not. If Aristotle's words be thus explained, as in my opinion they ought to be explained, there may be easily recognized in them the philosophy of the followers of Democritus and Epicurus. For these first of all laid down the existence of a τὸ ὄν, or a certain fixed and definite number of individual atoms, the internal nature of which it is impossible to alter; and from these atoms they decided were made τὰ μὴ ὄντα, other things which have no permanency, but whose nature is gradually to wear away and dissolve; and lastly they held that external conformation, size, appearance, and motion, were produced in a manner from the things that are not. The second sect, which he afterwards mentions, differed very much from these; since they denied the existence of τὸ ὄν, any stable, immoveable, and definite nature; and held, on the contrary, that all things were carried forward by a perpetual motion; which is shown with sufficient perspicuity by Aristotle when he says that they taught οὐδὲν εἶναι, that "nothing *is*," but γίγνεσθαι, "that all things exist;" that nothing was stationary, permanent, and unchangeable, but that all things passed not only from one shape to another, but also from one nature to another without limit or end. Hence they also necessarily taught, as he adds, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων γίνεσθαι τὰ γινόμενα, "that all things which exist, exist out of things that *are not*;" that is, in all productions, that the thing itself out of which any other thing exists, is changed and becomes different from what it was before; and that creation does not consist wholly in concretion, separation, aggregation, or diminution.

VIII. Aristotle has detained me longer than I had expected, yet I do not think I shall have lost my labour, since this explanation of certain principles of ancient philosophy is of some use towards a clearer knowledge than is usual of similar passages, not only of Aristotle but also of other ancient writers. In the elucidation of the passages of Empedocles and Seneca, which are quoted on this subject, less sagacity and diligence will be required. Plutarch has preserved for us the following verses of Empedocles:[7]

Νήπιοι· οὐ γάρ σφιν δολιχόφρονες εἰσὶ μέριμναι,
Οἱ δὴ γίνεσθαι πάρος οὐκ ἐὸν ἐλπίζουσιν
Ἤτοι καταθνήσκειν τε καὶ ἐξόλλυσθαι ἁπάντη.

"Foolish and short-sighted are they who hope that any thing which is not can exist, or that any thing can perish and be utterly destroyed." To the quotation of which verses Plutarch

[7] Libro adv. Colotem, p. 1113. tom. 2. opp.

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ls this explanation of them: Οὐκ ἀναίρει γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὴ ὄντος, οὐδὲ φθορὰν, ἀλλὰ τὴν πάντη, τουτέστι τὴν εἰς τὸ μὴ ἀπολύουσαν, "He does not take away all production, but ly that which is from what is not; nor yet corruption, ex-ɔting that which is entire, that is that in which things are luced to what is not." The most learned men think that in ɜse words Empedocles is refuting those who thought that all ngs were produced and made out of nothing; whence they erwards conclude that there were then living some philosophers ıo were of this opinion; since no wise man will fight with ıdows, and refute opinions which no one ever entertained. ıt perhaps these great men will pardon me for thinking that ɜy discover more in the verses of Empedocles than is really ıtained in them. For the philosopher is not speaking in them the creation of the universe out of nothing, but of the daily ɔduction and corruption of things. Many of the Pythago-ıns (to which sect Empedocles belonged) thought that there s a certain and eternal quantity of things, out of which all ɔductions are formed by a certain mutation of particles, and o which they are again dissolved when they seem to perish, ɜ total quantity still remaining the same and unalterable. This ɜtrine is the one taught in these verses; but is explained with ɜater elegance and beauty by Ovid when versifying the tenets Pythagoras; and it is worth while to quote the passage, as ng admirably adapted to illustrate the meaning of Empedocles:

> Nec perit in tanto quicquam, mihi credite, mundo,
> Sed variat, faciemque novat: nascique vocatur
> Incipere esse aliud, quàm quod fuit antè, morique
> Desinere illud idem: cùm sint huc forsitan illa,
> Hæc translata illuc: *summâ tamen omnia constant.*[8]

t most persons, who are not accustomed to abstract their ıds from what is seen by their eyes, persuade themselves that ıething new is born and made, when they see any thing pro-ɜd and existing; and, when any thing is destroyed, they ɛe no doubt but that it has entirely perished and come to hing. Empedocles confutes and ridicules this foolish opinion the vulgar, and therefore does not at all attack those philo-hers who taught that the very basis or material of things did exist previously to its being made out of nothing by God; ɔm, if indeed he had wished to refute them, he would have ıted with more polite and gentle language than calling them ish, and perplexed about unnecessary trifles. The common ple, who are full of business, and only believe their own eyes, might well speak of in such harsh terms; but not philoso-

[8] Metamorphoses, lib. 15. v. 255. &c.

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phers, who were so zealously addicted to contemplative habits of thought as by their meditations to have gone beyond matter, and discovered that at one time nothing had existed. The same answer may be given to those who call in Lucretius to their aid on this subject, and who, because this poet laboriously and copiously proves that out of nothing nothing can be produced,[9] take this for an argument that there were some in his day who thought that the world was created out of nothing. For he undertakes to prove nothing except that there are definite causes for every thing that happens in this world, and that all that is produced and made is formed out of matter already in existence. To this it may be added that those who are defending by solid argument any doctrine against all aggressions, do not always thus act because they are aware that there are some persons who are averse to it, but often only in order to confirm and corroborate their subsequent positions, and to give them greater access to the human mind.

IX. There remains a passage of Seneca, on which I must speak before I come to particular sects and individuals. Speaking of the benefits derivable from the study of philosophy, among other expressions he uses the following: "Quàm utile existimas ista cognoscere, et rebus terminos ponere? Quantum Deus possit: *materiam ipse sibi formet*, an datâ utatur? Utrùm idea materiæ priùs superveniat, an materia ideæ, "How useful dost thou think it to know these things, and to assign bounds to things? How far extends the power of God; *did he form matter for himself*, or make use of that given? Whether the idea was prior to matter, or matter to the idea."[10] Authors have supposed that from these words it is evident that Seneca doubted whether matter were formed by the Deity out of nothing, or whether it had existed from eternity; since he says that this question can be solved only by the aid of philosophy. Justus Lipsius, after observing that all the ancient philosophers agreed with Democritus, who taught that out of nothing, nothing could be produced, proceeds to say, "And yet it is wonderful that Seneca doubts whether God is the creator of matter. For he thus speaks in his Quæstiones Naturales . . . . . Thus he hesitates to believe what some Christians have not been ashamed to deny, asserting with the ancients the eternity of matter."[1] A similar opinion is entertained by G. J. Vossius, who says, "It is remarkable that among the Gentiles Seneca alone has not dared to affirm that matter is eternal; but doubted on this point: for thus he writes in his Quæstiones Naturales," &c. &c.[2]

[9] De Naturâ Rerum, lib. 1. v. 149. &c. p. 153.
[10] Præf. Quæstion. Natural. tom. 2. opp. p. 485.
[1] Physiologia Stoica, lib. 2. diss. 2. p. 57, a.
[2] Theses Historico-Theologicæ, diss. 1. p. 9.

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These have been followed by many since, whom it is not now necessary to name; while others go still further, and think that from this passage of Seneca it may be concluded that this was a common subject of disputation among the philosophers of that age, and that two sects existed, one holding that "God formed matter for himself," or made it out of nothing, and the other contending that the Deity "made use of matter given," or eternal. I do not at present contend against those who think that a creation out of nothing was anciently known to none excepting Jews and Christians. But if the meaning of Seneca's words be really what is attributed to them, yet they will not afford much aid to those who seek for patrons of this doctrine among the ancient sages. For it cannot be proved from them that any persons ever really embraced this opinion; but it only appears that when Seneca or others were closely engaged in meditation, some doubt occurred to their minds on this subject, by which however they did not long allow themselves to be troubled. But I freely confess that I do not know in what way and from what principles they can imagine they find the mention of a creation out of nothing in this passage of Seneca's. Do they think that the phrase formare sibi aliquid, regarded in itself, is equivalent to ex nihilo fingere? I can scarcely think so; nor will Seneca himself allow of this interpretation, since with him the word *formare* always signifies to give shape to any shapeless mass. Causa autem, says he, in another place,[3] id est ratio, *materiam format* et quocumque vult versat, ex illâ varia opera producit. What he here terms *formare*, he calls a little further on *faciem dare*; Statua et materiam habuit, quæ pateretur artificium; et artificem, qui materiæ *daret faciem*. In short, in the very passage whence the words are taken, about the meaning of which we are now inquiring, he uses the word in this sense. For shortly afterwards he proceeds to say, Deus quidquid vult efficiat, an in multis rebus illum tractanda destituant, et à magno artifice pravè *formentur* multa. Nor does the addition of the word *sibi* require us to change the idea in the present passage. For any one may with propriety be said formare sibi aliquid, when he disposes, shapes, and modifies matter according to his own will and pleasure. Or do they suppose that from the opposite expression, datâ materiâ uti, there can be deduced evidence of the meaning we have mentioned being correctly assigned to this sentence? Such seems to be the case. But I should be glad to be informed whether one who is said datâ non uti materiâ can be correctly said to form matter for himself, and to create it out of nothing. My own opinion will be entirely different, nor do I think that many, after an attentive consideration, will differ from me. Let

[3] Epist. 65. p. 160. tom. 2. opp.

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us imagine two workmen, to whom gold is given, in order that they may make an image of it. One of them carefully prepares the gold previously to commencing his work, and frees it from adventitious particles and impurities. The other, without any purification, forms the statue he was ordered to execute, out of the material delivered to him. Would it be improper and inaccurate to say of these two men, as Seneca does, Alter ipse sibi format materiam, alter datâ utitur materiâ? Nor can I think that Seneca's words are to be taken in any other sense. He was, as is well known, of the Stoic sect, among whom there was no difference of opinion respecting the nature and origin of matter; for all the Stoics believed it to be equally eternal with the Deity himself and destitute of any beginning; a fact which has been abundantly proved by Justus Lipsius.[4] And Seneca never calls in question this tenet of his sect, but every where openly approves of it. Dicunt, ut scis, he says, Stoici nostri, duo esse in rerum naturâ, ex quibus omnia fiant; causam et materiam. Materia jacet iners, res ad omnia parata, cessatura, si nemo moveat:[5] "Our Stoics, as you are aware, say that there are two things in nature, cause and matter; and that matter lies inert, prepared for every thing, ready to stop if no one moves it." It was, however, a moot point among philosophers who thought that the universe was made by God, and even among the Stoics, whether matter were shapeless and destitute of all qualities and beauty before the Deity began to arrange and beautify it, or whether the qualities and shapes of things were latent in matter itself, so that it only required Divine energy to bring them into proper order, and arrange them in a suitable manner. It has been generally supposed that Plato advocated the first of these alternatives, which is evident even from Plutarch;[6] but the latter has not been without its defenders. Perhaps the best method of understanding this controversy would be to compare with it the question respecting the natural state of the soul, which separated the Platonists from other philosophers; the former holding that the soul came into the body furnished with the ideas and images of things, and the latter thinking that it was imbued and furnished with these by education and teaching while in the body.[7] And I think Seneca has a reference to this dispute in the words, into the meaning of which we are now inquiring. For those who believed that all forms and qualities had been conferred upon matter by the Deity, said that he had "formed matter for himself," or had endowed it with the forms and qualities he chose. But those who decided otherwise, and held that forms

[4] Physiologia Stoica, lib. 1. diss. 4. p. 9.
[5] Epist. 65. p. 160.
[6] De Animæ Procreatione, ex Timæo, 1014. tom. 2. opp.
[7] See Chalcidius, on Plato's Timæus, cap. 13. p. 391. &c.

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ıd qualities were previously inherent in matter, maintained ıat God only "made use of matter as given," and merely ınged and digested the mass of nature on a new plan, so as) produce that beauty and splendour which we now behold the universe. Nor do I think that any other meaning is) be attached to Seneca's other expressions, which are not ry different from these of which we have now been speaking, ıd which seem to have rather greater force in this respect, ough they have escaped the observation of learned men who ıve treated of the subject now under discussion. Equidem, ys Seneca, tum naturæ rerum gratias ago, cùm illam non) hâc parte video, quæ publica est, sed cùm secretiora ejus travi; cùm disco quæ universi *materia* sit, quis *auctor*, aut *stos*, "Indeed I give thanks to nature, not when I regard it in popular aspect, but when I investigate its secrets; when I ırn what is the *material* of the universe and who is its *author guardian*."[8] Here again the philosopher hesitates and is in ubt; nor does he determine with sufficient precision whether is proper to call God the "author" or the "guardian" of ıtter. But does not the profession of a doubt whether God be e author of matter imply that such is the case, and that matter ıs therefore created out of nothing by God? It will then be ident at least from this quotation that neither Seneca, nor rhaps any other philosophers, believed that there was aught ɔugnant to reason in the doctrine which modern atheists nk to be so irrational. These considerations have an appear- ce of truth, I will not deny; but fall far short of an absolute ɔof. For who can be ignorant, that the appellation of the uthor" of any thing is also given to one who frames and ms it out of supplied material? Nor does the word custos, uardian," when opposed to the name auctor, "author," neces- ily require that we should assign to the latter any other aning. Wherefore, since the Stoics, as we have already ob- ved, were fully convinced of the eternity of matter, I can ily believe that those who called God "the author" of matter y meant that God gave to matter the nature it now possesses, l transmuted it from a totally shapeless state, unfit for any pose, to a better and more useful condition; while those who med the Deity "the guardian" of matter thought that he only served and guarded the forms and qualities latent in it. ere I desirous of being more copious and erudite, some other siderations might be added, tending to overthrow the com- n interpretation of Seneca's words; but these will be suf- ent to show that he does not afford any effectual aid to se who suppose that some of the philosophers entertained

[8] Præf. Quæst. Natural. p. 482. tom. 2. opp.

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opinions respecting the origin of nature identical with those of Christians.

X. After disposing of these more general testimonies, we will now come to particular sects and individuals, who are said to have held God to be the creator of matter. Orpheus is said to have been the founder and author of all the religion and wisdom anciently prevalent among the Greeks. This celebrated man was formerly reckoned by Clemens Alexandrinus among those who maintained a creation out of nothing. For after reciting some verses of Orpheus in which God is called *μητροπάτωρ*, "father of the mother," he thus proceeds: *Διὰ μὲν τοῦ Μητροπάτωρ, οὐ μόνον τὴν ἐκ μὴ ὄντων·γένεσιν ἐμήνυσεν· δέδωκεν δὲ ἀφορμὰς τοῖς τὰς προβολὰς εἰσάγουσι, τάχα καὶ σύζυγον νοῆσαι τοῦ Θεοῦ*, "In calling him 'Father of the mother,' he not only intimated the production of things out of nothing, but also gave occasion to those who introduce such pretences [viz. the Valentinians] of also assigning a wife to the Deity."[9] Thus Clement supposed that matter was called "the mother," and therefore when God was called "the father of the mother," he was said to be the creator and author of matter.[10] But who does not know that scarcely any thing can be more uncertain than the relations given respecting Orpheus and his verses? The remains of the Orphic verses which are extant at the present day are generally believed to have been composed by a Jew or by some degenerate Christian, who wished to fortify and corroborate his own tenets by the authority of so distinguished a name; an opinion which those who in other respects make much of the Orphic doctrine do not venture entirely to reject.[1] In the next place great inconsistency of opinion may be perceived in the verses themselves; which is an evidence that they do not all proceed from one author. So that if I were entirely to set aside out of the present question these verses of Orpheus quoted by Clement, as being of doubtful authenticity and genuineness, I should not be destitute of reason or good authority. But since this testimony of Orpheus can be invalidated in another method, I will not at present adopt this course. Let these verses be admitted to possess some degree of authority; and let Clement's interpretation of the word *μητροπάτωρ* also be granted. The inquiry still remains whether it thence follows as a consequence that the author of these verses considered God to be the creator of matter. It will, I hope, be granted that from one word, and that very ambiguous, it can by no means be proved what was the opinion of this author on so difficult a question; but that the

[9] Stromata, lib. 5. p. 724.

[10] A similar explanation has been given of this word by Edmund Dickinson, Physice Vetus et Vera, cap. 12. p. 198.

[1] See Cudworth's Intellectual System, cap. 4. sect. 17.

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other remains of his verses ought to be compared with it, and that from the comparison his meaning should be deduced. If this be done, this Orpheus, whoever he was, will be found so far from agreeing with the Christians, that he is little if at all removed from the profanity of Spinoza. For, as I have elsewhere observed,[2] his poetry inculcates the idea that God is the universe, and that all things have so proceeded from God that the several parts of the universe are to be regarded as members and parts of the Divine nature. Who will venture to compare so impious and profane a writer with the followers of Christ? Therefore in calling God the "father of the mother," or of matter, he doubtless meant to be understood that matter was generated and created from the Divine nature as a daughter, and was therefore part of the Divine nature itself. All which being considered, I could wish that men otherwise learned had praised Orpheus more sparingly; among whom Thomas Burnet[3] and Andrew Christian Eschenbach[4] have thought the highest commendations far below his excellency and virtue.

XI. Edmund Dickinson[5] reckons the ancient Greek poet Hesiod, as one of the principal assertors of a creation out of nothing. His words are as follows:—"That most ancient and learned cosmologist Hesiod also learned from the Egyptians that Chaos, by which name he called the material of the universe, was not eternal, but produced, for he says, Ἤτοι μὲν πρώτιστα χάος γένετ', "First of all Chaos was made."[6] And other learned men have been nearly of the same opinion, both among ancients and moderns, as we have elsewhere already observed.[7] But if Hesiod be worthy of this honour, it may also be claimed by Ovid, who has paraphrased the opinion of the Greek bard in these Latin verses:—

> Ante mare et tellus et quod tegit omnia cœlum
> Unus erat toto naturæ vultus in orbe,
> Quem dixere Chaos: rudis indigestaque moles.[8]

And perhaps Aristophanes may make out as good a case; since it is well known he has left this verse on record:—

> Χάος ἦν καὶ νὺξ ἔρεβός τε μέλαν πρῶτον καὶ τάρταρος εὐρύς.[9]

"There was Chaos, and night, and black Erebus, at first, and broad Tartarus." Our previous observations, unless I am deceived, will be sufficient to destroy this good opinion of learned

[2] Notes on Cudworth.
[3] Archæologia Philosophiæ, lib. 1. cap. 9. p. 354.
[4] Epigene, seu Liber de Poësi Orphicâ, p. 41. &c. præf. et al.
[5] Physice Vetus et Vera, cap. 12. p. 199. [6] Theogonia, v. 116.
[7] Notes on Cudworth. See also Bessarion, in Calumniatores Platonis, lib. 2. cap. 5.
[8] Metamorphoses, lib. 1. v. 5. &c. [9] Birds, v. 694. p. 404. ed. Kusteri.

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men respecting Hesiod. First of all, it will not be denied by any one acquainted with the Greek language and poetry, that the Greek verb γένετο, on which this interpretation is put, may be translated in the way in which it is usually rendered, and as it has been understood by innumerable interpreters, both ancient and modern; Primo omnium quidem Chaos fuit. Hence considerable doubt has arisen whether the poet affixed to it this latter signification, or the former, which has been preferred by some learned men. It is assuming too much, when an ambiguous word occurs, to prefer one of its meanings, without any good reason, and then from this meaning to estimate the doctrine of an author. If it were as certain as it is uncertain and dubious, that this word in Hesiod signifies "it is made or produced," yet even then the matter would not be entirely clear. For Hesiod does not add that Chaos was made by God, nor does he say that it was made and produced out of nothing; which is an evident refutation of his eulogists. But, apart from these considerations, I will make it evident that the common explanation of this word ought to be retained, and that Hesiod means nothing else than what Ovid speaks of, that Chaos existed before the formation of the world. In the first place, the words themselves require this interpretation; for if he had been speaking of the rude and undigested mass which is called Chaos he would, no doubt at the same time have mentioned its efficient cause; since it is usual, when any thing is said to be generated and made, not to be forgetful of its parent and maker. Who can believe that Hesiod, when relating a fact of such importance and magnitude as the creation of Chaos out of nothing, should not mention, even by a word, the author of so great an achievement? If this argument should fail to convince, a knowledge of this poet's religious system will immediately prevail. Hesiod knew of no greater or higher god than his Jupiter, as is evident even from a cursory inspection of his poem. This deity he proclaims to be the parent of gods and men, the manager of all things, the greatest and the best. But of this Jupiter he had very mean and abject ideas; saying, that he was the son of Saturn, and that Saturn himself was born of heaven and earth, subsequently to the beginning of this present world; that is, that he sprang out of the ground by the power of the air; on which subject I have already made some more detailed observations.[10] Can it possibly be believed that a poet openly disrespectful towards the Deity, and imbued with so puerile a religion as to make the human son of Saturn and Rhea the universal Ruler, could have thought in a wise and pious manner respecting the origin and creation of matter?

[10] Notes to Cudworth.

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XII. With Hesiod I shall unite Xeniades, a very ancient philosopher. Sextus Empiricus sometimes mentions him, and among other particulars relates of him as follows: *Ξενιάδης δὲ ὁ Κορίνθιος (οὗ καὶ Δημόκριτος μέμνηται) πάντ' εἰπὼν ψευδῆ καὶ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν καὶ δόξαν ψεύδεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον γίνεσθαι, καὶ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν πᾶν τὸ φθειρόμενον φθείρεσθαι, δυνάμει τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχεται τῷ Ξενοφάνει στάσιος,*[1] "But Xeniades, the Corinthian, (who is also mentioned by Democritus) saying that all things are false, and that every fancy and opinion is fallacious, and that every thing that exists, exists out of nonentity, and that whatever perishes returns into nonentity, substantially agrees with Xenophanes." By these words of Sextus, Peter Gassendi, who is otherwise acute and skilful in ancient philosophy, has been led to doubt whether this Xeniades were not to be reckoned among those who hold that all things were created out of nothing. He adds, however, that this opinion "may be understood in the same way as when Aristotle himself teaches that something is made from nonentity, that is, not from simple nonentity, but from what is such by accident."[2] But the celebrated editor of Sextus, J. A. Fabricius, in his note upon this place, unhesitatingly denies that this passage has any thing to do with a creation out of nothing, and that Xeniades only taught, as many other philosophers did, that when any thing is produced, the production becomes something that it was not before, and on the other hand, that when any thing perishes, it puts on an entirely different nature. This author's opinion is pretty near the truth; and the very nature of the case shows that no inquiry is instituted in this passage of Sextus respecting the origin of matter, since he is discussing the tokens of truth, and endeavouring to prove that the science of logic rests upon insecure foundations. Xeniades is by Sextus reckoned among those who abrogated all the distinctions of true and false, and all certain knowledge; and in order to sustain these views he is said by the same authority to have asserted that all things are made and produced from things which are not, and that whatever perishes, returns again into what is not. If the words *τὰ μὴ ὄντα* meant the same as *nothing*, Xeniades would have been inconsistent with himself, nor would he have taken away from mankind all knowledge and discrimination of truth; for to determine that all things are made from nothing, and return again to nothing, it is necessary to be furnished with certain and infallible rules and principles from which this may be known; and therefore this cannot be the case with those who think that not only all

[1] Lib. 7. adv. Mathematicos, or Lib. 1. adv. Logicos, sect. 53. p. 381.
[2] Physics, sect. 1. lib. 3. cap. 1. p. 282. tom. 1. opp.

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visible things, but also all opinions are uncertain and destitute of truth. Therefore, τὰ μὴ ὄντα must mean things that are unstable, transitory, and subject to perpetual changes; and the philosopher's meaning can only be that things which are produced are created from what is destitute of any permanency, and that therefore they widely differ from the material out of which they are made; and on the other hand, things that perish entirely change their nature and gain fresh qualities. It is indeed no wonder that those who entertain such an opinion should reject the decisions both of sense and reason, and abolish every standard of truth and certainty.

XIII. I now hasten to the philosophical sect of which Pythagoras is recorded to have been the founder. The great inconsistency of ancient writers has made it almost impossible to ascertain what were Pythagoras's own opinions on the origin of nature; and it is probable that those who professed to be his disciples were uncertain what were their master's views; since they differ among themselves, and are not all unanimous in their opinions respecting the universe and matter. It is however probable that their founder's views were most clearly understood by those who taught (to use the words of Chalcidius[3]) sylvam minimè genitam, exornatam à Deo, illustratam et eo digestore generatam esse, "that matter was not produced, but arranged and adorned by God, and under his disposal generated." But some of his followers are said to have departed so far from their teacher's track as to say that matter itself was made and produced by God. Chalcidius seems to testify this; for after he had recited the real opinion of Pythagoras out of Numenius, he relates on the same authority, that some of that philosopher's disciples had altogether perverted his views. "But some Pythagoreans," says he, "not rightly understanding the meaning of this opinion, have thought that it [matter] also began as an unbounded and immense duality from one unity, the unity departing from its own nature and putting on the nature of a duality. This is not correct," he proceeds to observe, "that what was a unity should cease to be so, and should become a duality that did not previously exist; and that from the Deity matter, and from an immense and unlimited unity duality should result."[4] In whatever way I understand these words, I can nowhere discover in them a creation out of nothing; but rather another deadly and pestilential opinion, very nearly akin to the impiety of Spinoza. "Unity," in the style of the Pythagoreans, which is followed by Chalcidius, means God; and "an immense and unlimited duality," matter, as being destitute of bounds and limits. So that when these Pythagoreans say that a duality began from a

[3] Comment. in Timæum Platonis, cap. 13. sect. 293, p. 387. [4] Ubi supra.

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unity they mean that matter was the workmanship of God. Thus far they are right enough; but when they come to explain the mode in which God produced matter, they exhibit symptoms of extreme irrationality; for they say that God or "unity" changed his nature and put on the nature of a duality, or converted himself into matter; and that this being done, he ceased to be unity or God, and began to be merely duality or matter; in short, that from God matter and from unity duality was made. What can be more impious and absurd than these opinions? for those who entertain them openly confess that the universe is God, and that there is nothing divine beyond the universe and matter. For if God has departed from his own nature, and converted himself into matter, what is left us, excepting the material universe, to worship as the Deity? And what else is God, on this supposition, than matter animated and furnished with a kind of spiritual nature? I fear lest those who embraced this sentiment might also at the same time have asserted that this change of the divine nature took place from eternity, and not at any definite time; and if this suspicion be correct, there are certainly no ancient philosophers who may with greater propriety be classed among those who defended the impieties of Spinoza, long before he himself was born. Hence, as Chalcidius rightly subjoins, this opinion was so futile and absurd that it could not possibly affect those whose minds had been even in a moderate degree cultivated by learning; a sentence he would never have passed upon it, if these Pythagoreans had agreed with Christians respecting the origin of matter; for this interpreter of Plato is so far from contemning the doctrines of Christianity, and has on the contrary so constantly commended them, that many have thought him to be altogether a Christian.

XIV. Philolaus the Crotonian, who occupied, as we are informed, an illustrious place among the first disciples of Pythagoras, has with greater probability been classed among those who supposed that all things were made out of nothing. For Claudius Mamertus[5] says that in a certain book of his that has been lost, the following passage was contained:—"God, who made all things out of nothing, as he began by his work, so he incorporated matter with all things, among which the soul is to be reckoned. As he distributed weight, number, and measure, so he placed quantity." What can be clearer than this? God is said to have "made all things out of nothing;" he is said to have "began matter by his work," which seems to be the same thing as to have prepared and arranged it. Have we not therefore here one of the school of Pythagoras who taught

[5] De Statû Animæ, lib. 2. cap. 3. p. 106. ed. Barth.

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with propriety respecting the origin of nature? I think not; and have reason to believe that not even Philolaus ought to be associated in this matter with the followers of Christianity. For some expressions of this philosopher are extant in Jamblichus,[6] in which he expressly denies that unity or God is the origin of all things, and affirms that *duality* or matter should be associated with him as a second principle in the creation of all things: Οὐ γὰρ ἓν φησὶν Φιλολάος ἀρχὰ πάντων, καὶ τοῖς ἑτερομήκεσιν εἰς γένεσιν ὕσπληγκα ὁμοίως ἑαυτὴν παρέξει, οὐκέτι δὲ νύσσα ἔσται τῆς καθ' ὑποστροφὴν παλινδρομίας καὶ ἐπανόδου, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡ δύας ἀντ' αὐτῆς ὑποστήσεται, "For Philolaus says that *unity* is not the beginning of all things, and like things longer on one side affords itself as a starting-base for generation; nor will it be a goal for the turning point of return and recursion; but this the *duad* will do instead of it." These words are very obscure, as are almost all which have been handed down to us from the esoteric and secret doctrines of Pythagoras; but what was in the main the opinion of Philolaus may be easily understood. Amongst the Pythagoreans it is well known that God is called Ἕν or *Unity;* while matter is termed δύας *duad.* And Jamblichus himself is a witness to this; for a little further on he says, Δύας ὕλης λόγον ἔχει, "The *duad* has the nature of matter." So that it is evident that Philolaus teaches generally that there were two first principles of all things, God and matter. Nor will Jamblichus allow us to doubt of this; for, after taking some pains to corroborate and explain this opinion of Philolaus, laying aside all disguises and mathematical expressions, he enunciates it in plain and perspicuous terms:[7] Διότι δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὐκ ἂν εἴη, φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἀρχὴ εἴη· εὑρίσκεται δὲ ἀναλόγως καὶ ἐν ταῖς κοσμικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ὁ δημιουργὸς Θεὸς, μὴ ὢν τῆς ὕλης γεννητικὸς, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὴν ἀΐδιον παραλαβὼν εἴδεσι καὶ λόγοις τοῖς κατ' ἀριθμὸν, διαπλάττων καὶ κοσμοποιῶν· εἰ δέ γε τὰς τῶν λοιπῶν ἑτερομηκῶν εἰς διαστάσεις κατὰ μόνην τὴν πρόοδον, ὡς ἔφαμεν, ἐπιδώσει αὐτὴν ἡ μονὰς, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ εἰς ἐπάνοδον, "Wherefore, it was not from a beginning, says Plato, nor yet shall be a beginning; but in the mundane first principles a creative Deity is found, not being indeed the generator of matter, but taking it as eternal, arranging and forming the universe according to forms and arithmetical methods, if indeed the unity affords itself to arrangements of the other unequal-sided things, only in the way of advance and not of retrogression." A comparison of these words with those of Philolaus, which we have already quoted, will immediately show that they are a more free and perspicuous exposition of the opinion deli-

[6] In Nicomachi Geraseni Arithmetic. Introduct. p. 109. ed. Tennulii.
[7] L. c. p. 111.

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vered by him in more obscure terms. So that from these considerations it necessarily follows, that we must assign to his words, as preserved and translated into Latin by Claudian, a different sense from what at first sight they seem to have. The "nothing," or τὸ μὴ ὄν, here spoken of, is no doubt the "nothing" of the Platonists, among whom, as we shall presently show, matter is called "nothing," because it is subject to perpetual changes, and is possessed of no stability. And when God is said to have "made all things out of nothing," this must be taken to mean that God prepared and formed the universe out of matter, which is destitute of any constancy or perpetuity. To "begin matter by his work," opere instituere materiam, which is here ascribed to God, is nothing else than to shape and arrange matter by his power; a meaning assigned to the verb instituere in innumerable passages of the Latin writers. The Pythagoreans must not therefore be accounted as ancient defenders and patrons of a creation out of nothing.

XV. From the very beginning of Christianity, so much sagacity and industry has been shown by distinguished men in the reformation of Plato, and in reconciling him with Christian doctrine, that it is scarcely possible to enumerate them. It is therefore no wonder that he has also been made to appear to have a more correct opinion respecting the origin of nature than he really entertained. The principal person, so far as I know, who has ranked him among the advocates of a creation out of nothing, is Clemens Alexandrinus: Ὅποτ' ἂν εἴπῃ, says he,[8] τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητόν τε ἔδειξε τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγονέναι σημαίνει, καθάπερ υἱὸν πατέρα δὲ αὐτοῦ κεκλῆσθαι, ὡς ἂν ἐκ μόνου γενομένου καὶ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος ὑποστάντος, "When he [Plato] says this, [that it is difficult to find out the Maker and Parent of this universe,] he not only shows that the world is made, but also intimates that it was made from him [God], as if in the relationship of father and son, as existing from him alone and from what *is not*." Clement indeed thought that Plato and other philosophers had not found out this opinion by their own reasoning and ingenuity, but had taken it from the writings of Moses; and all the ancients who have with Clement been persuaded that Plato improved his wisdom by reading the books of Moses (as it is well known many of them did), have also favoured this opinion of his. From among the sect of the later Platonists, Hierocles and some others have ascribed the same dogma to their master; but since they did this in a different way from the Christians, and had not the same views that we have of the origin of nature, it will be better to take them into consideration at the end of this discussion, when we shall come to speak of the opinions en-

[8] Stromata, lib. 5. cap. 14. p. 701.

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tertained by the later Academicians respecting the nature and origin of the universe. At the commencement of the revival of letters the Platonists, who made their appearance in Italy, asserted that in this, as in many other things, Plato was altogether a Christian. Among these Marsilius Ficinus stands preeminent, who was inordinately attached to Plato, and who, though in his Commentary on the Timæus[9] he seems to leave this question doubtful, and will not decide whether God, the author of the universe, is in Plato's opinion, the creator of matter; yet in the index, added by him to his edition of Plato's works, he hesitates not to join himself with those who think that Plato considered matter to be created by God.[10] I pass over others of less ability and celebrity, a large number of whom might be named; since they produce nothing worthy of particular attention, and rather show what they wish others to believe, than confirm their own views by argument. It will be sufficient to name three most famous and worthy men[1] of modern times, who were unusually diligent in defending the memory of Plato, and who have not endeavoured to convince their readers by their own authority, but by evidences and arguments. The first of these is Livius Galantes,[2] who endeavours to prove out of the Philebus, that this philosopher did not at all differ from the doctrines of Christianity respecting the creation of the universe. The second is P. D. Huët,[3] who has explained the opinion of Plato through the medium of the later Platonists' expositions; though that great man could not be ignorant that these were the worst interpreters of their master, and that they did not agree among themselves. The third place may be assigned to Andrew Dacier,[4] who endeavours to prove his point not so much by testimonies as by argumentation more ingenious than solid. But this learned man was inflamed with an incredible degree of attachment to Plato, by which he is often so far led away as to seem to place that philosopher scarcely below Christ and his apostles; so that it sometimes happens that he mistakes the most frivolous reasons for weighty arguments.

XVI. If ability and ingenuity could make the divine Plato appear in fairer colours than really belong to him, by the assistance of such great men he would long ere this have been endowed with surpassing lustre. But he himself rejects their

[9] Cap. 9. 10. p. 1441. tom. 1. opp.

[10] For under the word Deus in this index are to be found the following words:—Deum omnia ex nihilo creâsse, p. 168. Respecting the passage here pointed out some observations will be made further on.

[1] I had almost forgotten to add to these our author, Dr. Cudworth, in the 5th chapter of his Intellectual System.

[2] Comparatio Theologiæ Christianæ et Platonicæ, lib. 9. p. 237.

[3] Quæst. Alnetanis de Concordiâ Rationis et Fidei, lib. 2. cap. 5. p. 109.

[4] Vie de Platon, p. 178.

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patronage, and will not be cleansed. His real opinions respecting the origin of the universe cannot be better and more clearly understood from any of his writings than from his Timæus. But in this dialogue he has so plainly ascribed eternity to matter, and so obviously declares that God did not create matter, but only arranged and beautified it, that stronger language can scarcely by possibility be used. On this account several of the ancients who have explained his doctrines have said that three principles of nature have been laid down by him, *God*, *matter*, and *ideas*. Nor was any other opinion entertained by those of his disciples, Alcinous,[5] Apuleius, and others, who have with the greatest perspicuity and fidelity explained their master's system. "Plato," says Apuleius,[6] "thought there were three principles of things, God, and matter, and the forms of things, which he called *ideas*. . . . But he says that matter is uncreated and incorruptible." Chalcidius himself, who in other respects agrees with the later Platonists, cannot persuade himself to deny or doubt a matter so plain and evident as this. "The principles [of Plato] therefore are," says he,[7] "God and matter and ideas; God the first moving cause, and represented as in action; matter, from which whatever is produced was first made." In another passage[8] he announces his approval of the opinion which supposed that Plato taught "that there had always been a power of mind as well as of body; that God had not made the universe out of the things that are not, but had arranged those which were destitute of order and method; that therefore he had rather adorned existing things than produced those which were not." I pass over so many of the Christian fathers who not only attributed to Plato the dogma of the eternity of matter, but even attacked him on account of it in long and very serious disputations. Not a few of the ancients have thought that Plato considered the universe to be equally eternal with the matter of which it is composed; but that in the Timæus, in which he proposes to instruct the more ignorant, he speaks as if the universe had been framed by God as its author and parent; nor is this supposition, as I have elsewhere shown,[9] destitute of all probability. But those who think that according to Plato's opinion, God made the universe out of things that were not, will find no safe defence, nor prove any point, till they shall either have annihilated the Timæus or shown that it is not Plato's production. But let us briefly go over what learned men have brought forward in opposition even to Plato himself and so

[5] Introductio in Doctrinam Platonis, cap. 12. p. 338. in the Philosophical History of Thomas Stanley.
[6] Libro de Habitud. Doctrinæ Platonicæ, p. 3. opp.
[7] Comm. in Timæum, cap. 13. sect. 305. p. 390.
[8] Cap. 2. sect. 31. p. 287.
[9] Notes on Cudworth.

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many of his followers, in order to be able to rank him among Christian philosophers.

XVII. The observations of Clemens Alexandrinus on this subject are scarcely worthy of refutation. For what can be more futile than such argumentation as this:—Plato called God the Parent and Maker of the universe; therefore he thought that matter was created by him out of nothing? As if the calling of any being the father of a man, or the framer and maker of a thing, were the same thing as believing that he produced his son or his work out of nothing. Clemens would no doubt have altered his opinion if he had called to mind the immediately subsequent context in Plato's Timæus, and had not too eagerly desired to establish a concord between the philosophers and the Christians. Whether Plato has or has not borrowed some parts of his philosophy from the books of Moses, will be more properly examined in another place. Marsilius Ficinus and Dr. Cudworth ground the proof of their opinion upon the following passage of Plato:[10] Ζῶα δὴ πάντα θνητὰ καὶ φυτὰ, ὅσα τ' ἐπὶ γῆς ἐκ σπερμάτων καὶ ῥιζῶν φύεται, καὶ ὅσα ἄψυχα ἐν γῇ ξυνίσταται, σώματα τηκτὰ καὶ ἄτηκτα μὲν ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ Θεοῦ δημιουργοῦντος φήσομεν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι, πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα; "Shall we say that all mortal animals and plants, as many as are produced upon the earth from seeds and roots, and whatever inanimate things exist in the earth, liquefiable and non-liquefiable bodies, were produced by any other agent than God, not having previously existed?" To this question Theodorus, one of the interlocutors, shortly afterwards answers, that he was persuaded that all things were produced by God. But who is so obtuse as not to perceive that in these words no inquiry is instituted respecting the origin of matter, but only respecting the generation and procreation of animals and plants? Plato certainly believed that these things were made and constructed out of matter by God, if indeed he spoke his real opinion in the Timæus; but at the same time he held that the matter from which all things are made was eternal and without a beginning. Livius Galantes thinks that another of his dialogues, the Philebus, affords sufficient materials for his defence in this particular. I will transcribe this author's own words, in order the more plainly to disclose the gist of the argument. Materiam primam, says he, summus ille Deus produxit, exemplar, vel mundus idealis corpus dedit et vestigiis quibusdam formatum ornavit, quod corpus visibile factum et ornatum mundum hunc conformarunt. Hæc præclara et scitu digna positio Platonis in Philebo auctoritate confirmatur. Sunt verba ipsius in Philebo, unum illud primum ex se, et non ex nihilo produxisse πέρας et ἀπειρίαν,

[10] In Sophistâ, p. 168.

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hoc est, terminum et finem, vel infinitatem, quæ tamquam duo principia mixtionis entium omnium per entia et corpora permearent in corporibus hisce completis; finis et terminus est ipsa forma, infinitas vero est ipsa materia.[1] More follows to the same effect. Orpheus and Hermes are said to have been advocates and favourers of the same opinion; but in these cases it is of less consequence to quote the very words of the writer. But Galantes was more vigilant than was needful in giving this interpretation of Plato, and he either mistook his author's meaning, or was misled by the authority of the later Platonists, whose explanations he held in high estimation, from perceiving the drift of Plato's discourse. This interpretation of the Philebus is indeed ancient, and not invented by Galantes, but taken from those Platonists who attempted to reconcile together all the sages of antiquity, and principally Plato and Aristotle. Beside others, Proclus is a witness of this,[2] to whom may be associated, from among the moderns, Cardinal Bessarion, who is known to have been a most diligent student of Plato, and to have collected together from the more ancient Platonists nearly all that he brings forward for the illustration of his master's doctrine. "In the Philebus," says he,[3] "he [Plato] most plainly declares matter to be not fetched from without, but produced by the great Artificer. 'From unity,' says he, 'and multiplicity exist those things which are said always to be, and have a bound and infinitude generated in themselves. And elsewhere we have said that God brought this double kind of nature to light; I mean the finite and the infinite, from which both corporeal beings and all others are framed. To these hot and cold, moist and dry, great and little, and other similar qualities, may be added without end.' If bodies consist of boundary and infinitude, and the boundary is nothing else than form, for this bounds and defines matter, it is plain that matter is infinitude, and that in this passage Plato means that since God produces all infinitude, he produces matter also, which is the ultimate infinitude." Yet this opinion did not hinder these Platonists from maintaining that Plato, as well as Aristotle, thought the universe to be eternal; on which point we shall treat further on. For the present we will give attention

[1] I know not how it has happened that the truly learned Thomas Gale has embraced the same opinion. For in his Notæ ad Jamblichum de Mysteriis Ægyptiorum, p. 276, he says, "Plato's opinion about matter is not clearly apparent from the Timæus. He seems indeed to oppose matter to the Creator, and to distinguish it from him; but in the Philebus he plainly says that God τὸ μὲν πέρας δεῖξαι τῶν ὄντων, τὸ δὲ ἄπειρον. It is plain that by ἀπειρίαν is meant matter." This great man has doubtless been led astray by too great an attachment to the later Platonists, who find whatever they please in Plato.

[2] Comm. in Timæum, lib. 2. p. 117.

[3] Lib. 2. in Calumniatores Platonis, cap. 5.

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to Galantes, who follows the Platonists. First of all he assumes that ἀπειρία in Plato's Philebus means nothing else than matter itself, and πέρας the shape of matter; then, secondly, he affirms that Plato has left it on record that God produced ἀπειρίαν, or matter. Neither of these positions will be conceded by an attentive reader of the Philebus. Plato, or Socrates, at the beginning of this dialogue, that the Supreme Deity, in all things which have been made and produced, united and associated together ἀπειρίαν the infinite and πέρας the boundary or finite. Τὸν Θεὸν, says Socrates, among other observations, ἐλέγομεν ποῦ, τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον δεῖξαι τῶν ὄντων, τὸ δὲ πέρας· These are evidently the very words which Galantes supposes principally support his cause; but in which an extraordinary degree of acuteness will be necessary to perceive any traces of a creation out of nothing. Galantes would have us believe that δεῖξαι in this passage means the same as to *pròduce;* in which respect, as we have seen, he followed the later Platonists. "Plato," says he, "teaches that matter is *shown,* and uses this very word, which word the Platonists interpret to *produce.* And certainly what is produced is shown to have a beginning." Then again he thinks that by ἄπειρον is meant matter. From these premises he concludes the meaning of Plato's words to be, that God produced matter out of nothing, and endowed it with a boundary or form. A rash and injudicious conclusion truly; for who could ever suppose δεῖξαι to be the same as to produce out of nothing? and how can it be proved that ἄπειρον means matter? He has indeed quoted the later Platonists as his authorities. But no judicious person will allow these to possess more weight and influence than reason and a careful consideration of Plato's words. The plain and simple meaning of this passage of Plato (the import of which was not apprehended by Ficinus, who has given an incorrect interpretation of innumerable sayings of the same philosopher) is, that God every where shows or discloses both the finitude and infinitude of the things that are and exist; an exposition which is confirmed and corroborated by the whole texture and series of his discourse. So far is the word ἄπειρον from being used by Plato to mean matter, that it is rather a designation of several ideas and feelings entirely abstracted from all corporeal substantiality. I will endeavour to explain this part of Plato's philosophy, respecting the finite and the infinite, in such a way as to make it intelligible to all. It is not in itself very abstruse and difficult; but it is a source of confusion to many, because it is not accommodated to our own laws of disputation and philosophy, and is not easily to be comprehended by any one who has not first freed his mind from the shapes and forms of visible things, and raised it to the contemplation of abstract ideas. Ἄπειρον, or *infinity,* according to Socrates, or

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rather Plato, denotes all that description of affections, things, and qualities, which, regarded abstractedly and in themselves, have no boundary or termination; but may be increased, diminished, strengthened, or relaxed. Of this kind, therefore, are pleasure and pain, cold and heat, slowness and swiftness, beauty and deformity, with innumerable other entities to which any thing may be added or from which aught may be taken away, and which have not any term or boundary prescribed and appointed by nature. In a word, the *infinite* of Plato is an abstract notion of all things, properties, qualities, or affections whatever, so far as they are destitute of a boundary, and may either increase or decrease. This may be shown by the philosopher's own words:[4] *Ὅπως ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνηται μάλλον τε καὶ ἧττον γιγνόμενα, καὶ τὰ σφόδρα καὶ ἡρέμα δεχόμενα, καὶ τὸ λίαν, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, πάντα εἰς τοῦ ἀπείρου γένος ὡς εἰς ἓν πάντα ταῦτα δεῖ τιθέναι,* "Whatever appears to us greater or less, and is capable of intensity, or abatement, or excess, and things of this kind, all these should be reckoned as one kind of the *infinite*." Now then what is the meaning of *πέρας*, or *finitude*, which is opposed to *infinitude*? This has not been so plainly declared by Plato, who is often very obscure in his metaphysical definitions, and follows the method of Pythagoras's teaching. *Οὐκοῦν*, says he, *τὰ μὴ δεχόμενα ταῦτα, τούτων δὲ τὰ ἐναντία πάντα δεχόμενα, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἰσότητα· μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἴσον, τὸ διπλάσιον, καὶ πᾶν ὅ, τί περ ἂν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμὸς, ἢ μέτρον πρὸς μέτρον, ταῦτα ξύμπαντα εἰς τὸ πέρας ἀπολογιζόμενοι,* "But whatever are not susceptible of these, but are susceptible of all the contraries of these, as, firstly, equality and equability, and next after equality, duplicity, and all the proportions of number to number, or measure to measure, all these we reckon among finites." This passage is scarcely intelligible without an interpretation. What are the things which are not susceptible of increase or diminution, but which may nevertheless become equal, unequal, single, double, or triple? For these are said by Plato to be comprehended under the general denomination of *finite*, *πέρας*. The answer to this question must be sought by the attentive reader out of the whole disputation, by dint of meditation and research. And either I am much mistaken, or it is plain from this philosopher's whole works that *πέρας*, or *finitude*, with him denoted the measures, modes, proportions, and numbers of things, but regarded abstractedly and apart from the things themselves. For, as is apparent from the Timæus, he thought himself at liberty, after the method and manner of the Pythagoreans, to regard numbers, modes, and proportions as actual existences, in the same manner as he was accustomed to speak of the ideas and forms of things as actually

[4] In Philebo, p. 28.

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existent beings. So that πέρας is nothing else than a word denoting the abstract idea of all numbers, measures, and proportions, by which all things, affections, and qualities which in themselves are destitute of any mode of existence, are governed, defined, and bounded, so that a certain mutual consent and harmony of things and qualities is the result. With these premises it will not be difficult further to understand what Plato meant when he said that all things were mixed and compounded of the finite and the infinite; or that the infinite, as he himself says, is in a manner bound up in all things by the finite—ξυμπάντων ἀπείρων ὑπὸ τοῦ πέρατος δεδεμένων[5]—that God had also conjoined in all created things the infinite with the finite and bounded. His opinion therefore is, that the things, qualities, properties, and affections, which in themselves are destitute of mode or limit, are always wisely determined, and are defined in weight, number, and measure, so as to produce the beauty of nature and the happiness of living creatures. For instance, in music the finite is conjoined with the infinite, and from this union arises that harmony which delights the ear and the mind. Sounds regarded in themselves, whether they be grave or acute, swift or slow, belong to the category of things called infinite; for they may be increased or diminished, qualified or augmented. But the art of music gives a limit or boundary to this infinitude; that is, it circumscribes and defines in a fixed proportion the infinity of sounds, so that the sweetness of harmony results. In every part of the universe, and in all living beings, there are things, qualities, and properties destitute in their own nature of all limit; and therefore infinitude is every where present. But the divine counsel and wisdom have added a boundary and limit, and thus have defined by certain universal laws fire, cold, moisture, hardness, weight, softness, pleasure, pain, and other things, in order to ensure the welfare of the universe and all its parts; so that finitude or boundary every where exists. In every man there are desires, which by nature have no limit; but the intellect of a wise man adds to these a boundary or termination, and confines his wandering desires within a certain limit. There is, therefore, in a wise man πέρας καὶ ἄπειρον, "finite and infinite." Some, perhaps, will be ready to say that this wisdom of Socrates or Plato is not very recondite, but very plain and easy; and that all this might be expressed in a simple and popular manner; so that they are not worthy of very high praise for having by new terms and subtlety of disputation thrown an obscurity over very clear subjects. With these sentiments I will not find fault just now; but will rather confess that in most of Plato's disputations there seems to me to exist a method of demonstration

[5] Philebus, p. 79.

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and discussion too long, cumbrous, and unpopular, and a diction much more poetical and figurative than is consistent with the simple nature of truth. But at the same time I could wish it to be kept in remembrance that every one has his own peculiarities and mode of instruction, which a wise man ought to tolerate; and that perhaps Plato had weighty reasons, of which we are now ignorant, why he should always prefer unusual words, circumlocutions, and obscurity, to simplicity and brevity of language.

XVIII. I shall not now touch upon the testimonies by which Huëtius hoped to prove that Plato seemed to deny the eternity of matter; for they are taken, as I have already said, from Hierocles and similar sources, whose reasonings I have determined to consider separately. I proceed now, therefore, to the arguments by which Dacier thought that Plato could be rescued from his position among the advocates of the eternity of matter. First of all he reasons thus:[6] "A philosopher who in so many passages asserts the unity of God, cannot have fallen into so gross an error. If matter were eternal it would then be God, and there would then be two Gods, contrary to what he has laid down." The sum of this argument is, that he who believes in one God only, cannot at the same time maintain that matter is eternal. So indeed we may admit it to be if an individual be consistent with himself, and makes his teaching agree with his doctrine respecting the divine unity. But who does not know that many philosophers have entertained several mutually repugnant opinions, and have not perceived all the consequences of their own doctrines? This was the case with Plato, who, though he speaks so often of the unity of God, did not perceive or reflect that the unity of God would be abrogated if matter were considered to be equally eternal with the Deity. And this is the less to be wondered at, since it is very evident that innumerable others besides Plato have fallen into the same error, and while admitting the unity of God, have at the same time joined with him an eternal matter; for all whom, upon Dacier's principles, an apology might easily be made. Aristotle, though entertaining erroneous opinions respecting the divine nature, still maintained the existence of one first cause; and yet, as is well known, he held the universe to be eternal. Let the assumption of Dacier therefore be taken for granted, and then there will be no difficulty in freeing Aristotle from this gross error; for it may be said that he who admits of only one God cannot at the same time ascribe eternity to the universe, or otherwise there would be two Gods and not one. In examining into the opinions of ancient philosophers, it is proper to inquire not

[6] Vie de Platon, p. 178.

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what they ought to have thought, in accordance with their own doctrines and precepts, so as not to be inconsistent with themselves; but rather to ascertain what they have plainly expressed and professed, even though this should be somewhat at variance with their other opinions. Let us listen, however, to another of Dacier's arguments: "Plato," says he, "cannot have thought that matter was eternal, since he affirms that the soul is more ancient than the body; for the soul being more ancient than the body, the body must be created, and consequently cannot be eternal." The premises of this argumentation are certainly correct; that Plato taught that the soul was more ancient than and prior to all corporeal substance. But it must not hence be concluded from this opinion that he assigned a beginning to matter. I am surprised that a learned man, who undertook the translation of Plato, should be so ignorant of Plato's diction as not to know that he put a great difference between σῶμα and ὕλη. By the latter he means the primary matter from which all things were made; but by σῶμα he understands body when brought into shape, which consists of the original matter and the qualities imparted to matter by God. And this difference between the significations of the two words was studiously preserved by the more eminent of those who followed Plato as their guide; a point which I recollect has been more fully and copiously demonstrated by me in another place. But this fact has escaped the notice of many, who judge of the meaning of ancient expressions from our own ideas; so that they often heedlessly fall into very serious errors. Plato always maintains that the soul is more ancient than and prior to body; but he has nowhere said that ὕλη, or primary matter, which is the foundation of all bodies, is more recent than the soul. Dacier's third argument has been already refuted; for in this he agrees with Clemens Alexandrinus, who thinks that Plato's calling God the *parent* and *artificer* of the universe is an argument that he held a creation out of nothing; since the name of *parent* shows that God created matter out of nothing; and the word ποιητὴς or *artificer*, that matter when created was ordered, arranged, and adorned by him. "He calls," says Dacier, "God the Father or Creator, and the Artificer of the world. By the title of Creator he intimates that he brought forth the world out of nothing, and by that of Artificer he signifies that after having created it he conferred on it arrangement and order." An ingenious exposition, to be sure! But Plato will not allow us to put confidence in this interpretation of his words. For in the Timæus itself, in which these names of the Deity are to be found, he declares in the plainest terms the eternity of matter, so that it is evident that the learned expositor has given an erroneous interpretation of these words. The fact that Plato expressly taught the

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eternity of matter has not escaped him, nor is he unaware that this might be an obstacle to the general reception of his opinion; but he thinks that he has found a method of removing this objection, contending that Plato, in saying that matter existed from eternity, did not intend this to be understood of that matter which is tangible, visible, and sensible, but only of the form and appearance of this matter, or of *ideal* matter, so to speak: that there was from all eternity in the divine mind the image and notion of this matter, which, at last, as he maintained, God produced from out of the things that are not; and this eternal idea of matter, according to Dacier, is what Plato means when he says that matter had no beginning. "When Plato," says he, "called matter eternal, he did not mean to say that it existed visibly from all eternity, but that it existed intellectually in the eternal idea of the Deity." This view of the matter is closely allied to that opinion which is mentioned by Adam Tribbechovius[7] as being prevalent among some of the ancients, who, when they asserted that matter was eternal, "meant by *matter* the power of creating the universe which existed from eternity in God." Such a method of interpretation as this will promptly and easily make the blackest and most deadly foe of all truth and religion appear pure, holy, and without a blemish. But it is a wiser course, I think, and more worthy of an impartial inquirer after truth, not by ingenuity and artifice to extract from a philosopher's words what they could wish he had taught, but rather to ascertain what he has plainly and explicitly professed, even if it should be most highly unworthy of him. It adds nothing to the dignity and excellence either of philosophical or religious truth, for some of the ancient teachers to be thought better than they really were; but on the contrary, this preposterous desire of associating the philosophers with the Christians is often detrimental to the progress of revealed religion. To return to Plato, whom Dacier will have to speak of the idea and form of matter, and not of matter itself, when he says that matter is eternal. This learned man has made choice of a very unsafe refuge, from which his beloved Plato himself shall draw him forth. First of all, Plato, in his Timæus, opposes to each other the universe and matter; the first he affirms to have had a beginning and to have taken its origin from God; the latter he says was eternal. How will this agree with Dacier's subtle interpretation? The universe was eternal in the same sense as matter, if its form and idea only were in question; for how can it be denied that the form of the universe was eternally present to the Divine intellect? What then could have induced Plato to say that the universe was not, and that matter was,

[7] Veritas Creationis Mundi, cap. 2. p. 279.

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eternal? Shall we say that so great a man as Plato was at the same time so inconsistent as to oppose to the idea of matter the actually existing universe; affirming that the latter had a beginning and that the former had not? Indeed I have a greater respect for the memory of this philosopher, whom antiquity styled Divine, than to believe that he acted thus; and even if I were willing to entertain the supposition, his Timæus would not permit me. The truth is that Plato inculcates that out of matter, which he considers to be eternal, God formed and constructed the universe. Let it be granted then that by *matter* he means the form and idea of matter; on this supposition the philosopher will be made to say that the universe was formed by God out of an eternal form or idea of matter; a proposition in the highest degree absurd. The same matter which he calls eternal Plato says was confused, malignant, and agitated by various motions destitute of law or order, before God began to put it in order, and to construct the universe. Θεὸς, says he,[8] ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν παραλαβὼν, οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγων, ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας, "God, taking up whatever is visible, not as being possessed of tranquillity, but greatly and irregularly agitated, brought it from disorder into order." It is well known that he also held that the badness and perversity of matter resisted the will of the Supreme Deity, and prevented him from making the universe such as he wished, free from all fault and evil. Could any wise man have persuaded himself that these and other properties of a similar description belonged to the eternal idea of matter existing in the Divine mind? Could the eternal notion of matter in the intellect of the Deity be termed disorderly, malignant, restless, and confused, previously to its being brought into order by God? Could it be said to have prevented the Deity from removing all fault and evil from the universe which he had made? Any further arguments to prove the incorrectness of Dacier's opinion, may easily be gathered from a perusal of the Timæus, since it may be at once perceived to be in the highest degree inconsistent with the general strain of that treatise.

XIX. Before parting with Plato, I think it will not be foreign to my purpose to remove a stumbling-block which has been an occasion of error to some, and may still be so to others, who have eagerly desired to make this philosopher out to be a Christian. Frequent mention is made in the writings of Plato and his followers of τὸ μὴ ὂν, or *nothing*, as of a really existent nature, out of which all things exist and are produced. This being noticed by those who are not sufficiently acquainted with the style of this philosopher, occasions them to think that there

[8] Timæus, cap. 14. p. 527. See also Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 3. segm. 69. p. 207.

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is little or no difference between the sentiments of the Christians and those of the Platonists respecting the origin and commencement of nature. In opposition to this, it ought to be observed, that Plato calls all things which are destitute of perpetuity and constancy, which rise and set, are increased or diminished, nothing and τὰ μὴ ὄντα: and since all that comes under the notice of the senses, all matter and all the bodies that are created from it, are of that nature, on this account they are classed by him under the same denomination. This has been already well observed by Cicero, whose words[9] are these: *Nihil* Plato putat esse, quod oriatur et intereat, idque solum esse, quod semper tale sit, qualem *ideam* appellat ille, nos speciem, "Plato thinks that to be *nothing* which begins and perishes, and that that alone *is*, which is always the same; such as he calls *idea* and we *species*." Diogenes Laërtius takes the same view of the matter. Τὸ γοῦν, says he,[10] αἰσθητὸν, καὶ ὂν καλεῖ καὶ μὴ ὄν· ὂν μὲν, διὰ τὸ γένεσιν αὐτοῦ εἶναι· μὴ ὂν δὲ, διὰ τὴν συνεχῆ μεταβολήν, "Plato calls sensible objects both *being* and *not being*; *being* indeed on account of generation, and *not being* on account of their continual change." The later Platonists are also accustomed to give to matter the same appellation; yet they do not precisely agree on this point with their master. For he considers as *nothing* and *not-being* all that comes under the cognizance of the senses, all matter, whether regarded as destitute of forms and qualities, or as endowed with qualities and consolidated into bodies. But they only give this name to matter as it is conceived of abstractedly in the mind, and regarded in itself apart from all form, figure, and qualities; but they never apply this designation to matter as contained in bodies, endowed with forms and properties, and visible to the eyes. Respecting this formless matter, which is only to be viewed and contemplated by the mind, Plotinus speaks as follows: Ὕλη μὴ ὂν ἂν εἰκότως λέγοιτο· καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ κίνησις μὴ ὂν, ἢ στάσις μὴ ὂν, ἀλλὰ ἀληθινῶς μὴ ὂν, εἴδωλον καὶ φάντασμα ὄγκου καὶ ὑποστάσεως ὕφεσις, "Matter may with propriety be called *not-being*, but not in the same sense that motion or rest is so called; but as really *not-being* the mere image and phantasm of mass, and an appetency of substance." The same proposition, almost in the same words, may also be found in his disciple Porphyry,[2] who calls matter ἀληθινὸν μὴ ὂν, "truly *not-being*," and gives some subtle reasons for thus denominating it. The reason why primary matter obtains this name among these philosophers, is, because it has no fixed and certain nature, but varies and changes its appearance in different

[9] Tuscul. Quæst. lib. 1. cap. 24. p. 2598. tom. 8. opp.
[10] De Vitis Philosophorum, lib. 3. segm. 64. p. 202.
[1] De Impassibilitate Corporeorum, ennead 3. lib. 6. cap. 7. p. 310.
[2] Sententiæ ad Intelligibili a ducentes, sect. 21. p. 226.

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bodies and things. The pretended Dionysius Areopagitus applies this very word to matter,[3] and both his interpreters, Maximus and Pachymeres, in commenting upon this passage, explain the reason of the name of these words: Λέγεται δὲ μὴ ὂν ἡ ὕλη, οὐχ ὅτι παντελῶς οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι μή ἐστι, "Matter is called *not-being*, not because it is absolutely nothing, but because it *is not*," that is, it is destitute of a stable and immutable nature. Some learned men have pressed too far both this name, given by the Platonists to matter, and also other expressions made use of by this sect on the same subject; and have thought themselves at liberty to conclude from them that the *matter* of the Platonists was actually nothing and a nonentity; but these, as I have already elsewhere observed, seem to be too severe against this philosophical party, and not to have used all the diligence requisite in examining into the meaning of the words they make use of, and investigating their whole method of philosophizing. "Among the Peripatetics," says Marsilius Ficinus,[4] "those who call matter *not-being*, call it absolutely nothing. But among the Platonists, who give a wider and greater upward and downward extension to the nature of unity than to the nature of entity, though they may call matter *not-being*, yet they do not therefore account it nothing."[5] Among modern philosophers, Robert Fludd and many others, who have admired and endeavoured to propagate Plato's sentiments, have chosen to imitate this fashion of the Platonists, and to call matter *nothing*; which they seem to do for this reason among others, that it may not be known how far his doctrine respecting the origin of nature differs from that universally received in the Christian church. For though they make use of Christian expressions in speaking of the commencement of the universe, and like ourselves say that all things were produced out of nothing, yet they do not attach the same meaning as we do to the words, and by the word *nothing* they only intend a rude and shapeless kind of matter, which they will have to be a second principle of all things. These unfair interpretations have been well exposed, among others, by Peter Gassendi, whose words are worth quoting. "As respects creation," says he,[6] "must not be understood a production of something out of nothing, in the same sense as the Mosaic creation of the universe is commonly intended by divines. For though Fludd makes

[3] De Divinis Nominibus, cap. 4. sect. 18. p. 570. tom. 1. opp.

[4] Comment. in Plotini Librum Περὶ Ὕλης, cap. 17. p. 1654. tom. 2. opp.

[5] John Scotus Erigena, De Divisione Naturæ, lib. 3. cap. 14. p. 118. has these words: "Many Gentile philosophers have thought that unformed matter was coeternal with God, and that from it he made all his works; on which account they called matter *nothing*, because previously to its receiving a form and a shape from God it did not appear, and was, as it were, nothing at all. For whatever has no form or appearance, may without impropriety be called *nothing*."

[6] Examen Philosophiæ Fluddanæ, part 1. p. 218. tom. 3. opp.

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use both of the words and the narrative of Moses, yet he uses all these in a symbolical manner. By the word *creation*, therefore, he understands, in the first place, the production or generation of any thing which is said to be made out of nothing, only as being from obscurity, or matter, *which by him is called nothing*. It is also said to be by and from God, inasmuch as light, which by him is called God, by dividing, preparing, and forming matter, constitutes things what they are." It is not necessary now to open and discuss the internal nature of this philosophy, a task which would be foreign to my present purpose. I merely wish to take the present opportunity of warning those who read the works with which these persons are now inundating the Christian world, not to trust too much to the mere sounds of words, but rather to endeavour to ascertain and judge of their meaning from the doctrines held by the writers themselves.

XX. The doctrine of the eternity of the universe is so interwoven with Aristotle's philosophy, that on its removal, a large part of his system must necessarily fall to pieces. Take away from his doctrine the eternity of the universe, and his opinions respecting heaven, God, intelligences, and other things, will be utterly destitute of support; for all his tenets on these points rest entirely on this foundation. So that none of the ancients, whether favourable or opposed to him, ever doubted that he considered the universe and motion to have been as destitute of a beginning as their Cause and Author. But what will not result from a blind attachment to great names? There have been found some among Christians who have enrolled Aristotle, in spite of himself, amongst those who believed that God created existing things out of things that were not. Daniel George Morhof relates that the class of persons called schoolmen were so preposterously attached as this to their great idol Aristotle. "The schoolmen," says he,[7] "wish to persuade us that Aristotle acknowledged the creation of primary matter out of nothing." Who these were I must confess I do not know; nor do I think it worth while to spend time (than which nothing is more precious to me) in inquiring after the names of those who lent their aid to so perverse an opinion. The authority of Morhof is, I think, quite sufficient; for he possessed an endless amount of reading and accurate industry. And I am aware of the bold rash spirit of this sect, and that Thomas Aquinas[8] himself has endeavoured to prove that Aristotle contended, not for the eternity of the universe simply and absolutely, but only

[7] Polyhistor. Philosoph. lib. 2. part 1. cap. 12. sect. 9. p. 227.

[8] Summa, part. 1. quæst. 46. art. 1. Many of the schoolmen agree with Aquinas on this point. See the Jesuits Conimbricenses on Aristotle's Physics, lib. 8. cap. 2. p. 378.

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comparatively and in a certain sense; whose authority induced many to attempt something further, and to endeavour to clear away all improprieties whatever from so great a philosopher. Subsequently to the schoolmen, Georgius Trapezuntius,[9] a famous Greek writer of the fifteenth century, contended that Aristotle (whom he idolized) entertained no opinions respecting the origin of the universe and of matter that would be unworthy of a Christian; as is plain from his opponent Bessarion, who completely deprives his opinion of any semblance of truth.[10] Of the more modern admirers of the Stagirite, many might be named who have entertained the same view as Trapezuntius; for the same thing has happened to the Peripatetics as to others who have surrendered themselves entirely to a party, and renounced the liberty they received from God; that one blindly follows another, and proves what he sees to have been already proved and decided by others. I will however content myself with two, whose names are well known in our own [Lutheran] church. One is John Zeisold, who has published a book, De Aristotelis cum Scripturâ Sacrâ Consensû, in which, among other particulars, he copiously maintains that "Aristotle allowed of a true principle and creation of the universe, with a newness of being."[11] The other is Adam Tribbechow, who thinks that Zeisold has completely justified Aristotle on this point.[1] It is not necessary for me to dispute with persons of this description; for they shut their eyes at noon-day, and try to make that doubtful which must be well known to every one who is even slightly acquainted with the elements of the Peripatetic philosophy. Besides, some learned authors, who in other respects have a good opinion of Aristotle's piety, have refuted this error of theirs by solid arguments, and have shown from the Stagirite's own writings that he held the opinion attributed to him by Lactantius,[2] "that the world had always existed and always would." Those worthy of especial notice are the Jesuits Conimbricenses,[3] Benedict Pererius,[4] Francis Patricius,[5] and of our own countrymen James Thomasius,[6] who are equal to a host on this point. The principal passage on which

[9] Comparatio Platonis et Aristotelis, Venet. 1523. 8vo. See also Leo Allatius, de Georgiis et eorum Scriptis, sect. 50. p. 726. at the end of the 10th volume of the Bibliotheca Græca of J. A. Fabricius.

[10] Adversus Calumniatorem Platonis, lib. 3. cap. 13. 20. 27. ed. Rom. no date.

[11] Diss. 2. art. 1. sect 1. p. 60. and sect. 13. p. 71.

[1] Veritas Creationis Mundi, cap. 2. p. 279.

[2] Institut. Divin. lib. 7 cap. 1 p. 774.

[3] Comment. in Libros Phys. Aristot. lib. 8. cap. 2. quæst. 3. art. 1. p. 375. and quæst. 4. p. 382. &c.

[4] De Communibus Rerum Naturalium Principiis et Affectionibus, lib. 5. cap. 7. p. 286.

[5] Discussiones Peripateticæ, tom. 5. lib. 4. p. 400.

[6] De Stoicâ Mundi Exustione, diss. 4. p. 58.

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the defenders of Aristotle depend, is the following:[7] Θεὸς δοκεῖ τὸ αἴτιον πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή τις, "God seems to be the cause and a kind of beginning to all things." But it is obvious that generalities of this description must be understood and explained in accordance with the fundamental principles of a writer's philosophy. A contrary course of proceeding, in which short sentences of this description are to be taken as a standard by which to regulate the whole substance of an author's philosophy, would cast uncertainty over the clearest truths, and involve all investigation into ancient opinions in inextricable confusion. Nor is there any thing in this passage of Aristotle's inconsistent with an hypothesis that God was the author only of forms and modes, and yet that the universe was eternal. I say nothing at present of the Stoics, who, as I have already observed,[8] have been ranked by Clemens Alexandrinus among those who supposed that no pre-existing substance was present to the Deity when he created and formed the material universe; for there cannot be the least doubt but that this sect laid down two first principles, God and matter, nor could they, on the fundamental maxims of their philosophy, allow of any beginning to matter.

XXI. Dismissing therefore the Greek sects and philosophers, I now pass on to the barbarian nations, who have been supposed by learned men to have entertained correct opinions respecting the creation of the universe. I have already observed that all disputation on the philosophy and religion of the nations of antiquity must be very uncertain, unsatisfactory, and doubtful; since they were not bound by any specific laws, confessions, or formularies, to any uniformity of opinion throughout a state; but it was left to individual priests and citizens to embrace and defend, and even to propound and teach, whatever opinions appeared to them most consistent with propriety and truth, provided only that they did not entirely neglect or oppose the worship of the gods as established by the laws; while every one interpreted according to his own pleasure, without opposition, the ceremonies and public observances of religion; as is evident from innumerable passages and testimonies of the ancients. Hence it might have happened that there were in a nation as many religions as provinces, cities, colleges of priests, or even individuals, who chose to use their private judgment respecting sacred things. But we are apt to judge of the religion and theology of a whole nation from a few expressions of some of their writers; how erroneously, the very want of agreement among these writers themselves is sufficient to show. The diversity existing among ancient authors respecting the religion of the Persians and Egyptians is a proof to my mind that, with the

[7] Libro 1. Metaphys. cap. 2. p. 263. tom. 4. o. p.
[8] Sect. III. of this Dissertation.

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exception of a few primary principles, no certain belief was prevalent in these nations respecting religion, and that these authors have rather given us the private opinion of a few than the public creed of all. But I have discussed these points more copiously elsewhere; for the present we will follow the beaten track, and take it for granted that some kind of certain knowledge can be obtained by us respecting the general religion of ancient nations. I will begin with the Egyptians, who excel almost all other nations in reputation for wisdom, antiquity, and almost every other advantage. It is said that Hermes Trismegistus taught this nation the doctrine of a creation out of nothing; and this is said to be evident from his writings which are still extant.[9] It is added that this is further manifest from the Physiology of the Egyptians, in which ἀρχὴ, *a beginning*, is expressly attributed to matter. "Thus also," says Dickinson,[10] "the Physiology of the Egyptians attributes τὴν ἀρχὴν, that is, a beginning, to matter; and supposes that when it first began to exist it was in a very confused state, being a mingled mass of all kinds of particles; but that after these bodies had been separated from each other, the universe fell into the order in which we now see it." And lastly Jamblichus, who has been generally supposed to be very learned in the opinions and doctrines of the Egyptians, seems expressly to assert that they entertained no doubt upon this point. If I were disposed to be contentious, I might here oppose to these authorities those who have given a different account of the Egyptians, namely that they so far held matter to be the principle of all things as scarcely to take any account of the Deity in explaining the origin of nature; and after hearing these testimonies, I might contend that they were preferable to the former, in antiquity and number. Nor do I think this method of procedure would appear wanting in force and bearing; but I will take a milder course, and will review in their order the value of the proofs adduced. First of all then, I take leave to deny that any conclusion can be drawn from Hermes on this point; for the books extant under his name are rejected as spurious by the most competent judges, and if they have any part of the genuine Egyptian doctrine (which is however very doubtful) they are at the same time corrupted by many tokens of fraud and deception, so that it is quite impossible to tell what part of them is really Egyptian.[1] But let us also pass by this consideration, and come more closely to the point. What, after all, does this "thrice-great" Hermes say, to induce us to believe that he taught the Egyptians the doctrine of a creation out of nothing? Nothing but what we shall presently hear also taught by Jam-

[9] Livius Galantes, Comparatio Theologiæ Platonicæ, p. 237. 238.
[10] Physice Vetus et Vera, cap. 12. p. 198.
[1] See Cudworth's Intellectual System.

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blichus, and what was approved of by almost all the sect of the later Platonists; that the universe was an eternal efflux from the Deity, and that all things therefore are God.[2] Away with the advocate of so absurd a sentiment! which appears to me to be even worse than the opinion which supposes the addition to the Deity of an eternal matter. The "Physiology of the Egyptians," which Dickinson calls in to his aid, is a narrative of the origin of all things, which (as appears from Dickinson's own words[3]) has been left to us by Diodorus Siculus; for this has usually been considered by learned men to be a "Physiology of the Egyptians," though it is not called so by Diodorus, nor does Eusebius, by whom it is also quoted,[4] attribute it to the Egyptians, but to the Greeks. However this may be, it shows a great want either of discernment or impartiality, to suppose that the authors of this system of cosmogony ascribe a beginning to matter. Let impartial judges peruse the following words of Diodorus, and say how far the ancient Egyptians, if indeed they were the authors of this philosophy, can claim any credit from them: Οἱ δὲ γεννητὸν καὶ ἄφθαρτον εἶναι νομίσαντες, ἔφησαν ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τυχεῖν τῆς πρώτης γενέσεως ὡρισμένοις χρόνοις· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τῶν ὅλων σύστασιν, μίαν ἔχειν ἰδέαν οὐρανόν τε καὶ γῆν, μεμιγμένης αὐτῶν τῆς φύσεως· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διαστάντων τῶν σωμάτων ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τὸν μὲν κόσμον περιλαβεῖν ἅπασαν τὴν ὡρωμένην ἐν αὐτῷ σύνταξιν, "Those who supposed the universe to be produced and incorruptible, also said that the generation of mankind took place at a certain specific time; for when *at the beginning* the union of all things took place, heaven and earth had but one form, their natures being commingled together; but afterwards upon a separation of the bodies from each other, the universe assumed the order which is now seen in it." Here indeed a certain ἀρχή, a beginning, is attributed to the *union* of all things; whence it is apparent that the former advocates of this system did not consider the universe to be eternal; but I see no evidence of a belief that matter, like the universe, had a beginning. To this may be added the more important consideration, that no mention is made of the Deity in this explanation of the origin of the universe; which has already induced some learned men to suspect that the authors of this philosophy are to be classed among those who have not feared to ascribe the origin of the universe to natural causes and the fortuitous motion of matter.[5] I have lighted upon two passages in Jamblichus, which have reference to the matter in hand.

[2] See Cudworth.

[3] Bibliotheca Histor. lib. 1. p. 7. 8.

[4] Præparatio Evangelica, lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 19.

[5] This was the opinion of Eusebius, Præp. Evan. cap. 7. p. 21. with whom many moderns have agreed. See Sentiments des Philosophes sur l'Origine du Monde, p. 56.

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Porphyry, in his epistle to Anebo, an Egyptian priest, had inquired, among other questions, what the Egyptians thought of matter, whether they considered it to be eternal, or produced and created? Εἰ ἀγέννητον ὕλην, ἢ γεννητήν. To this question Jamblichus replies in these words:[6] Ὕλην δὲ παρήγαγεν ὁ Θεὸς ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσιότητος ὑποσχισθείσης ὑλότητος, ἣν παραλαβὼν ὁ δημιουργὸς ζωτικὴν οὖσαν, τὰς ἁπλᾶς καὶ ἀπαθεῖς σφαίρας ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἐδημιούργησε, τὸ δὲ ἔσχατον αὐτῆς, εἰς τὰ γεννητὰ καὶ φθαρτὰ σώματα διεκόσμησε, "God produceth matter by dividing materiality from essentiality; which [matter] being vital, the Creator taking, formed from it simple and incorruptible spheres, and the last part of it he arranged into generated and corruptible bodies." The meaning of the following passage is the same as that of the former, though it is not expressed with equal force and perspicuity:[7] Μὴ δή τις θαυμαζέτω ἐὰν καὶ ὕλην τινὰ καθαρὰν καὶ θεῖαν εἶναι λέγομεν· ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ δημιουργοῦ τῶν ὅλων καὶ αὐτὴ γενομένη, τὴν τελειότητα ἑαυτῆς ἐπιτήδειαν κέκτηται πρὸς θεῶν ὑποδοχήν, "Nor let any one wonder if we also say that some matter is pure and divine; for it also being produced by the Father and Creator of all things, possesses a perfection of its own, necessary for the reception of the gods." Shall these passages then induce us to say that the Egyptians thought matter to be the work of the Deity? They wear, I will admit, an aspect not unadapted to persuade the unwary; but I will endeavour to prove the contrary of this, and to show that Jamblichus is not better than the rest, who have been already seen entirely to differ from Christian doctrine on the origin of nature.

In the first place, Jamblichus was a man of a vain and corrupt mind, and not at all a proper authority from which to learn the doctrines and opinions of the ancient Egyptians. His time fell at an epoch when the ancient philosophy of Hermes had already perished, and had from various causes become obliterated; and even if this philosophy had still been in existence, a Platonist could not be considered a just and proper interpreter of it; for this sect never endeavoured simply to ascertain what the ancients really thought, but rather sought with all their might to pervert the opinions of antiquity in order to make these appear to agree with their own. This was the case with Jamblichus. I would therefore allow that there are some fragments of Egyptian philosophy in his works, such as it existed in his own time among some of the priests; but one must be very ignorant of the history of Platonism not to perceive that these are very much corrupted, and accommodated to the opinions and genius of the

[6] De Mysteriis Ægyptiorum, sect. 8. cap. 159.
[7] Sect. 5. cap. 23. p. 138.

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sect to which Jamblichus belonged, while at the same time they are entirely deprived of their native force and power, and expounded in a method contrary to the intention of their authors. But let us pass by these considerations, and have a higher opinion of this teacher of Egyptian philosophy than he deserves; yet it will not be possible to prove from these passages of his, that the Egyptians had the same ideas of matter as the Christians. Matter is said by him to have been produced by God; and then he asserts that from matter all things were created also by the Deity. The matter here spoken of is not however all of one kind; but is divided into the grosser and the more subtle; from the more subtle and ethereal God made the stars, and from the grosser and heavier the other bodies. This is well enough so far as words go; but it will be found very much otherwise, if their meaning and import be inquired into. If it be first demanded, how and in what manner did God produce matter, Jamblichus will reply, that "God, when he produced matter separated materiality from essentiality." Who can explain what this means? They certainly intend that God educed matter from his own essence and interior nature; or that he separated and secreted matter from his own nature. Jamblichus is therefore to be reckoned among the number of those who considered matter as part of the Divine nature, and held that it had at some former period emanated from the Deity;[8] a doctrine which is obviously very different from that of Christianity. For what was always in the Deity was not created out of nothing; but already had an existence before it flowed from the Deity, and was separated from the Divine nature, though in another form and in a different mode and aspect; and it appears to me to be of little consequence whether matter be supposed to have eternally existed within the Deity, or externally to the Divine nature. I am not unaware that a large number of ancients and moderns might be produced, who have adopted this view of creation, and yet have not thought that by so doing they did violence to Christian doctrine; but at the same time I know that even in Augustine's time this doctrine was publicly proscribed, and cannot be embraced excepting by those who are more attached to freaks of ingenuity than to Christian simplicity, and who do not object, in order to escape some difficulties, to accept of opinions at once portentous and wicked.[9] But let us proceed to inquire from Jamblichus, with whom alone we have here to do, whether he supposed that matter emanated from the Deity

[8] This opinion is professed by Jamblichus, sect. 1. cap. 9. p. 15. Τὰ δ' ἐπὶ γῆς ἐν τοῖς πληρώμασι τῶν θεῶν ἔχοντα τὸ εἶναι, "Terrestrial things have their being from the fulness of the gods."

[9] See the late Abraham Hinckelmann's Detectio Fundamenti Boëhmiani, p. 69, &c., where this opinion is expressly refuted.

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from all eternity, or whether he thought that this occurred at a definite time; and the falsity of the opinion which he ascribes to the Egyptians will be more clearly apparent. His own words seem to favour the latter opinion; but it is necessary to be careful in trusting the words of a Platonist, which often have concealed a very different meaning from what they seem at first to bear. Philosophers of this description are accustomed very often to speak of God previously to creation with such magnificent phrases, and to speak in such a way respecting creation, as to make it appear as if it happened at a certain definite time, and had been spontaneously undertaken by the Deity. But when they do this they sustain the character of metaphysicians, and understand a *state of reason* or *mental abstraction*, to speak scholastically; that is, they conceive of God, the universe, and creation *absolutely, abstractedly, and without any determination;* and when they lose sight of this abstract idea, they hold that the universe, like the Deity, existed from all eternity, and never emanated from his nature. The same must be said of Jamblichus, who, like the other Platonists, held that the universe was eternal, and had from infinite ages emanated from the Divine nature; so that when he here says that God had taken matter, and had from it formed other things, he regards God, matter, and creation, in an abstract point of view, and speaks after the manner of metaphysicians, when they separate *universals*, as they call them, from the things in which they inhere, and treat of them in a separate aspect. And indeed it was more consistent for Jamblichus to use a degree of license in the explanation of these matters, than it was for the other Platonists: since he believed that a philosopher might, in his instructions, for the sake of more easily informing the ignorant, assume that the universe had its beginning in time, whereas in reality it had no beginning. The emperor Julian has alluded to this opinion of his with an expression of disapprobation:[10] Οἶδα μεν, says he, καὶ Πλάτωνα τὸν μέγαν· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτον ἄνδρα τοῖς χρόνοις μὲν, οὔτι μὴν φύσει καταδείστερον, τὸν Χαλκίδεα φημὶ τὸν Ἰαμβλίχον . . . . ἄχρις ὑποθέσεως τῷ γεννητῷ προσχρωμένους καὶ οἱονεὶ χρονικήν τινα τὴν ποίησιν ὑποτιθεμένους, ἵνα τὸ μέγεθος τῶν παρ' αὐτοῦ γινομένων ἔργων ἐπινοηθείη, "I know that the great Plato, and another, who was second to him in time but not in genius, I mean Jamblichus the Chalcidian . . . . hypothetically considered the universe as produced, and suppose a certain creation in time, in order that the greatness of the things made by him may be understood." The emperor adds that this opinion did not appear to him free from danger. These things considered, there can be no doubt but that Jamblichus and the Egyptians, whose senti-

[10] Orat. 4. in Solem, p. 146.

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ments, he says, agreed with his own, were very far removed from the Christian doctrine respecting the origin of the universe. For this author, if we look only at his words, and strip off all disguises, will be found to have taught, that God is one and all things, for that matter, of which all things consist, emanated from all eternity from the Divine nature, and diffused itself into the whole universe; so that whatever exists is part and portion of God. But scarcely any doctrine can be more injurious towards the Almighty than this, or more in accordance with the principles of atheism. Hence also Proclus, who is well known to have been a most strenuous defender of the eternity of the universe, quotes the first of the above-mentioned passages of Jamblichus, and intimates that it favours his own views.[1] And the same was the case with Bessarion, the chief of that Platonic sect which formerly pervaded part of Italy; who, while far from denying that all the Platonists asserted the eternity of the universe, thought at the same time that these expressions of Jamblichus or Hermes are not at all opposed to this opinion. "God the Creator," says he,[2] "also produces matter, and so imparts to it being as to be inseparable from form. This is the opinion of Plato, of Plotinus, Porphyry, Amelius, Jamblichus, Syrianus, Proclus, and all who followed the doctrine of Plato. Jamblichus also informs us that this was the opinion of Hermes Trismegistus; since he asserts that Hermes held that matter was produced from substance." How these words are to be understood is plainly apparent from the whole chapter whence the words are taken; and particularly from the following expressions: "That eternal Being which comprehends within itself at once all infinitude of entity, such as Plato supposed God to be, is different from that eternal being which possesses its own essence, not absolutely, but connected with the flux of generation, and acquires from elsewhere the possibility of being perpetual; such as in Plato's opinion the universe is." This distinction of eternities will be explained further on, when we come to the younger Platonists.

XXII. From the Egyptians I proceed to the Chinese, whom learned men have, by a very probable conjecture, suspected to be the root-stock of the Egyptians. This nation bears in general a very bad character; for the mass of the common people are supposed to be slaves to the grossest superstitions; and the literati, as they are called, are considered to be entirely ignorant of God, and destitute of all religion. But there are some writers who contend that the ancient Chinese, before the impieties of the Hindoos and other nations had crept into the empire, had very

[1] Comment. in Timæum Platonis, lib. 2. p. 117.
[2] In Calumniatorem Platonis, lib. 2. cap. 5.

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different views, and were at no great distance from true religion and sound wisdom; and the testimonies in favour of this, adduced by them out of Chinese books and other writings, are not unworthy of notice. Those who wish to know more on this point, may consult Athanasius Kircher,[3] the Jesuit editors of Confucius,[4] M. V. La Croze,[5] and T. S. Bayer,[6] the most recent writer on this subject, a very famous author, exceedingly learned in oriental languages and history, and professor in the university of Petersburg. On the general subject, Leibnitz's Epistles may be consulted, vol. 11. p. 441; and respecting the opinions of the modern Chinese, Longobardus, *l. c.* pp. 197, 329. It is also said that some remains of this golden age are still not wanting in this populous nation: but that there are still worthy and honest individuals, who abhor the novel and nefarious religion of the rest of the people. These therefore have been thought by some eminent authors to have had such just ideas respecting the origin of all things and the creation of the universe as not to be at all unworthy of being ranked in this respect with the Christian believers in a Divine revelation. Of this opinion are the authors of the Universal History, who think that this better portion of the Chinese people teach that there is a God, the supreme Ruler of heaven and earth, governing and wisely managing all things, who created all that is substantial and consists of matter; that chaos is of two kinds, the one occult or imperfect, which they call *Yin;* and the other plain or perfect, which they term *Yang*;[7] that these two principles parted again into other two, these again into four, the four into eight, and so on to many more, the first ratio of the division being always preserved.[8] If this be indeed the doctrine of the ancient Chinese, and of those among the modern nation who excel the rest in wisdom, I do not think we shall find in China any with whom we may form an alliance on the question of the origin of the universe. They affirm that God produced all things out of Chaos, or *Tay Kie*, as they call it; and that Chaos is not all of one kind, but by its various admixtures had produced the universe. But whence was Chaos? Was it made by God? Did it exist within the Deity from all eternity, or externally to God? The Chinese philosophers are silent on this point, and I fear that this silence will condemn their cause, and show that they thought

[3] China Illustrata; part 3. p. 129. &c.
[4] Declaratio Procemialis, part 1. sect. 1. p. 54. &c.
[5] Histoire du Christianisme des Indes, livre 6. p. 440.
[6] Commentarii Originum Sinicarum, sect. 3. &c. p. 269. &c. tom. 2. of the Museum Sinicum, Petersburg, 1730, 8vo.
[7] Some have it *Yam*.
[8] Sentiments des Philosophes sur l'Origine et la Création du Monde, p. 153. See also the Jesuit editors of Confucius, who have given a copper-plate illustrative of this doctrine, Declaratio Procemialis, part 1. sect. 7. p. 42.

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Chaos to be equally eternal with the Deity himself. Those who think that God created all things out of Chaos, and do not add the source whence Chaos was derived, may well be ranked with Ovid and other ancient poets, who say the Deity, as a superior nature, divided and compounded,

Non benè junctarum discordia semina rerum :

but not with the Christians, who think that there was absolutely nothing at all in existence previously to the creation of matter and the universe by the Deity. However, the learned authors of the Universal History do not seem to have followed the best authorities, but rather to have confounded together the ancient and the modern philosophy of the Chinese. Let us therefore take for our guides those who have treated this question with more accuracy, so that the truth may become more clearly apparent. The modern philosophers of China call the first principle of all things *Tay Kie;* and though they speak respecting this in magniloquent phrases, yet even the Jesuits themselves confess that by this term "they merely mean primary matter;"[9] nor do they deny that "it can be plainly perceived from these philosophers' method of speech, that they acknowledge a certain kind of antecedent eternity of things arising and setting, in that numerous cycle of years, infinitely repeated, which they assign to our world." Those who entertain such absurd sentiments ought rather to be classed with profane and atheistical persons, than to be ranked among the lovers of wisdom; and this even the Jesuits admit. "For," say they, "when they copiously, but very intricately and confusedly, treat of their Ly and Tay Kie, they seem by degrees to glide into atheism; since they exclude every supernatural efficient principle; and though they sometimes seem to abstract themselves from sense and matter, yet in reality they continue in material ideas." All who are accurately skilled in Chinese literature agree in this opinion; even those who attribute more to this people than to almost all the other nations of the earth. The question therefore is settled, as regards the piety of those who seem at the present day to have in China the greatest regard for wisdom. But some eminent authors deny that the ancestors of the Chinese held similar sentiments; and think that, previously to the coming of some foreign philosophers, principally Hindoos, so pernicious a doctrine was scarcely heard of in this nation. Let us listen to what is said by that great man, himself a host, T. S. Bayer, who says:[10] "There are some among the Chinese, who in their writings lay down a principle

[9] Procemialis Declaratio ad Confucium, part 2. sect. 1. pp. 56. 57.

[10] Commentarii Originum Sinicarum, sect. 3. p. 272. tom. 2. Musei Sinici. See also what is said by the Jesuits, ubi supra, p. 59. who go into this matter more in detail.

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of all things different from this,—Tay Kie. But since these words signify a great termination or pole, it will, I think, be evident that all this has proceeded from some philosophical ratiocination, which spurns the ancient faith of their ancestors. For what is now the opinion of the Brahmins prevailed also 1700 years ago among the Chinese, that a perpetual succession of worlds existed for infinite ages before our time; so that some arose out of others, and that the present also, as it proceeded from its predecessor, so when its cycle is accomplished it will terminate, and leave behind the germ of another." Let us take it for granted that these statements are correct; for there is no reason why we should refuse to credit those who are well skilled in Chinese literature, and have studied with great diligence the ancient writings of that people, particularly when no suspicion can possibly attach to them of any sinister design. It remains, therefore, for us to inquire how the first philosophers among the Chinese reasoned respecting the origin of things. The Jesuit editors of Confucius say that they attributed a beginning to every thing. "In which," say they,[1] "they [the modern philosophers] are at variance with the common consent of Chinese antiquity, which, so far as can be gathered from its traditions, assigned a beginning to heaven and earth, and the first man and woman, with such a nicety, as even unhesitatingly to state the hour in which they began to exist." Bayer is rather more industrious on this point. He has observed out of the treatise Siao-ul-lun [Seaou-heŏ—*Davis*] or "The Instruction of Youth," which the Chinese masters are accustomed to explain to the children, that the ancient sages of this nation called the principle of all things *Tay-ku*, and also *Puen-ku*. [Pa-kua?][2] This *Tay-ku*, though some incorrectly think it to be the name of a very ancient king, he contends, in accordance with Christian Menzelius, is a vast eternity existing before the commencement of the universe. "The Chinese," says he, "have received from their ancestors the doctrine of the existence of a vast eternity before the beginnings of things, which they concisely call *Tay-ku*, extreme antiquity, or *Puen-ku*, prime antiquity." From these premises and explanations he proceeds to lay down the opinion of the founders of the Chinese nation respecting the origin of nature, in the following terms:[3] "Those ancient men had heard nothing of an eternal vicissitude of worlds and things; for they thought that this *Tay-ku*, which had preceded the origin of the heaven and of the earth, contained a tranquil and quiet chaos of all things, until by a certain impulse it put on motion and form: which opinion, rightly interpreted, does not differ greatly from

[1] Ubi supra, p. 56.
[2] Commentarii Originum Sinicarum, sect. 3. pp. 269. 270. 271.
[3] Ubi supra, p. 272.

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the sacred faith of the patriarchs and of Moses." This learned man seems to proceed even further than this, and endeavours to prove that the primitive Chinese entertained the same opinion as the Phœnicians, Thales, and others, are said to have held: "that from water, as the material, the forms of all things were produced."[4] Let all this be taken for granted; for who would dare, without evidence, to accuse of falsehood learned men who have spent a great part of their lives in the examination of Chinese learning? Yet I am not thus induced to believe that the early Chinese understood and believed the doctrine of a creation out of nothing. The ancient sages of China assigned indeed a beginning to the universe and to the human race; they taught that eternity contained a tranquil and quiet chaos of things, until being acted upon by the Deity it acquired the form which at present it wears. But these are rather the sentiments of men who join with the Deity an eternity of matter, than of those who contend that nothing was in existence before the universe was made by God. For if eternity embraced and contained within its bosom a tranquil and quiet chaos, there must have been from all eternity a rude and undigested mass of matter, which afterwards submitted itself to the disposing and formative hand of God. Therefore, the learned men from whom these statements are derived, do not dare to say that the ancient Chinese were altogether sound upon this point. The Jesuits, by the use of the qualifying expression, "at least," evidently show that they did not venture to clear them of all suspicion, and that nothing was clearly ascertainable from their ancient books, except that they had more reason and truth than to believe in the eternity of the universe. The learned Bayer only says that the opinions he ascribes to the ancient Chinese in some measure approached to Christian truth, especially if a favourable interpretation were put upon them; which is the same thing as saying that there was not a little difference between the doctrines of the Christians and those of the ancient Chinese respecting the origin of the universe. Therefore, even if we should grant that the modern philosophy of the Chinese has considerably departed from the ancient form, and has become wonderfully corrupt; yet still more weighty testimonies are required, before we can agree that the early Chinese believed that God was the only parent and author of all things that exist.

XXIII. From the Chinese, I proceed to the Japanese and Hindoos. As regards the former, Ludovic Froes relates[5] that

[4] Sect. 4. p. 274. &c.

[5] In a letter in the Portuguese language, dated from Japan in the year 1565, quoted by Athanasius Kircher, China Illustrata, part 3. cap. 2. p. 142. The Portuguese original runs as follows:—Que antes desto mundo ceos e terra, serem creados o Fombum semper

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some of this nation are wiser and better than the rest, and hold sentiments widely different from those of the common people respecting their deity Amida. For they were persuaded that this god existed prior to the formation of heaven and earth, and that he would be eternal; that all things were made and framed by him; that his nature or essence was diffused throughout heaven and earth; that it even extended far beyond both these; and lastly, that all things were governed and preserved by his providence. Some there are who think these particulars sufficient to prove that among the Japanese there were not wanting the advocates of a creation out of nothing. But I think the matter is not yet quite so plain, and demands a little further consideration. Let it be granted that Froes correctly understood the sentiments of the Japanese with whom he conversed, and did not inadvertently accommodate their words to Christian doctrine; a thing, however, that is very often done by those who examine into the religion and customs of foreign nations. The only conclusion that can be drawn from his words is, that this sect did not accede to the doctrine of the eternity of the universe; for those who hold that the Deity formed all things out of eternal matter, would not hesitate to profess and approve the sentiments they held respecting creation. A comparison of the Timæus of Plato with this opinion will show the intimate alliance between the two. But I fear that Froes, misled by a similitude and congruity of expression, has fallen into error on this point, and has attributed to this description of persons a more correct sentiment than is just. For Engelbert Kæmpfer, who has very lately inquired into the sects, religion, and opinions of the Japanese, with greater sagacity than any preceding author, has met with nothing in the whole nation, but ignorance and impiety; and never met with persons of such correct sentiments, though he had diligently perused their sacred writings and the books of particular sects, and had conversed with the mystagogues of all religions. Three principal sects are in existence amongst the Japanese. The first called *Sintos*, is the most ancient, and seems to have been originated and matured in the island itself. The second is called *Budsdo*, or "the religion of foreign deities," and was brought to the Japanese from the neighbouring parts of Asia. It does not seem to differ from Brahminism. The third is that of the philosophers, and is called *Siuto*, that is, "the way of the wise." This is easily recognised by those acquainted with oriental religions, as approaching very near to the modern doctrine of the Chinese; nor is this denied by its followers, who hold Confucius in high veneration, and venerate their ancestors

fora enunca tivera principio, nem havia de ter fim, e qua por elle foraon creadas todas as conzas, que seu ser estava dentro na terra e nos ceos.

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and the souls of their deceased parents, after the manner of the Chinese. Those called Sintos entertain the multitude with tales respecting the gods and their exploits; but studiously conceal their real doctrine respecting the origin of nature, and only disclose it to their disciples after a terrific oath that they will never discover this sublime mystery to the profane and stupid multitude. But Kæmpfer, out of the book of this sect which is called Odaiki, brought this doctrine to light; upon which elucidation, it was found to be worthy of eternal oblivion. For this senseless sect think that the being who created and formed all things was produced out of eternal chaos or matter, and made all things by a certain fatal necessity. The words of the book I have above mentioned, and in which all this sacred doctrine is contained, are as follow:[6] "In the beginning of the opening of all things a chaos floated, as fishes swim in the water for pleasure. Out of this chaos arose a thing like a prickle, moveable and transformable. This thing became a soul or spirit, and this spirit is called '*Kunito Kodatsno Mikotto.*'" There is, I think, little doubt but that Froes heard one of this sect describing the origin of the universe, and interpreted his words according to the doctrine of Moses, who is well known to have declared that the Spirit of the Lord moved the waters when the universe was created by God; whence it has happened that he also accommodated the other doctrines of this philosophy to agree with the tenets of Christianity. Those who follow the religion called Budsdo by the Japanese, seem to entertain the idea of a certain eternal succession of worlds, such as the Stoics formerly professed, and many of the Hindoos imagine. The Siodosju, or philosophers, entertain such improper sentiments respecting all religious truth, that we shall not be far wrong in classing them among Atheists. Most of them worship no god except a kind of soul of the universe, which they think pervades all things, and acts only by fatality and necessity. Some, though they admit of a soul as distinct from body, yet deny that it is the parent of all things, and are even so senseless as to think that this soul, which they think rules and governs all things, was generated and produced from the conjunction of the heaven and earth, or Yin and Yo.[7] Both kinds think the world to be eternal, and that men and animals were produced by the power of heaven, and of the five terrestrial elements.[8]

XXIV. In inquiring into the religion and opinions of the Hindoos respecting the Deity and divine things, the Hindoo philosophers are principally to be understood, who are called

[6] History of Japan, lib. 3. cap. 1. p. 207.

[7] Kæmpfer's History of Japan, lib. 3. cap. 7. pp. 249. 250.

[8] Ubi supra, p. 250. "They make the world eternal, and suppose men and animals to have been produced by Yin and Yo, the heaven and the five terrestrial elements."

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Brahmans or Brahmins, and who have enjoyed a high reputation for wisdom from the remotest antiquity. For it is universally admitted by all that have visited that country, that the rest of the people are buried under a mass of senseless fables and gross errors, and rarely raise their minds to the contemplation of abstract subjects. And therefore, some learned men, relying upon the narratives of some travellers, do not hesitate to reckon these Brahmins among those who refer the origin of all things and of matter itself to one God. But if there be any thing doubtful, obscure, and uncertain, it is the religion of the Brahmins, of which there are almost as many opinions as there are authorities who have undertaken to explain it; on which account it is not clear what they think, or what they ought to think, respecting the origin of the universe. Some say that they maintain an eternal series of successive worlds, and that the modern Chinese derived this doctrine from them; an opinion that is not destitute of probability, as is plain from what M. V. La Croze [9] has related respecting the great number of worlds spoken of by them. Others say that they hold creation to have been nothing else than an amplification of the Divine nature, and say that when the Deity purposed to create the universe, he drew the material of all things from his own essence, just as a spider draws its web from its body; whence it follows that all things are identical with the Deity, and that whatever exists is part of the divine nature.[10] A similar report makes them believe that the Deity himself was first of all converted into a certain kind of egg, or into matter, and that from this egg, or rather from the Deity, emanated heaven and earth, and all things.[1] But a very different account is given out of the books of the Hindoos, by Bartholomew Ziegenbalg, who is well known to have propagated Christianity among them in our own time with great zeal and considerable success; for he says that when the sages of the nation are questioned respecting the origin of nature, they produce a kind of genealogy of the gods. They say that the first of all this imaginary family was an infinitely powerful being, destitute of any beginning, whom they call *Barabara Wastu;* this being, who is identical with the supreme Deity, is said to have generated eternity; from eternity was generated *Tschiwen,* the most powerful god; from this god was born the goddess *Tshaddy;* she again produced *Putadi,* or the elementary and sensible world.[2] Thus these triflers proceed, and string together an endless series of gods and things, mutually

[9] Histoire du Christianisme des Indes, livre 6. p. 467.
[10] François Bernier, Voyages aux Terres du Grand Mogol, tom. 2. p. 164.
[1] La Croze, ubi supra, p. 462. Sentiments des Philosophes sur l' Origine du Monde, p. 150.
[2] Der Königl. Dänschen Missionarien Berichte aus Ostindien, tom. 1. pt. 1. p. 47.

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produced and dependent on each other, until after a long train they come to the creation of man. I have contented myself with giving the beginning of the fable. But I suspect that all this is but a development of the opinion which makes all things to have flowed from the divine nature itself, for they say that the supreme and omnipotent nature is the source whence all things have emanated, and to which they must all return; so that their meaning is obvious. Another form of Brahminism is given by Abraham Roger,[3] whose accuracy and diligence are commended by all who have had occasion to give their attention to Hindooism. He relates that the Brahmins worship one supreme Deity, whom they call Vishnu; that this Deity was believed by them to have produced another god of the name of Brahma, previously to the existence of aught else; and that when asked whence this Brahma was produced, they were accustomed to reply that the god was made from a flower which swam in the immense abyss before the creation of the universe. They add that Brahma possessed so much faith and virtue, that the supreme Deity imparted to him the power of creating the natural world. Here are plainly perceptible the traces of an ancient error respecting the eternity of matter. For what else is that immense vortex in which floated the flower from which Brahma was produced, but an eternal chaos, which these ridiculous sages maintain that Brahma afterwards put in order? It would be easy to enumerate many more opinions, that have been generally attributed to Hindoo philosophers by the writings of those who have lived in the East. But this is unnecessary; since we have in those which have already been adduced sufficient evidence to prove, upon an attentive consideration, that inextricable difficulties attend the ascertainment of the real doctrine of the Brahmins respecting the origin of the universe. Doubtless there are several more opinions among them upon this subject, and every one embraces which he pleases, since there is no law enacted to bind them to any fixed opinions; for I am unwilling to suppose that those who have reported this diversity of fables and doctrines were either deceived themselves, or wished to deceive others. But in all those which I have quoted, or others that I have read, there is none accordant with Christian sentiments, or consistent with the doctrine we profess to believe respecting the origin of nature. I will grant that the professors of most of these opinions do not agree with those who think that the universe never had a beginning, and that, on the contrary, they assent to the doctrine that a certain infinite Being created the universe; but at the same time I think it certain that some of them had such erroneous views of the method of

[3] Offene Thür zum verborgenen Heidenthum, pt. 2. cap. 1.

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creation as to make little or no difference between the universe and God, while the rest imagined to themselves a kind of eternal chaos from which all things were produced. But both are thus far removed from Christians, who, unless they wish to contemn the authority of the sacred Scriptures, cannot but abhor both these views. But if (what however I very much doubt) any of the Hindoos could be produced, who in all respects approved the doctrines of Christianity respecting the origin of nature, it would in the first instance be necessary to ascertain whether they had retained inviolate the genuine doctrine of their ancestors, or whether by their intercourse with Europeans, and the disputations of the missionaries, they had introduced into it some emendations; for I think there can be no doubt that many of the Brahmins, particularly those upon the coasts, have derived no small advantage from their conferences with Christians, and being constrained by the force of truth, have in some respects accommodated their own philosophy to Christian doctrines.

XXV. It may perhaps here be said, that no account should be taken in this inquiry of the modern Brahmins; since they have gradually departed in innumerable instances from the laws and customs of their ancestors, and subsequently to the Mogul conquest have become almost entirely different from what they were before, and that comparatively few of them understand the dialect in which their ancient books are written, containing the principles of Hindoo philosophy; much less do they comprehend the doctrines of the ancients. It may further be asserted that great latitude of opinion has now for a long time prevailed among the people; and that nothing hinders any persons from interpreting the metaphysical philosophy of their ancestors according to their own will; that the poets also, who have had great authority among them, have wonderfully obscured and corrupted their ancient wisdom by their fabulous and puerile embellishments; moreover, that most of them are altogether barbarous and ignorant, and use many expressions the meaning of which they themselves do not understand; that the books from which is drawn the picture of Hindooism given us by travellers and divines, are themselves of modern origin, and composed subsequently to the change and perversion which took place in the form and constitution of ancient doctrine. On these accounts the whole question may be turned over to those Brahmins who lived previously to this change taking place in Hindooism; and we may be told that the memory of these sages, and of the philosophy which they taught, is to be found in the Greek writers, while even to the present day a sacred volume is preserved among themselves, to which all who wish to be called Brahmins pledge their obedience, though they differ wonderfully from each other; that hence alone is to be ascer-

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tained the true and genuine religion of the Hindoos, and that the fictions of the modern nation should be left to their authors. I will not deny that all this is to a great extent true; and I could wish it were, as well as many other considerations, never forgotten by those who undertake to discuss the religions of the East. Let us therefore take this course, and see whether so we can prove that the ancient sages of India entertained a correct opinion respecting the origin of the universe, and that their posterity, if they would be worthy of them, must conform to it also. The opinions of the ancient Brahmins are explained by Megasthenes, in Strabo.[4] He says that they "considered the universe to have been produced and to be corruptible, and that it was of a spherical shape," ὅτι γὰρ γεννητὸς ὁ κόσμος καὶ φθαρτὸς, καὶ ὅτι σφαιροειδής, "that God was its manager and maker, and that he pervaded the whole," ὅτι διοικῶν αὐτὸν καὶ ποιῶν Θεὸς δι' ὅλου διαπεφοίτηκεν αὐτοῦ, "that water was the first thing created," τῆς δὲ κοσμοποιΐας ἀρχὴ τὸ ὕδωρ. I pass over other particulars, less relevant to the matter in hand. With this entirely agrees what is said by Philostratus or (if the supposition be preferred) Jarchas, the prince of Hindoo philosophers, as reported by Philostratus.[5] Among other particulars, he very plainly declares that the world is an animal, and in order to illustrate this doctrine he compares it with a ship, and ascribes to the God who made this animal the principal share in the government of this ship, associating with him minor gods: Τὴν μὲν γὰρ δὴ πρώτην καὶ τελειωτάτην ἕδραν ἀποδοτέον Θεῷ γεννέτορι τοῦδε τοῦ ζωοῦ, "The first and most perfect place may be given to God the producer of this animal." Let all this be taken for granted; for who would venture to assert the contrary? But still it is very insufficient to prove that the Brahmins assigned a beginning even to matter itself. For to say that the universe was created by God, to hold that the Deity supplies the place of a soul to the world, and that the universe may again be dissolved and perish, is after all compatible with a belief that the matter itself of which the universe was composed was destitute both of beginning and end. I know not how it has happened that even learned men, when they read that any of the ancients taught that God was the maker of the universe, at once conclude that they held the whole circle of Christian truth in reference to the origin of nature; as if the admission that the universe was made were identical with saying that matter was made also. Since therefore no help for the Hindoos is to be obtained out of the Greek writers, we must next come to their own books, which they assert to be divine and given to them by the founder

[4] Geographia, lib. 15. p. 677.
[5] Vita Apollonii Tyanæi, lib. 3. cap. 34, p. 125. &c.

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of their nation. There is still extant among the Brahmins a very ancient collection of books, which they call the Veda. These this ignorant nation say that they received from the god Brahma himself; these they revere with great zeal and veneration, nay even with profounder reverence than Christians do the Old and New Testaments. They are allowed to be read by none even of the Brahminical order, except by those who have been previously prepared by a sacred ceremony, and freed from all impurities of mind and body. These books, in short, they hold to be the only rule and standard of all religion and wisdom, and there is no Brahmin who will not allow that all their knowledge is contained in the precepts contained in them, though they are otherwise divided amongst themselves by diversity of sentiments. I will grant that the real religion of the Hindoos is to be drawn from this volume alone, and in common with other authors I wish that very shortly this most ancient document may be published and translated into a language better understood. But the Brahmins say that this law is written for and binding upon themselves alone; on which account they preserve it with the greatest care, and will not allow it even to be seen by any but those of their own caste, but least of all will they allow any Europeans, whom they consider to be profane persons, to meddle with it. And after all the attempts of the Jesuits (who have imitated the manners and customs of the Brahmins, and said that they were Brahmins from the north), to obtain a copy of the Veda, they have never been able to accomplish their purpose; a fact which shows that the golden fleece of old was never so strictly guarded as this law, supposed by the Hindoos to be divine. Some particulars, I am aware have been given us by learned men of the general plan and argument of this work, which they profess to have received by oral communication from the Brahmins; but these are few in number and mutually contradictory, so that it is evident either that their Indian authorities deceived them, or otherwise were not sufficiently acquainted with their own literature. I pass by other considerations of which, were it not for the sake of brevity, I could easily take notice, and will touch only upon what is here in question, namely, the doctrine of the origin of the universe, as given in the Veda. Those authorities who have explained this subject more fully and accurately than others, Abraham Roger, Bouchet the Jesuit, and Francis Bernier, agree that it is divided into four books; that the first of these treats of God, the universe, its origin, primary matter, and similar topics; but they do not specify what is the nature of the doctrine which this book contains. Abraham Roger intimates that it teaches that the supreme Deity first of all produced the god Brahma from a flower floating in the vast abyss, and that Brahma afterwards

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created all other things, as we have mentioned above. Bernier says that it relates that when the chief of all the gods began the creation of the universe, he produced first of all three most perfect natures, Brahma, Beschen [Vishnu], and Mehahdeu [Mahadeo]; that by the first the universe was created, by the second it is preserved, and by the last it will be destroyed.[6] Bouchet, the most recent authority, so far as I know, is more brief upon the point, who, writing to P. D. Huet,[7] respecting this law book of the Brahmins, merely says that it is written in it that in the beginning nothing existed but the Deity and water, and that the Deity floated on the surface of the waters; a doctrine which this Jesuit thinks does not widely differ from what is said by Moses respecting the origin of nature.[8] A comparison of these reports with each other will show that they are not so different as to be irreconcileable, or incapable of reduction to one system. It will also, I think, unless I am mistaken, be perceived that they do not throw sufficient light upon the whole doctrine of the Brahmins respecting the universe, and give more countenance to the suspicion that the ancient Hindoos ascribed eternity to matter, than to the opposite opinion. For what else is water, or the immense vortex, which they say existed from the beginning with God, but the chaos spoken of by the Greek poets, or the undigested material which, according to Plato, was skilfully arranged by the Deity for the benefit of the human race? And what can be said of the flower from which Brahma, the creator of the world, is reported to have been born? Would it be altogether an ungrounded suspicion, that this nation is not far removed from the opinion of the Japanese, who, as we have already observed, were persuaded that the generative nature which arranged the mass of matter, was produced from the bosom of matter itself, and had been from eternity concealed within it? But I am unwilling to delay my readers by conjectures, and only wish them to bear in mind, that the ancient sages of India do not seem to have been better than the moderns.

XXVI. I had almost forgotten the Phœnicians, a famous nation, and formerly much lauded by several authorities. If Eusebius is to be believed, they were very little better than

[6] Voyage aux Etats du Grand Mogol, tom. 2. p. 139. Bernier calls the sacred books of the Hindoos by different names from the others; but it is plain from his whole narrative that he speaks of the same collection, which is called by the Hindoos the Veda.

[7] In a letter to be found in the Lettres édifiantes et curieuses, écrites des Missions étrangères par quelques Missionaires de la Compagnie de Jesus, 9 recueil, p. 38. &c.

[8] Ubi supra, p. 40. La première partie du Vedam, qu'ils appellent Irroucou-Vedam, traite de la première cause et de la manière dont le monde a été creé. Ce qu'ils m'en ont dit de plus singulier, par rapport à notre sujet, c'est qu'au commencement il n'y avait que Dieu et l'eau. La ressemblance de ce trait avec le premier chapitre de la Genèse n'est pas difficile à remarquer.

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atheists, and worshipped no other gods than the sun, moon, and stars, to which they ascribed the origin and destruction of all things. Φοίνικας, says he,[9] ἁπάντων κατέχει λόγος ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἀστέρας θεοὺς ἀποφῆναι, μόνους τε εἶναι τῆς τῶν ὅλων γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς αἰτίους, "The Phœnicians, it is reported, considered the sun, moon, and stars, to be gods, and the only causes of generation and corruption." He repeats the same thing in other passages, and studiously confirms them from those well-known fragments which are attributed to Sanchoniathon, a very celebrated philosopher of this nation. And this opinion of his is approved by the most acute writers. But so severe an accusation against the Phœnicians has been rebutted by Edmund Dickinson, who, in opposition to Eusebius and so many learned men, places them in the number of those who suppose the Supreme Deity to be the framer and parent of matter. "Hence," says he,[10] "the cosmogony of the Phœnicians plainly teaches, that not only the universe but also its material, which was σπορὰ κτίσεως, the seed of creation, is γεννητὸν, or produced." But either this learned man has wished to deceive us, or was hindered by his prepossessed opinions from perceiving the truth himself. The cosmogony in which he fancies he finds such exalted wisdom are those very remains of Sanchoniathon from which, Eusebius contends,[1] it is evident that the Phœnicians philosophized respecting the origin of the universe in so impious and wicked a manner as even to deny the existence of the Deity altogether: Τοιαύτη μὲν αὐτῶν ἡ κοσμογονία, ἀντικρὺς ἀθεότητα εἰσάγουσα, "Such then is their cosmogony, evidently introducing atheism." The words which led him [Dickinson] to adopt his opinion are the following: Καὶ ἐκ ταύτης ἐγένετο πᾶσα σπορὰ κτίσεως καὶ γένεσις τῶν ὅλων, "And from this all the seed of creation and the generation of all things existed." This learned man was persuaded that the term σπορὰ κτίσεως meant matter, and that it was said to be generated and produced by God; but nothing could be farther from the truth than this; for the being from which Sanchoniathon says this "seed of creation" existed, was not the Deity, but *Mot*, as the Phœnicians called it, an indescribable kind of existence which, as he himself says, some called "mud," and others "the corruption of the watery mixture." What can be imagined more opposed to Christian doctrine than this? This "seed of creation" was not the primary material of all things, which, according to the opinion of the Phœnicians, existed long before what they called Mot; but it was a certain disposal of matter to receive those forms into which it was afterwards changed when the creation and produc-

[9] Præparatio Evangelica, lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 17.
[10] Physice Vetus et Vera, cap. 12. p. 198.
[1] Ubi supra, lib. 1. cap. 10. p. 33.

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tion of all things took place. Indeed I am so far from agreeing with those who find no small portion of divine truth in the doctrine of the Phœnicians, as explained by Sanchoniathon, that I think on the contrary that Eusebius accurately perceived the enormities of this system; and I am of opinion that this nation ought to be associated with those who hold that all things were produced from an eternal matter by a certain power and law of nature, and who exclude the Deity altogether from the creation of the universe. If the Phœnicians are to be taken as guides, it must first of all be believed that from all eternity there existed a certain darksome atmosphere, pregnant with a certain spirit, and at the same time a turbid, rude, and undigested chaos; and also that these two principles are destitute both of beginning and end. How absurd is all this, and how injurious towards the Deity! For these men refuse to acknowledge any other God than a certain spirit mixed with a gloomy atmosphere. Nor is the sequel any better. This spirit was once inflamed with a love of Chaos, and therefore united itself with it. This conjunction of spirit and of rude matter they call πόθην or *desire;* and from this desire they suppose to have been derived the commencement of creation. The purport of all this it is not difficult to conjecture. After spirit had insinuated itself into eternal matter and pervaded it, there existed in it a certain blind impetus to generate and produce from itself all things that were afterwards created. Nor is it their theory, as one might suppose, that this spirit acted by a plan and method, and arranged matter by a preconcerted design; for it was not of such a nature as to undertake any thing of this description. It was on the contrary ignorant what would take place, and did not foresee what would happen; that is, all things happened by necessity and fatality. Αὐτὸ δὲ πνεῦμα, says Sanchoniathon, οὐκ ἐγίνωσκε τὴν αὐτοῦ κτίσιν, "The spirit did not know its own work," or those things which ensued from its conjunction with matter. From the union of spirit and chaos was born Mot, a certain slime or mud, as I have already shown; Mot produced first of all the sun, moon, and stars; the stars afterwards by their heat and power generated mankind and animals. Fine wisdom truly! which will be readily embraced by all who wish to expel the Deity from the universe.

XXVII. Some learned men of considerable ability and extensive reading have persuaded themselves that the ancient Persians also referred the creation of matter to the Supreme Deity, and that their modern descendants entertain equally correct sentiments. But I have never met with any thing in ancient or modern writings which should make me assent to this proposition, nor do I perceive that any thing of the kind has ever been adduced by the authors who have embraced this opinion. If we

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may believe Herodotus, the ancient Persians were so far remote from the truth, that they acknowledged no supreme Deity, except one that was substantial and corporeal. For he says that "they call the whole circle of heaven Jupiter," τὸν κύκλον πάντα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ Δία καλέοντες.[2] But I have already said elsewhere, that the Greeks seem to me to have attributed so erroneous a sentiment to the Persians, because they made use of no temples, and worshipped the Deity in the open air in mountains. I should therefore set lightly by this testimony, and, not to be prolix, I will grant not only that the Persians worshipped one omnipotent and eternal Deity, but also thought that by the power and might of this Deity the universe was created. It only remains that those who desire to favour the Persians should point out but one passage of some ancient writer from which it may be apparent that the very nature of all things was considered by them to be the work of the Deity. Such a supposition as this appears to me to be incredible, upon a consideration of the absurd fables of this people respecting the two principles of nature, Oromasdes and Ahriman, and also what they say about Mithras and other matters. Those who at the present day wish to appear to retain the ancient religion of the Persians, have already for some time very greatly departed from the laws and institutions of their ancestors, and have accommodated many of their tenets to agree with the opinions of the Mohammedans, in order that they may live with greater security among them; and this is not denied by those who in other respects make great account of this nation because of their antiquity. They cannot therefore be competent witnesses to the ancient religion of the Persians. But neither do I recollect that anything has been produced from their sacred books to prove that their opinion respecting the origin of the universe was entirely correct. Learned men, who have expressly inquired into their opinions respecting theology, have said that the common opinion of this nation was that God at six periods, consisting of unequal numbers of days, and included within the space of a year, created the world and all its several parts. That in the first period, which contained fifty-five days, the heaven was created; in the second, containing sixty days, the waters; in the third the earth; in the fourth plants and trees; in the fifth animals; and that lastly, in the sixth, mankind came into existence.[3] These particulars, I will admit, are not very different from what is related by the divinely inspired Moses; and I apprehend they are taken from the Christian or Jewish scriptures, rather than born in the gardens of Persia. But it is not at all clear from

[2] Lib. 1. sect. 131. p. 55.

[3] Thomas Hyde, Historia Religionis Veterum Persarum, p. 64. &c. and Henry Lord, Account of the Religion of the Parsees, pp. 6. 41. &c.

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hence, that they ascribed a beginning to matter; for although they say that heaven was at first created by God, it is not decided whether they supposed that it was produced out of nothing, or out of a certain eternal matter. To my own mind the latter appears most probable, and that for several reasons, which, for the sake of brevity, I now pass by.

XXVIII. Some respectable writers assert that the Etruscans used more diligence in the investigation of natural causes than other nations. Let them enjoy this reputation; while we in our turn will take the liberty to investigate, if possible, how far they had advanced in wisdom and learning in this respect. Indeed I have met with more traces of Etruscan superstition and folly than of wisdom in ancient books which speak of them; and this, I think, will be assented to by all impartial judges of things and opinions. But still the Etruscans have their advocates; who, though they do not deny that this people erred in many respects from the truth, yet make no doubt of their being orthodox in reference to the universe and its creation. They quote, as the originator of this favourable opinion, a certain unknown author, whose words have been preserved by Suidas.[4] He states that the Tyrrhenians or Tuscans held that the God by whom all things were created,[5] would occupy twelve thousand years in the fabrication of his works; that in the first thousand years the heavens and the earth were formed by him; that next to these the visible heaven was constructed; then the sea and all the waters were made; from hence the sun, moon, and stars were produced; that to these succeeded the birds, fishes, and other animals; and that the creation of man was the conclusion of the whole work; that in each of these tasks the Deity spent a thousand years; that therefore six thousand years elapsed before man was created by God; and that the human race would pass the other six thousand years on the earth. Suidas' narration terminates here; but it is very probable that the Etruscan prophets added, that at the close of the twelve thousand years the world would be destroyed, and would be again constructed anew by God. For it is apparent from Plutarch[6] that they believed that after the lapse of a certain number of years fixed by the Deity, and which they called "the great year," a vast revolution of all things usually took place. I will not quarrel with those who will have that this writer, whose name Suidas has not given, is worthy of all credit; although I might perhaps justly use my privilege in this respect; but I must contend that very little can be drawn from this testimony to prove that the Etruscans held the same views as the Chris-

[4] Lexicon, tom. 3. verbo Τυρρηνία χῶρα.
[5] Τὸν δημιουργὸν τῶν πάντων Θεόν.
[6] Life of Sylla, p. 456. tom. 1. opp.

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tians respecting the creation of the universe. For not a word can be found in this account, to show that they thought that matter arose into being at the command of God, not having had any previous existence. On the contrary, some parts of it induce me to believe that this doctrine never entered their minds. They say that the Deity, forsooth, consumed six thousand years in the preparation and embellishment of this world. But the infinitely powerful God, whose will all things obey, who is able by a word to bring all things into existence out of nothing, does not require so much time to prepare and produce what he wills. Therefore it appears to me, in the first place, that the ancient Etruscans thought that some obstacle prevented the Deity from finishing his work, and consumed so great a number of years in its fabrication. What hindrance, then, was the cause of such slowness to the Creator? Was it in his own nature, or external to him? It will be the same thing to my argument, whichever view be embraced. If the Divine Being himself, in the opinion of the Etruscans, was so weak in his own nature as not to be able to perform his designs at once, I can never persuade myself that they attributed to him the greatest of all possible achievements, the creation of matter out of nothing. If the cause be sought for externally to the Deity, an eternal matter will at once be brought into supposition. This it was, unless I am much mistaken, which by its obstinacy, inertness, and depravity, prevented the Deity from more speedily accomplishing his designs. When to this I add what I have already quoted from Plutarch respecting the "great year" imagined by the Etruscans, I readily agree that they formed one sect with those who held a kind of eternal succession of worlds; a tenet altogether inconsistent with the truths we profess to believe. I have now therefore gone over the principal nations who have been in such good standing with the learned, that they have wished to set the tenets taught by them respecting the creation of the universe on a par with the divine doctrines of Christianity. For I am unwilling to enter upon a discussion respecting the ancient Northern nations, and some of the people of America, who have found advocates of a similar character; since the whole ancient history of these people is too barren and obscure to afford any solid and certain data respecting their religion.

XXIX. It now only remains for me to speak of the later Platonists, who, proceeding from Egypt, propagated their doctrine through almost all the more civilized regions of the world, and are not destitute of friends and favourers at the present day. Not a few authors of talent have failed in the explanation of the views and opinions of this sect, partly because they have interpreted their style and diction in accordance with vulgar usage, and partly because they have not properly observed that many

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things said by them are to be taken *in a state of reason*, or *of mental abstraction*, to use scholastic language. And I fear that this has been the case in the present instance. Some of the ancient Christians put so favourable an interpretation on some of these Platonic dogmas respecting the universe, as to think they differed not at all from their own doctrines. This is shown by Æneas Gazæus, a very famous philosopher of the fifth century, who, in confutation of those Platonists who held that the universe was eternal, and denied that either it or the matter of which it is composed ever had a beginning, opposes to them the pillars of the Platonic school; and contends that Plotinus and Porphyry, as well as the Oracles called Chaldæan, exhibited the same views respecting matter as the Christian. His words are as follow: Οὐ γὰρ ἀγέννητος οὐδ' ἄναρχος ἡ ὕλη· τοῦτό σε καὶ Χαλδαῖοι διδάσκουσι καὶ ὁ Πορφύριος· ἐπιγράφει δὲ καθ' ὅλου τὸ βιβλίον, ὃ εἰς μέσον προάγει τῶν Χαλδαίων τὰ λόγια· ἐν οἷς γεγονέναι τὴν ὕλην ἰσχυρίζεται, καὶ τὸ Πλωτίνου διανοίγων βιβλίσον ὅθεν τὰ κατὰ φύσιν που λέγει, ἀγέννητον δὴ εἶναι τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὸ ἐν ἀρχαῖς τιθέναι, ὡς ἄθεον δόγμα παραιτητέον.[7] This passage is thus translated into Latin by Caspar Barth: Materia ipsa neque ingenerata, neque caret principio. Hoc quidem et Chaldæi te docuerint et Porphyrius, libro quem Catholon scripsit, producendis eorumdem dogmatibus compositum. In hôc factam esse materiam convincit, et Plotini enarrans commentarium statuit, opinionem eorum, qui sylvam illam ingenitam et principii expertem docent, in Deum impietatis explodendam. This version labours under several inaccuracies, which will be immediately apparent upon a comparison of the Greek with the Latin; and the worst of which is, that the words καθ' ὅλου and their context are rendered by Barth as if Porphyry had left behind him a book called Catholon, and that in it he had only collected the oracles of the Chaldæans. No book of this description, written by Porphyry, is extant; nor do Gazæus' words require us to believe that in the volume which is here mentioned he had merely collected, or perhaps explained, the oracles of the Chaldæans. This error has been already noticed by the learned Lucas Holstenius, who denies that the words καθ' ὅλου are the title of a book, and translates the period thus:[8] Ille enim integrum librum conscripsit, quo Chaldæorum oracula producit, quibus materiam esse genitam confirmatur. But neither can I quite agree with him. I rather suspect that, after all, the title of some book of Porphyry's is here mentioned by Gazæus, but that his text is corrupted by the carelessness of transcribers. He wrote, I imagine, καθ' ὕλης, and refers to the volume which,

[7] In Theophrasto, seu Dialogo de Opificio Mundi, p. 56.
[8] De Vitâ et Scriptis Porphyrii, cap. 9. p. 56. ed. Cantab.

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according to Suidas, Porphyry wrote περὶ ὕλης, or "On Primary Matter." And this, I think, is evident both from the nature of the case (for the discourse here is respecting matter), and also because Gazæus adds that a certain treatise of Plotinus was expounded in this book by Porphyry; for a book of Plotinus περὶ ὕλης is still extant, which doubtless his disciple endeavoured to elucidate in this work. Many among the moderns have followed these authorities among the ancients, and have not hesitated to affirm that Plato and all his genuine disciples thought that matter was produced and created by God. Among these the first place may be assigned to Bessarion, who says,[9] "God also produced matter itself, and imparted to it such an existence as to be inseparable from form; this is the opinion of Plato respecting matter, as well as of Plotinus, Porphyry, Amelius, Jamblichus, Syrianus, Proclus, and of all, in short, who have followed the doctrine of Plato. This also, Jamblichus informs us, was the belief of Hermes Trismegistus, since he affirms that Hermes held that matter was produced from substantiality." But here Bessarion is not quite accurate, since he ascribes the same opinion to all the Platonists, which, as will presently appear, is not at all possible; nor does he in any way favour those who affirm that the later Academy embraced the opinion of Christians respecting the origin of the universe, since he does not in the least deny that this sect at the same time attributed eternity to the universe. Livius Galantes[10] has written with more accuracy and diligence on this point, whose treatise, rightly divided into its several parts and divisions, but with the omission of whatever does not pertain to the main purpose, I will here introduce.

Galantes inscribes the chapter in which he discusses this subject with the following title: "Was the universe created out of nothing, or out of pre-existing matter?" In the chapter itself he divides the Platonists into three classes. In the first class he includes those who thought matter to be equally eternal with the Deity, of whom, he observes, Plato himself is usually accounted the leader and head. To this he subjoins a second class, of those who thought indeed that matter was created and produced by God, but at the same time held that the universe was

[9] Lib. 2. contra Calumniatorem Platonis, cap. 5.

[10] Comparatio Christianæ Theologiæ cum Platonicâ. The great J. A. Fabricius was in error when he said, Bibliotheca Græca, lib. 2. cap. 12. p. 464. that Galantes had adduced passages from Syrianus, Hermias, Damascius, and Priscianus Lydius, which proved that these philosophers favoured the idea of a creation out of nothing. For Galantes does not quote the passages of these authors, but only mentions their names; nor does he say that they held the same views as the Christians, but only that Proclus, Porphyry, and Jamblichus deserved this commendation, as will appear from the substance of his discussion, which we shall here exhibit. I should not have mentioned this, were it not that I feared there might be some who, relying on the authority of so great a man, may suspect that I may not have accurately reported Galantes' dissertation.

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eternal. "Other principal Platonists in this sect," says he, "or those who derived their origin from Ammonius Sacca, . . . Plotinus, his disciple Porphyry, Jamblichus the hearer of Porphyry, Syrianus of Jamblichus, Proclus of Syrianus, Ermias of Proclus, Damascius of Ermias, Priscianus Lydius, who was the master of Damascius, and this whole school of eminent Platonists, universally seem to think that primary matter was generated and produced by God." But he immediately subjoins that this sect, if all its doctrines be rightly considered, could not claim a place among the genuine assertors of a creation out of nothing; since they held that the universe was eternal; on which account what they say respecting the production and creation of matter is to be understood not of *a true and real production*, but *only of one causal and rational*. "For," says he, "if they supposed that the universe was produced only causatively, that is in reason, not in reality, but really eternal, how was it they did not think matter to be eternal, with this mundane eternity to wit? It must therefore be said that as they held the universe never to have been really produced, so also they thought primary matter to be in reality unproduced, but said that it was produced, not by a real production but by a causal or rational one, since it not only was never destitute of shapes, but can scarcely even be conceived of as so." These observations are wisely and justly made, and if all other parts of Galantes' work were like them, it would be worthy of the highest praise. But he considers that some of the Platonists taught better doctrines than the rest, and did not in any respect deteriorate the Christian doctrine respecting the creation of the universe. These he places in the third class. "There are some," says he, "who follow Proclus and others, in thinking that matter was produced *in reality and in time* by God." In the following context he names Porphyry and Jamblichus as favourers of this opinion. These, he first asserts, supported their views by the authority of Plato, Hermes, and Orpheus, and plainly intimates that they seemed to him to be sound interpreters of these philosophers; and then confirms their opinion by some reasons and arguments. It is not necessary for us to repeat these two last named particulars here. For we have above copiously shown that Plato and the rest are not at all favourable to the opinion of the creation of matter by the Deity out of nothing; and the arguments by which he says these Platonists defended their opinion, are excogitated by Galantes himself, and not drawn from their writings. Nearly the same course is pursued by Cudworth, who, though he admits that many of the Platonists held that the universe was eternal, and that therefore matter was so also, makes no doubt but that some of this sect held and approved more correct views, and thought that matter itself was made by God; of which sort he thinks, besides others, are Plotinus, Por-

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phyry, Jamblichus, Hierocles, and Proclus, who, he says, followed the Chaldee oracles, the Egyptians, and Orpheus.[1] Beyond all the other Platonists Hierocles is quoted by learned men as a most strenuous defender of this more correct opinion respecting the origin of the universe; and certainly he has spoken more decidedly on this point than the rest of his sect, and not only, as will be presently apparent, inveighs with asperity against those of his associates who have been bold enough to join eternal matter with the Deity, but also zealously endeavours to prove that matter itself was created and produced by divine operation. On this account P. D. Huët[2] has thought his sole authority sufficient to prove that Plato, and all those who really followed his doctrine, held as correct views as the Christians respecting matter. Bayle, however, was induced by Hierocles' words to suspect that he derived this doctrine from Christian writings, and that upon a consideration that it was in the highest degree consistent with the divine majesty, he deserted the common doctrine of his sect.[3] In which supposition, I do not think that ingenious writer to be far wrong; for nothing can be more certain than that the later Platonists transferred not a few things from Christianity into their own sect, and at least imitated the Christians in their words and phrases, even if their doctrines appeared to be too inconsistent with their own tenets to obtain their approval.

XXX. A regard merely to the words of these philosophers, without a comparison of them with their other opinions, which are enunciated with apparent magnificence and wisdom, will almost induce an agreement with the views of the authors above mentioned; for I must admit that they sometimes speak of matter and its causes as if they entirely agreed with the Christians. Proclus,[4] the most subtle writer of this sect, warmly contends that God himself is ἄῤῥητον αἴτιον, "the ineffable cause" of matter, and that as he had made all ἀπειρίαν, or "infinity," so also he had made matter, which is "ultimate infinity." Εἰ οὖν, says he, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, ὁ Θεὸς πᾶσαν ἀπειρίαν ὑφίστησι, καὶ τὴν ὕλην ὑφίστησιν, ἐσχάτην οὖσαν ἀπειρίαν. He also bitterly inveighs against those who lay down two principles of nature, God and matter, and strenuously endeavours to vindicate his beloved Plato from the imputation of this opinion; so that you might

[1] Intellectual System, chap. 5. sect. 2.

[2] Quæstiones Alnetanæ, lib. 2. cap. 5. p. 109.

[3] Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, tom. 2. art. Hierocles, note A. p. 1464. "Je me persuade qu'il l'avait lu dans les écrits des Chrétiens, et qu'ayant été frappé des arguments qui combattent l'existence d'une matière increée, et qu'ayant joint à cela les notions du Créateur qui portent au plus haut point la puissance et la majesté divine, il supposa pour la gloire de la secte, que son fondateur avait connu Dieu sous l'idée d'une nature dont un simple acte de volunté peut suffire à la formation de l'univers."

[4] Comment. in Timæum, lib. 2. p. 17.

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fancy another Eusebius or Basil to be speaking, and sharply reproving the errors of a profane philosophy. Nor are some other philosophers of the sect less zealous on this point, who need not, however, now be brought in question. It will be sufficient to name Hierocles,[5] who is more energetic and copious than the rest, both as regards language and argument. First of all, he vehemently reproves those among the Platonists who held that God had formed all things out of a certain eternal matter, whether this were supposed to have taken place in time or in eternity. He thinks that this opinion is both repugnant to the divine goodness and opposed to sound reason; and to many his ratiocinations will appear very just. He takes his first argument from the nature of those things which are self-existent and destitute of beginning. Whatever, says he, is neither generated nor produced, but is necessarily self-existent, cannot but be perfect, well-ordered, and free from every fault. Wherefore, whatever is added to any thing of this kind, alters its nature; whatever alters its nature, vitiates and corrupts it. If, therefore, the Deity had set in order, arranged, and modified eternal and self-existent matter, he would have undertaken a task that was superfluous and useless, rather than one accordant with his goodness, (*δ περιεργία μᾶλλον ἂν εἴη, ἢ ἀγαθότητος Θεοῦ,*) and would not have rendered matter perfect, but would have deteriorated and spoilt it. His other argument may, I think, be most properly set out and explained as follows: Whoever transfers a thing that is eternal, and not subject to his control, and over which he has no legitimate power, out of its natural state into another contrary to its nature, does wrong, and is, in a manner, guilty of an improper action. On which account, if God did not suffer eternal matter, which was, as it were, his sister, to remain in its own state, but modified and altered it upon a new plan, he would undoubtedly have done an improper and unjust action: *Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὁ Θεὸς αὐτὸς κακῶν αναίτιος ἔσται, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς δημιουργίας ἀπό τινος κακοποιίας ἐνστησάμενος,* "But neither God himself would be innocent, founding the commencement of creation in a kind of evil-doing." What is said by Hierocles in a confused and concise manner, I have reduced into order for the sake of perspicuity; a plan which I think no wise man will blame. After laying down these propositions, he separately attacks those who held that God had created the universe out of matter, not from eternity, but in time; and contends that they were worse than those who said that the Deity had arranged matter from infinite ages. But this I pass by, lest I should wander too far from the point. If any inquiry should now be made, what is correct sentiment re-

[5] Lib. 7. de Providentiâ et Fato, apud Photium, Bibliotheca, codex, 251. p. 1379. &c. See also his extracts from the same book, cod. 214. p. 550.

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specting the creation of the universe, Hierocles will reply that every sane person will think that God, by his own mere will, produced out of no eternal matter, or out of nothing, the universe both visible and invisible, and that this was also Plato's opinion: Ὅτι δημιουργὸν Θεὸν, φησὶ, προϋφίστησιν ὁ Πλάτων ἐφεστῶτα πάσης ἐμφανοῦς τε καὶ ἀφανοῦς διακοσμήσεως, ἐκ μηδενὸς προϋκειμένου γεγενημένης· ἀρκεῖν γὰρ τὸ ἐκείνου βούλημα εἰς ὑπόστασιν τῶν ὄντων. Who could remain unmoved by such express words? However, by long experience and reading of Platonistic writings, I have learned that no sect require their expressions to be more narrowly watched than this Alexandrian one; and that what at first sight seems to be said by them in a favourable and excellent manner, loses all its force and beauty, if it be compared with those tenets which are the foundation of their whole philosophy. This will be proved by what I shall presently say, from which it will be apparent that the opinion of the Platonists, respecting the universe and matter, differs greatly from the words by which it is explained.

XXXI. First of all, in elucidation of this question, it must be observed, that the whole sect of Platonists considered the world to be equally eternal with God, and to be appended to him, in the same manner as a shadow to the substance, from infinite ages. This is a trite and sacred doctrine in their schools; nor can it be repudiated by any one of them, without at the same time abjuring their whole philosophy, and passing over to another party; for the eternity of the universe follows as necessarily from their tenets as from the axiom: "Equals added to equals make the sum equal," is deduced the consequence that "two and two make four." Καθάπερ, say the Platonists themselves, in Zacharias Mitylenæus,[6] αἴτιον τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἑκάστου σκιᾶς γίνεται· ὁμόχρονος δὲ τῷ σώματι ἡ σκιὰ καὶ οὐχ ὁμότιμος. ὑῦτω δὴ καὶ ὅδε ὁ κόσμος παρακολούθημα ἐστὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ αἰτίου ὄντος αὐτῷ τοῦ εἶναι, καὶ συναΐδιος ἐστι τῷ Θεῷ, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ ὁμότιμος, "As every substance is the cause of its own shadow; and the shadow is coeval with the substance, but not of equal honour; so the universe is the accompaniment of the Deity, who is the cause of its existence, and is co-eternal with God, but not equally honourable." This the common opinion of the whole sect, which if any one deserted, he would doubtless be disowned by its leaders. They usually illustrate this doctrine by examples and similes, taken from such things as an eternal staff and its eternal shadow, an eternal sun and his eternal ray, an eternal foot and its eternal imprint. For what an eternal shadow would be to an eternal staff, what an eternal imprint to an eternal foot, what an eternal ray to an eternal sun, that (they say) the eternal

[6] Dialogus de Opificio Mundi, p. 187. ed Barth.

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universe is to the eternal Deity. I remember that I have treated this subject elsewhere more copiously; on which account I shall be the briefer here. The very philosophers who have been named by authors as the defenders of a creation out of nothing, have testified their adherence to this dogma of the sect. Plotinus professes in so many passages of his works to believe that the universe emanated from all eternity from the Deity, like an eternal ray from an eternal sun, that one must needs be a mere tyro in his writings not to know this. But a knowledge of the doctrines of Plotinus will at once show what were the views of his disciple Porphyry, who is so attached to his preceptor as in many instances to adopt his very words; as is apparent from his "Sentences," edited by Lucas Holstenius. Of Jamblichus I have spoken already.[7] He differs from the other Platonists in supposing that for the sake of argument and disputation it might be proper to assume that the universe had a beginning; which opinion of his is rejected by the Emperor Julian; yet he makes no doubt that the universe is in reality destitute of any beginning, and is to be regarded as an eternal *causation*, to speak metaphysically, of an eternal *cause*. Proclus is so far from thinking that the universe commenced at a definite period, that (as is well known) in a singular book he defended the eternity of the universe against the Christians; which treatise of his was attacked on the part of the Christians by Johannes Philoponus.[8] Nor was Hierocles of any other opinion, as is apparent from his calling the Deity ἐξ ἀϊδίου ἐνεργοῦντα,[9] or "the operator from eternity;" for in the style of the Platonists "to operate from eternity," and "to create the universe from eternity," are phrases of the same import. This is evident also from the fact that in his books on Providence and Fate (as we learn from Photius) he endeavoured, with the utmost care and diligence, to reconcile Plato and Aristotle, and to prove that both entertained the same opinion respecting the universe and its origin. But who does not know that Aristotle held that the universe was eternal and destitute of beginning? Nor do any of the Platonists attribute any other opinion to Aristotle. I am not unaware that this sect often speak magnificently, and even deny that the universe is eternal; but no one at all versed in their writings will be disturbed by this. For when they say that the universe was founded and made by the Deity, they do not mean such a creation as we do, but an eternal one; and this they often expressly assert. Again, when they deny any eternity of the universe, and attribute it solely to the Deity,

[7] Sect. 21. of this Dissertation.

[8] See J. A. Fabricius, Bibliotheca Græca, lib. 5. cap. 26. p. 522. tom. 8. and lib. 5. cap. 37. p. 362. tom. 9.

[9] Apud Photium, Bibliotheca, cod. 251. p. 1378.

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they do not intend this to be understood of all kinds of eternity, but only of one particular sort; for they assert that the Deity is eternal in one way, and the universe in another. They were accustomed to distribute eternity into an *eternity of time* and an *eternity of cause*, and again into a *flowing*, and a *stable* or *constant* eternity; of which distinction and its causes I have already treated more copiously elsewhere. That eternity which relates to *time* they held to be common to the universe and the Deity; but the eternity of *cause* they deny to the universe but attribute to God alone. Boethius has well explained this opinion, to which he himself was addicted. "For," says he,[10] "the Deity ought not to seem older than nature by quantity of time, but rather by a property of his undivided nature." Again, they said that the eternity which I have termed "flowing" was congruous with the universe, in which all things are carried on by perpetual vicissitudes and changes; so that one thing is produced out of another, and a new series and succession of things always follows the preceding; but to God alone they attributed the *stable* eternity, destitute of all succession. "It is one thing," says Boethius, "to be led through an interminable life, which is assigned by Plato to the universe; and another that the whole presence of an interminable life should be simultaneously embraced, which is manifestly a property of the divine mind." Also when the Platonists deny that the universe is equally eternal with the Deity, their meaning only amounts to this: that the universe has emanated from all eternity, without any beginning, from the Deity as its cause and author, as an eternal shadow would from an eternal substance, or an eternal ray from an eternal sun. Since this is the opinion of the whole Platonic sect, it is obvious that, according to the tenets of the doctrine they profess, they could not possibly agree with the Christians respecting the universe and matter, or do otherwise than reject the creation of them. Is it then true, that the Platonists are inconsistent with themselves, when they affirm that not only the universe, but also the matter of the universe, was made and produced, and even that it was produced out of nothing by the volition of the Deity? Do they not thus become oblivious of the very elements of the philosophy to which they adhere? or do they deceptively hold language contrary to their real sentiments? This enigma I will solve, and will show that these philosophers are neither inconsistent with themselves nor disingenuous with regard to others.

XXXII. The Platonists, in most of their writings, bear a double character, that of natural philosophers and of metaphysicians; and an ignorance of this fact cannot but be productive of the most serious errors in the exposition of their opinions. In

[10] De Consolatione Philosophiæ, lib. 5. p. 138.

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their character of naturalists, they explain the matters of which they treat just as they are in themselves and in nature, in accordance, of course, with the spirit of the philosophy whose tenets they maintain. But when they assume the guise of metaphysicians, they distinguish in reasoning between things that are naturally associated, and treat of these abstract portions in such a manner as if there were no alliance between them, and they were even independent existences. This is always permitted, to a certain extent, to metaphysicians; but this sect has burst all bounds in their use of this license. For after passing from the visible universe to the *ideal*, or *imaginary*, they are so suddenly carried away by the force of imagination and idealism, as to convert the notions of their own minds not only into real persons, but even into gods. The whole sect labour under this defect; but out of them some are worse than others. Some, as Proclus, Jamblichus, and Damascius, are so hot-headed when they have passed the bounds of nature, that I think no poet has ever given such a loose to his imagination. This is the first point necessary to be recollected on the present subject. As long as the Platonists bear the character of naturalists, and do not, in their discussions, fly beyond the moon and the stars, they maintain the universe to be eternal, and to have existed together with the Deity from all eternity, in such a manner as to have received its whole nature from God as its efficient cause. This opinion is not very different from the view of Aristotle respecting God and the universe, as we have already elsewhere observed, and is akin to some very noxious errors, and even to atheism itself. But the same persons, when they give a loose to their imaginations, and pass over into the imaginary world of forms and ideas, or when (what is the same thing) they assume the character of metaphysicians, treat of the universe, the Deity, and matter in a way apparently inconsistent with themselves, and suppose that there is no connexion whatever between the Deity, the universe, and matter. They separate, in idea, the great First Cause from the universe, and when they have done this, they speak in as grave and accurate a manner respecting the universe, as if they held that God had made a commencement of his labours, and had maintained and observed a certain order in creation, as Christians have learned from the inspired writer, Moses. These statements being read by those who are not aware of, or do not remember, the other tenets of this sect, make them easily believe that nothing can be more orthodox than these philosophers' sentiments. But those who are not ignorant of what is to be found in other parts of their writings, respecting the eternal union of God and matter, will at once perceive that the creation of the universe of which they speak is merely metaphysical, and that the whole affair is to be found in the *intermundia* [limbo] of

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Epicurus, or rather in these men's brains, who in their abstractions dissociate and reunite, according to their own fancy, things that are by their own nature joined together. For what is "eternal creation" but the union of two words, the ideas of which are utterly incongruous? Or in what way can that which existed from all eternity, and always depended upon God, be made to appear to be founded according to certain laws and in a particular order? But the Platonic doctors, not content with these considerations, take a more subtle course, and as they separate in their reasonings the Deity from the universe, so also they disjoin the matter of which the universe consists from the universe itself; that is, they form in their minds an idea and notion of matter regarded abstractedly, and *per se*. When they have attained to this contemplative height, and stand aloft, above the universe and the heavens, it is scarcely possible to give an idea of the extravaganzas they enact. For they dispute about this idea of matter, its origin and properties, just as if they were considering and handling some animal or man; as is apparent from Plotinus's book on Matter, and other treatises of the same description. Any one not much acquainted with the sect would swear that a very grave and serious matter was in question, and that the Platonists were persuaded that, previously to the formation of any thing, there existed a certain kind of matter, and that this matter was made use of by God when he designed to frame the universe; but those who more carefully weigh all considerations, and do not allow themselves to be deluded with rhetorical and poetical obscurities, will perceive that so wordy, long, and thorny a disputation is undertaken only respecting a certain mental abstraction, or Platonic *idea*. This ideality they almost seem sensibly to finger; this they turn about on every side; this they distinguish into I know not how many different subdivisions, in the consideration of which they are so acute and ingenious as to escape and elude even the most industrious speculatist. And since dissensions and quarrels arise in nothing more easily than in matters remote from the cognizance of the senses, and which can only be contemplated by a very close and attentive application of the mind, it hence results that they often fall into bitter controversies on the nature and properties of this idea, and declare each other's errors to be altogether intolerable. We may pass by, for the present, their other inquiries respecting matter, and only consider the doctrines of their schools respecting its origin. Among them it was an arduous and very subtle question, Whence was derived the existence of matter? which is therefore placed by Porphyry among those on which he thought proper to inquire the opinion of the Egyptians, in his epistle to Anebo the Egyptian priest. After a diligent perusal of the writings of their doctors, it

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appears to me that three opinions were entertained among them on this point. Some maintain that matter is a nature existing from all eternity, altogether separate and apart from the divine nature, which was arranged and subjected to certain laws by the Deity, when he created the universe. Those who are imbued with this sentiment principally call in to their aid the Timæus of Plato. But they do not seem to have many followers; on which account Proclus, Hierocles, and others, as we have already seen, take a safe liberty in reproaching them, and insinuating that they are almost Atheists. Others think that matter eternally emanated from the divine nature itself, and that therefore it is part of the divine essence. This seems to be the opinion of Plotinus and of Porphyry; and Jamblichus, as we have already shown (to speak of no others), openly professed it. Others again, deeming even this view not sufficiently honourable to the Divine Being, stretched their genius still further, and have determined that matter was created out of nothing by the sole will of God. This opinion is professed by Hierocles, as is apparent from his words above cited; and the same was doubtless the case with several others. But I suspect, since I can meet with no vestige of this opinion among the elder Platonists, that it was originated in the third century, when Christianity had already attained to considerable prevalence, and was perhaps even excogitated by Hierocles himself; who, as he held a great deal of intercourse with the Christians, and was well versed in their writings, thought he should do well if he made use of their own words, and in order the more readily to persuade them, should explain the origin of nature in the same way that they did. And it has already been noticed by others, that he borrowed the language rather than the doctrines of the Christians, and united them with the tenets of his own sect, in order to render the latter more agreeable and acceptable to the Christians. An impartial spectator of these controversies and contentions of the Platonists will be easily induced to believe that they supposed matter to be really disjoined from the universe and the Deity, and considered it to be a self-existent nature. But a different opinion will be the result of an acquaintance with the esoteric dogmas of the sect, and a removal of the veil which covers their disquisitions. For it will be perceived that these sturdy belligerents are acting under a metaphysical disguise, and are scarcely better than those who are said to have instituted a long law-suit respecting the shadow of an ass. All the quarrel is about "a rational entity," or "a mental abstraction," a mere figment of the mind. Setting aside all oratorical figures of speech, the sum of the whole disputation amounts to this:—Is it more wise and correct, after forming an abstract notion of matter in the mind and thoughts, to conjoin with this notion the idea of an eternal

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existence, or eternal emanation; or to associate with it the idea of creation out of nothing? A contest and discussion well worthy, indeed, of such acute minds! As if it were of any consequence to the social or spiritual interests of mankind to know in what manner the forms and ideas of things are to be conceived of in the mind, which never had a separate existence, and were from infinite ages such as they are now. Let there be imagined a golden chain from all eternity depending from the hand of Jove; then fancy three philosophers sharply contending with each other whether the gold of which this chain is made, separated and abstracted in imagination from the chain itself, be in itself eternal, or whether it emanated from Jove's own hand; or again, whether it were created out of nothing. What would be said on hearing the trio contending and battling with each other by mutual reproaches? Would it not be said they were not far from crazy? For since this chain was always such as it now is, and always will be the same, it is not only useless but absurd and stupid to enter into a contention as to what kind of idea ought to be formed in the mind respecting the gold of which it consists. If this gold were neither made nor generated, and never existed apart from the chain, and the chain itself were never destitute of existence, what is the use of disputing about what the gold would be if it had been generated, and had at some period existed apart from the chain? Transfer this simile to the Platonists, and it will be at once apparent what value ought to be attached to their speculations respecting matter, regarded apart from the universe. We Christians, when we teach that matter was made out of nothing by God, intend a real thing actually existent; they, when they use similar language, speak, not of matter itself, but only of the abstract idea and notion of matter, a shadow, a figment of the imagination. Let us now therefore close this discussion, having finished our design, and shown that as yet no philosopher or people has been offered us by the records of antiquity, who entertained the same opinion as the Christians respecting the origin of nature.

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CHAPTER V.

SECTION III.

THE six following atheistic argumentations, driving at these two things, (the disproving, first of an incorporeal, and then of a corporeal Deity) next taken all together. In way of answer to which three things. First, to confute the atheistic argumentations against an incorporeal Deity, being the third and fourth. Secondly, to show that from the very principles of the atheistic corporealism, in their fifth and sixth arguments, incorporeal substance is demonstrable. And lastly, that therefore the two following atheistic arguments, (built upon the contrary supposition) are also insignificant. 2. Before we come to the atheistic arguments against an incorporeal Deity, premised, that though all Corporealists be not Atheists, yet Atheists universally mere Corporealists. 3. In disproving incorporeal substance, some difference amongst the Atheists themselves. First, those who held a vacuum, (as Epicurus and Democritus, &c.) though taking it for granted that what is unextended or devoid of magnitude, is nothing; yet acknowledged a double extended nature; the first impenetrable and tangible body; the second penetrable and intangible space or vacuum; to them the only incorporeal. Gassendus' officiousness here to help the Atheists; that space is neither accident nor substance, but a middle nature, or essence betwixt both. But whatsoever is, must either subsist by itself, or else be an attribute, affection, or mode of something that subsisteth by itself. Space, either the extension of body, or of incorporeal substance, or of nothing: but nothing cannot be extended; wherefore space supposed not to be the extension of body, must be the extension of an incorporeal substance infinite, or the Deity. 3. Epicurus' pretended gods, such as could neither touch nor be touched, and had not corpus, but quasi corpus only; and therefore incorporeals distinct from space. But granted that he juggled in this. 4. Other Atheists who denied a vacuum, and allowed not space to be a nature, but a mere imaginary thing, the phantasm of a body, or else extension considered abstractly. 5. This argument against incorporeal substance answered two manner of ways; some assertors of incorporeal substance denying the minor, whatsoever is, is extended; others the major of it, whatsoever is extended is body. First, the generality of ancient Incorporealists really maintained, that there was something unextended, indistant, devoid of quantity and of magnitude, without parts and indivisible. Plato and Aristotle. 6. Philo's double substance, distant and indistant. God also to him both every where, and yet nowhere, as in a place; place being created by him together with bodies. Plotinus and Simplicius much concerned in this doctrine.. 7. Porphyrius' assertion, that were there such an incorporeal space, (as Democritus and Epicurus supposed) Mind, or God, could not be co-extended with it; but only body. The whole Deity, indivisibly and indistantly present to every part of divisible and distant things. 8. Thus Origen against Celsus. St. Austin, that the human soul hath no dimensions of length, breadth, and thickness, and is in itself illocabilis. 9. That therefore no novel or recent opinion, that the Deity is not part of it here, and part of it there, nor mensurable by yards and poles; but the whole undivided, present to every part of the world. We shall further show, how these ancient Incorporealists endeavoured to quit themselves of them. The first objection; that to suppose the Deity and other incorporeal substances unextended, is to make them absolute parvitudes. Plotinus' answer.

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The second objection; that what neither great nor little, and possesses no place, a nonentity. This according to Plato, Plotinus, and Porphyrius, a mistake proceeding from men's adhering to sense and imagination. They grant that an unextended Being is *ἀφάνταστον*, "unimaginable." Porphyrius, that mind and fancy are not the same, as some maintain. That which can neither do or suffer, not nothing, though it swell not out into distance. Two kinds of substances to Plotinus; bulky tumours and unbulky active powers. Which latter said by Simplicius to have nevertheless a certain depth in them. Something *ἀφάνταστον* "unimaginable," even in body itself. We cannot possibly imagine the sun of such a bigness as reason evinces it to be. Urged also by Plotinus, that an unstretched-out duration, as difficult to be conceived as an unextended substance; and yet must this needs be attributed to the Deity. That God and human souls no otherwise incorporeal, than as *σῶμα λεπτομερὲς*, "*a thin or subtle*" body, false. Because the difference of grossness or subtlety in bodies, according to true philosophy, only from motion. That the most subtle body may possibly be made as gross as lead or iron; and the grossest as subtle as ether. No specific difference of matter. The third argument against unextended substance; that to be all in the whole, and all in every part, a contradiction and impossibility. This granted by Plotinus to be true of bodies, or that which is extended; that it cannot be *ὁμοῦ πᾶν*, but impossible, that what hath no parts, should be a part here, and a part there. Two answers of Plotinus. First, that by Hades may be meant only the invisible, or the soul's acting without the body. Secondly, that if by Hades be meant a worse place, the soul may be said to be where its idol is. 10. Some excerptions out of Philoponus, concerning the soul's spirituous or airy body (after death) is declared. Intimated by Philoponus, that, according to some of these ancients, the soul hath such a spirituous body here in this life, which then adheres to it, when its outer garment is stript off by death. An opinion of some, that the soul may, in this spirituous body, leave its grosser body for some time, without death. True, that our soul doth not immediately act upon bones and flesh; but certain thin and subtle spirits, the instruments of sense and motion. He further addeth, that besides both the terrestrial, and this spirituous body, there is yet a third kind, peculiar to such as are souls, as are more thoroughly purged after death; called by them a luciform and heavenly body. Of this Proclus also upon the Timæus (who affirmeth it to be unorganized); as likewise Hierocles. This called the thin vehicle of the soul, in the Chaldee Oracles, according to Psellus and Pletho. By Hierocles, a spiritual body, in a sense agreeable to that of the scripture: by Synesius, the divine body. 11. That many of these Platonists and Pythagoreans supposed the soul, in its first creation, to be clothed with this luciform body; which also did always inseparably adhere to it, in its after-descents into the terrestrial; though fouled and obscured. Thus Pletho. The same intimated by Galen; when he calls this the first vehicle of the soul. Hence was it, that besides the moral and intellectual purgation of the soul, they recommended also a mystical way of purifying the ethereal vehicle. This much insisted on by Hierocles. What Pliny's dying by wisdom, or the philosophic death. 12. But this not the opinion of all, that the same numerical ethereal body always adhereth to the soul; but only, that it every where either finds or makes a body, suitable to itself. Thus Porphyrius and Plato. This affirmed by Hierocles to have been the cabala of the Pythagoreans. Hierocles' definition of a man, a rational soul together with a cognate immortal body. 13. That it would be no digression here, to compare the forementioned Pythagoric cabala with the doctrine of Christianity. First therefore, a clear agreement of

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these philosophers with Christianity in this, that the highest happiness of human nature consisteth not in a separate state of souls un-united to any body. Thus Plotinus, who sometimes runs as much into the other extreme, in supposing human souls to animate, not only the bodies of brutes, but of plants. Thus also Maimonides amongst the Jews; and therefore suspected for denying the resurrection. His Iggeroth Teman written purposely to purge himself of this suspicion. The allegorizers of the resurrection, and of the life to come. 14. Christianity correspondeth with the philosophic cabala, concerning human souls, in this, that their happiness consisteth not in conjunction with gross terrestrial bodies; scripture, as well as philosophy, complaining of them, as a burden to the soul; which therefore not to be taken up again at the resurrection. The difference betwixt the resurrection-body and this present body in scripture. The resurrection body of the just (as that of the philosophic cabala) immortal and glorious, spiritual and angelical. Not this gross fleshly body, gilded and varnished over in the outside only, but changed throughout. Our souls strangers and pilgrims in these terrestrial bodies: their proper home and country, the heavenly body. That the grossest body, that is, according to philosophy, may merely by motion be brought into the purity and tenuity of the finest ether. 15. But whether human souls after death, always united to some body, or else quite naked from all body, until the resurrection, not so explicitly determined in Christianity. Souls after death live unto God. According to Origen, this a privilege proper to the Deity, to live and act alone, without vital union with any body. If natural to the soul, to enliven a body, then not probable, that it should be kept so long in an unnatural state of separation. 16. Again; probable from scripture, that wicked souls after death have punishment of sense or pain, besides remorse of conscience: which not easily conceivable, how they should have, without bodies. Thus Tertullian. He adding, that men have the same shape, after this life, which they had here. Though indeed he drives the business too far, so as to make the soul itself to be a body. But Irenæus plainly supposed the soul after death (being incorporeal) to be adapted to a body, such as has the same character with its body here. Origen also of this persuasion, that souls after death have certain subtle bodies, retaining the same characterizing form, which their terrestrial bodies had. His opinion, that apparitions of the dead are from the souls themselves, surviving in that which is called a luciform body. As also, that St. Thomas did not doubt, but that the body of a soul departed might appear every way like the former: only he disbelieved our Saviour's appearing in the same solid body, which he had before death. 16. Our Saviour telling his disciples that a spirit had no flesh and bones, that is, no solid body, as himself then had, seems to imply them to have thinner bodies. Thus in Apollonius, is touch made the sign to distinguish a ghost appearing, from a living man. Origen on our Saviour's body after his resurrection. Moses and Elias visibly appearing to our Saviour, had true bodies. 17. The regenerate in this life have a certain earnest of their future inheritance, gathered from scripture by Irenæus and Novatian. Which prelibations cannot so well consist with a perfect separation from all body, after death, until the day of judgment. This opinion of Irenæus, &c., does not clash with the Christian article of the resurrection. 18. The last thing in the Pythagoric cabala, that demons or angels consist of soul and body united together. Thus Hierocles, that no incorporeal substance, besides the Deity, is complete without the conjunction of a body. God the only incorporeal in this sense. Origen's full agreement with this old Pythagoric cabala misrepresented by Huetius, as asserting angels not to have bodies. 19. Some of the fathers concluded angels to be

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corporeal. The Origenic and Pythagoric hypothesis, that they consist of incorporeal and corporeal substance. Most of the ancient fathers for neither of those extremes. They did not suppose angels to be perfectly unbodied spirits, evident from their affirming devils, as the Greek philosophers did demons, to be delighted with the nidours of sacrifices. Thus Porphyrius and Celsus. Amongst the Christians, Justin, Athenagoras, Tatianus, &c. St. Basil, concerning the bodies of demons being nourished with vapours. Several of the fathers plainly asserting both devils and angels to consist of soul and body. St. Austin, Claudianus, Mamertus, Fulgentius, &c. 20. The fathers, though herein agreeing with the philosophic cabala, yet seemed to have been led thereunto by scripture. As from that of our Saviour, "they who shall obtain the resurrection of the dead, shall be *ἰσάγγελοι*, equal to the angels." From that of St. Jude, that angels sinning lost their own heavenly body (called *οἰκητήριον* by St. Paul), and thereupon cast down into the lower Tartarus. Again, from that fire said to have been prepared for the devils, implies them (as Psellus concludeth) to be bodied. 21. If all created incorporeals be souls vitally united to bodies, then probable that human souls, after death, not quite naked from all body; a privilege proper to Deity. Nor is it at all conceivable how imperfect beings could have sense and imagination without bodies. Origen distinguisheth the *τὸ σκῆνος* in St. Paul (translated "tabernacle"), from the earthly house; he understanding by the former a thin spirituous body, and which the soul remaineth still clothed with, after death. This opinion of Origen's, that the soul after death, not quite separate from all body, never reckoned up in the catalogue of his errors. Origen not taxed by Methodius, for asserting souls to have bodies, but for not asserting them to be bodies; there being no truly incorporeal substance but Deity. This one of the extremes mentioned. The Origenic hypothesis to be preferred before that of Methodius. 22. Origen not singular in this opinion concerning human souls; Irenæus, Philoponus, Joannes Thessalonicensis, Psellus, and others, asserting the same. St. Austin in his De Gen. ad Lit. granted, that souls after death cannot be locally moved without a body. Himself seems to think the punishment of souls, before the resurrection, to be fantastical. In his book De Civ. Dei. he conceives that Origenic opinion not improbable, that some souls before the resurrection, may suffer from a certain fire, which could not be without bodies. 23. Hitherto showed, how the ancient assertors of unextended incorporeals answered all the objections against the illocality and immobility of created incorporeals; or according to Origen, that the soul stands in need of a body for local motions. Next to be considered their reasons for this assertion, of unextended and indistant substance. 24. That whatever arguments do evince other substance besides body, the same against the Atheists demonstrate that there is something unextended. Other arguments propounded by these ancients to prove unextended substance. Plotinus, to prove the human soul and mind such. Either every part of an extended soul, is soul; and of mind, mind; or not. Again, Plotinus endeavours to prove, from the energies of the soul, that it is unextended; because it is one and the same indivisible thing, that perceiveth the whole sensible object. This further pursued; if the soul be extended, then must it either be one physical point, or more. Impossible, that it should be but one physical point. If therefore more, then must every one of those points, either perceive a point of the object, and no more, or else the whole. A fourth supposition, that the whole extended soul perceives both the whole object, and all the parts thereof; because the whole of an extended substance nothing but all the parts. Lastly, he disputes farther from the rational energies. A magnitude could not understand, what hath no

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magnitude, and what is indivisible: whereas we have a notion, not only of latitude as indivisible to thickness, and of longitude as to breadth, but also of a mathematical point, every way indivisible. We have notions of things also, that have neither magnitude nor site, &c. Again, all the abstract essences of things indivisible. We conceive extended things themselves unextendedly; the thought of a mile, or a thousand miles distance, taking up no more room in the soul than the thought of an inch. Moreover, were that which perceiveth in us a magnitude, it could not be equal to every sensible, and alike perceive things greater and lesser than itself. 25. Besides which, they might argue thus; that we, as we can conceive extension without cogitation, and again cogitation without extension, so can we not conceive cogitation with extension; nor the length, breadth, and thickness of a thought. Thoughts therefore must be nonentities, if whatsoever is unextended be nothing; as also metaphysical truths, they having neither dimensions nor figure. So volitions and passions. If the things belonging to soul and mind be unextended, then must themselves be so. Again, if mind and soul have distant parts, then could none of them be one, but many substances. If life divided, then a half of it would not be life. Lastly, no reason could be given, why they might not be as well really, as intellectually divisible. Nor could a Theist deny, but that divine power might cleave a thought into many pieces. 26. The sense of the ancient Incorporealists therefore this; that in nature, two kinds of substances. The first of them passive bulk, or distant and extended substance; which is all, one thing without another; and therefore as many substances as parts, into which it can be divided. Essentially antitypous; one magnitude joined to another always standing without it, and making the whole so much bigger. Body all outside, having no internal energy, nor any action besides local motion; which it is also passive to. Were there no other substance besides this, there could be no motion, intellection, volition; but all would be a dead lump; nor could any one thing penetrate another. Wherefore another substance, whose character φύσις δραστήριος, "the active nature," life, self-activity, cogitation: which no mode or accident of extension, it having more of entity in it. Nor are these two, extension and life, inadequate conceptions of one and the same substance. A thinker a monad; or one single substance. Not conceivable, how the several parts of an extended substance should jointly concur to produce the same thought. 27. The energies of these two substances very different. The one nothing but local motion, a mere outside thing: the other cogitation, an internal energy; or in the inside of that, which thinks. Which inside of the thinking nature hath no length, breadth, or profundity, no out-swelling tumour. Were a cogitative being extended, yet must it have, besides this extended outside, an unextended inside. But one and the same substance cannot be extended and unextended. All summed up together. 28. Hitherto the sense of the ancient assertors of unextended incorporeals represented to the best advantage. These and other arguments do demonstrate against the Atheists, some other substance besides body: but whether they prove this to be indistant and unextended, left to others to make a judgment. The Atheists, who deny this, must acknowledge every thought to be not only mentally, but also physically divisible, together with the soul; as also deny internal energy; and consequently make cogitation nothing but local motion; and that no substance can co-exist with another, more inwardly than by juxtaposition. 29. This the first answer to the fore-mentioned atheistic argument against incorporeal substance, by denying the minor, that though whatsoever is extended be body, yet every thing is not extended. But the argument otherwise

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answered by some learned assertors of incorporeal substance, by denying the major; that though every thing be extended, or what unextended nothing; yet whatever is extended is not body; they asserting another extension incorporeal, which is both penetrable, and not made up of parts physically separable from one another; to which belongeth life, self-activity, and cogitation. Probable, that some would compound both the forementioned hypotheses together; by supposing the Deity to be altogether unextended; but souls to have an unextended inside, diffused into an extended outside. Ourselves here only to oppose Atheists; and dogmatize no further than to assert, that, besides body, there is another substance, which consisteth not of parts really separable; which is self-active, and hath an internal energy, distinct from local motion. All which is demonstratively certain. This the full answer to the first atheistic argument against incorporeal substance. 30. The second atheistic assault against incorporeal substance; by pretending the original of this mistake to have sprung from the scholastic essences, distinct from the things themselves; and the abuse of abstract names and notions, they being made to be substances existing by themselves. For, though the opinion of ghosts and spirits sprung first from fear; yet that these should be incorporeal could never have entered into the minds of men. 31. The first general reply to this, that it is all but romantic fiction. That the opinion of the Deity sprung not from fear, and that all invisible ghosts are not fancies, already sufficiently proved; as also the existence of a God demonstrated by reason. That apparitions are real phenomena; and there may be invisible aërial and ethereal, as there are visible terrestrial animals. Sottishness to conclude, that there is no understanding nature superior to man. 32. The second particular reply, that the opinion of spirits incorporeal sprung not from the scholastic essences. No man supposing these to be things really and substantially existing without the mind; either an universal man and universal horse, or else humanity and equinity: and that these walk up and down in airy bodies. These essences of things said to be eternal as their verities. The meaning of these eternal essences, not, that they are so many eternal substances incorporeal; but that knowledge is eternal, and that there is an eternal unmade Mind, that comprehends them; which all other minds partake of. 33. Again, that another atheistic dream, that the abstract names and notions of the mere accidents of bodies were made substances incorporeal; souls, minds, and ghosts. Conscious life no accident of bodies; but the essential attribute of another substance, which incorporeal. 34. The following atheistic arguments to be despatched with more brevity. That the four next, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth, proceed only upon this supposition, that there is no other substance in the world, besides body or matter; and therefore signify nothing to the assertors of an incorporeal Deity. Stoics only concerned to answer them. Nevertheless, a necessity of incorporeal substance will be evinced. 35. Here two atheistic corporealisms founded upon these suppositions, that all is body or matter; and, that matter, as such, is devoid of life and understanding. The first in the way of qualities and forms generable and corruptible, called the hylopathian. This the most ancient atheistic form, viz. that bulky extension, the only substantial and unmade thing, and all other things but the passions, qualities, and accidents thereof; makeable out of it, and destroyable into it. The consequence from whence, that there is no substantial unmade life and understanding; and that no mind could be a Creator; it being all accidental and factitious. 36. This hylopathian atheism, called also Anaximandrian. Simplicius conceives Anaximander to have held an homœomery, or similar atomology, of eternal unmade qualities, as Anaxagoras afterwards; only that he acknowledged no unmade Life

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or Mind, but generated it all from the fortuitous commixture of those qualified atoms. Anaximander supposed life and understanding to be at least secondary qualities, and accidents of body, generable and corruptible. 37. The second atheistic corporealism, in the way of unqualified atoms, producing all things, from figures and magnitudes of parts. Whence it will also follow, that Mind is no primordial thing, but secondary, compounded, and derivative; Democritus the first inventor of the dissimilar atomology; who made dissimilar atoms the principles of all things whatsoever. 38. Not to be denied, that from these two things granted, all is body, and, that the first principles of body are devoid of life, it would follow, that there is no God. Therefore the Stoics, who were corporeal Theists, denied the latter; they supposing an understanding Fire, the maker of the whole mundane system. Truly observed by Origen, that this corporeal god of the Stoics was but by accident incorruptible and happy. This no genuine Theism. 39. But an absolute impossibility in both these atheistic corporealisms; not only because they suppose no active principle; but because they bring something out of nothing. The atomic Atheists most to be condemned, because so grossly contradicting themselves. From that true principle, that matter, as such, is devoid of life and understanding, an absolute necessity of another substance incorporeal, which is essentially vital and intellectual. That all life cannot possibly be factitious and accidental, generable and corruptible; but there must be substantial life; and also some eternal. 40. The truth of this acknowledged by the Hylozoists; that there must of necessity be both substantial and unmade life and understanding; who therefore attribute the same to all matter, but without animality; which, according to them, was all factitious and accidental. Wherefore this hylozoic atheism also brings conscious life out of nothing; or makes them without a cause. The argument of the Epicurean Atheists, against stratonism or hylozoism, unanswerable: that upon this supposition there must be, in every man and animal, a heap of innumerable percipients; and so no one thinker. The pretence of the Hylozoists, that all the particles of matter in every animal do confederate, ridiculous. 41. Thus the fifth and sixth atheistic argumentations fully confuted; and from that true supposition in them, that matter is devoid of life and understanding, incorporeal substance plainly demonstrated. 42. The third and last, that there being undeniably substance incorporeal, the two following atheistic argumentations altogether insignificant. The seventh not properly directed against theism, but against a religious kind of atheism; which supposed a god of the world generated out of senseless matter, and the offspring of Chaos. A sober and true sense of the world's animation; that there is a sentient and understanding Nature, presiding over the world. But the sense of pagan Theists, that the whole corporeal world animated is a God, exploded by us. This argument therefore being against theogonism; the confutation thereof might be here well omitted. But because the denying of a living understanding nature, presiding over the world, is atheistical, the ground of this assertion briefly declared, that life and understanding are accidents of bodies, resulting only from such a composure of atoms, as produce flesh, blood, and brains, in bodies organized; and, that there is no reason to be found any where but only in human form: which also confuted. 43. The eighth atheistic argumentation, that there can be no living being immortal, nor perfectly happy; built upon that false supposition, that all life and understanding results from a contexture of senseless atoms, and therefore is annihilable. But that there is life essential and substantial, which naturally immortal: as also a necessity of an eternal life, and Mind unmade, and unannihilable; which perfectly happy.

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THE six following atheistic argumentations, driving at these two things, First, the disproving of an incorporeal, and then of a corporeal Deity (from both which, the Atheists conceive, it must follow of necessity, that there can be none at all); we shall take them all together, and, in order to the confutation of them, perform these three things. First, we shall answer the atheistic argumentations against an incorporeal Deity (contained in the third and fourth heads). Secondly, we shall show, that from the very principles of the atheistic corporealism (as represented in the fifth and sixth heads) incorporeal substance is demonstrable. And lastly, that there being undeniably incorporeal substance, the two following atheistic argumentations also, against a corporeal Deity (in the seventh and eighth sections) prove altogether insignificant.

We begin with the first of these; to show the invalidity of the atheistic argumentations against an incorporeal Deity. It hath been already observed, that though all Corporealists be not therefore of necessity Atheists, yet Atheists universally have been corporealists; this being always their first and grand postulatum, that there is no other substance besides body. Thus Plato long ago declared concerning them;* Διϊσχυρίζονται τοῦτο εἶναι μόνον ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφὴν τινὰ, ταυτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὁριζόμενοι· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων εἴτις φησὶ μὴ σῶμα ἔχον εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες τὸ παράπαν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἄλλο ἀκούειν, "They contend strongly, that that only really is, which is tangible, or can resist their touch; concluding body and substance to be one and the self-same thing: and if any one should affirm, that there is any thing incorporeal, they will presently cry him down, and not hear a word more from him." For there can be no doubt,[1] but that the persons here intended by Plato were those very Atheists, which himself spake of afterward, in the same dialogue:[2] Μῶν τῷ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματι καὶ ῥήματι

* Soph. p. 172. Fic. [P. 160.]

[1] This opinion of Dr. Cudworth is not altogether free from doubt. I confess that the persons who are stated by Plato to have held the whole nature of things to be corporeal, seem to be distinct from those whom he speaks of at the end of the dialogue, as having wholly excluded the divine mind and power from the construction of this world. For in addition to these two classes being separated by a long interval in Plato's treatise, those who are represented by him as denying incorporeal things are no other than the opponents of forms and images, or *ideas*, as is manifest from what follows; and the philosopher is censuring them for no other reason than because they despised his favourite doctrine of eternal ideas. But this contempt of Plato's ideas does not preclude the possibility of their being imbued with some sort of religion and regarding God as a nature endowed with a most subtle body, an opinion which was entertained by many. But as will be shown by and by, Dr. Cudworth had a certain motive for identifying the persons introduced by Plato as denying incorporeal things with the Atheists of the same author.

[2] These very words of Plato, however, induce me to believe that those who are represented by him as denying the existence of any thing in the universe except body, were not so impious as altogether to discard God. For I. It is clear from the very controversy here touched upon by Plato, that the question in dispute between this class

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χρώμενοι φήσομεν, τὴν φύσιν αὐτὰ πάντα γεννᾶν, ἀπό τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης, καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας φυούσης; ἢ μετὰ λόγου καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας, ἀπὸ θεοῦ γιγνομένης, "Whether shall we assent to that opinion now-a-days entertained by so many, That nature generateth all things from a certain fortuitous cause, without the direction of any Mind or Understanding? or rather, that it produceth them, according to reason and knowledge, proceeding from God?" Indeed the philosopher there tells us, that some of these atheistic persons began then to be somewhat ashamed of making prudence, and justice, and other moral virtues, corporeal things, or bodies: Ἀποκρίνονται τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν σφίσι σῶμά τι κεκτῆσθαι, φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, ὧν ἠρώτηκας, αἰσχύνονται τὸ τολμᾶν, ἢ μηδέν τῶν ὄντων αὐτὰ ὁμολογεῖν, ἢ πάντ' εἶναι σώματα διϊσχυρίζεσθαι, "Though they affirm concerning the soul itself, that this seems to them to be corporeal; yet, concerning prudence, and those other virtues mentioned, some have now scarcely the confidence to maintain these to be either bodies or nothing." But this (saith he) was indeed no less than the quite giving up of the cause of atheism: Εἰ γάρ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἐθέλουσι τῶν ὄντων συγχωρεῖν ἀσώματον, ἐξαρκεῖ, "Because, if it be but once granted, that there is never so little incorporeal, this will be sufficient to overthrow the atheistic foundation." Wherefore he concludes, that such as these were but mongrel and imperfect Atheists: Ἐπεὶ αὐτῶν οὐδ' ἂν ἓν ἐπαισχυνθεῖεν, ὅτι γε αὐτῶν σπαρτοὶ καὶ αὐτόχθονες, ἀλλὰ διατείνοιντ' ἄν, πᾶν ὅ μὴ δυνατοὶ ταῖς χερσὶ συμπιέζειν, ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο οὐδὲν τὸ παράπαν ἔστι, "For they, who are thorough-paced and genuine Atheists indeed, will boggle at neither of those forementioned things; but contend, that whatsoever they

and their adversaries was not upon God and religion, but upon *ideas* and forms. The earliest champions of ideas and eternal exemplars of things were wont to instance human virtues, wisdom, justice, love, and the rest, or rather the notions and forms of those virtues, and to ask of those, who opposed ideas and included all things in bodies: Whether they held these forms in the virtues to be nothing or bodies. But to this highly captious question the contemners of ideas here spoken of did not venture to give any definite answer, nor could they persuade themselves to say that those virtues were either nothing or bodies. Unquestionably, however, they were not wholly silent. Plato has not thought proper to give such an explanation of the state and nature of this controversy as to make it perfectly clear to ourselves; and hence it is impossible for us to ascertain whether they benefited or injured their cause by this silence or hesitation. But it is enough for us to know that the dispute with them was not upon God and religion, but merely upon the existence of forms and ideas. II. Plato says that they admitted the soul κεκτῆσθαι σῶμά τι, "to possess a certain body." This again inclines me to think more favourably of this class than the learned Doctor does. For if they had been hostile to God and all religion, they would have asserted the soul to be either σῶμα, "body," or a mode and affection of body. But they simply maintain that it partakes of or possesses body; which makes it probable that they regarded the soul as a nature separated from an earthy and grosser body like our own, and yet not incorporeal, but endowed with a more subtle kind of body. But every man conversant with these subjects must know that this was the opinion of many in times past, who in other respects entertained correct notions of God and things divine, and that it is not subversive of all piety and religion.

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cannot grasp with their hands, is altogether nothing."[3] That is, that there is no other substance nor entity in the world, but only body, that which is tangible, or resists the touch. Aristotle[4] also representeth the atheistic hypothesis after the same manner: Τοῦτο καὶ τοσαύτην φασὶν εἶναι τὴν ἅπασαν οὐσίαν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα πάθη τούτων, "They affirm, that matter, or body, is all the substance, that is; and that all other things are but the passions and affections thereof." And again, in his Metaphysics:* Ἕν τὸ πᾶν, καὶ μίαν εἶναί τινα φύσιν, ὡς ὕλην τιθέασι, καὶ ταύτην σωματικὴν καὶ μέγεθος ἔχουσαν, "These men maintain all to be one, and that there is but one only nature, as the matter of all things, and this corporeal, or endued with magnitude." And now we see plainly, that the ancient Atheists were of the very same mind with these in our days, that body, or that which is tangible and divisible, is the only substantial thing; from whence it follows, that an incorporeal substance would be the same with

[3] Dr. Cudworth's translation of these words is in conformity with his own rather than Plato's opinion. For Plato makes no mention in this passage of Atheists, neither does he say that the men whose opinion he is reciting, if they were really Atheists, would answer that nothing exists except what can be laid hold of by the hands. The Elean guest, introduced into this dialogue as speaking, asks Theodorus whether these men, who denied the existence of any thing besides body, ranked human virtues also among bodies. Theodorus replies, that they attributed body to the soul, but were undecided as to the nature of the virtues. Upon this the stranger says he now has favourable hopes of them: "For if they were genuine and indigenous Spartans," that is, if they were of the frank and noble disposition of the Lacedemonians, who spoke out the sentiments of their mind freely and undisguisedly, and were at the same time indigenous as the Spartans wished to appear, "they would not long delay, but would freely and sincerely acknowledge the virtues to be either nothing or bodies, nay, would openly avow that there is nothing except what can be touched and laid hold of by the hands." Plato therefore does not pronounce them to be semi-atheists, but indirectly denies that they are true, genuine, and indigenous Spartans.

[4] The former of the passages here adduced from Aristotle I have not been able to find in that philosopher's works, notwithstanding a very diligent search; I have no doubt, however, of their being somewhere extant therein. The other is read in Aristotle as it is here given, but in my opinion has little or no bearing upon the question under consideration. For Aristotle does not affirm, that the persons represented by him as holding matter to be the principle of all things are Atheists. The learned Doctor, however, brings forward this testimony to prove that the ancient foes of the divine nature referred all things to matter and body. I acknowledge this to be the case, nor do I believe that an Atheist, either ancient or modern, ever associated another immaterial nature with matter. But I deny that those whom Aristotle is censuring in these passages are Atheists, as he does not charge them with this crime; and Dr. Cudworth himself admits it to be possible for a man to believe in the existence of nothing but body, and still not despise God and all religion. Our worthy author, I am afraid, here suffered himself to be carried a little farther than he ought by his otherwise proper dislike of Hobbes and his philosophy. Hobbes denied the existence of any thing besides body, and even asserted God himself to be corporeal. To show the pernicious tendency and gross impiety of this opinion, Dr. Cudworth endeavours to prove from Plato and Aristotle, that the ancient Atheists held the same. This certainly was well calculated to excite odium against Hobbes and his friend, and to deter men from adopting his wild and foolish theories; nor can it be denied that the Atheists of old entertained this opinion. But the passages of Plato and Aristotle, he relies upon, are manifestly foreign to his purpose, and ought not to be understood of Atheists.

* Met. lib. 1. cap. 7. [P. 274. tom. 4. opp.]

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an incorporeal body, i. e. an impossibility, and that there can be no incorporeal Deity.

But in the management of this cause, there hath been some disagreement amongst the Atheists themselves. For first, the Democritics and Epicureans, though consenting with all the other Atheists, in this, That whatsoever was unextended, and devoid of magnitude, was therefore nothing (so that there could neither be any substance, nor accident, or mode of any substance, unextended); did notwithstanding distinguish concerning a double nature. First, that which is so extended, as to be impenetrable, and tangible, or resist the touch, which is body. And secondly, that which is extended also, but penetrably and intangibly; which is space or vacuum: a nature, according to them, really distinct from body, and the only incorporeal thing that is.[5] Now since this space, which is the only incorporeal, can neither do nor suffer any thing, but only give place or room to bodies to subsist in, or pass through; therefore can there not be any active, understanding, incorporeal Deity. This is the argumentation of the Democritic Atheists.

To which we reply, That if space be indeed a nature distinct from body, and a thing really incorporeal, as they pretend, then will it undeniably follow from this very principle of theirs, that there must be an incorporeal substance; and (this space being supposed by them also to be infinite) an infinite, incorporeal Deity. Because, if space be not the extension of body, nor an affection thereof, then must it of necessity be, either an accident existing alone by itself, without a substance, which is impossible; or else the extension, or affection, of some other incorporeal substance, that is infinite. But here will Gassendus step in, to help out his good friends the Democritics and Epicureans at a dead lift; and undertake to maintain, that though space be indeed an incorporeal thing, yet it would neither follow of necessity from thence, that it is an incorporeal substance or affection thereof; nor yet that it is an accident existing alone by itself, without a substance; because this space is really neither accident, nor substance, but a certain middle nature or essence betwixt both. To which subterfuge of his, that we may not quarrel about words, we shall make this reply; that unquestionably, whatsoever is, or hath any kind of entity, doth either subsist by itself, or else is an attribute, affection, or mode of

[5] To the followers of Democritus he might have added the Stoics, of whom Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 7. segm. 140. p. 453: Ἔξωθεν δὲ κόσμου περικεχυμένον εἶναι τὸ κενὸν ἄπειρον· ὅπερ ΑΣΩΜΑΤΟΝ εἶναι· ἀσώματον δὲ τὸ οἷόν τε κατέχεσθαι ὑπὸ σωμάτων, οὐ κατεχομένου, "(The Stoics say) that without the world an immense vacuum is circumfused, which is incorporeal: and that that is incorporeal which can be contained by bodies but is not contained." This doctrine of the Stoics, however, I confess differs in a certain respect from Democritus' theory concerning space.

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something, that doth subsist by itself. For it is certain, that there can be no mode, accident, or affection of nothing; and consequently, that nothing cannot be extended, nor mensurable. But if space be neither the extension of body, nor yet of substance incorporeal, then must it of necessity be the extension of nothing, and the affection of nothing; and nothing must be mensurable by yards and poles. We conclude, therefore, that from this very hypothesis of the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists, that space is a nature distinct from body, and positively infinite, it follows undeniably, that there must be some incorporeal substance, whose affection its extension is; and because there can be nothing infinite, but only the Deity, that it is the infinite extension of an incorporeal Deity; just as some learned Theists and Incorporealists have asserted. And thus is the argument of these Democritic and Epicurean Atheists, against an incorporeal Deity, abundantly confuted; we having made it manifest, that from that very principle of their own, by which they would disprove the same, it is against themselves demonstrable.[7]

[7] The learned Doctor here employs the argument *ad hominem*, as the schoolmen say, and overthrows the reasoning of the Democritics and Epicureans against an incorporeal God from their own axioms on the nature of space. Whether this argumentation is such as completely to put those to silence who with Epicurus and Democritus discard God, but acknowledge infinite incorporeal space, or whether some means of defence are still left them, let others determine. To myself, indeed, he seems to assume something which, if I mistake not, both sides are not yet sufficiently agreed upon; for example, that nothing can be infinite except God. But passing over these things I shall notice two points which have some bearing upon the present question. I. Although the learned Doctor nowhere clearly indicates whether he is more favourable to those who regard space as a mere notion of the mind or affection of bodies, or those who suppose it to be a really existent nature, he here however seems evidently to incline to the opinion that God is not different from extension or space, or that space and extension are a property of a God. Compare chap. 2. sect. 8. and our remarks there. I have already shown in another place on chap. 5. sect. 1. sect. 25. that not a few of the ancient fathers, the Greeks especially, maintained this opinion. Whoever wishes to see a variety of passages to this effect may consult Dion. Petavius, Dogmat. Theolog. tom. 1. lib. 3. cap. 9. sect. 10. p. 161. &c. who however seems to me not sufficiently to distinguish the passages, but to confound those of a different purport and opinion; on which this is no place for comment. In a later age this opinion was caught up among the English in particular, and defended by men of the highest ability, but not in the same words or the same manner. At the time when Dr. Cudworth wrote this, his friend Dr. Hen. More had already publicly approved of it; and at this day the disciples of the illustrious Newton are most of them among its supporters. [A dispute is carried on in England on this subject at the present time against Dr. Clarke. See Biblioth. Raisonnée, tom. 13. par. 1. p. 229. &c. tom. 14. p. 468.] Among our own countrymen Andr. Rüdiger, Physica Divina, lib. 1. cap. 8. sect. 4. p. 346. 347. has adopted it. Compare Appendix de Monitis Censorum, p. 790. &c. The whole question concerning space and its nature is exceedingly abstruse, and embarrassed with infinite difficulties; wherefore they perhaps show greater wisdom who choose to know nothing at all of the matter, rather than include all things within the limits of their own mind, and advance any thing which themselves must be aware may with great show of truth be impugned by others. [For space Mussehenbroek Journ. Litt. tom. 22. par. 2. p. 246.] I am certain that there is space; nor do what I will can I divest my mind of this notion. On its nature and relations I feel no disposition to dispute, and confess myself not to possess intellect sufficient to grasp and comprehend so pro-

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To which it might be here further added, that Epicurus, who professedly opposed Plato's incorporeal God, as an impossibility, did notwithstanding manifestly contradict himself, when he asserted such a Democracy of monogrammous gods, as were not compounded of atoms and vacuum (though, according to him, the only principles of body), that so they might be incorruptible; nor yet could touch or be touched, but were penetrable, as is declared in those verses of Lucretius,[8]

> Tenuis enim natura deûm, longeque remota
> Sensibus à nostris, animi vix mente videtur.
> Quæ quoniam manuum tactum suffugit et ictum,
> Tactile nil nobis quod sit, contingere debet.
> Tangere enim non quit, quod tangi non licet ipsum.

(though tangibility and impenetrability were elsewhere made by him the very essence of body); and lastly, such as had not corpus, but quasi corpus, and therefore must needs be really incorporeal. Though there is no doubt to be made, but that Epicurus colluded in all this; himself not believing a jot of it, nor any such gods at all.

But other Atheists there were, who concluding likewise, That whatsoever was unextended was nothing, were sensible of the inconvenience of making space thus to be a thing really distinct from body (from whence it would follow unavoidably, that it was an affection of incorporeal substance); and therefore acknowledged, not two natures of extended things, but as we had it before in Aristotle, μίαν τινὰ φύσιν καὶ ταύτην σωματικὴν, "one only nature, and that bodily;" space being therefore to them, either a mere imaginary thing, that hath no reality without our minds, but only a phantasm of our own, and, in their modern language, a kind of ghost, apparition, or spectre of a body; or

found and recondite a subject. Let others, however, retain the right of explaining this matter as they please, provided they broach nothing derogatory to the divine perfections. II. I cannot agree with Dr. Cudworth when he tells us that Gassendi, in asserting space to be something intermediate between substance and accident, meant to help the Democritics and Epicureans. After Gassendi several others, who could not fairly be ranked among Atheists, have adopted a similar view, or at least have professed their ignorance to what class of things space belonged; among whom it will be sufficient to name Dr. Cudworth's acute countryman, J. Locke, on the Human Understanding, lib. 2. cap. 13. p. 192. When the subject of inquiry lies far above human comprehension, and the distributions and distinctions invented by philosophers are not yet cleared of all difficulty, and lastly, when the words themselves, which are used to designate the various kinds of things, are undefined and ambiguous, I should consider it the wisest course to be content with knowing the thing itself, and to hazard no positive assertion as to its mode or nature. Should any one on account of this opinion call me ignorant and inexperienced, as Andr. Rüdiger accuses Gassendi of folly, Physica Divina, lib. 1. cap. 8. sect. 2. I will bear it with patience; but he to whom I appear ignorant may, on the other hand, perhaps seem to me to be too bold and confident, and it is at least a question, whether the latter is the more excusable fault.

[8] De Natura Rerum, lib. 5. v. 149. &c. p. 245. &c. On these sportive gods of Epicurus, see what is said above, chap. 2. sect. 2.

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else indeed the very extension of body itself, considered in general, and abstractly, from this or that singular body, moveable. And these men therefore framed their argumentation against an incorporeal Deity after this manner: Nothing truly is, but what is extended, or hath a certain magnitude (because that which is unextended, and hath no magnitude, is no where, and consequently nothing). But whatsoever is extended, and in a place, is body. Therefore is there no other substance besides body; and consequently there can be no incorporeal Deity. Or else to put the argument into a more approvable syllogistic form; whatsoever is extended, is body, or corporeal; but whatsoever is, is extended. Therefore whatsoever is, is body, or corporeal. And by consequence, there can be no incorporeal Deity.

To which argumentation the assertors of incorporeal substance have replied two manner of ways. For first, the generality of the ancient incorporealists taking it for granted, that whatsoever was extended in magnitude, and had parts one without another, was divisible, as also probably impenetrable by any thing else extended, because there can be no penetration of dimensions; and therefore no one magnitude can be imbibed or swallowed up into another, but must of necessity stand without it, adding so much to the quantity thereof: they readily gave their assent to that proposition, that whatsoever is extended into longitude, latitude, and profundity, is body. But being strongly persuaded of the existence of some other substance besides body, they denied that other proposition of theirs, that whatsoever is, is extended; or what is unextended, is nothing: maintaining, that besides body, or extended substance, there was another substance incorporeal, which therefore was ἀδιάστατος, and ἀμεγέθης, and ἄποσος, and ἀμερὴς, and ἀδιαίρετος, "unextended," and devoid of "quantity" and "magnitude," without "parts," and "indivisible."[9] That Plato himself philosophized after this manner, might be proved from sundry passages of his writings; as that in his tenth De Legibus, where he affirmeth, that the soul itself, and those things which belong to it, as cogitative, are πρότερα μήκους σωμάτων καὶ βάθους καὶ πλάτους, "in order of nature, before the longitude, and latitude, and profundity of bodies." Where, doubtless, his meaning was not, as if there were longitude, latitude, and profundity in souls, but of a different kind from that longitude, latitude, and profundity of bodies, and before it; but that longitude, latitude, and profundity, being the essential properties of body only, soul and cogitation, as devoid of these, was in order of nature before them. Again, from that

[9] Bayle, Dictionn. tom. 4. art. Simonides, supposes that before Des Cartes no one supposed spirit to be unextended.

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in his Timæus, where speaking of place, space, and matter, he condemneth this for a vulgar error. That whatsoever is, must of necessity be in some place or other, and what is in no place, is nothing. Τρίτον δὲ αὖ γένος τὸ τῆς χώρας, ἕδραν παρέχον ὅσα ἔχει γένεσιν πᾶσιν——πρὸς ὃ δὲ καὶ ὀνειροπολοῦμεν βλέποντες, καὶ φαμὲν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί που, τὸ ὂν ἅπαν ἔν τινι τόπῳ, καὶ κατέχον χώραν τινὰ· τὸ δὲ μήτε ἐν γῇ, μητέπου κατ' οὐρανὸν, οὐδὲν εἶναι, "The third kind is that of space, which gives room to all things that are generated. And when we look upon this, we dreamingly affirm, that every thing, that is, must of necessity be in some place, and possess a certain room and space, and that whatsoever is not somewhere, either in earth, or in heaven, is nothing. Which drowsy or dreaming imagination (saith he), like a ghost, continually haunteth and possesseth men, and that even then, when they think of that true and awakened nature of the Deity." Whereas this philosopher himself, discoursing elsewhere of God, under the title of πολὺ πέλαγος τοῦ καλοῦ, "the vast sea of pulchritude," describeth him after this manner: Οὐδέπου ὂν, ἢ ἐν γῇ, ἢ ἐν οὐρανῷ, ἄλλ' αὐτὸ, μεθ' αὑτοῦ, μονοειδὲς ἀεὶ ὂν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα καλὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα, "As that, which is not any where, either in earth, or in heaven, but itself alone by itself, and with itself, all other beautiful things partaking of it."[10]

[10] These passages, from which Dr. Cudworth considers it may be proved that Plato abstracted both the soul and God from all extension, seem at first sight to possess no inconsiderable weight: but if they be examined with more attention, and regarded in strict reference to the construction of the words, I am very much afraid they will lose all their force and efficacy. I. The first one from book 10. De Legibus, p. 669. is altogether foreign to this question, and our worthy author is manifestly mistaken in his interpretation of it. In that passage Plato is merely endeavouring to show that the soul is prior to all body, but as to its internal nature is altogether silent. Nor have his words any other meaning than this, that the affections of the soul, as well as the soul itself, existed before all bodies. This will at once be made evident by producing the entire passage. The Athenian guest says he has before demonstrated that the soul is more ancient than the body, and therefore that those things which are in it, the affections, virtues, and the rest, are so also. Τρόποι δὲ, he proceeds, καὶ ἤθη καὶ βουλήσεις καὶ λογισμοὶ καὶ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς, ἐπιμέλειαί τε καὶ μνῆμαι, πρότερα μήκους σωμάτων, καὶ πλάτους, καὶ βάθους, καὶ ῥώμης εἴη γεγονότα ἂν, εἴπερ καὶ ψυχὴ σώματος, "Therefore affections, morals, wills, cogitations, true opinions, cares, memories, were all before the longitude, latitude, profundity, and strength of bodies, as the soul also is before body." He must be rude and uninformed indeed who cannot understand Plato's meaning to be simply, that, as the soul is prior to the body, so the affections also and virtues of the soul are necessarily prior to the properties and affections of bodies, as longitude, latitude, and so on. If the words be taken in the sense attached to them by Dr. Cudworth, he would be made to say what no man in his senses ever questioned, that ratiocination, opinion, recollection, are destitute of extension. But Plato's opinion on the soul would not allow of his denying all extension to it. For as is incontrovertibly clear from the Timæus, he supposed the soul to be compounded of *the same*, or an indivisible nature, and *the different*, or, as almost all the Platonists correctly interpret it, all the elements and first principles of things. See the Timæus, sect. 19. p. 242. and sect. 20. p. 244. edit. Fabricii. Chalcidius, In Timæum Platonis, sect. 51. p. 298. thus writes: "Plato compounds the soul of all the elements, so that it is cognizant both of the elements themselves and of those things which follow the elements and universally of all existing things, and judges of all." See also Eusebius, Præparat. Evangel. lib. 13. cap. 16. p. 696. on this dogma, who, cap.

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And as for Aristotle's sense in this particular; that he here departed not, as he did in some other things, from his master Plato, may appear from that whole chapter, or section, at the

17. p. 700. quotes a remarkable passage from the Disputatio de Animo of the Platonist Severus, in which he castigates this doctrine of his master and shows that it goes to overthrow the soul's immortality. How that which consists of a twofold nature and of the elements of all bodies can be void of extension, I am at a loss to understand. II. As regards the other passage, which is quoted from the Timæus, p. 535. I would observe, first of all, that the last portion of it which stands here only in English, is translated by Dr. Cudworth more freely than the words will permit. In the Greek of Plato the words here given are followed by these: *Ταῦτα δὲ πάντα καὶ τὰ τούτων ἀδελφὰ, καὶ περὶ τὴν ἄϋπνον καὶ ἀληθῶς φύσιν ὑπάρχουσαν, ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὀνειρώξεως οὐ δυνατοὶ γιγνόμεθα ἐγερθέντες διοριζόμενοι τ' ἀληθὲς λέγειν, ὡς εἰκόνι μεν.* These the learned Doctor has interpreted freely and according to the sense, rather than translated, as follows: "Which drowsy or dreaming imagination, like a ghost, continually haunteth and possesseth men, and that even then, when they think of that true and awakened nature of the Deity." Ficinus has rendered them thus: "And all these and similar imaginations we ourselves, occupied by such dreams, are unable to distinguish from the wakeful and really existing nature." In whatever way these words be translated it will always be clear from this passage of Plato, I. That he considered those men to be deceived who suppose all existing things to be in some place, or in heaven and earth. II. That in particular a certain nature, which he calls *wakeful* and *really existent*, is excluded by this philosopher from place and space. In the first place it will be evident to the more attentive readers of Plato, that he is here covertly rebuking those persons in particular who opposed his favourite doctrine of the eternal forms and ideas of things by the following argument: "Whatever is not in place, is nothing: the forms of things are not in place or space: therefore they are nothing and mere fictions." This class are like dreamers, he says, and attribute more to phantasy than to reason. But that he is not speaking of ideas alone is evident from the fact that he particularly mentions a certain *ἄϋπνος* or "sleepless" nature, which is in like manner to be abstracted from space. This word is not applicable to the ideas and forms of things, but means undoubtedly a nature that always contemplates all things with the purest mind and intelligence. For he contrasts men as frequently dreaming and that ever wakeful nature with each other. Those dreamers are evidently the men who leave too much place and efficacy in the soul to the power of the imagination. The ever wakeful and sleepless nature therefore is unquestionably most pure mind, which divested of all body at no time either obeys or can obey the vagaries of fancy: consequently I will readily admit that the name designates God himself. The opinion of Plato seems to me to be aptly explained by Chalcidius, Comm. in Timæum Platonis, cap. 13. sect. 347. p. 404: "By a sleepless and wakeful nature he means that intelligible and incorporeal kind, which is ever the same, and subsists as principal and chief, without beginning and without end, having no connexion with the senses, perceptible by pure mind: that is to say, God and his intelligible cogitations and incorporeal forms." Wherefore it is certain from this passage that Plato denied the Supreme Being to be in space: but it does not appear to me to be equally plain from it that he held God to be devoid of extension. *Χώρα* and *τόπος* are with Plato nothing more than the space which bodies occupy: as will be evident to any one who reads him with attention. For he defines space to be that "which affords a place to all things that are generated," *ἕδραν ἔχει γένεσιν πᾶσιν*. Afterwards when he adds that those are mistaken who suppose all things to be either in heaven or in earth, he at the same time intimates that they know of no other space than that which contains heaven and earth. Whether he ranked this corporeal space, if it may be so called, among the affections and properties of body and matter, or believed it to be a nature distinct from matter, I leave to others to decide. For he has not expressed himself sufficiently clearly. He distinguishes space I observe from matter; but I cannot say whether he did so merely in mind and thought, or supposed these two to be in reality different. Such being the case, this passage of Plato proves no more than this: that God is not in the space and place occupied by bodies, or is neither in heaven nor in earth. But besides this space by which bodies are contained, he believed in other space extending far above heaven and earth, the seat of all con-

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end of his physics, spent upon this very subject, to prove ὅτι τοῦτ' ἀμερὲς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, καὶ μηδὲν ἔχειν μέγεθος, "that his first Immoveable Mover (which is God Almighty) must of ne-

ceivable pulchritude and the abode of the supreme Being himself. On this region he makes Steichorus discourse in his Phædrus, p. 345. as follows: Τὸν δὲ ΥΠΟΥΡΑΝΙΟΝ ΤΟΠΟΝ οὔτε τὶς ὕμνησέ πω τῶν τῇδε ποιητὴς, οὔτε ποθ' ὑμνήσει κατ' ἀξίαν· ἔχει δὲ ὧδε——ἡ γὰρ ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφὴς οὐσία ὄντως οὖσα ψυχῆς κυβερνήτῃ, μόνῳ θεατῇ νῷ χρῆται, κ. τ. λ. "Of this supercelestial place no one of our poets has sung or ever will sing according to its dignity. Its nature is this——without colour, without figure, without contact, an essence really existent, it uses contemplative intellect alone, the pilot of the soul," &c. Therefore, though he excluded God from heaven and earth, or the space and place in which bodies are, he nevertheless assigned him another place more exalted than heaven and earth: from which it follows that he did not discard all extension from the divine nature. Maximus Tyrius, who, Diss. 1. p. 15. discourses with great clearness on this subject, affirms that according to Plato's doctrine, heaven and earth are the bounds and limits of the divine abode. Synesius also, a well-known devoted admirer of Plato, Hymn. 1. in Deum, p. 315. perspicuously expresses the opinion of his master when he says that God is seated in tranquillity above the heavens:

Ὑψιθώκων
Ὑπερ οὐρανοῦ καρήνων,
Ἀλύτῳ κύδει γαίων
Θεὸς ἕμπεδος ἁάσσει,

"Above the lofty summits of heaven, rejoicing in immortal glory, is God firmly enthroned." This might be further proved from the interior discipline of Plato, and especially from his doctrine of demons: but the present is not a fitting opportunity, neither does the subject itself much require it. I cannot omit to mention, however, that Cicero in the part where he recounts the opinions of the Platonists and Aristotelians on the nature of things, expressly denies that they supposed any thing to exist, which is without place and devoid of extension, Academic. Quæstion. lib. 1. cap. 6, p. 2231. tom. 8. opp. Nullam vim (efficientem) dicebant hi philosophi esse sine aliqua materia. *Nihil est enim, quod non alicubi* (id est in loco quodam) *esse cogatur.* "These philosophers asserted that there is no (efficient) force without some matter. For there is nothing that is not necessarily somewhere (that is, in some place)." According to his authority therefore, which I think ought to be attended to, Plato considered something of matter to be associated with all natures, and upon this ground that nothing can exist without place. The question however which has exercised the learned even of our own time: whether or not Plato supposed God to be destitute of body and matter, it is not my present intention to discuss: highly difficult and doubtful as it is, owing to the ambiguity of the words, *body, matter, simple, incorporeal, corporeal,* to which no one meaning can be attached. When we meet with these words in ancient authors we estimate them according to the laws of our own language: a practice which has sometimes led men otherwise acute and ingenious into error. I am satisfied that Plato wholly abstracted God from this gross and mutable matter of which bodies are composed, nor can I agree with those, who would persuade us to the contrary for the purpose of more conveniently classing this philosopher among Atheists. But still I have scarcely a doubt that he supposed him to partake of a certain most subtle, most simple and indivisible matter. [He held the soul to be corporeal. See Beausobre Hist. du Manich. p. 482.] Neither do I abandon this opinion because Plato calls God ἀσώματος, "incorporeal and destitute of parts." For I have proved above on chap. 1. sect. 27. from many passages of the ancients that the word ἀσώματος had not the same meaning formerly as it has at this day. To pass over other significations of this word, the ancient philosophers held that to be ἀσώματος which does not consist of various elements, nor is so compounded as the bodies which fill the universe. It will be sufficient to show this by one passage of Apuleius: Plato ranks the stars and heroes among the gods: and no one will deny that the stars are bodies, and that a body, however subtle, was attributed by him to heroes. But Apuleius declares that according to the discipline of his master Plato, these deities are divested of all body, De Deo Socratis, p. 43. opp. "Which gods Plato regards as *incorporeal by*

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cessity be devoid of parts, or indivisible, and have no magnitude at all." The conclusion of which section, and his whole book of Physics,[1] is this: Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων, φανερὸν ὅτι ἀδύνατον τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν καὶ ἀκίνητον ἔχειν τι μέγεθος· εἰ γὰρ μέγεθος ἔχει, ἀνάγκη ἤτοι πεπερασμένον αὐτὸ εἶναι, ἢ ἄπειρον· ἄπειρον μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μέγεθος εἶναι, δέδεικται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς· ὅτι δὲ τὸ πεπερασμένον ἀδύνατον ἔχειν ἄπειρον δύναμιν, δέδεικται νῦν· φανερὸν τοίνυν, ὅτι ἀδιαίρετόν ἐστι, καὶ ἀμερὲς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔχον μέγεθος, "These things being thus determined, it is manifestly impossible, that the first Mover should have any magnitude. For if it hath magnitude, that must of necessity be either finite, or infinite. But that there can be no infinite magnitude, was before demonstrated in the Physics; and that nothing which hath a finite magnitude can have infinite power, hath been now proved. Wherefore it is plain, that the first Mover is indivisible, and devoid of parts, and hath no magnitude at all." Which same doctrine is again taught and asserted by Aristotle, in his Metaphysics:* Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστιν οὐσία τις ἀΐδιος καὶ ἀκίνητος, καὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· δέδεικται δε καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν

nature, animal, having no end or beginning, but wholly and retrospectively eternal, remote in their nature *from the contagion of body*." But the ancients called that destitute of parts, which they supposed to be incapable of being cut and divided. We indeed consider every thing consisting of matter to be divisible: but many of the early philosophers thought otherwise and held the existence of a certain kind of matter, the parts of which no force can disturb and disarrange. Let those who are sceptical about this, only reflect upon the fiery god of the Stoics and the soul of Plato. III. But it is time to come to the third passage here cited from Plato. It occurs in his Symposium or De Amore, p. 331. but if I am not altogether deceived is also totally irrelevant to the matter under consideration. Plato is not speaking there of God, as Dr. Cudworth fancies, but of the abstract form and idea of beauty. He first of all states that whoever wishes to know what the beautiful is, must not contemplate this or that man or animal or deity, but plunge ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος τοῦ καλοῦ, "into the vast sea of beauty." He then, to explain this thing more clearly, declares that there is a certain eternal and immutable form of beauty, which is conceived by reason and intelligence alone, and is not to be found in any thing perceptible to the eyes and sense. Even this is a proof of their being in error who fancy that these words of Plato are to be understood of God. The philosopher is discoursing upon corporeal beauty; and how can any one know what is really beautiful in corporeal and sensible things by contemplating the form and idea of the supreme Being? What affinity is there between God and those things which are manifest to the eyes, hands, and ears? But what necessity for longer discussion? Plato's words themselves, here appealed to, if they only be examined entire, refute those who understand them of God. For in Plato they run as follows: Οὐδέπου δν ἐν ἑτέρῳ τινὶ, οἷον 'EN ΖΩ'Ωι, ἢ ἐν γῇ, ἢ ἐν οὐρανῷ, ἢ ἐν τῷ ἄλλῳ. The words οἷον ἐν ζώῳ, "as in an animal," are here omitted by Dr. Cudworth, whether purposely or by a slip of the memory I cannot say, although they put it beyond all dispute that Plato is by no means speaking in this place of the nature of God. For his discourse would have been utterly absurd and ridiculous, if he had said that the supreme Being is not to be sought for in any animal. For what man was ever so insane as to estimate the form and image of God from that of an animal. Yet this not unfrequently happens, that men derive their notions of the nature of universal beauty from this source: an error which the philosopher is here exposing.

[1] Page 608. tom. 1. opp.

* Page 14. cap. 7. [Page 480. tom. 4. opp.]

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ταύτην τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀλλὰ ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστι·[2] οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει δύναμιν ἄπειρον πεπερασμένον, καὶ ὅλως οὐκ ἐστὶν οὐδὲν ἄπειρον, "From what hath been declared, it is manifest, that there is an eternal and immoveable substance, separate from sensibles; as also, that this substance cannot possibly have any magnitude, but is devoid of parts, and indivisible. Because no finite thing can have infinite power, and there is no such thing possible as infinite magnitude." Neither doth Aristotle appropriate this to the supreme Deity, "To be thus devoid of magnitude and of parts," and consequently "indivisible;" he somewhere[3] attributing the same also to all other immaterial or incorporeal things, and particularly to the human mind, ἀδιαίρετον πᾶν τὸ μὴ ὕλην ἔχον, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς, "every thing that is devoid of matter, is indivisible, as the human mind." And the like doth he assert, at once, both concerning the mundane and the human soul, that they are no magnitudes, though ridiculously (after his manner) imputing the contrary opinion to Plato:[4]* Οὐ καλῶς

[2] The words which follow are not read in Aristotle in the same order as here quoted, but are extracted from a longer sentence, although not strictly in adherence to the philosopher's meaning.

[3] Metaphys. lib. 14. cap. 9. p. 484. tom. 4. opp. But this passage seems to have little bearing upon the present question. For in it Aristotle makes no positive and definite assertion, but merely doubts, whether every thing that is devoid of rude and gross matter, is indivisible: Ἔτι δή, says he, λείπεται ἀπορία, εἰ σύνθετον τὸ νοούμενον, "There remains a doubt, whether that which is understood is compound;" .... Ἢ ἀδιαίρετον πᾶν τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὕλην, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς· ἢ ὅγε τῶν συνθέτων ἔχει ἐν τίνι χρόνῳ; "Or every thing, not possessing matter, is indivisible, as the human mind: or whatever is compound is in some time." But granting it to be evident from this passage, that the founder of the Peripatetics held the human mind to be both devoid of matter and indivisible, still it does not follow, that he deprived it of extension and magnitude. For when the ancients assert any thing to be destitute of matter, they mean the gross and dense matter that bodies are composed of, and are not necessarily to be supposed on that account to detract all matter from the nature which they hold to be immaterial. Many of the ancients affirm, that human souls are devoid of matter, and therefore immortal, and yet they hold the same to be igneous. Nor do those who suppose a thing to be indivisible necessarily separate and disconnect it from all matter. For formerly many believed in the existence of natures partaking of a certain matter, and yet of that kind, that their parts were wholly incapable of separation. To pass over other examples for the present, let those to whom this appears to be scarcely credible, bear in mind the god of the Stoics.

[4] I have a remark or two to offer upon this passage of Aristotle. I. Dr. Cudworth speaks as though Aristotle had entertained no doubt of this world being endowed with a soul, as was supposed by Plato and others. But not at present to mention that this philosopher has long since been shown to have at least rejected such a soul of the world as Plato imagined, no such inference can be drawn from this passage. For Aristotle is merely endeavouring to show that Plato's opinion on the soul of the world is opposed to truth and reason. II. The learned Doctor complains that Aristotle accuses Plato of supposing the soul to be extended. It is true he here finds fault with Plato for having in his Timæus not only compounded the soul of the world out of all the elements, but endowed it also with a certain magnitude: nor do I agree with Dr. Cudworth in considering that there is any thing so very ridiculous in his doing so. I will admit that Aristotle in other places has perverted his master's doctrines for the mere purpose of censure, but this dogma concerning the soul of the world is clearly put forth

* De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 3. [p. 9. 10. tom. 2. opp.]

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τὸ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν μέγεθος εἶναι. Ὁ δὲ νοῦς εἷς καὶ συνεχής, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ νόησις· ἡ δὲ νόησις τὰ νοήματα· ταῦτα δὲ τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἓν, ὡς ὁ ἀριθμος, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς τὸ μέγεθος· διόπερ οὐδὲ νοῦς οὕτω συνεχὴς, ἀλλ' ἤτοι ἀμερὴς ἢ οὐχ ὡς τὸ μέγεθός τι συνεχής· πῶς γὰρ δὲ καὶ νοήσει μέγεθος ὢν, ὅτῳ οὖν τῶν μορίων τῶν αὐτοῦ; μορίων δὲ ἤτοι κατὰ μέγεθος, ἢ κατὰ στιγμὴν· εἰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ στιγμὴν, αὗται δ' ἄπειροι, δῆλον ὡς οὐδέποτε διέξεισιν· εἰ δὲ κατὰ μέγεθος, πολλάκις ἢ ἀπειράκις νοήσει τὸ αὐτὸ· Ἔτι δὲ πῶς νοήσει τὸ ἀμερὲς μεριστῷ; "It is not rightly affirmed either of the mundane or rational soul, that they are magnitudes. For the Intellect is one and continuous, as Intellection is, which is the same with the Intelligibles. But these are one, not as magnitudes, but as numbers. Wherefore the Intellect is not so continuous, but either devoid of parts, or not continuous as magnitude. For how, being magnitude, could it understand with any of its parts, whether conceived as points, or as lesser magnitudes; since either way there would be an innumerable company of intellections? Moreover, how can it conceive any thing that is indivisible, by what is divisible?" Furthermore, in this same book, De Anima,[5] Aristotle stiffly denies souls in general either to be in a place, or to be locally moved, otherwise than by accident, as they are said to be moved together with the motion of the body. Thus Simplicius:[6] Ὅρα ὡς πανταχοῦ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀποσείεται τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις, "See how Aristotle

by Plato in his Timæus: nor do his best interpreters deny this. See what we have adduced on this subject a little above, as well as in other places. III. The learned Doctor has omitted many things in the passage itself. After the words μέγεθος εἶναι, Aristotle has interposed an explanation of Plato's opinion, without which it is impossible clearly to understand the demonstration which follows. The substance of what he says, in reference to this opinion is, that "Plato did not regard the soul of the world as a sentient or concupiscent, but as a rational soul." Having laid down this, he proceeds to show that such a rational soul cannot possibly be endowed with magnitude: "for intellect," says he, "is one and continuous, &c." Again, after the words νόησει τὸ αὐτὸ at the close of this passage, many things are omitted which I shall not repeat here, although they are indispensable towards a full comprehension of his demonstration. On the demonstration itself contained in this passage of the Stagirite, I am not disposed to touch, or on his doctrine respecting the soul of the world. For it has long ago been confessed by men pre-eminent for virtue and erudition, that Aristotle's precepts on the soul are so abstruse and intricate that no one can make out his real meaning. I should suppose that the philosopher was unwilling to speak clearly and explicitly on the subject, lest he should excite the jealousy and hatred of the multitude: nor should I say otherwise of his doctrine of a first mover, which he likewise denies to partake of magnitude. There are persons who highly commend it for its subtlety and excellence, and who maintain it to be in accordance with true religion: while others again reject it as absurd and futile, and contend that the man did not himself know what he was saying. Both however agree that it is difficult of comprehension, and cannot be explained in words so as to make it intelligible to all. On the comparative merits of these two opinions let others decide. For my own part I frankly acknowledge my lack of sufficient acumen to be able to comprehend its entire tenor and import; and from the same cause it happens also that I consider it to be scarcely reconcileable with his other opinions concerning God.

[5] Lib. 1. cap. 4. p. 12. tom. 2. opp.

[6] Comment. in Libros Aristotelis de Anima, fol. 6. ed Græcæ Franc. Asulani, Venet. 1527. fol.

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doth every where remove or exclude from the soul, corporeal (or local) motions." And again:* Ἀπαγορεύει μὴ κινεῖσθαι τὰ ἀσώματα τῆς κινήσεως αἴτια κἂν πρῶτα κἂν μέσα κἂν ἔσχατα ᾖ, "Aristotle will by no means allow any incorporeal things whatsoever, whether of the first, second, or lowest rank, (they being all the causes of motion) themselves to be moved." Philoponus[7] likewise: Ὁρᾷς ὡς πρὸς τὰς σωματικὰς κινήσεις ἀποβλέπων, οὕτως αὐτὴν ἀκίνητον εἶναί φησι· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ἐν τόπῳ σῶμά ἐστιν, "You see how Aristotle, respecting corporeal motions, pronounces of the soul, that it is immoveable. For whatsoever is in a place (and moveable) is body." Lastly, in that passage before cited, Aristotle plainly makes the essence of corporeal substance, as opposed to incorporeal, to consist in magnitude.

Besides Plato and Aristotle, we might here instance in sundry other of the ancient Incorporealists, who clearly maintained the same doctrine. Philo doth not only assert in general a double essence or substance, ἀδιάστατον, and διαστηματικὴν, "a distant and indistant one;" but somewhere writeth thus concerning the Deity:† Ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ πεπλήρωται τὰ πάντα, περιέχοντος, οὐ περιεχομένου, ᾧ πανταχοῦ τε καὶ οὐδαμοῦ συμβέβηκεν εἶναι μόνῳ· οὐδαμοῦ μὲν, ὅτι καὶ χώραν καὶ τόπον αὐτὸς τοῖς σώμασι συγγεγέννηκε· τὸ δὲ πεποιηκὸς ἐν οὐδενὶ τῶν γεγονότων θέμις εἰπεῖν περιέχεσθαι· πανταχοῦ δὲ, ὅτι τὰς δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ διὰ γῆς καὶ ὕδατος ἀέρος τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ τείνας, &c. "All things are filled with God, as containing them, but not as being contained by them, or in them; to whom alone it belongeth to be both every where and nowhere. Nowhere, because himself created space and place, together with bodies, and it is not lawful to include the Creator within any of his creatures. And every where, because he extendeth his virtues and powers throughout earth and water, air and heaven, and leaveth no part of the world destitute thereof; but, collecting all things together under himself, hath bound them fast with invisible bonds."[8] But none

* Fol. 6.

[7] Comment. in Libros tres Aristot. de Anima, fol. 13. ed Græcæ Venet. 1553. fol.

† De Confus. Ling. p. 339.

[8] I can hardly believe Philo, however, to have belonged to the number of those who formerly denied all extension to God: on the contrary, he appears to me to have inclined to the opinion that God is mind pervading the whole universe of things, and that the divine nature does not differ from all-comprehending space. It will not be foreign to our purpose to demonstrate this by one or two passages. In his first book, Allegoriar. Legis, p. 48. he thus speaks concerning God: Θεοῦ γὰρ οὐδὲ ὁ σύμπας κόσμος ἄξιον ἂν εἴη χωρίον καὶ ἐνδιαίτημα· ἐπεὶ αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ τόπος, καὶ αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ πλήρης καὶ ἱκανὸς ὁ Θεὸς, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐπιδεᾶ, καὶ ἔρημα, καὶ κενὰ ὄντα πληρῶν καὶ περιέχων, αὐτὸς δὲ ὑπ' οὐδένος ἄλλου περιεχόμενος, ἅτε εἷς καὶ τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸς ὤν, "For of God not even the whole world would be a worthy and fitting dwelling-place: for God is his own place, and full of and sufficient for himself, filling and containing all other things which are deficient, desert, and empty

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hath more industriously pursued this business than Plotinus, who every where asserts body and magnitude to be one and the same thing;[9] and that, besides this, there is another sub-

whereas he is contained by no other thing, as being one and all things." What Philo here calls *deficient*, *desert*, and *empty*, are undoubtedly terrene and corporeal things, or in a word, the universe. His meaning therefore is, that God is that space, so to speak, in which bodies exist and revolve, and which penetrates and pervades all things. There is another still more explicit passage to the same effect, in his book De Somniis, p. 575. Αὐτὸς, says he, ὁ Θεὸς καλεῖται τόπος, τῷ περιέχειν μὲν τὰ ὅλα, περιέχεσθαι δὲ πρὸς μηδένος ἁπλῶς, καὶ τῷ καταφυγὴν τῶν συμπάντων εἶναι αὐτὸν, καὶ ἐπείδηπερ αὐτός ἐστι χώρα αὐτοῦ, κέχωρηκὼς ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἐμφερόμενος μόνῳ ἑαυτῷ, "God himself is called place, because he contains all things and is contained by nothing whatever, and because he is himself a refuge for all things, and is contained and filled by himself alone." He further illustrates his opinion by a comparison between God and men: Ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ εἰμὶ τόπος, ἀλλ' ἐν τόπῳ, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ὁμοίως· τὸ γὰρ περιεχόμενον διαφέρει τοῦ περιέχοντος· τὸ δὲ θεῖον ὑπ' οὐδένος περιεχόμενον ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τόπος ἑαυτοῦ, "I am not place, but in place, as likewise are all things. For the contained differs from the containing: but the divinity being contained by nothing is necessarily his own place." If these words have any meaning at all, they signify that God is that space which surrounds and encompasses the whole nature of things. In another place he asserts that heaven is bounded by God, or that God is the boundary of heaven, in his book Quis Rerum Divinarum Hæres, p. 512. Ὁ δὲ οὐρανὸς——ἀπειρομεγέθης ἐστὶ——ἐστὶ δὲ ὅρος αὐτοῦ ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ ἡνίοχος καὶ κυβερνήτης· ὥσπερ οὖν ἀπερίληπτον τὸ ὄν, οὕτως καὶ τὸ ὁριζόμενον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ μέτροις τοῖς εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν ἐπίνοιαν ἥκουσιν οὐ μετρεῖται, "Heaven——is of infinite magnitude——but God is its boundary, and ruler and governor. Therefore, as being is itself incomprehensible, so also that which is bounded by it is not measured by measures coming within our knowledge." The sense of which is evidently that heaven is not co-extensive with God himself: whence it necessarily follows that the divine nature extends through and pervades the whole region of heaven. Nor do the words of Philo here quoted by Dr. Cudworth show him to have entertained any other opinion: which in my judgment contain nothing more than what might easily be assented to by those who hold God to be space or in space. "God," says Philo, "is every where, and nowhere." "He is nowhere," that is, he is included and contained in no certain place: which all will acknowledge even who deny God to be different from infinite space, as they distinguish between place and space. They certainly are very much deceived who suppose that all the ancients who denied God to be in place, or asserted him to be nowhere, divested the supreme Being of all extension and concretion. Tertullian notoriously attributed extension to God, nay, held him in a certain respect to be corporeal: and yet he denies him to be in place, Contra Praxeam, cap. 16. p. 355. "God holds the whole world in his hand, like a nest, whose throne is heaven and footstool earth. *In him is all place, and he is not in place*, being the extreme limit of the universe." But according to Philo, God is also *every where*: which in like manner is admitted by all who maintain God to be extended. And Philo himself, a little after the words here in question, openly asserts that God is a nature distributed and passing through all parts of the universe, p. 340. Θεὸς ἐγκεκόλπισται τὰ ὅλα καὶ διὰ τῶν τοῦ παντὸς μερῶν διελήλυθε, "God contains all things in his bosom, and passes through all the parts of the universe." I am aware that the expressions of the ancients on the immensity and omnipresence of God are sometimes not to be taken too strictly, and that many of them thought more wisely and correctly on this subject than they spoke. The doctrine I confess is both abstruse and recondite in itself, and of a nature that will scarcely admit of being properly stated and explained in human language. Whatever you may say, another, if he feels disposed, will be able so to explain, as to make you apply to God what is proper to bodies alone. Nor have the divine fathers themselves employed any other phrases than those borrowed from human things: which has been a manifest source of error to many both of ancient and modern times. But Philo, I consider, has declared his sentiments so clearly and openly that no one can doubt his having entertained the opinion ascribed to him.

[9] Let it not be supposed, however, that wherever Plotinus is discoursing of an

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stance incorporeal, which consequently, is ἄποσος and ἀμεγέθης, and ἀμερὴς, devoid of quantity, and of magnitude, and of parts, locally distant from one another; ὃ ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ οὐσίᾳ τὸ ποσὸν εἶναι ὑπερβέβηκεν, "it having in its nature transcended the imperfection of quantity." And who hath also written two whole books[10] upon this very subject: Τὸ ὂν ἓν καὶ ταυτὸν ἀριθμῷ ἅμα πανταχοῦ εἶναι ὅλον, "That one and the self-same numerical thing may be all of it entirely every where." Wherein his principal design was to prove, that "the Deity is not part of it here, and part of it there;" and so much thereof in one place, and so much in another, (as if the very substance of it were mensurable by yards and poles:) but the whole undivided Deity every where: Πρὸ τῶν ἐν τόπῳ ἁπάντων (saith he) "God is before all things, that are in a place."[1] And[2] θαυμάζειν οὐ δεῖ, εἰ αὐτὸ μὴ ὂν ἐν τόπῳ, παντὶ τῷ ἐν τόπῳ ὄντι, ὅλως πάρεστι, φησὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος, ὡς ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ τόπον οὐκ εἰληχότι, ᾧ πάρεστι, τοῦτῳ ὅλον παρεῖναι, "It is not at all to be wondered at, that God, being not in a place, should be present to every thing, that is in a place, wholly and entirely; reason pronouncing, that he, having no place, must therefore of necessity be ὅλως, all of him indivisibly present to whatsoever he is present." Neither is this, saith he, a thing only deduced by reason, but that which is before reason, suggested by the instincts of mankind:[3] Τὸ ἓν καὶ ταυτὸν ἀριθμῷ, πανταχοῦ ἅμα ὅλον εἶναι, κοινὴ ἔννοια φησὶν εἶναι, ὅταν πάντες κινούμενοι αὐτοφυῶς λέγωσι, τὸν ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν Θεὸν, ὡς ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν, "That one and the same numerical substance (to wit of the Deity) is at once entirely everywhere, is agreeable to the common notions, as sentiments of mankind,

indivisible nature, destitute of parts, quantity, and quality, God and the soul are always to be understood. For in some places, the nature we have alluded to is no other than matter of which we have spoken above. See his book Περὶ ὕλης, and another in which he proves ἀσώματα, or incorporeal things, to be impassible.

[10] These two books are the fourth and fifth of the sixth Ennead. opp. Plotini. Dr. Cudworth, writing from memory, has expressed their title inaccurately: for they are thus inscribed: Περὶ τοῦ τὸ ὂν ἓν καὶ ταυτὸ ὂν ἅμα πανταχοῦ εἶναι ὅλον. But in both these books, as almost every where, the philosopher discourses on the subject so subtly and acutely, that great attention is required in order to ascertain his meaning. And the difficulty is increased by the language he makes use of in common with other Platonists, which approaches closely to the poetic, and is, as it were, intermediate between prose and poetry. Indeed, the style employed by most of the junior Platonists has caused many to interpret their opinions erroneously, and to apply what is said of mental notions and abstract forms to really existent things.

[1] These words are used by Plotinus not of God himself, as Dr. Cudworth's version implies, but of the soul of the world.

[2] Namely, in the former of the books written by him upon this argument, cap. 3. p. 647. It must be observed, however, that the passage is not read in Plotinus as here quoted. For after ὅλως πάρεστι many words intervene in explanation of this subject.

[3] With these words Plotinus begins the latter of the two books from which these testimonies are adduced, p. 660. The argument comprised in them is similar to that which the ancient Christian fathers are accustomed to draw *from the testimony of the soul*, to prove that there is only one God.

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when we do so often by the instincts of nature speak of that God who is in every one of us, supposing him to be one and the same in all." Where the philosopher subjoins: Καὶ ἔστι πάντων βεβαιοτάτη ἀρχὴ, ἣν ὥσπερ αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν φθέγγονται, &c., "And this is the firmest of all principles, that which our souls do, as it were, naturally and of themselves speak; and which is not collected by reason, but comes forth from them before ratiocination." Moreover he often affirmeth of the human soul, or rather takes it as a thing for granted, that this is the whole or all of it, in every part of the body, that is, undividedly:[4] Ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ αὐτὸ ἀριθμῷ, τὸ ἐν τῷ ποδὶ, καὶ τῇ χειρὶ ὑπάρχει, "As for the human soul, it is one and the same numerically in the hand and in the foot." And again: Εἶτα πῶς ἐν ποδὶ καὶ χειρὶ τὴν αὐτὴν, τὴν δὲ ἐν τῷ δὲ μέρει τοῦ παντὸς οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν τὴν ἐν τῷδε; "Since we commonly suppose our own soul to be the same, both in our foot and in our hand, why should we not in like manner, acknowledge that of the mundane soul or Deity," which is in one part of the universe, to be the same with that in another? In like manner, Simplicius[5] proving that body is not the first principle, because there must of necessity be something self-moving, and what is so, must needs be incorporeal, writeth thus: Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἀμερὲς εὐθὺς ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ ἀδιάστατον, μεριστὸν γὰρ καὶ διαστατὸν ὑπάρχον, οὐ δύναται ὅλον ὅλῳ ἑαυτῷ ἐφαρμόττειν, ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἶναι κινοῦν, καὶ ὅλον τὸ αὐτὸ κινούμενον, "Because what is such, must of necessity be indivisible and indistant; for were it divisible and distant, it could not all of it be conjoined with its whole self; so that the whole should both actively move, and be moved." Which same thing seems further evident in the soul's being all conscious of itself, and reflexive of its whole self; which could not be, were one part of it distant from another. Again, the same philosopher expressly denieth the soul, though a self-moving substance, to be at all locally moved, otherwise than by accident, in respect of the body, which is moved by it: Οὐ τὰς σωματικὰς κινούμενον κινήσεις (κατὰ γὰρ ἐκείνας ἀκίνητόν ἐστι) ἀλλὰ τὰς ψυχικὰς, αἷς ὀνόματά ἐστι σκοπεῖσθαι, βουλεύεσθαι, διανοεῖν, δοξάζειν, κινεῖ τὰ σώματα κατὰ τὰς σωματικὰς κινήσεις, "The soul, being not moved by corporeal or local motions, (for in respect of these it is immoveable) but by cogitative ones only, (the names whereof are Consultation and Deliberation, &c.) by these moveth bodies locally." And that this was really Plato's meaning also, when he determined the soul to be a self-moving substance, and the cause of all bodily

[4] If I am not mistaken this dogma is not to be found expressed in these words in the books of Plotinus, from which these passages are quoted. I should suppose that the learned Doctor elicited it from the passage which follows, in which it is evidently contained. But this latter passage occurs in the former book, cap. 6. p. 649.

[5] Comment. in Aristot. Libros de Anima, loc. supra indic. fol. 7.

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motion; that moving itself in a way of cogitation, it moved bodies locally, (notwithstanding that Aristotle would not take notice of it) sufficiently appears from his own words, and is acknowledged by the Greek scholiasts themselves[6] upon Aristotle's De Anima. Thus again Simplicius elsewhere: Ἐπεὶ δ' οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ ψυχὴ, οὐδ' ἂν κινοῖτο, τὰς τῶν ἐν τόπῳ ὄντων κινήσεις, "Since the soul is not in a place, it is not capable of any local motion."

We should omit the testimonies of any more philosophers, were it not that we find Porphyrius so full and express herein, who makes this the very beginning of his ἀφορμαὶ πρὸς τὰ

[6] I am aware that the later Platonists, some of whom wrote scholia upon Aristotle's books De Anima, in expounding the meaning of Plato, represent him as having discarded all *corporeal* or *local* motion from the soul, and having left it only such motion as is suited to rational souls, namely, cogitation, deliberation, ratiocination, and the like: but I know also that they are accustomed to attribute many things to Plato to which he was wholly opposed, and in defiance of all truth to accommodate his doctrine to the rule and standard of philosophy invented by themselves. I cannot see indeed how it can be proved that the dogma put forth by Plato in his Phædrus, tenth book De Legibus, and elsewhere, of the soul's being moved not by any thing external, but by its own inherent virtue, ought to be understood in the sense attached to it by Dr. Cudworth on the authority of the later Platonists. On the contrary, as Plato ascribed extension to the soul, which we have shown a little above to be the case, he could not help also attributing to it such a motion as belongs to extended natures. The passage of Plato, here appealed to by Dr. Cudworth in proof of his own position, is doubtless the one which occurs in the tenth book De Legibus, and which Simplicius, the interpreter of Aristotle's De Anima, has in part adopted as his own: Ἄγει μὲν δὴ ψυχὴ πάντα τὰ κατ' οὐρανὸν, καὶ γῆν, καὶ θάλατταν, ταῖς αὐτῆς κινήσεσιν, αἷς ὀνόματα ἐστὶ, βούλεσθαι, σκοπεῖσθαι, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, βουλεύεσθαι, δοξάζειν ὀρθῶς, ἐψευσμένως, χαίρουσαν, λυπουμένην, θάῤῥουσαν, φοβουμένην, μισοῦσαν, στέργουσαν, καὶ πάσαις ὅσαι τούτων συγγενεῖς ἡ πρωτουργαὶ κινήσεις, τὰς δευτερουργοὺς αὖ παραλαμβάνουσι κινήσεις σωμάτων, ἄγουσι πάντα εἰς αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν, κ. τ. λ., "The soul leads all things in heaven, in earth, and in the sea by its own motions, the names whereof are volition, cogitation, care, consultation, true or false opinion, joy, sorrow, confidence, fear, hatred, love, and by all other motives which are kindred to these and primary, which also receiving the secondary motions of bodies, lead all things to increase and decrease, &c." But this passage, in my opinion, affords little support to the opinion of those who suppose Plato to have divested the soul of all exterior motion. For the philosopher is not expressly enumerating the kinds of motion which the soul partakes or is destitute of, but simply explaining in what way or by what kind of motion the soul of the world impels and excites bodies. Thus he shows that the soul, inherent in the whole body of the world, can by meditation, cogitation, and ratiocination, alone cause matter to obey and to assume or relinquish any particular form. But even here he is not sufficiently consistent. For a little afterwards, p. 670. when treating of the motion of the sun, he openly acknowledges his ignorance of the nature of the motion by which the soul moves the sun, although it is certain that its motion proceeds from some soul: It may be done he says in three ways, that is, it may either be in the sun, and give motion to that globe as our soul does to us, or it may be enclosed in some aerial or igneous body, and impel body by body, or lastly, it may move the sun from without in a manner unknown to us: but which of these three motions it employs he does not determine Now, how can this be reconciled with what he had said a little before, that the soul causes all motions of bodies by meditation, deliberation, and ratiocination alone? To confess the real truth: Plato is not a man whose opinion is always so clear and plain as to leave no room for doubt and difficulty. For the rest, the passage of Aristotle wherein he states that Plato attributed motion to the soul occurs in his De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 9. tom. 2. opp.

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νοητὰ, his "manuduction to intelligibles:" Πᾶν σῶμα ἐν τόπῳ, οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸ ἀσωμάτων ἐν τόπῳ, "That though every body be in a place, yet nothing that is properly incorporeal is in a place." And who afterwards further pursues it in this manner:* Οὐδὲ τοπικῶς διέρχεται τὸ ἀσώματον· ὅπου βούλεται· ὄγκῳ γὰρ συνυφίσταται τόπος· τὸ δ' ἄογκον παντελῶς καὶ ἀμέγεθες, ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ὄγκῳ ἀκράτητον, τοπικῆς τε κινήσεως ἄμοιρον, διαθέσει τοίνυν ποίᾳ ἐκεῖ εὑρίσκεται, ὅπου καὶ διάκειται· καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ φανερὰ ἡ παρουσία αὐτοῦ γίνεται, "Neither does that, which is incorporeal, move locally by will, place being relative only to magnitude and bulk. But that which is devoid of bulk and magnitude, is likewise devoid of local motion. Wherefore it is only present by a certain disposition and inclination of it to one thing more than another; nor is its presence there discernible otherwise than by its operations and effects." Again, concerning the three divine hypostases he writeth thus:† Ὁ Θεὸς πάνταχοῦ ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ, καὶ ὁ νοῦς πανταχοῦ ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ, καὶ ψυχὴ πανταχοῦ ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ, &c., "The supreme God is therefore every where, because he is nowhere; and the same is true also of the second and third divine hypostasis, Nous and Psyche. The supreme God is every where and nowhere, in respect of those things which are after him, and only his own, and in himself. Nous, or Intellect, is in the supreme God, every where and nowhere, as to those things that are after him. Psyche, or the mundane soul, is both in intellect and the supreme God, and every where and nowhere, as to bodies. Lastly, body is both in the soul of the world, and in God." Where he denies God to be locally in the corporeal world, and thinks it more proper to say, that the "corporeal world is in God, than God in it;" because the world is held and contained in the divine power, but the Deity is not in the locality of the world. Moreover, he further declares his sense after this manner:[7] Οὐδ' εἰ κενὸν οὖν τι ἐπινοηθείη ἀσώματον, ἐν κενῷ οἷόν τε εἶναι Νοῦν, σώματος μὲν γὰρ δεκτικὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ κενόν. Νοῦ δὲ ἐνέργειαν χωρῆσαι ἀμήχανον, καὶ τόπον δοῦναι ἐνεργείᾳ, "Nor, if there were conceived to be such an incorporeal space, or vacuum (as Democritus and Epicurus supposed) could Mind, or God, possibly exist in this empty space (as co-extended with the same) for this would be only receptive of bodies, but it could not receive the energy of mind or intellect, nor give any place or room to that, that being no bulky thing." And again:[8] Ὁ μὲν κόσμος ἐν τῷ νῷ διασ-

* Page 229. 230. [Sect. 28. ed. Cantab.] † Page 251.

[7] These words of Porphyry are extant in the Appendix Sententiarum sive Graduum ad Intelligibilia, first published by Luc. Holstenius from a MS. of Aloysius Lolinus, sect. 44. p. 278. ed. Cantabr.

[8] In the second part of his Sentent. ad Intelligibilia Ducentium, first published by Holstenius, sect. 35. p. 241. The words ἐν τῷ νῷ towards the beginning are a false reading for τῷ νοητῷ.

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τατικῶς πάρεστι, τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον τῷ κόσμῳ ἀμερῶς, καὶ ἀδιαστάτως· τὸ δὲ ἄμερες ἐν διαστατῷ ὅλον γίνεται κατὰ πᾶν μέρος, ταυτὸν ὂν καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ· αὐτὸ ἀμερῶς πάρεστι καὶ ἀπληθύντως καὶ ἀτόπως, κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν, τῷ μεριστῷ, καὶ πεπληθυσμένῳ, καὶ ὄντι ἐν τόπῳ, "The corporeal world is distantly present to the intelligible (or the Deity); and that is indivisibly and indistantly present with the world. But when that which is indistant and unextended, is present with that which is distant and extended, then is the whole of the former one and the same numerically in every part of the latter. That is, it is indivisibly and unmultipliedly, and illocally there (according to its own nature) present with that which is naturally divisible, and multipliable, and in a place." Lastly, he affirmeth the same likewise of the human soul, that this is also οὐσία ἀμεγέθης, "a substance devoid of magnitude, and which is not locally present to this or that body, but by disposition and energy; and therefore the whole of it in every part thereof undividedly.[9]

And as for Christian writers, besides Origen, who was so famous an assertor of incorporeal substance, that (as Socrates[10] recordeth) the Egyptian monks and Anthropomorphites threatened death to Theophilus the Alexandrian bishop, unless he would at once execrate and renounce the writings of Origen, and profess the belief of a corporeal God of human form; and who also maintained incorporeal substance to be unextended,[1] as might be proved from sundry passages, both of his book against Celsus, and that Peri Archon; we say (besides Origen and others of the Greeks (St. Austin amongst the Latins clearly asserted the same; he maintaining in his book De Quantitate Animæ,[2] and elsewhere, concerning the human soul, that being

[9] I suppose he is alluding here to the definition of the soul which occurs Sententiar. par. 1. sect. 18. p. 225: Ἡ ψυχὴ, οὐσία ἀμεγέθης, ἄϋλος, ἄφθαρτος, ἐν ζωῇ παρ' ἑαυτῆς ἐχούσῃ τὸ ζῆν, κεκτημένη τὸ εἶναι, "The soul is a substance without magnitude or matter, imperishable, and possessing its essence in a life vital of itself."

[10] Histor. Ecclesiast. lib. 6. cap. 7. p. 310.

[1] I regret that Dr. Cudworth has not proved this by some passage or other from Origen. I do not deny that the fact is as he states: for he who had derived so many other things from the school of the Platonists might easily imbibe their precepts on the nature of the soul. After a careful perusal and examination however of all that learned men have collected from the writings of Origen, in illustration of his opinion on the soul, I feel by no means relieved of all doubt on this subject. I am aware he calls the soul ἀσώματος or incorporeal: but I am not convinced by this epithet that he divested it of all matter, much less of all extension. For the word is very vague and ambiguous among the ancient Christian authors, as well as among philosophers, and they very often call that incorporeal which at other times is termed corporeal: namely *incorporeal* as respects the grosser bodies of men and animals, but *corporeal* in regard to God, whom most of them held to be abstracted from all body. It is unnecessary to exemplify this by passages.

[2] Extant in tom. 1. opp. Augustini, ed. Benedictor. p. 298. &c. Add his Epistola 166. sect. 4. p. 444. where he explains more clearly the respective senses in which the soul may be called body and incorporeal. In his book De Quantitate Animæ, St. Augustine is disputing from Platonic precepts, to which he frequently ascribes more importance than they deserved, and consequently advances many things which will not

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incorporeal, it hath no dimensions of length, breadth and profundity, and is illocabilis, nowhere as in a place. We shall conclude with the testimony of Boetius, who was both a philosopher and a Christian: Quædam sunt (saith he[3]) communes animi conceptiones, per se notæ, apud sapientes tantum; ut incorporalia non esse in loco, "There are certain common conceptions, or notions of the mind, which are known by themselves amongst wise men only; as this for example, that incorporeals are in no place." From whence it is manifest, that the generality of reputed wise men were not formerly of this opinion, quod nusquam est, nihil est, "that what is nowhere, or in no certain place, is nothing;" and that this was not looked upon by them as a common notion, but only as a vulgar error.

By this time we have made it unquestionably evident, that this opinion of incorporeal substance being unextended, indistant, and devoid of magnitude, is no novel or recent thing, nor first started in the scholastic age;[4] but that it was the general persuasion of the most ancient and learned assertors of incorporeal substance, especially that the Deity was not part of it here, and part of it there, nor the substance thereof mensurable by yards and poles, as if there were so much of it contained in one room, and so much and no more in another, according to their several dimensions; but that the whole undivided Deity was at once in every part of the world, and consequently nowhere locally after the manner of bodies. But, because this opinion seems so strange and paradoxical, and lies under so great prejudices, we shall in the next place show, how these ancient Incorporealists endeavoured to acquit themselves, in repelling the several efforts and plausibilities made against it. The first whereof is this, that to suppose incorporeal substances unextended and divisible is to make them absolute parvitudes, and by means of that, to render them all (even the Deity itself) contemptible: since they

be admitted by all those who philosophize upon sound and legitimate principles. Whoever therefore wishes to read this book with advantage must separate St. Augustine's own opinion from the arguments by which he supports it.

[3] Dr. Cudworth has quoted this testimony of Boetius from memory, and on that account has not given the exact words. In Boetius' book entitled Quomodo Substantiæ in eo, quod sint, bonæ sint, cum non sint substantialia bona, p. 167. the passage runs thus: Alia (enunciatio) est doctorum tantum, quæ tamen ex talibus communis animi conceptionibus venit, ut est, quæ incorporalia sunt, in loco non esse, et cætera: quæ non vulgus, sed docti comprobant, "There is another proposition of the learned only, which comes however from such common conceptions of the mind, as for example, that incorporeals are not in place, &c. which is admitted not by the vulgar but by the learned." As St. Augustine and Boetius were the common teachers of the Latins in succeeding centuries, it is not difficult to understand therefore from what source this opinion was derived by all the more able and erudite fathers that lived after them.

[4] Hobbes and not a few others besides him ranked this doctrine of unextended natures and of God and the soul being devoid of all extension, among those dogmas which owed their origin to the too great sagacity of the scholastic doctors: in which they were unquestionably mistaken.

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must of necessity be either physical minimums, that cannot actually be divided further by reason of their littleness (if there be any such thing) or else mere mathematical points, which are not so much as mentally divisible: so that thousands of these incorporeal substances, or spirits, might dance together at once upon a needle's point. To which it was long since thus replied by Plotinus:* Οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ἀμερὲς ὡς μικρόν· οὕτω γὰρ οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ μεριστὸν ἔσται· καὶ οὐ παντὶ αὐτὸ ἐφαρμόσει· οὐδ' ἂν αὐξομένῳ τὸ αὐτὸ συνέσται· ἀλλ' οὐδ' οὕτως ὡς σημεῖον, οὐ γὰρ ἓν σημεῖον ὁ ὄγκος, ἀλλ' ἄπειρα ἐν αὐτῷ οὐδ' ὡς ἐφαρμόσει, "God, and all other incorporeal substances, are not so indivisible, as if they were parvitudes or little things, as physical points; for so would they still be mathematically divisible; nor yet as if they were mathematical points neither, which indeed are no bodies nor substances, but only the termini of a line. And neither of these ways could the Deity congruere with the world; nor souls with their respective bodies, so as to be all present with the whole of them."[5] Again, he writeth particularly concerning the Deity thus:† Οὔτε οὕτως ἀμερὲς, ὡς τὸ σμικρώτατον, μέγιστον γὰρ ἁπάντων, οὐ μεγέθει, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει·——ληπτέον δὲ καὶ ἄπειρον αὐτὸν, οὐ τῷ ἀδιεξιτήτῳ, ἢ τοῦ μεγέθους, ἢ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπερι-λήπτῳ τῆς δυνάμεως, "God is not so indivisible as if he were the smallest or least of things, for he is the greatest of all, not in respect of magnitude, but of power. Moreover, as he is indivisible, so is he also to be acknowledged infinite; not as if he were a magnitude, or a number, which could never be past through, but because his power is incomprehensible." Moreover, the same philosopher condemneth this for a vulgar error, proceeding from sense and imagination, that whatsoever is unextended, and indistant, must therefore needs be little; he affirming, on the contrary, the vulgar to be much mistaken, as to true greatness and littleness:‡ Μέγα νομίζοντες τὸ αἰσθητὸν, ἀποροῦμεν πῶς ἐν μεγάλῳ καὶ τοσούτῳ ἐκείνη ἡ φύσις ἐκτείνεται· τὸ δὲ ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ λεγόμενον μέγα μικρόν· ὃ δὲ νομίζεται μικρὸν εἶναι μέγα· ἐπεὶ ὅλον ἐπὶ πᾶν τούτου μέρος φθάνει, μᾶλλον δὲ

* Page 656. [Ennead. 6. lib. 4. cap. 13.]

[5] Dr. Cudworth's translation of this passage, it is evident, does not correspond to Plotinus' words, but is a somewhat free interpretation of them, although on the whole sufficiently in accordance with the author's meaning. He has, moreover, not adduced the whole passage, but made several omissions. In order fully to comprehend its force, it will be necessary to ascertain first of all what the ancient philosophers meant by μικρὸν and σημεῖον. Μικρὸν is the *point*, and σημεῖον the *sign* of the Latins. We shall give the definition of each in the words of St. Augustine from his book De Quantitate Animæ, cap. 11. sect. 18. p. 303. tom. 1. opp. "It is called a point when it is in the middle of a figure: but if it is the beginning of a line or lines, or even the end, or simply denotes any thing understood to be without parts and is not in the middle of a figure, it is called a sign. But a point is a mark in the middle of a figure. Consequently every point is also a sign but not every sign a point."

† Page 764. [Ennead 6. lib. 9.] ‡ Page 645. [Ennead. 6. lib. 4. cap. 2.]

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τοῦτο πανταχόθεν τοῖς αὐτοῦ μέρεσιν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο ἰὸν εὑρίσκει αὐτὸ πανταχοῦ πᾶν καὶ μεῖζον ἑαυτοῦ, "We commonly, looking upon this sensible world as great, wonder how that (indivisible and unextended) nature of the Deity can every where comply, and be present with it. Whereas that which is vulgarly called great, is indeed little; and that which is thus imagined to be little, is indeed great. Forasmuch as the whole of this diffuseth itself through every part of the other; or rather, this whole corporeal universe, in every one of its parts, findeth that whole and entire, and therefore greater than itself." To the same purpose also Porphyrius:* Τὸ ὄντως ὂν οὔτε μέγα, οὔτε μικρόν ἐστι· (τὸ γὰρ μέγα καὶ μικρὸν κυρίως ὄγκου ἴδια) ἐκβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ μικρόν· καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ μέγιστον καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ ἐλάχιστον, ταυτὸ καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὄν· εἰ καὶ εὑρίσκεται ἅμα ὑπὸ παντὸς μεγίστου, καὶ ὑπὸ παντὸς ἐλαχίστου εὑρισκόμενον· μήτε ἄρα ὡς μέγιστον αὐτὸ ὑπονοήσεις· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπορήσεις, πῶς μέγιστον ὂν τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις ὄγκοις πάρεστι, μὴ μειωθὲν, ἢ συσταλέν· μήτε ὡς ἐλάχιστον, εἰ δὲ μή, πάλιν ἀπορήσεις, πῶς ἐλάχιστον ὂν τοῖς μεγίστοις ὄγκοις πάρεστι, μὴ πολλαπλασιαθὲν, ἢ αὐξηθὲν, "The Deity, which is the only true Being, is neither great nor little (forasmuch as great and little properly belong to corporeal bulk or magnitude); but it exceedeth both the greatness of every thing that is great, and the littleness of whatsoever is little (it being more indivisible, and more one with itself, than any thing that is little, and more powerful than any thing that is great); so that it is above both the greatest and the least; it being found all one and the same by every greatest and every smallest thing participating thereof. Wherefore you must neither look upon God as the greatest thing (that is, in a way of quantity) for then you may well doubt, how being the greatest, he can be all of him present with every least thing, neither diminished, nor contracted; nor yet must you look upon him as the least thing neither; for if you do so, then will you be at a loss again, how, being the least thing, he can be present with all the greatest bulks; neither multiplied, nor augmented." In a word, the sum of their answer amounts to this, that an incorporeal unextended Deity is neither a physical point, because this hath distance in it, and is mentally divisible; nor yet a mathematical one, because this, though having neither magnitude nor substance in it, hath, notwithstanding, site and position; a point being, according to Aristotle,[6] a monad having site and position. It is not to be conceived as a parvitude, or very little thing, because then it could not congruere with all the greatest things; nor yet as a great thing, in a way

* Sent. p. 243. [Sect. 36.]

[6] De Anima, lib. 2. cap. 6. p. 13. Στιγμὴ μονάς ἐστι, θέσιν ἔχουσα. Add Metaphysicor, lib. 13. cap. 12. p. 471. tom. 4. opp. where he explains in what way a point differs from a monad.

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of quantity and extension; because then it could not be all of it present to every least thing. Nor does true greatness consist in a way of bulk or magnitude, all magnitude being but little; since there can be no infinite magnitude, and no finite magnitude can have infinite power, as Aristotle before urged. And to conclude, though some, who are far from Atheists, may make themselves merry with that conceit of "thousands of spirits dancing at once upon a needle's point;" and though the Atheists may endeavour to rogue and ridicule all incorporeal substance in that manner, yet does this run upon a clear mistake of the hypothesis, and make nothing at all against it; forasmuch as an unextended substance is neither any parvitude, as is here supposed (because it hath no magnitude at all), nor hath it any place, or site, or local motion, properly belonging to it; and therefore can neither dance upon a needle's point nor any where else.

But in the next place, it is further objected, that what is neither great nor little, what possesses no space, and hath no place nor site amongst bodies, must therefore needs be an absolute nonentity, forasmuch as magnitude or extension are the very essence of being or entity, as such; so that there can be neither substance, nor accident unextended. Now, since whatsoever is extended, is bodily, there can therefore be no other substance, besides body, nor any thing incorporeal, otherwise than as that word may be taken for a thin and subtle body; in which sense fire was, by some in Aristotle,[7] said to be, *μάλιστα τῶν στοιχείων ἀσώματον*, and *ἀσωματώτατον*, "the most incorporeal of all the elements;" and Aristotle[8] himself useth the word in the same manner, when he affirmeth, that all philosophers did define the soul by three things, motion, sense, and incorporeity; several of those, there mentioned by him, under-

[7] De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 6. tom. 2. opp.

[8] De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 7. tom. 2. Were I disposed to be prolix I might here quote a vast number of passages from ancient authors, both Christian and profane, in which the word *ἀσώματος* is used in this sense: but I have already repeatedly produced testimonies of the kind. I shall, however, briefly point out the various senses in which it occurs among the ancient philosophers. In the first place they call that *ἀσώματος* which is imperceptible to the sense, and known and comprehended by the mind alone. This is a frequent meaning with the Platonists, who apply the term to ideas, or the species and forms of things, to the faculties of the mind, and to virtues and perfections; the whole of which, however, although the Platonists speak of them as self-existent natures, are, abstractedly considered, nowhere but in our own minds. Secondly, that is termed *ἀσώματος* which is destitute of form and quality, though in other respects consisting of undigested, rude, and gross matter; in this sense many called *ὕλη incorporeal*, on which subject we have already spoken above. Thirdly, they designated by this name whatever consisted of most slight and subtle particles. Thus many of the ancients asserted fire and air to be incorporeal. Not a few of the early Christian fathers also might be instanced, as St. Basil and others, who, although holding the angels to possess bodies, nevertheless call them *ἀσώματοι*, or incorporeal, in reference, namely, to our own terrestrial and concrete bodies. Lastly, the Platonists in particular apply this word to natures altogether free from bodily concretion, and in no respect susceptible of extension.

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standing the soul to be no otherwise incorporeal, than as σῶμα λεπτομερὲς, "a thin and subtle body." In answer to which objection, we may remember, that Plato, in the passage before cited, declareth this to be but a vulgar error, that whatsoever doth not take up space, and is in no place, is nothing. He intimating the original hereof to have sprung from men's adhering too much to those lower faculties of sense and imagination, which are able to conceive nothing, but what is corporeal.[9] And accordingly Plotinus;* Ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις, ᾗ προσέχοντες ἀπιστοῦμεν τοῖς λεγομένοις, λέγει ὅτι ὧδε καὶ ὧδε· ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ ὧδε καὶ ὧδε φησὶν, οὐκ ἐκταθεῖσαν ὧδε καὶ ὧδε γεγονέναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκταθὲν πᾶν αὐτοῦ μετειληφέναι, ὄντος ἀδιαστάτου αὐτοῦ, "Sense indeed, which we attending to, disbelieve these things, tells us of here and there; but reason dictates, that here and there is so to be understood of the Deity, not as if it were extendedly here and there, but because every extended thing, and the several parts of the world, partake every where of that, being indistant and unextended." To the same purpose Porphyrius:† Δεῖ τοίνυν ἐν ταῖς σκέψεσι κατακρατοῦντας τῆς ἑκατέρου ἰδιότητος μὴ ἐπαλλάττειν τὰς φύσεις· μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ προσόντα τοῖς σώμασιν, ἢ τοιαῦτα, μὴ φαντάζεσται καὶ δοξάζειν περὶ τὸ ἀσώματον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ σωμάτων, ἐν συνηθείᾳ πᾶς· ἐκείνων δὲ μόλις ἐν γνώσει γίνεται. ἀοριστῶν περὶ αὐτὰ, ἕως ἂν ὑπὸ φαντασίας κρατῆται, "We ought therefore, in our disquisitions concerning corporeal and incorporeal beings, to conserve the property of each, and not to confound their natures; but especially to take heed, that our fancy and imagination do not so far impose upon our judgments, as to make us attribute to incorporeals what properly belongeth to bodies only. For we are all accustomed to bodies; but as for incorporeals, scarcely any one reaches to the knowledge of them; men always fluctuating about them, and diffiding them, so long as they are held under the power of their imagination." Where afterwards he propoundeth a form for this, how we should think of incorporeals, so as not to confound their natures with corporeals: Ἐν ἀπείροις μέρεσι τοῦ διαστατοῦ παρὸν ὅλον τὸ ἀδιάστατον, οὔτε μερισθὲν πάρεστι, τῷ μέρει διδὸν μέρος, οὔτε πληθυνθὲν τῷ πλήθει παρέχειν ἑαυτὸ πόλλα πλησιασθὲν· ἀλλ' ὅλον πᾶσί τε τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ ὀγκωμένου, ἑνί τε ἑκάστῳ τοῦ πλήθους, ἀμερῶς καὶ ἀπληθύντως καὶ ὡς ἓν ἀριθμῷ· τὸ δὲ μερικῶς καὶ διῃρημένως ἀπολάυειν αὐτοῦ, "That the indistant and unextended Deity is the whole of it present in infinite parts of the distant world, neither divided, as applying part to part; nor yet multiplied into many wholes, according to the multiplicity of those things, that partake thereof. But the whole of it (one and

[9] See above, where this passage of Plato is quoted and illustrated with some observations.

* Page 656. † Ἀφ. p. 242.

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the same in number) is present to all the parts of the bulky world, and to every one of those many things in it, undividedly and unmultipliedly; that in the mean time partaking thereof dividedly." It was granted therefore by these ancients, that this unextended, and indistant nature of incorporeals is *ἀφάνταστον*, "a thing altogether unimaginable;" and this was concluded by them to be the only reason, why so many have pronounced it to be impossible, because they attended only to sense and imagination, and made them the only measure of things and truth; it having been accordingly maintained by divers of them (as Porphyrius tells us), that imagination and intellection are but two different names for one and the same thing:* *Ὀνόματος διαφορᾶς προστεθείσης τῇ τοῦ νοῦ ὑποστάσει, καὶ τῆς φαντασίας, ἡ γὰρ ἐν λογικῷ ζώῳ φαντασία δέδοκτο αὐτοῖς νόησις*, "There is a difference of names only, and no more, betwixt mind and fancy; fancy and imagination, in rational animals, seeming to be the same thing with intellection." But there are many things, which no man can have any phantasm or imagination of, and yet are they, notwithstanding, by all unquestionably acknowledged for entities, or realities; from whence it is plain, that we must have some other faculties in us, which extend beyond fancy and imagination. Reason indeed dictates, that whatsoever can either do, or suffer any thing, must therefore be undoubtedly something; but that whatsoever is unextended, and hath no distant parts one without another, must therefore needs be nothing, is no common notion, but the spurious suggestion of imagination only, and a vulgar error. There need to be no fear at all, lest a Being infinitely wise and powerful, which acts upon the whole world, and all the parts thereof, in framing and governing the same, should prove a nonentity, merely for want of bulk and extension; or, because it swells not out into space and distance, as bodies do, therefore vanish into nothing. Nor does active force and power, as such, depend upon bulk and extension; because then whatsoever had the greater bulk, would have the greater activity. There are therefore two kinds of substances in the universe; the first corporeal, which are nothing but *ὄγκοι*, "bulks," or "tumours," devoid of all self-active power; the second incorporeal, which are *ἄογκοι δυνάμεις*, "substantial powers, vigours, and activities;" which, though they act upon bulk and extension, yet are themselves unbulky, and devoid of quantity and dimensions; however, they have a certain *βάθος* in them in another sense,† an "essential profundity," according to this of Simplicius:[10] *Μεριστὴ μὲν*

* Page 224. Ἀφ. † In Ar. Phys. p. 3.

[10] I suppose Simplicius' meaning to be simply that the nature of what is cognizable to intelligence and reason alone, is difficult of comprehension to us, in the same way as the apostle St. Paul ascribes a certain *βάθος* to wisdom and the other divine perfections,

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ἁπλῶς ἡ σωμάτικὴ οὐσία πᾶσα, ἄλλων ἀλλαχοῦ τῶν μορίων κειμένων· ἀμέριστος δὲ εἰλικρινῶς ἡ νοερὰ, πολὺ δὲ βάθος ἔχουσα, "All corporeal substance is simply divisible, some parts of it being here and some there; but intellectual substance is indivisible, and without dimensions, though it hath much of depth and profundity in it in another sense." But that there is something ἀφαντάστον, "unimaginable," even in body itself, is evident, whether you will suppose it to be infinitely divisible or not, as you must of necessity suppose one or other of these. And that we ought not always to pronounce of corporeal things themselves according to imagination, is manifest from hence; because, though astronomical reasons assure us, that the sun is really more than a hundred times bigger than the whole earth, yet can we not possibly, for all that, imagine the sun of such a bigness, nor indeed the earth itself half so big, as we know it to be. The reason whereof is, partly because we never had a sense or sight of any such vast bigness at once, as that of either of them; and partly because our sense always representing the sun to us, but ὡς πεδιαῖον, "as of a foot diameter;"[1] and we being accustomed always to imagine the same according to the appearance of sense, are not able to frame any imagination of it, as very much bigger. Wherefore if imagination be not to be trusted, nor made the criterion, or measure of truth, as to sensible things themselves, much less ought it to be as to things insensible. Besides all which the ancient Incorporealists argued after this manner, that it is as difficult for us to conceive a substance, whose duration is unextended or unstretched out in time, into past, present, and future, and therefore without beginning; as that which is unextended as to parts, place or space, in length, breadth, and thickness; yet does reason pronounce, that there must needs be not only a duration without beginning, but also ἄχρονος αἰὼν, a "timeless eternity," or a permanent duration, differing from that successive flux of time (which is one of Plato's[2] γεννητὰ, "things generated," or that had a beginning), this parity of reason is by Plotinus thus insisted on:*[3] Διὸ οὐδὲ

Rom. xi. 33. If, as the learned Doctor supposes, he understood any thing else by this term, and intended to denote some natural property of incorporeal things, he would not, if he were alive, be himself able to explain his own meaning to us in clear and perspicuous words.

[1] He imitates the words of Cicero, Academ. Quæst. lib. 4. cap. 26. p. 2294. tom. 8. opp. Quid potest esse sole majus? quem mathematici amplius duodeviginti partibus confirmant majorem esse, quam terram: quantulus nobis videtur? mihi quidem quasi pedalis, "What can be greater than the sun? which mathematicians assert to be eighteen times larger than the earth: of what size does it appear to us to be? to me indeed about a foot in diameter."

[2] In Timæo, p. 529. opp.

* Page 669. [Ennead. 6. lib. 5. cap. 11.]

[3] Dr. Cudworth has given a paraphrastic interpretation rather than a translation of these words of Plotinus.

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ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀλλὰ παντὸς χρόνου ἔξω, τοῦ μὲν χρόνου σκιδναμένου αἰεὶ πρὸς διάστασιν, τοῦδ' αἰῶνος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μένοντος καὶ κρατοῦντος, καὶ πλείονος ὄντος δυνάμει ἀϊδίῳ, τοῦ ἐπὶ πολλὰ δοκοῦντος ἰέναι χρόνου, "For the same reason, that we deny local extension to the Deity, must we also deny temporal distance to the same; and affirm, that God is not in time, but above time, in eternity. Forasmuch as time is always scattered and stretched out in length and distance, one moment following after another; but eternity remaineth in the same, without any flux, and yet nevertheless outgoeth time, and transcendeth the flux thereof, though seeming to be stretched and spun out more into length." Now, the reason why we cannot frame a conception of such a timeless eternity, is only because ourselves are essentially involved in time, and accordingly are our conceptions chained, fettered and confined to that narrow and dark dungeon, that ourselves are imprisoned in; notwithstanding which, our freer faculties, assuring us of the existence of a being, which far transcendeth ourselves, to wit, one that is infinitely perfect; we have, by means hereof, μαντείαν τινὰ, "a certain vaticination," of such a standing timeless eternity, as its duration.

But as for that conceit, of immaterial or incorporeal bodies, or that God, and human souls are no otherwise incorporeal than as σῶμα λεπτομερὲς, "a thin and subtle body," such as wind or vapour, air or ether; it is certain that, according to the principles of the most ancient atomic philosophy (before it was atheized) there being no such real quality of subtlety or tenuity (because this is altogether unintelligible) but this difference arising wholly from motion, dividing the insensible parts, and every way agitating the same, together with a certain contexture of those parts; it is not impossible, but that the finest and most subtle body that is, might become as gross, hard, heavy, and opaque, as flesh, earth, stones, lead, or iron; and again, that the grossest of these bodies, by motion, and a different contexture of parts, might not only be crystalized, but also become as thin, soft, and fluid as the finest ether. So that there is no specific difference betwixt a thick and thin, a gross and fine, an opaque and pellucid, an hard and soft body, but accidental only; and therefore is there no reason why life and understanding should be thought to belong to the one rather than to the other of them. Besides which, the reasons of the ancient Incorporealists (afterwards to be produced) will evince, that the human soul and mind cannot possibly be any body whatsoever, though never so fine, thin, and subtle, whose parts are by motion dividable, and separable from one another.[4]

[4] I am by no means disposed to become the advocate of those who hold souls and spirits to be most subtle bodies; yet I think I may be permitted to express my doubts, whether this argument, borrowed from the atomic philosophy, will effectually silence

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But it is further objected against this unextended nature, of incorporeal substances, as they are said to be all in the whole, and all in every part of that body, which they are united into,

them. This sect will perhaps grant it to be the case with natural bodies, that they may be increased or diminished, become gross or thin, according to the different contexture of the particles they are composed of; but will deny the possibility of founding any argument upon this against themselves. For that far different is the nature of celestial and ethereal bodies; which always continue such as they were made at the beginning, and are not subject to any change or assume any other form, but ever remain in the same individual state. Such being the case, the whole controversy will be reduced to this question: Whether it is repugnant to reason and the nature of things, that there should be corporeal natures, that is, consisting of a certain matter, endowed with a certain form, extended and therefore included in a certain space, and lastly, moveable; but at the same time so thin and subtle that they are imperceptible to the senses, can be separated by no force, admit of no increase or diminution, and are destructible by nothing short of infinite power. Those who hold the souls of men, and good as well as evil genii, to be corporeal, see nothing contradictory in this opinion; and in this they have the fellowship and concurrence of an immense host both of ancient and modern philosophers. Whoever supposed God to resemble the nature of fire, or to be a soul pervading the whole universe, or the souls of men to be either igneous or ethereal, and at the same time immortal, or souls to be compounded of the various elements and yet incapable of perishing, all maintained the existence of bodies, or, if you will, a celestial matter of the kind, against which no force whatever is of any avail. And how vast is the multitude of these? I speak not now of the heaven of the Peripatetics which is devoid of all conversion and change, although extended and corporeal. Even those Platonists themselves, who in times past contended with so much zeal for the existence of unextended natures, seem to me to be not very far from this opinion. For one of the tenets of the major part at least of these philosophers is, that a certain body is united with every soul and demon, but much more thin, slight, and fine than our bodies, and bearing a sort of resemblance in its subtlety to fire, light, and ether. The learned Doctor himself seems to lean to the opinion, which was more openly avowed by his friend Dr. Henry More. As this body, according to the doctrine of this sect, perpetually adheres to souls and demons, and is utterly incapable of being separated from them, it is necessarily as immortal, immutable, eternal, and constant as the natures, themselves that are invested with it. Hierocles, Comm. in Aurea Carmina Pythagoræ, p. 213.: Ὁ ἄνθρωπος ψυχὴ λογικὴ μετὰ συμφυοῦς ἀθανάτου σώματος, "Man is a rational soul with a congenerate immortal body." These philosophers, therefore, not only acknowledge bodies, more gross or subtle of their own nature, but also maintain that there is a substance consisting of parts, included in space, extended, in a word, corporeal, and yet at the same time indivisible and perennial, and susceptible of injury from no power short of the divine. And I must frankly confess I do not consider this to belong to that class of opinions which are termed self-contradictory; nor, when I contemplate the infinite power of God, can I perceive any thing to prevent me from supposing that it is possible for him to create natures, in a certain respect corporeal, and yet so continuous and consistent, as not to admit of being changed, dissolved, or dissipated.

But those who deny souls and spirits to be bodies more slight and subtle than our own, will perhaps come into closer collision, and abandon the course pointed out by Dr. Cudworth. They will grant, in the first place, that it is possible for such natures as we have been speaking of to exist; but will then add, that this is by no means the point in dispute, which is simply, Whether spirits and souls are such natures; and that this is utterly impossible, because matter cannot be made to partake of thought and ratiocination. Liberius Fromondus, Philosophiæ Christianæ de Animo, lib. 14. cap. 2. p. 801. thus writes: "It would be necessary to insert into that soul another second soul; because that man discharges the vital functions, and especially those of intellect and will by means of another principle infused into matter." But they do not appear to me to gain much even by this argument. For they themselves acknowledge that the properties and virtues of that celestial and ethereal matter, from which their opponents suppose souls and spirits to be compounded, are wholly unknown to them. By what right therefore do they contend that a thing, the nature of which they are

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or act upon; that this is an absolute contradiction and impossibility, because if the whole of the Deity be in this one point of matter, then can there be nothing at all of it in the next adjoining, but that must needs be another whole, and nothing the same with the former. In like manner, if the whole human soul be in one part of this organized body, then can there be none at all of it in any other part thereof; and so not the whole in the whole. To which objection the ancient Incorporealists made this twofold reply. First, in way of concession, That this is indeed an absolute contradiction for an extended substance, or body, to be all of it in every one part of that space, which the whole occupieth. Thus Plotinus:* Σώματι ἀδύνατον ἐν πλείοσι τὸ αὐτὸ ὅλον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μέρος ὅπερ τὸ ὅλον ὑπάρχειν, "It is impossible for a body, or extended substance, to be one and the same, all of it in every part of that space, which it possesses; and for every part thereof, to be the same with the whole.† But, secondly, as for an unextended and indistant substance, which hath no parts one without another, it is so far from being a contradiction, that it should be all of it in every part of that body, which it acts upon; that it is impossible it should be otherwise, only a part in a part thereof, so that an equal quantity of both should co-exist together, because this is to suppose an unextended substance to be extended. We say it is contradictious to the nature of that substance, which is supposed to be, ἀμεγέθης, ἄποσος, ἀδιάστατος, ἀμερὴς, ἀδιαίρετος, "devoid of magnitude, and of quantity, and of parts indistant, and indivisible;" that it should be otherwise united to, or conjoined with an extended body, than after this way, which is looked upon as such conjuring; namely, that the whole of it should be

ignorant of, cannot become possessed of any particular perfection? While they syllogize in this manner: "Matter can neither reason, nor will, nor understand: human souls and spirits reason, will, and understand: therefore they cannot consist of matter and body;" they erroneously transfer the affections of this gross and terrestrial matter, the chief properties of which we know, to that celestial and aerial matter which is altogether distinct from our own. But it is vicious and illogical to confound things of a different kind, and from those that are more known to infer the nature and character of those that are unknown. If those who dispute about the nature of the soul were to adopt the course I should suggest, they would some of them display greater wisdom and accuracy in their controversies with each other. We are taught by the scriptures that the soul is a nature distinct and separate from all visible body, and at the same time perennial and immortal. Again, the notion of divine holiness and justice, which is implanted by nature herself in the minds of all men, proclaims that it is utterly impossible for the soul to be annihilated with the body. With these two truths we ought to rest content, and to defer the others to that time when, having put off this concrete and grosser body, we shall be made acquainted with the inmost recesses of things. But in our anxiety to know every thing, we measure ourselves by a standard not our own, and task our minds in the vain effort to investigate the internal nature of souls, and yet complain in the same breath that the subject is too abstruse and recondite. In attempts of which kind we are generally found wanting, and act as though we were familiar with the nature and relations of all created things, when scarcely the slightest portion of them is known to us.

* Ennead. 4. lib. 7. p. 460. † [See Beausobre, Hist. du Manich. p. 488.]

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present with, and act upon every part thereof. Thus Plotinus:* Οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἀλλότριον οὐδὲν, οὐδ' ἐκ τῆς ἑτέρας φύσεως ἑλκύσας, "This form of doctrine, concerning Incorporeals, is necessarily taken from the thing itself (viz. the nature of them as unextended) and hath nothing in it aliene from that essence, as confounding the corporeal nature therewith." Whatsoever is unextended and indistant, cannot possibly co-exist with an extended substance, point by point, and part by part, but it must of necessity be ὅλον ἓν καὶ ταυτὸν ἀριθμῷ, "All of it, one and the same numerically;" that is (like itself), undividedly, in every part of that which it acts upon. Wherefore the word ὅλον, in this form, when it is said, that the whole Deity is in every part of the world, and the whole soul in every part of the body, is not to be taken in a positive sense, for a whole consisting of parts, one without another, but in a negative only, for μὴ μεμερισμένον, "an whole undivided;" so that the meaning thereof is no more than this, that the Deity is not dividedly in the world, nor the soul dividedly in the body, a part here and a part there; but the Τὸ Θεῖον is πανταχοῦ ὅλον μὴ μεμερισμένον, "every where all of it, undividedly." Thus again Plotinus:† Εἰ οὖν πανταχοῦ θεὸς, οὐχ' οἷόν τε μεμερισμένον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι πανταχοῦ αὐτὸς εἴη, ἀλλ' ἕκαστον αὐτοῦ μέρος, τὸ μὲν ὧδι, τὸ δὲ ὧδι ἔσται, αὐτὸς οὐχ εἷς ἔτι ἔσται, ὥσπερ εἰ τμηθείη τι μέγεθος εἰς πολλὰ, καὶ τὰ μέρη πάντα, οὐκ ἔτι τὸ ὅλον ἐκεῖνο ἔσται· πρὸς τούτοις δὲ καὶ σῶμα· εἰ δὲ ταῦτα ἀδύνατα, πάλιν ἂν ἀνεφάνη τὸ ἀπιστούμενον, ἐν φύσει ἄνθρώπου, ὁμοῦ θεὸν νομίζειν καὶ πανταχοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὅλον εἶναι, "If therefore God be everywhere, it cannot possibly be, that he should be so dividedly; because then himself would not be everywhere, but only a part of him here, and a part of him there, throughout the whole world; himself being not one undivided thing. Moreover, this would be all one, as if a magnitude were cut and divided into many parts, every one of which parts could not be that whole magnitude. Lastly, this would be the very same as to make God a body." Now if these things be impossible, then must that so much disbelieved thing (looked upon as such a puzzling griphus, or rather as contradictious nonsense) be an undoubted truth, according to the common notions of mankind, that God is everywhere; to wit, that he is all of him the same whole, undividedly, everywhere. The sum of all is, that though it be an absolute contradiction for a body, or quantum, to be ὁμοῦ πᾶν, "all of it in every part" of that space, which the whole is in; yet it is no contradiction at all for an unextended and indistant being, to be all of it undividedly, in every part of that body it acts upon; but on the

* Page 662. † Ibid.

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contrary, it would be flatly contradictious to it to say, that it is only part of it in a part; this being to divide an indivisible thing into parts.

The fourth and last objection against incorporeal and unextended substance is from that illocality and immobility (which will follow thereupon) of human souls, and other finite particular spirits, such as demons or angels; that this is not only itself very absurd, to suppose these finite and particular beings to be thus illocal and immoveable, no where, and every where (from whence it would seem to follow that they might act the whole corporeal universe, or take cognizance of all things therein every where); but also, that this conceit is contradictious to the very principles of religionists themselves, and plainly confuted by the same; they acknowledging universally that human souls (at death) departing out of this body, do locally move from thence into a certain other place, called Hades, Hell, or Inferi. Now the latter part of this objection is first to be answered. And this is indeed a thing which the ancient assertors of incorporeal substance, as unextended, were not unaware of; that the vulgarly received tradition, of human souls (after death) going into Hades, might be objected against them. For the satisfying whereof Plotinus suggesteth these two things:* First, Τὸ μὲν εἰς Ἅϊδου γίνεσθαι, εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ Ἀϊδεῖ τὸ χώρις λέγεται, "That if by Hades be meant nothing but τὸ ἀειδές, the invisible (as many times it is), then is there no more signified by the soul's going into Hades, than its no longer being vitally united to this earthy body, and but acting apart by itself, and so hath it nothing of place necessarily included in it."[5] Secondly, Εἰ δέ τινα χείρω τόπον· τί θαυμαστόν; ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν οὗ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἐν τῷ τόπῳ κἀκείνη λέγεται ἐκεῖ· ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄντος ἔτι σώματος; ἢ τὸ εἴδωλον εἰ μὴ ἀποσπασθείη, πῶς οὐκ ἐκεῖ οὗ τὸ εἴδωλον, "But if by Hades be understood a certain worser place (as sometimes it also is), what wonder is this? since now where our body is, there in the same place is our soul said to be also? But you will reply, how can this be, when there is now no longer any body left? We answer, that if the idol of the soul be not quite separated from

* Ennead. lib. 4. [Cap. 16. p. 659.]

[5] This version is manifestly a very free and diffuse exposition of a few words of Plotinus; I consider however that Dr. Cudworth has expressed the philosopher's general meaning, although the whole of what is here given is by no means inculcated in the passage from which these words are extracted. In translating the passage which follows also he has taken greater liberty than the words will bear, and yet in my opinion has advanced nothing contrary to the doctrine of Plotinus. This author belongs to that class, whose words it is sometimes necessary not merely to translate but to explain in different and much more copious language, in order to render their real meaning clear and manifest. Which course his interpreter Marsilius Ficinus has very often neglected, and his version on that account is in many places extremely obscure and intricate, so as to be intelligible to those alone who are conversant with the discipline and diction of the Platonists.

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it, why should not the soul itself be said to be there also, where its idol is?" Where, by the idol of the soul, Plotinus seems to mean an airy or spirituous body, quickened and vitalized by the soul, adhering to it after death. But when the same philosopher supposes this very idol of the soul to be also separable from it, and that so as to subsist apart by itself too, this going alone into Hades, or the worser place, whilst that liveth only in the intelligible world (where there is no place or distance), lodged in the naked Deity, having nothing at all of body hanging about it, and being now not a part but the whole, and so situate neither here nor there; in this high flight of his, he is at once both absurdly paradoxical, in dividing the life of the soul as it were into two, and forgot the doctrine of his own school,[6] which, as himself elsewhere intimateth, was this:[7] Τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν τόδε

[6] What Dr. Cudworth here reprehends in Plotinus, and considers to be foreign to the doctrine of the Platonic school, is contained in these words of his which immediately follow the part here quoted: Εἰ δὲ παντελῶς λύσειε φιλοσοφία καὶ ἀπέλθοιτο εἴδωλον εἰς τὸν χείρω τόπον μόνον, αὐτὴ δὲ καθαρῶς ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, οὐδενὸς ἐξῳρημένου αὐτῆς, "But if philosophy should altogether set it free, the idol alone goes into a worse place; but the soul itself lives purely in the intelligible world, nothing being then taken out of it." But if I am not completely mistaken, Dr. Cudworth has here misrepresented the opinions of the ancients, especially the Platonists, on the image or idol of the soul, and is wrong in asserting that Plotinus forgot the doctrine of his own school, and that Porphyry therefore deserted his master. In my judgment Plotinus does not offend against the precepts of his sect, and Porphyry, so far from despising, strictly follows the discipline of his master. This I hope will be made manifest from what we shall observe below on this recondite dogma of the Platonists, a great portion of which was transferred to the Christians. But any error our learned author may happen to have committed here, is not to be imputed to him as a crime: for the obscurity of the Platonists is so great, and their subtleties so refined and abstruse, that even the most perspicacious may fail in exploring them, and before Dr. Cudworth those have frequently erred in expounding this dogma, who affected to appear the principal masters of the Platonic discipline: a fact which might be proved, if necessary, by the example of Ficinus and others.

[7] In this passage Plotinus does not intimate, as Dr. Cudworth here states, that the whole of the Platonic school held this among their precepts: that no soul is ever without body; but merely that τινὲς, some of them, maintained it. The soul of the world, he informs us, is not said to quit its body, as our soul is said to abandon our body: Οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἡ ἡμετέρη λέγεται καταλείπειν τὸ σῶμα, "For it (the soul of the world) is not said to quit its body in the same way as ours." After which he subjoins: Καίτοι τινὲς φασὶ τόδε μὲν σῶμα καταλείψειν, οὐ πάντη δὲ ἔξω σώματος ἔσεσθαι, "Although some say it will quit this body, but yet not be altogether out of body." If these words therefore be considered absolutely, the Platonists held two opinions on this subject. For while some supposed the soul on its departure from the body to be divested of all body whatever, others on the contrary maintained that some body always remains connected with the soul, notwithstanding its having put off this gross and earthy body, which is compounded of the elements of physical things. Plotinus himself appears disposed to assent to neither side: and yet whoever puts such a construction upon his words will in my opinion deviate from their meaning. The whole of the Platonists were agreed that the soul always possesses a certain celestial body, and that it is invested with such body when it descends into this concrete body, which it again takes away on its departure from it. What, then, does the philosopher mean? He seems to me to be speaking of that body alone which philosophers called εἴδωλον, when he tells us that some supposed the soul to be at no time entirely separated and freed from body. On this body, the nature of which we shall explain by and by, these philosophers were at variance with each other. Some main-

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μὲν σῶμα καταλείψειν, οὐ πάντη δὲ ἔξω σώματος ἔσεσθαι,* "That our soul, though it shall quit this body, yet shall it never be disunited from all body." Wherefore Porphyrius answering the same objection, though he were otherwise much addicted to Plotinus, and here uses his language too, yet does he in this depart from him, adhering to the ancient Pythagoric tradition; which, as will appear afterwards, was this, "That human souls are always united to some body or other."† Ὥσπερ τὸ ἐπὶ γῆς εἶναι ψυχῇ ἐστὶν, οὐ τὸ γῆς ἐπιβαίνειν, ὡς τὰ σώματα· τὸ δὲ προεστάναι σώματος, ὃ γῆς ἐπιβαίνει· οὕτω καὶ ἐν ᾅδου εἶναι ἐστὶ ψυχῇ, ὅταν προεστήκει εἰδώλου, φύσιν μὲν ἔχοντος εἶναι ἐν τόπῳ, σκότει δὲ τὴν ὑπόστασιν κεκτημένου· ὥστε εἰ ὁ Ἅιδης ὑπόγειός ἐστι τόπος σκοτεινὸς, ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν ᾅδου γίγνεται ἐφελκομένη τὸ εἴδωλον· ἐξελθούσῃ γὰρ αὐτῇ τοῦ στερεοῦ σώματος, τὸ Πνεῦμα συνομαρτεῖ, ὃ ἐκ τῶν σφαιρῶν συνελέξατο· ἐπεὶ δὲ διήκει τὸ βαρὺ πνεῦμα, καὶ ἔννγρον, ἄχρι τῶν ὑπογείων τόπων, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη λέγεται χωρεῖν ὑπὸ γῆν· οὐχ ὅτι ἡ αὐτὴ οὐσία μεταβαίνει τόπους, καὶ ἐν τόποις γίνεται· ἀλλ' ὅτι τῶν πεφυκότων σωμάτων, τόπους μεταβαίνειν, σχέσεις ἀναδέχεται, "As the soul's being here upon earth (saith he), is not its moving up and down upon it, after the manner of bodies, but its presiding over a body, which moveth upon the earth; so is its being in Hades nothing but its presiding over that idol, or enlivened vaporous body, whose nature it is to be in a place, and which is of a dark subsistence. Wherefore, if Hades be taken for a subterraneous and dark place, yet may the soul nevertheless be said to go into Hades, because when it quits this gross earthy body, a more spirituous and subtle body, collected from the spheres (or elements) doth still accompany it. Which spirit being moist and heavy, and naturally descending to the subterraneous places, the soul itself may be said in this sense to go under the earth also with it, not as if the substance thereof passed from one place to another, but because of its relation and vital union to a body which does so." Where Porphyrius addeth, contrary to the sense of Plotinus: "That the soul is never quite naked of all body, but hath always some body or other joined with it suitable and agreeable to its own present disposition (either a purer or impurer one). But that at its first quitting this gross earthy body, the spirituous body, which accompanieth it (as its vehicle), must needs go away fouled and incrassated with the gross vapours and steams thereof, till the soul afterwards by degrees purging itself, this becometh at length a dry splendour, which hath no misty obscurity, nor casteth any shadow."

tained that it can be completely put off, and by virtue of philosophy thoroughly expelled from the soul; while others denied this to be possible, and consequently supposed that the soul is never ἔξω σώματος, but is always associated with some form or other of this gross and earthy body.

* Ennead. 4. lib. 3. cap. 4. [Page 374.] † Ἀφ. p. 235.

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But because all this doctrine of the ancient Incorporealists, concerning the human soul's being always (after death) united to some body or other, is more fully declared by Philoponus than by any other that we have yet met withal, we shall here excerp some passages out of him about it. First, therefore, he declareth this for his own opinion, agreeable to the sense of the best philosophers:* Τὴν μὲν λογικὴν χωριστὴν, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον, τούτου μὲν χωριστὴν, ἄλλου μέντοι τινὸς σώματος ἀχώριστον, λέγω δὲ τοῦ Πνευματικοῦ, ἐστὶν ἀληθὴς δόξα, ὡς δείξομεν, "That the rational soul, as to its energy, is separable from all body; but the irrational part, or life thereof, is separable only from this gross body, and not from all body whatsoever, but hath (after death) a spirituous or airy body, in which it acteth; this I say is a true opinion, as shall be afterwards proved by us." And again: Ἡ δὲ ἄλογος οὐκ ἔτι ἐν τούτῳ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, ἐπιδιαμένει γὰρ καὶ μετὰ ἔξοδον τὴν ἐκ τούτου τῆς ψυχῆς· Ὄχημα καὶ Ὑποκείμενον ἔχουσα τὸ πνευματικὸν σῶμα· ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ ἔστι μὲν ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων, λέγεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πλεονάζοντος τοῦ ἀέρος· ὥσπερ καὶ τοῦτο γήϊνον λέγεται ἐκ τοῦ πλεονάζοντος, "The irrational life of the soul hath not all its being in this gross earthy body, but remaineth after the soul's departure out of it, having for its vehicle and subject, the spirituous body; which itself is also compounded out of the four elements, but receiveth its denomination from the predominant part, to wit, air; as this gross body of ours is called earthy from what is most predominant therein." Thus do we see that, according to Philoponus, the human soul, after death, does not merely exercise its rational powers, and think only of metaphysical and mathematical notions, abstract things, which are neither in time nor place, but exerciseth also its lower sensitive and irrational faculties, which it could not possibly do, were it not then vitally united to some body; and this body then accompanying the soul he calls pneumatical, that is (not spiritual in the scripture sense, but) spirituous, vaporous, or airy. Let us therefore, in the next place, see what rational account Philoponus can give of this doctrine of the ancients, and of his own opinion agreeably thereunto:† Ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ ἡμετέρα, μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τούτου ἔξοδον, ὁμολογεῖται, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀποδείκνυται, εἰς ᾅδου ἀφικνεῖσθαι, καὶ ποινὰς ἐκεῖ τῶν οὐ καλῶς βεβιωμένων παρέχειν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τοῦ εἶναι ἡμῶν φροντίζει ἡ πρόνοια, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ εὖ εἶναι· διὸ οὐκ ἀμελεῖται ἡ ψυχὴ εἰς τὸ παρὰ φύσιν ἐξολισθήσασα, ἀλλὰ τυγχάνει τῆς προσηκούσης ἐπιμελείας· καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν αὐτῇ διὰ γλυκυθυμίαν ἐγένετο, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τὸ καθαρθῆναι δι' ἀλγύνσεως αὐτῇ γενήσεται· κἀνταῦθα γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων ἰάματα· διὰ τοῦτο ἀλγύνεται ἡ καθαιρομένη ἐν τοῖς ὑπὸ γὴν δικαιωτηρίοις διὰ κολάσεως. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἀσώματος ἡ ψυχὴ,

* Procem. in Aristot. De An. † Ibid.

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ἀδύνατον αὐτὴν παθεῖν· πῶς οὖν κολάζεται; ἀνάγκη οὖν πᾶσα σῶμά τι αὐτῆς ἐξῆφθαι, ὃ διακρινόμενον ἀμέτρως ἢ συγκρινόμενον, ὑπὸ ψύξεως ἢ καύσεως ἀμέτρου, ἀλγύνει τὴν ψυχὴν διὰ τὴν συμπάθειαν· ποῖον οὖν σῶμά ἐστι τὸ ἐξημμένον αὐτῆς; οὐ δήπου τοῦτο· ἀνελύθη γὰρ εἰς τὰ ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκεν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο, τὸ Πνευματικὸν, ὃ λέγομεν ἐν τούτῳ οὖν εἰσὶ πάντως διὰ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς, "Our human soul (in those who are not purged and cleansed in this life) after its departure out of this body, is acknowledged, or rather demonstrated, to go into Hades, there to receive punishment for its evil actions past. For providence does not only take care of our being, but also of our well being. Therefore is the soul, though lapsed into a preternatural state, yet not neglected by providence, but hath a convenient care taken of it, in order to its recovery. And since sinning had its original from the desire of pleasure, it must of necessity be cured by pain: for here also contraries are the cures of contraries. Therefore the soul being to be purged, is punished and pained in those subterraneous judicatories and prisons, in order to its amendment. But if the soul be incorporeal, it is impossible for it to suffer. How then can it be punished? There must of necessity be some body joined with it; which being immoderately constringed or agitated, concreted or secreted, and discordantly moved by heat and cold, or the like, may make the soul sensible of pain, by reason of sympathy, as it is here in this life. What body therefore is that which is then conjoined with the soul, after the dissolution of that earthy body into its elements? Certainly it can be no other than this pneumatical or spirituous body, which we now speak of; for in this are seated, as their subject, the irascible and concupiscible passions, and they are inseparable from the same; nor could they be in the soul disunited from all body: and that soul, which is freed from these, would be forthwith freed from generation; nor would it be concerned in those subterraneous judicatories and prisons, but be carried up aloft to the higher celestial regions," &c. After which he endeavours further to confirm this opinion from the vulgar phenomena: Δῆλον δὲ ἔτι μᾶλλον ὅτι τί ἐστι τὸ πνευματικον σῶμα, καὶ τούτου ἀχώριστα θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία, ἐξ αὐτῆς τῶν πραγμάτων ἐνεργείας· πόθεν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τάφοις τὰ σκιοειδῆ φαίνονται φαντάσματα; οὐ γὰρ δήγε ἡ ψυχὴ ἐσχημάτισται, ἢ ὅλως ἐστὶν ὁρατὴ· ἀλλὰ φασὶ τὰς ἀκαθάρτους ψυχὰς, μετὰ τὴν ἔξοδον τούτου τοῦ σώματος πλανᾶσθαι ἐπί τινα χρόνον μετὰ τοῦ Πνεύματος, καὶ τοῦτο παραδεικνῦναι περὶ τοὺς τάφους· διὸ φροντιστέον εὐζωΐας· ὑπὸ τούτου γὰρ φασὶ τοῦ πνεύματος, παχυνθέντος ἐκ μοχθηρᾶς διαίτης, καταπᾶσθαι περὶ τὰ πάθη τὴν ψυχὴν, "Furthermore, that there is such a pneumatical (spirituous, vaporous, or airy) body, which accompanieth souls unpurged after death, is evident also from the phenomena them-

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selves. For what account can otherwise be given of those spectres and phantoms which appear shadow-like about graves or sepulchres, since the soul itself is neither of any figure, nor yet at all visible? Wherefore these ancients say, that impure souls, after their departure out of this body, wander here, up and down, for a certain space, in their spirituous, vaporous, and airy body, appearing about sepulchres, and haunting their former habitations. For which cause there is great reason that we should take care of living well, as also of abstaining from a fouler and grosser diet; these ancients telling us likewise, that this spirituous body of ours, being fouled and incrassated by evil diet, is apt to render the soul, in this life also, more obnoxious to the disturbances of passions." And here Philoponus goes on to gratify us with a further account of some other of the opinions of these ancients, concerning this spirituous or airy body, accompanying the soul after death: *Ἔχει γάρ τι καὶ αὐτό φασι τῆς φυτικῆς ζωῆς, καὶ γὰρ τρέφεσθαι· τρέφεσθαι δὲ οὐχ οὕτως ὡς τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀτμῶν οὐ διὰ μορίων, ἀλλ' ὅλον δι' ὅλου, φέρε εἰπεῖν, ὡς οἱ σπόγγοι, δέχονται τοὺς ἀτμοὺς· διὰ τοῦτο φροντίζουσιν οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῆς λεπτοτέρας διαίτης καὶ ξηροτέρας, διὰ τὸ μὴ παχύνεσθαι τὸ πνεῦμα, ἀλλὰ λεπτύνεσθαι· πρὸς τοῦτο καὶ τοὺς καθαρμούς φασι παραλαμβάνειν· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα ὕδατι πλύνεται, ἐκεῖνο δὲ καθαρμοῖς διὰ τῶν ἀτμῶν· διὰ γὰρ ἀτμῶν τινῶν τρέφεται, τινῶν δὲ καθαίρεται· οὐ διωργανῶσθαι δέ φασιν αὐτό, ἀλλ' ὅλον δι' ὅλου ἐνεργεῖν, κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι· διὸ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶν ἐν τοῖς μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, ὅτι ἡ κυρίως αἴσθησις μία, καὶ τὸ κυρίως αἰσθητήριον ἕν,* "They further add, that there is something of the plantal and plastic life also, exercised by the soul, in those spirituous or airy bodies after death; they being nourished too, though not after the same manner, as these gross earthy bodies of ours are here, but by vapours; and that not by parts or organs, but throughout the whole of them (as sponges), they imbibing every where those vapours. For which cause they, who are wise, will in this life also take care of using a thinner and drier diet, that so that spirituous body (which we have also at this present time within our grosser body) may not be clogged and incrassated, but attenuated. Over and above which, those ancients made use of catharms, or purgations, to the same end and purpose also: for as this earthy body is washed by water, so is that spirituous body cleansed by cathartic vapours; some of these vapours being nutritive, others purgative. Moreover, these ancients further declared concerning this spirituous body, that it was not organized, but did the whole of it in every part throughout, exercise all functions of sense, the soul, hearing, and seeing, and perceiving all sensibles by it every where. For which cause, Aristotle himself affirmeth, in his Metaphysics, that there is properly but

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one sense, and but one sensory; he, by this one sensory, meaning the spirit, or subtle airy body, in which the sensitive power doth all of it, through the whole, immediately apprehend all variety of sensibles. And if it be demanded, how it comes then to pass, that this spirit appears organized in sepulchres, and most commonly of human form, but sometimes in the form of some other animals? to this those ancients replied, That their appearing so frequently in human form proceedeth from their being incrassated with evil diet, and then, as it were, stamped upon with the form of this exterior ambient body in which they are, as crystal is formed and coloured like to those things which it is fastened in, or reflects the image of them; and that their having sometimes other different forms proceedeth from the fantastic power of the soul itself, which can at pleasure transform this spirituous body into any shape; for being airy, when it is condensed and fixed, it becometh visible, and again invisible, and vanishing out of sight when it is expanded and rarified."

Now, from these passages cited out of Philoponus, it further appeareth, that the ancient assertors of the soul's immortality did not suppose human souls, after death, to be quite stripped stark naked from all body; but that the generality of souls had then a certain spirituous, vaporous, or airy body accompanying them, though in different degrees of purity or impurity respectively to themselves. As also that they conceived this spirituous body (or at least something of it) to hang about the soul also here in this life, before death, as its interior indument or vestment, which also then sticks to it when that other gross earthly part of the body is, by death, put off, as an outer garment. And some have been inclinable to think (by reason of certain historic phenomena[8]) these two to be things so distinct, that it is not impossible for this spirituous body, together with the soul, to be

[8] Thus some are recorded to have been seen in two places at the same time; others to have been a long time inanimate, and afterwards on being restored to themselves to have declared that in the meanwhile they had seen most wonderful and extraordinary things. These examples led well-meaning but over-credulous persons to believe that the human soul, clothed in its own interior body, is for a certain time absent from this body even before death. That not a few traces of these opinions, which are here cited from the Platonists, still remain among Christians, especially the Roman Catholics, must be known to every one acquainted with the popular opinions and superstitions. The Platonic philosophy, indeed, which was approved by the ancient Christians, has been abandoned, and another substituted in its place: but the dogmas and conclusions derived from it have been retained by most men in all their pristine integrity. And any one conversant with the ancient philosophy, might write a long and copious commentary upon *the relics of the Platonic philosophy among Christians*. Thus happens it with mortals. The primary and fundamental doctrines of a sect are very often repudiated by those who preside over communities; while they either are unwilling to interfere with the consequences and institutions that proceed from them, owing to their ignorance of their origin, or are unable to do so, because the people is not easily prevailed upon to abandon inveterate customs. In the course of time, many opinions and rites are held sacred, which those who are addicted to them would hold in far different estimation, if they were thoroughly aware of their origin.

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locally separated from the other grosser body, for some time before death, and without it. And indeed thus much cannot be denied, that our soul acteth not immediately only upon bones, flesh, brains, and other such like gross parts of the body, but first, and chiefly upon the animal spirits, as the immediate instruments of sense and fancy, and that, by whose vigour and activity the other heavy and unwieldy bulk of the body is so nimbly moved. And therefore we know no reason but we may assent here to that of Porphyrius:[9] Τὸ αἷμα νομὴ καὶ τροφή ἐστι τοῦ πνεύματος, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ὄχημα τῆς ψυχῆς, "That the blood is the food and nourishment of the spirit, (that is, that subtle body called the 'animal spirits') and that this spirit is the vehicle of the soul, or the more immediate seat of life."

Nevertheless, the same Philoponus there addeth, that according to these ancients, besides the terrestrial body, and this spirituous and airy body too, there is yet a third kind of body, of a higher rank than either of the former, (peculiarly belonging to such souls after death, as are purged and cleansed from corporeal affections, lusts and passions) called by them, σῶμα αὐγοειδές, and οὐράνιον, and αἰθέριον, &c. a "luciform," and "celestial," and "ethereal body." The soul (saith he) continueth either in the terrestrial or the aerial body, so long, ἕως ἑαυτὴν καθάρασα ἀνενεχθῇ, τῆς γενέσεως ἀπαλλαγεῖσα· τότε τοίνυν καὶ τὸν θυμὸν, καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἀποτίθεται μετὰ τούτου τοῦ ὀχήματος, τοῦ πνεύματος λέγω· εἶναι δέ τι καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄλλο τι ἀϊδίως αὐτῆς ἐξημμένον, σῶμα οὐράνιον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀΐδιον, ὅ φασιν Αὐγοειδὲς ἢ Ἀστροειδὲς· τῶν γὰρ ἐγκοσμίων οὖσαν ἀνάγκη πάντως ἔχειν τινὰ κλῆρον, ὃν διοικεῖ, μέρος ὄντα τοῦ κοσμοῦ· καὶ εἰ ἀεικίνητός ἐστι, καὶ δεῖ αὐτὴν ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖν, δεῖ ἔχειν ἀϊδίως ἐξημμένον τὸ σῶμα, ὃ ἀεὶ ζωοποιήσει· διὰ ταῦτα οὖν τὸ αὐγοειδὲς φασι σῶμα αὐτὴν ἀεὶ ἔχειν, "until that having purged itself, it be carried aloft and freed from generation. And then doth it put off both the irascible and concupiscible passions at once, together with this second vehicle, or body, which we call spirituous. Wherefore these ancients say, that there is another heavenly body always conjoined with the soul, and eternal, which they call luciform, and star-like: for it being a mundane thing, must of necessity have some part of the world as a province allotted to it, which it may administer. And since it is always moveable, and ought

[9] Where this precept of Porphyry's is to be met with I leave to others to discover, having in vain sought for it in those books wherein he discourses on the soul and the things pertaining to it. It is so much at variance, however, with his opinions, as we find certain axioms in his book, De Antro Nympharum, which are closely allied to it. Thus p. 257. he tells us that some souls "delight in blood and in the moist juices:" Αἷμα μὲν οὖν ταύταις καὶ ὁ διυγρὸς γόνος φίλος. In another place, p. 259. Δι' αἵματος, he says, καὶ ἐξ αἱμάτων ἡ σαρκογονία· καὶ χιτών γε τὸ σῶμα τῇ ψυχῇ, ὃ ἠμφίεσται, "By means of the blood and from blood flesh is produced: and the body is the vestment of the soul, with which it is clothed."

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always to act, it must have a body eternally conjoined with it, which it may always enliven. And for these causes do they affirm the soul always to have a luciform body." Which lucid and ethereal body of the soul is a thing often mentioned by other writers also: as Proclus, in his commentary upon the Timæus:* Καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς ἐξήρτηταί τι τοιοῦτον ὄχημα αἰθέριον, ὡς αὐτός φησιν· ἐμβιβάσαι γοῦν εἰς ὄχημα καὶ αὐτὴν φησὶ τὸν δημιουργὸν· καὶ γὰρ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη πρὸ τῶν θνητῶν σωμάτων ἀϊδίοις καὶ εὐκινήτοις χρῆσθαι σώμασιν, ὡς κατ' οὐσίαν ἔχουσαν τὸ κινεῖν, "The human soul hath also (saith he) such an ethereal vehicle belonging to it, as Plato himself intimates, when he affirmeth the Demiurgus at first to have placed it in a chariot. For of necessity every soul, before this mortal body, must have an eternal and easily moveable body, it being essential to it to move." And elsewhere the same Proclus:† Ἄνω μένοντες οὐδὲν δεόμεθα τούτων τῶν μεριστῶν ὀργάνων· ἃ ἡμῖν συνήρτηται κατελθοῦσιν εἰς γένεσιν, ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ τὸ ὄχημα τὸ Αὐγοειδὲς, πάσας ἔχων ἡνωμένας τὰς αἰσθήσεις, "Whilst we remain above we have no need of these divided organs, which now we have descending into generation; but the uniform, lucid, or splendid vehicle is sufficient, this having all senses united together in it." Which doctrine of the unorganized, luciform, and spirituous vehicles seems to have been derived from Plato, he, in his Epinomis, writing thus concerning a good and wise man after death:[10] Ὃν καὶ διϊσχυρίζομαι παίζων καὶ σπουδάζων ἅμα, ἐάνπερ θανάτῳ, τὴν αὐτοῦ μοῖραν ἀναπλήσει, μήτε μεθέξειν ἔτι πολλῶν τότε, καθάπερ νῦν, αἰσθήσεων, μιᾶς μοίρας μετειληφότα μόνον, καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἕνα γεγονότα εὐδαίμονα ἔσεσθαι, "Of whom, whether I be in jest or earnest, I constantly affirm, that when dying he shall yield to fate, he shall no longer have this variety of senses, which now we have, but one uniform body, and live a happy life." Moreover, Hierocles[1] much insisteth upon this: Αὐγοειδὲς σῶμα, this "luciform" and "ethereal body," ὃ καὶ

* Page 290. † Page 164.

[10] In these words of Plato, however, which occur p. 705. opp. I find no clear trace of the Platonic doctrine on the shining body of the soul: on the contrary, I consider them to prove nothing beyond this, that in Plato's opinion wise men will be freed after death from this grosser earthy body, and will no longer be happy by means of the senses, but in a much more simple way. For when Plato affirms that a wise man, after his departure from this life "will become partaker μιᾶς μοίρας, of one lot, and be made one out of many," I do not think it follows from this that he is to have a splendid and luciform body when he has been emancipated from the thraldom of this earthy one. Dr. Cudworth indeed, to give some colour to his own opinion, has rendered the words μιᾶς μοίρας, "one uniform body:" but by doing so, he interprets Plato according to his own sense, rather than translates him: not to mention that critics and philologists of the highest eminence, not only modern but ancient, maintain by no contemptible arguments, that the dialogue entitled Epinomis, was not written by Plato, but by some one of his disciples. Consult the Dissertation of the Abbè Sallier on this subject, Histoire de l'Academie des Inscriptions et de Belles Lettres, tom. 3. p. 143.

[1] Comm. in Aurea Pythagoræ Carmina, p. 214. 215.

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ψυχῆς λεπτὸν ὄχημα οἱ χρησμοὶ καλοῦσι, "which also (saith he) the oracles call the thin and subtle vehicle or chariot of the soul;" he meaning, doubtless, by these oracles, the magical or Chaldaic oracles before mentioned. And amongst those now extant under that title, there seems to be a clear acknowledgment of these two vehicula of the soul, or interior induments thereof; the spirituous and the luciform body, the latter of which is there enigmatically called Ἐπίπεδον, or a plain superficies, in these words:[2] Μὴ Πνεῦμα μολύνῃς, μηδὲ βαθύνῃς τὸ Ἐπίπεδον, "Take care not to defile or contaminate the spirit; nor to make the plain superficies deep." For thus Psellus glosseth upon that oracle: Δύο χιτῶνας ἐπενδύουσι τὴν ψυχὴν οἱ Χαλδαῖοι· καὶ τὸν μὲν Πνευματικὸν ὠνόμασαν, ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐξυφανθέντα αὐτῇ· τὸν δὲ Αὐγοειδῆ, λεπτὸν καὶ ἀναφῆ, ὅνπερ Ἐπίπεδον, "The Chaldaic philosophers bestow upon the soul two interior tunicles or vestments, the one of which they call pneumatical, or the spirituous body, which is weaved out, as it were, to it, and compounded of the gross sensible body, (it being the more thin and subtle part thereof,) the other the luciform vestment of the soul, pure and pellucid, and this is that which is here called the plain superficies." Which, saith Pletho[3] is not so to be understood, as if it had not three dimensions (forasmuch as it is a body also) but only to denote the subtlety and tenuity thereof. Wherefore, when the aforesaid Hierocles[4] also calls this luciform and ethereal body, τὸ Πνευματικὸν Ὄχημα τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς, "the spiritual vehicle of the rational soul," he takes not the word πνευματικὸν, in that sense, wherein it is used by Philoponus, and others; as if he intended to confound this ethereal body with that other spirituous or airy body, and to make but one of them, but rather styles it spiritual, in a higher sense, (and which cometh near to that of the Scripture) as being a body more suitable and cognate with that highest and divinest part of the

[2] Oracul. Zoroastr. sect. 10. v. 274. p. 394. ed. Clerici.

[3] Comm. in hoc Oracul. Whether Psellus, however, has correctly expounded this oracle or not, is not apparent. For the obscurity of most of those called Chaldaic oracles is so great, that no wise and discreet man can decide with any certainty as to their sense: nor ought we always to put faith in the junior Platonists, who are accustomed rashly to accommodate many things to the principles of their own philosophy, which are altogether foreign to them. If it be proper to hazard a conjecture, I should suppose the words πνεῦμα and ἐπίπεδον in this oracle to be synonymous, and merely two names of one and the same thing. For I find no mention of a twofold body of the soul in other parts of these oracles: neither, as will be made appear presently, did all the Platonic philosophers maintain such a doctrine.

[4] Comm. in Aurea Carmina, p. 222. Ταῦτα γὰρ ἰδίως καθαίροντα καὶ τελειοῦντα τὸ πνευματικὸν ὄχημα τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς, τῆς μὲν ὑλικῆς συζωΐας αὐτὸ χωρίζει, "For these properly purge and perfect the spiritual vehicle of the rational soul, and separate it from all association of matter." The learned Doctor justly observes that the word πνευματικὸς is not taken by Hierocles in the sense in which it is used by Philoponus and other Platonists. For Hierocles seems to have belonged to those Platonists who ascribed but one body to the soul.

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soul, mind, or reason, than the other terrestrial body is (which, upon that account is called also, by the same Hierocles,[5] as well as it is by St. Paul, σῶμα ψυχικὸν, "the animal or natural body." So that this spiritual body of Hierocles is not the airy, but the ethereal body, and the same with Synesius'[6] θεσπέσιον σῶμα, "his divine body." And that this distinction of two interior vehicles or tunicles of the soul, besides that outer vestment of the terrestrial body, (styled in Plato τὸ ὀστρεῶδες, the "crustaceous," or "ostraceous body") is not a mere figment of the latter Platonists since Christianity, but a tradition derived down from antiquity, appeareth plainly from Virgil, in his sixth Æneid, where, though not commonly understood,[7] he writeth first of the spirituous, or airy body, in which unpurged souls receive punishment after death, thus:

Quin et supremo cum lumine vita reliquit,
Non tamen omne malum miseris, nec funditus omnes
Corporeæ excedunt pestes; penitusque necesse est
Multa diu concreta modis inolescere miris.
Ergo exercentur pœnis, veterumque malorum
Supplicia expendunt; aliæ panduntur inanes
Suspensæ ad ventos: aliis sub gurgite vasto
Infectum eluitur scelus, aut exuritur igni.

And then again of the other pure ethereal and fiery body, in this manner:

Donec longa dies perfecto temporis orbe
Concretam exemit labem, purumque reliquit
Æthereum sensum, atque auraï simplicis ignem.

Now, as it was before observed, that the ancient assertors of the soul's immortality, supposing it to have, besides this ter-

[5] Ibid. p. 214. Λείπεται δ οὖν ἡ τοῦ ΨΥΧΙΚΟΥ ΣΩΜΑΤΟΣ κάθαρσις, "There remains therefore the purgation of the animal soul." The passage of St. Paul occurs 1 Cor. xv. 44. It is very probable that Hierocles, who unquestionably had read the divine books, borrowed this word from St. Paul: as he is considered by learned men to have transferred many moral precepts from the epistles of the divine writers into his own commentary. But to the rest of the Platonists who were not so conversant with the books and doctrines of the Christians as Hierocles, this style of language is unknown.

[6] He means no other passage of Synesius than the following, which occurs in his book, De Insomniis, p. 140. opp. "Ὑλης γὰρ σκύβαλον οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ θεσπέσιον σῶμα,," For the divine body cannot be the dregs and refuse of matter." I shall have an opportunity below of making an observation or two upon the opinion put forth in this passage of Synesius.

[7] And yet some of Virgil's interpreters very closely approach the learned Doctor's exposition of this passage. Also Renat. Vallinus, Not. ad Boëthium de Consolat. Philosoph. p. 62. interprets Virgil's *ethereal sense* of the celestial body of the soul. For my part, however, I do not hesitate to dissent from these learned men in reference to this passage, and consider the dogma contained in it to be drawn, not from the secret recesses of the ancient philosophy, but from the opinions of the vulgar. I shall state my own opinion by and by.

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restrial body, another spirituous or airy body, conceived this not only to accompany the soul after death, but also to hang about it here in this life, as its interior vest or tunicle; (they probably meaning hereby the same with that which is commonly called the animal spirits, diffused from the brain, by the nerves, throughout this whole body[8]) in like manner it is certain, that many of them supposing the soul, besides those two forementioned, to have yet a third luciform, or ethereal body, conceived this in like manner to adhere to it even in this mortal life too, as its inmost clothing or tunicle; yet, so as that they acknowledged the force thereof to be very much weakened and abated, and its splendour altogether obscured by the heavy weight and gross steams or vapours of the terrestrial body. Thus Suidas, upon the word Αὐγοειδὴς tells us out of Isidore, ὡς ἔχει ἡ ψυχὴ Αὐγοειδὲς Ὄχημα, λεγόμενον ἀστροειδές τε καὶ ἀίδιον· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ Αὐγοειδὲς σῶμα τῷδε ἀποκέκλεισται ἐνίοις μὲν εἴσω τῆς κεφαλῆς, "That according to some philosophers, the soul hath a certain luciform vehicle, called also star or sun-like, and eternal; which luciform body is now shut up within this terrestrial body (as a light in a dark lanthorn) it being supposed by some of them to be included within the head," &c. With which agreeth Hierocles:[9] Ἐν τῷ θνητῷ ἡμῶν σώματι, τὸ Αὐγοειδὲς ἔγκειται, προσπνέον τῷ ἀψύχῳ σώματι ζωὴν, καὶ τὴν ἁρμονίαν αὐτοῦ συνέχον, "The splendid or luciform body, lieth in this mortal body of ours, continually inspiring it with life, and containing the harmony thereof." The ground of which opinion was, because these philosophers generally conceived the human soul to have pre-existed before it came into this earthly body, and that either from eternity, or else from the first beginning of the world's creation; and being never without a body, and then in a perfect state, to have had a lucid and ethereal body, either co-eternal, or co-eve with it (though in order of nature junior to it) as its chariot or vehicle; which being incorruptible, did always inseparably adhere to the soul, in its after-lapses and descents, into an aerial first, and then a terrestrial body; this

[8] Nearly the same opinion as the one here put forth by Dr. Cudworth on the ethereal body of the soul, is entertained by Renat. Vallinus, Ad Boëthium de Consol. Philosoph. p. 62. But long before them the illustrious Galen, De Dogmat. Platon. et Hippocratis, lib. 7. cap. 6. p. 1037. tom. 1. opp. says he considers it very probable that the spirit contained in the ventricles of the brain is the first primary seat and instrument of the soul." [It has recently been maintained by Bishop Berkeley that the animal spirits, the fire of the soul, are the vehicle and instrument of God himself. See Biblioth. Raisonnée, tom. 35. par. 1. p. 49. &c.] Neither was Proclus, if we are to believe Marsil. Ficinus, Comment. in Platon. p. 799. far from entertaining the same view. "The soul," says he, "carries with it something visible, that is, a certain vestment or covering, either air, or compounded of the *vapours* and *spirits* of its own body, as is supposed by Proclus." But few, I imagine, of those who are familiar with the dogmas of the Platonists will concur in this opinion.

[9] Comm. in Aurea Carmina Pythagoræ, p. 214. ed. Needhami.

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being, as it were, the vinculum of union betwixt the soul and them. Thus Pletho declares their sense:[10] Διὰ δὲ τοιούτου σώματος τῷ δὲ πότε τῷ θνητῷ τήνγε ἀνθρωπίνην ψυχὴν συγγίγνεσθαι, ὅλου ὅλῳ τῷ τοῦ ἐμβρύου ζωτικῷ πνεύματι διὰ συγγένειαν ἐπεπμεκολένου ἅτε πνεύματός τινος καὶ αὐτοῦ ὄντος, "By this ethereal body is our human soul connected with its mortal body; the whole thereof being implicated with the whole vital spirit of the embryo, forasmuch as this itself is a spirit also." But long before Pletho was this doctrine declared and asserted by Galen, as agreeable both to Plato's and his own sense; he first premising, that the immediate organ or instrument of sight was αὐγοειδὲς, a "luciform" and "ethereal spirit:* Δεόντως οὖν ἐροῦμεν αὐγοειδὲς μὲν εἶναι τὸ τῆς ὄψεως ὄργανον, ἀεροειδὲς δὲ τὸ τῆς ἀκοῆς, ἀτμοειδὲς δὲ τὸ τῆς ὀδμῆς, καὶ τὸ μὲν τῆς γεύσεως ὑγρὸν, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἁφῆς γεῶδες, &c., "Wherefore we may reasonably affirm, that the organ of sight is a luciform or ethereal body: as that of hearing is aerial; that of smelling vaporous; that of taste moist or watery; and that of touch earthy; like being perceived by like." And he accordingly thus understanding those known verses of Empedocles, which as Aristotle otherwise interprets them, are nonsense: Καὶ τοῦτ' ἄρ' ἦν ὃ βούλεται δηλοῦν ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐν οἷς φησὶ, Γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν, &c.: αἰσθανόμεθα γὰρ ὄντως τῷ μὲν γεωδεστέρῳ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων, τῆς γεώδους φύσεως, τῷ δ' αὐγοειδεστέρῳ τῆς ὄψεως, τῆς Αὐγοειδοῦς, "And this was that which Empedocles meant to signify, in those famous verses of his; it being certain, that by the most earthy of our senses, the touch, we perceive the earthy nature of sensibles; and by the most luciform, viz. that of sight, the passions of light; by that which is aerial, sounds; by that which is moist and sponge-like, tastes; and lastly, by the organ of smelling, which is the extremity of those former cavities of the brain, as replenished with vapours, odours." After which he writeth of the essence or substance of the soul, in this manner: Εἰ δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς οὐσίας ἀποφήνασθαι χρὴ, δυοῖν θάτερον ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν, ἢ τοῦτ εἶναι τὸ ὅλον Αὐγοειδὲς, καὶ Αἰθερῶδες σῶμα λεκτέον αὐτὴν, εἰς ὃ κἂν μὴ βούλονται κατ' ἀκολουθίαν ἀφικνοῦνται Στωϊκοὶ, ἢ αὐτὴν μὲν ἀσώματον ὑπάρχειν οὐσίαν, ὄχημά τε τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῆς εἶναι τουτὶ τὸ σῶμα, δι' οὗ μέσου τὴν πρὸς τ' ἄλλα σώματα κοινωνίαν λαμβάνει· τοῦτο μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ δι' ὅλου λεκτέον ἡμῖν ἐκτετᾶσθαι τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου· τῇ δέ γε πρὸς αὐτὸ κοινωνίᾳ τὸ κατὰ τὰς ὄψεις αὐτῶν πνεῦμα φωτοειδὲς γίγνεσθαι, "And if we should now declare any thing concerning the essence or substance of the soul, we must needs affirm one or other of these two things; that either itself is this luciform and ethereal body

[10] In Oracul. Chald. ibid.
* Dog. Hip. et Plat. lib. 7. [Cap. 13. p. 1043 tom. 1. opp.]

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(which the Stoics, whether they will or no, by consequence will be brought unto, as also Aristotle himself), or else that the soul is itself an incorporeal substance, but that this luciform ethereal body is its first vehicle, by which, as a middle, it communicates with the other bodies. Wherefore we must say, that this ethereal lucid body is extended throughout the whole brain; whence is that luciform spirit derived, that is the immediate instrument of sight." Now from hence it was, that these philosophers, besides the moral purgation of the soul, and the intellectual or philosophical, recommended very much a mystical or telestic way of purifying this ethereal body in us, by diet and catharms. Thus the forementioned Hierocles:[1] Ἐπειδὴ καὶ τῷ Αὐγοειδεῖ ἡμῶν σώματι προσέφυ σῶμα ϑνητὸν ὄν, καϑαρεῦσαι δεῖ καὶ τοῦτο, &c., "Since to our lucid or splendid body, this gross mortal body is come by way of accession, we ought to purify the former also, and free it from sympathy with the latter." And again after-

[1] Ibid. p. 214. Dr. Cudworth has expressed this passage as it stands in the older editions, which have the reading: Καϑαρεῦσαι δεῖ καὶ τοῦτο. But if this reading be retained, the philosopher seems to be speaking of the purification of the mortal body, although it is clear from the context that he means that of the lucid or splendid body. For which reason that great ornament of his country, the sagacious Dr. Bentley, considered that the passage required emendation, and that τούτου should be substituted for τοῦτο. If we adopt this conjecture, highly ingenious as it certainly is, and altogether in accordance with the Platonic doctrine, the sense of the words will be as follows: "The ethereal body of the soul, which is united with the mortal, must be purified and freed from this mortal body and divested of all sympathy with it." Undoubtedly the followers of Plato in former times derived all the dross and impurities of the soul from the grosser and mortal body: and therefore the learned Pet. Needham, who has published an elegant edition of Hierocles, has not hesitated to prefer this emendation to the ancient reading and to receive it into the text. See his Annotations, p. 431. 432. Nevertheless, to confess my own candid opinion, I consider there is more acuteness and ingenuity than truth in this correction. For if τούτου be substituted for τοῦτο the sentence, if I am not mistaken, becomes broken and disconnected, since the laws of grammar require a *pronoun* in it that can be referred to σώματι αὐγοειδεῖ. Besides the particle καὶ prefixed to the word τοῦτο is fatal to this critical conjecture. For as Hierocles before these words mentions nothing else from which the vehicle of the soul is also to be purged, it is clear that the pronoun following this particle pertains to the thing itself which he says is to be purified. Are we therefore to adhere strictly to the ancient reading and to suppose that Hierocles has expressed himself inaptly and improperly, and not attended sufficiently to grammatical rules? I consider indeed, there would be no fault in our doing so: nor am I such an admirer of the ancients as to believe that they were always more fortunate than ourselves, who, when absorbed in profound meditation, very often inadvertently offend against the decrees of grammarians. If the meaning of a sentence be plain and perspicuous, as in this case, we ought not to be too severe upon any occasional errors in ancient or modern authors, nor impute that to them as a crime which probably arose from a mere slip of the memory or some other pardonable cause. But on attentively examining this passage of Hierocles I find an easy way of purging him from all charge of negligence. All that gives critics offence in this sentence has proceeded I suspect from the copyists, who interchanged the two kindred words αὐτο and τοῦτο, and put one in place of the other: than which no mistake could happen more easily. I conjecture therefore that Hierocles wrote as follows: Καϑαρεῦσαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ ΑΥ̓ΤὈ καὶ τῆς πρὸς ΤΟΥ̓ΤΟ συμπάϑείας ἀπαλλαγῆναι; but in such matters nothing can positively be decided upon. Observe also that in the beginning of this passage the reading of the MS. is not ἐπειδὴ but ἀλλὰ δὴ.

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wards:[2] Αἱ τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς καθάρσεις καὶ τοῦ Αὐγοειδοῦς ὀχήματος προὐμηθοῦνται, ὅπως ἂν αὐταῖς ὑπόπτερον καὶ τοῦτο γενόμενον μὴ ἐμποδὼν ἵστηται πρὸς τὴν ἄνω πορείαν, καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς, "Together with the purgations of the rational soul, the purification of the luciform or ethereal vehicle is also to be regarded, that this being made light, and alate or wingy, might no way hinder the soul's ascent upward: but he that endeavours to purify the mind only, neglecting the body, applies not himself to the whole man."[3] Whereupon he concludes: Τὴν Τελεστικὴν ἐνέργειαν λέγω, τὴν τοῦ Αὐγοειδοῦς καθαρτικὴν δύναμιν, "I therefore call this the telestic or mystic operation; which is conversant about the purgation of the lucid or ethereal vehicle." And whereas philosophy was by Plato and Socrates[4] defined to be a continual exercise of dying (which Pliny[5] thought to be nothing

[2] Ibid. p. 216.

[3] Those acquainted with the Greek language will easily perceive that this translation of Dr. Cudworth's does not correspond to the words of Hierocles. That of Needham is better: "For the purgations of the rational soul regard also the luciform vehicle, that having acquired wings by means of these, it may not impede the journey (of the soul) upwards." The words: *But he*, &c. subjoined to the version of this passage do not occur in the same part of Hierocles as the preceding, but stand at a considerable distance from them. In Greek they run as follows, p. 222.: Ὁ γὰρ ψυχῆς μόνης ἐπιμέλειαν ποιούμενος, τοῦ δὲ σώματος ἀμελῶν, οὐ τὸν ὅλον ἄνθρωπον καθαίρει.

[4] See Plato's Phædo, p. 378. &c. where Socrates discourses at great length upon this subject.

[5] This is a singular and very ingenious interpretation of the well-known words of Pliny, Histor. Natural. lib. 8. cap. 50: Atque etiam morbus est aliquis per sapientiam mori. Claud. Salmasius in his Exercit. Plinian. in Solinum, tom. 1. p. 283. supposes that φρενῖτις is called by Pliny the disease of wisdom or philosophy: "as the disease of the joints," says he, "is called ἀρθρῖτις——so also φρενῖτις is a disease, to which philosophy is subject, or the disease of philosophy." But Dr. Cudworth seems to me to be right in considering this meaning to be inapplicable to the present passage: whose opinion again J. Le Clerc has attempted to refute, Biblioth. Choisie, tom. 8. p. 56. What this most erudite scholar supposes to make particularly against it is another passage of Pliny, lib. 7. cap. 51. where he in like manner speaks of this death by philosophy [See Biblioth. Raisonnée, tom. 13. par. 2. p. 348. &c. and Heumann in the Miscellan. Lips. tom. 1. p. 80. &c.]. Jam signa lethalia in furoris morbo risum, *sapientiæ* vero *ægritudine* fimbriarum curam et stragulæ vestis plicaturas, "That the fatal symptom in madness is laughter, but in the disease of philosophy a care about fringes or the folds of a coverlet:" for that it is evident from this passage that the disease by philosophy is classed by Pliny among bodily maladies, and therefore that it is more probable he meant some species of insanity by this term, in which men discourse upon matters pertaining to philosophy even until death. I confess that those who suppose Pliny to be speaking of one and the same distemper in these two passages, which almost all critics do, cannot help preferring this opinion to the exposition of Dr. Cudworth and understanding it of some bodily disease, which at the same time deprives the sick person of his senses. But I am almost satisfied that learned men are in error when they associate these two passages of Pliny together, and suppose him to be speaking of one and the same thing. In the former passage he treats of *death by philosophy*, which he declares to be a *disease*, or species of disease; but in the latter he does not make mention of death by philosophy but the disease of philosophy. And these two, it must be evident to every body, differ from each other, the same as death and disease. Wherefore I consider that these two evils, mentioned by Pliny, ought by no means to be confounded. The sense of the former passage is simply this: "Those who die by wisdom or philosophy are affected with a certain disease," or to explain it more diffusively: "Although those who die by philosophy seem to be any thing rather than ill, they in reality have lost their health and are labouring under some disease."

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but an hypochondriacal or atrabiliarian distemper in them), in those words of his, which Salmasius and other critics can by no means understand: Est etiam quidam morbus, per sapientiam mori, "That the dying by wisdom or philosophy, is also but a certain kind of bodily disease or overgrown melancholy"), though they supposed this principally to consist in a moral dying to corporeal lusts and passions; yet was the design thereof partly mystical and telestic also, it driving at this further thing, that when they should put off this terrestrial body, they might at once die also to the spirituous or aerial; and then their soul have nothing left hanging about it, but only the pure ethereal body, its light-winged chariot: which in Virgil's language is—

Purumque relinqui
Æthereum sensum, atque aurai simplicis ignem.[6]

Notwithstanding which, the Pythagoreans and Platonists seem not to have been all of them of this persuasion, that the

He here says that death by wisdom is a disease, but not a sort of disease which may be called the *disease of wisdom*. He who bears this in mind will no doubt confess that Dr. Cudworth's exposition of this passage is the best and most convenient one. For the philosophers, especially those who were devoted to Pythagoras and Plato, inculcated that the soul is to be abstracted and drawn away from the contagion and association of the body by close and incessant meditation and the study of philosophy: and those who obeyed this precept were said to die like Socrates philosophically, or as Pliny says "by wisdom." Pliny, who had no care about religion or moral discipline, tells us that this class of men, although they discourse magnificently upon the releasing of the soul from the body by philosophy, are any thing rather than sane and are afflicted with some disease. But in the other passage he is unquestionably treating of some disease of the body: and as he contrasts this disease with madness, which the Greek physicians call *μανία*, I hold the opinion of Salmasius to be not improbable, who conceives that *φρενῖτις* is denominated by Pliny "the disease of wisdom."

[6] If this and what the learned Doctor states a little before be true, therefore, the Platonists inculcated a twofold kind of philosophical death: *moral* and *mystical* or *telestic* death. But I nowhere remember their mentioning it. Socrates, when said that the life of a philosopher is a perpetual exercise of dying, meant simply, as is manifest from Plato's Phædo, that it is the part of a wise man to endeavour through the whole of his life to abstract the mind from the passions, lusts, and perturbations of the body. Neither did the junior Platonists add much to this dogma, except that they prescribed certain courses for obtaining this death, which Socrates, had he lived in their time, would no doubt have despised and ridiculed. For this great and acute man was by no means favourable to those who recommended the killing of the body by hunger, thirst, and the like: than which these philosophers considered nothing to be more efficacious for purging the soul from the contagion of the body. Hence Porphyry, according to the prescript of his own school, asserts that there are only two kinds of death, one natural, the other philosophical, Sentent. ad Intelligibilia Ducentes, sect. 9. p. 221. Ὁ γοῦν θάνατος διπλοῦς· ὁ μὲν συνεγνωσμένος, λυομένου τοῦ σώματος ἀπὸ ψυχῆς· ὁ δὲ τῶν φιλοσόφων, λυομένης τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος· καὶ οὐ πάντως ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ ἕπεται, "Death is twofold: one known to all, wherein the body is freed from the soul; the other of philosophers, when the soul is released from the body: neither does one always follow the other." Wherefore the mystic and telestic purgation of the soul, continually dwelt upon by the Platonists, is by no means a new kind of death, different from the philosophical and moral, but merely pertains to those things by which this class of philosophers supposed that the philosophical death could be accelerated. Much also has been collected on this subject by Jac. Thomasius in his Dissertat. Varii Argumenti, dis. 14. de Philosophia Mortis Meditatione, p. 124. &c.

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same numerical ethereal body, which the soul was at first created with, continueth still about it, and adhereth to it inseparably to all eternity, during its descents into other grosser bodies; but rather to have supposed, that, according to the moral disposition of the soul, it always finds or makes a cognate and suitable body correspondently pure or impure; and consequently, that by moral virtue and philosophy, it might again recover that celestial body, which was lost by its fall and descent hither. This seemeth to have been Porphyrius' sense in these words of his:[7] Ὡς ἂν διετέθη ἡ ψυχὴ, εὑρίσκει σῶμα τάξει καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις διωρισμένον· διὸ καθαρώτερον μὲν διακειμένῃ σύμφυτον τὸ ἐγγὺς τοῦ ἀΰλου σῶμα, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ αἰθέριον, "However the soul be in itself affected, so does it always find a body suitable and agreeable to its present disposition; and therefore to the purged souls does naturally accrue a body that comes next to immateriality; that is, an ethereal one." And probably Plato[8] was of the same mind when he affirmed the "soul to be always in a body, but sometimes of one kind and sometimes of another."

Now from what hath been declared, it appeareth already, that the most ancient assertors of the incorporeity and immortality of the human soul supposed it, notwithstanding, to be always conjoined with a body. Thus Hierocles[9] plainly: Ἡ λογικὴ οὐσία συμφυὲς ἔχουσα σῶμα, οὕτω παρὰ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ εἰς τὸ εἶναι παρῆλθεν, ὡς μήτε τὸ σῶμα εἶναι αὐτὴν, μήτε ἄνευ σώματος· ἀλλ' αὐτὴν μὲν ἀσώματον, ἀποπερατοῦσθαι δὲ εἰς σῶμα τὸ ὅλον αὐτῆς εἶδος, "The rational nature having always a cognate body, so proceeded from the demiurgus, as that neither itself is body, nor

[7] In Sententiis ad Intelligibilia Ducentibus, sect. 32. p. 233. It does not follow from these words of Porphyry, as Dr. Cudworth supposes, that the celestial and ethereal body, which in the opinion of the Platonists is cognate with the soul, can be lost and again recovered. For granting, what however may be denied, that σῶμα αἰθέριον in this passage is correctly understood of that splendid chariot or vehicle of the soul, in which the Platonists supposed it to be placed by God immediately on its creation, the words may conveniently be explained as follows: "If the soul moderates and controls its propensities, that celestial body is contaminated by no foreign impurity but remains pure and unsullied." This explication is confirmed by the words which follow a little after: Ὅταν δὲ μελετήσει ἀφίστασθαι φύσεως, αὐγὴ ξηρὰ γίνεται, ἄσκιος καὶ ἀνέφελος, "But when it purposes receding from nature (corporeal things), it becomes a dry splendour, without shadow or cloud." I can hardly believe that any of the Platonists ever imagined the first and lucid body of the soul to be capable of being entirely lost and again restored. For since they held this body to belong to the nature of the soul itself, if they had entertained this opinion, they must have supposed it possible for the nature of the soul to be changed and dissipated: which is altogether at variance with their doctrine. But the obscurity and dissension of these philosophers, when they touch upon this argument, is wonderful and almost incredible: whence it happens that it is not always possible to come to any clear and satisfactory conclusion as to their real meaning.

[8] This passage of Plato occurs in the tenth book De Legibus. But I have shown below on chap. 5. sect. 5. that it has no reference to this matter, but ought to be understood rather of the wanderings of souls and their migrations into various bodies in this life.

[9] Comm. in Aurea Carmina, ed. ver. 67. p. 210.

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yet can it be without body; but though itself be incorporeal, yet its whole form, notwithstanding, is terminated in a body." Accordingly whereunto, the definition which he gives of a man is this:* Ψυχὴ λογικὴ μετὰ συμφυοῦς ἀθανάτου σώματος, "A rational soul, together with a cognate immortal body." He concluding there afterwards, that this enlivened terrestrial body, or mortal man, is nothing but εἴδωλον ἀνθρώπου,[10] "the image of the true man," or an accession thereunto, which is therefore separable from the same. Neither doth he affirm this only of human souls, but also of all other rational beings whatsoever, below the supreme deity, and above men, that they always naturally actuate a body. Wherefore a demon or angel (which words are used as synonymous by Hierocles) is also defined by him after the same manner:[1] Ψυχὴ λογικὴ μετὰ φωτεινοῦ σώματος, "A rational soul together with a lucid body." And accordingly Proclus upon Plato's Timæus,[2] affirmeth: Πάντα δαίμονα τῶν ἡμετέρων κρείττονα ψυχῶν, καὶ νοερὰν ἔχειν ψυχὴν, καὶ ὄχημα αἰθέριον, "That every demon, superior to human souls, hath both an intellectual soul and an ethereal vehicle, the entireness thereof being made up or compounded of these two things." So that there is hardly any other difference left betwixt demons or angels, and men, according to these philosophers, but only this, that the former are lapsable into aerial bodies only, and no further; but the latter into terrestrial also.[3] Now Hierocles positively affirmeth this to have been the true cabala, and genuine doctrine of the ancient Pythagoreans, entertained afterwards by Plato: Καὶ τοῦτο τῶν Πυθαγορείων ἦν δόγμα, ὃ δὲ Πλάτων ὕστερον ἐξέφηνεν, ἀπεικάσας ξυμφύτῳ δυνάμει ὑποπτέρου ζεύγους τε καὶ ἡνιόχου; πᾶσαν θείαν τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνην ψυχὴν, "And this was the doctrine of the Pythagoreans, which Plato afterwards declared; he resembling every, both human and divine soul (that is, in our modern language, every created rational being) to a winged chariot, and a driver or charioteer, both together:" meaning by the chariot an enlivened body; and by the charioteer, the incorporeal soul itself acting it.[4]

* Page 290. [Page 212.] [10] Page 214.

[1] By these words Hierocles is defining what the Platonists call a hero, p. 212. But with him *hero*, *demon*, and *angel* are synonymous terms. See his Comm. p. 36.

[2] Lib. 5. p. 230.

[3] Certainly many of the Platonists formerly held this opinion concerning demons. See Porphyry, De Abstinentia ab Esu Animalium, lib. 2. sect. 38. p. 81. &c. and others.

[4] This digression upon the celestial and ethereal body, formerly ascribed by the Platonists and others to Hesiod, has earned for our author a high meed of praise among the learned who are versed in these subjects. [It is commended by Jo. Grammius, Diss. 7. de Allegatione τῶν LXX. in N. T. where he also makes some remarks upon the body of the soul, p. 260. 262. &c.] J. Le Clerc confesses that no modern writer has more elaborately and learnedly illustrated this argument, which is however of such great importance towards a full and correct comprehension of the

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And now have we given a full account, in what manner the

ancient philosophers and early Christian fathers, Biblioth. Choisie, tom. 8. p. 59. The venerable J. Christ. Wolf, Nota ad Origenis Philosophumena, declares that he knows of no one that has expounded this dogma of the Platonists more clearly, copiously, and elaborately than Dr. Cudworth. I pass over others who pronounce this portion of his work to be especially deserving of commendation. From this judgment of scholars of the highest eminence it would be rashness in me or any one else to dissent. Still I doubt not I shall be pardoned by the wise, if, although far inferior in erudition and intellect, I add a remark or two to so many excellent and learned observations, and modestly correct certain statements of our author which seem to me not to be characterized by his accustomed caution and accuracy.

Sect. I. In the first place, we ought I consider, to inquire more minutely into the origin of this Platonic doctrine on the body or bodies of souls: for unless this be done, it is impossible but that many mistakes must arise in judging of its true nature and character, and in expounding the sayings both of the ancient philosophers and Christians. As far then as the obscurity of antiquity will permit, I shall first examine the source from which the whole of this philosophy emanated. That the first founders of this sect arrived at the dogma by reason and meditation, I can never be made to believe, although many worthy men seem to entertain this view: on the contrary, I am satisfied that it was wholly derived and collected as it were from the vulgar and popular opinions which, long before the existence of the junior Platonic sect, were diffused through the Greek and oriental nations. Let others think what they please of the discipline of the junior Platonists; for my part, after bestowing no trifling labour upon its investigation, a task which no one ought to shrink from who wishes to become acquainted with the affairs of the earliest Christians, I have come to the firm conviction that this discipline is for the most part nothing more than an accumulation of popular opinions, accommodated to the precepts of the ancient philosophers, especially of Pythagoras and Plato. It is evident from innumerable sayings of the, philosophers of this school, that they held as one of their primary and fundamental precepts, that the tenets and opinions of their ancestors were to be scrupulously retained, and that no popular doctrine derived from ancient times was to be repudiated, but merely required an apt and suitable interpretation. Hence, there is no opinion in Homer and Hesiod, no superstition of the vulgar, which they do not every where endeavour to refine upon and to explain in conformity with their own doctrines: a fact that, if the subject and space would permit, might be proved by an infinity of examples. In matters pertaining to the nature and condition of the soul, above all others, they considered that the opinions of the ancients, that is, the vulgar, were to be adhered to, and under no consideration to be abandoned. That I may not appear to have said any thing at random, I shall demonstrate this by some passages of Plotinus, a common preceptor as it were of this sect. This philosopher, then, Ennead 2. lib. 9. cap. 6. p. 704. discourses as follows: *Μηδὲν τοὺς θείους ἄνδρας διασύροντας· ἀλλ' εὐμενῶς δεχομένων τὰ ἐκείνων ὡς παλαιοτέρων· καὶ ἃ καλῶς λέγουσι παρ' ἐκείνων λαβόντας, ψυχῆς ἀθανασίαν, νοητὸν κόσμον, θεὸν τὸν πρῶτον, τὸ τὴν ψυχὴν δεῖν φεύγειν τὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα ὁμιλίαν, κ. τ. λ.* "It behoves us by no means to cavil at the divine men, but kindly and favourably to interpret the mysteries of the ancients, receiving from them what they well and truly speak of, the immortality of the soul, the intelligible world, the first God; also that the soul ought to fly from the intercourse of the body: again, that its separation from the body is nothing more than its transition from generation to essence." And afterwards: *Οὐ παρὰ φαύλων ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι φέγειν, λέγοντας ἑαυτοὺς ἐκείνων ἀμείνους εἶναι, ἐπεὶ τά γε εἰρημένα τοῖς παλαιοῖς περὶ τῶν νοητῶν, πολλῷ ἀμείνω καὶ πεπαιδευμένως εἴρηται, καὶ τοῖς μὴ ἐξαπατωμένοις τὴν ἐπιδεύουσαν εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἀπάτην, ῥᾳδίως γνωστήσεται,* "It is wholly ridiculous for them to declare that they are better than those (the ancients): for what the ancients have recorded respecting intelligible things, is much better and more learnedly said, and will be understood by those who are not deceived by the fallacy diffused among men." But this partiality for the ancients and their opinions had been imbibed from Plato himself, who in his Timæus, sect. 26. p. 249. thus expresses himself, whether seriously or not, I cannot say: *Ἀδύνατον οὖν θεῶν παισὶν ἀπιστεῖν, καίπερ ἄνευ εἰκότων τε καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἀποδείξεων λέγουσι, ἀλλ' ὡς οἰκεῖα φάσκουσιν ἀπαγγέλλειν, ἑπομένους τῷ νόμῳ πιστευτέον,* "It is impossible therefore to disbelieve the sons of the gods, although

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ancient assertors of incorporeal substance, as unextended, answered

they speak without probable arguments and conclusive demonstrations; but as they profess to relate matters belonging peculiarly to themselves, we ought to obey the law and believe them." Nor is Plato unmindful of this precept in his writings, in which, as every one conversant with them must be aware, he rarely dissents from the tenets and opinions of his own time, but endeavours, with all the dexterity he is master of, to adapt and accommodate them to his own doctrines. Add also what Marinus, in his life of Proclus records of the talent of this great Platonist, and his predilection for the ancients, cap. 19. p. 47. cap. 22. p. 53. &c. The Platonist in Æneas Gazæus, in Theophrastus, p. 65. ed. Barthii, expressly calls these very opinions on the bodies of souls, *τὰ τῶν παλαίων ἀπορρήτα*, "the sacred mysteries of the ancients."

Sect. II. Such being the case, those who wish to understand the true nature of the Platonic dogma on the body of the soul and the state of the soul itself, must investigate the vulgar discipline, such as was in vogue before the time of Plato himself, and compare it with the tenets of this sect. I will try whether I can furnish any information to those who are disposed to undertake this task. The most ancient sages, who flourished prior to all the Greek philosophers that we know of, seem to have entertained this fixed opinion, that there are two souls in man, one the seat and residence of animal life, the senses and desires, or *sentient*, the other partaking of reason and intelligence, or *rational*: the latter of divine origin, and therefore immortal, the former of a far inferior nature, and consequently not incapable of utterly perishing: that they are both united in this life, and after the death of the body remain so united in most persons: but yet that they can be separated and in reality are so on the decease of great men. This opinion flowed to the multitude and common people; by whom, as generally happens, it was disfigured by so many foolish errors and opinions, as to be scarcely recognizable. And this corruption was in no slight degree contributed to by the poets, who by their fables, figures, fictions, and embellishments, have notoriously corrupted even the best doctrines, and rendered them contemptible in the eyes of wise men. Evident traces of this dogma are extant in the most ancient poet Homer, although, according to the poetic wont, he every where obscures its light, and does not always sufficiently clearly express its genuine sense and meaning. This has not altogether escaped the notice of the author of Homer's life, commonly said to be Plutarch, but according to others, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who, p. 345. ed. Th. Gale, contends that Homer, like the philosophers, assigned two parts to the soul, one rational, the other irrational, *τὸ λογικὸν καὶ τὸ ἄλογον*. We shall demonstrate the same thing a little more plainly in the sequel, because, by ascertaining the doctrine of Homer, we at the same time will become acquainted with the opinion entertained by the more intelligent upon the same subject both before and after his time. The rational soul is called by Homer *φρὴν*, *φρένες*, and *νοῦς*: to this in many places he opposes *θυμὸς*; by which name he designates the animal, sensual, and concupiscent soul. In Iliad. lib. 1. v. 188. p. 17. tom. 1. ed. Barnesii, he thus speaks of the anger of Achilles:

Πηλείωνι δ' ἄχος γένετ', ἐν δὲ οἱ ἦτορ
Στήθεσσιν λασίοισι διάνδιχα μερμήριξεν,
Ἢ ὅγε φάσγανον ὀξὺ ἐρυσσάμενος παρὰ μηροῦ
Τοὺς μὲν ἀναστήσειεν, ὁ δ' Ἀτρείδην ἐναρίξοι
Ἠὲ χόλον παύσειεν, ἐρητύσειέ τε ΘΥΜΟ'Ν·
Ὣς ὁ ταῦθ' ὥρμαινε κατὰ ΦΡΕ'ΝΑ καὶ κατὰ ΘΥΜΟ'Ν,

"But in Pelides grief arose, and in his manly breast his heart fluctuated between two resolves, whether to draw his keen-edged sword from his side, and having removed the others, to slay the son of Atreus, or to curb his rage and restrain his fury. While he revolved these things in his mind and soul." In these verses the soul of Achilles, deliberating upon the course to be pursued, is distinguished from that in which anger and fury resided; and in the last verse *φρὴν* or *νοῦς*, as the ancient scholiast rightly expounds it, is opposed to *θυμὸς*, upon the restraining of which the soul is said in the preceding verse to have deliberated. I cannot but observe, by the way that this passage shows Homer to have placed the seat of the rational soul in the heart; to which undoubtedly it is owing that he very frequently calls it *φρένες* from its supposed place of abode. The ancient biographer of Homer is certainly mistaken, in supposing, p. 345.

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that objection against the illocality and immobility of particular

as many philosophers have done, that this poet assigned the soul its place in the head. In Iliad Ξ. v. 294. p. 548. he thus sings of Jupiter beholding Juno most beautifully adorned:

Ὡς δ' ἴδεν, ὡς μὲν ἔρως πυκινὰς φρένας ἀμφεκάλυψεν,

"When he saw, immediately love enveloped his prudent mind." Here again, ἔρως, "love," or the concupiscent soul, and φρένες, the intelligent and rational mind, dwelling in the region of the heart, are opposed to each other: and the former is said to have subdued the latter. Penelope thus addresses her nurse, Odyss. lib. Ψ. v. 14. p. 596.

Πρὶν δὲ ΦΡΕ΄ΝΑΣ αἰσίμη ἦσθά,
Τίπτε μὲ λωβεύεις πολυπενθέα ΘΥΜΟ΄Ν ἔχουσαν,

"Since before thou wast discreet in thy mind, why dost thou deride me having a much afflicted soul." Here also the distinction observed by Homer between φρένες and θυμὸς is sufficiently apparent. To the former he ascribes wisdom and reason, to the latter sorrow. Many more passages of the same kind will be met with by those who read his works; which, that I may not wander altogether from my purpose, I for the present pass over. I confess, however, that they do not prove him to have supposed these two souls to be of a different nature, and not to be so associated as to be incapable of being separated: but this will be made appear by other passages which I shall quote by and by. That after Homer's time an infinite multitude of philosophers and poets, Greek as well as Roman, professed this twofold soul in men, is too notorious to require being corroborated by testimonies. Even the names themselves by which these souls are designated were borrowed by them from Homer. Concerning Pythagoras, Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 8. segm. 30. p. 512. says: Τὴν δὲ ἀνθρώπων ψυχὴν διαιρεῖσθαι τριχῇ, εἰς τὸν νοῦν καὶ φρένας καὶ θυμόν, "He made a threefold division of the soul into mind, and soul, and sense." In Homer νοῦς and φρένες are not different: the rest are Homeric.

Sect. III. The ancients supposed the rational soul to descend to men from the gods, or to be of celestial origin, and a certain portion of purer ether sent down into mortal bodies. [For in the earliest ages, God himself was believed to be light and ether. So Zeno expressly declares, Cicero De Natur. Deor. lib. 1. cap. 14. p. 2901. And Cleanthes, ibid. Deus æther, "God the ether." See Bouhier, Not. ad Cic. de Natur. Deor. p. 2902. who is mistaken in supposing fire and ether to be the same.] But according to Cicero, De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 40. p. 3021. Æther est ultimus et a domiciliis nostris altissimus, omnia cingens et coërcens cœli complexus,————extrema ora et determinatio mundi: in quo cum admirabilitate maxima igneæ formæ cursus ordinatos definiunt, "Ether is the last and highest from where we dwell, surrounding all things and confining the compass of heaven,————the extreme margin and boundary of the world: in which the fiery forms most wonderfully define their appointed courses." This may be proved by innumerable passages of ancient authors, some of which only I shall adduce. [Cicero also applies the term ardorem cœli, "the heat or burning brightness of heaven," De Natur. Deor. lib. 1. cap. 13. p. 2899. On God considered as fire, see Beausobre, Hist. du Manich. p. 466.] Euripides, who received his discipline from the illustrious philosopher Anaxagoras, in a tragedy entitled Chrysippus, thus formerly sung:

Γαῖα μεγίστη καὶ Διὸς αἰθὴρ,
Ὁ μὲν ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν γενέτωρ
————τίκτει θνατούς·
Χώρει δ' ὀπίσω τὰ μὲν ἐκ γαίας
Φύντ' εἰς γαῖαν· τὰ δ' ἀπ' αἰθερίου
Βλάστοντα γονῆς εἰς οὐράνιον
Πόλον ἦλθε πάλιν,

"The mighty earth, and the ether of Jove, the father of men and gods, generate the human race. What is produced from the earth, goes back again to earth, and that

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finite spirits, demons or angels, and human souls; that these

which springs from ethereal seed returns to the celestial pole." See Hugonis Grotii Excerpta ex Antiquis Tragicis et Comicis, p. 416. These verses require no interpretation: for it is manifest from them that this tragedian supposed souls to come from the ether into the bodies of animals, and on the dissolution of the body to return again to ether. And every one must be aware that the tragedians and comedians of former times propounded on the stage the most popular and generally received opinions. I will add the very ancient comic writer, Pacuvius, who, according to Nonius Marcellus, De Proprietate Sermonum, cap. 2. in Dionysii Godofredi Auctoribus Linguæ Latinæ, p. 525. in Chryse, has left this on record: Mater est terra, ea parit corpus: *animam æther* adjugat, "Earth is the mother, she produces the body: ether adds the soul." Some manuscripts have the most corrupt and utterly unmeaning reading: anima mater adjungat. This opinion was adopted by Pythagoras, as were most of those which were diffused among the oriental nations; for he is said by Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 8. segm. 28. p. 509. to have taught, *εἶναι ψυχὴν ἀπόσπασμα αἰθέρος*, "that the soul is an avulsion or detached portion of ether." Nay, even the Jewish philosophers, the Essenes, did not hesitate to admit this ancient opinion among their doctrines, as Josephus informs us in these words, De Bello Judaico, lib. 2. cap. 8. sect. 2. p. 164. *Καὶ γὰρ ἔῤῥωται παρ' αὐτοῖς ἥδε ἡ δόξα, φθαρτὰ μὲν εἶναι τὰ σώματα——τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς ἀθανάτους ἀεὶ διαμένειν καὶ συμπλέκεσθαι μὲν ἐκ τοῦ λεπτοτάτου φοιτώσας αἰθέρος τοῖς σώμασιν*, "For this opinion also prevails among them, that bodies are perishable, but that souls are immortal and everlasting, and come from the most subtle ether into connexion with the body." Many, I am aware, will consider this opinion to be remarkable, and contrary to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, which these ancients professed. But I would again remind them, as I have already repeatedly done, that no wise man ought to judge of the precepts of the ancients from our own opinions. We indeed consider that every thing corporeal and consisting of matter is destitute of life, consists of parts, and therefore can be dissolved and perish. But most of the ancients thought differently, and were convinced that all matter is not capable of being dissipated, but that some is alive, indivisible, and eternal. The highest ether in particular was supposed by them to be endowed with life, devoid of all corruption, and even of the same nature as God himself. In Homer, the ether is called divine, Odyss. lib. T. v. 540:

——ὁ δ' ἐς αἰθέρα δῖαν ἀέρθη,

"But he was raised up into the divine ether." [Ovid. Metam. 1. ver. 68. 80.] Pythagoras clearly taught that the soul was immortal, because of the nature from which it is derived being immortal: *Ἀθάνατον δὲ εἶναι ψυχήν, ἐπειδήπερ καὶ τὸ ἀφ' οὗ ἀπέσπαστο, ἀθάνατος ἐστί*, "That the soul is immortal, since that also from which it is plucked, is immortal," Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 8. segm. 28. p. 509. 510. For as we have already seen, he supposed the soul to be plucked from the ether, when it is joined to the body. Jamblichus, according to the opinion of the Egyptians, De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. 1. cap. 17. p. 29. *Τὸ οὐράνιον σῶμα πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν ἀσώματον οὐσίαν τῶν θεῶν ἐστὶ συγγενέστατον· μιᾶς μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνης οὔσης, αὐτὸ ἁπλοῦν ἐστιν, ἀμερίστου δὲ ἀδιαιρέτου, καὶ ἀτρέπτου ὡσαύτως ἀναλλοίωτον*, "The celestial body is most closely allied to the incorporeal substance of the gods: for as that is one, so this is simple; as that is indivisible, so this is also indivisible; as that is immutable, so this is invariable." If more testimonies be required, add the Indian Brahmin, Jarchas, in Philostrati Vita Apollonii Tyanæi, lib. 3. cap. 34. p. 125. Hierocles, Comment. in Aurea Carmina Pythagoræ, p. 228. where he calls ether *ἄϋλον καὶ ἀΐδιον σῶμα*, "an immaterial and eternal body;" Apuleius, De Mundo, p. 58. &c. and others, to quote whose passages would be tedious and unnecessary.

Sect. IV. On the opinion of the antehomeric philosophers respecting the origin of the sentient soul, I can hazard nothing more than conjecture: for I have always considered it an unsafe and irrational course to estimate the doctrines of bygone ages from the opinions of later philosophers. Perhaps they supposed this soul to be a portion of that spirit which they believed to pervade the whole universe, and to animate all generated things. Of the nature and character they assigned to it, I am able to speak with more certainty. It was regarded by them as a certain corporeal spirit, which was diffused through the entire body, and therefore possessed the same form as the human body,

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being all naturally incorporate, however in themselves and

and which was fed and nourished by the blood of a man as its own proper food. What I here state in respect to the nature and form of this soul will be made manifest from passages of the ancients which I purpose bringing forward by and by: for the present I shall merely say a few words on the subject of its aliment. That the earliest philosophers imagined the sentient souls to be fed by blood is put beyond all question even by the history of Ulysses in Homer. For when he has descended into the infernal regions, or the abode of souls divested of their earthly body, he is commanded to sacrifice beasts in order to propitiate these souls, and on their approach to offer them the blood to drink: nor are the souls able to speak the truth, and to tell of their own affairs, till they have quaffed the blood. See Odyss. Λ. p. 277. &c. tom. 2. This appetite for blood no one will ascribe to the rational soul, whose nature, according to the opinion of the ancients, being ethereal and allied to the gods, cannot be distracted by any desires of the kind. We are left to suppose, therefore, that the sentient souls which had hitherto been associated with the rational, as we shall see by and by, retained the recollection and love of their ancient nutriment, and unless refreshed by it were unable to develope all their energies, and to discourse with intelligence and aptitude. The doctrine concealed under this fable was well understood by the ancient author of Homer's Life, who p. 341. says: Καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ᾔδει, ὅτι τὸ αἷμα νομὴ καὶ τροφὴ ἐστὶ τοῦ πνεύματος, "For he (Homer) knew that blood is the food and aliment of the spirit." He is in doubt whether it is the soul itself which requires this food, or its vehicle which is nothing more than what we call the sentient soul. But he would not have doubted, if he had been further removed from the discipline of the Platonists, who did violence to the ancient doctrine respecting souls, by bending it too much to a conformity with their own precepts. Diogenes Laërtius records of Pythagoras, lib. 8. segm. 31. p. 513. τρέφεσθαί τε τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἵματος, "He said that the soul is nourished by blood," that is, the sentient soul. Porphyry, speaking of the souls which, as the Platonists say, are ἐν τῇ γενέσει, "in generation," or united with the sentient souls, De Antro Nympharum, p. 257. says: αἷμα μὲν οὖν ταύταις καὶ ὁ δίψυχος γόνος φίλος, "and for that reason these souls delight in blood and moist seed." Wherefore those who formerly boasted of being able to evoke the souls of the dead, as we are told by the same Porphyry and others, said that they were chiefly attracted by the effusion of blood.

Sect. V. These two souls, the rational and sentient, during the life of the body in which they dwell, are closely and intimately associated with each other, but yet, if we are to believe the ancients, not so as entirely to coalesce and combine into one nature, and to be incapable of separation. At the death of the generality of persons, indeed, both souls, as if bound and chained together, descend into the realms of Pluto. But some men, in whom there is greater virtue and mental vigour during life, can preserve themselves pure and uncontaminated by the influence and desires of the sentient soul, so that on the dissolution of the body the rational soul returns to the upper regions from whence it came, and leaves the sentient to descend alone into the lower world. Most of the later Greek and Latin philosophers, indeed, supposed the sentient soul to be merely a part or faculty of the rational: of whom Aristotle, as is well known, affirmed that the sentient exists in the rational in the same way as a quadrangle in a triangle: but the more ancient believed that these two souls can be entirely disconnected, and exist separately from each other. Should any one consider this to be scarcely credible, let him attentively examine the testimonies of Greek and Latin authors, which I shall now produce. The first is a saying of Euripides from the tragedy entitled Helen, ver. 1020. p. m. 578.

Ὁ νοῦς
Τῶν κατθανόντων ζῇ μὲν οὐ, γνωμὴν δ' ἔχει
Ἀθάνατον, εἰς ἀθάνατον αἰθὴρ' ἐμπέσων.

"For the soul of the dead does not live, but yet possesses immortal reason, falling into the immortal ether." Euripides' opinion concerning God was singular, and unless it be known, the true force of these verses of his will not easily be understood. This poet supposed God to be a subtle, thin, and fiery nature, extended and diffused on all sides: or, in other words, believed the ether to be the same as God. This is shown by his well known verses, preserved by Stobæus and others, in which he says that ether is

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directly immoveable, yet were capable of being in sense moved

God. Wherefore when he here says that souls are transferred into the immortal ether, he strictly means that at the death of the body they are again joined with or return to what he supposed to be the immortal and eternal God from whom they came. And yet, according to his opinion, they are not commingled with the divine nature after the death of the body, but remain as self-existent things, although they altogether change their state. For they no longer live, but have merely immortal γνωμὴ, or mind; the meaning of which words I conceive to be no other than this: that the vital and sentient part is detached and separated from the soul on its departure from the body, and the interior power of reason and mind alone ascends to the upper regions. Wherefore this passage completely proves that the ancients held it to be possible for the sentient soul to be severed and disconnected from that which possesses γνωμὴ and reason. But still, I own, it affords no evidence of the sentient soul being a nature which can subsist and remain by itself after the other has parted from it, and therefore we shall require more clear and conclusive testimonies. Among the great multitude of souls, which the Ulysses of Homer beholds in the infernal regions, is that also of Hercules, terrible indeed to all the rest of the shades, but of a far different kind. For the others are all whole and entire: but the soul of Hercules is deprived of its noblest part, namely the mind, which had flown to heaven, Odyss. Λ. ver. 600. p. 311.

Τὸν δὲ μετ' εἰσενόησα βιὴν Ἡρακληείην,
Εἴδωλον· αὐτὸς δὲ μετ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι
Τέρπεται ἐν θαλίῃς.

"After him I saw the strength of Hercules, his image: for he himself enjoys the banquets among the immortal gods." I am aware that Lucian is very facetious upon this passage of Homer, and makes this twofold Hercules, one dwelling in heaven and the other in the lower regions, the subject of severe satire and ridicule in his Dialogue of Diogenes and Hercules, tom. 1. p. 298. and that his example is followed by many ancient as well as modern authors, who consider it to be the most stupid and absurd of fictions. [Cicero De Natura Deor. lib. 3. cap. 16. tom. 9. p. 3071. &c. has fallen into the same error.] And those grammarians and critics, who are admirers of Homer, torture themselves wonderfully in order to invent an explanation of this passage, which may satisfy the scruples of these cavillers. But Lucian, I consider, would have been more sparing of his ridicule if he had looked into the thing itself, divested of all figments, figures, and poetic integuments, and had been more deeply versed in the philosophy of antiquity. For in this fable lies concealed that ancient dogma, which with a slight variation, many of the Platonists afterwards adopted as their own: that the souls of heroes and great men are released by death from the bonds of the body, and of the sentient soul at the same time, and that the sentient and vital soul alone passes to the infernal realms, and there remains. Undoubtedly the εἴδωλον of Hercules introduced by Homer is his sentient soul: which is evident even from the fact that he designates it by the peculiar word βιὴν, "the strength of Hercules," while he calls the rest of the souls sojourning in the lower world ψυχαί. For courage and strength belong to the vital power of man, and not to his mind and reason; and therefore that soul only of Hercules, in which his βιὴ had resided, was saluted by Ulysses in the realms of Pluto. I shall add to this another passage of Homer, which many I am aware have considered to be even more explicit than the preceding one. To Achilles sleeping on the seashore the soul of Patroclus appears, perfectly representing the form which he possessed when living:

Πάντ' αὐτῷ μέγεθός τε καὶ ὄμματα κάλ' εἰκυῖα
Καὶ φωνήν,

"Altogether resembling him in bulk and beautiful eyes and voice." Iliad, lib. Ψ. ver. 66. p. 851. And what kind of soul is this? It possesses sense and life, but is destitute of mind and reason. This is declared by Achilles after its departure in these words, ver. 104. p. 853.

Ὦ πόποι, ἦ ῥά τις ἐστὶ καὶ εἰν ἀΐδαο δόμοισι
Ψυχὴ καὶ εἴδωλον, ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἔνι παμπαν,

"O wonderful! there is certainly therefore a soul and image in the mansions of Orcus, but mind is not in it." Grammarians dispute much as to what these

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by accident, together with those bodies, respectively, which they

φρένες are which Achilles denies to be in souls, particularly in the soul of Patroclus. But let them cease their contentions, as the thing is sufficiently plain and clear. The term φρένες, as we have observed before, and as is shown by innumerable passages of this poet, is applied by him to the rational and intellectual soul, which he supposed to reside about the φρένες or midriff. For Patroclus being an illustrious man and a hero, his *ethereal sense*, or soul partaking of mind and reason, had on the death of the body immediately taken its flight to the gods: but the other, or sentient one, was supposed to have descended to the dominions of Pluto and the community of shades. Great men therefore, and those renowned for warlike prowess, who had despised the pleasures of sense, and had encountered the greatest dangers or met with their death in the defence of their country and fellow citizens, were believed in the remotest ages to enjoy this privilege, that their minds were released at the very point of death from the bonds of the sentient soul, and migrated to the gods. For it seemed just and reasonable that those who had renounced pleasures and the empire of the senses, when alive, and had made no account even of life itself, should at once be freed from all corporeal sense and animal life after death, and be united with purer minds. This opinion flowed to succeeding ages, and not only fixed itself in the minds of most heathen nations, but unfortunately reached the Christians also; who retained the doctrine itself, but substituted their own martyrs and confessors in lieu of heroes. [Irenæus, lib. 1. cap. 10. p. 48. Tertull. De Resurrectione Corporis. Origenes, Contra Celsum, lib. 7. p. 334. Warburton, Divine Legation of Moses, tom. 1.] But of these elsewhere: we are now treating of such as were strangers to the true religion. There are manifest traces of the opinion we speak of in the oration of Titus Vespasian to his soldiers, in Josephus, De Bello Judaico, lib. 6. cap. 1. sect. 5. p. 370. who doubtless recited the common opinion of the Romans: Τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδε τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν, ὅτι τὰς μὲν ἐν παρατάξει ψυχὰς σιδήρῳ τῶν σαρκῶν ἀπολυθείσας, τὸ καθαρώτατον στοιχεῖον αἰθὴρ ξενοδοχῶν ἄστροις ἐγκαθιδρύει· δαίμονες δὲ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἥρωες εὐμενεῖς ἰδίοις ἐκγόνοις ἐμφανίζονται· τὰς δὲ ἐν νοσοῦσι τοῖς σώμασι, συντακείσας, κἂν τὰ μάλιστα κηλίδων ἢ μιασμάτων ὦσι καθαραὶ, νὺξ ὑπόγειος ἀφανίζει καὶ λήθη βαθεῖα δέχεται, "For what brave man does not know that souls released from the bodies by the sword in battle are received by that purest element, the ether, and lodged among the stars; and that they appear as good demons and propitious heroes to their posterity: but that those which waste away along with the bodies in disease, although they may be free from all stain and pollution, disappear in subterranean night, and are buried in profound oblivion." And, to say nothing at present of other nations, the same opinion must have been entertained by the Alani, of whom Ammianus Marcellinus, Historiar. lib. 31. cap. 2. p. 620. says: "Among them he is accounted a *happy* man who has lost his life in battle." To these add a passage of Cicero, Tuscul. Quæst. lib. 1. cap. 12. p. 2578. tom. 8. opp. wherein he expounds the opinion of the ancient Greeks and Romans on the state of the soul after the death of the body: Mors est quædam quasi migratio, commutatioque vitæ, quæ *in claris viris et fœminis* dux in cœlum solet esse: in ceteris humi et retinetur et permanet tamen, "Death is a certain migration as it were and change of life, which in the case of illustrious men and women is wont to be a guide to heaven: in the rest it is retained in the ground (that is, I suppose, descends into the regions beneath the earth) and nevertheless remains." Cicero afterwards adduces examples of heroes whose souls on departing from the body immediately ascended into heaven. [Add De Natura Deor. lib. 3. cap. 5. on Castor and Pollux. On the Celts consult Pelloutier and on the Danes Bartholini.] Afterwards, when philosophers sprung up among the Greeks and sought to accommodate the popular opinions to their own precepts, they were unwilling to leave this glory to warriors alone, and persuaded their disciples that their own souls also, devoted wholly to contemplation, belong to the same class and after the death of the body are immediately transferred to the society of the gods. I shall prove this by a striking passage of Plato or rather Socrates, from the Phædo, p. 400. Οἱ δὲ δὴ ἂν δόξωσι διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ὁσίως βιῶναι, οὗτοι εἰσὶν οἱ τῶνδε μὲν τῶν τόπων τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ ἐλευθερώμενοί τε καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι, ὥσπερ δεσμωτηρίων, ἄνω δὲ εἰς τὴν καθαρὰν οἴκησιν ἀφικνούμενοι, καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς οἰκιζόμενοι· τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφίᾳ ἱκανῶς καθῃρμένοι ἄνευ τε σωμάτων ζῶσι τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον καὶ εἰς οἰκήσεις ἐπὶ τούτων καλλίους ἀφικνοῦνται, "Those who are found to have lived a pre-eminently pious and holy life, being freed

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are vitally united to. But as for that pretence, that these finite

and released from terrestrial places as from a prison, ascend upwards into a pure habitation and dwell above the earth: and among these whoever have been sufficiently purified by philosophy live altogether without bodies hereafter and obtain habitations even more beautiful than the others." This is a passage that deserves a somewhat more minute consideration. Plato makes mention in it of a twofold class, one of pious and good men, the other of philosophers. The souls of the pious, he tells us, do not pass into the infernal realms after death, but ascend to pure and delightful regions above the earth. But he adds that philosophers attain still greater felicity after the decease of the body: for in the first place they are assigned a more beautiful habitation than these, and secondly, will be entirely without bodies, *ἄνευ σωμάτων*. And what bodies, pray, are these? The earthy ones with which we are invested while living? By no means: for all men when they die, whether pious or impious, philosophers or illiterate, are alike stript of these bodies. The bodies he speaks of therefore must of necessity be the sentient souls, which the ancients supposed to be subtle bodies. The philosophers, according to Plato's opinion, are divested of these souls, because they were wholly devoted to contemplation during life, and abstracted their mind from the senses; but not so the rest of men, not even the pious and good, because these, although they lived a pure and spotless life, were nevertheless unable completely to withdraw themselves from the dominion of the senses. To this add another passage from the Phædo, p. 386.: *Εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι καὶ παντελῶς καθαρῷ ἀπιόντι οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἄλλῳ ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ*, "No one is allowed to enter into the family of the gods (after death) but the lover of learning alone, who has devoted himself to philosophy and died perfectly pure." Compare the same in his Gorgias, p. 314. which passage I at present pass over for the sake of brevity. [The souls of great men were supposed by the ancients to ascend after death to the stars, and to reside in the milky way. See Leich, Ad Carmina Sepulcralia ex Anthologia, p. 2. 3. &c. Compare Sebast. Pauli Diss. de nomine Divus in Opuscoli Scientifici, tom. 15. p. 112. who disputes copiously concerning the vehicles and idol. Some passages of the kind occur also in Lafiteau, Mœurs des Sauvages Ameriquains, tom. 2. p. 425.]

Sect. VI. To these Greek witnesses I shall add some Latin ones, who imbibed the opinions and sentiments of the ancient Greeks, chiefly through the instrumentality of the poets. Let the first be Ennius, a shrewd reader and imitator of the Greek poets, of whose opinion Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, lib. 1. v. 121. p. 45. thus sings:

> Etsi præterea tamen esse Acherusia templa
> Ennius æternis exponit versibus, edens:
> Quo neque permanent animæ, neque corpora nostra:
> Sed quædam simulacra modis pallentia miris.

These simulacra or images, which Ennius distinguishes from body and soul, are nothing more than the *πνεύματα* of Homer, which Ulysses beheld in the lower regions, or spirits representing the form of the human body. But Ennius deviated from the tenets of the ancients, if as Lucretius records, he really inculcated that the images of all men were separated after death from mind and soul, and departed void and empty into the lower world. It is certain that not a few of the Platonists were of this opinion, from whom probably the poet borrowed it. But the earlier philosophy taught a different doctrine, as we have already seen, and held that great and illustrious men have the felicity of being at once freed from their images at the decease of the body, and that the minds of most men descend into the infernal realms along with the sentient souls for the purpose of purification. This may easily be learnt from Servius, who, in speaking of the same opinion, adds, that it is clearly and aptly handed down by philosophers, meaning beyond doubt the Platonists. "It is also," says he, "a subject of much controversy among philosophers, what this is that goes into the lower world. For we consist of three things: the soul, which is from above and returns to its source and origin; the body, which finally dissolves into earth; the shade, which Lucretius thus defines: Supra spoliatus lumine aër, 'air deprived of the light above.' The shade therefore, which is produced from the body, no doubt, perishes with it, nor is there any thing left of the man which can descend into the lower realms. But they discovered that there is a certain image, fashioned in resemblance of our body, which descends into these realms, a corporeal form or spectre, which is impalpable like the wind."

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spirits or substances incorporeal, being unextended, and so having

Neither in these words nor in those which follow does Servius display any great knowledge of the ancient philosophy, not even the Platonic; but let others correct his errors; for me it is sufficient to have shown in him the seeds of the ancient dogma which I am here attempting to bring to light. It is much better expressed by Ovid, where he introduces Vesta speaking of Julius Cæsar, who is said by this goddess to have abandoned his image and ascended to the gods, Fastorum lib. 8. v. 699. &c. p. 210. 211. tom. 3. opp.

Meus fuit ille sacerdos,
Sacrilegæ telis me petiere manus.
Ipsa *virum* rapui, *simulacraque nuda* reliqui,
Quæ cecidit ferro, Cæsaris umbra fuit.
Ille quidem cœlo positus Jovis atria servat
Et tenet in magno templa dicata foro.

[Metam. lib. 12. p. 618. 619.] The learned annotators who have elucidated Ovid by their observations, have entirely passed over this remarkable passage, which in comparison with many others was deserving of their especial attention. For in it the poet speaks aptly and wisely according to the standard of the most ancient discipline. The sentient soul, the image of so great an emperor and hero as Cæsar, is said to have remained naked and to have passed into the infernal regions; the celestial soul had returned to the gods from whom it sprung. [Ovid. Trist. lib. 3. Eleg. 3. v. 58. 59. makes mention animarum suarum, "of his own souls," and declares that one is in the air; although he supposed the manes to descend into the lower regions. He seems to have thought, therefore, that his own soul, as of a poet, is dissevered from the sensitive soul after death; but that his parent, a man of less authority and importance, was altogether in the lower realms, lib. 4. Eleg. 10. v. 85. &c. Horace, Odar. lib. 1. 24. Num vanæ redeat sanguis imagini, "Whether the blood returns to the empty image.' Hence arose the whole of the apotheosis of the Roman emperors, who were believed to ascend into heaven, leaving their εἴδωλον behind, and to be received into the society of the gods. See Aurelius Victor, De M. Antonio, p. 526.] Lucan, who sings the praises of Cæsar's enemy Pompey, attributes to him the same felicity and glory, Pharsal. lib. 9. v. 1. &c. p. 236. &c.

At non in Pharia manes jacuere favilla,
Nec cinis exiguus tantam compescuit umbram:
Prosiluit busto; semiustaque membra relinquens,
Degeneremque rogum, sequitur convexa tonantis,
Qua niger astriferis connectitur axibus aër:
Quodque patet terras inter, lunæque meatus
Semi-Dei manes habitant, quos *ignea virtus*
Innocuos vitæ patientes ætheris imi
Fecit, et æternos animam collegit in orbes.

The poet, I confess, does not here speak expressly of the shade or image of Pompey passing to the infernal regions, but records merely that his rational soul had proceeded to the council of the demi-gods. But as Lucan is evidently writing according to the popular opinion of the ancients, and this opinion inculcates that a portion even of the heroes themselves, Bacchus, Hercules, and the rest, descended into those regions, there can be no doubt of his having meant, though obscurely, that the shade of his own hero had gone to the same place. And these very verses are a proof that the poet distinguished between the rational and sentient soul of Pompey. For he supposes his mind to have flown up to the stars, and the highest ether from the funeral pile itself, and not till the body was half burnt. Whereas the life and sense of this illustrious man had already quitted the body before its members were laid upon the pile. Consequently the mind and celestial soul, the portion acceptable to the gods, remained in the body for some time after this was deprived of life, although in the mean while the sentient soul, as the ancients believed, had departed to the shades. [Nor was this opinion unknown to the Jews; see a passage from the Shalsheleth Hakkabala.]

Sect. VII. It is scarcely possible to express the confusion, doubt, and obscurity to which an ignorance of this ancient dogma has given rise in the lucubrations even of

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in themselves no relation to any place, might therefore actuate

men who were eminent for their learning and for their profound acquaintance with matters of antiquity. For unless light and clearness be obtained from this source, there are many things in the rites and ceremonies of the Greeks and Romans which are altogether obscure, and many things in the disciplines of some philosophers which appear self-contradictory and almost inexplicable; a fact which I recollect having shown above by an example from the philosophy of Empedocles. The purpose of this disputation calls me to other matters, nor can I consume any time in illustrating what I have just stated; nevertheless, I shall adduce a specimen to prove how much assistance is afforded by this doctrine towards a full comprehension of the precepts of the ancients. It is well known that Pythagoras, Plato, Ennius, the ancient Egyptians, and others of the older philosophers, asserted the continual migration of departing souls into new bodies, and yet at the same time inculcated the doctrine of the punishment of souls in the infernal regions. It seems very difficult to reconcile these two tenets with each other. [See Bayle, Diction. voce Pythagoras, note f. 2317. and note m. p. 2320.] For if the soul, immediately on its departure, is subject to rewards or punishments in the lower regions, how can it enter into a new and different body? Many of the ancients, as it would require little labour to show, were already alarmed at this difficulty; and some therefore professed that minds do not enter into new bodies till they have passed a long period among the shades. This opinion was adopted by Virgil, not to speak now of others, who makes Anchises, Æneid. lib. 6. v. 650. say:

> Has omnes ubi mille rotam volvere per annos
> Lethæum ad flumen Deus evocat agmine magno,
> Scilicet immemores supera ut convexa revisant
> Rursus et incipiant in corpora velle reverti.

But it is hardly necessary to intimate that this is at variance with the ancient doctrine respecting the wanderings of souls. Others tried other ways of solving this difficulty, which for the present I pass over. Some more modern writers suppose, that the above-mentioned philosophers, when they discourse of the shades and the punishment of souls after death, are speaking merely according to the vulgar opinion, but that when they assert souls to be continually migrating into new bodies, they are declaring the genuine sentiments of their own mind. But this is conjecture and surmise rather than a clearing up of the difficulty by probable and satisfactory arguments. The whole question is got rid of by merely attending to the distinction which the ancients observed between the rational and sentient soul. The latter, which is alone susceptible of pain or pleasure, descends to the realms below according to these philosophers, and there either suffers punishment or is rewarded with delights. But the rational soul, to which neither pain nor pleasure belongs, does not go to the abode of the shades, but migrates into other men or beasts according to its various conditions, and performs a certain round, as it were, in its peregrinations. This was understood, though not to the full extent, by some of the junior Platonists, particularly Proclus and Syrianus, whom Æneas Gazæus names in his Theophrastus, p. 19. ed. Barthii; for they openly inculcated that the soul of a man, which migrates into beasts after the death of the body, is not that nature which formerly possessed sensation in the man; because a lion, eagle, or other animal is furnished with a peculiar sentient soul of its own; but that the rational soul alone was joined with the animate bodies of brutes on account of its having submitted too much to the senses and bodily desires; therefore that the fish in which Empedocles, according to his own confession, formerly resided, possessed a twofold soul, rational and sentient. Τὸν μὲν ἱκτῖνον λέγουσι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ψυχὴν ἔχειν τὴν ἄλογον, τὴν δὲ ἀνθρωπείαν ταύτῃ συνδεδέσθαι καὶ παραμένειν καὶ συμπέτεσθαι, "They say that the kite has its own irrational soul, and that the human is bound and connected with this, and remains fixed and flies about with it." Should any one pronounce all this to be foolish nonsense, I will not dissent from him; but still he must grant that it embraces some portion of the ancient discipline. The early doctrine of the transmigration of souls, let me add by the way, has been much corrupted and adulterated, first by Plato and afterwards by other philosophers, Greek as well as Roman, whose whole study was to make it conform and harmonize in some measure with the rest of their own precepts and tenets; and hence arose the great diversity and discrepancy of the opinions put forth by the ancients respecting the true

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and inform the whole corporeal world at once, and take cogni-

nature and character of this doctrine. For each endeavoured to expound it so as to make it appear to be in accordance with his own views. I am not aware whether it is anywhere to be found at this day more pure and uncontaminated than among the Indians, whose precepts the Greeks, who might not improperly be called the corrupters of the earlier philosophy, had no opportunity of mixing up with any dogmas of their own. To this matter let those turn their attention, who devote themselves to the investigation of the true and genuine doctrines of ancient nations; for my own part I return to the subject from which I have somewhat digressed.

Sect. VIII. I come now to vulgar and plebeian souls, which afforded too ready an obedience to the incitements of the senses, and proceed to show the condition which the ancients assigned to these. The minds of the common multitude are so accustomed while in the mortal body to the society of the vital and sensitive souls, that on quitting the body they are not separated from those souls, nor are any longer capable of being separated, but descend with them into the lower world. This is evident from the passages of Homer and others, already quoted, and will be further corroborated by other testimonies which I shall produce by and by. The souls of Homer thirst for and are refreshed by blood; some are tormented with pains in the kingdom of Pluto, others are filled with pleasure and delight; and who, I ask, will deny these to be properties of the sentient soul? But the same souls reason, discourse, relate their own misfortunes, implore the aid of the living, and desire a better state; all which proclaim the presence of mind or the rational soul. According to the creed of the ancients, therefore, all that remains of a man, after the dissolution of this earthy body, is a thin and subtle image, or corporeal and airy spirit, which as appears from Homer, Iliad. Ψ. v. 199. &c. p. 853. and other places, gives way and seems to vanish like smoke, when the living attempt to lay hold of it:

Par levibus ventis volucrique simillima somno.

But still it subsists and is endowed with the faculty of sensation, and moreover contains and includes the rational soul. In its form it is human, and a perfect resemblance of the body with which it was associated. And this is the less to be wondered at, as the ancients believed that the mind itself also, or the rational soul, divested of all sense, represented the human form: [Forma humana præstantissima, see Cicero De Natur. Deor. lib. 1. cap. 18. p. 2907.] of which we have an evidence, besides many others, in Thespesius mentioned by Plutarch, De His qui sero a Numine puniuntur, p. 564, tom. 2. opp. who was reported to have been for some time absent from the body and then to have returned to it. This man, besides many other matters relating to souls, in whose society he pretended to have been for some time, declared: "That the souls of the dying, when they ascend upwards, form a fiery bubble, and on this gradually bursting they come out *τύπον ἔχουσαι ἀνθρωποειδῆ*, 'having the human form,' and of a small bulk." And who is not aware that heroes, although their images, or *εἴδωλα*, were supposed to have descended to the shades, are nevertheless always represented in the writings of the poets as possessing the human form? Now, as is clear from passages of Homer and innumerable other early writers, those remains of the dead abovementioned were called by the ancient Greeks *εἴδωλον*, a word which the Platonists, always great admirers of ancient names and customs, afterwards adopted and retained. The Latin poets expressed this Greek term by the words *simulacrum*, *imago*, *umbra*, *manes*, as the sayings already adduced from them abundantly testify. [Pliny, Epist. 7. 27. p. 536. calls it *idolon*. Horace, lib. 1. od. 24. *vana imago*; on which consult Dacier, in his notes, tom. 2. p. 300. who sees a part but not the whole of the truth we have here expounded, for he supposes *εἴδωλον* to be the body without the soul.] Strictly and properly *εἴδωλον* denotes the body of the rational soul, or merely the sentient soul with which the mind itself is invested. This is shown by a remarkable passage of Plato, De Legibus, lib. 11. p. 693. wherein he states that the bodies of the dead are commonly called *εἴδωλα*: *καὶ τελευτησάντων λέγεσθαι καλῶς ΕΙΔΩΛΑ εἶναι τὰ τῶν νεκρῶν σώματα*, "The bodies of the dead we must suppose are rightly called images." Which bodies of the dead are nothing more that I know of than that subtle but corporeal spirit in which the ancients believed the minds of most men to be enveloped on their departure from this grosser body. This spirit, therefore, the Greeks formerly designated by the peculiar term *εἴδωλον*; to which *νοῦς*, or *ψυχή*, the name

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zance of all things therein; their reply hereunto was, That

of the rational soul, is opposed in Plato and other writers. But a custom gradually grew up, as usually happens amongst mortals, of attaching a wider meaning to this word, and the whole of that which remains after the dissolution and extinction of the body came to be designated εἴδωλον, or image. This ought especially to be borne in mind by those who read Greek and Latin authors; with whom εἴδωλον sometimes denotes merely the vestment or corporeal image of the rational soul, and sometimes the two souls in conjunction and connexion with each other. The junior Platonists restored the ancient meaning to the word; in whose writings, as far as I remember, it always signifies the integument or aerial body of the departing soul, and never the whole of that which quits the body in death. The principles of the philosophy they professed did not permit this sect to follow the custom of poets, and to assign to the word a more extensive signification.

Sect. IX. I am not now disposed to enter into a long investigation of the opinion entertained by the ancients respecting the site or locality of the infernal regions: which most of them seem to have placed beneath the earth. For I can hardly persuade myself that this opinion, which was formerly common to the whole of the Greeks and Latins, emanated from the poets alone. But an inquiry into the condition of souls during their sojourn in these regions, will be more in accordance with our present purpose. All souls that proceed to the Plutonic realms are in a corrupt state, and polluted with various stains and impurities. While they were among mortals they suffered from the contagion of the body, and their connexion with the sentient and concupiscent soul: to the influence of which they so entirely submitted, as to be utterly incapable of being released from its bonds. That is, the depraved and perverse desires of the sentient soul flowed with such force into the purer and better mind, during its stay in the body, that they became as it were, properties of the mind itself: which is now therefore wholly connected and united with the sentient soul, and disquieted and agitated by the same passions. Hence, before these souls can be received into the society of the blessed, there is a necessity for purgation. For what brawls and tempests would not souls propense to vice, and addicted to depraved desires, excite in the celestial regions, from which all discord ought for ever to be absent! First of all, therefore, medicine is administered to them in the shades to purge them from inveterate stains, and entirely to draw them away from the communion of the sentient, irascible, libidinous, and concupiscent soul. In what manner the most ancient sages supposed souls to be cured and renovated in the lower world, or what physician they appointed to this office, I would not readily undertake to say. For what we read of in the poets and philosophers in regard to this purgation, is for the most figurative, as will be seen by and by, and borrowed from human customs and institutions. Most probably, however, they are not much mistaken who suppose that the ancients regarded that most subtle element fire, as best adapted for the cure and purification of ethereal souls, which are themselves closely allied to the nature of fire. To some souls this treatment is beneficial: a portion of which are sooner set free than another according to the nature of the vices and the inveteracy of the habit of crime. For the corporeal image or sentient soul gradually flows off, and leaves the mind free and emancipated from all affection and suffering. Those which have thus recovered their healthy state, are permitted to depart to the society of the better and purified souls, with which they live a life of endless felicity in the most delightful regions. But others have been so deeply imbued with vice and the love of sin, that that they are utterly incapable of being separated from the sentient soul, and restored to their pristine purity. These are doomed by the just and inexorable judge to eternal punishment, and are tortured in various ways according to the variety of crimes. There is therefore a threefold class of souls in the lower world, and this subterraneous and most ample dominion of the shades is divided into three departments. To the first class belong those which are curable, and are therefore located in a certain place, appointed by divine providence for their cure: another class consists of purified souls which have been released from their prison, and inhabit regions filled with every delight, and which the poets call *the Elysian fields*: the third class comprises those that remain connected with their images or shades, and suffer eternal puishment for their crimes in Tartarus: Virgil, Æneid, lib. 6. v. 441. &c.

Nox ruit, Æneas, nos flendo ducimus horas.
Hic locus est, partes ubi se via findit in ambas,

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these being essentially but parts of the universe, and therefore

> Dextera, quæ Ditis magni sub mœnia tendit :
> Hac iter Elysium nobis : at læva malorum
> Exercet pœnas et ad impia Tartara mittit.

[On this descent of Æneas consult Warburton, in the Biblioth. Britan. tom. 12. par. 1. p. 1. &c.] This is the voice of the Sybil conducting Æneas to the lower regions. I have hitherto been explaining in plain and simple terms the doctrine of the ancients respecting the state of souls after death: and that I have here advanced nothing hastily, will be shown by the testimonies which I shall by and by bring forward. But the licence of the poets and their love of fiction have introduced so much darkness and fable into this simple discipline, that it can scarcely be recognized by those who are altogether inexperienced in matters of antiquity. Wherefore, the ornaments and figures with which the ancient bards have embellished or rather corrupted it, ought always to be carefully distinguished from the things and opinions concealed under these coverings: a task which will occasion very little difficulty to him who is moderately acquainted with the nature of the fables respecting the gods, and with the habits and customs of poets.

Sect. X. Among the evidences I intend to bring forward, I shall assign the first place to Plato, who, in his Gorgias, p. 313, gives a clear and intelligent account of the popular opinions of his own time. I shall not repeat, however, the whole of the fable which he there relates, but shall merely extract so much of it as is especially applicable to my present purpose. After saying that judges are appointed by Jupiter in the infernal regions to hear the causes of departed souls, he states that the souls bring with them certain marks to enable these judges to know, which have formerly lived a just and pious life, and which the contrary: *Ἔνδηλα πάντα ἐστὶν ἐν ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὰν γυμνωθῇ τοῦ σώματος, τά τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὰ παθήματα, ἃ διὰ τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν ἑκάστου πράγματος ἔσχεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος· ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἀφίκωνται παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν——θεᾶται ἑκάστου τὴν ψυχήν, οὐκ εἰδὼς ὅτου ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ πολλάκις τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ἐπιλαβόμενος——κατεῖδεν οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὂν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ διαμεμαστιγωμένην καὶ οὐλῶν μεστὴν ὑπὸ ἐπιορκιῶν καὶ ἀδικίας ἃ ἑκάστῳ ἡ πρᾶξις αὐτοῦ ἐξωμόρξατο εἰς τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ πάντα σκολιὰ ὑπὸ ψεύδους καὶ ἀλαζονείας, κ. τ. λ.*, "All things are visible in the soul when it is denuded of the body, both those of nature and the affections which a man has implanted in the soul by his pursuit of each particular object. When they come therefore before the judge——he inspects the soul of each, but knows not to whom it belongs: but oftentimes taking that of the great and potent king (of the Persians) he finds no soundness in it, but sees it lashed all over and full of scars through perjuries and injustice, such as the practice of each vice has impressed upon the soul, and all made crooked by falsehood and vanity, &c." According to this passage of the philosopher, when crimes and evil deeds are committed in this life, the soul is impressed with certain marks and spots, and these marks appear in the body in which the departed soul is invested, and disclose to the judge its internal nature. All this is borrowed from the poets, who had certain reasons for inventing this fiction, which I shall explain by and by. But the opinion entertained by the ancients is evident even from these shadows. They supposed namely, that the soul on departing from the earthly body, possesses another thin and subtle body, whose passions and internal state would not be easily discernible to a man less wise and sagacious than Minos and Rhadamanthus, whom the poets installed as judges of the lower world. Unless the ancients had fancied a certain image of the man or sentient soul to be present with the rational soul when it quits the body, the poets would never have sung of scars and marks imprinted upon the soul by crime. Let us follow Plato in his examination of the state of souls, affected in the way he has stated: *Ἰδὼν δὲ (ὁ δικαστὴς) ἀτίμως ταύτην ἀπέπεμψεν εὐθὺ τῆς φρουρᾶς, οὗ μέλλει ἐλθοῦσα ἀνατλῆναι τὰ προσήκοντα πάθη*, "The judge, therefore, having inspected the soul so affected, straightway commits it with ignominy into custody, where it is to undergo the merited punishment." And yet these souls which the judge has condemned as wicked and vicious, do not all remain for ever in this custody. Those which admit of being healed are discharged from thence, while the others which cannot be divested of their scars, are sent away to graver and eternal punishments. This is stated so clearly by Plato, as to leave not the least room for doubt: *Εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ μὲν ὠφελούμενοί τε καὶ δίκην διδόντες ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων,*

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not comprehensive of the whole, finite or particular, and not

οὗτοι οἳ ἂν ἰάσιμα, ἁμαρτήματα ἁμαρτῶσιν· ὅμως δὲ δι' ἀλγηδόνων καὶ ὀδυνῶν γίγνεται αὐτοῖς ἡ ὠφέλεια καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν ᾅδου· οὐ γὰρ οἱόντε ἄλλως ἀδικίας ἀπαλλάττεσθαι· οἳ δὲ ἂν ἀδικήσωσι, καὶ διὰ τοιαῦτα ἀδικήματα ἀνίατοι γίνονται, ἐκ τούτων τὰ παραδείγματα γίγνεται, καὶ οὗτοι αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι ὀνίνανται οὐδὲν, ἅτε ἀνίατοι ὄντες· ἄλλοι δὲ ὀνίνανται, οἱ τούτοις ὁρῶντες διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα καὶ φοβερώτατα πάθη πάσχοντας τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἀνηρτημένοις ἐκεῖ ἐν ᾅδου ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ τοῖς ἀεὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀφικνουμένοις θεάματα καὶ νουθετήματα, "Those who profit by the punishment they suffer both among gods and men, as such as have committed remediable sins; who are benefited by pains and torments both here and in orcus: for it is impossible otherwise to be freed from injustice. But whoever are guilty of the worst of crimes, and by reason of such crimes become incurable, of these examples are made, and they no longer are benefited themselves, as being incurable: but others are benefited, who behold them suffering for their sins the greatest and most painful and most frightful punishments for everlasting, and held up there in their prison in hell, as examples, and spectacles, and warnings to the unjust that from time to time come thither." I pass over the rest that is to be met with in Plato to the same effect: for I have already quoted what will be sufficient to give an insight into the most ancient doctrine prevailing among the Greeks long prior to the time of this philosopher.

Sect. XI. To Plato I join Plutarch, who is well known to have been intimately versed in the doctrines and institutions of antiquity, and who with a few trifling exceptions, gives the same exposition of the fate and condition of disembodied souls, not omitting even that opinion of the poets which inculcates that indelible marks are impressed upon souls by crime. After saying that some souls suffer the punishment of their sins while they are yet in the body, he thus proceeds: Ὧν δὲ μεῖζον ἐστὶν ἔργον ἡ περὶ τὴν κακίαν ἰατρεία, τούτους δίκη μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν ὁ δαίμων παραδίδωσι· τοὺς δὲ πάμπαν ἀνιάτους ἀπωσαμένης τῆς δίκης, ἡ τρίτη καὶ ἀγριωτάτη τῶν Ἀδρασταίας ὑπουργῶν Ἐριννὺς μεταθέουσα πλανωμένους καὶ περιφεύγοντας ἄλλον ἄλλως, οἱκτρῶς τε καὶ χαλεπῶς ἅπαντας ἠφάνισε καὶ κατέδυσεν εἰς τὸ ἄῤῥητον καὶ ἀόρατον, "But those (souls), whose wickedness requires more powerful and efficacious remedies, the demon delivers up to justice after death; and such as are altogether incurable, being repelled and driven away by justice, and wandering and fleeing up and down, are pursued by Erinnus, the third and most relentless of the ministers of Adrastea, and are all miserably and cruelly dispersed, and plunged into the place which is untold of and unseen." After this he describes the severity and cruelty of the punishments which souls polluted with vices undergo in the lower regions; which to avoid unnecessary prolixity, I for the present pass over. But I cannot omit what he subsequently records respecting the spots and marks of souls: Οὐλαὶ δὲ, says he, καὶ μώλωπες ἐπὶ τῶν παθῶν ἑκάστου τοῖς μὲν μᾶλλον ἐμμένουσι, τοῖς δὲ ἧσσον· ὅρα δὲ τὰ ποικίλα ταῦτα καὶ παντοδαπὰ χρώματα τῶν ψυχῶν· τὸ μὲν δρφνιον καὶ ὑπαρὸν, ἀνελευθερίας ἀλοιφὴν καὶ πλεονεξίας· τὸ δὲ αἱματωπὸν καὶ διάπυρον ὠμότητος καὶ πικρίας· ὅπου δὲ τὸ γλαύκινόν ἐστιν, ἐντεῦθεν ἀκρασία τις περὶ ἡδονὰς ἐκτέτριπται μόλις, κακὸν οἷα δεινὸν οὖσα μετὰ φθόνου τουτὶ τὸ ἰωδὲς καὶ ὕπουλον, ὥσπερ αἱ σηπίαι τὸ μέλαν, ἀφίησιν· ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἥ τε κακία τῆς ψυχῆς τρεπομένης ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν καὶ τρεπούσης τὸ σῶμα τὰς χρόας ἀναδίδωσιν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ καθαρμοῦ καὶ κολάσεως πέρας ἐστὶ· τούτων ἐκλεανθέντων παντάπασι, τὴν ψυχὴν αὐγοειδῆ καὶ σύγχρουν γίνεσθαι, "But the scars and seams remain from the several vices, in some greater, in some less. Now behold those various and diversified colours of souls. The dark and squalid are the taint of illiberality and avarice: the blood-red and fiery of cruelty and barbarity: the green of intemperance in pleasures: the violet-coloured and livid, like the ink of the cuttle-fish, of envy and malignity. For there the wickedness of the soul influenced by the passions, and influencing the body, produces the colours: here it is the end of the purification and punishment. When these colours are thoroughly purged away, the soul becomes bright and unsullied." In these words, Plutarch not only gives a more lucid explanation of the doctrine of the Greek poets on the ulcers and blotches of vicious souls, but also endeavours in some degree to reconcile it to the precepts of philosophy and reason: which probably he would have refrained from doing, had he taken the trouble to inquire into its true causes, which we shall presently explain. He pretends moreover, to have received all this, as well as the rest of what he there states respecting souls,

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universal beings (as the three hypostases of the Platonic trinity

from the mouth of an individual called Thespesius, who quitted the body for a certain time, and lived among souls, and afterwards returned to the body, De Sera Numinis Vindicta, tom. 2. opp. p. 564. 565. This Thespesius, therefore, had furnished the living with no new information in consequence of his intercourse with souls, but had merely learnt that what had been handed down by poets and sages from the remotest times was in accordance with the truth.

Sect. XII. An attentive reader of the ninth book of Virgil's Æneid, and of the description given in it of the infernal regions, will find the same dogma propounded. We shall in this place merely quote and briefly illustrate those verses, which Dr. Cudworth adduced above to show the antiquity of the Platonic doctrine respecting the twofold body of souls, v. 637. &c.

Quin et supremo cum lumine vita reliquit,
Non tamen omne malum miseris, nec funditus omnes
Corporeæ excedunt pestes: penitusque necesse est,
Multa diu concreta modis inolescere miris.
Ergo exercentur pœnis, veterumque malorum
Supplicia expendunt: aliæ panduntur inanes
Suspensæ ad ventos: aliis sub gurgite vasto
Infectum eluitur scelus, aut exuritur igni:
Quisque suos patimur manes: exinde per amplum
Mittimur Elysium et pauci læta arva tenemus,
Donec, longa dies perfecto temporis orbe
Concretam exemit labem, purumque reliquit
Æthereum sensum atque aurai simplicis ignem.

The learned Doctor supposes that these verses of Virgil are drawn from the middle philosophy, and contain a clear indication of that twofold body, ethereal and aerial, which the junior Platonists assigned to the soul. In both which suppositions I consider him to be mistaken. For it is evident from what we have hitherto stated that the poet is here expressing the popular, antiquated, and obsolete opinions which flourished long before Plato founded his own discipline, and instilled it into the minds of the Greeks. I do not deny, however, that Virgil there combines the vulgar opinions with the precepts of Pythagoras, and as it were, confounds the two with each other: and whether he has done this with sufficient skill and accuracy or not, I shall not now inquire. The account he gives of the various purgations of souls in the lower regions, savours of popular fables and poetic fictions rather than of the dogmas of the wise: but what he afterwards adds respecting the migration of souls into new bodies after the lapse of a certain space of time, is borrowed from the precepts of Pythagoras and others. Although I have read this over and over again, I have met with no trace of a twofold body of the soul. It is clear, I confess, from the first eight verses, that Virgil supposed the soul to be invested with a certain body on its departure to the shades, and that this body exhibits the traces of crimes and misdeeds committed during life. For how could a soul devoid of body undergo those punishments, by which souls, he tells us, are healed and purified? I own it to be evident also from the concluding verses, that the souls of Virgil are at length divested of that grosser body, which the ancients held to be marked with the imprints of vice. But I deny the truth of the learned Doctor's opinion, that the "ethereal sense and fire of simple air," which the poet tells us "is left pure," is another and different body, called by the Platonists ethereal. This ethereal sense is the soul itself, which the ancients, as we have before seen, supposed to be detached from the immortal ether, and in a certain measure corporeal. The sect of junior Platonists distinguished the ethereal portion from the nature of the soul itself; but in this they corrupted the doctrine entertained in earlier times: as is evident from the preceding verse, 632. in which the poet thus sings of the nature of souls:

Igneus est ollis vigor et cœlestis origo.

From which we may easily learn that Virgil held souls to be of a fiery nature and portions of ether; celestial meaning the same as what he afterwards calls ethereal.

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are), the sphere of their activity could not possibly extend any

Nevertheless, in these verses, Virgil does not preserve the ancient discipline pure and unadulterated, but tempers it with an alloy from the schools of philosophers, and probably also from his own peculiar opinions. The ancients imagine that souls are not transferred to the society of the blessed till they are thoroughly purified, and that they dwell in those delightful abodes for everlasting. Far otherwise Virgil: who, as these verses clearly show, supposed: That souls which are capable of being healed in the first instance, suffer lengthened tortures in the lower regions; but that as these tortures do not purge them from every blemish and corporeal stain, they are despatched to the Elysian plains, having been divested of their graver impurities: that in these plains the purgation after a long period is entirely completed, and the soul being restored to its perfectly pure and unsullied state, is inspired by providence with a desire to revisit the upper regions. Probably Virgil was indebted to some contemporary philosopher of the Platonic sect, for a portion of this discipline, which he himself amplified and enriched from the fables of the poets, and the opinions of the multitude.

Sect. XIII. The discipline of the ancients on the state of souls after their departure from the body being now presented in its naked form, and stript of the fictions of poetry, I shall proceed to say a few words respecting the ornaments and embellishments by which the poets recommended it to the favour of the public. But before I do so, I shall anticipate a doubt which I am aware may occur to the minds of attentive and intelligent readers. I stated before that according to the doctrine of the ancients, the image or sentient soul is utterly destroyed in the infernal regions, and removed from the ethereal soul, and that the latter is not permitted to proceed to the society of the blessed, until this soul, which is the seat of the sensual appetites and animal life, has been entirely dispersed and obliterated. But the passages of Plato and Plutarch warrant us in supposing the ancients to have meant, not that the image is totally annihilated, but merely that it is divested of its marks and vices, and in its purified state, accompanies the rational soul in its ascent to the happy mansions. There were some among the Platonists themselves who asserted this common flight of the εἴδωλον, or "corporeal image of man," and the mind to the celestial regions. And owing to the great darkness in which the affairs and doctrines of the ancients are involved, I own it is very difficult to say what were the real opinions entertained by the principal philosophers upon the subject. Perhaps there was some dissension among them, one portion attributing destruction, and another immortality to the sentient soul, and from this arose the obscurity and discrepancies of the early writers who have touched upon this dogma. Still I have not adopted the opinion above mentioned without reason; but on a due consideration of the matter, conceive it to be more probable that the images or shades of the dead were supposed by the first founders of this philosophy to be doomed to utter extinction. What in the first place leads me to this conclusion, is the nature of the souls themselves, which is such as to be incapable of holding out against the multiplicity of punishments and torments which the ancients supposed to be inflicted upon them. For the sentient soul is a thin, subtle, and corporeal spirit, resembling air and wind, which, as every body will admit, can be dispersed and dissipated. Moreover, according to the belief of the ancients, everything concrete and corporeal, with the exception of ether, which they held to be immortal, if acted upon by a superior force, perishes and returns to its primitive elements. Another argument for this opinion is furnished by that state of quiescence, tranquillity, and exemption from all perturbation, into which they supposed souls to enter after undergoing the tortures of hell. For how could they live so placidly, quietly, and chastely, if they were to enter that abode of supreme felicity in the society of a soul which is full of desires and animal sense, and retains the traces of its ancient propensities? Some one will object perhaps that it is divested of all these by the punishments of the lower world; but I beg him to remember that by destroying these appetites which constitute the very nature and essence of the sentient soul, the soul itself also is necessarily destroyed and annihilated. In this soul there exists a propensity to anger, an appetite for pleasure, a love and desire of the body: take away these, and you will take away the soul itself; which without them is altogether a nonentity. Lastly, I am not a little confirmed in this opinion, by a passage of Philostratus, respecting the soul of Ulysses, in his Heroic. cap. 18. sect. 3. p. 727. Ἐς Ἰθάκην, says he, πότε τὸν Ὅμηρον πλεῦσαι φησὶν, ἀκούσαντα ὡς πέπνυται ἔτι ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως καὶ ψυχαγωγίᾳ ἐπ' αὐτὴν χρήσασθαι, "(Protesilaus) tells us that Homer once sailed to Ithaca, having heard

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farther than to the quickening and enlivening of some certain

that the soul of Ulysses was still alive, and made use of charms for its evocation." The soul of Ulysses summoned from hell by Homer appears, and among other things declares that it suffers most grievous tortures for having slain Palamedes: Οἱ γὰρ, it says, θεμιστεύοντες ἐνταῦθα δεινοὶ, Ὅμηρε, καὶ τὰ ἐκ ποινῶν ἐγγὺς, "For those who administer justice here are severe and rigid, O Homer, and the punishments quickly follow." Scarcely any thing more apposite could be said for the corroboration of our opinion. The soul of Ulysses is stated to be yet living in the lower world, and to be suffering the punishments to which it is sentenced by Rhadamanthus for a murder heretofore committed. Consequently, after the lapse of a certain interval, death and destruction await it. To understand these words as referring to the rational and ethereal soul would be in direct opposition not only to the sentiments of Philostratus and Homer, but also to the entire discipline of the ancients, which denies it to be possible for this soul to perish. It remains for us to suppose, therefore, that his sentient soul was punished and tormented till it ceased to exist, and the free and emancipated mind migrated to the heavenly abodes. I am aware that souls dismissed from the dominions of Pluto, and residing in the society of the happy, were supposed, according to the more ancient doctrine, not only to possess a certain body but even the human form and appearance; which might seem to be a proof that the sentient and aerial but purified soul never abandons the other soul with which it was associated during life. But this does not move me from my opinion; for it proceeds from the poets, who, as is the case also in sacred Writ, when discoursing of the souls and delights of the happy, adapt themselves to the popular comprehension, and borrow their forms and modes of expression from human things. Upon this subject Cicero most pertinently, Tusculan. Quæst. lib. 1. cap. 16. p. 2584. tom. 8. opp. Animas per se viventes non poterant mente complecti: formam aliquam figuramque quærebant. Inde Homeri tota νεκυία. . . . Nihil enim animo videre poterant, ad oculos omnia referebant, "They could form no conception of souls living by themselves; they required some shape and figure. Hence the whole of Homer's νεκυία. . . . . For being able to perceive nothing mentally, they referred every thing to the eyes." I pass over what I have already intimated, that the human form was ascribed by the most ancient writers to the rational soul also; whose opinion so pervaded all nations that even Christian authors adopted it, as we may learn from Tertullian's book De Anima. Julian in his Cæsars tells us that all the heroes whom he represents as present at the banquet of the gods possessed the human form and a subtle body. Nor is it greatly to be wondered at when we consider that the ancients supposed souls to consist of most subtle ether. For where matter is, there of necessity must be some form also. And what form can be imagined more suitable to the soul than the human, with which the ancients firmly believed even the gods themselves to be endowed? But I shall dismiss these matters for the present, and proceed to the fictions of the poets.

Sect. XIV. It is notorious that those who embodied the dogmas of antiquity in verse, borrowed the colouring and embellishments, by which they sought to gain for them a readier access into the popular mind, from ancient history, and formed a certain discipline called in the present day *mythology*, compounded of the precepts of ancient philosophers and the legends of their own country. Hence they also obscured with the same ornaments and fictions the most simple doctrine of the state of souls after death, in order to beguile and conciliate the ears of the multitude, who held in firm remembrance the affairs and exploits of bygone ages as handed down from their ancestors. First of all the subterranean place itself in which disembodied souls were supposed to be confined was depicted by them in such a way as accorded with Grecian conceptions, and the manners of the times in which they lived. In the next place, being aware that that incredible multitude of souls could not possibly dispense with a leader and king, they selected Pluto out of ancient tradition, a certain king probably of Epirus or some other province, well known to the common people for his severity, and assigned to him the sovereignty of the shades. On him they bestowed all the concomitants with which the kings of their own times were accustomed to be surrounded, a palace, servants, wife, counsellors, lictors, executioners, porters, and the like. But as they had founded so dreadful and dismal a community, in order to express all these they were obliged to have recourse to the most hideous and horrible images. This is well known to the readers of Homer, Virgil, and the other poets. That in the re-

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parts of matter and the world, allotted to them, and thereby of

motest ages dogs were chained to the doors of the rich and powerful for the purpose of deterring the approach of mendicants and thieves, is a fact which has long ago been demonstrated by learned men. The poets, therefore, considered it incumbent upon themselves to commit the custody of hell in like manner to a great and savage dog; which, to produce a more powerful impression upon the minds of the vulgar, they feigned to be triple-headed. For as the infernal dominions were divided into three parts, namely, Tartarus, the Elysian fields, and the abode of souls not yet purged and proved, and consequently the door and entrance of this gloomy realm was threefold, it was reasonable that the dog placed at the threshold of hell should be endowed with a threefold head, in order to be able to guard all the inlets. In Homer's time kings had already departed from the ancient simplicity, and no longer adjudicated on the causes of their subjects, but had delegated this office to others. It was therefore proper to exempt the king of hell also from this labour. Hence they selected from the ancient history of their country those men that had formerly enjoyed a high reputation for justice and rigour, and were commonly regarded as the first examples of most upright and just judges, namely, Rhadamanthus, Minos, and Æacus, whom they installed in that awful tribunal, and appointed as inquisitors of souls. And with respect to these judges they used the same expressions as though they perfectly resembled those whom they saw administering justice in their own times, either as regards the form of trial or any other characteristic by which a judge is usually distinguished from the rest of the people. As this region was believed to be situated underneath the earth, the road which led to it was necessarily described as rugged, dark, dreary, and unknown to mortals. Disembodied souls, therefore, would probably have missed their way, unless they had been furnished with a guide; probably also some of those which were weighed down by a consciousness of crime would have chosen to wander about on the earth for ever, rather than descend into a place which they foresaw was about to be most dreadful and fatal to themselves. Even this inconvenience was provided against by the poets; for they assigned Mercury as the guide and conductor of the dead, and taught the people that he not only points out the way to errant souls, but compels the reluctant to enter it. The rest I pass over; for I have no intention here of explaining the fables of the poets, or of trespassing upon the province of the philologer. Yet it perhaps will be worth while, and at the same time not foreign to our present purpose, to select from a great variety of matter certain points which in my opinion have not yet been sufficiently discussed, and to examine and illustrate them by the light of reason. For although the first authors and inventors of fables obeyed any thing rather than reason, still I am certain that their discipline is in a certain measure consistent and in keeping with itself, and that nothing has been handed down by them which is repugnant to its first principles.

Sect. XV. I shall speak first of all of the spots and blotches with which souls on their departure from the bodies are said by the poets to be marked and impressed owing to their former habitude of crime. The thing and doctrine itself is already understood from the passages of Plato and Plutarch above quoted. But none of the ancients, that I know of, has expounded it according to the vulgar and poetic sense more aptly than Lucian, whom it therefore will be of advantage to hear. In his Cataplus or Tyrannus, tom. 2. opp. p. 438. &c. he introduces three men who are placed before Rhadamanthus for examination in the lower regions, Cyniscus a philosopher, Myciscus a cobbler, and lastly a tyrant infamous for the variety of his crimes during life. The philosopher is first placed before the judge, perfectly naked. He is considered by Rhadamanthus to be pure, but nevertheless has three or four marks of healed ulcers. On seeing these marks the judge asks how he managed to efface the imprints of crime. The philosopher replies: Πάλαι πονηρός δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν γενόμενος καὶ πολλὰ διὰ τοῦτο ἐμπολήσας στίγματα, ἐπειδὴ τάχιστα φιλοσοφεῖν ἠρξάμην, κατ' ὀλίγον ἀπάσας τὰς κηλίδας ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπελουσάμην, "Having formerly become depraved and wicked through ignorance, and by that means marked with many spots, as soon as I began to philosophize, I gradually wiped away all stains from the soul." The ancients believed, therefore, that the study of philosophy and the love of virtue can heal and remove the leprosy which the bodies of souls contract from crimes. The cobbler next appears before the judge; but he is perfectly pure and devoid of spots, καθαρὸς ἀκριβῶς καὶ ἀνεπίγραφος, because he had led an innocent life. But the third, Megapenthes the tyrant, although he endeavours by all means to clear

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becoming particular animals; it being peculiar to the Deity, or

himself before the judge, is found to be covered over with the foulest blotches: Ἀλλὰ καὶ, says the judge, p. 442. ἀπόδυθι τὴν πορφυρίδα, ἵνα καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἴδωμεν τῶν στιγμάτων· παπαὶ, ὅλος οὗτοσὶ πελιδνὸς καὶ κατάγραφος, μᾶλλον δὲ κυάνεος ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τῶν στιγμάτων, "Put off the purple robe, that we may see the number of the spots. Why really this man is all over livid and spotted, nay, rather is black with spots." The criminal is consequently doomed by Rhadamanthus to a new and exquisite punishment. This passage does not require illustration; for it clearly shows what opinion was entertained by the poets as well as by the people, who derived their religion from the poets, on souls being marked with certain spots in consequence of vice. Hence Julian the emperor, when he wished to accommodate his satire entitled "the Cæsars," to the vulgar and popular opinions, judged it proper to avail himself also of this dogma. Thus Tiberius, whose life and reign had been most base and vicious, as soon as he appears in the company of the gods, is immediately perceived to be covered with foul marks: Ἐπιστραφέντος δὲ πρὸς τὴν καθέδραν ὤφθησαν ὠτειλαὶ κατὰ τὸν νῶτον μυρίαι, κάντῆρες τινες καὶ ξέσματα καὶ πληγαὶ χαλεπαὶ καὶ μώλωπες ὑπό τε ἀκολασίας καὶ ὠμότητος, ψωραί τινες καὶ λειχῆνες, οἷον ἐγκεκαυμέναι, "When he turned to the chair thousands of scars were seen on his back, seams and scratches and severe gashes and wales, caused by intemperance and cruelty; scabs and blotches as though burnt into the skin." Juliani Cæsares, opp. p. 309. What is extraordinary in this passage is that Tiberius' back alone is said to be polluted with these marks, whereas the others have no part of the body free from this malady. But the imperial writer seems to me to have intended this as a silent sneer at the hypocrisy of Tiberius, who is known to have affected the greatest probity and decorum in his words and outward appearance, while in his heart he was an utter stranger to all shame and virtue. Now if any one should inquire the reason why the poets inculcated that marks are imprinted on the sentient soul by vice and crime and cannot be obliterated except by an amendment of life, I think it will be unnecessary to go far out of the way for an answer, nor do I agree with those who suppose the fiction to have originated from some dogma of philosophy. For over the administration of justice in the lower regions they had placed mortals, Minos, Æacus, and Rhadamanthus, who certainly were great, just, and illustrious, but still mortals, and therefore incapable of looking into the interior recesses of souls. It was therefore natural for them to devise certain external marks by which the judges might be enabled to ascertain without accusers and witnesses what actions the soul had committed during their association with the earthly bodies. Now it was a very ancient custom with moralists and wise men to compare the vices of mankind to filth and dirt, and metaphorically to designate sins or crimes as the spots and stains of the souls; which figurative expressions, as usually happens among men, the generality of the common people of former times, as at the present day, understood and interpreted in the strict and literal sense. Wherefore in conformity with the ancient form and usage of speech, and agreeably at the same time to the notions of the vulgar, to whose favour they were anxious to recommend their fables, they feigned that the soul is polluted by crimes, and that it always retains the traces of that contagion, and carries them down with it to the infernal tribunal. If they had referred this inquisition on the life and morals of men to God himself, from whom nothing is hidden and concealed, they would have been able to dispense with this ingenuity, and to give a more plain and easy solution of the whole matter.

Sect. XVI. From this most ancient doctrine of marks being impressed upon the body by the vices, flowed, in my opinion, the various lustrations and purgations of the ancients, especially those practised in the Mysteries, as also the Taurobolia and other sacrifices of that kind, which were formerly supposed to be of avail for the purification of men and the total expiation of crime: which customs first took their rise in Greece, and were afterwards transferred also to the Latins. Ovid, Fastorum, lib. 2. ver. 35. p. 76. tom. 3. opp.

Omne nefas, omnemque mali purgamina caussam
Credebant nostri tollere posse senes.
Græcia principium moris fuit: illa nocentes
Impia lustratos ponere facta putat.

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that incorporeal substance, which is infinite, to quicken and actuate all things.

I am duly grateful to those learned men who in erudite works have investigated and thrown light upon the Grecian mysteries, lustrations, and other ancient superstitions of the kind, but still they seem to me to have explained the rites themselves more than their origin and causes. It is evident that those who first held it to be possible for men to be purified by sacred waters, blood, and the like, whether in or out of the Mysteries, believed that the souls derived some advantage and benefit from these ceremonies. For the body, which they supposed to be about to perish, was not an object of their solicitude. But they believed that guilt, and the punishment due to crimes, were to be expiated by the offering of victims and sacrifices: what benefit then could souls expect to derive from lustrations? For my own part I feel convinced that sacred waters, and other kinds of purgations, were supposed in the earliest ages to be efficacious for cleansing the soul from the filth and impurity contracted by the perpetration of crimes. As the philosophers of a later period, as we have just shown from Lucian, boasted that the wounds and ulcers of souls were healed by their precepts and dogmas; so, in the mysteries of old, crafty and designing priests professed the art of effacing the marks left imprinted on the soul in consequence of crimes and misdeeds, so that they should not be visible to the infernal judges; alleging that water consecrated by due formalities and other similar absurdities possess such great virtue and efficacy, that they penetrate through the body to the sensual soul, and thoroughly purge it of all traces of vice. As we are too far removed from the times in which these rites were instituted, and the writers from whom at this day we derive our knowledge of ancient matters are not always sufficiently plain and perspicuous, it is impossible to prove this by direct and express testimonies: but I consider the thing here speaks for itself, nor are we altogether without evidence from which it may be safely inferred. In the first place, the priests of the Mysteries, as we are told by grave authors, affirmed that those who were not duly initiated and purified would live in hell in mud and mire, while the initiated, after departing from the bodies, would at once be transferred to the mansions of the blessed. Plato in his Phædo, p. 380: *Καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῖν οὗτοι καταστήσαντες, οὐ φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι, ὅτι ὃς ἂν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς ᾅδου ἀφίκεται, ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται· ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει*, "Wherefore those who instituted the Mysteries seem to be no contemptible men, but in reality to have darkly admonished us of old that whoever passes into the infernal regions uninitiated and unexpiated, will lie wallowing in mud: but that he who arrives thither purified and initiated will dwell with the gods." A kindred passage occurs in lib. 2. De Republica, p. 424. Aristides, in the oration called Eleusinian, in which he deplores the burning of the temple of Ceres, tom. 1. opp. ed. Sam. Jamb. p. 259. says as follows: *Ἀλλὰ μὲν τότε κέρδος τῆς πανηγύρεως οὐχ ὅσον ἡ παροῦσα εὐθυμία οὐδ' αἱ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ προτέρου χρόνου δυσκολιῶν λύσεις καὶ ἀπαλλαγαί. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ περὶ τῆς τελευτῆς ἡδίους ἔχειν τὰς ἐλπίδας ὡς ἄμεινον διάξοντας καὶ οὐκ ἐν σκότῳ τε καὶ βορβόρῳ κεισομένους, ἃ δὴ τοὺς ἀμήτους ἀναμένει*, "Nevertheless the advantage of this assembly consists not merely in present tranquillity of mind or in being released and freed from former troubles, but in our having better hopes in regard to death, as being about to live more happily, and not to lie in darkness and mire, a fate which awaits the uninitiated." In Diog. Laërtius the Athenians exhort Diogenes to get himself initiated into the Mysteries for the sake of the advantages accruing from thence to souls after this life, lib. 6. segm. 39. p. 334. 335. The philosopher replies: *Γελοῖον εἰ Ἀγεσίλαος μὲν καὶ Ἐπαμεινώνδας ἐν τῷ βορβόρῳ διάξουσιν, ἀτελεῖς δέ τινες μεμυημένοι ἐν ταῖς μακάρων νήσοις ἔσονται*, "It is ridiculous if Agesilaus and Epaminondas are to live in mud, and vile and worthless persons, that have been initiated, are to reside in the isles of the blessed." Add a quotation from Plutarch in Ægid. Menagius' notes on this passage, p. 240. and what is related by the same Laërtius respecting Antisthenes, lib. 6. segm. 4. p. 319. I will never believe that the priests who terrified the vulgar by this phraseology, meant that the souls of those who were not duly initiated and purified would live in hell in mud and filth. For apart from this not being a very severe punishment, the opinion is altogether at variance with the ancient doctrine of departed souls, nor has any thing of the kind been put forth by the poets, who have given an elaborate description of the infernal regions. I therefore take it to be a figurative mode of speech, such as was generally made use of by this

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But it would be no impertinent digression here (as to the

class of persons, which was meant to imply that men not purified by consecrated waters and other ceremonies will carry with them the impurities contracted through vice and crime into the lower world, and will there have to endure a far more painful purgation than they were willing to undergo in the Mysteries, till they have been thoroughly divested of all marks and stains. Socrates certainly had some notion of this kind in Plato's Phædo, where he expounds this saying of the priests who presided over the Mysteries philosophically, and in reference to the necessity of purifying the mind. That is to say, according to the opinion of the ancients, a man contaminated with vice stands in need of purgation; and therefore it is necessary for him to undergo it either here or after he has quitted the body. The earliest philosophers, as we have already seen, asserted that the soul is not purified till after death: but subsequently those who had the charge of the religions, or rather superstitious, who in former times, as at the present day, turned the fear and levity of the people to their own profit, endeavoured to persuade the multitude that they knew of a method by which, if so disposed, they might escape that severe purgation in the lower world. And I regret to perceive, on reading the ancient Christian writers, that not a small portion of this absurd opinion found its way into the Christian community. What I have stated is greatly confirmed by the examples of the junior Platonists, Apollonius, Proclus, Jamblichus, and others, who are said to have travelled over a considerable part of the world and to have suffered themselves to be initiated into all the Mysteries, in order to give the soul greater freedom and aptitude for contemplation, and to purge it from all mortal contagion. In doing which they doubtless imitated the ancient discipline to which this sect was altogether devoted. For although they explained the meaning of this lustration and purgation practised in the Mysteries somewhat differently from the popular opinion and the traditions of the priests themselves, still this custom of theirs proves the antiquity and universal prevalence of the opinion, that mysteries and sacred purgations are beneficial to the soul, and divest it of all impure admixture, so that it departs pure and unsullied into the lower world. And what after all is that which ancient writers so often speak of, that a man expiated by taurobolium, lustration, or the mystic rites, *is born again?* Apuleius, Metamorphos. lib. 11. p. 267. says of the benefit of the Mysteries, into which he had himself been initiated: "Since when the mortal course is finished, and they are now placed on the very threshold of closing life, God is wont to select those to whom the great secrets of religion may safely be confided, and by his providence to place them, *born* again in a certain manner, in a new career." Those who had made the sacrifice of the taurobolium, and had imbibed the blood of the slain bull, through the whole of the body as it were, proclaimed that they were "born again for ever," or at least "for twenty years," as is shown by inscriptions and other passages collected by Ant. Van Dalen, in his Dissert. ad Antiquitates et Marmora, Diss. 1. p. 42. &c. p. 128. &c. But in performing these rites they neither felt nor supposed that new strength was added to the body: consequently they must necessarily have believed that the whole benefit pertained to the mind, and that the marks impressed upon it by vice were washed away by the blood of the sacred victim diffused through the entire body. It is not to be wondered at that this ancient opinion was somewhat obscurely propounded, and as it were interpolated by later writers. The same happened to almost all the dogmas and opinions of antiquity: which no sooner fell into the hands of philosophers, than they were remodelled and refined with such exquisite ingenuity as to lose much of their primitive form. If those who even at this day believe that a painful purgation awaits souls after death, possess one particle of sense or acquaintance with things, I fancy, when they read these remarks, they will entertain less magnificent notions of the first origin of this doctrine.

Sect. XVII. The poets assigned Mercury as the guide to souls in their progress to the lower world; the same that they supposed to be the messenger of the gods and the guardian and protector of the public ways. Now, learned antiquarians are wont to inquire very seriously what it was that led the ancients to invest Mercury with this twofold office, and the generality of them assign exceedingly abstruse, recondite, and ingenious reasons for this, borrowed for the most part from the junior grammarians and philosophers, who sought to divest the ancient fables of their deformity, and to reduce them to some rational standard. Those which have been suggested by learned men, to account for the care and custody of highways having been formerly entrusted to Mercury, have been carefully collected by the erudite Everard Otto in an excellent work

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main scope of our present undertaking) should we briefly com-

De Tutela Viarum Publicarum, par. 1. cap. 9. p. 153. &c. To confess the truth, most of them seem to me to exhibit more subtlety and acumen than soundness and consistency. But those which have been put forth to prove that the troublesome office of conducting souls to the infernal regions was properly assigned to Mercury, are still more far-fetched. Phornutus, De Natura Deorum, cap. 16. p. 166. in Thom. Gale's Scriptor. Mytholog. fancied that Mercury is called ψυχόπομπος, "conductor of souls," because he "soothes the souls of men" by his eloquence, of which he supposes him to be the image and emblem. Very subtle certainly, if true: but he is far surpassed in industry and sagacity by others, not only of the sect of junior Platonists, but also of later writers, who do not hesitate to assert, upon what grounds I know not, that the fables of the poets are replete with recondite wisdom. Pet. Dan. Huet, in his Demonstratio Evangel. prop. 4. cap. 4. sect. 2. p. 161. who supposes Mercury to be the divine Moses, thinks he was called the ambassador of the shades, because Moses by his own authority caused Korah, Dathan, and Abiram to descend into hell. The intelligent, I doubt not, will smile at this notable interpretation of a poetic fiction: but they will scarcely repress their indignation when they hear that one Peter a Sarn has lately started forth, and in a specific Dissert. in the Biblioth. Bremensis. tom. 5. par. 2. p. 205. has dared to compare our blessed Saviour to Mercury, and to advance this as one of the principal arguments by which he attempts to bear out the comparison, sect. 33. p. 213, that Mercury is said by the poets to discharge the twofold function of dismissing souls to Tartarus and evoking them from thence. In these and other conjectures I commend the ingenuity of learned men: but I have for a long time been exceedingly careful not to follow in their footsteps: in which determination I am not a little confirmed by their admirable discord, which I hold to be a sure sign of an utter lack of solid arguments. I know not what unfortunate fatality has led men of the highest eminence for talent and erudition to suppose that any attention is to be paid to the later grammarians and philosophers, Stoics as well as Platonists, who have referred the fables of the ancients to philosophical and moral things: for they must have known that these men build upon no certain foundation, and were despised and laughed at by the wise of old, and especially by the first founders of Christianity. For my own part, on attentively reading the fables of the ancient poets, I am of opinion that the origin of most of their figments may be easily and conveniently derived and explained from the so called mythology itself, in conjunction with ancient history. But such is the constitution of human minds, that they despise the plain and open path, and follow the secret and rugged, in which they expect to acquire more fame and glory. To me Mercury presents very little difficulty either as guardian and god of highways or as guide and herald of souls. The ancient poets represented the gods as men, and subject to the same affections and infirmities as ourselves: they regarded the assembly of the gods no otherwise than as a senate deliberating and legislating upon the affairs of the human race. Hence as every council presiding over a state or community had its messenger who carried the laws and mandates of the magistrates to the citizens and communicated to them all their transactions, so they were obliged to assign a similar messenger to the council of the immortal gods. This they declared to be Mercury the son of Maia. Beyond all controversy a man of that name had lived in ancient Greece, and had acquired for himself a high reputation by swiftness of foot, eloquence, and other virtues or vices; and I have scarcely a doubt, that he held the office of public runner and messenger to Jupiter, an ancient king of Thessaly. The poets therefore, who mixed up the affairs of the gods with those of the ancient heroes, could select no one out of ancient history more qualified to discharge the embassies of the gods. But he who wishes to perform the functions of messenger, ought to be well acquainted with all the roads and avenues in that country which he is often compelled to traverse. The legate of the gods therefore could not possibly dispense with this knowledge. And as the empire of the immortals is bounded by the same limits as the course of the sun, it was necessary that the individual whom they supposed to be despatched by the gods to the people and nations of the whole world, should be represented as acquainted with all the roads and paths in the universe. You now, if I am not altogether mistaken, have the reason and cause why the ancient Greeks and Latins committed the care and guardianship of the public roads to Mercury. For to whom, I ask, could this office be entrusted more properly than to him whose business it was to know all roads, to undertake long and distant journeys at the behest of the celestial senate, and to be almost continually

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pare the forementioned doctrine and cabala of the ancient

wandering over the surface of the globe? Neither should I look for any greater mystery in the fact that the ancients usually assign Mercury as the guide to souls in their transit to the shades. The descent of Avernus was difficult and the road to the infernal regions unknown, rugged, and trackless. Ennius in Cicero's Tuscul. Quæst. lib. i. cap. 16. tom. 8. opp. p. 2584.

> Adsum atque advenio Acheronte vix via alta atque ardua
> Per speluncas saxis structas asperis, pendentibus
> Maximis: ubi rigida constat crassa caligo inferum.

It was unworthy the clemency of the poets to suffer miserable souls to enter upon so dark, precipitous, and dangerous a road, without a guide. And whom could they supply in preference to Mercury? He not only, as is expressly recorded by Apollodorus, Biblioth. lib. 3. cap. 10. sect. 2. p. 196. was the messenger of Jupiter, but also of the Θεοὶ ὑποχθόνιοι, "the subterranean and infernal gods." [See Ovid's Fast. lib. 5. ver. 665. 666.] It behoved him therefore, above all others, to be perfectly acquainted with the road leading from the upper to the lower regions, and the most convenient paths to be followed in the journey to the dominion of Pluto. I had intended to add something more and to state the opinion of the ancients on certain points pertaining to the infernal regions: but I perceive I have already digressed too far from my proposed object, and have almost lost sight of the junior Platonic school which first suggested these remarks. I return therefore to the Platonists.

Sect. XVIII. Those who read what we have brought hitherto forward from the records of antiquity, will I think perceive that learned men are mistaken in supposing this dogma respecting the body or *vehicle* of departing souls to be the invention of the Platonists, and devised by them for the purpose of more easily maintaining and defending other doctrines to which they were devoted. The opinion, or if you will the superstition, that there is in man besides the rational and ethereal soul a certain corporeal spirit, which in the case of most persons is utterly incapable of being disconnected from the soul after death, and is proof against every thing except certain punishments in hell, belongs to times of the remotest antiquity. This opinion the Platonists, who were fond of appearing as the guardians and preservers of the earliest philosophy, and who to a certain extent adopted all the popular superstitions, in some respects remodelled and refined, and according to their wont accommodated to the other precepts of their discipline. And yet they did not all enter upon this task in the same way: whence arose the variety of opinions formerly prevailing among them on the body of souls, the principal of which are enumerated by Proclus, Comm. in Timæum, Platonis, lib. 5. p. 311. 320. And even this dissension, if there were nothing else, would lead me to the conviction that the Platonists did not arrive at this dogma by reasoning and reflection, but having received it from others, endeavoured each according to his notion, to make it accord and harmonize with their own theories. Plato, as is every where apparent from his works, had already attempted something of the kind: but had accomplished nothing. Here therefore this junior school found something to do. But to remove all doubt that might possibly arise on the matter, I shall now prove this more clearly and specifically. The Platonists, then, held what was handed down from the ancients to be generally recognized and indisputable, that the soul of man is a particle of the celestial ether, but at the same time has in connection with it a shade, resembling the human body, with which it descends to the lower world after death, and lastly that unless purified by suitable remedies in this life it has to undergo purification after death: but these dogmas were variously modified by them and interpreted in accordance with their own precepts. The ancients had originally taught, as we have seen before, that the soul is a portion of the highest heaven or ether, or a most subtle and pure fire. But the Platonists declared the soul to be more noble and excellent than all matter, and to be a part and member of that world which they called νοητὸς, or "intelligible," in which there is no place for concretion, or rather of God himself. Consult, as one example for all, Plotinus in his book De Essentia Animæ, Ennead 4. lib. 1. p. 360. 361. In combining this opinion therefore with the ancient doctrine they asserted that the soul immediately on its issuing forth from the intelligible world was invested by God in heaven with a celestial and immortal body, which afterwards was utterly incapable of being separated from it:

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Incorporealists (the Pythagoreans and Platonists) with that of

which body this school, as Boëtius for instance, calls the *chariot* of the soul. By this means they kept true to their own principles and at the same time to the reverence they entertained for antiquity. For if this dogma be adopted it will be possible to call the soul fire and *ethereal sense*, on account of the immortal body which God has associated with it: and yet to assert notwithstanding, that it is better and more excellent than all body. Plotinus in his first book, De Dubiis Animæ, Ennead 4. lib. 3. cap. 15. p. 383. says: Ἴασι δὲ ἐκκύψασαι τοῦ νοητοῦ, εἰς οὐρανὸν μὲν πρῶτον, καὶ σῶμα ἐκεῖ προσλαβοῦσαι, δι' αὐτοῦ ἤδη χωροῦσι καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ γεωδέστερα σώματα, εἰς ὅσον ἂν εἰς μῆκος ἐκταθῶσι, "The souls declining from the intelligible world proceed first into heaven, and there receiving a body, now pass through it into the more earthy bodies, to whatever length they extend." Of this celestial body of the soul all the Platonists speak in most magnificent terms. This, say they, is placed out of γένεσις, or "generation," and yet accompanies souls descending to generation: this is pure, splendid, and devoid of all dross and concretion: this in short is connected with the soul by an eternal and indissoluble bond, and is wholly incapable of extinction. For according to their opinion, heaven itself from which, in concurrence with the above-mentioned most ancient sages, they supposed this body to be derived, is also body, not indeed concrete and divisible, but most pure and simple: which opinion, besides Jamblichus, whose passage I have already quoted, and others, Plotinus that prince of the Platonic school endeavours to confirm by many subtle arguments, in his book De Cœlo, Ennead. 2. lib. 1. p. 96. &c. I am not ignorant that some individuals of this class express themselves as though they supposed the nature of the soul itself to consist of celestial matter or to be nothing more than pure and unmixed fire. Porphyry in his Sententiæ ad Intelligibilia Ducentes, sect. 32. p. 233. Ὅταν δὲ μελετήσει ἀφίστασθαι φύσεως, αὐγὴ ξηρὰ γίνεται, ἄσκιος καὶ ἀνέφελος, "But when it (the soul) endeavours to withdraw from its nature, it becomes a dry splendour, without shadow or cloud." And probably there were some in this sect who were unable to reach so far by contemplation as to comprehend the real opinion of their masters and therefore adopted the ancient doctrine respecting the nature of the soul. But whoever attentively studies their principal leaders will readily perceive that in other passages they most clearly separate the soul itself from its ethereal body, and therefore that those who give any other interpretation to their opinion are manifestly in error. Some of them also occasionally assert that the soul is altogether destitute of all body: but they by no means differ from the rest in the matter itself, but only in the meaning of the word σῶμα, or "body." For they take the word in its stricter sense and merely of those things which consist of grosser matter: but from this grosser matter they except ether, which they consider too noble to be called σῶμα, or "body;" agreeably to which opinion they can pronounce the soul to be destitute of all body. Nevertheless there is some dissension among the Platonists with regard to the origin of this celestial body. For some suppose it to be associated with the soul by God himself. Of this opinion was Boëtius, who is well-known to have been a Platonist: in lib. 3. De Consolat. Philosoph. p. 69. he thus addresses God:

> Tu caussis animas paribus, vitasque minores
> Provehis et *levibus* sublimeis *curribus* aptans
> In cœlum, terramque seris.

But others assert that the soul of itself assumes this body: among whom rank Plotinus, in some passages, Porphyry, Sententiæ, p. 233. Theophrastus in Æneas Gazæus, in the Dialogue De Resurrectione, p. 64. and others, whose names it is unnecessary to enumerate. But this disagreement does not touch the main point of the question, nor has ever given rise to much contention and controversy.

Sect. XIX. These philosophers have much more frequent bickerings with each other on the subject of the other body or vestment of the soul. They all agree with the ancients that a certain other body besides the celestial and ethereal adheres to the rational soul, representing the human form and figure: and this body they not only designate by the Homeric name εἴδωλον, but also like the poets declare it to be a shade and similar to wind and vapour. The arguments above quoted from Philoponus, by which they substantiate this opinion, plainly show that reason did not compel them to adopt it, but rather superstition and an immoderate veneration for antiquity.

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Christianity; and consider the agreement or disagreement that

Hence as soon as they are required to give a clearer exposition of their ideas upon the nature of this body, they generally fly off into as many opinions as they can number writers of any name and dignity among them. In the first place when it is asked, what is the cause and origin of this body and who unites it with the soul, they answer with one voice that the soul itself assumes and adopts it. For it is one of the leading precepts of this philosophy that the soul is endowed with the faculty of acquiring for itself a body out of every region that it passes through, out of air, fire, ether, earth. Theophrastus the Platonist, in Æneas Gazæus in the Dialogue entitled Theophrastus, p. 64. thus writes: Τοιούτων καὶ τοσούτων ἡ ψυχὴ σωμάτων ἐμπίπλαται, δι' ὅσων καὶ οἵων χωρίων παρέρχεται, "The soul is invested with such and so many bodies, as are the places it traverses." To him add Porphyry, Sententiæ ad Int. Ducent., sect. 32. p. 233. who explains this dogma more copiously, Plotinus, Proclus, and all whose writings have come down to us: Ὡς γὰρ, says Porphyry, ἂν διατεθῇ, εὑρίσκει σῶμα, τάξει καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις διωρισμένον, "For as the soul is disposed and situated, so it finds a body suitable to its order and properties." This dogma, the force of which was not comprehended even by the Platonists themselves, as is manifest from the various explications of it which they every where put forth, is abstruse and difficult to be understood: but necessity compelled them to devise something of the kind. For they neither could attribute the fabrication of this body to God, whom they proclaimed to be most friendly to souls, and to be himself the best, nor to matter, of which this body consisted: wherefore nothing was left for them but to say, that the soul itself was its maker, although they could by no means explain the manner in which it performed this work. So far they are concordant: but proceed with your inquiries, and ask them for something more plain and explicit respecting the matter, form, and other things pertaining to this body, and you will no longer find any agreement or unanimity among them. For although this school in former times professed the greatest concord, and did not descend to public controversies and graver strife, still no sect of philosophers that I know of has been divided into so many discordant opinions and sentiments as these Platonists. Nor is this greatly to be wondered at: for they followed the imagination rather than reason as their guide in philosophizing, and those who do so cannot avoid being split up into various opinions. The chief of these opinions I shall forthwith proceed to enumerate: merely premising beforehand that this secondary body of the soul is not designated by all of them by the same name. Most of them call it εἴδωλον, a name which we have already shown to be most ancient: others, however, among whom are Porphyry and Hierocles, call it φύσις, others πνεῦμα, others ψυχὴ πνευματικὴ, as Synesius, in his book, De Insomniis, p. 137. And from these names arose various forms of expression familiar to the Platonists, in the exposition of which any one will easily fall into error, unless he be acquainted with the names.

Sect. XX. The space from heaven, in which the Platonists tell us the soul first receives its immortal body, to this earth of ours, in which it is united to the earthly bodies, is immense, and distributed into various kinds of provinces and regions, according to the variety of bodies with which this interval is filled. Consult among others, Synesius, De Insomniis, p. 141. While the soul traverses these regions in its descent to the earth to γένεσις, as they say, it cannot help adopting a body from them. When it passes through the region of the sun, it assumes a body similar to the sun; when through the province of the moon, one kindred to the moon; and when it departs hence into the free and open air, it assumes an aerial body; as Porphyry, among others has expressly recorded in his Sententiæ ad Intelligibil. Ducent. sect. 32. p. 283. But what is the nature and material of this body, which the soul possesses in addition to its first and celestial one, when it is united with its earthy body? Is it compounded of all the elements of the regions through which the soul passes? or does the soul on entering a new province adopt a new body, having lost the former one, so that its exterior tunic is only of one kind, and of a simple material. This question is the subject of a grave and most intricate controversy in the schools of the Platonists, as appears from Proclus' lib. 1. Comm. in Timæum. Platonis, p. 311. 320. For many of this sect consider that it is compounded out of all the celestial orbs, and that a new body is always added to the soul on entering a new province, in the same way as a man successively puts on various vestments, which cover one body. See Porphyry, ibid. sect. 32. p. 237. where he calls this body, πνεῦμα, "a spirit," ὃ ἐκ τῶν σφαιρῶν

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is betwixt them. First therefore, here is a plain agreement of

συνελέξατο, "which the soul collected from the spheres." Æneas Gazæus, in his Theophrastus, p. 65. Σὺ δὲ σπουδάζεις, ὦ Θεόφραστε, καὶ οὐ γελοῖον εἶναί σοι δοκεῖ τὸ ἀσώματον ὂν οὕτως σώματι ῥᾳδίως συμπλέκεσθαι, καὶ ἐπισυνάπτειν καὶ συῤῥάπτειν, ἄλλο ἄλλῳ, καὶ πολλὰ ἅμα σώματα ἐπενδύεσθαι, "But thou, O Theophrastus, seriously assertest these things, and dost not consider it absurd that the incorporeal should so easily be enveloped in body, and that they should be fitted and knitted to one another, and it should be invested with many bodies at the same time." But others seem to have been alarmed at the difficulties involved in such a doctrine, and therefore asserted this body to be of a simple nature and material; although these again are wonderfully at variance with one another, and cannot easily decide to what principle or element it is to be referred. It would be neither a pleasing nor profitable task to recount all the refined and subtle opinions of this insane sect: suffice it to observe that not one of them is supported by any species of argument, the whole of what they advance amounting to nothing more than mere idle surmise and conjecture. Nor could any thing better be expected from men who take upon them to adorn poetic fables and vulgar superstitions with the varnish of philosophy, and are indebted to the imagination for the aid which they ought to seek from reason alone.

Sect. XXI. If you now inquire as to the form of this body you will have the opportunity of becoming spectator, and, if you like, the arbiter of a new conflict. These sages agree that the body we speak of can be changed into various shapes at the will of the soul itself, and, as we have above seen from Philoponus, sect. 16. at one time assumes the appearance of a man, at another of a beast or other animal, although generally speaking it is regarded as possessing the human form. The earlier philosophers attributed the human form alone to this vestment of the soul, nor do I think it can be proved from any passage of ancient writers that in the more remote ages the soul was ever supposed to be capable of assuming the figure of a dog, lion, wolf, or other animal. But the Platonists rejected none of the rumours and fables of the credulous multitude, and therefore as they knew that stories were every where afloat of spectres going about in the form of wolves or other animals, and doing violence to men, they considered that these, in like manner, were by no means to be repudiated by them, but so tempered and modified as not to militate against their own precepts. Hence they taught that the exterior form of the soul always corresponds to its interior state: that most souls represent the human form: but yet that some more corrupt and prone to evil desires than the rest appear in the resemblance of those beasts the vices of which they imitated in this life: the cruel and tyrannical bearing the image of the lion, the intemperate and voracious of the wolf, the libidinous of the goat. Whether all the philosophers of this sect, however, were addicted to this opinion, I would not undertake to say. They agree also with each other as to the cause and origin of this form. For they all admit that the soul itself impresses it upon the body by its own inherent faculty of imagination: that is, that the soul is excited by the love of bodies: that this love causes it copiously to attract a humid spirit: that by this grosser spirit it becomes visible: and, lastly, that the imagination of the soul intervenes and confers upon the body such a form as corresponds to its own interior affection. In recounting these opinions I am aware I shall appear to be detailing the most monstrous and improbable absurdities to those who admit of nothing except what they see supported by reasoning and argument: but that I am attributing nothing to this sect which is foreign to their discipline may be proved by innumerable testimonies from their works. Let those who are sceptical upon the matter consult the passages of Philoponus quoted by Dr. Cudworth, and compare them with Porphyry, in his Sententiæ, sect. 32. p. 233. and De Antro Nymphar. p. 257. in the latter of which passages he says amongst other things: Καὶ τάς γε φιλοσωμάτους ὑγρὸν τὸ πνεῦμα ἐφέλκομένας παχύνειν τοῦτο ὡς νέφος· ὑγρὸν γὰρ ἐν ἀέρι παχυνθὲν νέφος συνίσταται· παχυνθέντος δὲ ἐν αὐταῖς τοῦ ὑγροῦ πλεονασμῷ, ὁρατὰς γίνεσθαι, "Cherishing a love of bodies and attracting to themselves a humid spirit, they condense this like a cloud: for moisture in the air by condensation forms a cloud: and the spirit in them being in like manner condensed through a redundance of moisture, they become visible." With respect to the time, however, when the soul receives the faculty of thus forming the aerial body it is invested with, there is some disagreement among these philosophers. Some suppose the soul to be always in possession of this virtue, and therefore to be capable of assuming various forms even previously to its conjunction

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these best, and most religious philosophers, with Christianity, in

with this earthy and mortal body. Among these must be ranked Porphyry, to say nothing now of others, as is evident from the passages above indicated. But others maintain that the soul does not acquire this faculty till it is associated with the earthy body; in which having contracted various impurities and corporeal propensities, and having attained a stronger and more vigorous power of imagination, it then becomes qualified to adopt whatever forms it pleases. As far as the obscure phraseology employed by these masters will enable me to judge, the great majority of this sect espoused the latter opinion. From this dissension flowed another controversy, upon which I shall say only a word or two, respecting spectres wandering about the sepulchres of the dead. For some held these spectres to be the souls of dead men, or rather their images: while others, on the contrary, asserted that they were of a twofold kind, one belonging to the order of demons or souls not yet associated with bodies, the other to souls already released from the body. Nay, some were bold enough to declare that this twofold description of spectres could be distinguished from each other by certain marks or signs. So true it is, that there is nothing which superstition leaves unattempted.

Sect. XXII. The state of the aerial body after the dissolution of the earthy and concrete body, and the fate of the soul which it invests, are also the subjects of many knotty, intricate, and subtle questions among these philosophers: as cannot but be well known to every one conversant with the affairs and institutions of the Christian community in the earlier ages. One of the most important of these is the following: whether or not the so-called images or aerial bodies are capable of being separated from the soul, so that it can depart free and unshackled to the pure ether. The principal masters of this school, Plotinus, Porphyry, Hierocles, and many others inculcate that a wise man has the power of destroying the bond of the celestial and aerial body by various exercises and purgations, and of so releasing the soul, that on the extinction of the mortal body, it also divests itself of this other body, and clothed in that splendid body alone with which it was formerly united in heaven, proceeds to the mansions of the blessed. As one example for all I shall bring forward Hierocles, Comm. in Aurea Carmina Pythagoræ, p. 227. especially as I perceive this passage of his is not at all understood by his interpreters: Πυθαγορικῆς ἀγωγῆς τὸ πέρας, ὅλους δι' ὅλων ὑποπτέρους γενέσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν θείων ἀγαθῶν μετάληψιν, ἵν' ὅταν ὁ τοῦ θανάτου καιρὸς ἐνστῇ, καταλιπόντες ἐπὶ γῆς τὸ θνητὸν σῶμα, ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΤΟΥΤΟΥ ΦΥΣΙΝ ἀποδυσάμενοι, πρὸς τὴν οὐρανίαν πορείαν ὦσιν εὔζωνοι οἱ τῶν φιλοσοφιας ἀγώνων ἀθληταί, "The end of the Pythagorean discipline is to become wholly winged for the reception and participation of divine goods, that when the period of death arrives, the champions of philosophical contest, having left the mortal body on the earth, and put off *its nature*, may be ready for the heavenly journey." In these words, it ought to be observed first of all, that Hierocles declares that a wise man, when he dies, not only puts off the *mortal body*, but also its φύσις, or *nature*. But this name is employed both by him and the rest of the Platonists to designate the aerial body, which according to their doctrine, the soul assumes from the air, prior to its descent into the mortal body, or ὀστρεῶδες περίβλημα, "shell-like covering," as Synesius calls it, De Insomniis, p. 137. And this opinion, I confess, approaches very closely to the most ancient discipline, which as we have already seen, taught that the souls of heroes and great men abandon the shade or image in the infernal regions, and straightway ascend to the council of the celestials. The same idea was entertained by this sect in respect to the souls of ordinary mortals, which like the ancients they doomed to a painful purgation in the lower world after death, and imagined that such souls were not released from their infernal prison till all concretion contracted from the air and other elements was dissipated and removed from them. And in this matter again they follow the ancients, whose opinions have been inquired into above. But from these main props and pillars of the Platonic school, and their followers, not a few dissented, for example Jamblichus, Proclus, Syrianus, and others, who held that this image is never cast off by the soul, but after being purified and divested of all vice and stain, accompanies it in its flight to the blessed abodes. In the time of Plotinus a controversy was already engaged in on this matter, as is manifest from his book, Quod Ens unum idemque simul totum est ubique, Ennead. 6. lib. 4. cap. 16, p. 659. I have not met with one of these philosophers who has attempted to set forth and defend this dogma more copiously and elaborately than Synesius, and therefore I shall appeal to this

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this; That the most consummate happiness, and highest per-

author in particular for testimonies confirmatory of what I have just stated. Synesius, then, does not absolutely deny it to be possible for the soul on its departure to the upper regions to lay aside all corporeal concretion: on the contrary he admits that this boon may perhaps have been granted to one or two by the blessing of God and through the influence of sacred exercises: Καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἑνὶ καὶ δευτέρῳ δῶρον ἂν γένοιτο τελετῆς καὶ θεοῦ, De Insomniis, p. 13. But he denies notwithstanding that any one can look forward to such felicity, since the image, according to his opinion, cleaves to the soul in its ascent, and remains its inseparable companion, p. 140. Οὐ γὰρ μόνην εἰς τὰς σφαίρας ἀνάγειν ἔοικε τὴν ἐκεῖθεν ἠκούσαν φύσιν, ἀλλὰ εἴ τι καὶ τῆς πυρὸς καὶ τῆς ἀέρος ἀκρότητος εἰς τὴν εἰδωλικὴν φύσιν ἕσπασε κατιοῦσα, πρὶν τὸ γήϊνον ἀμφιέσασθαι κέλυφος, "For it appears to carry up to the celestial spheres not only the nature which comes from thence, but also whatever it attracted to this image-nature from the extremity of fire and air in its descent, before it was clothed in its earthy shell." This opinion he first proves by a twofold argument: first by a certain oracle from those called the Chaldaic or Zoroaster's, which were always of immense authority in this school. We give the verses themselves:

Οὐ τῷ τῆς ὕλης κρημνῷ σκύβαλον καταλείψει,
Ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰδώλῳ μερὶς εἰς τόπον ἀμφιφάοντα.

Nec jam materiæ fœcem in prærupta relinquas,
Quin pars idolo splendenti in sede relicta est.

For he does not doubt but that τόπος in these words means the celestial habitation to which all well-constituted souls are destined to go. He then brings forward an argument to confirm what I have stated, alleging it to be most consistent with truth, that those things which come into a communion of the same nature, enter into an indissoluble association, especially if they are allied and kindred to that nature: Καὶ λόγον δ' ἂν ἔχει τὰ κοινωνήσαντα φύσεως, καὶ εἰς ἓν συντελέσαντα, μήτοι παντάπασιν ἄσχετα εἶναι καὶ μάλιστα οἷς ἐκ γειτόνων ἡ χώρα· καθάπερ πῦρ ἐφεξῆς ἐστὶ τῷ κύκλῳ σώματι, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ γῆ τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἔσχατον, "For it stands with reason that those things which come into a participation of the same nature and coalesce into one, are not destitute of all habitude and relation towards each other, especially those which are neighbouring in place; in the same way as fire is next adjoining to circumfused body, and not as earth the lowest of all things." Now if it should be objected that upon this hypothesis corporeal dross and impurity are admitted into that place from which all impurity ought to be absent, our philosopher replies that nothing of the kind is to be feared, for whatever is of a worse condition in the body of the soul, provided only it obeys the better part, acquires a more excellent nature and becomes similar to ether. After this exposition he concludes that he has no wish to obtrude this opinion upon others: but yet that all must admit it to be unquestionable that the celestial body which the soul brings from ether returns thither with it: Καὶ ἀπιστεῖν ἔξεστι καὶ πιστεύειν· τὴν δὲ ἐκεῖθεν ἥκουσαν σωματικὴν οὐσίαν, οὐδεμία μηχανὴ κατὰ φύσιν ἀνιούσης ψυχῆς, μὴ οὐ συνεξᾶραι τοῦ κτώματος ἀνασπασαν καὶ ταῖς σφαίραις ἐναρμοσθῆναι, τοῦτ' ἔστιν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν ὥσπερ ἀναχθῆναι, "This may be believed or disbelieved: but as to that corporeal substance which comes from thence, it is impossible but that when the soul agreeably to its nature returns upwards; arising from its fall it ascends along with it and is united with the celestial spheres, that is, is restored to its own nature." These passages show what was strictly and properly meant by those who held the image or body of the soul to accompany it in its ascent to heaven. They supposed that this body is compounded of the various elements, air, fire, earth, &c. and therefore that a distinction is to be made in it between the matter which is kindred to ether, such as air and fire, and the grosser matter such as earth and all that encompasses the earth: that the nobler matter is so intimately associated with the celestial body of the soul, as to put on its nature and to be henceforward incapable of separation from it, but that the remaining dross or ὕλη, the heavier and denser matter, is separable and ought to be removed by severe contemplation and expiations during life, as otherwise the soul will be deprived of its celestial habitation and felicity and doomed to undergo the most exquisite tortures after death.

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fection, that human nature is capable of, consisteth not in a

Sect. XXIII. It is the constant and concordant opinion of antiquity, that souls released from the bonds of the earthy body depart into ᾅδης, or the lower world: that the minds of wise men and heroes put off the image itself together with the mortal body and after death are immediately transferred to the gods, although the image or sentient soul descends to the dominions of Pluto: but that the ordinary and vulgar souls proceed along with the image to this subterranean abode, where those which are curable are subjected to various kinds of torments for their purification, while the rest, being too deeply criminal and imbued with inveterate and ineradicable sin are tortured with everlasting punishments: on the whole of which matters we have largely commented above. The Platonists, ever anxious to appear as the strict and rigid preservers of the ancient dogmas and traditions, did not venture to controvert any part of this creed; as is evident from the passages of Philoponus cited by Dr. Cudworth, and if the subject required, or the present opportunity would permit, might easily be confirmed from Plotinus, Synesius, and many others. But the diversity of their opinions upon other matters relating to the soul gave rise to some discord among them even in respect to this subject: and moreover, the philosophy they professed did not allow of their assenting to every thing that had been handed down from antiquity, especially by the poets: hence it became requisite for them to exercise their ingenuity in remodelling the ancient opinions and expounding them agreeably to their own discipline. I am not disposed to go into endless detail and repeat all that I have met with in their writings on these matters, but shall content myself with a few points bearing more closely than the rest upon our present inquiry. On the souls of those who had neglected purgation in this life, there was no great difference of opinion among them: for they all agreed that these are despatched into a dark and dismal region, where such as have moderately sinned are purged and purified, while the rest, as having exceeded all bounds in transgression, endure the most severe and dreadful punishments. This doctrine indeed seemed to clash with that precept of their school which denies the possibility of the soul's being in place, and consequently of its locomotion: but they fancied they sufficiently met this difficulty by declaring that the soul is said to be in hell by reason of its presiding over the image which resides there. Porphyry, Sententiæ ad Intelligibil. Ducent. sect. 32. p. 232. Οὕτω καὶ ἐν ᾅδου εἶναι ἐστὶ ψυχῇ, ὅταν προεστήκει εἰδώλου, φύσιν μὲν ἔχοντος εἶναι ἐν τόπῳ, "So also to be in hades is asserted of the soul, when it presides over the idol or image, which is of such a nature as to exist in place." Add Plotinus, Ennead. 6. lib. 4. cap. 16. p. 659. And in interpreting this descent of the soul into the lower world and the punishments there awaiting it according to the principles of their own philosophy, the disciples of the Platonic school display considerable subtlety. They maintain that the soul, on emerging from the body, is encumbered with many humid and heavy vapours, which are carried by their own gravity to the earth and subterraneous places: that in these places the hades of the ancients must be supposed to be situated: and consequently that the soul, being bound and united to its image, of necessity descends into this infernal abode along with it: see Porphyry, ibid. p. 232. and compare the same author in his De Antro Nymphar. p. 257. 258. Ἐπεὶ δὲ, says he in the former passage, διήκει τὸ βαρὺ πνεῦμα καὶ ἔνυγρον ἀχρὶ τῶν ὑπογείων τόπων, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ λέγεται χωρεῖν ὑπὸ γῆν, "Since the heavy and moist spirit reaches the subterranean places, the soul itself is thus said to descend under the earth." The manner in which they attempted to explain the nature of the punishments to which polluted souls are exposed in the lower regions, is evident from the passages of Philoponus adduced by Dr. Cudworth, sect. 16. On this subject the dissension among these philosophers is very trifling, and all arises out of their disagreement respecting the nature of the image or the body derived from the air and stars. For those who held this image or at least a portion of it to be so intimately connected with the ethereal body of the soul as to be wholly incapable of separation from it, supposed that souls on the completion of their term of purgation, carry this image with them to the habitations of the blessed: whereas the others who believed it to be possible for the aerial to be disconnected from the ethereal body, maintained that the image either remains in the lower world or wanders up and down on the earth and especially about the tombs of the dead, till it is finally dissolved and annihilated. But when the question came to the souls of great men and in particular of philosophers, this sect was agitated by somewhat graver dissensions. The ancients indeed, as we have already seen, although they supposed the

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separate state of souls, stripped naked from all body, and having no manner of commerce with matter, as some high-flown persons

minds of heroes and illustrious men to be immediately received into heaven, inculcated nevertheless that their sentient souls become denizens of the subterranean community. In this opinion there was something which the junior Platonists, if they wished to remain true to the principles of their own discipline, could not wholly adopt. Hence they were obliged to devise some method of reconciling themselves with the ancients. The assertors of the possibility of the soul's separation from its image or aerial body, found this task comparatively easy: for they declared that the soul of a wise man ascends to heaven, but that its image proceeds to the lower regions: which indeed approximates very closely to the ancient doctrine. But a greater difficulty presented itself to those who maintained that the image is altogether incapable of being detached from the soul: hence they had recourse to the signification of the word ᾅδης, and borrowed from philology the aid which philosophy denied them: ᾅδης, said they, is the same as ἀειδής, "obscure," and therefore when a wise man's soul is stated to be ἐν ᾅδου, it means "that it exists separately or in a manner unknown to us." Both these opinions are touched upon by Plotinus, among others, Ennead. 6. lib. 4. cap. 16. p. 659. Τὸ δὲ εἰς ᾅδου γίνεσθαι, εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ ἀειδεῖ, τὸ χωρὶς λέγεται, "If the name of hades means something hidden, to go into hades is nothing more than to be apart,—— εἰ δὲ παντελῶς λύσειε φιλοσοφία τὸ εἴδωλον καὶ ἀπέλθοι τὸ εἴδωλον εἰς τὸν χείρω τόπον μόνον, αὐτὴ δὲ καθαρῶς ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, οὐδένος ἐξῃρημένου αὐτῆς, "but if philosophy altogether dissolves the image, this proceeds to the worse place alone, but the soul itself lives in the intelligible world, nothing being taken away from it." This derivation of the word ᾅδης from ἀειδής is frequently met with among the ancients, and we are informed by Methodius in Photius, Biblioth. cod. 234. p. 923. that it was also adopted by Origen. This passage of Plotinus led Dr. Cudworth to say above, sect. 15. that this philosopher in asserting it to be possible for the soul to be divested of all body, dissents from the rest of the Platonists and especially from Porphyry. But on carefully comparing Plotinus, Porphyry, and the other masters of this sect with each other, it will easily be perceived that their difference lies in the words alone. For Plotinus does not affirm that the soul on quitting this earthy body loses all body, but speaks expressly of the εἴδωλον only: which the whole sect of Platonists is accustomed to distinguish from the celestial and ethereal vestment of the soul. Besides, he lays down nothing positively, but withholds his assent and merely points out a way by which the difficulty started among the Platonists on the subject of the soul's descent into hell may be got rid of, whatever opinions they may entertain with regard to its state after the dissolution of the body. I own, indeed, he places the soul of the wise man on its departure from the body in what the Platonists call the νοητὸς, or "intelligible" world, to which these philosophers deny all access to bodies. But setting aside that they do not always employ the word νοητὸς in the same sense, but sometimes attach to it a wider and sometimes a more restricted signification, and that the whole of Plotinus' doctrine on the subject is obscure and almost inexplicable; this philosopher does not seem to take away all body from the inhabitants of this rational world. For, Ennead. 6. lib. 7. cap 10. p. 702. he gravely argues that the animals living in it are not destitute of horns, nails, and other members of the kind: which certainly would be very amusing and more worthy of a simpleton than a philosopher if he had believed these animals to be devoid of all body and nothing but empty shadows or notions. Still I will not on that account deny that there ever was a Platonist who supposed it possible for the soul to be gradually divested even of its celestial body: for I know this school abounds with men who indulge in the wildest theories, and talk with the utmost confidence upon matters of which they have not the slightest comprehension. But I do maintain, that if any one of them ever thought in this wise, he deviated from the common opinion of his order, and professed a doctrine altogether repugnant to the fundamental precepts of Platonism on the nature of the soul. That Plotinus entertained no such notion is shown by his words, Ennead. 4. lib. 9. cap. 7. p. 455. where he declares it to be necessary for the soul always τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ μεταλαμβάνειν, "to partake of the sensible nature."

Sect. XXIV. The precepts of these philosophers upon the mode of purging the soul during its connexion with the mortal body and upon the effect of this purgation, are again so numerous and diversified as not to admit of being comprised in a few pages. Porphyry, according to the testimony of St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, lib. 10. cap.

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in all ages have been apt to conceit. For such amongst the philosophers (and Platonists too) was Plotinus;[5] the unevenness

32. p. 204. tom. 7. opp. recorded at the close of his first book, On the Return of the Soul, "that no one opinion had yet been received, containing a universal method of freeing the soul, either by any most true philosophy, or by the customs and discipline of the Indians, or the system of the Chaldæans, or by any other method, and that no such method had come to his knowledge from historical inquiry." This is said with the greatest truth: nor does he indeed except the very sect to which he himself belonged. For although all the masters of this school proclaim that the soul is to be purified and constantly exhort their disciples to commence and complete this purgation, lest they should descend into hades after the death of the body, still it is incredible how much they disagree when they come to seek for the means most adapted for the furtherance of this object. I have no intention of enumerating their various opinions, but shall content myself with observing, that some enjoin one and others two kinds of purgation: which dissension is chiefly owing to the fact, that some maintain and others deny the possibility of the separation of the image from the soul. The former merely require of their followers to purge the celestial soul and to present it free and pure from the contagion of the image: while the latter decide that in the first place the celestial body and afterwards the aerial body or image is to be purified: and as these two bodies are of a different nature, they are obliged to prescribe a twofold description of purgation.

Sect. XXV. There are a great many other points still remaining, which might be dwelt upon in relation to these matters; especially if I were disposed to compare the tenets of the ancient Christians with the precepts of the Platonists and to point out the degree of affinity between them. But I fear I have already digressed so far from my main object as to have exhausted the patience of many of my readers. I shall therefore merely add a few words upon what I consider to be the chief advantages to be derived by them from these copious remarks. In the first place, I fancy, they will show that those Platonic philosophers who flourished in the early ages of Christianity are not such men as many suppose them to be, ingenious, wise, subtle, and acute, with whom sound argument is every thing, and fancy and rash conjecture nothing. For who can entertain a very high conception of philosophers who recklessly adopt all the opinions of the vulgar, and then tax their ingenuity to devise the means of combining the most absurd superstitions and conceits with their own doctrines. For my own part, as I avowed at the very outset, so far from regarding these Platonists as discreet and considerate men, I hold them to be superstitious, trifling, credulous, and fanatical, who fancied themselves qualified to reconcile old wives' fables with the dogmas of the ancient philosophers and to establish a sort of concord between the absurd religions of the common people and the Platonic precepts. And as to their discipline itself, although it contains some things not altogether deserving of contempt, for even the Phrygians do not always rave, I should pronounce it to be nothing more than a jumble of heterogeneous opinions compiled from the dogmas of Plato and Pythagoras, the precepts of the ancient oriental philosophers, and the delusive vagaries of misguided and distempered minds. In the second place, I consider it to be evident from these remarks, that the earliest Christian fathers did not derive all that they are commonly said to have derived from the schools of the Platonists. I agree with those who charge the major portion of these fathers with too great a partiality for the Platonic philosophy: but I deny that they are all guilty of this fault, nor can I believe that every thing which they have in common with the Platonists is Platonic and transferred from the Academy to the Christians. For many things which are regarded as Platonic in their books and opinions, belong to the ancient popular traditions which were diffused among the Greeks and Romans long before the birth of our Saviour, and were retained by the Christians as far as was consistent with the holier discipline they had adopted. For as the Platonists endeavoured to amalgamate whatever had been formerly handed down by the poets and received by the multitude, with the precepts of philosophy; so the Christians also rejected none of the public opinions of the people among whom they lived that were not openly repugnant to their own principles, but combined them to the best of their power with the new religion. No nation embraced the Christian rites in so pure and chaste a form as not to retain some admixture of ancestral superstitions and fictions. Of the other advantages to be derived from these remarks I shall not speak, as they cannot but be obvious to the intelligent reader.

[5] We have seen in the preceding note, sect. 18. that injustice is here done to

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and unsafeness of whose temper may sufficiently appear from hence, that as he conceived human souls might possibly ascend to so high a pitch, as quite to shake off commerce with all body; so did he on the other hand again imagine, that they might also descend and sink down so low, as to animate not only the bodies of brutes, but even of trees and plants too; two inconsistent paradoxes; the latter whereof is a most prodigious extravagancy, which yet Empedocles (though otherwise a great wit) seems to have been guilty of also, from those verses of his in Athenæus:[6]

Ἤδη γάρ ποτ' ἐγὼ γενόμην κούρη τε κόρος τε,
Θάμνος τ' οἰωνός τε καὶ εἰν ἁλὶ ἔλλοπος ἰχθύς.

And among the Jews, the famous Maimonides was also of this persuasion, it being a known aphorism of his, in his great work שבעילם הבא אין גוף אי דויה: "That in the world to come (or state of consummate happiness) there shall be nothing at all of body, but pure incorporeity." Upon which account, being accused as a denier of the resurrection (an article as well of the Jewish as of the Christian faith) he wrote that book entitled, Iggereth Teman,[7] purposely to purge himself, and to reconcile those two assertions together, which he doth after such a manner, as that there should be indeed a resurrection, at the first coming of the Jewish Messias, of some certain persons, to live here a while upon the earth, eat and drink, marry and be given in marriage, and then die again; after which, in the world to come, they

Plotinus. But even if he had entertained this opinion, and at the same time supposed it possible for souls to migrate into the bodies of beasts and plants, he would not, as far as I can judge, have believed in things that are incompatible with, and contradictory to each other, as the learned Doctor supposes. For I see no reason why a man may not defend them both, and yet not be inconsistent with himself. The migration of souls into the bodies of beasts and plants is treated of by Plotinus in Ennead 3. lib. 4. cap. 1. 2. p. 283. 284.

[6] Deipnosoph. lib. 8. at the end, p. 510. But Athenæus is not the only one who has preserved these verses of Empedocles from oblivion, as they are also to be met with in many other ancient writers. See Aldobrandinus, Not. ad Diogen. Laërt. tom. 1. p. 539. and Ægidius Menagius, Comm. ad Diogen. p. 384. tom. 2. who comments very learnedly on the various reading of the latter verse in the ancient books. Dr. Cudworth himself, though he would seem to have copied them from Athenæus, has expressed the reading of Clemens Alexandr. in the second verse, Stromat. lib 6. p. 750. For in this author we read ἔλλοπος, whereas in Athenæus it is ἔμπνοος. Compare, besides Casaubon on this passage of Athenæus, Dr. Potter on Clemens Alexandr. p. 750. and P. Petitus, Miscellan. Observat. cap. 11. p. 66. who proposes the reading ἔμπυρος.

[7] The learned Doctor's memory has deceived him. In the epistle or book which Maimonides has entitled אִגֶּרֶת תֵּימָן, and which is extant in Latin in W. Hen. Vorst's Notes to Zemach David, p. 393. and elsewhere, he does not declare his opinion respecting the resurrection of the dead, but discourses of very different matters. But there is another work of his called אִגֶּרֶת תְּחִיַּת הַמֵּתִים, or "Epistle concerning the Resurrection of the Dead," where he more copiously and clearly explains his views on the resurrection than in any other place. The editions of both these books are enumerated by J. Christoph. Wolf, Biblioth. Hebraic. tom. 1. p. 860, 861. Maimonides' opinion is refuted by Manassah Ben Israel in his book De Resurrectione Mortuorum, lib. 3. cap. 11. p. 339.

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should for ever continue pure souls, ununited to any body. In which it may be well suspected that the design Maimonides drove at was against Christianity; which, notwithstanding, as to this particular, hath the concurrent suffrages of the best philosophers, that the most genuine and perfect state of the human soul, which in its own nature is immortal, is to continue for ever, not without, but with a body: and yet our high-flown enthusiasts generally (however calling themselves Christians) are such great Spiritualists, and so much for the inward resurrection (which we deny not to be a Scripture notion also; as in that of St. Paul, "If ye be risen with Christ,"[8] &c. And again, "If by any means I might attain to the resurrection of the dead"[9]) as that they quite allegorize away, together with the other parts of Christianity, the outward resurrection of the body; and indeed will scarcely acknowledge any future immortality, or life to come, after death, their spirituality thus ending in Sadducism and infidelity, if not at length in downright atheism and sensuality.[10]

[8] Col. iii. 1. [9] Phil. iii. 2.

[10] It is notorious that among the fanatics of every age there have existed men foolish and silly enough to contend that every thing recorded in the sacred volumes respecting the resurrection of the dead is figurative, and ought to be understood of the regeneration and purification of the mind. And in Dr. Cudworth's time not a few of the sect called Quakers and other fanatics had espoused this opinion. Rob. Barclay, indeed, a most learned Quaker, endeavours to acquit his friends of so pernicious an error, and asserts that it is unjustly attributed to them. In the conclusion of his Apology for the True Christian Divinity: "Hence," says he, "because we tell them, when they are talking and determining about the resurrection, that they have more need to know the Just One, whom they have slain, raised in themselves, and to be sure that they are made partakers of the first resurrection: hence they say, that we deny the resurrection of the body." But granting that all the members of this sect were not contaminated with this impious doctrine, it is nevertheless beyond all question that many of them both entertained and publicly professed it. And perhaps it has not a few supporters even at this day in that community; although if questioned upon the subject they are either wholly silent or betake themselves to various subterfuges, in order to avoid declaring the sentiments of their mind and exposing themselves to contempt and ill will. Probably they became more cautious in consequence of the secession of Geo. Keith, a most eminent teacher of this sect, who was so much offended with this doctrine as to renounce all further connexion with Quakerism. Of this we are informed by Gerh. Crœsius in his History of Quakers, lib. 3. p. 449. whose words I quote for the purpose of showing that no false charge is brought by Dr. Cudworth and others against them: "With respect to the state of souls after death, there were some who asserted that all the faithful and pious enter straightway into a state of perfect joy and felicity, but that the unbelieving and impious immediately after death undergo all the punishment that awaits them, and that in this consists the whole of resurrection. Which was the same as asserting that properly there will be no resurrection of the body, and that the body, after it is turned into dust, will henceforward be nowhere and nothing, and that there will be no final day of judgment. Others affirmed that resurrection and the entire state of glory was consummated and finished in this life, because of the death of Christ and the happy and glorious life which he led. They attached the same meaning to their words, as if they were to say that there is no heaven or hell, except such as is in men's own breasts. These dogmas were noticed by Keith in the sermons and discourses of these men." For my own part I consider it to be hardly possible for the Quakers to teach otherwise, if they wish to inculcate

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But, besides this, there is yet a further correspondence of Christianity with the forementioned philosophic cabala, in that the former also supposes the highest perfection of our human souls, not to consist in being eternally conjoined with such gross bodies, as these we now have, unchanged and unaltered: for as the Pythagoreans and Platonists have always complained of these terrestrial bodies, as prisons, or living sepulchres of the soul; so does Christianity seem to run much upon the same strain, in these Scripture expressions, "In this we groan earnestly, desiring to be clothed upon with our house which is from heaven:"[1] and again, "We that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened, not for that we would be unclothed (that is, stripped quite naked of all body) but so clothed upon, that mortality might be swallowed up of life:"[2] and lastly, "Ourselves also, which have the first-fruits of the Spirit, groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption (sonship or inheritance) namely, the redemption of our bodies;"[3] that is, the freedom of them from all those evils and maladies of theirs, which we here lie oppressed under. Wherefore we cannot think, that the same heavy load and luggage, which the souls of good men being here burdened with, do so much groan to be delivered from, shall, at the general resurrection, be laid upon them again, and bound fast to them, to all eternity; for, of such a resurrection as this, Plotinus[4] (though perhaps mistaking it for the true Christian resurrection) might have some cause to affirm, that it would be but ἀνάστασις εἰς ἄλλον ὕπνον, "a resurrection to another sleep;" the soul seeming not to be thoroughly awake here, but, as it were, soporated with the dull steams and opiatic vapours of this gross body. For thus the author of the Book of Wisdom:[5] "The corruptible body presseth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the mind, that museth upon many things." But the same will further appear, from that

what is consistent with the first principles of their own discipline. For there is scarcely any thing which they more earnestly impress upon their followers than this: That the letter of Scripture is to be disregarded and the pith and marrow alone to be attended to; that the history of our blessed Saviour, all the acts of holy men, nay the whole of the sacred volume itself, ought to be understood and explained *mystically*, or, as they call it, in the *spiritual* sense; from which precept the inference to be drawn is manifest. Before the origin of this sect Henr. Nicolai, who in the 16th century agitated Belgium with his fanatical opinions is said to have partaken of the same most grievous error; who according to Jo. Hornbeeck, Summa Controvers. lib. 6. p. 397. taught: "That there will be no resurrection of bodies after death, but that all resurrection happens in this life, and is no other than that from sin."

[1] 2 Cor. v. 2. [2] 2 Cor. v. 4. [3] Rom. viii. 23.

[4] I have been unable to meet with this passage of Plotinus, after spending considerable time in searching for it. The learned Doctor's memory, I fear, has deceived him, and he has supplied Plotinus with the words rather than found them in that author. But I will not be positive; as, after all, it is possible for the mistake to be on my own side.

[5] Chap. ix. 15.

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account, which the Scripture itself giveth us of the resurrection: and first, in general, when St. Paul, answering that query of the philosophic infidel,[6] "How are the dead raised, or with what body do they come?" replieth in this manner: "Thou fool (that is, thou, who thinkest to puzzle or baffle the Christian article of the resurrection, which thou understandest not) that which thou sowest, is not quickened (to the production of any thing) except it first die to what it was. And thou sowest not that body that shall be, but bare grain," as of wheat, or of barley, or the like; "but God (in the ordinary course of nature) "giveth it a body, as it hath pleased him" (that is, a stalk, and an ear, having many grains with husks in it, and therefore neither in quantity nor quality the same with that which was sowed under ground); nor does he give to all seeds one and the same kind of body neither, but to every seed its own correspondent body; as to wheat one kind of ear, and to barley another. As if he should have said: Know that this present body of ours is to be looked upon but as a kind of seed of the resurrection-body, which therefore is accordingly in some sense the same, and in some sense not the same with it. Besides which general account, the particular oppositions which the scripture makes betwixt the present and future body, seem very agreeable to those of the philosophic cabala: for, first, the present body is said to be sowed in "corruption,"[7] but the future raised in "incorruption." For the "children of the resurrection cannot die any more."[8] And then "mortality shall be swallowed up of life."[9] Wherefore the Christian resurrection-body, as well as that of the philosophic cabala, is σῶμα ἀθάνατον, and ἀΐδιον too, (2 Cor. v. 1), "an immortal" and "eternal body." Again, the body sowed is said[10] to be a "dishonourable, ignominious," and "inglorious body;" and therefore called also by St. Paul,[1] Τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως ἡμῶν, "The body of our humility," or "humiliation;" a body agreeable to this lapsed state of the soul, but the body which shall be raised shall be a glorious body; and σύμμορφον τῷ σώματι τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ, "conformable to that glorious body of Christ;" who, when he was but externally transfigured, his face did "shine as the sun," and his "raiment was white as the light." The glory of a body consisteth only in the comeliness of its proportion, and the splendour thereof: thus is there[2] "one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars," that is, a different splendour of them. Wherefore the future body of the righteous, according to the scripture also, as well as the philosophic cabala, will be σῶμα φωτεινὸν, and σῶμα αὐγοειδὲς, and σῶμα ἀστροειδὲς, a "glorious, splendid, luciform,"

[6] 1 Cor. xv. 36, &c. [7] 1 Cor. xv. 42. [8] Luke xx. 36.
[9] 1 Cor. xv. 54. [10] 1 Cor. xv. 43. [1] Phil. iii. 21. [2] 1 Cor. xv. 41.

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and "star-like body," Wisdom iii. 7. Ἐν καιρῷ ἐπισκοπῆς αὐτῶν ἐκλάμψουσι, "The righteous, in the time of their visitation, shall shine forth." Daniel xii. 2, 3, "They that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars for ever and ever." And Matt. xiii. 43, "Then shall the righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their father." And therefore probably this future glorious resurrection-body is that "inheritance of the saints in light,"[3] which the scripture speaks of, Col. i. 12. Moreover,

[3] I cannot prevail upon myself to assent to this interpretation of St. Paul's words: Εὐχαριστοῦντες, says the holy apostle, τῷ πατρὶ τῷ ἱκανώσαντι ἡμᾶς εἰς τὴν μερίδα τοῦ κληροῦ τῶν ἁγίων ἐν τῷ φωτί, "Giving thanks unto the Father, who has rendered us meet to become partakers of the inheritance of the saints in light." According to Dr. Cudworth's opinion the meaning of these words is as follows: "We ought to give thanks to God, because instead of this concrete and heavy body we shall acquire another splendid and shining body." But if I am not mistaken this will be considered by every one as too flat and jejune, and unworthy of the divine writer. In the first place, St. Paul would have expressed himself exceedingly obscurely, and in a style remote from the vulgar usage. For who, I ask, without the aid of an interpreter, would understand μερὶς τοῦ κληροῦ τῶν ἁγίων ἐν τῷ φωτὶ to be the same as σῶμα φωτεινόν? Again, of all the benefits conferred upon us by Christ, and of the heavenly gifts which we shall be made partakers of through him, why should the apostle have selected that bodily felicity alone which we shall attain to after the resurrection, and declared that for this in particular we are to give thanks unto God? This splendour of the body which we look forward to, holds the lowest place among the privileges and joys of the blessed; therefore why did he not rather enjoin us to praise God for the gifts with which the mind shall be adorned when received into heaven, and for the other portions of eternal felicity? Lastly, this exposition is at variance with the entire context of the discourse; from which it is manifest, that all the good things, secured to mankind by the death and sufferings of Christ, are comprehended by the apostle in the expression κληρὸς τῶν ἁγίων. And those who are accustomed to his phraseology will easily perceive that these words contain an image and figure drawn from the distribution of the Holy Land among the Israelites. No slight benefit, says he, did they receive from God, to whom Joshua formerly assigned a portion in the land of Canaan, which was the inheritance and possession of the people of God; but a much greater felicity falls to our lot, who through faith in Jesus receive a portion in the kingdom of heaven among the saints of God, and become entitled to those future benefits which are promised after this life to the true followers of Christ. The words ἐν τῷ φωτὶ, although variously expounded, as I am aware, seem to me to denote that by which the saints are made fit to obtain this happiness. But this is the heavenly doctrine revealed to men by Christ, which we embrace by faith. For, as is well known in Scripture, this salutary doctrine is called φῶς or *light*, and the ancient ignorance and wicked superstition of nations opposed to it under the name of σκότος, or *darkness*; as is also done in this very place. And everybody acquainted with the subject is aware that the particle ἐν is put for διὰ in innumerable passages of the New Testament. Wherefore I consider the whole passage is to be understood thus: "We ought to give praise to God, who by the light of the gospel which we have received, has rendered us meet to become partakers of the heavenly kingdom on this earth, and hereafter to obtain those blessings which are destined for the saints in heaven." This interpretation is admirably confirmed by a similar passage occurring in Acts xxvi. 18. wherein St. Paul is said to be sent "to turn the Gentiles from darkness (the pernicious superstitions and errors of antiquity) to light (the true knowledge of the supreme Being), that they may receive forgiveness of sins, καὶ κλῆρον ἐν τοῖς ἁγιασμένοις πίστει τῇ εἰς Χριστον, and inheritance among them which are sanctified by faith that is in Christ." The latter words plainly correspond to those the sense of which we are here inquiring into. What St. Paul in the present passage calls φῶς is there termed πίστις εἰς Χριστὸν; which alone has obtained for us the privileges of the heavenly community and a portion in the inheritance of the saints.

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there is another difference betwixt this present and that future body of the righteous, wherein St. Paul[4] and Hierocles[5] do well agree; the first being called by both of them σῶμα ψυχικὸν, "an animal body," the second σῶμα πνευματικὸν, "a spiritual body." Which latter expression, in scripture, does not only denote the subtilty and tenuity thereof; but also as this present body is *called* an "animal body," because it is suitable and agreeable to that animal life which men have common with brutes, so is that future called "spiritual," as bearing a fit proportion and correspondency to souls renewed in the spirit of their mind, or in whom the divine Spirit dwelleth and acteth, exercising its dominion. [6]"There is an animal body, and there is a spiritual body." And "The first Adam was made a living soul, the last Adam a quickening spirit." And thus are ψυχικοὶ, in the scripture, taken for οἱ πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες, "they who have not the Spirit." And[7] Ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος οὐ δέχεται τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ θεοῦ, "The animal man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God." Which Spirit is also said in scripture to be "the earnest of that our future inheritance," Ephes. i. 14. and the earnest of this spiritual and heavenly body, 2 Cor. v. 5. It is also said to be that by which (efficiently) these mortal bodies shall be quickened, Rom. viii. 11, "If the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you; he, that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit, that dwelleth *in you.*" Neither doth Hierocles fall much short of this scripture-notion of a spiritual body, when he describes it to be that[8] ᾧ τῇ νοερᾷ τελειότητι τῆς ψυχῆς συνάπτεται, "which is agreeable to the intellectual perfection of the soul." This spiritual body is that which the ancient Hebrews called, כנפי הנשר "eagles' wings;" we reading thus in the Gemara of the Sanhedrin (cap. 1. fol. 92. col. 2) אם תאמר אותן שנים שעמיר חקבת לחדש בהן את העולם צדיקים מה הן עושין תקבה עושה להן כנפים כנשרין על פני המי If you ask, What shall become of the righteous, when God *all renew* the world? the answer is, God shall make them wings like eagles', whereby they shall fly upon the face of the waters." Again, as this present body is called in scripture an earthly body, so is the future body of the righteous styled by

[4] 1 Cor. xv. 44.

[5] Comm. in Aurea Carmina Pythagoræ, p. 214. See the remarks made above on passage of Hierocles.

[6] 1 Cor. xv. 45.

[7] 1 Cor. ii. 14.

[8] Comm. in Aurea Carmina Pythagoræ, p. 214. The philosopher's meaning will better understood if the passage be transcribed entire. He is there discoursing the benefit to be derived by the celestial body of the soul from the purgation he had prescribed: Διὰ γὰρ τούτων, says he, ἀναβιώσκεται τρόπον τινὰ συλλέγεται, καὶ θείου πληροῦται τόνου, καὶ τῇ νοερᾷ τελειότητι τῆς ψυχῆς πτεται, "For by means of these (purgations) it (the lucid vehicle of the soul) es in a manner new life and strength, and is filled with divine vigour, and united he intellectual perfection of the soul."

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St. Paul, as well as the Pythagoreans, a "heavenly body," and t ey who shall then be possessors thereof, ἐπουράνιοι ἄνθρωποι, "heavenly men," 1 Cor. xv. "As is the heavenly, such are they that are heavenly." Besides which, as philosophers supposed both demons (or angels) and men, to have one and the same σῶμα αὐγοειδὲς, οὐράνιον and αἰθέριον, or a like lucid, heavenly, and ethereal body; so from that of our Saviour, when he affirmeth, that they who[9] "shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, will neither marry, nor be given in marriage; nor can die any more; for they are ἰσάγγελοι, equal to the angels." From hence, I say, we may venture to call this resurrection-body of the just also an "angelical" or "isangelical body;"[10] and the rather because the

[9] Luke xx. 36.

[10] For my own part, however, I think we ought not to do this till we are satisfied of the truth of the assumption, that the angels have bodies similar to those glorious bodies, which the blessed shall put on at the last day. For how can the bodies of the saints be called *angelic*, if it be evident that the holy beings called angels are destitute of body? The saying of our Saviour, in which he declares that the saints shall hereafter resemble the angels, is here improperly appealed to, as we have already shown in another place. For Christ does not compare the righteous who are to be partakers of future life with angels in respect to the bodies in which they shall be clothed, but in reference to immortality and to those things which follow from immortality. The authority of the ancient Hebrews, and of Tertullian, is of little or no weight in this matter. The former, indeed, as the learned are well aware, drew largely from the fountains of Platonism; while the latter adopted what was almost the common opinion of the ancient fathers, which attributed bodies to angels; and it is not surprising, therefore, that holding such a notion he should also ascribe flesh to them, and believe that the righteous will be endowed with the same bodies as those of the angels. Not having Nachmanides' book in my possession, I am unable to give an opinion upon the sense of the passage here referred to; but the passage of Tertullian, which occurs in his book De Carnis Resurrectione, cap. 26. p. 214. runs as follows: "Thus also in Isaiah, Bona terræ edetis, the good things of the flesh are meant, which await it in the kingdom of God, when it shall be reformed and angelified, and obtain what the eye has not seen, nor the ear heard." The passage of St. Augustine quoted by the learned Doctor in the margin, is doubtless the following, which is extant in his book De Diversis Quæstionibus Octoginta Tribus, quæst. 47. p. 14. tom. 6. opp. "The question is frequently asked, how we shall be able to see our thoughts after the resurrection and change of the body which is promised to the saints? A conjecture therefore must be formed from that part of our body which has a greater degree of light; since angelic bodies, such as we hope to possess, must be supposed to be most lucid and ethereal; if therefore many motions of our minds are now discovered in the eyes, it is probable that no motion of the mind will remain concealed when the body shall have become wholly ethereal, in comparison with which those eyes are flesh." St Augustine was afraid lest some might interpret this passage as though he had believed that the bodies which the righteous are hereafter to receive will be destitute of all members and flesh; and therefore gives a sort of correction of it in his Retractat. lib. 1. cap. 26. tom. 1. opp. p. 28. where he thus expresses himself: "When I said that the angelic bodies, such as we hope to possess, must be supposed to be most lucid and ethereal, if this be understood of being without the members which we now have, and without the substance of incorruptible flesh, it is wrong." I shall add another passage nearly to the same effect from his Serm. 363. de Cantico Exodi, sect. 30. p. 1002. tom. 5. opp. "In this life of the saints, therefore, their bodies also being changed into a *heavenly and angelic* state shall be so filled and freshened with immortal vigour that no corruption of necessity shall turn and call them away from the most blessed contemplation and praise of truth." But what I stated with respect to Tertullian will apply also to St. Augustine. For this great man was favourable to those

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ancient Hebrews (as we learn from Nachmonides, in Shaar Haggemul) styled it, לבושת הנפש המלאכותי "the angelical clothing of the soul;" and Tertullian himself, angelificatam carnem, "angelified flesh." But, lastly, St. Paul is not only positive in his doctrine here, but also negative:[1] "Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption."* Which place being undoubtedly not to be allegorized, it may be from thence inferred, that the happy resurrection-body shall not be this foul and gross body of ours only varnished and gilded over on the outside of it, it remaining still nasty, sluttish, and ruinous within, and having all the same seeds of corruption and mortality in its nature which it had before, though by perpetual miracle kept off, it being as it were by violence defended from being seized upon and devoured by the jaws of death; but that it shall be so inwardly changed in its nature as that the possessors thereof cannot die any more. But all this, which hath been said of the resurrection-body, is not so to be understood, as if it belonged universally to all that shall be raised up at the last day, or made to appear upon the earth in their own persons at that great and general assizes; that they shall have all alike (wicked as well as good) such glorious, spiritual, and celestial bodies; but it is only a description of the ἀνάστασις τῆς ζωῆς, the "resurrection of life;" which is emphatically called also by our Saviour Christ,[2] ἀνάστασις ἡ ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν, "the resurrection from the dead," or to a happy immortality; as they, who shall be thought worthy thereof, are likewise styled by him υἱοὶ ἀναστάσεως, "the children

who formerly held the angels to be endowed with most thin and subtle bodies, as has been abundantly proved from many passages of his by Dion. Petavius. Dogmat. Theologicor. tom. 3. lib. 1. de Angelis, cap. 2. sect. 9. p. 5. &c. But I think the learned Jesuit ought to have added, that St. Augustine was not so wedded to this opinion as to be perfectly satisfied of its truth. At any rate, in his Epist. 95. tom. 2. opp. p. 197. where he is professedly treating of this question: "Whether the angels have bodies or are only spirits," he first of all indeed brings forward certain reasons which he considers make it probable that the angels have bodies; nevertheless, having stated thus much, he leaves the whole matter undecided: "But," says he, "whether the angels have bodies, or it can be shown by any one that they may perform all these things and yet be devoid of body, still in that community of saints," &c. From which it is evident that St. Augustine, although supposing the opinion of those who ascribed bodies to the angels to be the more probable one, did not however consider it to be so true and certain as to be altogether incapable of refutation. Nevertheless, holding it to be probable that the angels are clothed in bodies, and wishing to illustrate the nature of those bodies which the blessed are hereafter to receive by some comparison, he could hardly have applied a more apt example than the bodies of angels. To these great authors let me add Methodius in Photius, Biblioth. cod. 234. p. 923. Πᾶν τὸ ἐκ καθαροῦ ἀέρος καὶ καθαροῦ πυρὸς συνιστάμενον σύγκριμα καὶ τοῖς ἀγγελικοῖς ὁμοούσιον ὑπάρχον, οὐ δύναται γῆς ἔχειν ποιότητα, "Whatever is compounded of pure air and pure fire, and is of the same substance as the angelic natures, cannot have the quality of earth." He is speaking of the resurrection-body. Other passages that might be produced of the same kind I pass over.

* Thus St. Austin, Corpora Angelica; and Qualia sunt Angelorum.

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 50. [2] Luke xx. 25.

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of the resurrection." Of which resurrection only it is that St. Paul treateth, in that fifteenth chapter of his to the Corinthians. And we say that this Christian resurrection of life is the vesting and settling of the souls of good men in their glorious, spiritual, heavenly, and immortal bodies. The complete happiness of a man and all the good that can be desired by him, was by the heathen poet thus summed up, Ut sit mens sana in corpore sano, "That there be a sound mind in a sound body:" and the Christian happiness seems to be all comprised in these two things; first, in being inwardly regenerated and renewed in the spirit of their mind, cleansed from all pollution of flesh and spirit, and made partakers of the divine life and nature; and then, secondly, in being outwardly clothed with glorious, spiritual, celestial, and incorruptible bodies. The Scripture plainly declareth, that our souls are not at home here, in this terrestrial body and these earthly mansions, but that they are strangers and pilgrims therein; which the patriarchs also confessing, plainly declared, that they sought a country, not that which they came out from, but a heavenly one. From which passages of Scripture some indeed would infer, that souls being at first created by God pure, pre-existed, before this their terrene nativity, in celestial bodies; but afterwards straggled and wandered down hither, as Philo for one:[3] Ἀπολιποῦσα μὲν γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ τὸν οὐράνιον τόπον,

[3] De Agricultura, p. 197. Compare the same also in his book Quis Divinarum Rerum Hæres, p. 519. and other places. But it is notorious that this Jew was smitten with such a partiality for the Platonic precepts, which at that time were publicly taught at Alexandria, that he does not hesitate on every occasion to drag in Moses as entertaining the opinion of Plato. But if those who maintain that souls existed before the bodies, can adduce nothing else from scripture in proof of this doctrine of theirs, than those sayings in which righteous men are declared to be strangers and pilgrims on this earth, and to seek a better country, there is certainly an end of their cause. For in all these passages there is a metaphor borrowed from human things; namely, a comparison of this life with the life which a man leads in a foreign land, destitute of friends and relations, and of heavenly glory with the sweet and pleasant life which a man lives among his friends in the place where he is bred and born. But who is not aware that figurative passages of this kind are not to be too closely pressed, and that no argument can be drawn from them either in proof or refutation of any doctrine? In every similitude, as every body knows, we ought to look solely to that point from which the comparison is chiefly drawn, and not to carry the thought further. Now it is manifest that heaven is called one's own country by the divine writers simply on account of the pleasant and happy life we there look forward to, and this earth a place of exile because of the troubles which we are obliged to undergo in it. Whoever wishes to enlarge the limits of this comparison, will both err himself and afford occasion to others of adding fallacy to fallacy. For what reply would you return to a man reasoning thus: heaven is our native country: in one's native country are one's parents, relatives, and friends: therefore the soul also leaves family, ancestors, parents, relations, brothers, sisters, &c., in its heavenly country? If those who deny the existence of souls before bodies were disposed to adopt the same line of argument, they might in their turn easily find texts to answer their purpose. Celestial happiness, for instance, is every where compared by the sacred writers to a feast, as also to an inheritance, and other things. But he who is invited to a feast is invited to delights which he has hitherto been a stranger to, and he who comes into an inheritance acquires some good which he had not possessed before. It will therefore follow from these images that souls when

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καθάπερ εἰς ξένην χώραν ἦλθε τὸ σῶμα, "Our soul (saith he) having left its heavenly mansion, came down into this earthly body, as a strange place." But thus much is certain, that our human souls were at first intended and designed by God Almighty, the maker of them, for other bodies and other regions, as their proper home and country, and their eternal resting place: however, to us, that "be not first, which is spiritual, but that which is natural, and afterwards that which is spiritual." Now, though some, from that of St. Paul,[4] where he calls this happy resurrection-body, οἰκητήριον ἡμῶν τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, "that house of ours, that is from heaven," or which "cometh out of heaven," would infer, that therefore it will not be taken out of graves and charnel houses; they conceiving also, that the individuation and sameness of men's persons does not necessarily depend upon the numerical identity of all the parts of matter, because we never continue thus the same, our bodies always flowing like a river, and passing away by insensible transpiration; and it is certain, that we have not all the same numerical matter, and neither more nor less, both in infancy and in old age, though we be for all that the self-same persons; yet, nevertheless, according to the best philosophy, which acknowledges no essential or specifical difference of matter, the foulest and grossest body that is, merely by motion may not only be crystallized, but also brought into the purity and tenuity of the finest ether. And undoubtedly, that same numerical body of our Saviour Christ, which lay in the sepulchre, was after his resurrection thus transformed into a spiritual and heavenly body; the subtlety and tenuity whereof appeared from his entering in when the doors were shut, and his vanishing out of sight; however its glory were for the time suspended, partly for the better convincing his disciples of the truth of his resurrection, and partly, because they were not then able to bear the splendour of it. We conclude, therefore, that the Christian mystery of the resurrection of life, consisteth not in the soul's being re-united to these vile rags of mortality, these gross bodies of ours, (such as now they are;) but in having them changed into the likeness of Christ's glorious body, and in this mortal's putting on immortality.

Hitherto have we seen the agreement that is betwixt Chris-

they depart hence to heaven are to go to delights and joys not previously known to them, and are made partakers of good things of which they had before been destitute: which is plainly at variance with the doctrine of those who maintain that souls existed before they were united with bodies. Not to mention that David altogether, both body and soul, complains of his being a stranger and sojourner here, and that not only the minds of the saints, but the saints altogether, are said to seek their own country. Wherefore if these passages are a proof that souls descended into this world from heavenly places, they necessarily prove that the bodies also came from thence, and were turned out of a better state into this miserable and wretched one.

[4] 2 Cor. v. 1.

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tianity and the old philosophic cabala, concerning the soul, in these two things: First, that the highest happiness and perfection of the human soul consisteth not in a state of pure separation from all body; and secondly, that it does not consist neither in an eternal union with such gross terrestrial bodies as these unchanged; the soul being not at home, but a stranger and pilgrim in them, and oppressed with the load of them: but that at last, the souls of good men shall arrive at glorious, spiritual, heavenly, and immortal bodies. But now as to that point, whether human souls be always united to some body or other, and consequently, when by death they put off this gross terrestrial body, they are not thereby quite divested and stripped naked of all body, but have a certain subtle and spirituous body still adhering to them and accompanying them? or else, whether all souls that have departed out of this life, from the very beginning of the world, have ever since continued in a state of separation from all body, and shall so continue forwards till the day of judgment or general resurrection? we must confess that this is a thing not so explicitly determined, or expressly decided in Christianity, either way. Nevertheless, it is first of all certain from scripture, that souls departed out of these terrestrial bodies are therefore neither dead nor asleep,* till the last trump and general resurrection, but still alive and awake; our Saviour Christ affirming, that "they all live unto God;" the meaning whereof seems to be this, that they who are said to be dead, are dead only unto men here upon earth; but neither dead unto themselves, nor yet unto God, their life being not extinct, but only disappearing to us, and withdrawn from our sight; forasmuch as they are gone off this stage, which we still continue to act upon. And thus is it said also of our Saviour Christ himself, and that after his resurrection too, "that he liveth unto God," Rom. vi. 10. From whence it is evident that they who are said to live to God, are not therefore supposed to be less alive, than they were, when they lived unto men. Now, it seemeth to be a privilege or prerogative proper to the Deity only, to live and act alone, without vital union or conjunction with any body. Quærendum, saith Origen,† si possibile est, penitus incorporeas remanere rationabiles creaturas, cum ad summum sanctitatis ac beatitudinis venerent? An necesse est eas semper conjunctas esse corporibus? "It is worth our inquiry, whether it be possible for rational creatures to remain perfectly incorporeal and separate from all body, when they are arrived to the highest degree of holiness and happiness? or whether they be always of necessity conjoined with some

* Death, called sleep in scripture, only *κατ' εὐφημισμόν*.
† Περὶ ἀρχῶν, lib. 2. [Cap. 2. p. 69. opp.]

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bodies;" and afterwards he plainly affirmeth it to be impossible: Vivere præter corpus ullam aliam naturam, præter Patrem et Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum: "For any other nature besides the Father, and the Son, and Holy Ghost, to live quite without a body."[5] Indeed, if this were most natural to the human soul, and most perfective of it, to continue separate from all body, then doubtless, (as Origen implied) should the souls of good men rather after the day of judgment, continue in such a state of separation, to all eternity.[6] But on the contrary, if it be natural to souls to enliven and inform some body or other, (though not always a terrestrial one) as our inward sense inclines us to think, then can it not seem so probable that they should, by a kind of violence, be kept so long in an unnatural or preternatural state of nakedness and separation from all body, some of them even from Adam till the day of judgment.[7]

[5] [The disciples of Leibnitz think so at this day. See Leibnitii Epist. 203. 207. Elsewhere, and tom. 2. p. 437.] This opinion, that God alone possessed the privilege of living and acting without any body, was formerly entertained not only by Origen, but by most of the fathers in the first ages of Christianity. And even Origen's adversaries themselves found nothing to reprehend in this opinion. As one example for all take Methodius, who is well known to have confuted Origen; and who in Photius, Biblioth. cod. 234. p. 931. says as follows: Ἠγοῦν ἀγέννητος καὶ ἀνενδεὴς καὶ ἀκάματος φύσις ὁ θεὸς μόνος ᾖδεται, ἀσώματος ὢν, διὰ καὶ ἀόρατος, "Therefore God alone is proclaimed to be a nature ungenerated, without deficiency and unwearied, who being incorporeal is therefore also invisible." Even as late as the fifth century, when many held this doctrine to be false and dangerous, Faustus Rhegiensis did not shrink from defending it. See his sixteenth Epistle, published by Henr. Canisius, Antiquarum Lectionum, tom. 1. p. 363. &c. of the new edition. In it he says he speaks according to the opinion of the elder saints: which is true. Afterwards, p. 364. he thus discourses: "For although we declare that there are some spiritual natures, as are the angels, archangels, and the other powers, as also our own soul itself, or at least that subtle air: still they are by no means to be accounted incorporeal. For they have about them a body by which they subsist, although incomparably more thin and subtle than our bodies, according to the opinion of the apostle, who says, 'bodies celestial and bodies terrestrial.' From which it is clearly shown that *nothing is incorporeal but God alone.*" And this opinion he then endeavours to support by many arguments from Sacred Writ. But he was confuted by Claudianus Mamertus, in his book De Statu Animæ, published separately by Casp. Barth. To these add Gennadius Massiliensis, De Ecclesiast. Dogmatibus, lib. 1. cap. 11. p. 8. and Geverh. Elemenhorst on this passage, p. 128.

[6] [Origen proves that the body adheres to the soul after death by the example of Samuel and Lazarus. See tom. 1. p. 35. of his works.]

[7] The learned Doctor in his zeal for the fathers, as they are called, and his partiality for the Platonic philosophy here openly adopts the opinion of those who hold that a certain body, or as the Platonists say, *ethereal vehicle*, is always present with the soul, although considered in itself it is devoid of all matter and corporeal concretion. It would seem indeed from the closing words of the disputation that he wishes to appear as leaving the matter undecided, and allowing every one to entertain his own ideas upon it: but the entire tone of his remarks, and the arguments by which he endeavours to substantiate this opinion, show him to have belonged to a class of men at that time, as at this day, very numerous in Great Britain, who boldly maintained it. I do not consider that a man is to be excluded from the Christian community or charged with a capital and most pernicious error on account of this dogma, provided his notions regarding the nature of the soul are correct in other respects, and he does not embrace the other opinions which were formerly coupled with it. I am aware that among men eminent at the present day as philosophers, and at the same time as pious Christians,

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Again, the Scripture also intimates, that souls departed out of this life, have a knowledge of one another, and are also capable of the punishment of sense or pain: "Fear him, (saith our

there are not wanting those who consider the doctrine that no spirit is ever without a body to be probable, nay, true and indisputable: whose arguments were collected not long ago by a learned writer who assumed the name of H. C. Trichorius, in a singular dissertation entitled Ochematologia, and published in the Museum Bremense Philologico-Theologicum, tom. 1. par. I. p. 114. I fancy, however, I have the gravest of reasons for not concurring in their views. And to confess the truth, since the scriptures make no mention of such a body of souls, which even the most erudite Trichorius himself does not deny, and a matter so recondite and abstruse cannot be settled by surmises and conjectures of our own, I regret that these excellent men were not content with what God has revealed to us, and less bold and free in their decisions: and that they did not decline entering into matters so far out of the reach of human inquiry rather than attempt to explain them by opinions which others might be disposed to contemn and repudiate. It cannot be denied that the assertors of a subtle and inseparable body of the soul have something to offer in the shape of a reply to those who ask in what manner the soul lives, subsists, feels, and is rendered susceptible of pleasure and pain. But I am afraid the remedy they resort to for the purpose of curing men of their scepticism will prove worse than the disease, and expose them to other objections which they never will be able to get over unless they at once cut the knot by confessing their own ignorance. And even if this opinion be adopted, how many questions still remain respecting the nature and condition of the soul which no one will satisfactorily answer, while he resides here among mortals? For my own part what in the first place dissuades me from admitting it, is the exceptionable source from which it sprung. We have already shown it to be of the highest antiquity, and of plebeian rather than philosophical origin. It was not invented by wise men under the guidance of intellect and reason: but adopted into the schools of later philosophers from the poets and common people, and adorned and embellished by them so that it should not appear too absurd and irrational. Lactantius tells us that some of the ancient Christians supposed the poets to be the authors of those opinions which at that time prevailed respecting the state of the soul after death. "Some," says he, Instit. Divinar. lib. 7. cap. 22. p. 863. "imagine that these are the fictions of poets, not knowing whence the poets received them, and deny their truth." And, although he himself opposes them, and maintains that the poets received all these things from divine revelation, a portion of which had come down to them by tradition and hearsay, nevertheless these Christians seem to me to have been tolerably shrewd and clear-sighted, nor does Lactantius, as far as I can see, bring forward any thing that should induce a sane man to forego this opinion. If any one should inquire what first led the most ancient poets and others to attribute a body and human form to souls, he will find that they were influenced chiefly by two causes: first, the common report that souls had often appeared in the human form, especially about the tombs of the dead; and, secondly, their utter inability to comprehend a nature perfectly simple and entirely destitute of body. The former of which reasons is altogether uncertain and fallacious. For the truth of such apparitions ought first of all to be placed beyond controversy, before any deductions can be drawn from them. And even if it were certain that some souls had appeared in the way stated, this would be no satisfactory proof that the soul is always united and associated with a body. The other reason will weigh with no one who has ever entered into close communion with himself, and attentively examined the powers and faculties of his own mind. The authority even of the ancient philosophers and Platonists themselves will not be regarded, I should imagine, among the props and supports of this doctrine. For if any great dependence is to be placed upon this authority, we shall be compelled to believe many things which at the present day would be too gross for the credulity even of children or old women.

In the next place, the advocates of this doctrine of an immortal body of the soul seem to me greatly to assist the cause of those who either deny the soul to be a self-existent nature, or hold it to be wholly corporeal. For a nature which never is nor can be without body, is something imperfect, and having no independent existence; a part, or if you please, a faculty of the body which it animates. Is the body then more perfect than the soul? For while the soul according to this hypothesis cannot exist

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Saviour) who after he hath killed, hath power to cast into hell," Luke xii. And the soul of the rich man is said to be immediately after death in torments, before the day of judgment; as

independently of body, the body, on the contrary, is complete and perfect although altogether destitute of soul. However magnificently, therefore, these worthy supporters of this doctrine may speak in respect to the powers, nature, and faculties of the soul, declaring it to be simple, devoid of concretion, and eternal; still I am afraid if the whole matter be more minutely inquired into, they will be driven to the confession that it is nothing more than a certain energy or vital faculty animating the body that invests it. And for my own part I consider theirs to be on the whole a somewhat wiser course who assert that the soul is altogether corporeal, or consists of incorruptible matter: which opinion the most ancient philosophers entertained. For in taking this view they still suppose the soul to be a nature in itself perfect and independent, and requiring no external aid for the discharge of its own functions: which the former deny. But if it should be said, that assuming this opinion to be right, it will be altogether impossible to explain how the soul can think, inasmuch as matter is incapable of cogitation; a ready answer is at hand. For if God, as they themselves believe, could create immortal and most simple matter, and unite it by an indissoluble bond with immaterial mind, there is no reason for believing that he could not endow this eternal and most subtle matter with the faculty of cogitation. To draw conclusions from this grosser matter of our own in reference to that celestial and indestructible matter which is unknown to us, would certainly be rash and unsafe, and wholly unworthy of a philosopher. But perhaps they will tell us that their opinion is misunderstood, and that they by no means deny the soul to be capable of existing apart from the body, and to be a self-existent nature; what they do maintain being simply that it cannot feel and perceive without body, and therefore that God has furnished it with an imperishable body to qualify it for sensation and perception. But who taught these learned persons that the soul is unable to feel and perceive unless it be associated with body, and that there is no other faculty of sensation except that with which we ourselves are endowed? For my part, I firmly believe that God, whose power is infinite, can render the soul susceptible of pleasure and pain without connecting it with body; nor can I see any necessity for supposing that it is incapable of perceiving external things unless it be endowed with eyes, ears, and other members. Has so intimate a knowledge of souls living out of the mortal body been vouchsafed to us, that we can confidently decide upon such matters, and undertake to lay down a code of belief to others?

Lastly, certain corollaries, I perceive, may be drawn from this dogma which tend in a certain measure to the subversion of the Scripture doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. For if souls are furnished with a natural body of their own, and on their departure hence, take it away with them into heaven, there appears to be no reason why they should again receive the mortal body, purified and endowed with new qualities, at the final day of this world. For by the intervention of that other body, the souls of the good as well as the wicked are made capable of perceiving pleasure and pain, although destitute of this concrete body. This difficulty has already been raised by J. Le Clerc, Bibliotheque Choisie, tom. 7. p. 81. who expresses himself as follows: "To this dogma it may be objected that if the soul after the death of the body has another ethereal body, such as those of angels whom we shall be made to resemble after we rise again from the grave, there would be no necessity for the resurrection of the body: for the soul, according to this opinion, already possesses its own body, which it is to have for everlasting. All that can be adduced in answer to this objection is: that at the last day the soul will receive from the earth certain particles of its earthly body, which being united with the one it already possessed before the resurrection, will constitute that body with which it is to be invested through all eternity." I shall now briefly examine into the arguments which the learned Doctor has here brought forward in proof of the dogma in question.

I. What he first of all endeavours to establish, that souls departed out of the terrestrial bodies are really alive and awake, and not dead or asleep, as some, both of the ancients and moderns have supposed, will not for a moment be questioned by any one who does not disregard the authority of sacred writ. But I cannot see what this has to do with the present matter. For who would reason in this manner: "Souls live after the death of the body: therefore they are endowed with bodies?" As if nothing

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likewise to have known Abraham and Lazarus. And it seems neither agreeable to our common notions, nor yet to piety, to conclude, that the souls of wicked men, departing out of this

can live except it be associated with body. II. His observation that probably no nature but the supreme Deity alone, can live and act without body, is wholly incapable of being substantiated by arguments, if we except the authority of Origen and other ancient fathers which on this question is altogether vain and worthless. Neither reason nor divine revelation supplies anything in the slightest degree tending to support such an opinion. III. The learned Doctor syllogizes as follows: It is repugnant to the nature and perfection of souls to be without body: therefore, it is incredible that God would suffer them to remain so long a time in an unnatural and imperfect state. But in this reasoning he assumes what every one would require him to prove: namely, that it is repugnant to the nature and perfection of souls to be without body. Whence did he obtain it? Nay, it is sufficiently evident, he will reply, from this, that God will hereafter re-unite souls with bodies, for he would not do so if they could be in their natural and perfect state, when divested of bodies. But it is surprising so acute a man could be prevented by his partiality for a hastily received opinion, from perceiving that this argument is altogether fallacious. In the first place, it proves more than is necessary. For if it be more closely pressed, it will enable others to contend that this gross mortal and perishable body cannot be separated from the soul, but ought immediately to be restored to it. The learned Doctor lays down these two positions as a foundation: That God cannot suffer the soul to remain long in a state contrary to its nature: that the use of the body is indispensable to the soul's natural state: the latter of which he proves by saying that God will hereafter restore the body to the soul. In reasoning thus he openly concedes that prior to their being connected with these bodies again at the last day, they live in a state foreign to their nature and perfection. For unless something were wanting towards their complete felicity, God would not hereafter restore to them this concrete body. But our worthy author insists that God cannot suffer the soul to live long in an unnatural state. Therefore, this frail and mortal body itself ought at once to be restored to the soul, to enable it to enjoy a more happy and perfect life. Again, the whole argument seems to me to be weak and futile. How do you know that the soul when released from the mortal body, is clothed in an ethereal and subtle body? Because its nature and perfection require it. And how have you learnt that the nature of the soul necessarily requires body? Because God will hereafter endow it again with this mortal body. This is the same as if we were to reason thus: Souls already have a body, because divine providence will hereafter restore to them this frail and earthly body: than which nothing can be more absurd and illogical. Lastly, the learned Doctor involves himself by this reasoning in inextricable difficulties, and overthrows his own arguments. Souls clothed in a subtle and ethereal body are either already perfect, or are lacking of perfection till they hereafter receive the other body also. If the former be true, there is an end to the doctrine of the resurrection of mortal bodies. For what necessity is there for adding a new body to a soul already perfect? If the other be preferred, what Dr. Cudworth urges falls to the ground, that it is inconsistent with God to leave the soul so long in a state contrary to the perfection of its nature. For my part, although I think we ought to speak cautiously and circumspectly on matters in respect to which sacred writers are silent, still I hold God to be able by his infinite power to cause the soul to be affected by the same pleasures and pains out of the body as it is when associated with body. And not to speak of other reasons, I consider that the design of God in again uniting this terrestrial body with the soul, to be, that it may receive its reward or punishment through that instrument by which it performed good or wicked deeds in this life. But supposing the learned Doctor's assumption to be true, that the soul living out of the body is not in its perfect and natural state, not even so will his argument be a valid one. For there is no reason why God should not for the wisest purposes permit the soul to pass some time in a less perfect state. Is it repugnant to the divine virtues to lead the soul gradually to extreme and consummate happiness, and not fill it at once with all the pleasure of which it is destined to become the partaker? But as I said before, upon matters of this kind, which divine wisdom has not thought meet to reveal to us, we ought to speak only with humility and modesty, and to put off subjects, the knowledge of which is denied to us mortals, to that day when all darkness shall be removed from our minds.

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life, from the beginning of the world in their several ages, till the day of judgment, have all of them no manner of punishment inflicted on them, save only that of remorse of conscience, and future expectation. Now, it is not conceivable how souls after death should know and be knowable, and converse with one another, and have any punishment of sense or pain inflicted on them, were they not vitally united to some bodies. And thus did Tertullian reason long ago:* Dolet apud inferos anima cujusdam, et punitur in flamma, et cruciatur in linguâ, et de digito animæ felicioris implorat solatium roris. Imaginem existimas, exitum illum pauperis lætantis, et divitis mœrentis. Et quid illic Lazari nomen, si non in veritate res est? Sed etsi imago credenda est, testimonium erit veritatis. Si enim non habet anima corpus, non caperet imaginem corporis. Nec mentiretur de corporalibus membris scriptura, si non erant. Quid est autem illud, quod ad inferna transfertur post divortium corporis? quod detinetur, et in diem judicii reservatur? Ad quod et Christus moriendo descendit? puto ad animas patriarcharum? Incorporalitas animæ ab omni genere custodiæ libera est; immunis à pœna et à fovela. Per quod enim punitur aut fovetur, hoc erit corpus. Igitur si quid tormenti sive solatii anima præcerpit in carcere, vel diversorio inferûm, in igni vel in sinu Abrahæ, probata erit corporalitas animæ. Incorporalitas enim nihil patitur, non habens per quod pati possit: aut si habet, hoc erit corpus. In quantum enim omne corporale passibile est; in tantum quod passibile est, corporale est, "We read in Scripture of a soul tormented in hell, punished with flames, and desirous of a drop of water to cool his tongue. You will say, perhaps, that this is parabolical and fictitious. What then does the name of Lazarus signify there, if it were no real thing? But if it be a parable never so much, yet must it, notwithstanding, as to the main, speak agreeably to truth. For if the soul (after death) have no body at all, then can it not have any corporeal image, shape, or figure. Nor can it be thought that the Scripture would lie concerning corporeal members, if there were none. But what is that, which after its separation from this body, is carried down into hell, and there detained prisoner, and reserved till the day of judgment? And what is that, which Christ dying descended down unto? I suppose to the souls of the patriarchs. But incorporality is free from all custody or imprisonment, as also devoid of pain and pleasure. Wherefore, if souls be sensible of pain after death, and tormented with fire, then must they needs have some corporeity; for incorporality suffers nothing. And as every corporeal thing is passive or patible, so again whatsoever is passive is corporeal." Tertullian[8] would also confirm

* De An. p. 309. Rigal. [Cap. 7. p. 165.] [8] Ubi supra, cap. 9. p. 166.

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this from a vision or revelation of a certain sister-prophet, (miracles and prophecy being said by him not to be then altogether extinct,) Inter cætera ostensa est mihi anima corporaliter, et spiritus videbatur, tenera et lucida, et aërii coloris, et formæ per omnia humanæ, "There was (said she) amongst other things, a soul corporally exhibited to my view, and it was tender and lucid, and of an aereal colour, and every way of human form." Agreeably to which, Tertullian himself addeth: Effigiem non aliam animæ humanæ deputandam præter humanam, et quidem ejus corporis, quod unaquæque circumtulit, "There is no other shape to be assigned to a human soul, but human; and indeed, that of the body, which is before carried about." It is true indeed, that Tertullian here drives the business so far, as to make the soul itself to be corporeal, figurative, and colorate; and after death to have the very same shape which its respective body had before in this life; he being one of those who were not able to conceive of any thing incorporeal, and therefore being a religionist, concluded God himself to be a certain body also. But the reasons which he here insisteth on will indeed extend no further than to prove that the soul hath after death some body vitally united to it, by means whereof it is both capable of converse and sensible of pain, forasmuch as body alone can have no sense of any thing.[1]

[1] The argument here brought forward by Dr. Cudworth in support of his opinion on the body of souls, is capable of as easy a refutation as the preceding one.

I. He reasons in this manner: Souls divested of their earthly bodies know and converse with each other, and can feel pleasure and pain: but nothing of this kind can take place without corporeal members: therefore, souls are connected with a thin and ethereal body which adapts and qualifies them for all these things. In this argumentation the learned Doctor assumes what pure reason tells us is inadmissible, that no one can know and converse with another, unless he has eyes, a tongue, and other bodily members. We know that God sees, perceives, knows, and discerns all things, although he is wholly destitute of eyes, ears, and all members. Why, therefore, may not souls also, when released from the body, be able by some means unknown and incomprehensible to us, to perceive external things and know one another, and disclose their thoughts by certain signs? The same may be said of sense. For who will deny it to be possible for the divine power to cause simple spirits divested of all body to participate in joy or sorrow? The fact that we ourselves, during this life, have no sensation or perception except through the body, is no proof in my opinion that there is no different mode of perception in another state. To confess the truth, I have always considered those to judge too hastily who suppose that we are to draw our own conclusions as to the possibility or impossibility of a thing from what happens here among us mortals.

II. The authority of Tertullian, which Dr. Cudworth next appeals to, is in itself very slight: we shall, therefore, merely consider the arguments he brings forward. These are two-fold; one drawn from the history related by our Saviour of the rich man and Lazarus, Luke xvi.; the other from a vision which appeared to a certain woman. Neither of which is of any great weight. Granting that in Tertullian's time, divine visions had not yet ceased among Christians, still, it is unquestionable that many at that time passed off false visions and mere illusions of a fertile imagination as true, and that even the best of men were grossly deceived in this matter. Tertullian, it is notorious was too ready and prone to receive every idle dream as a divine appearance. Besides, he wrote his book, De Anima, after he had already gone over to the Montanists. Wherefore, the woman to whom he tells us this vision appeared, was doubtless

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And this is that which Irenæus from the same Scripture gathereth; not that the soul is a body, but that it hath a body after death conjoined with it, and that of the same form and

some fanatic of this sect, which abounded in women of the kind. Our Saviour's narrative respecting the souls of the rich man and beggar, Luke xvi. was considered by other ancient fathers besides Tertullian to be of great importance in this question, as Methodius in Photius, Biblioth. cod. 234. p. 931. Faustus Rhegiensis in Henr. Canisius' Lectiones Antiquæ, tom. 1. p. 364. Irenæus, Adversus Hæreses, lib. 2. cap. 34. p. 168. and others. But who does not see that in this narrative, whether it is altogether fictitious and parabolical, or contains some historical truth, our Saviour is depicting futurity by images drawn from the things of this world; which he also frequently does elsewhere, in order to be better understood by the less informed and intelligent. But every body is aware that narratives of this kind are not to be pressed too closely. If it be right to reason thus: Christ attributes to the souls of the rich glutton and Lazarus a tongue, hands, and feet; therefore souls that have departed from this terrestrial body, still live in connexion with certain bodies: the following also will be admissible logic: Christ represents Lazarus as sitting and feasting in Abraham's bosom; therefore, in heavenly glory we shall be really refreshed and fed with meat and drink. Besides, this parable will be of equal avail to those who suppose the soul to be wholly corporeal, as to those who hold it to be connected with a certain subtle body. For there is nothing in it from which you can infer that Lazarus consisted of two parts, soul and body. Lastly, if the souls of the dead have a tongue, feet, and the other members, as the ancient fathers infer from this narrative of Christ, what becomes of the resurrection of the body? What necessity is there for the former bodies to be hereafter restored to souls, if they are already supplied with bodies? Or is it, that happy souls require a twofold tongue and a double share of hands and feet?

III. But as Dr. Cudworth in the sequel again appeals to the testimony of the ancient Christian fathers, it may be worth while to give a brief exposition of their sentiments generally on the nature of the soul. Not one of them entertained the same opinion as the majority of Christians do at the present day, that it is perfectly simple, and entirely destitute of all body, figure, form, and extension. On the contrary, they all acknowledge it to contain something corporeal, although of a different kind and nature from the bodies of this mortal sphere. But yet they are divided into two opinions. For some contend that there are two things in the soul, spirit and a very thin and subtle body in which this spirit is clothed: while others hold it to be altogether corporeal, and nothing more than a certain subtle and aerial body. I am aware that some of them pronounce the soul to be a mere *spirit*: but it is a mistake to understand them as using this word in the sense attached to it at the present day. For spirit which they sometimes oppose to body, according to their idea is nothing but a thin and subtle body, such as air or ether: as might be proved if necessary, from many of their sayings. Consult Tertullian, for example, in his book, De Anima, cap. 11. p. 167. There are very learned men who have given most erroneous interpretations of the dogmas of antiquity, in consequence of their ignorance of this fact. This difference of opinion existing, as I have stated, among the ancient fathers, arises not only from the diversity of their intellectual powers, but also from their study of philosophy. For those who follow Plato and the Platonists, for example Clement, Origen, and their disciples, adopt the Platonic doctrine respecting the soul also, and pronounce it to be most simple in itself, but yet always invested with a subtle body. But the others who keep farther aloof from Plato, and consider his philosophy to be prejudicial to Christian principles, repudiate this doctrine of his as well, and maintain that the soul altogether is nothing more than a most subtle body. To these belong Tertullian, Arnobius, Methodius, and several others, whose writings abound with passages condemnatory of Plato, and holding him forth as the prince and founder of the heretics of their own time. They very frequently assail the Platonists with bitter invectives, for inculcating that the soul is a nature most simple in itself, and devoid of all concretion, Arnobius, lib. 2. Adversus Gentes, writes thus: "Wherefore, there is no reason why we should be deceived and buoyed up with false hopes, when some well known extravagant admirers of themselves, tell us that souls are immortal, and next in dignity to God the first of things, that they are sprung from that parent and father, and are divine, wise, learned, and exempt from all contagion of body." He must be very little versed

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figure with that body which it had before here in this life;* Plenissimè autem Dominus docuit, non solum perseverare, non de corpore in corpus transgredientes animas, sed et characterem corporis, in quo etiam adaptantur, custodire eundem; et meminisse eas operum, quæ egerunt hic, et à quibus cessaverunt; in enarratione, quæ scribitur de Divite et de Lazaro, qui refrigerabatur in sinu Abrahæ; in qua ait Divitem cognoscere Lazarum post mortem; et manere in suo ordine unumquemque ipsorum. "Our Lord hath most plainly taught us, that souls do not only continue after death, without passing out of one body into another, but also, that they keep the character of body wherein they are then also adapted, the same which they had before; as likewise, that they remember the actions and omissions of their life past; in that enarration which is written concerning the rich man and Lazarus, who was refreshed in Abraham's bosom; wherein he affirmeth the rich man to have known both

in the affairs of Platonism, who does not at once see that these words are named at that school. Read also Tertullian, in his De Anima, cap. 17. p. 165. where he says: "These things are agitated by the Platonists with more sutlety than truth." [God is both body and spirit according to Tertullian, Beausobre Hist. du Manich. p. 474.] But those again who suppose the soul to be body, are not of one and the same opinion: for some, in explaining what they mean by this word, express themselves in such a way as clearly to make it appear that they give the name of body generally to every thing which is bounded by a certain limit and place, and has a circumscribed substance, or by which any thing is what it is. Tertullian himself, in some passages which have been collected by Jac. Pamelius, in his Paradoxes of Tertullian, sect. 15. p. 9. expressly owns that by the name *body* he means that by which any thing subsists. Those who entertain this notion, although they call the soul corporeal, and affirm it to be extended, and moved, and included in place, which is repugnant to the doctrine of later Christians, properly speaking, however, attach no meaning to the word *body*, and as it were, tacitly confess their ignorance of the nature of the soul. Wherefore they differ least of all from the modern opinions concerning it. But the others do not hesitate to tell us what is the nature of the soul they call corporeal, and declare that its body consists of pure air and fire, or ether: to which number belong Methodius and others. And yet many of these think this amounts to no reason why they should not pronounce the soul to be immortal and eternal: in which they follow the opinion of the ancients, who, as I have already more than once stated, held the most pure and subtle ether and fire to be wholly indestructible. Theirs was a graver error, who while they pronounced the soul to be corporeal, and all body to be perishable, supposed that the soul also is by no means immortal, but capable of dissolution and extinction. Among these are to be ranked Arnobius, lib. 2. Adversus Gentes, p. 66. the author of the Clementines, homil. 3. sect. 6. p. 641. tom. 1. Patr. Apostol. and some others who are mentioned by Desid. Heraldus and J. Bapt. Cotelerius, in their annotations on these writers. There is also some slight discrepancy among the supporters of this opinion, which I am not now disposed to dwell upon: generally however they all agree that souls are of an intermediate nature, that is, can perish, and on the other hand, if God so wills, become immortal: that the souls of those who have embraced the Christian doctrine, are rescued from the peril of mortality by baptism or some other means: but that the souls of wicked men who reject the discipline of Christ remain mortal, and being sent down to the abode of the shades, are there tormented by fire, till they are finally dissolved and annihilated. Persons not unacquainted with the transactions of the learned of our own times, are aware that not long ago Henry Dodwell, a man eminent for his erudition in other respects, revived this doctrine to a certain extent, and wrote some books in which he displays more zeal than skill in its defence.

* Lib. 2. cap. 62. [Cap. 34. p. 168. edit. Massueti.]

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Lazarus and Abraham after death, as also each of them to remain in their own order." And thus again in the following chapter:* Per hæc manifestissimè declaratum est, et perseverare animas; et non de corpore in corpus exire; et habere hominis figuram; (ut etiam cognoscantur) et meminisse eorum, quæ hic sint; et dignam habitationem unamquamque gentem percipere, etiam antè judicium, "By these things it is most manifestly declared, that souls do both persevere after death, and that they do not transmigrate out of one body into another, and that they have a human figure or shape, (whereby they may be known;) as also that they remember the things here upon the earth, and their own actions; and lastly, that each kind of good and bad have their distinct and suitable habitations assigned them, even before the judgment." Now, that Irenæus did not here mean that souls are themselves bodily substances, and consequently have a certain character, form, and figure of their own, but only that they have certain bodies conjoined with them, which are figurate, is first of all evident from the words themselves, characterem corporis, in quo etiam adaptantur, custodire eundem; the natural sense whereof is this, that they "keep the character of body (wherein they are then also adapted after death) the same with that which these bodies before had here in this life." And it is further manifest from hence, because he elsewhere plainly declareth souls themselves to be incorporeal; as in his fifth book and seventh chapter:† Flatus autem vitæ incorporalis est, "but the breath of life is incorporeal."[2]

* Cap. 63. [Cap. 34. p. 168.] † Page 300.

[2] The learned Doctor is mistaken in his exposition of Irenæus' doctrine concerning the soul: I shall therefore explain it somewhat minutely.

I. Irenæus supposes man to consist by nature of two parts, body and soul. Nevertheless, he also speaks in some places of *spirit*, which he tells us is joined to the body and soul; but in what sense he does so, will be made appear by and by. They are certainly deceived, who imagine this holy father to have entertained the opinion that man consists by nature of three parts—body, soul, and spirit; and Joshua Barnes, in his Notes to Homer. tom. 2. p. 311. is also in error when he makes the doctrine of Homer and Irenæus respecting the soul, to have been one and the same.

II. Again, he did not distribute the soul into two parts, as Dr. Cudworth supposes, namely into the soul itself, and the body connected with it, but held the soul to be wholly corporeal, or composed of a most subtle matter. I am aware that he called souls incorporeal in some places, and in others pronounced them to be spirit. But we ought not to look to Irenæus' words, but to the power attached to them, and not to estimate the significations of the terms he employs according to our own notions. The sense in which he called the soul incorporeal is manifest from what he says lib. 5. cap. 7. p. 300. "Souls are incorporeal in comparison with mortal bodies." Therefore he did not suppose them to be absolutely devoid of body, but comparatively only, that is, in respect to the grosser body with which we are now invested. The same is evident also from the fact that a little afterwards, when he assigns the reasons why neither the soul nor spirit can die, he declares that spirit is utterly incapable of extinction, because of its being simple and separate from all body, and that the soul is so because it is the breath of life: "Death happens neither to the soul, for it is the breath of life: nor spirit, for it is simple and uncompounded, and cannot be dissolved." If Irenæus had believed the soul to be simple and uncompounded, like spirit, he certainly would have

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Furthermore, Origen was not only of the same persuasion, that souls after death had certain subtle bodies united to them, and that those bodies of theirs had the same εἶδος χαρακτηρίζον,

stated this very simplicity of the soul to be the reason why it cannot perish. But as he assigns a very different cause, he undoubtedly gives us to understand that he did not hold the soul to be simple. Hence Renat. Massuetus himself, who in other respects is a wonderful admirer of Irenæus, is compelled frankly to confess that this father supposed human souls to be compounded of a most subtle matter like the angels, Diss. in Irenæum artic. 11. sect. 120. p. 161.

III. But although Irenæus belonged to that class of persons who held the soul to be altogether corporeal, he nevertheless believed it to be immortal; as has been shown by Massuetus, ibid. artic. 10. sect. 104. p. 153. 154. But he seeks the cause and origin of this immortality, not in the nature of the soul itself, but in the divine will. This opinion he discusses at great length, lib. 5. cap. 7. p. 300. where having admitted that all generated things are liable to perish, and therefore that the soul also is by its own nature mortal, he adds that the divine will causes it to continue in existence: "As heaven, and the sun, and the moon——continue for a long time agreeably to the will of God; so also we shall not be wrong in thinking the same of souls and spirits, and in short all created things: since all things which are made have a beginning of their making, they continue so long as God wills them to exist and continue." Consequently he supposed souls to be preserved by God from gradually dissolving and perishing in the same way as the rest of bodies. And from the words just quoted, it appears to me, we may glean his opinion respecting the kind and nature of the soul. For he compares it with the sun, heaven, moon, and stars; which, if I am not mistaken, is a proof that he held it to be composed of the same matter as the ether and stars: a notion which a very great number of the ancients entertained.

IV. The saying of Irenæus, that "souls on their departure from the body keep the character of the body, and have the human figure," is most correctly interpreted by Dr. Cudworth to mean that when separated from the body, they are of the human shape and preserve the form of the body which they had here in this life. Renat. Massuetus, in his notes on Irenæus, p. 167. has attempted to purge him from this doctrine: but he has wholly failed in this attempt. He supposes that the holy father's words ought to be understood "of certain characters or marks, by which they are distinguished from other spirits that are not destined to animate and inform body, and which determine them to be human souls rather than angels, it being necessary that in human minds, even living in heaven, there should be certain definite characters, and a certain disposition for body, by which they may be distinguished from other spirits." I fancy, Nicol. Gallasius, a Genevese theologian, first suggested this interpretation to Massuetus. For in his notes on the passage he in like manner affirms that Irenæus' words are to be understood of certain marks, by which souls can be distinguished from each other, although of a different kind from those of Massuetus. It is necessary, he tells us, that the souls of the dead should be distinguished by certain signs in the other life, so that any one may ascertain which is the soul of Paul, of Peter, or of Lazarus, and it is of these signs that Irenæus speaks: "His object was to show that each man has his own proper soul assigned to him by God, so that even after death the souls can be distinguished from one another, and by their proper and peculiar marks, can as easily be recognized when separate from the bodies, as when they were clothed in them." But these most learned men would have acted more wisely if they had been less ingenious in expounding this passage. For both interpretations are far-fetched, and by no means correspond to the words of Irenæus. What the holy father meant by saying that the soul preserves the character and figure of the body, will be best understood from the passage of Scripture which he adduces in proof of this doctrine. Now this passage is our Saviour's narrative of the rich man and Lazarus, recorded in the gospel of St. Luke. In this narrative not the least mention is made of any marks such as Gallasius and Massuetus dream of, by which human souls are distinguishable either from the angels or from each other. But the soul both of Lazarus and the rich man is represented as endowed with human figure and body: from which we may infer Irenæus to have simply meant that the souls of men retain the figure and appearance of their own bodies after death. And this is placed beyond all doubt by another passage of his, where he expressly declares that the soul has the figure of its body, in

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"characterizing form," which these their terrestrial bodies before had; but also thinks, that this, together with the soul's immortality, may be sufficiently proved from the frequent apparitions of ghosts or departed souls; in way of opposition to Celsus, endeavouring to invalidate the Scripture testimonies concerning the apparitions of our Saviour Christ, and imputing them either to magical imposture, or fanatic phrenzy, or the disciples mistaking their own dreams and fancies for visions and sensations, after the Epicurean way :[3] Τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν ἧττον κατασκευαστικόν

the same way that water put into a vessel, assumes the shape of the vessel, lib. 2. cap. 19. sect. 6. p. 143. "For it will not have the likeness and image of angels, but of the body in which it was formed; as water put into a vessel will have the form of the vessel, and if it be congealed in it, will take the shape of the vessel in which it is congealed, so souls have the form of the body; for they are adapted to the vessel itself in the manner we have stated."

V. This holy man's opinion concerning spirit is a peculiar and remarkable one. He supposed that spirit is added to a man as a third part after he has devoted himself to Christ, and that this perfects, preserves, and unites him with God. By this name, however, he unquestionably meant the Holy Ghost. "But a perfect man," says he, lib. 5. cap. 6. p. 299. "is a commixture and union of the soul, assuming the spirit of the Father, and mixed with that flesh which is fashioned according to the image of God. On which account the apostle also says, 'We speak wisdom amongst the perfect;' calling those perfect who have received the Spirit of God." In which place he follows up this doctrine at great length. In lib. 5. cap. 9. p. 302. he thus expresses himself: "There are three things of which a perfect man (that is, a Christian) consists, flesh, soul and spirit; the spirit being that which preserves and forms, the flesh that which is united and formed, and the soul being between these two." I shall add what he says a little afterwards, from which it is manifest that Irenæus denied this spirit to men who are strangers to Christ, and therefore did not, as some suppose, reckon it among the natural portions of a man: "As many, therefore, as have not that which preserves and forms and this unity, will consequently be and be called flesh and blood; seeing that they have not the Spirit of God in them. For which reason such men are also called dead by our Lord." The pious father seems to have regarded the Holy Spirit as a certain divine nature every where diffused, a portion of which is received by all who espoused the faith in Jesus Christ. This is manifest even from the words which Dr. Cudworth adduces from him a little afterwards. I have already shown in another place, that not a few of the ancient fathers were tinctured with this heresy, and believed the Holy Ghost to be the soul of the world, pervading the whole nature of things. Irenæus, therefore, conceived the souls of the wicked and unchristian to be corporeal spirits, which are preserved from perishing and made immortal by the divine power; but the minds of the holy and pious were supposed by him to be composed of two parts, a body or soul, and a spirit inhabiting and governing that soul. And he believed that the souls of the blessed carry this spirit along with them into heaven, and retain it to all eternity. I subjoin a remarkable passage of his, which makes all this plain and clear, lib. 2. cap. 33. p. 168. Πάντες οἱ ἐγγραφέντες εἰς ζωὴν ἀναστήσονται, ἴδια ἔχοντες σώματα καὶ ἰδίας ψυχὰς καὶ ἴδια πνεύματα ἐν οἷς εὐηρέστησαν τῷ θεῷ. Οἱ δὲ τῆς κολάσεως ἄξιοι, ἀπελεύσονται εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἰδίας ἔχοντες ψυχὰς, καὶ ἴδια σώματα, ἐν οἷς ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ χάριτος, "All that are registered unto life will rise again, having their own *bodies* and *souls* and *spirits*, in which they were well pleasing to God. But those who are deserving of punishment will depart unto the same, having also their own *souls* and *bodies*, in which they withheld themselves from the grace of God." In this opinion Irenæus had some associates, whose names it is not necessary now to repeat.

[3] Lib. 2. adv. Celsum. p. 97. But Origen is not singular in thus proving this dogma of the bodies of souls from their apparitions about sepulchres. The followers of this opinion have scarcely any thing better to advance in support of it than this argument; of the full value of which I leave all candid judges to form their own estimate.

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ἐστιν ἀναγκαίου δόγματος, ὡς ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ ὑφέστηκε τῶν ἀποθανόντων· καὶ οὐ μάτην πεπίστευκε περὶ τῆς ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς, ὁ τοῦτο τὸ δόγμα ἀνειληφώς· ὡς καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς λέγει, σκιοειδῆ φαντάσματα περὶ μνημεῖα τισὶ γεγονέναι τῶν ἤδη τεθνηκότων, "Though this might seem to have been smartly opposed by Celsus, yet are those very apparitions of ghosts, notwithstanding, a sufficient argument or proof of a certain necessary opinion, that souls do subsist after death. Neither did Plato vainly conclude the immortality and permanency of the soul, besides other things, from those shadow-like phantasms of the dead, that have appeared to many about graves and monuments." Whereupon he giveth this further account of these apparitions: Τὰ μέν οὖν γινόμεμα περὶ ψυχῆς τεθνηκότων φαντάσματα ἀπό τινος ὑποκειμένου γίνεται, τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑφεστηκυῖαν ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ Αὐγοειδεῖ Σώματι ψυχήν, "For these apparitions of the dead are not mere groundless imaginations, but they proceed from souls themselves, really remaining and surviving after death, and subsisting in that which is called a luciform body." Where, notwithstanding Origen takes this Αὐγοειδὲς Σῶμα, or "luciform body," in a larger sense, than the Greek philosophers were wont to do; namely, so as to comprehend under it that airy or vaporous body also, which belongeth to unpurged souls, who do therein most frequently appear after death; whereas it is thought proper to the purged souls to be clothed with the luciform body only.[4] Besides which, the same Origen tells us, that the thing which St. Thomas the apostle disbelieved, was not our Saviour's appearing after death, as if he had thought it impossible for ghosts or souls departed visibly to appear, but only his rising and appearing in that same solid body, which had been before crucified, and was laid in the sepulchre: Συγκατετέθειτο μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖνος τῇ φασκούσῃ αὐτὸν ἑωρακέναι, ὡς οὐκ ἀδυνάτου ὄντος, τοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ τεθνηκότος ὀφθῆναι· οὐκέτι δ' ἐνόμιζεν

[4] There is no necessity for supposing that Origen here attached a wider signification than was commonly done to the word αὐγοειδὴς. We have already shown that not a small portion of the Platonists attributed only one body to the soul, namely, the heavenly and ethereal, and supposed that the remaining aerial matter, of which, according to the others, the εἴδωλον, or second body of the soul, was composed, could be dissolved by philosophy and contemplation, and therefore removed from the soul on its departure from this body. Doubtless Origen preferred this to the other doctrine, which denied the φύσις, as they called it, of the soul to be altogether incapable of dissolution. That Origen is reasoning here entirely upon Platonic principles is manifest even from what Theophrastus, the Platonist, in Æneas Gazæus, Dialog. de Resurrectione Mortuorum, p. 65. argues according to the prescript of his own school. This mode of disputation prevailed for some time among the Christians, namely, so long as the authority of Origen and his followers had any weight. But when this ceased to be the case the Christians took a different view of these apparitions of the dead about sepulchres, and did not hesitate to contend that evil demons assume the form and figure of departed men, and deceive the eyes of mortals. See Æneas Gazæus, ibid. p. 65. 66. For which opinion they adduced this argument, that at the rising of the sun these spectral images dissolve and vanish.

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εἶναι τὸ ἐν σώματι αὐτὸν ἀντιτύπῳ ἐγηγέρθαι, " Thomas also, as well as the other apostles, assented to the woman affirming that she had seen Jesus; as not thinking it at all impossible for the soul of a dead man to be seen: but he did not believe him to have risen and appeared in that self-same solid body, which before he lived in; for which cause he said, not only, 'unless I see him;' but added also, 'And unless I shall put my finger into the print of the nails, and thrust my hand into his side, I will not believe.'" Where again Origen subjoins: Ταῦτα δ' ἐλέγετο ὑπὸ τοῦ Θωμᾶ, κρίνοντος ὅτι δύναται Ὀφθαλμοῖς αἰσθητοῖς φανῆναι ψυχῆς Σῶμα πάντα τῷ προτέρῳ εἴδει, ... μέγεθός τε, καὶ ὄμματα κάλ' ἐοικνίης, καὶ φωνὴν,

Πολλάκι δὲ καὶ τοῖα περὶ χροῖ εἵματ' ἐχούσης.

" These things were said by Thomas, not as doubting at all, but that the body of a soul departed (to wit, condensed) might be seen with the eyes of sense, every way resembling that form which it had before in this life, both in respect of bigness, figure, colour, and voice; and oftentimes also in the same customary garments." Wherefore, according to Origen, the Jews were at that time generally possessed with this opinion, that souls after death had certain bodies united to them, wherein they might visibly appear; neither is that of any great moment to the contrary, which a learned critic[5] objecteth, that Josephus, writing of their opinions, maketh no mention hereof; he omitting, besides this, other considerable dogmata of theirs also, as that of the resurrection. However, this at least is certain from hence, that Origen himself took it for granted, that human souls departed were not altogether naked or unclothed, but clothed with a certain subtle body, wherein they could also visibly appear, and that in their pristine form.

Moreover, it might be here observed also, that when upon our Saviour's first apparition to his disciples, it is said, that theyw ere affrighted, as supposing they had seen a spirit; our Saviour does not tell them, that a spirit or ghost had no body at all wherein

[5] Who this was I know not; nor have I considered it necessary to try to find out is name. Origen is not at all mistaken in supposing that neither St. Thomas nor the her disciples of our Saviour thought it impossible for the souls of the dead to appear the human form and figure. For this is evident from Luke xxiv. 37, where they e said to have supposed, when Christ exhibited himself before them, that they had en his πνεῦμα, or spirit. But how this can be taken as a proof that not only these ciples, but all the Jews as well, believed that departed souls are always clothed in a n and subtle body, I am at a loss to comprehend. Do all those who believe in the quent apparition of ghosts and spectres imagine these spectres to have always a tle body united to them? To say nothing at present of other things, why might the Jews have entertained the opinion espoused by many both of modern and ient times, that spirits can assume to themselves bodies from the air, and retain n for a certain time.

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it could visibly appear; but, (as rather taking that for granted[4]) that a spirit had no flesh and bones (no σῶμα ἀντίτυπον) no such solid body as they might find him to have: bidding them therefore handle him, to remove that scruple of theirs. As if he should have said, Though spirits or ghosts, and souls departed, have bodies (or vehicles) which may by them be so far condensed, as sometimes to make a visible appearance to the eyes of men, yet have they not any such solid bodies as those of flesh and bone; and therefore by feeling and handling may you satisfy yourselves that I am not a mere spirit, ghost, or soul, appearing, as others have frequently done, without a miracle; but that I appear in that very same solid body, wherein I was crucified by the Jews, by miraculous divine power, raised out of the sepulchre, and now to be found no more there. Agreeable to which of our Saviour Christ is that of Apollonius in Philostratus:[5] Λαβοῦ μοι, ἔφη, κἂν μὲν διαφύγω σε, εἴδωλον εἰμί· εἰ δὲ ὑπομείναιμι ἁπτόμενος, πεῖθε καὶ ζῆν τέ με, καὶ μὴ ἀποβεβληκέναι τὸ σῶμα, "Touch me and handle me, and if you find me to avoid the touch, then may you conclude me to be a spirit or ghost (that is, a soul departed); but if I firmly resist the same, then believe me really to live, and not yet to have cast off the body." And indeed though spirits or ghosts had certain subtle bodies, which they could so far condense as to make them sometimes visible to men, yet is it reasonable enough to think, that they could not constipate or fix them into such a firmness, grossness, and solidity as that of flesh and bone is, to continue therein; or at least not without such difficulty and pain as would hinder them from attempting the same. Notwithstanding which, it is not denied, but that they may possibly sometimes make use of other solid bodies, moving and acting them, as in that famous story of Phlegon's,[7] where the body vanished not, as other ghosts used to do, but was left a dead carcase behind. Now, as for our Saviour Christ's body, after his resurrection, and before his ascension; which notwithstanding its solidity in handling, yet sometimes vanished also out of his disciples' sight; this probably, as Origen conceived, was purposely conserved for a time, in a certain middle state, betwixt the crassities of a mortal body, and the spirituality of a perfectly glorified, heavenly, and ethereal body.[8]

[4] Luke xxiv. 37.

[5] In Vita Apollonii Tyanæi, lib. 9. cap. 12. p. 355. The same passage of Philostratus was cited not long ago in illustration of these words of our Saviour by the most erudite Jac. Elsner, Observat. Sacr. in N. T. Libros, tom. 1. p. 287.

[7] He means Trallianus, whose book De Rebus Mirabilibus, cap. 1. may be consulted in Jac. Gronovius' Thesaurus Antiquitatum Græcar. tom. 8. p. 2694. &c. The entire story is too long to be repeated here; neither does the matter in hand require it.

[8] These arguments also fail in making me believe what the learned Doctor considers to be probable, that souls have a certain body united to them which they bring with them into this world, and again take away at their departure.

I. The interpretation here given of the words of Christ, Luke xxiv. 37. although I

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But there is a place of Scripture, which, as it hath been interpreted by the generality of the ancient fathers, would naturally imply, even the soul of our Saviour Christ himself, after his

am aware of its having occurred also to the minds of others, to confess the truth, seems o me to be altogether fallacious, and to have no foundation to support it. Dr. Cudworth makes our blessed Saviour speak like a philosopher of the later Platonic school; ut by what right he does so I cannot tell. For my own part I think we ought to be xceedingly cautious not to attribute to our Lord and God any thing that we do not ee expressed by him in clear and perspicuous words. But we must bear with this n one adorned in other respects with such eminent virtues, and consider that we are ut men, whose minds are exposed to many snares in this mortal life. Let us examine little into the force of this argument drawn from the words of Christ: "Our Saviour ays: A spirit has not flesh and bones; therefore spirits have a subtle body united to hem, which they never cast off." Is this argument, or is it mere conjecture and surmise? Does it follow from Christ's denying spirits to have a solid body that they ossess some other body, not solid, but resembling ether or air? Our Saviour, it must e confessed, does not deny souls to have a subtle body; and therefore I cannot agree ith those who consider it to be evident from this passage that souls are altogether estitute of all body. For no one, I imagine, would syllogize in this manner: Souls ave no solid and concrete body; therefore they have no body at all. But those are qually illogical in their reasoning who hold this saying to be a proof that souls always ossess a subtle body thinner and lighter than these of ours. As if the following ode of argumentation were correct and legitimate: Peter says, he has neither silver or gold, Acts iii. 6. therefore this holy apostle had brass or copper money. I shall ld two other considerations, which will thoroughly demolish this argument. In the rst place, those who make use of it ought to abandon the other one drawn from our aviour's parable of the rich man and Lazarus. For it is proved from these words of hrist, that spirits are destitute of a solid and concrete body, or of flesh and bones, it if the narrative concerning Lazarus be pressed and insisted upon, it will be ecessary to grant that souls have flesh and bones. For the rich man's tongue is rning hot, and he asks for water: and Lazarus has fingers wherewith to take up the ater and pour it into his mouth. Are not these signs and proofs of a solid body? hey must either confess, therefore, that our Saviour's words concerning Lazarus and e rich man are figurative, and therefore have no demonstrative weight in this estion; or otherwise must admit, although Christ denies it, that souls have flesh and nes. In the second place I fear, if our Saviour's words be explained in this anner, they will lead others to attribute a subtle body, such as the Platonists sign to souls, to the supreme Being himself. For our blessed Saviour positively irms every nature which is πνεῦμα, or spirit, to be destitute of a solid body. But in hn iv. 24. he pronounces God to be πνεῦμα. Therefore, if in Luke xxiv. 34. he eans that spirits have not a gross and crass but a thin and subtle body, it will be rrect to apply this to God also as being πνεῦμα, and to suppose him to be furnished, t indeed with human members, but with a thin and subtle vehicle.

II. What the learned Doctor, after the example of the Platonists, here states, that uls have the power of condensing the particles of their ethereal body so as to become ible, and again expanding and dilating them so as to vanish from human sight, as far I am able to understand it, involves a doctrine entirely subversive of the precepts of e Platonists themselves on this body of souls. For they held that subtle body to be mortal and incapable of perishing, unless by the will of God. Let them explain to , therefore, how that can be indissoluble and immortal, which admits of condension l expansion. For my own part, I consider every thing that can be condensed and panded to consist of parts not so intimately united and connected with each other as be utterly incapable of being dissolved. I pass over other difficulties involved in s opinion, from which the Platonists will never be able to extricate themselves, less they make up their minds to abandon the beaten path of almost all philosophers, l to reject truths which scarcely any one has ever yet called into question.

III. I fear Dr. Cudworth attributed to Origen an opinion which was foreign to him, en he makes him to have supposed that our Saviour Christ's body after the resurtion and before the ascension was conserved by God in a certain intermediate state. m aware of its having been Origen's belief that Christ's resurrection-body was

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death, and before his resurrection, not to have been quite naked from all body, but to have had a certain subtle or spirituous clothing, and it is this of St. Peter:* Θανατωθεὶς μὲν σαρκὶ, ζωροποιηθεὶς δὲ τῷ πνεύματι, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασι πορευθεὶς ἐκήρυξε. Which being understood by those ancients of our Saviour Christ's descending into Hades or hell, is accordingly thus rendered in the vulgar Latin,† "Put to death in the flesh, but quickened in the spirit: in which (spirit) also he went

aerial or of a certain middle nature between the mortal body which he had before possessed and the disembodied soul: Καὶ ἦν γε, says he, [lib. 2. adv. Celsum, p. 98. κατὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν αὐτοῦ ὡσπερεὶ ἐν μεθορίῳ τινὶ τῆς παχύτητος τῆς πρὸ τοῦ πάθους σώματος, καὶ τοῦ γυμνὴν τοιούτου σώματος φαίνεσθαι ψυχὴν, "He had after the resurrection a certain middle body between the crassitude of the mortal body before the passion and the soul divested of such body." Butwhe re he has declared that this body, which Christ wore for forty days, was preserved by God in that middle state till his ascension into heaven, and afterwards assumed another form and nature, I am altogether at a loss to know. I am either thoroughly deceived, or Origen supposed that this middle and aerial body, which according to his conception Christ received at the resurrection, was not only preserved by God in that state during the forty days which he passed with his disciples, but also carried with him into heaven never again to be laid aside. Probably our worthy author borrowed this interpretation of Origen's opinion from Hugo Grotius; who Comment. ad Luc. 24. 31. p. 839. in like manner imagines this intermediate state of Christ's body to have lasted only forty days. It is easy to fall into errors of the kind; but I am much more surprised that the learned Doctor should have prevailed upon himself to approve of what he supposes to have been Origen's opinion concerning the body of Christ. In the first place I see nothing whatever to sustain it. For the Scriptures, the authority of which alone is to be relied upon in such matters, are wholly silent in respect to this miracle. Christ, says the learned Doctor, sometimes vanished, therefore he must have possessed an aerial body, such as could at one time be condensed so as to appear, and at another expanded so as to disappear. But this I consider to be mere trifling. Christ's suddenly vanishing out of the sight of his disciples is certainly a proof that his body had acquired new properties and laid aside its pristine gravity, or had been made a glorious body, but it by no means shows that resurrection-body to have been aerial and of a certain intermediate nature. It is unnecessary to mention that what the Platonists inculcate respecting the nature of aerial bodies, which they suppose to be capable of condension and expansion, is too slippery and uncertain to be readily admitted by those who receive nothing without proof and argument. But what need of many words? This opinion, in the next place, is at variance with the clear and express words of the sacred writer, or rather of Christ. Our blessed Saviour declares that he has flesh and bones, Luke xxiv. 39.; he also tells Thomas to put his finger into the print of the nails, and to thrust his hand into his side, John xx. 27. Are these not a proof of Christ's having recovered the body which had been deposited in the sepulchre? Do bodies which are aerial and of a middle nature consist of flesh and bones? Or do they retain the marks of the wounds inflicted upon the mortal body, so that the fingers and hands can feel those scars? I am not disposed to combat this opinion by much more that is at hand for its refutation, but I am sorry that our eminent author should have been so far influenced by his partiality for Origen and the Platonic philosophy as to have hastily adopted it. Although it is beyond all controversy that the bodies of the blessed at the resurrection will be glorious and endowed with new virtues, still none of us have such a knowledge of those immortal bodies as to be able to tell what can and what cannot be done by them. Why then do we sometimes dispute with each other as though we were already in possession of such a lucid and glorious body, and were perfectly acquainted with all the affections which are proper and peculiar to it?

* 1 Pet. iii. 18. 19.

† Of this St. Austin, in his 12th Book, De Gen. ad Lit. cap. 33. Et Christi quidem animam venisse usque ad ea loca, in quibus peccatores cruciantur, ut eos solveret, quos esse solvendos occulta nobis sua justitia judicabat, non immeritò creditur.

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ınd preached to those spirits that were in prison," &c. So that he word πνεύματι, or "spirit," here, according to this inter-›retation, is to be taken for a spirituous body; the sense being his: "That when our Saviour Christ was put to death in the lesh, or the fleshly body, he was quickened in the spirit, or a pirituous body: in which (spirituous body) also, he went and ›reached to those spirits which were in prison," &c. And loubtless it would be said, by the assertors of this interpretation, hat the word "spirit" could not here be taken for the soul of ›ur Saviour Christ, because this being naturally immortal, could ıot properly be said to be quickened and made alive. Nor could ıe, that is our Saviour Christ's soul, be so well said to go, in this pirit neither, that is in itself, the soul in the soul, to preach to he spirits in prison. They would add also, that spirit here ould not be taken for the divine Spirit neither, which was the fficient cause of the vivification of our Saviour's body at his esurrection; because then there would be no direct opposition etwixt being put to death in the flesh, and quickened in the pirit; unless they be taken both alike materially. As also the ›llowing verse is thus to be understood; that our Saviour Christ went in that spirit, wherein he was quickened, when he ›as put to death in the flesh, and therein preached to the spirits ı prison. By which spirits in prison also would be meant, not ure incorporeal substances, or naked souls, but souls clothed ›ith subtle spirituous bodies; as that word may be often under-›ood elsewhere in Scripture.[9] But thus much we are unques-

[9] Various as are the opinions and conjectures of commentators upon this passage of ›. Peter, which all allow to be obscure, I have seen no interpretation, however, more olent and more remote from all appearance of truth than the one here put forward ' Dr. Cudworth. Can the minds even of those, whose keen and vigorous intellect in her respects has raised them above the rest of men, be so beset with mist and darkness, hen they are embued with preconceived opinions?

I. The worthy Doctor supposes the word πνεῦμα here to mean the ethereal body of e soul. But upon what ground does he do so? By what passage of holy writ does ' support this interpretation? For my own part I see nothing advanced by him in vour of it. The truth is, his love of Platonism led him to expound the passage in is manner. For with them the word πνεῦμα denotes that vehicle of the soul; and erefore as he entertained no doubt in respect to the doctrine itself, he did not hesitate transfer this Platonic notion to the saying of St. Peter.

II. But this interpretation is not only destitute of all foundation, but at variance ›o with the holy apostle's words. Our Saviour is said by him to be θανατωθεὶς μὲν ρκὶ, ζωοποηθεὶς δὲ τῷ πνεύματι, the meaning of which words the learned ›ctor supposes to be as follows: "He was put to death in this fleshly or grosser dy; but was quickened in the spirituous or subtle body, which is natural to souls." ı the interpretation of the former member there is now no controversy between us; t that of the latter seems to me to be as remote from the truth as it possibly can be. ı the power of the word ζωοποιέω, also, I suppose we are agreed. For its constant age in the books of the New Testament shows that it means "to restore to life," d ζωόποιεῖσθαι, "to be restored to life." Nor does this passage admit of any other nification; in which, as must be evident to every body, our blessed Saviour's death d resurrection are opposed to each other. Let us inquire, therefore, into the matter elf. When our Saviour is said to be quickened or restored to life, this unquestionably to be understood of his body which alone can die. For to suppose that the soul of

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tionably certain of from the Scripture, that not only Elias, whose terrestrial body seems to have been, in part at least, spiritualized, in his ascent in that fiery chariot, but also Moses appeared visibly to our Saviour Christ and his disciples upon the mount, and therefore (since piety will not permit us to think this a mere prestigious thing) in real bodies; which bodies also seem to have been Αὐγοειδῆ, "luciform," or "lucid," like to our Saviour's then transfigured body.

Again, there are sundry places of Scripture which affirm, that the regenerate and renewed have here in this life a certain earnest of their future inheritance; which is their spiritual or heavenly body; as also the quickening of their mortal bodies is

Christ could die is impious, and to impute death to the divine nature would be downright insanity. Therefore, if we adopt Dr. Cudworth's interpretation of St. Peter's words, we shall have this meaning: "But the body of Christ, which before had perished, was restored to life in the subtle body of the soul, or through that subtle body." But who is so stupid as not to see that such a sense is both absurd in itself and wholly repugnant to Dr. Cudworth's own principles? If the soul of Christ had died and returned to life there would have been some slight show of truth in this interpretation; but as the body alone perished and was restored again, the least we can say of it is that it is a most surprising one. Perhaps the admirers of this exposition will reply, that St. Peter's words are to be understood thus: "But the soul of Christ returned again to the body clothed in a subtle body of its own. But I ask these persons first of all: What necessity was there for St. Peter to declare that the soul of Christ underwent no change, but returned to the body clothed in its natural vehicle? Again, I request them to prove even by one passage of Scripture, that ζωοποιεῖσθαι signifies "to return to," or "be united again with the body." If we allow ourselves to abandon the constant and uniform significations of words, and to invent new ones at pleasure, there will be nothing so certain or sacred as not to admit of being subjected to cavil and controversy. Lastly, I leave all rational men to judge whether this exposition of St. Peter's words is to be tolerated: "Christ's solid body suffered death, but his soul afterwards returned to this solid body, clothed in its own subtle body."

III. In my own opinion St. Peter either says nothing that is intelligible or he means by the word πνεῦμα the efficient cause of Christ's resurrection. And as this cause is not Christ's soul but his divine nature, I do not hesitate to concur with those who hold πνεῦμα to signify in this passage the divinity of Christ. Dr. Cudworth certainly has something to oppose to this commonly received opinion. But I confess myself to be unable to see clearly what he means by stating that if this opinion be adopted there will then be no direct opposition between "being put to death in the flesh ard quickened in the spirit." On the contrary, I think this direct opposition is wanting in his own interpretation: for the solid body of Christ and the Platonic vehicle of the soul cannot very aptly be compared and contrasted with each other.

IV. Lastly, when Dr. Cudworth tells us at the very outset that the generality of the ancient fathers interpreted this passage of St. Peter, in such a way as would naturally imply the doctrine he is himself defending, he must not be understood as though these ancient fathers supposed like himself that πνεῦμα there denotes the vehicle of our Saviour Christ's soul. I have not met with one of them who attached such a sense to it. The great majority of them understand this word of Christ's soul itself, and imagine it to have descended while his body was in the grave, into the lower world, in which souls according to their notion are detained. The learned Doctor's meaning therefore is simply, that those who follow this opinion of the ancient fathers may by an easy transition arrive at the interpretation which he himself prefers to all others. Probably the name of *the fathers*, which is known to be of great weight, was put forward by him for the mere purpose of more successfully evading the charge of novelty. What he adds respecting Moses and Elias is wholly irrelevant to the present question.

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therein attributed to the efficiency of the spirit dwelling in them. Which is a thing that hath been taken notice of by some of the ancients, as Irenæus:* Nunc autem partem aliquam spiritus ejus sumimus, ad perfectionem et præparationem incorruptelæ, paulatim assuescentes capere et portare Deum. Quod et pignus dixit apostolus; hoc est, partem ejus honoris, qui à Deo nobis promissus est. . . . . Si ergo pignus hoc habitans in nobis jam spirituales effecit, et absorbetur mortale ab immortalitate, "Now have we a part of that spirit, for the preparation and perfection of incorruption; we being accustomed by little and little to receive and bear God. Which also the apostle hath called an earnest; that is, a part of that honour which is promised to us from God. If therefore this earnest (or pledge) dwelling in us hath made us already spiritual, the mortal is also swallowed up by immortality." And Novatian:[10] Spiritus Sanctus id agit in nobis, ut ad æternitatem et ad resurrectionem immortalitatis corpora nostra perducat, dum illa in se assuefacit cum cœlesti virtute misceri, "This is that, which the Holy Spirit doth in us, namely, to bring and lead on our bodies to eternity, and the resurrection of immortality; whilst in itself it accustometh us to be mingled with the heavenly virtue." Moreover, there are some places also which seem to imply, that good men shall, after death, have a further inchoation of their heavenly body, the full completion whereof is not to be expected before the resurrection or day of judgment. We know, that "if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. For in this we groan earnestly."† And verse 5, "He that hath wrought us for the self-same thing is God, who also hath given us the earnest of the Spirit." Now how these preludiums and prelibations of an immortal body can consist with the soul's continuance, after death, in a perfect separation from all manner of body, till the day of judgment, is not so easily conceivable.[1]

* Lib. 5. cap. 8. [Page 301. Edit. Massueti.]

[10] In his book, De Trinitate, cap. 29. p. 450. appended to the Works of Tertullian.

† 2 Cor. v. 1.

[1] The learned Doctor, I am confident would have said nothing of this kind, if his mental vision had not been darkened by a too great admiration of Platonic precepts. Observing that the Platonists very often employ the word πνεῦμα to designate the spiritual or ethereal body of the soul, he therefore entertains no doubt of the same notion being sometimes attached to it in the scriptures; and approaching the sacred volumes with this impression, what to others is clear and evident, is to him obscure, abstruse, and recondite; and passages which manifestly treat of the Holy Spirit, are all to be referred to the Platonic vehicle of the soul. So great is the weakness of the human mind, that if cramped and clouded by preconceived errors, it is unable to see light itself! Let us enter into a brief examination of his argument.

I. The scriptures he tells us affirm in sundry places that the regenerate and renewed have in this life a certain earnest of their future inheritance, namely, the spirit, or πνεῦμα: and this earnest or spirit, according to him, is the celestial body of

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Lastly, it is not at all to be doubted, but that Irenæus, Origen, and those other ancients, who entertained that opinion, of souls being clothed after death with a certain thin and subtle body,

the soul. He alludes unquestionably to 2 Cor. i. 22. 2 Cor. v. 5. Ephes. i. 13, iv. 30. and other similar passages. But whoever finds any difficulty in understanding these passages as referring to the Holy Ghost and his gifts to mankind, must be dull indeed, and lamentably warped and fettered by other opinions. Certainly the sense of these sayings would be amazingly absurd, if πνεῦμα denoted in them the celestial body of the soul. St. Paul, 2 Cor. i. 22. says that God "has given the earnest of the Spirit in the hearts of those who have believed." Do the regenerate, then, acquire the celestial body in their hearts, ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις? The same apostle, Ephes. iv. 30. exhorts the Ephesians "not to grieve the Spirit of God, whereby they are sealed." Does the heavenly and ethereal body, therefore, mourn and lament over our sins, and is it on that account capable of being grieved by us? I pass over the other sayings of the same kind. But the learned Doctor acknowledges that none but the holy and regenerate receive this earnest or spirit. Consequently, if the spirit be the subtle body or vehicle of the soul, none possess this vehicle except the sons of God, to whom it is granted on their entering into the communion of our blessed Saviour. How little does all this agree with those principles of Platonism imbibed by the learned Doctor himself? For the Platonists hold all souls, whether inhabiting the bodies of the good or the bad, to be alike clothed with this vehicle, and to bring it along with them in their descent to generation. He must either deny therefore that these passages treat of this vehicle, or invent some entirely new discipline, different from the Platonic, and maintain that none but the pious are invested with this spiritual and heavenly body. I speak not of its being very difficult to understand how a certain thin and subtle body can be an earnest to us of future glory: but that the Holy Ghost and his gifts can assure us of the future possession of heavenly blessings, is plain even to the comprehension of children.

II. He remarks that the resurrection of bodies is sometimes attributed by the divine writers to the efficiency of the spirit dwelling in the pious and good; alluding no doubt to the passage of St. Paul, which occurs Rom. viii. 11. "But if the spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken your mortal bodies, διὰ τὸ ἐνοικοῦν αὐτοῦ πνεῦμα ἐν ὑμῖν, by his Spirit that dwelleth in you." For my own part I have never entertained any doubt with respect to this passage. I consider in concurrence with the best commentators, that the Spirit dwelling in the saints, is represented here not as the efficient cause of the quickening of dead bodies, but as the moving and inciting cause, and that the meaning of the passage is this: "God will raise up your bodies from the dead, because you have been the abodes and temples of the Holy Spirit in this life." But even supposing the interpretation of those who affirm that the resurrection is here called the work of the Spirit dwelling in the saints to be the preferable one, what bearing will it have upon the present question? Does the worthy Doctor mean to assert that the spirit said to dwell in the saints is the celestial body or vehicle of the soul? Does this vehicle cause bodies to rise again from the dead? And does God use this vehicle as an instrument to restore the terrestrial and grosser bodies to life? In whatever point of view I consider this interpretation, I can find nothing in it to satisfy any reasonable man. Either Dr. Cudworth had in his mind some peculiar opinion in respect to the *spirit* and the body of souls which I am unable to fathom, or he ought himself to have rejected such an exposition. The passages of Irenæus and Novatian are dragged into this question in utter disregard of the real meaning of the authors. What Irenæus understood by the word spirit, and the opinion he entertained respecting it, have already been shown by us above, in speaking of his doctrine regarding the soul. Spirit, according to Irenæus, is the third person of the divine nature, called in scripture the Holy Spirit. Of this Holy Spirit he supposes the pious to receive a portion when they are converted to God: "Our substance," says he, lib. 5. cap. 8. p. 301. "that is, the union of soul and body, receives the Spirit of God, and perfects the spiritual man." And the same is also manifest from the words here quoted: in which, if he were speaking of the spiritual body of the soul, how could he say that "by the indwelling of the Spirit the holy and pious are gradually accustomed to receive and bear God?" Nor is any other sense to be attached to the words of Novatian, as is evident from

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uspected it not in the least to be inconsistent with that of the uture resurrection; as it is in no way inconsistent for one, who ath only a shirt or waistcoat on, to put on a suit of clothes, or xterior upper-garment. Which will also seem the less strange, ' it be considered, that even here in this life, our body is, as it 'ere, twofold, exterior and interior; we having, besides the rossly tangible bulk of our outward body, another interior pirituous body, the soul's immediate instrument, both of sense nd motion; which latter is not put into the grave with the

ose which immediately follow: "Whilst in itself it accustoms them to be mingled ith the heavenly virtue, and to be associated with the *divine eternity of the Holy pirit.*" Who but a madman would understand these words of the Platonic *spirit* of e soul? But the meaning of Irenæus and Novatian when they say that "the spirit rfects our bodies, and leads them to immortality, incorruption, and the resurrection," sufficiently aptly explained by Novatian himself in these words: "For our bodies are ught in it (the Spirit) and by it to go forward to immortality, while they learn to ntrol and govern themselves according to its decrees." Neither of them, therefore, d any thought of the celestial body of the soul, when speaking of the Spirit and its fits.

III. It would appear, he adds, from some places of scripture, and especially from Cor. v. 1—5. that the heavenly bodies of good men are after the dissolution of the id body rendered gradually more perfect, but that they do not arrive at full per- tion, till the resurrection or day of judgment. But here the learned Doctor umes the very point in dispute, that the souls of pious men have heavenly vehicles bodies. Dismissing this, however, let us inquire merely whether the passages pted from St. Paul warrant the inference that the heavenly bodies on the inction of this earthly body are gradually perfected. The holy apostle says, he pws that although this frail and mortal body were to die and perish, the same never- less will be restored to him, but made glorious, immortal, and imperishable: that he nestly desires this glorious and celestial body: but that God has given him the nest of the Spirit, which testifies to his mind that his hope is not fallacious. Now, pever can perceive the least mention in this discourse of a celestial body of souls, or 'over the dogma which Dr. Cudworth considers it to imply, that the vehicles of souls gradually perfected after death, must unquestionably surpass a soothsayer in keen- tedness. I am afraid any one who reads the words of St. Paul with attention, will rely forget the Platonic vehicle. For the divine writer declares that he is inflamed n an earnest desire for the heavenly body we are speaking of, verse 2. consequently hat time he did not yet possess that heavenly body: which is plainly opposed to the rine of the Platonists, who hold the vehicles of souls to be natural.

V. The worthy Doctor subjoins in the last place that "it is inconceivable how good can have a preludium and prelibation of a heavenly body, if they live destitute ll body, till the day of judgment." I confess that here as well as in some other es, his words are somewhat obscure to myself; and on carefully examining the le, I am inclined to think that he was unwilling to declare the whole of his opinion ly and openly, and suppressed no small portion of it, to avoid incurring reprehen- and ill-will. If I rightly apprehend his meaning, his words contain the following ment: "Souls have now an anticipation of a heavenly body, or know for a cer- y that they shall hereafter receive a glorious body: therefore, they already possess avenly and ethereal body: for no one can form even by anticipation any notion of which he does not possess." This reasoning to speak candidly, is so thoroughly sh and absurd, that I should consider it a useless waste of time to say any thing position to it. I am willing therefore to suppose that I do not fully understand eaning, rather than attribute to him a line of argument, so grossly fallacious and cal. The way in which the pious and good are assured that God will hereafter re their bodies to them much more splendid and excellent than before, is clearly ated by St. Paul, v. 5. The Holy Spirit and his testimony and gifts, which they ndowed with, preclude all possibility of doubt on this matter.

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other, nor imprisoned under the cold sods.[2] Notwithstanding all which, that hath been suggested by us, we shall not ourselves venture to determine any thing in so great a point, but sceptically leave it undecided.[3]

[2] We have already shown how very injurious this Platonic dogma of the body or vehicle of souls is to the Christian doctrine of the resurrection. The fact of the ancient fathers having supposed it to be consistent with this doctrine is no proof of such being the case. Many men are so obtuse as not to perceive the pernicious inferences deducible from their own opinions, although they do not escape the eyes of others. The rest that is here advanced respecting a twofold body even in this life is assumed by the learned Doctor, not proved: and therefore it is unnecessary for us to take the trouble of examining into it. We should be able to prove any thing that we pleased, if we were at liberty thus to beg the question, and to lay down the very point in controversy as the groundwork of the disputation.

[3] This digression upon the body of souls exposed Dr. Cudworth to the severe reprehension of his countrymen, some of whom charged him with having impugned the most holy doctrine of the resurrection. The various points of accusation have been collected by Thomas Wise in the Introduction to his Abridgment of Dr. Cudworth's work, p. 125. where he has at the same time pointed out what may be said on the opposite side. I shall therefore extract from this Introduction, as faithfully as I can, both the charges brought against this eminent man and the points to be alleged in his exculpation. My own sentiments on the matter I shall merely briefly intimate at the end of the disputation: for I have already declared in several places, and at considerable length, that I disapprove of some portion of his opinions, and have adduced the reasons of my dissent. In this digression Dr. Cudworth is considered by many persons to have, if not openly denied, at least covertly attacked and called in question the resurrection of the body. Let us see by what arguments they prove this.

I. In a previous part of this section he interprets St. Paul's comparison, 1 Cor. xv. 36. of a dead body with a grain of wheat, as though it were altogether complete and perfect, and in no respect lame and halt, as the logicians say. He himself confesses that the body which springs from grain committed to the earth, is not the same either in quantity or quality with the body which was sown. Therefore our resurrection-body if it altogether resemble an ear of corn, which springs from seed, will not be the same body that we now possess. And that this was his meaning is evident from these words by which he there explains St. Paul's opinion: "Know that this present body of ours is to be looked upon but as a kind of seed of the resurrection-body, which therefore is accordingly in some sense the same, and in some sense not the same with it."

II. He contends that the account given in scripture of the glorious bodies of those who shall rise again to a life of happiness is not different from what the Platonic philosophers inculcated respecting the splendid and ethereal body of souls. But if this be true, this body with which the soul is now associated will not be restored to us, but either a body entirely new and different from this mortal body, or at least one not solid and fleshly, but subtle and ethereal. For such the Platonists supposed those bodies to be, which were said by them to be united with souls. Nor does the learned Doctor make any secret of this being his view. "The future body," says he, "of the righteous, according to the scripture as well as the philosophic cabala, will be *σῶμα φωτεινὸν*, and *σῶμα αὐγοειδὲς*, and *σῶμα ἀστροειδὲς*, a *glorious, splendid, luciform*, and *star-like body*."

III. St. Paul, Col. i. 12. speaks of the inheritance of the saints in light. Dr. Cudworth thinks these words are to be understood of the lucid body which the righteous are to receive at the resurrection. But if this lucid and glorious body be an inheritance, it is different from our mortal body. For an inheritance is properly a good which a man has not possessed before.

IV. He affirms that the future bodies of the righteous will be like those of the angels. But the bodies of the angels he holds to consist of ether, and to be most thin and subtle. Therefore he supposed the bodies of the righteous also to be of the same nature and condition, and not to be composed of flesh and blood.

V. What St. Paul says, 1 Cor. xv. 50. "that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God," is to be taken, he argues, in a thoroughly proper, and not figurative

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The third and last thing in the forementioned philosophic or

sense: contrary to the opinion of all sounder theologians, who suppose the words to mean: that vicious affection and turbulent passions of the mind which in scripture are designated by the terms *flesh* and *blood*, will have no place in the resurrection-body. According to his opinion, therefore, the same body will not be raised up, but a far different one. For these bodies of ours are compounded of flesh and blood.

VI. The resurrection so often mentioned in the books of the New Testament he pronounces to be the same as the *ἀνάστασις ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν* spoken of by our Saviour Luke xx. 35. But in that passage our Saviour is not alluding to the resurrection of the mortal body, but showing generally that we shall survive after this life, and be immortal. And yet Dr. Cudworth subjoins that the resurrection of which Christ is speaking is alone treated of by St. Paul in the fifteenth chapter of his first epistle to the Corinthians; nay, he declares his opinion more explicitly in these words: "And we say that this Christian resurrection of life is the resting and settling of the souls of good men in their glorious, spiritual, heavenly, and immortal bodies."

VII. When the scripture declares that we are strangers and pilgrims in this gross and terrestrial body, the meaning is merely that these bodies look forward to greater perfection. But Dr. Cudworth seems to interpret the words in so wide a sense as to make the divine writers say, that we are hereafter to obtain celestial bodies altogether different and distinct from these terrestrial bodies.

VIII. God Almighty, he tells us, at first intended that our souls should inhabit far other bodies than those in which we are now clothed. But he also plainly intimates that the resurrection-body will be like those which God first designed for our souls. Therefore the resurrection-body will be of a far different kind and nature from these bodies of ours, and will not consist of flesh and blood.

These are the grounds upon which Dr. Cudworth is charged by learned men with denying the doctrine of the resurrection of the same body which we are invested with in this life. Let us now see in what way Mr. Wise attempts to repel the charge. He confesses that he cannot clear him of all suspicion: grants, p. 125. that he was too much led away by his partiality for the Platonists: and, p. 130. declares that he followed in the footsteps of Origen, whose notions on the resurrection of bodies were notoriously unsound and unscriptural. But yet he considers him not to be entirely without the means of defence. Therefore although it cannot be denied that he sometimes spoke too boldly and inconsiderately respecting the bodies of those that rise again, he observes that there are notwithstanding other sayings of his on this subject, than which nothing can be more sound and excellent. That he repudiates such as assert that the resurrection-body will in no respect be allied and akin to this mortal body, and refutes them in these words: "Yet nevertheless, according to the best philosophy, which acknowledges no essential or specifical difference of matter, the foulest and grossest body that is, merely by motion may not only be crystalized, but also brought into the purity and tenuity of the finest ether." That other remarks follow in the same place, which no man would deny to be consistent with truth and the purer doctrine. That in another passage, in his Discourse on 1 Cor. xv. 57. p. 88. appended to the Intellectual System, he discourses in such a manner as not even the most strenuous defender of orthodoxy can find fault with: "Although we are taught by the doctrine of the church that the bodies of those that rise again will be the same in kind and number as these of ours; still the scripture declares that these bodies will be so changed in respect to qualities and affections, that they may be said to be different from our bodies." From these the learned writer thinks it may be proved that Dr. Cudworth is not justly chargeable with error, so much as inconsistency, in explaining the doctrine of the resurrection, nor with wickedness of purpose, but merely carelessness and negligence. The discourse he alludes to on 1 Cor. xv. 57. I have had no opportunity of seeing, nor is it appended to my copy of the Intellectual System. But if those English friends whose kindness I have bespoken in the matter should happen to forward it to me in time, I will add a Latin version of it to this volume, together with the other minor works of the learned Doctor. But still some will say, this very inconsistency and variety of expression is no slight fault, and pretty clearly shows that he was not thoroughly convinced of the truth of this grave and holy doctrine. Mr. Wise replies: That Dr. Cudworth is accustomed throughout the whole of his work, whenever he wishes to propound any thing contrary to received doctrines, to speak in the person of some one else, and having adduced the strongest arguments in support of

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Pythagoric cabala is concerning those beings superior to men,

the opinion put forth, eventually to leave the whole matter undecided: that it is therefore almost impossible to ascertain his real opinion, much less to attribute to him those doctrines which he every where defends in the words of others. And if any one should now ask the reason why the illustrious man acted in this manner and did not candidly and frankly avow the sentiments of his mind, that he has no answer to make, being deterred by his reverence for so great a name from hazarding surmise and conjecture: still that he is willing to confess, that perverse teachers and propagators of error are in the habit of fighting under his shadow and of attempting to defend their own absurd theories by his authority and arguments. This is as much as saying, that Dr. Cudworth would have done more wisely, if he had been more unreserved and open in his disputations, and had spoken out his mind on many subjects with frankness and sincerity.

I shall now briefly subjoin what appears to myself, after a careful consideration of this matter, to be not very far from the truth. First of all it is unquestionable that Dr. Cudworth is not always sufficiently guarded in speaking of the bodies of those that rise again, and makes use of phrases which are calculated to give just cause of suspicion to orthodox believers. But in the next place the arguments brought against him are not all of them such as I should consider entitled to much attention. Certainly those who read his adversaries' reasons, as above enumerated, will easily perceive that they were solicitous about their number rather than their weight. The second is exceedingly weak, and the third utterly worthless. For who would think much of this reasoning: He who considers the resurrection-body to be called in scripture an *inheritance*, denies that the same body numerically will be raised from the dead? Arguments drawn from metaphorical expressions are held in very little estimation by those who reason upon right principles. Of the other points urged against him I have not a much better opinion; and with the exception of the first, which I own to be of some weight, I think it will require little trouble to dispose of the whole of them. The sixth argument especially will be repudiated, I am confident, by every one possessing the least pretensions to common fairness and equity. For who would approve of this argumentation: Dr. Cudworth asserts the resurrection treated of by St. Paul, 1 Cor. xv. to be the same as that which Christ, Luke xx. calls ἀνάστασις ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν: therefore he denied that the same body which our soul now inhabits will be restored to us? For my part I think Dr. Cudworth was right, nor can I agree at all with those who suppose Christ to be speaking not of the resurrection of bodies but merely of immortality and eternal life, although I am aware that such is the opinion of interpreters of high eminence. The express words of Christ and St. Luke, as well as the opinions of the Sadducees whom our Saviour is convicting, forbid us from assenting to this exposition. Thus happens it among mortals: Those who publicly accuse others of heresy in the heavenly doctrine are sometimes so carried away by their zeal as to rank the best of sentiments among flagrant and heinous errors. I do not make these remarks however for the purpose of exculpating Dr. Cudworth, or of showing that he held no opinion adverse and repugnant to the common tenets of Christians. On the contrary I am convinced that he considered the received doctrine of the resurrection of the body to be either doubtful or altogether false: and in this I fancy I shall have the concurrence of all who attentively examine what has hitherto been argued by himself and remarked by us. His opinion, if he did entertain any fixed one upon the subject, is very doubtful and uncertain. For as I have already observed above, he has nowhere so laid open his mind as to admit of our seeing into all its recesses. But if he arrived at no certain conclusion, but merely doubted and hesitated as to which opinion he should in preference adopt, he probably derived this taint from the later Academy, of which he was a devoted admirer, and from Plotinus whose guidance he chiefly followed in philosophizing. For although the junior Platonists ought to be classed among dogmatists rather than Academics, still they dispute on both sides of many questions without deciding upon any thing. As to the rest, I cannot understand why Mr. Wise was unwilling to point out the reason of Dr. Cudworth's great caution and hesitancy. To myself they seem easy to be accounted for; nor do I suppose I shall do any injustice to the great man's memory, by saying that his prudence and love of tranquillity so far influenced him as to induce him to suppress a portion of his opinions rather than state them in clear and perspicuous language. If I am not mistaken, the times in which he lived did not yet allow full liberty to Englishmen freely and openly to avow what sentiments they pleased, regardless of the ill-will and animosity of others. Burnet, in

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commonly called by the Greeks demons (which Philo[4] tells us are the same with angels amongst the Jews, and accordingly are those words demons and angels, by Hierocles and Simplicius, and other of the latter pagan writers, sometimes used indifferently as synonymous[5]) viz. That these demons or angels are not pure, abstract, incorporeal substances, devoid of vital union with any matter; but that they consist of something incorporeal and something corporeal, joined together: so that, as Hierocles writeth of them:[6] Τὸ μὲν ἄνω αὐτῶν ἀσώματος οὐσία, τὸ δὲ κάτω σωματική, "They have a superior and an inferior part in them; and their superior part is an incorporeal substance; their inferior corporeal." In a word, that they all, as well as men, consist of soul and body, united together, there being only this difference betwixt them, that the souls of these demons or angels never descend down to such gross and terrestrial bodies as human souls do; but are always clothed either with aërial or ethereal ones.[7] And indeed this Pythagoric cabala was universal, con-

his History of his own Times, an. 1667. p. 187. records of Dr. Cudworth as follows: "He was a man of singular prudence and great circumspection: and this his enemies made a pretext for falsely charging him with dissimulation and fraud."

[4] De Insomniis, p. 586. Philo follows the opinion of the most eminent of the Platonists, who suppose demons to be souls more excellent and noble than the rest, which have never been smitten with a love of bodies, and consequently have never wished to descend into them. Having put forth this opinion he thus proceeds: Τὰς δαίμονας μὲν οἱ ἄλλοι φιλόσοφοι, ὁ δὲ ἱερὸς λόγος ἀγγέλους εἴωθε καλεῖν, "These philosophers are accustomed to call demons, and scripture angels." There is a great difference between what Philo calls demons and those natures which the divine writers denominate angels: but Philo had nothing more at heart than to accommodate the whole of scripture to the precepts of the philosophy he had himself imbibed, and in spite of all truth to interpret the sacred texts agreeably to the dogmas of the Alexandrine school.

[5] It is, as the learned Doctor states: the junior Platonists, who borrowed many other words from the Christians, in the third century adopted the term ἄγγελος also, and applied it to those natures which they had heretofore called demons. For they thought there was little or no difference between the demons of philosophers and the angels of Christians: in which opinion they were much confirmed by the Christians themselves. But if we impartially compare what philosophers say of their demons with the scriptural account respecting angels, we shall easily perceive no slight discrepancy between them, although they are associated by a certain similitude. It is worth while however to observe, that demons or genii were not all called angels by the whole of the Platonists. For some of them distribute them into three classes, *demons, angels,* and *heroes*: of which those are angels that live nearest the heavenly places. See Hierocles, In Aurea Carmina, p. 36. Porphyry, Περὶ ἀποχῆς, lib. 2. sect. 38. p. 82. and others. But many of them use these words indiscriminately.

[6] Comm. in Aurea Carmina, sect. 67. p. 210. The learned Doctor is wrong in supposing these words of Hierocles to relate to demons. Unquestionably this philosopher, like the rest of the Platonists, ascribed a body to those natures which they called demons: but in these words he is explaining the nature not of demons but of the stars and heavenly bodies. A little lower down he says the same of the sun, which he makes to consist of something *corporeal* and something *incorporeal.* With these heavenly bodies however he afterwards compares men and heroes; and defines the nature of heroes in these words, p. 212. Ἥρως ψυχὴ λογικὴ μετὰ φωτεινοῦ σώματος, "A hero is a rational soul with a lucid body." It is well known that heroes are a kind of demons.

[7] The Platonists disagree among themselves upon this as well as upon innumerable

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cerning all understanding beings besides the supreme Deity, or Trinity of divine hypostases; that is, concerning all the pagan inferior gods; that they are no other than souls vitally united to some bodies, and so made up of incorporeal and corporeal substance, joined together. For thus Hierocles plainly expresseth himself in the forecited place:* Ἡ λογικὴ οὐσία παρὰ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ εἰς τὸ εἶναι οὕτω παρῆλθεν, ὡς μήτε τὸ σῶμα εἶναι αὐτὴν, μήτε ἄνευ σώματος, &c. "The rational nature (in general) was so produced by God, as that it neither is body, nor yet without body; but an incorporeal substance, having a cognate or congenite body." Which same thing was elsewhere also thus declared by him:† Ἔστι γὰρ πᾶς μὲν ὁ λογικὸς διάκοσμος μετὰ τοῦ συμπεφυκότος αὐτῷ ἀφθάρτου σώματος, εἴκων ὅλου τοῦ δημιουργοῦ, "The whole rational order, or rank of being, with its congenite immortal body, is the image of the whole Deity, the maker thereof." Where, by Hierocles' rational nature or essence, and by the whole rational order, is plainly meant all understanding beings created, of which he acknowledgeth only these three kinds and degrees; first, the immortal gods, which are to him the animated stars; secondly, demons, angels, or heroes; and thirdly, men, called also by him καταχθόνιοι δαίμονες, "terrestrial demons;" he pronouncing of them all, that they are alike incorporeal substances, together with a congenite immortal body; and that there is no other understanding nature than such, besides the supreme Deity, which is complete in itself, without the conjunction of any body. So that, according to Hierocles, the ancient Pythagoric cabala acknowledged no such entities at all as those Intelligencies of Aristotle and the Noes of some high-flown Platonists (that is, perfectly unbodied minds); and much less any rank of Henades or unities, superior to these Noes. And indeed such particular created beings as these could neither have sense or cognizance of any corporeal thing existing without them (sense, as Aristotle hath observed, resulting from a complication of soul and body, as weaving results from a complication of the weaver and weaving instruments): nor yet could they act upon any part of the corporeal universe. So that these immoveable beings would be but like adamantine statues, and things unconnected with the rest of the world, having no commerce with any thing at all but the Deity; a kind of insignificant metaphysical gazers, or contemplators. Whereas the Deity,

other subjects. Thus some do not hesitate to inculcate that demons can become men, or that a demon can arrive at such a pitch of levity as to descend into a gross and solid body: but the others deny this, and suppose the souls called demons to be by their own nature possessed of such constancy that they never can be smitten with an insane love of bodies. A volume of no contemptible size might be written on the entire doctrine of this sect concerning demons and their various contentions on the subject.

* Page 210. † Page 17. [Page 19.]

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though it be not properly ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος, a "mundane soul," such as, together with the corporeal world, as its body, makes up one complete and entire animal; yet because the whole world proceeded from it, and perpetually dependeth on it, therefore must it needs take cognizance of all, and act upon all in it; upon which account it hath been styled by these Pythagoreans, ψυχὴ ὑπερκόσμιος (not a mundane, but) a supra-mundane soul. Wherefore this ancient Pythagoric cabala seems to be agreeable to reason also, that God should be the only incorporeal being in this sense, such whose essence is complete, and life entire within itself, without the conjunction or appendage of any body; but that all other incorporeal substances created should be completed and made up by a vital union with matter, so that the whole of them is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, but a complication of both; and all the highest and divinest things in the universe, next to the supreme Deity, are animals consisting of soul and body united together. And after this manner did the ancient assertors of incorporeal substance, as unextended, decline that absurdity objected against them, of the illocality of all finite created spirits, that these being incorporeal substances, vitally clothed with some body, may, by reason of the locality and mobility of their respective bodies, truly be said to be here and there, and to move from place to place.[s]

[s] He therefore plainly and openly approves of the opinion of those who like the Platonists of former times maintain that all genii and demons are endowed with a natural body. But the arguments here adduced by him in support of this doctrine have already been met by us above, when treating of the bodies of souls. The whole reasoning amounts to this: No one can feel without body, or move any thing except by means of body: but the angels feel and see, and also move other bodies: therefore they are unquestionably furnished with body. Here, however, a transition is made from what takes place and is done here, to what is possible to take place: which mode of argumentation I have always considered to have less weight in it than many suppose. This will at once be made evident if the argument be reduced into that form in which it ought to be exhibited. Thus then do those learned men reason who agree with Dr. Cudworth: Whatever takes place in this visible world takes place every where; nor has God subjected the invisible world to any other laws than those of the visible; nay he was unable to subject it to any other: but in this sensible world no one feels without the intervention of body, or moves any thing except by body: therefore neither in the other world which is removed from our senses can any nature feel or move any thing, unless it be conjoined with body. Let those who syllogize in this manner take care that they do not either form too high an opinion of themselves and the compass of their own intellect, or foolishly attempt to prescribe limits to the boundless power of God. For my own part a consciousness of my own weakness and the majesty of Omnipotence deter me from following in their footsteps. These worthy men themselves confess that the supreme Deity can feel and perceive all things and impart motion to all without the conjunction or appendage of body. Therefore sense and motion without body are at least ranked by them amongst things that are possible. Now I want to have it shown to me by solid and satisfactory arguments, that God is utterly incapable of communicating this power which he himself possesses to other natures. Perhaps they will appeal to the infinite and supreme perfections of God and to the weakness and infirmity of created things. But granting all they say respecting God and created things to be most true, still it is not sufficient to make me believe that God cannot impart some slight portion of his own supreme perfections to inferior natures. To my

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Wherefore we are here also to show what agreement or disagreement there is betwixt this part of the Pythagoric cabala and the Christian philosophy. And first, it hath been already intimated, that the very same doctrine with this of the ancient Pythagoreans was plainly asserted by Origen. Thus, in his first book, Peri Archon, cap. 6. Solius Dei (saith he) id est Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, naturæ id proprium est, ut sine materiali substantia, et absque ullâ corporeæ adjectionis societate, intelligatur subsistere, "It is proper to the nature of God only, that is, of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to subsist without material substance; or the society of any corporeal adjection." Again, lib. 2. cap. 2. Materialem substantiam opinione quidem et intellectu solum separari, à naturis rationalibus, et pro ipsis vel post ipsas effectam videri; sed nunquam sine ipsa eas vel vixisse, vel vivere: solius namque trinitatis incorporea vita existere rectè putabitur, "Material substance in rational natures is indeed separable from them in conception and understanding, it seeming to be made for them, and in order of nature after them; but it is not really and actually separable from the same; nor did they ever, or can they, live without it: for a life perfectly incorporeal is rightly deemed to belong to the Trinity only." So also, in his fourth book, and his Anacephalæosis: Semper erunt rationabiles naturæ, quæ indigent indumento corporeo. Semper ergo erit natura corporea, cujus indumentis uti necesse est rationabiles creaturas. Nisi quis putet se posse ostendere, quod natura rationabilis absque ullo corpore vitam degere possit. Sed quam difficile id sit, et quam propè impossibile intellectui nostro, in superioribus ostendimus, "There always will be rational natures, which stand in need of a corporeal indument. Wherefore there will be always corporeal nature, as a necessary indument or clothing for these rational creatures. Unless any one could show, that it is possible for the rational nature to live without a body. Which how difficult and almost impossible it is to our understanding, hath been already de-

mind those have always appeared to be the wisest men who suffer the consciousness of their own wretchedness and ignorance to lead them devoutly to adopt what is recorded by the divine writers of the acts, functions, and offices of angels, and either to keep entirely aloof from all subtle questions respecting their nature, or to handle them with moderation and caution. What estimation, pray, are we forming of ourselves, when we lay down the few things that are known to us as the rule and standard by which to measure the infinity of others that are unknown. Are we sufficiently mindful of our being mortals made of mud and clay, born yesterday and perhaps gone to-morrow? I * do not wish to detract from the ability or acumen of any one: on the contrary, I commend the endeavours of those who attempt to throw light upon most abstruse subjects, for the purpose of enhancing the glory of God among men: but yet I would have all of them to consider that in grave and arduous questions nothing is more becoming than modesty to a frail and perishable creature whose mind is enveloped in no inconsiderable darkness.

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clared." Aquinas affirmeth[9] Origen, in this doctrine of his, to have followed the opinion of certain ancient philosophers; and undoubtedly it was the old Pythagoric cabala which the learned Origen here adhered to; that ἡ λογικὴ οὐσία, as it is in Hierocles, and πᾶς ὁ λογικὸς διάκοσμος, "the rational nature made by God;" that is, all created understanding beings are neither body nor yet without body, but have always a cognate or congenite body, as their vehicle or indument. So that angels or demons, as well according to Origen as Hierocles, are all of them incorporeal substances, not naked and abstract, but clothed with certain subtle bodies, or animals compounded and made up of soul and body together.

Wherefore Huëtius,[10] and other learned men, seem not well to have understood Origen here, but to have confounded two different opinions together, when they suppose him to have asserted angels, and all understanding creatures, not to have bodies, but to be bodies, and nothing else; and consequently, that there is no incorporeal substance at all besides the Deity: whereas Origen only affirmeth, that nothing besides the Trinity could subsist and live alone, absque ulla corporeæ adjectionis societate, "without the society of any corporeal adjection;" and that the material nature is only a necessary indument or clothing of all rational or understanding creatures. And in this sense is it, that an incorporeal life is said by him to be proper only to the Trinity; because all other understanding beings are animals compounded of soul and body together. But that Origen acknowledged even our human soul itself to be incorporeal, as also that there is something in angels incorporeal, might be made evident from sundry passages in his writings; as this particularly in his sixth book against Celsus: Ἡμεῖς ἀσώματον οὐσίαν οὐκ ἔσμεν ἐκπυρουμένην, οὐδ' εἰς πῦρ ἀναλυομένην τὴν ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴν, ἢ τὴν ἀγγέλων ἢ θρόνων, &c. ὑπόστασιν, "We do not think an incorporeal substance to be combustible, nor that the soul of man can be resolved into fire, or the substance of angels, thrones, dominions, principalities, or powers." Where, by the "substance of angels," he doubtless meant the souls of them.[1]

[9] In Summa Theolog. par. 1. quæst. 51. n. 1. "Origen, in saying this of God, and denying it of others, followed the opinions of other men: as he was also deceived in many other matters by following the opinions of the ancient philosophers."

[10] In Origenianis, lib. 2. quæst. 5. p. 68. &c.

[1] The learned Doctor will hardly make it generally believed that the name ὑπόστασις in this passage was intended by Origen to designate the soul of angels. I should rather suppose it to imply the whole of their nature: nor have I any recollection of Origen or any one else ever calling the soul of any thing by this name. But these words of his are preceded by some others from which it would appear to be more probable that he held the angels to be natures partaking of body and soul. He censures the Stoics for making every thing corporeal, not excepting even *αἱ ἀρχαί*, or the *principalities*. Σωματικὰς λέγονται εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντα φθείροντας, κινδυνεύοντας δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν φθεῖραι τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεὸν, εἰ μὴ πάνυ ἀνεμφάλνον

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Origen's sense being thus declared by St. Jerome,[2] in libris περὶ ἀρχῶν, angelos, et thronos, et dominationes, et potestates, et rectores mundi et tenebrarum, et omne nomen quod nominatur, dicit, animas esse eorum corporum, quæ vel desiderio vel ministerio susceperint: that "in his book of principles he affirmeth, angels, and thrones, and dominions, and powers, and the governors of the darkness of this world, and every name that is named (in St. Paul) to be all of them the souls of certain bodies, such as either by their own desire and inclination, or the divine allotment, they have received." Now there can be no question made, but that he who supposed the souls of men to be incorporeal, in a strict philosophic sense, and such as could not suffer any thing from fire, did also acknowledge something incorporeal in angels. And thus doth he somewhere declare himself, in that book Peri Archon:[3] Per Christum creata dixit (Paulus) omnia visibilia et invisibilia; per quod declaratur, esse etiam in creaturis quasdam invisibiles, secundum proprietatem suam, substantias; sed hæ, quamvis ipsæ non sunt corporeæ, utuntur tamen corporibus, licet ipsæ sunt corporeâ substantiâ meliores. Illa vero substantia trinitatis neque corpus, neque in corpore, esse credenda est; sed in toto incorporea, "When Paul affirmeth all things, visible and invisible, to have been created by Christ, or the Λόγος, he intimated, that even amongst the creatures, there are some properly invisible substances. Which invisible substances created, though they be not bodies, yet do they use bodies, themselves being better than corporeal substance. But the substance of the Trinity is neither body, nor yet in body, but altogether incorporeal." Wherefore angelical and human souls are not, as Huetius supposeth, called incorporeal by Origen, only as subtle bodies sometimes are by the more simple and unskilful, but in a strict philosophic sense; only he supposed them to differ from the Deity in this, that though they be not

τοῦτ' αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει τυγχάνειν, "The Stoics assert that the principalities are corporeal and therefore corruptible, so that if the thing did not appear too absurd, the supreme God himself would not be exempt from the danger of corruption." Αἱ ἀρχαὶ in these words are undoubtedly the angels, by which name Origen, after St. Paul's example, frequently designates them. At any rate nobody will believe that the principles or elements of things are meant by this word: since these were regarded as corporeal not only by the Stoics but by all philosophers. If Origen therefore found fault with the Stoics for supposing the principalities or angels and the gods themselves to be corporeal, he himself unquestionably believed that there is something simple and incorporeal in them. But to confess the truth, not even this passage in my opinion is free from all exception. For it is manifest from an infinity of passages of Origen and other writers, that in calling any thing ἀσώματος or incorporeal, they merely speak comparatively and in reference to heavier and solid bodies. We have already shown this by the example of Irenæus: and we shall quote in the sequel a passage from Origen himself, from which it is clear and manifest.

[2] Epist. 61, ad Pammachium de Erroribus Johannes Hierosolymitani, tom. 2. opp. p. 115.

[3] Lib. 4. cap. 2.

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bodies, yet they are always in bodies, or clothed with bodies; whereas the Deity is in both senses incorporeal, it having not so much as any corporeal indument. So that there is here no contradiction at all to be found in Origen, he constantly asserting angels to have something incorporeal in them as their superior part, and not in that vulgar sense of a subtle body, but in the philosophic; nevertheless, to have also a corporeal indument or clothing, as their outside or lower part, and in that regard only he calling them corporeal.[4]

It is true indeed, that there were, amongst the ancient fathers, some, who were so far from supposing angels to be altogether incorporeal, that they ran into the other extreme, and concluded them to have nothing at all incorporeal in them, but to be mere bodies.[5] But these either asserted that there was no such thing at all as any incorporeal substance; and that not only angels, and human souls, but also God himself was a body: or at least they concluded that nothing created was incorporeal; and that God, though himself incorporeal, yet could create nothing but bodies. These are here the two extremes; one, that angels have nothing corporeal at all belonging to them; the other, that they are altogether corporeal, or have nothing incorporeal in them: a middle betwixt both which is the Origenic hypothesis, the same with the Pythagoric, that in angels there is a complication of incorporeal and corporeal substance both together, or that they are animals consisting of soul and body. We shall now make it

[4] Huet does not positively deny that Origen assigned a body and soul to angels, but ibid. sect. 6. p. 70. cites some passages of his, from which he candidly confesses it to be deducible that "he was not content with attributing a corporeal nature to angels, but ascribed a soul to them as well." The learned ecclesiastic supposes indeed that this tenet is at variance with Origen's other precepts; but in this, as might easily be shown if necessary, he is undoubtedly mistaken. Huet, let it be observed by the way, was less conversant with the notions and precepts of the ancient philosophers than with other subjects of antiquity: from which it happens that he sometimes attributes opinions both in his Origeniana and Quæstiones Alnetanæ to the early Christians and sages which they themselves would have repudiated. In such subjects it is easy to fall into error: and therefore we ought not hastily to impute it to any one as crime, that he has not clearly understood the full force of a particular phrase or doctrine of antiquity. But to return to Origen. In this dogma, as on many other topics, he is not always sufficiently consistent with himself. There are many passages of his, from which we might infer with Dr. Cudworth, that he held angels to be natures consisting of body and soul. But in others he doubts whether angels have a soul or not. See lib. 2. cap. 8. and Huet, ibid. sect. 6. p. 70. From which it appears that he did not altogether spurn the opinion of those who consider angels to be wholly corporeal. He therefore is to be considered as having doubted and hesitated, to which side he should give the preference: but still there are numerous sayings of his which put it beyond all question that of the two he held the opinion of the contemporary Platonists to be the more probable one, who ascribed a body and soul to demons the same as to men.

[5] See the testimonies of ancient writers collected by Dion. Petavius, Dogm. Theol. tom. 3. lib. 1. de Angelis, cap. 2. p. 3. &c. and Pet. Dan. Huet, Origenian. lib. 2. quæst. 5. sect. 8. p. 71. and Not. ad Origenem. p. 85. Some of these testimonies, however, admit of a sufficiently apt explanation agreeably to the opinion of those who ascribe to angels not only a body but a simple soul also.

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appear, that the greater part of the ancient fathers were for neither of the two forementioned extremes, either that angels were wholly incorporeal, or that they were wholly corporeal; but rather for the middle hypothesis, that they had bodies, and yet were not bodies, but, as other terrestrial animals, spirits or souls, clothed with ethereal or aërial bodies. And that the generality of the ancient and most learned fathers did not conceive angels to be mere unbodied spirits, is unquestionably evident from hence, because they agreed with the Greek philosophers in that conceit, that evil demons, or devils, were therefore delighted with the blood and nidours of sacrifices, as having their more gross, airy, and vaporous bodies nourished and refreshed with those vapours, which they did as it were luxuriate and gluttonize in. For thus does Porphyrius write concerning them, in his book De Abstinentia:[6] Οὗτοι οἱ χαίροντες λοιβῇ τε, κνίσσῃ τε, δι' ὧν αὐτῶν τὸ σωματικὸν[7] καὶ πνευματικὸν παίνεται: ζῇ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀτμοῖς καὶ ἀναθυμιάμασι, "These are they who take pleasure in the incense, fumes, and nidours of sacrifices, wherewith their corporeal and spirituous part is as it were pinguified; for this lives, and is nourished, by vapours and fumigations." And that, before Porphyrius, many other pagan philosophers had been of the same opinion, appeareth from this of Celsus:* Χρὴ γὰρ ἴσως οὐκ ἀπιστεῖν ἀνδράσι σοφοῖς, οἳ δή φασι, διότι τῶν μὲν περιγείων δαιμόνων τὸ πλεῖστον γενέσει συντετηκὸς καὶ προσηλωμένον αἵματι καὶ κνίσσῃ, &c. "We ought to give credit to wise men, who affirm that most of these lower and circumterraneous demons are delighted with geniture, blood, and nidour, and such like things, and much gratified therewith; though they be not able to do any thing more in way of recompense, than sometimes perhaps to cure the body, or to foretel good and evil fortunes to men and cities." Upon which account himself, though a zealous pagan, persuadeth men to moderation in the use of these sacrifices, as principally gratifying the inferior and worser demons only. In like manner Origen† frequently insisteth upon the same thing, he affirming that devils were not only delighted with the idolatry of the Pagans in their sacrifices, but also ἀπὸ τῶν θυσιῶν ἀναθυμιάσεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν αἱμάτων καὶ ὁλοκαυτωμάτων ἀποφοραῖς τρέφεσθαι τὰ σώματα φιληδονούντων τοῖς τοιούτοις, "That their very bodies were nourished by the vapours and fumes arising from them, and that these evil demons therefore did as it were deliciate and Epicurize in them." And before Origen, most of the ancient fathers, as Justin Mar-

[6] Lib. 2. sect. 43. p. 86.

[7] This word is not found in Porphyry, and has been inserted, I suppose, by Dr. Cudworth for the sake of perspicuity. But they who are acquainted with the phraseology of the Platonists, and who know that a subtle and thin body is called by them πνεῦμα and πνευματικὸν, have no need of this explanatory word.

* Origen, lib. 8. [Page 417.] † Contra Celsus, lib. 7. p. 334.

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tyr, Athenagoras, Tatianus, Tertullian, &c. and also many others after him endeavour to disparage those material and bloody sacrifices upon the same account, as things whereby evil demons were principally gratified. We shall only cite one passage to this purpose out of St. Basil,[8] or who ever were the author of that Commentary upon Isaiah, because there is something philosophic in it: *Δαίμοσι διὰ τὸ φιλήδονον καὶ ἐμπαθὲς, αἱ θυσίαι φέρουσί τινα ἡδονὴν καὶ χρείαν ἐκθυμιώμεναι, διὰ τῆς καύσεως ἐξατμιζομένου τοῦ αἵματος, καὶ οὕτω διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης λεπτοποιήσεως, εἰς τὴν σύστασιν αὐτῶν ἀναλαμβανομένου· ὅλοι γὰρ δι' ὅλων τρέφονται τοῖς ἀτμοῖς, οὐ διὰ μασσήσεως καὶ κοιλίας, ἀλλ' ὡς αἱ τρίχες πάντων ζώων καὶ ὄνυχες, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα εἰς ὅλην ἑαυτῶν τὴν οὐσίαν, τὴν τροφὴν καταδέχεται,* "Sacrifices are things of no small pleasure and advantage to demons; because the blood, being evaporated by fire, and so attenuated, is taken into the compages and substances of their bodies: the whole of which is throughout nourished with vapours, not by eating, and stomachs, or suchlike organs, but as the hairs and nails of all animals, and whatsoever other things receive nourishment into their whole substance." And thus do we see it undeniably manifest, that many of the ancient fathers supposed devils to have bodies; neither can it at all be doubted, but that they concluded the same of angels too, these being both of the same kind, and differing but as good and evil men. And though they do not affirm this of good angels, but of devils only, that they were thus delighted and nourished with the fumes and vapours of sacrifices, and that they Epicurized in them; yet was not the reason hereof, because they conceived them to be altogether incorporeal, but to have pure ethereal or heavenly bodies; it being proper to those gross and vaporous bodies of demons only to be nourished and refreshed after that manner. And now, that all these ancient fathers did not suppose either angels or devils to be altogether corporeal, or to have nothing but body in them, may be concluded from hence, because many of them plainly declared the souls of men to be incorporeal; and therefore it cannot be imagined that they should so far degrade angels below men, as not to acknowledge them to have any thing at all incorporeal.[9]

[8] Cap. 1. sect. 25. p. 398. tom. 1. Operum Basilii Magni in Appendice. The recent editor of Basil, Julian Garner, a learned Benedictine monk, in the preface to tom. 1. sect. 10. p. 47. 48. is at much pains to show that this Commentary upon Isaiah is unworthy of St. Basil, and yet p. 43. he does not deny its being the work of some contemporary presbyter. And to me the arguments by which he supports this opinion appear to possess very great weight.

[9] Here also, if I am not mistaken, there are some things which require illustration and if I may be allowed to add, correction.

I. It is a very old opinion of the Greeks and other nations that the immortal gods feed upon the vapours and fumes of victims and sacrifices: on which account it was the custom of those who offered sacrifices to invite the gods to them as to a banquet. See Ælian among others, Variæ Histor. lib. 9. cap. 15. p. 599. They who require

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But we shall now instance in some few, amongst many of these ancients, who plainly asserted both devils and angels to be spirits incorporate, and not to be mere bodies, but only to have bodies; that is, to consist of soul and body, or corporeal and incorporeal substance joined together. That angels themselves

testimonies of the antiquity of this notion, may consult the numerous ones collected by Gisb. Cuper, Observat. lib. 2. cap. 3. p. 76. Ezek. Spanheim in his French Notes ad Juliani Cæsares, p. 256. and dans les Preuves, p. 112. Lud. Kuster, Historia Critica Homeri, sect. 2. sect. 3. p. 16. and Sig. Havercamp, Ad Tertulliani Apologetic. p. 218. Nor, as we may learn from passages of Lucian, St. Chrysostom and many others, had this foolish opinion ceased to exist among nations even after the time of our Saviour. It had its origin, I have no doubt, in the ignorance of those who presided over the public sacrifices and ceremonies; who when persons more curious and inquisitive than others about the reasons of the sacred rites frequently asked them what necessity there was for offering sacrifices to the gods, who lived a happy life and wanted nothing to complete their felicity, could scarcely find any thing else to reply, than that the gods were refreshed, nourished, and strengthened by the blood and vapours of victims. Nor could this answer appear absurd at a time when it was generally supposed that the gods possessed subtle bodies, and fed upon nectar and ambrosia in the heavenly mansions. Hence this opinion spread itself through various nations, and, like many other absurdities, was embellished and propagated by the poets. But the doctrine that, not the gods, but the inferior and worse cast of demons only delighted in this food, is of a much more recent date. Its first foundations I conceive to have been laid by Pythagoras, who as is well known repudiated the immolation of victims, and taught his disciples that bloodless offerings were alone worthy of God. But the junior Platonists, whose custom it was to retain the ancient dogmas, if possible, and to correct and remodel them, if too absurd to be retained, professedly confirmed and established it. For these philosophers, whose notions respecting the Deity were more sound and wise than those of others, easily perceived that so foolish an opinion respecting the gods was not to be entertained, and yet they were unwilling altogether to abandon it on account of its very great antiquity. They therefore reformed and corrected it, substituting malignant or inferior demons in place of the gods. And when the Christian writers, who in the second and third century, defended the truth and excellence of their own religion chiefly against the philosophers, saw that this philosophic opinion was every where received, although the common people still adhered to the ancient doctrine, they did not hesitate to convert it to their use, nay even to adopt it as their own. For the Christians admitted of no sacrifices; and for that reason were held in bad repute among the vulgar. And what, I ask, was better calculated to put an end to the popular odium than their adoption of this dogma publicly propounded by the Platonists that victims were not acceptable to the gods, but to the evil genii alone? If this doctrine had been universally received, it would unquestionably have put an end to all the sacrifices and public religions, the extinction of which was so ardently desired by the Christians. Wherefore it is not at all to be wondered at that it is approved of and inculcated in almost all their Apologies. But the Platonists at last perceived that the doctrine was doing their cause more harm than good: consequently they rejected and repudiated it. See Jamblichus, De Mysteriis Ægypt. sect. 5. cap. 10. p. 125. &c. who in opposition to Porphyry gives a copious refutation of this opinion.

II. The learned Doctor is right in considering it to be manifest from this dogma that the ancient fathers supposed devils to have subtle bodies. But when he wishes it to be understood from the same that they also attributed bodies to good angels, I think he goes farther out of the way than is necessary. For my own part if we could find nothing else in their writings except what is here said of evil demons, from which it could be proved that they regarded good angels also as partakers of body, I should consider myself to have just cause for doubts upon the subject. For I should be afraid lest they might have supposed demons to have had a body assigned them by God merely by way of punishment. It is at least notorious that of the modern Roman Catholic theologians Caietanus and Eugubinus attributed a body to demons but maintained that the angels are destitute of it. There are, however, so many other passages of theirs to be met with from which this is manifest, that there was no necessity for

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have bodies, is every where[10] declared by St. Austin* in his writings; he affirming that the bodies of good men, after the resurrection, shall be qualia sunt angelorum corpora, "such as are the bodies of angels;" and that they shall be corpora angelica, in societate angelorum,† "angelical bodies, fit for society and converse with angels;" and declaring the difference betwixt the bodies of angels and of devils in this manner:[1] Dæmones, antequam transgrederentur, cœlestia corpora gerebant, quæ conversa sint ex pœna in aëream qualitatem, ut jam possint ab igne

the learned Doctor to look about him for a proof. I pass over those that have already been brought forward by Dr. Cudworth himself and others, and shall merely notice one, which is so relevant to the matter in hand, that I am surprised it did not occur to a man so intimately acquainted with the records of the ancients. As the early fathers generally supposed demons to be nourished by certain viands, so some of them believed also that the angels in heaven eat some description of food: to which they referred the saying of David in Psalm lxxviii. 25. wherein he calls manna angels' food. Justin Martyr, Dialog. cum Tryphone, p. 279. opp. Καὶ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, δῆλόν ἐστι ἡμῖν, τρεφόμενοι κἂν μὴ ὁμοίαν τροφὴν ἥπερ οἱ ἄνθρωποι χρώμεθα, τρέφονται: περὶ γὰρ τῆς τροφῆς τοῦ μάννα, ἣν ἐτράφησαν οἱ πατέρες ὑμῶν ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ, ἡ γραφὴ οὕτω λέγει, ὅτι ἄρτον ἀγγέλων ἔφαγον, "In heaven also, as is manifest to us, the angels are nourished, although not with the same food as we men use: for of the food manna, which your fathers did eat in the wilderness, the scripture saith, they did eat angels' food." Of the same opinion are Clemens Alexandr. Pædagogi. lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 122. Tertullian, Adv. Judæos, cap. 3. p. 221. and De Carne Christi, cap. 6. p. 249. and others.

III. I readily admit that many of the ancient fathers, whose writings have come down to us, suppose the angels to be animals consisting of body and soul: but I deny, in the first place, that this opinion was entertained, as the learned Doctor seems to imagine, by all those who affirmed demons to possess bodies requiring some sort of aliment. Tertullian, to say nothing of the rest, unquestionably held the angels to be wholly corporeal; and yet in his Apologeticum and elsewhere he adopts that opinion concerning demons. In the next place, I deny that there is any great force in the argument by which he considers it may be proved that they assigned souls as well as bodies to angels. His reasoning is this: "The fathers held human souls to be incorporeal: therefore they believed genii or angels, which are more excellent than human souls, to be also in themselves incorporeal." But I can see no reason why a man who affirms the human soul to be simple, ought also to decide that angels are in themselves simple and incorporeal. Besides, it must be well known to every one who has paid any attention to ancient authors, that those who call the soul incorporeal, do not at all regard it as a nature altogether simple and distinct from all body. The word *incorporeal* with most of them is used only comparatively, and natures which are said to be incorporeal are called so merely in respect to our body. And as we have before shown, there are not a few among them who suppose the soul to be a thin body, which on account of its subtlety ought to be designated by the name of spirit.

* In Psalm lxxxv.

[10] Some of the passages have already been given on sect. 23. But the learned Doctor here points out two others from the Enarrat. in Psalm lxxxv. sect. 17. p. 686. and in Psalm cxlv. sect. 3. p. 1212. I shall therefore add these to the rest. In the former St. Augustine writes as follows: "Our body certainly possesses life, and yet in comparison with that future body, *such as are the bodies of angels*, the body of man is found to be dead, although yet having life." In the latter he says: "But when our body shall have become such, a celestial and spiritual body, *an angelical body in the society of angels*, not even so will it give counsel to the soul." Add lib. 4. De Genesi ad Literam, cap. 5. p. 124. tom. 3. opp.

† In Psalm clxv.

[1] On this subject the same opinion as St. Augustine's was entertained both by Minucius Felix and Origen, as has already been observed by Pet. Dan. Huet, in his Origeniana, lib. 2. quæst. 5. sect. 7. and 8. p. 71. 72.

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pati,* "That though devils, before the transgression, had celestial bodies, as angels now have, yet might these afterwards, in way of punishment, be changed into aerial ones, and such as now may suffer by fire." Moreover, the same St. Austin somewhere[2] calleth good angels by the name of animæ beatæ atque sanctæ, "happy and holy souls." And though it be true, that in his Retractations† he recalleth and correcteth this, yet was this only a scrupulosity in that pious father concerning the mere word, because he nowhere found in scripture angels called by the name of souls; it being far from his meaning, even there to deny them to be incorporeal spirits joined with bodies. And certainly he, who every where concludes human souls to be incorporeal, cannot be thought to have supposed angels to have nothing at all but body in them. Again, Claudianus Mamertus,[3] writing against

* De Gen. ad Lit. lib. 3. cap. 10. [Sect. 15. p. 114. tom. 3.]

[2] De Musica, lib. 6. cap. 17. sect. 59. p. 401. tom. 1. opp. where he makes use of these words: "The rational and intellectual choirs of happy and holy souls receiving the law of God itself, without which a leaf does not fall from the tree, and in which our hairs are numbered, with no nature intervening, transmit it to the terrestrial and infernal tribunals." This passage, lib. 1. Retractat. (not lib. 2. as here indicated in the margin) cap. 11. p. 13. tom. 1. opp. is thus interpreted and at the same time corrected by St. Augustine: "Whereas I meant to be understood merely of the holy angels, of whom I nowhere recollect to have read in the divine canonical books, as possessing souls." He repeats nearly the same, cap. 16. p. 19. From these words it is evident that Dr. Cudworth is mistaken in saying that St. Augustine does not deny the thing itself, but merely doubts whether he ought to use the word soul when speaking of angels. For he openly declares that he has nowhere read in scripture that *angels have souls:* which at least proves him not to have doubted "whether angels can be called souls, or not," but "whether they have souls or not." His scrupulosity therefore referred to the thing itself, not the word. But in this the learned Doctor followed Dion. Petavius, Dogmat. Theolog. tom. 3. lib. 1. de Angelis. cap. 2. sect. 14. p. 7. who discourses in exactly the same strain. There are, I acknowledge, many passages in St. Augustine, from which we may learn that he supposed souls to be compounded of soul and body. And these led Theophilus Alethinus or J. Le Clerc in his Notes, ad Petavii Dogmata Theol. p. 6. to believe that the holy father, when he denies angels to have souls, meant the vital and sentient souls. But this interpretation is at variance with the very passage which St. Augustine corrects in his Retractations, it being clear from the beginning of this passage that he is speaking of *rational* souls: "The rational and intellectual choirs," says he, "of happy souls." Such being the case, I consider those to take the most correct view, who suppose that St. Augustine, whose frequent self-contradictions are well known, was unable to make up his mind as to the nature of angels, and sometimes inclined to one sometimes to another opinion as the more probable. There are sayings of his to be met with from which it might be inferred that he approved of the opinion of those who held souls to be wholly corporeal: while others again go to show that he regarded them either as pure spirits or as consisting of body and soul. We have already produced a passage from his Epist. 95. p. 197. tom. 2. opp. wherein he leaves the question "whether angels have bodies or not," undecided. And in his books of Retractations, as we have seen, he doubts "whether a soul can be attributed to angels." There is nothing left for us, therefore, but to confess that he arrived at no fixed conclusion respecting angels, but sometimes preferred one and sometimes another opinion, and that in his latter days he was not far removed from those who supposed them to be wholly corporeal.

† Lib. cap. 11.

[3] De Statu Animæ, lib. 3. cap. 7. p. 178. ed Barthii. Where the former passage is not read in the words here given, although the sentiment is the same: "It cannot be denied," says Claudianus, "that the devil also made of the corporeal and incorporeal

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Faustus, who made angels to be mere bodies without souls, or any thing incorporeal, maintaineth, in way of opposition, not that they are mere incorporeal spirits, without bodies (which is the other extreme) but that they consist of corporeal and incorporeal, soul and body joined together; he writing thus of devils, Diabolus ex duplici diversaque substantia constat; et corporeus est et incorporeus, "The devil consisteth of a double and different substance; he is corporeal, and he is also incorporeal. And again of angels,* Patet beatos angelos utriusque substantiæ, et incorporeos esse in ea sui parte, qua ipsis visibilis Deus; et in ea itidem parte corporeos, qua hominibus sunt ipsi visibiles, "It is manifest that the blessed angels are of a two-fold substance; that they are incorporeal in that part of theirs, wherein God is visible to them, and again corporeal, in that other part, wherein themselves are visible to men." Moreover, Fulgentius writeth concerning angels in this manner:† Planè ex duplici eos esse substantia asserunt magni et docti viri. Id est, ex spiritu incorporeo, quo à Dei contemplatione nunquam recedunt; et ex corpore, per quod ex tempore hominibus apparent. Corpora vero ætherea, id est, ignea, eos dicunt habere; dæmones vero corpus aëreum, "Great and learned men affirm angels to consist of a double substance; that is, of a spirit incorporeal, whereby they contemplate God; and of a body whereby they are sometimes visible to men: as also, that they have ethereal or fiery bodies, but devils aerial." And perhaps this might be the meaning of Joannes Thessalonicensis, in that dialogue of his, read and approved of in the seventh council, and therefore the meaning of that council itself too, when it thus declared: Νοεροὺς μὲν αὐτοὺς ἡ καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία γινώσκει, οὐ μὴν ἀσωμάτους πάντη καὶ ἀοράτους, λεπτοσωμάτους δὲ, καὶ ἀερώδεις, ἢ πυρώδεις, &c., "That the catholic church acknowledges angels to be intellectual, but not altogether incorporeal and invisible; but to have certain subtle bodies, either aiery or fiery." For it being there only denied that they were altogether incorporeal, one would think the meaning should not be, that they were altogether corporeal; nor indeed could such an opinion be fastened upon the catholic church; but that they were partly incorporeal, and partly corporeal; this being also sufficient in order to that design, which was driven at in that council.[4] How-

———is of a twofold substance." We there meet with many other sayings to the same purport, but they rest on very weak and slender foundations.

* Lib. 3. † Lib. 3. De Trin. [P. 119. opp. Edit. Sirmondi.]

[4] The words here quoted are not the decree of the whole of the seventh, or second Nicene, council, but taken from the disputation of Joannes Thessalonicensis, which was publicly read therein, act. 5. see J. Harduinus, Concilior. tom. 4. p. 293. Nevertheless, the entire council seems to have approved of this opinion, because, on Joannes' book being read, they found nothing in it deserving of reprehension. At any rate, the patriarch Tarasius attaches much importance to the authority of Johannes,

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ever Psellus,[5] who was a curious inquirer into the nature of spirits, declares it not only as his own opinion, but also as agreeable to the sense of the ancient fathers, ὡς οὐκ ἀσώματον τὸ δαιμόνιόν ἐστι φῦλον, μετὰ σώματος δέ γε, "that the demoniac or angelic kind of beings is not altogether incorporeal, or bodiless, but that they are conjoined with bodies, or have cognate bodies belonging to them." Who there also further declares the difference betwixt the bodies of good angels and of evil demons, after this manner:* Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀγγελικὸν, αὐγάς τινας ἐξανίσχον ξένας, τοῖς ἐκτὸς ὀφθαλμοις ἐστὶν ἀφόρητόν τε καὶ ἀνυπόστατον· τὸ δαιμόνιον δὲ, εἰ μὲν τοιοῦτον δῆποτε ἦν, οὐκ οἶδα εἰπεῖν, ἔοικεν δ' οὖν, ἐωσφόρον Ἡσαίου τὸν ἐκπεσόντα κατονομάζοντος· νῦν δὲ ἀλλὰ ζοφῶδες οἷον καὶ ἀμαυρόν ἐστι, καὶ τοῖς ὄμμασι λυπηρὸν, γυμνωθὲν τοῦ συζύγου φωτός· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀγγελικὸν παντάπασιν ἐστὶν ἄϋλον· διὸ καὶ διὰ πάντα ἐστὶ στερεοῦ διαδύνον καὶ διϊὸν, καὶ τῆς ἡλιακῆς ἀκτῖνος ὂν ἀπαθέστερον· τὴν μὲν γὰρ διὰ σωμάτων διαφανῶν ἰοῦσαν, ἀποστέγει τὰ γεώδη καὶ ἀλαμπῆ ὡς καὶ κλᾶσιν ὑπομένειν, ἅτε δὴ ἔνυλον ἔχουσαν· τῷ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ πρόσαντες, οἷα μηδεμίαν ἔχοντι πρὸς μηδὲν ἀντίθεσιν· τὰ δὲ δαιμόνια σώματα, κἂν ὑπὸ λεπτότητος ἀφανῆ καθέστηκεν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἔνυλά πη, καὶ ἐμπαθῆ, καὶ μάλισθ' ὅσα τοὺς ὑπὸ γῆν ὑποδέδυκε τόπους· ταῦτα γὰρ τοσαύτην ἔχει τὴν σύστασιν, ὡς καὶ ἀφαῖς ὑποπίπτειν, καὶ πληττόμενα ὀδυνᾶσθαι, καὶ πυρὶ προσομιλήσαντα καίεσθαι, "The angelical body sending forth rays and splendours,

and affirms it to be manifest from him, "that it is proper to paint angels, since they are circumscribed, and have appeared to many in the form of men:" and this opinion of Tarasius, the whole council adopts as its own, exclaiming, ναὶ δέσποτα, "even so, master." But this is difficult of digestion to the Roman Catholic theologians; who, at this day, holding the angels to be mere spirits, and therefore abandoning the opinions of the ancient doctors, and yet considering the decrees of the general councils as sacred and inviolable, have recourse to all sorts of expedients, and put various interpretations upon the words of the council, in order that it may not appear to be at variance with the modern doctrines of their church. I shall not touch upon all their subtleties, most of which carry with them their own refutation: but shall merely notice the opinion of Dion. Petaivus, who seems to have struck out a better path than the others. He supposes, Dogmat. Theol. tom. 3. lib. 1. cap. 2. sect. 7. p. 5. that Tarasius and the council do not follow and commend the whole of Joannes' doctrine, but adopt out of his book merely this one thing: "that angels are circumscribed, and have appeared in the human form, and therefore may be painted:" consequently that those who ascribe bodies to angels cannot rely upon the authority of this council. Ingenious enough certainly: but even this does not in my opinion get rid of the whole difficulty in which those are involved who patronize the councils, and at the same time deny bodies to angels. For the fact of the council acknowledging angels to be περίγραπτοι, "circumscribed in place," clearly shows that it did not hold them to be mere spirits, according to the present papal doctrine. It ought to be observed also that no part of Joannes' opinion is rejected by the fathers, which silence of theirs must be admitted to be no contemptible argument for supposing that they held the whole of his doctrine concerning angels to be sound and probable. For my part, I think Dr. Cudworth has given a true exposition of the opinion of the council. Let the catholic theologians consider whether they had better retain the dogma professed by them at the present day, or obey the authority of the council by abandoning it.

[5] Dialog. de Operationibus Dæmonum, p. 41.

* P. 33. [P. 48.]

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such as would dazzle mortal eyes, and cannot be borne by them; but the demoniac body, though it seemeth to have been once such also, (from Isaias' calling him, that fell from heaven, Lucifer) yet is it now dark and obscure, foul and squalid, and grievous to behold, it being deprived of its cognate light and beauty. Again, the angelical body is so devoid of gross matter, that it can pass through any solid thing, it being indeed more impassable than the sun-beams; for though these can permeate pellucid bodies, yet are they hindered by earthy and opaque, and refracted by them: whereas the angelical body is such, as that there is nothing so imporous or solid that can resist or exclude it. But the demoniac bodies, though, by reason of their tenuity, they commonly escape our sight, yet have they notwithstanding gross matter in them, and are patible, especially those of them which inhabit the subterraneous places; for these are of so gross a consistency and solidity, as that they sometimes fall also under touch, and being strucken, have a sense of pain, and are capable of being burnt with fire." To which purpose, the Thracian there addeth more afterwards from the information of Marcus the monk, a person formerly initiated in the diabolical mysteries, and of great curiosity:* Τὸ δαιμόνιον ἄρα πνεῦμα διόλου ὂν κατὰ φύσιν αἰσθητικὸν κατὰ πᾶν ἑαυτοῦ μέρος, ἀμέσως ὁρᾷ τε καὶ ἀκούει, καὶ τὰ τῆς ἁφῆς ὑπομένει πάθη, διαιρούμενον ὀδυνᾶται κατὰ τῶν σωμάτων τὰ στερεά· ταύτῃ τούτων διενεγκὸν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῶν διαιρεθέντων, μόλις ἢ οὐδαμῶς οὐλοῦται· τὸ δὲ διαιρούμενον εὐθὺς συμφύεται, καθάπερ ἀέρος ἢ καὶ ὕδατος μόρια μεταξύ τινος ἐμπίπτοντα στερεοῦ· ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ θᾶττον ἢ λόγος τουτὶ τὸ πνεῦμα συμφύεται, πλὴν ἀνιᾶται κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ γίνεσθαι τὴν διαίρεσιν, "The demoniac spirit or subtle body, being in every part of it capable of sense, does immediately see and hear, and is also obnoxious to the affections of touch; insomuch that being suddenly divided or cut in two, it hath a sense of pain, as the solid bodies of other animals have; it differing from them only in this, that those other bodies being once discontinued, are not easily consolidated together again; whereas the demoniac body, being divided, is quickly redintegrated by coalescence, as air or water: nevertheless, it is not without a sense of pain at that time, when it is thus divided," &c. Moreover, the same Marcus affirmeth the bodies of these demons to be nourished also, though in a different manner from ours: Τρέφονται οἱ μὲν δι' εἰσπνοῆς, ὡς τὸ ἐν ἀρτηρίαις καὶ ἐν νεύροις πνεῦμα· οἱ δὲ δι' ὑγρότητος ἀλλ' οὐ στόματι καθ' ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ σπόγγοι καὶ ὀστρακόδερμα, σπῶντες μὲν τῆς παρακειμένης ὑγρότητος ἔξωθεν, "There are some of them nourished by inspiration, as the spirit contained in the nerves and arteries; others by sucking in the adjacent.

* P. 94. [P. 142.]

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moisture, not as we do, by mouths, but as sponges and testaceous fishes." And now we may venture to conclude, that this opinion of angels being not mere abstract incorporeal substances, and unbodied minds, but consisting of something incorporeal, and something corporeal, that is, of soul or spirit, and body joined together, is not only more agreeable to reason, but hath also had more suffrages amongst the ancient fathers, and those of greater weight too, than either of those two other extremes, viz., That angels are mere bodies, and have nothing at all incorporeal in them; or else, that they are altogether incorporeal, without any bodily indument or clothing.[6]

Notwithstanding which, this latter opinion hath indeed prevailed most in these latter ages; time being rightly compared to a river, which quickly sinks the more weighty and solid things, and bears up only the lighter and more superficial. Though there may be other reasons given for this also; as partly because the Aristotelic philosophy, when generally introduced into Christianity, brought in its abstract intelligencies along with it; and partly because some spurious Platonists, talking so much of their Henades and Noes, their simple monads and immoveable unbodied minds, as the chief of their generated and created gods; probably some Christians might have a mind to vie their angels with them: and lastly, because

[6] I have read and carefully weighed all the arguments hitherto brought forward by the learned Doctor in confirmation of the opinion, that angels are animals compounded of body and soul; and yet I cannot bring myself to believe that it is more consistent with reason, and fortified by stronger authorities than the opposite one which entirely divests them of body. Should any one think proper to call this obstinacy and stupidity in me, I must bear with the imputation; but I shall do so the more easily from the consciousness that I have spared no pains in order to get the better of this affection of the mind, which he chooses to designate by so harsh a name. The arguments borrowed from reason and philosophy in support of this doctrine of the bodies of angels, we have already examined in the preceding. I shall now say a few words upon the authorities of the ancients. Great is my reverence for the names of those who lived in the first ages of the rising church, and strengthened the Christian cause by their talents and virtues; and yet if they advance any thing which is neither supported by the open testimony of scripture, nor by perspicuous arguments, I consider we ought not to put faith in them. If the question is to rest upon authorities, the greater number, if I mistake not, will be found to be on the side of those who suppose angels to be nothing but mere bodies or corporeal spirits: nor will the learned Doctor easily persuade any one conversant with the records of the first four centuries, that the majority of the ancient fathers believed them to be natures partaking both of body and soul. Psellus, if I possess the faculty of judging, ought not to have been included in the number of those to whose dignity and excellence we are to pay any regard or reverence. For the account he gives of demons and their nature, besides being incredible in itself, and amply refuted by the observations of later writers, rests chiefly upon the faith of a monk: and every sensible man is aware how much credit ought to be attached to this class. I grant that Psellus, or the Thracian and the monk Marcus, whose opinions he recites, might be taken as fair evidence of the opinions prevailing at their own time among the Syrians, Chaldeans, and other oriental nations, in regard to genii and demons: and in this respect I consider his book to be highly useful: but when the question is, not what was believed in former ages, but what we ought to believe, I require more grave and weighty authorities than Psellus.

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angels are not only called in scripture *spirits*, but also by several of the ancients said to be incorporeal; whilst this, in the mean time, was meant only either in respect of that incorporeal part, soul or mind, which they supposed to be in them, or else of the tenuity and subtlety of their bodies or vehicles. For this account does Psellus give hereof:* Καὶ τοῖς ἡμετέροις καὶ τοῖς θύραθεν, εἰωθός ἐστι, τὰ παχύτερα τῶν σωμάτων σωματώδη λέγειν· ὃ δὲ λεπτομερές ἐστι καὶ τὴν ὄψιν διαφυγάνον καὶ τὴν ἁφὴν ἀσώματον, οὐ μόνον οἱ καθ' ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀξιοῦσι λέγειν, "It is usual both with Christian writers, and Pagans too, to call the grosser bodies corporeal, and those which by reason of their subtlety, avoid both our sight and touch, incorporeal." And before Psellus, Joannes Thessalonicensis, in his dialogue, approved in the seventh Council:† Εἰ δέ που εὕροις ἀσωμάτους καλουμένους τοὺς ἀγγέλους, ἢ δαίμονας, ἢ ψυχὰς, ὡς μὴ ὄντας ἐκ συμπλοκῆς τῶν ὑλικῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων, καὶ τοιαῦτα σώματα παχέα καὶ ἀντίτυπα, οἷα ἡμεῖς περικείμεθα, οὕτως αὐτοὺς προσηγόρευσαν, "If you find angels, or demons, or separate souls called sometimes incorporeal, you must understand this in respect of the tenuity of their bodies only; as not consisting of the grosser elements, nor being so solid and antitypous as those which we are now imprisoned in." And before them both, Origen, in the proeme of his Peri Archon, where, citing a passage out of an ancient book, intituled, "The doctrine of Peter," wherein our Saviour Christ is said to have told his disciples, that he was not δαιμόνιον ἀσώματον, an "incorporeal demon," though rejecting the authority of that book, he thus interprets those words: Non idem sensus ex isto sermone ἀσωμάτου indicatur, qui Græcis vel Gentilibus auctoribus ostenditur, quum de incorporeâ naturâ à philosophis disputatur. In hoc enim libello, incorporeum dæmonium dixit, pro eo, quod ipse ille, quicunque est, habitus vel circumscriptio dæmonici corporis, non est similis huic nostro crassiori, vel visibili corpori; sed secundum sensum ejus, qui composuit illam Scripturam, intelligendum est, quod dixit; non esse tale corpus, quale habent dæmones, quod est naturaliter subtile, et velut aura tenue; et propter hoc vel imputatur à multis, vel dicitur incorporeum; sed habere se corpus solidum et palpabile, "The word ἀσώματον, or incorporeal, is not to be taken here in that sense wherein it is used by the Greek and Gentile writers, when they philosophized concerning the incorporeal nature. But a demon is here said to be incorporeal, because of the disposition of the demoniac body, not like to this gross and visible body of ours.

* P. 30. 33. [P. 47.]

† In Actis Concilii 7. Œcum. seu Nicæni 2. Actione 5. p. 293. tom. 4. Concilior. Jo. Harduini.

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So that the sense is, as if Christ should have said, I have not such a body as the demons have, which is naturally subtle, thin, and soft as the air, and therefore is either supposed to be by many, or at least called incorporeal; but the body, which I now have, is solid and palpable." Where we see plainly, that angels, though supposed to have bodies, may, notwithstanding, be called incorporeal, by reason of the tenuity and subtility of those bodies, comparatively with the grossness and solidity of these our terrestrial bodies. But that indeed which now most of all inclineth some to this persuasion, that angels have nothing at all corporeal hanging about them, is a religious regard to the authority of the third Lateran council having passed its approbation upon this doctrine; as if the seventh Œcumenical (so called) or second Nicene, wherein the contrary was before owned and allowed, were not of equal force, at least to counterbalance the other.[8]

[8] It is scarcely necessary to observe, that what the learned Doctor here advances respecting the causes why the ancient doctrine of the bodies of angels was discarded, and its place supplied by the opinion of those who held them to be divested of all body, is not all equally sound and well founded, but that some portion of it is to be regarded as little better than ingenious conjecture.

I. That the philosophy of Aristotle, after its introduction into Christianity, contributed to the overthrow of the ancient dogma of the corporeity of angels I can easily believe: but I should not be so ready to admit that the whole of the opposite doctrine was framed in imitation of his intelligences.

II. Much less can I agree in what Dr. Cudworth subjoins of the subtle follies of certain Platonists being emulated by the Christians. For at the period when the modern doctrine concerning angels was most prevalent, the commentaries of the Platonists were no longer read in the western regions, nor did the general ignorance of the Greek language admit of their being read by many. At that time, the less enlightened and informed derived their information almost exclusively from the translations of Greek writers. But of Proclus, to whom the *νόες* and *ἕναδες* chiefly owed their origin, there was formerly no Latin version extant.

III. What afterwards follows respecting the signification of the words *σώματος*, *ἀσώματος*, "corporeal" and "incorporeal," in the ancient Christian writers, is most true, and may be proved by many other testimonies from their works. Indeed, whoever neglects this observation, will egregiously fail in his interpretation of the fathers, and will sometimes suppose them to contradict themselves, when their doctrine is perfectly consistent. The learned Doctor himself, as we have seen above, did not always guard himself against error, nor sufficiently keep in view this meaning which is so frequently attached to the word incorporeal. But granting that some persons put a wrong interpretation upon those passages of the fathers in which angels are called incorporeal, still I should consider this error to have operated to the confirmation rather than to the first concoction of this doctrine of their incorporeity.

IV. The whole of the Catholic theologians, when they deny that bodies are to be attributed to angels, appeal to the decree of the Lateran council, which condemned this opinion. But many of them are very inaccurate, when they do so; some quote the Lateran council generally, although it is notorious that there are many councils of this name: others add the number, but the wrong one. This law was passed in the Lateran Council, which is the fourth of the Œcumenical councils convened in the Lateran palace, and was held by Pope Innocent III. in the year 1215. The words of this law in Joh. Harduinus, Concilior. tom. 7. cap. 1. Decretor. p. 15. 16. run as follows: "The Creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal, who by his own omnipotent power from the very beginning of time created both natures out of nothing, the spiritual and corporeal, that is, the angelical and mundane: and afterwards the human, as a common nature consisting of spirit and body." The mode in which

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But though this doctrine of angels, or all created understanding beings superior to men, having a corporeal indument or clothing, does so exactly agree with the old Pythagoric cabala; yet have we reason to think, that it was not therefore merely borrowed or derived from thence by the ancient fathers; but that they were led into it by the scripture itself. For first, the historic phenomena of angels in the scripture are such as cannot well be otherwise solved, than by supposing them to have bodies; and then not to lay any stress upon those words of the Psalmist,[9] "who maketh his angels spirits, and ministers a flame of fire," (though, with good reason, by the ancient fathers interpreted in this sense) because they may possibly be understood otherwise, as sometimes they are by rabbinical commentators; nor to insist upon those passages of St. Paul,[10] where he speaks of the tongues of angels, and of the voice of an archangel, and such like; there are several other places in scripture which seem plainly to confirm this opinion. As first, that of our Saviour before mentioned to this purpose, Luke xx. 35, "They who shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage, neither can they die any more; for they are equal unto the angels." For were angels utterly devoid of all bodies, then would the souls of good men, in a state of separation, and without any resurrection, be rather equal to angels, than after a resurrection of their bodies. Wherefore the natural meaning of these words seem to be this, (as St. Austin hath interpreted them) that the souls of good men, after the resurrection, shall

the popish theologians prove from this decree that the church rejected the doctrine which ascribes bodies to angels, will be apparent from the words of Dion. Petavius, Dogmat. Theol. tom. 3. lib. 1. de Angelis, cap. 3. sect. 9. p. 10. where he says: "As it opposes the spiritual to the corporeal, and holds it to be of the same nature as the soul of man, it is manifest that angels are neither bodies nor enveloped in bodies." When these learned doctors insist that this law proscribed the opinion which maintained the corporeity of angels, for my own part I am quite ready to admit it; but still I think those who choose to take a different view will not be unprepared with an answer. For setting aside that in the Romish church itself there are not wanting those who hold this council in no very high estimation, and consider that nothing was decreed in it, and that the laws usually attributed to it were written by Innocent alone, on which, consult Natalis Alexander, Selecta Histor. Eccles. Capita. sæc. 13. diss. 1. artic. 2. p. 325. &c.; the force of this law will be much weakened, if it be contended that the words *spiritual* and *corporeal* are used in it in the sense of the holy fathers. I have already more than once intimated that in the fathers *spiritual* means that which consists of a most subtle matter; *corporeal*, that which is allied and similar to these grosser bodies of ours; and lastly, *spirit*, a nature not indeed solid, but still not entirely destitute of all matter. Transfer these notions to the Lateran law, and you will give the Roman Catholic, who scarcely knows of any thing more sacred than the name of the fathers, much more trouble than he will be able to get over. My opinion is that the cause of those who hold the angels to be mere spirits derives very little support from this decree: and that it is better sustained by the authority of St. Thomas, who, Summæ par. 1. quæst. 51. n. 1. denies bodies to angels.

[9] Psalm civ. 4. [10] 1 Cor. xiii. 1. 1 Thess. iv. 16.

* De Gen. ad Lit. lib. 3.

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have corpora angelica, "angelical bodies," and qualia sunt angelorum corpora, "such bodies as those of angels are." Wherein it is supposed that angels also have bodies, but of a very different kind from those of ours here.[1] Again, that of St. Jude, where he writeth thus of the devils: "the angels, which kept not their first estate (or rather, according to the vulgar Latin, suum principatum, 'their own principality,') but left their proper habitation (or dwelling-house) hath he reserved in everlasting chains, under darkness, unto the judgment of the great day." In which words it is first implied, that the devils were created by God pure, as well as the other angels, but that they kept not *τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀρχὴν*, their "own principality," that is, their lordly power and dominion over their worser and inferior part, they having also a certain duplicity in their nature, of a better and worser principle, of a superior part, which ought to rule and govern, and of an inferior, which ought to be governed: nor is it indeed otherwise easily conceivable how they should be capable of sinning. And this inferior part in angels seems to have a respect to something that is corporeal or bodily in them also, as well as it hath in men. But then in the next place, St. Jude addeth, as the immediate result and natural consequence of these angels sinning, that they thereby left or lost, *τὸ ἴδιον οἰκητήριον*, suum proprium domicilium; that is, not only "their dwelling-place" at large, those ethereal countries, and heavenly regions above, but also their proper dwelling-house, or immediate mansion; to wit, their heavenly body. Forasmuch as that heavenly body, which good men expect after

[1] The learned Doctor is right in not insisting upon the passages Psalm civ. 4. 1 Cor. xiii. 1. 1 Thess. iv. 16. in this question, and in acknowledging that they admit of a different exposition from the one given both by the ancient fathers and some modern writers, who fancy they clearly establish the corporeity of angels. Indeed, I am surprised that those who attribute such great force to these passages, do not avail themselves of that saying of our Saviour, wherein he declares that trumpets will be sounded at the last day, Matt. xxiv. 31. compare 1 Cor. xv. 52. and 1 Thess. iv. 16. For who can sound a trumpet without possessing a body, mouth, and lungs? But dismissing these passages upon which Dr. Cudworth himself does not think proper to lay any stress, let us speak only of those which he regards as affording unquestionable evidence that angels have bodies. Of these, the first is that celebrated saying of our Saviour, Luke xx. 35. wherein he tells us that those who shall be accounted worthy to obtain the resurrection from the dead, will be like the angels. I have already over and over again discussed the meaning of this saying, and therefore shall at present but briefly touch upon it. Christ it is evident does not say that the men who rise again will altogether resemble the angels, but only in a certain respect. After showing that there will be no marriages in heaven, and assigning as the reason of this that death will no longer prevail over them, he subjoins these words: *ἰσάγγελοι γάρ εἰσι*, "for they are equal unto the angels." Now, who does not perceive from these words that our Saviour compares the holy men who shall rise again from the dead with the angels, in respect only of immortality, and of the things which necessarily result from immortality? Those therefore either of the ancients or moderns who conclude from this passage that the bodies of good men after the resurrection will be the same as those of angels, carry this comparison beyond its proper limit: a course which is always erroneous, and in expositions of the divine oracles more especially baneful and mischievous.

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the resurrection, is thus called by St. Paul,[2] τὸ οἰκητήριον ἡμῶν τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, "Our habitation or dwelling house that is from heaven." The heavenly body is the proper house or dwelling, clothing or indument, both of angelical and human souls; and this is that which makes them fit inhabitants for the heavenly regions. This, I say, was the natural consequence of these angels sinning, their leaving, or losing their pure and heavenly body, which became thereupon forthwith obscured and incrassated; the bodies of spirits incorporate always bearing a correspondent purity or impurity to the different disposition of their mind or soul. But then again, in the last place, that which was thus in part the natural result of their sin, was also, by the just judgment of God, converted into their punishment; for their ethereal bodies being thus changed into gross, aerial, feculent and vaporous ones, themselves were immediately hereupon, as St. Peter in the parallel passage expresseth it,[3] ταρταρωθέντες, "cast down into Tartarus," and there imprisoned or "reserved in chains under darkness, until the judgment of the great day." Where it is observable, that the word ταρταροῦν, used by St. Peter, is the very same that Apollodorus and other Greek writers frequently make use of in a like case, when they speak of the Titans being cast down from heaven; which seems to have been really nothing else but this fall of angels poetically mythologized. And by Tartarus here, in all probability, is meant this lower caliginous air, or atmosphere of the earth, according to that of St. Austin,* concerning these angels: Post peccatum in hanc sunt detrusi caliginem, ubi tamen et aër, "That after their sin, they were thrust down into the misty darkness of this lower air." And here are they, as it were chained and fettered also by that same weight of their gross and heavy bodies, which first sunk them down hither; this not suffering them to reascend up, or return back to those bright ethereal regions above. And being thus for the present imprisoned in this lower Tartarus, or caliginous air or atmosphere, they are indeed here kept and reserved in custody, unto the judgment of the great day, and general assizes; however they may, notwithstanding, in the mean time seem to domineer and lord it for a while here.[4] And, lastly, our Saviour's, "Go ye

[2] 2 Cor. vi. 1. [3] 2 Pet. ii. 4.

* De Gen. ad Lit. lib. 3. cap. 10. [Page 114. tom. 3. opp.]

[4] This is a novel and altogether singular exposition of the passage of St. Jude ver. 6, but one of which it will be easy for us to prove the fallacy. Before doing which,

I. I consider it worth while to observe that this saying, as must be admitted even by those who may agree with Dr. Cudworth, is involved in very great obscurity, not indeed as regards the meaning, which is sufficiently clear, but in respect to the words and phrases in which it is expressed, and consequently that it can be variously expounded. Wherefore, if this explication were even such as altogether to defy refutation, still it would not assist those who attribute bodies to angels. For all rational men are agreed

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cursed into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels," seems to be a clear confirmation of devils being bodied; because, first, to allegorize this fire into nothing but remorse of conscience,

that no doctrine can be satisfactorily proved from obscure passages, admitting of different interpretations; unless there be other clear and evident sayings in which it is contained and inculcated.

II. The passage itself consists of two parts, in one of which is described the offence committed by the devils against God, and in the other the punishment inflicted upon them for this offence. The crime itself is comprised by the divine writer in these words: Ἀγγέλους τε τοὺς μὴ τηρήσαντας τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ ἀπολιπόντας τὸ ἴδιον οἰκητήριον, "The angels, which kept not their first estate, or their own principality, but left their own habitation." The rest declare their punishment. There are some interpreters, I am aware, who consider the words ἀπολιπόντας τὸ ἴδιον οἰκητήριον ought to be referred not to the sin but to the punishment of the wicked angels; and Dr. Cudworth seems here to accord with them for the sake of more easily defending the opinion he has adopted. But the word ἀλλὰ manifestly makes against this opinion, as it shows that the divine writer is proceeding in the explanation of one and the same thing, and that the words which follow are opposed to those which he had said before, or that the same thing is stated by him for the sake of perspicuity in a twofold manner, first *positively* or *affirmatively*, as they say, and afterwards *negatively*. Besides, it is evident that the word ἀπολιπόντας denotes some action of the wicked angels, and not of God himself. But the punishment with which they are visited after the commission of the crime is the act of God and not of the delinquent angels. Others suppose these words to pertain both to the crime and punishment; with whom, if they mean merely that punishment was the natural result of this abandonment of their dwelling-place, I am not disposed to enter into any contention; but if they more than this, they may easily be refuted by the same argument as the others. No one, I imagine, who attentively examines the words themselves, will hesitate to agree with me in my opinion. But as regards the meaning itself of this former member of the sentence, it is easier to show Dr. Cudworth's interpretation to be wrong than to demonstrate the true signification of Jude's words. The learned Doctor considers the phrase μὴ τηρεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν to mean, "Not to keep their lordly power and dominion over the worse and inferior part of the mind, in which the appetites reside, but to obey the turbulent passions." For he supposes the soul of angels, like that of men, to consist of two parts, one rational, the other the seat of the passions and allied and contiguous to a certain body; which precept concerning the soul, as every body knows, belongs to the discipline of the Platonists. But to say nothing of this doctrine of the souls of angels, which most men will consider Dr. Cudworth to have been more bold than he ought in assuming, who does not see that this interpretation is too subtle and far-fetched, and therefore altogether repugnant to the simplicity of St. Jude's discourse. Nor has he either produced or been able to produce a single passage from sacred or profane records in which this phrase, put absolutely, signifies, "to abandon the dominion over the desires and affections of the mind." Any person abounding in ingenuity, and willing to give play to it in expounding the sayings of sacred writ, will, with very little trouble, find whatever he pleases in them; but reason forbids that we should attach to the words of the divine writers a sense foreign to their common and received meanings, unless we are supported by usage and the examples of approved authors. Still less admissible is his explication of the following words, wherein he makes οἰκητήριον signify the *celestial body* of angels; so as to give this sense, "The angels lost or rather corrupted their ethereal body by crime. The learned Doctor does not prove that οἰκητήριον ἴδιον is any where used of such a celestial body. For the passage quoted by him from St. Paul, who, 2 Cor. v. 2. calls the body which the saints expect τὸ οἰκητήριον ἡμῶν τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, "our house which is from heaven," is entirely foreign to the purpose. There is a great difference between τὸ ἴδιον οἰκητήριον and τό οἰκητήριον τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ. And who, I should like to know, will tolerate this argumentation: "St. Paul calls the body which will be restored to the saints after the resurrection a *celestial habitation*; therefore the proper habitation of angels spoken of by St. Jude is their natural body in which they are always clothed." I am aware that our body is sometimes figuratively denominated our house, or our soul's house, but it would be wrong to conclude from hence that whenever the word οἰκητήριον, or house, is figu-

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would endanger the rendering of other points of our religion uncertain also; but to say, that incorporeal substances, ununited to bodies, can be tormented with fire, is, as much as in us lieth,

ratively attributed to any one, it signifies his body. Again, the word *ἀπολείπω*, which St. Jude makes use of, is opposed to this opinion. The common meaning of this word is "to abandon," or "leave a thing, to lay it aside," or "put it away" But according to Dr. Cudworth, the celestial body which the devils have by nature was not cast off by them after their transgression, but was merely polluted and contaminated by various impurities, or merely lost its lightness and splendour. How, therefore, could the divine writer affirm that the wicked angels left or abandoned this body? Lastly, this loss of the celestial habitation which the angels underwent when they sinned, is regarded by Dr. Cudworth as a punishment inflicted by God. But we have already shown that the words of St. Jude in question are not speaking of what God did, but what the angels committed. Although if the passage were even understood in Dr. Cudworth's sense, this loss would not properly be a punishment. A punishment, strictly speaking, is an evil inflicted by one having the right of dominion upon another who has disobeyed his laws. But this corruption or dereliction of the celestial body would not be a punishment inflicted by divine omnipotence upon the angels for their transgression, but a calamity naturally resulting from it. For the learned Doctor supposes, with the Platonists, that the body is affected in the same way as the soul which resides in it. Consequently, when the souls of the angels were viciously inclined, and no longer controlled their desires, the necessary result was that their body was corrupted, and instead of light and ethereal became solid, heavy and incrassated; and this change having taken place, they naturally fell from the supreme and happy regions of heaven into the lower air, and their fixed there perpetual abode. According to this, therefore, it was not divine justice that punished the transgression of the angels, but they brought the entire evil upon themselves, contrary to God's will, as drunken and libidinous men are wont to bring various diseases upon themselves by their vices. Let all candid and liberal judges say whether this opinion is in accordance with the words of St. Jude, who propounds this example of the angels for the purpose of showing the severity of the Supreme and the rigour of avenging justice.

III. For my part, I am satisfied that St. Jude's words are less obscure and abstruse than many suppose; and although I do not wish to obtrude my opinion upon any one as unquestionably true, still I doubt not but that it will recommend itself to many persons by its simplicity. I have already observed above, that the sacred writer, in speaking of the angels' transgression, describes one and the same thing in a twofold manner; from which it follows that these two phrases, "not to keep their principality," and "to leave their proper habitation," correspond to each other, and are nearly equivalent in meaning. That *μὴ τηρεῖν* and *ἀπολιπεῖν* do not differ in signification will, I imagine, be admitted by every one; it remains therefore for us to inquire respecting the words *ἀρχὴ* and *οἰκητήριον*. The meaning of *ἀρχὴ* in this passage I consider to be *office, dignity*. The word often occurs in this sense in the Septuagint version, which I have long considered to be of more use towards a right understanding of the books of the Old and New Testaments than almost all the Greek writers put together. To give one example, we find in it the following words respecting Pharaoh's butler, who was restored to his former office, Gen. xl. 21.: *Καὶ ἀποκατέστησε αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ*, which ought to be translated thus: "And restored him to his former office or dignity." The same I consider to be the meaning of the word *οἰκητήριον* in this passage. For as the Latins put *locus, statio*, and *provincia* for the office and dignity held by any one, so *οἰκητήριον* in my opinion here figuratively denotes the same thing. I cannot indeed at present recollect a passage of a Greek writer where the noun *οἰκία* or *οἰκητήριον* is employed in this sense, nor have I leisure sufficient to seek for passages of the kind, but as the meaning is neither altogether unusual nor absurd in itself, and as it moreover accords sufficiently well with the subject, I do not hesitate to consider this as a probable interpretation, leaving to others, however, the full liberty of thinking otherwise if they like. Wherefore, I hold this to be the plain and simple sense of St. Jude's words: "The angels did not keep the office and dignity in which they had been placed by God, but coveting greater and more important offices they rashly abandoned the station assigned to them." Should any one, however, prefer understanding the word *οἰκητήριον* in a proper sense and of a certain

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to expose Christianity and the Scripture, to the scorn and contempt of all philosophers and philosophic wits. Wherefore Psellus lays no small stress upon this place:* Εἰμὶ μὲν παρὰ τῶν

place and abode which the wicked angels abandoned, I have no great objections to offer, as it will not materially interfere with the interpretation I have put upon the passage. For those who preside over a certain office or department are also usually assigned a certain abode and habitation.

IV. Of the succeeding words wherein the punishment of the wicked angels is described, these only: δεσμοῖς ἀϊδίοις ὑπὸ ζόφου τετήρηκεν, require explanation. Dr. Cudworth suppose them to contain this meaning: "The devils forasmuch as by their transgression they made for themselves another heaven, and more solid body in lieu of the heavenly and ethereal one, are therefore chained and fettered down by the weight and bulk of this body in this atmosphere of ours or lowest region of caliginous air, so as to be unable to reascend to the bright ethereal regions." But this interpretation we have already in a great measure overthrown, by making it plain that οἰκητήριον cannot possibly denote the heavenly body of angels in this passage of St. Jude. Neither is it in accordance with the words themselves; as he expressly declares that the wicked angels are detained in darkness by the power of God and not by the weight and inertness of the body which they wear. If the learned Doctor's opinion were correct, the angels would have fettered and bound themselves in everlasting chains; but both here and 2 Pet. ii. 4. this work is attributed to divine justice. The *everlasting chains* in which St. Jude tells us the wicked angels are bound, as well as the σειραὶ ψόφου spoken of by St. Peter, 2 Pet. ii. 4. are undoubtedly figurative chains. The meaning of the divine writers is, that those wretched beings are detained by the divine power in that dreadful place, just as though they had been bound in chains, so that they are utterly unable to depart thence unless God permits. Compare Luke xvi. 26. And a lucid passage of Lucian's now occurs to me, admirably corroborative of this opinion, in his book De Luctu, p. 300. tom. 2. opp. where he thus speaks of souls sent down to the realms of Pluto: Καταδεξάμενον δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ παραλαβόντα, κατίσχειν δεσμοῖς ἀφύκτοις, "having taken and received the souls, he confines them in chains not to be escaped from." And what he wishes to be understood by these chains he immediately explains in these words: Οὐδενὶ τὸ παράπαν τῆς ἀνόδου ὑφιέμενον, πλὴν ἐξ ἅπαντος τοῦ αἰῶνος πάνυ ὀλίγων ἐπὶ μεγίσταις αἰτίαις, "permitting no one whatever to return except a very few throughout the whole of time, and that for the gravest reasons." The word ψόφος in like manner I consider to be here used figuratively. For as light is a designation in Scripture for all joy and felicity, so darkness signifies every kind of calamity and misery both in this and in other places. This explication is not a little supported by the fact of St. Peter's joining the noun ψόφος to σειραῖς, and saying that the wicked angels are delivered into the *chains of darkness*. For what are *chains of darkness* but unhappy chains? and what is *being bound in chains of darkness* but to be confined for everlasting in a place replete with all misery?

V. The view here put forth by the learned Doctor respecting Tartarus is the one taken not only by St. Augustine, whom he quotes, and some other ancients, but by some of the moderns also: among whom I mention J. Windet in particular, who in his book On the State of the Dead, published in London in 1663 in 4to. p. 12. gives a very erudite exposition of this opinion. But I cannot be induced to concur with these learned men. For I do not recollect the word τάρταρος being used by any Greek writer of the lowest air: on the contrary, I observe they all call it either generally the subterraneous place in which the dead reside, or that place in particular in which those are tormented who incur the divine displeasure. See Hesiod, Theogon. ver. 720. p. 108. Lucian, De Luctu, tom. 2. opp. p. 299. 300. and others cited by Lamb. Bos in his Diss. de Etymologia Græca, p. 41. Wherefore ταραρόω, according to the common usage of the Greeks, is nothing more than "to cast or thrust down into hell." That St. Peter used the word in a new and hitherto unheard of sense, seems to me to be wholly incredible. I consider those, therefore, to interpret the divine writer more correctly who suppose him to have said simply that God pre-

* Page 37. [Page 52.]

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τοῦ Σωτῆρος λόγων πεπεισμένος ταῦτα, πυρὶ κολασθήσεσθαι φασκόντων τοὺς δαίμονας· ὃ πῶς οἷον παθεῖν ἀσωμάτους ὄντας; τὸ γὰρ ἀσώματον ἀμήχανον παθεῖν ὑπὸ σώματος· ἀνάγκη γοῦν σώμασιν αὐτούς τὴν κόλασιν ὑποδέχεσθαι πεφυκόσι πάσχειν, "I am also convinced of this, that demons have bodies, from the words of our Saviour, affirming that they shall be punished with fire: which how could it be were they altogether incorporeal? it being impossible for that which is both itself incorporeal and vitally ununited to any body, to suffer from a body. Wherefore of necessity it must be granted, by us Christians, that devils shall receive punishment of sense and pain hereafter, in bodies capable of suffering.[5]

cipitated the delinquent angels into hell, or thrust them down from heaven into a place, wherever it may be, full of pain and misery. What he observes in passing respecting the use of the word ταρταρόω and the Titans, has been noticed also by others. Apollodorus, Bibliothecæ, lib. 1. cap. 1. sect. 3. p. 3. and cap. 2. sect. 1. p. 4. employs the word καταταρταρόω in speaking of Jupiter hurling the Titans down into Tartarus.

[5] Even this last argument seems to me to be relied upon with more confidence than it deserves by the ancients as well as moderns, who hold the angels to be enveloped in bodies. In the first place, I am at a loss to conceive the reason why they are to be considered as grievously in error, who suppose our Saviour to be theatening the wicked angels not with corporeal and sensible fire, but with mental pains and tortures. This was formerly the opinion of grave and eminent men among the Christian fathers, of whom Dion. Petavius makes mention in his Dogmat. Theolog. tom. 3. lib. 3. de Angelis, cap. 5. p. 103. And not a few of the moderns also, who are wholly removed from all suspicion of pernicious errors, firmly maintain the same doctrine. As our Saviour frequently compares the joys of heaven to a feast, I do not see why it is to be considered dangerous to the divine truth to suppose that he also spoke figuratively of the punishments of hell, and in order to demonstrate more vividly and clearly the dreadful sufferings which wicked angels and men will have to undergo, borrowed an image from the most exquisite of torments inflicted upon human malefactors. For my own part I conceive no greater injury is done to the Christian religion by supposing the fire with which the rich glutton is tormented to be figurative than by regarding the feast, at which Lazarus is said to be present along with Abraham, as an image and emblem of supreme felicity. But even granting the opinion which interprets hell-fire of the torture and misery of the mind to be inadmissible, still this will not much benefit the cause of those who ascribe eternal and natural bodies to angels. For the utmost that can be inferred from these sayings of our Saviour will be this, that the wicked angels alone are clothed in these bodies, and that not always, but only while they are tortured and tormented in hell. They will be no proof therefore that the good as well as bad angels have their respective bodies, nor even that the bodies which the wicked angels possess during their punishment in hell, are natural to them. For there is nothing to hinder those who hold the contrary doctrine from saying that the Supreme Being gives these angels a certain body by way of punishment, to render them susceptible of greater suffering, and to subject them to the action of fire. A notion very similar to this was entertained by Lactantius, who affirms that the souls of wicked men contract a certain dross or contagion in the body, by means of which they can hereafter be tormented and made to feel the force of hell-fire, Institut. Divinar. lib. 7. cap. 20. p. 560. "Forasmuch as the wicked have polluted themselves by evil desires, they bear a sort of intermediate nature between the immortal and mortal, and have a certain imbecility from the contagion of the flesh: to whose desires and lusts the souls being addicted, contract a certain indelible stain and earthy taint: and when this has become thoroughly ingrained in them by length of time, the souls acquire such a nature that although incapable of being wholly extinguished, as being derived from God, they nevertheless become susceptible of torture through the blemish of the body, which is impressed by crimes, and gives the sense of pain." Lastly, to confess the candid

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Now if angels in general, that is, all created beings superior to men, be substances incorporeal, or souls vitally united to bodies, though not always the same, but sometimes of one kind,

truth, those persons seem to me to speak somewhat more boldly than the circumscribed nature of our knowledge will warrant, when they deny that a spirit is altogether incapable of being affected by fire. Who can take upon himself to decide that it is beyond the power of God to produce such fire as shall be able to cause pain and torment even to spirits? For my part I own myself much pleased with the modesty and wisdom of those who assume this one thing from our Saviour's words, namely, that the rebellious angels as well as wicked souls will be punished with the most exquisite torments in hell, and on that account lead such a life as may not subject them hereafter to the visitation of the divine avenging justice: but either leave all other questions on the nature of this fire and the infernal punishments altogether untouched or at least handle them with becoming diffidence and caution.

The ancient doctrine of the bodies of genii, which was first entertained by the Platonists, and subsequently by the Jews and principal Christian fathers, after being assailed and apparently altogether demolished by the scholastic doctors in the middle ages, gradually acquired new strength from the period of the reformation. Probably the first to revive it was Michaël Servetus, a man beyond measure addicted to strange and novel opinions; of whose thirty Epistles to John Calvin, subjoined to what he calls the Restitutio Christianismi, the fourth, p. 583. &c. is wholly taken up in the defence of this doctrine. At the commencement of this epistle he thus expresses himself: "You consider this gross heresy in me———that I attribute something visible or perceptible to *spirits and angels*. This gross faith was embraced by the rude disciples of old, and is embraced by true Christians in the present day, although sublime mathematicians and metaphysicians ridicule it." A little afterwards he proceeds in this manner: "The ancient theologians attributed a certain matter susceptible of divine light and a certain substantial body to spirits and angels: and the same is affirmed by St. Basil the Great and St. Augustine himself, of whom you boast as your support and patron. He himself has said De Genesi, that this light of the sun is a substance and a penetrable body. Such is the body of an angel, penetrable from without, a spiritual body, an ethereal substance.———They have their own proper substance, which we shall hereafter sensibly perceive, and would now perceive, if our senses were sufficiently exquisite.———Celestial creatures under the form of angel we call visible, under the form of spirit invisible to us but yet truly visible in themselves. These, with David, we call breaths of air and flames of fire, that is superelementary, not having flesh and earthy bones, as Christ saith." He then argues that the bodies of angels, like those of men, differ from each other in excellence and agility. "As among men, so among those spirits, some rule over others, and are more excellent, more acute, having more agility, tenuity, and splendour." In the sequel he defends the well-known opinion of Josephus and many others, which supposes demons to have formerly consorted with women, and afterwards to have been hurled down by God into Tartarus along with the giants. As this man had an amazing number of followers, this opinion also was most probably received by many of his contemporaries. In the Romish church itself, as I recollect having noticed before, Thom. Cajetanus and some others contended that bodies are at least to be assigned to evil demons. Nor are there wanting among the professors of the better doctrine men who hold it to be more probable that angels have bodies: out of whom I merely mention Huld. Zanchius, De Operibus sex Dierum, lib. 2. cap. 3. But this doctrine found a much greater number of admirers and patrons in the following century; whose names it would be too tedious to enumerate: and that even in our own time both philosophers and theologians of the highest eminence are favourable to it, is too well known to require being dwelt upon. And yet they have not all been led into it in the same way. Some adopted it out of reverence for the ancient fathers of the Christian church: others were influenced by the principles of the philosophy they were devoted to; while many have no other cause for preferring it to the common opinion than that it seems to be more easy of comprehension to the human intellect. In our own times the learned professor J. Christ. Loërsius wrote a work professedly to prove, that angels have their own bodies, Diss. de Angelorum Corporibus, Duesberg, 1719. in 4to. But he was opposed by the illustrious Steph. Vitus, in his Schediasma, inserted in the Biblioth. Bremens.

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and sometimes of another, and never quite separate from all body; it may seem probable from hence, that though there be other incorporeal substances besides the Deity, yet vita incor-

Theol. Philol. tom. 6. par. 3. p. 418. wherein he stoutly and learnedly defends the vulgar opinion. In these two publications we have brought before us with great ingenuity almost every thing that can be suggested in corroboration of the respective opinions: wherefore I fancy I shall do an acceptable service to most of my readers by giving a short digest of the arguments made use of on both sides, and interspersing where I deem it necessary an occasional remark of my own.

The proofs adduced by Loërsius to show that genii as well as men are united to certain bodies, may conveniently be divided into three classes: The first class is borrowed from authorities: the second consists of arguments drawn from philosophy: the third comprises the sayings of holy writ. He assigns the first place to the testimonies and authorities of the Jews and of the ancient fathers of the Christian church, some of whom as is well known, supposed the angels to be wholly corporeal, while others regarded them as compounded of soul and body, sect. 3—5. This constant doctrine of the early Christians was first corrupted, as he supposes, by the idle subtleties of schoolmen, who were led by a blind admiration of Aristotle to consider the angels as perfectly resembling his intelligences. "If the doctrine of the fathers," says he, sect. 6. p. 6. "had been preserved, angels at this day would be held to be endowed with bodies: but it was by degrees neglected and obscured: there followed the times in which——the authority of Aristotle began to prevail, who was received as an authority into the church itself; when the follies and subtleties of the schoolmen rose to the greatest height——who blinded by their admiration of Aristotle followed him as their sole guide and leader: and as he had pronounced the δαίμονες to be simple and abstract intelligences, they were obliged in accordance with him to assert that angels are spirits devoid of all natural body." We have already seen that Dr. Cudworth agrees with Loërsius: and there are not a few others by whom the same conjecture, or, if you please, opinion, is adopted.

What his adversary advances in reply to all this, may in a great measure be easily conjectured. 1. He denies first of all that the authority of the ancient Jews and Christian fathers is such as to warrant our giving credence to them without reason and argument: seeing that these men were credulous and unthinking enough to adopt many of the precepts of the ancient Chaldeans and Platonists without exercising the slightest judgment of their own. 2. A considerable number, he observes, of the ancient fathers, who are cited by Loërsius as favourable to himself, held angels to be wholly corporeal rather than compounded of body and soul, and therefore are of very little weight towards confirming his opinion, sect. 11. p. 442. 3. He contends that it is altogether wrong to say that the opinion of those who divest angels of all corporeity was derived from the philosophy of Aristotle: that there were patrons of this doctrine before Aristotle's discipline was received among Christians: nay that there were men who asserted angels to be incorporeal before Aristotle existed, sect. 12. p. 446. in short, that Aristotle himself is more favourable to those who attribute than to those who deny bodies to angels: for his intelligences live united to the celestial orbs, as to their proper bodies, and are altogether inseparable from them: see his Metaphys. lib. 5. cap. 8. lib. 14. cap. 8. To whom may be added Plutarch, De Placitis Philos. lib. 1. cap. 7. 4. Lastly, he produces a long array of those of the ancient fathers, who supposed angels to be simple spirits and wholly abstracted from all body: for he considers this to have been the opinion of Clemens Alexandrinus, Hippolytus, Gregorius Thaumaturgus, Gregorius Nazianzenus, Methodius, Eusebius, Lactantius, Theodoret, and many others, whose names it is at present unnecessary to enumerate, sect. 9. p. 437. &c.

Most part of this I approve of, as well and truly observed; neither do I altogether reject what he says respecting the intelligences of Aristotle, from which many suppose the schoolmen's notion of angels to be derived. As I have already declared before, I consider the precepts of the Peripatetic philosophy to have afforded not a little assistance to those who wished to abrogate the ancient doctrine respecting the bodies of angels: but still there is a great difference between Aristotle's intelligences and angels as they are represented by modern theologians. The learned writer's assertion however, that not a few of the ancient fathers entirely abstracted angels from all body, as we do at the present day, I can hardly believe to be true. Before him Gerh. Jo.

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porea, "a life perfectly incorporeal," in the forementioned Origenic sense, or sine corporeæ adjectionis societate vivere, "to live altogether without the society of any corporeal adjection,"

Vossius, De Idololatria, lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 17. Geverh. Elmenhorstius, Notæ ad Gennadum Massiliensem, cap. 12. p. 128. and especially Dion. Petavius, Dogmat. Theol. tom. 3. lib. 1. de Angelis, cap. 3. p. 7. have already named many fathers who, as they suppose, held angels to be wholly incorporeal. But on attentively examining all these passages, I do not find one so certain and clear as to put it beyond controversy that its author entirely deprived them of all body: wherefore I almost come to the conclusion, that in the first ages of Christianity there was hardly one who did so. The principal passages usually brought forward as proofs of angels being regarded as mere spirits by some of the ancient fathers, may be conveniently distributed into three classes. Some said that angels are nothing but πνεύματα, or "spirits," and that πνεῦμα is ἄϋλος or destitute of matter: others called them ἀσώματοι or "incorporeal:" lastly, others termed them νόες, that is, "minds," and νοητοὶ and νοεροὶ, "intelligible" and "intelligent." But if I am not altogether mistaken, these words possess much less weight than learned men suppose, towards confirming the opinion adopted by them.

I. In the first place, if the word πνεῦμα were used by the ancients in the sense in which it is usually understood at the present day, the question would be completely settled, and those who called the angels πνεύματα would unquestionably be to be regarded as having divested them of all body. But I have already more than once remarked, that this word in ancient authors frequently means not what we call *spirit*, but a thin, subtle nature resembling a shadow rather than body, and yet consisting of a certain matter. [Origen, Περὶ ἀρχῶν, lib. 1. cap. 1. sect. 1. p. 49. tom. 1. opp. expressly declares *spirit* to be *body*. Add sect. 2. p. 50.] Neither is it of any moment in this question, that others call πνεῦμα or "spirit," ἄϋλος or "devoid of matter." For by the word ὕλη the ancients understand the grosser matter of which visible bodies consist: to which they are every where accustomed to oppose another of a nobler and better nature. Wherefore those who call spirits ἄϋλοι mean merely that they are destitute of such matter as the bodies of ourselves and other animals are composed of. Besides, if it were certain that they attached the same signification to the word πνεῦμα as it usually bears at the present day, it still would remain a question, whether or not those who call angels spirits applied this name to them in reference to their other and more excellent part, namely the soul. Men, who consist of two natures, body and soul, are frequently named from one of them, either ψυχαὶ or σώματα, and yet no one would conclude from this, that they are either mere spirits or mere bodies. Nor are those of the ancients who suppose the angels to be compounded of soul and body, accustomed to speak differently of them, as might easily be proved even from various passages of St. Augustine alone. For although he for the most part inclines to the side of those who assign a twofold nature to angels, nevertheless he is accustomed sometimes to call them simply spirits, and sometimes again *corporeal* from their other nature. I will illustrate what I say by the example of Clemens Alexandrinus, who is ranked by Vitus and others in the number of those who divested angels of all corporeity. [Compare Beausobre, Hist. du Manich. Not. p. 484.] This Clemens in many parts of his works called angels πνεύματα or spirits, nor could he do otherwise, as they are styled so in scripture: but the way in which he defined spirit we learn from Jo. Veccus, in his book, De Processione Spiritus Sancti in Leon. Allatius' Græcia Orthodoxa tom. 1. p. 248. who gives this definition of spirit: Πνεῦμα μέν ἐστι λεπτὴ καὶ ἄϋλος καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος ἐκπορευτικὴ ὕπαρξις, "Spirit is a most subtle substance devoid of all matter and form." Who that reads this would not suppose Clemens to be altogether averse to the doctrine of those who invest the angels with body? And yet the same Clemens, Pædagog. lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 122. tells us that the good angels feed upon a certain food, namely manna, which was formerly given from heaven to the Jews in the desert, and in another passage, Stromat. lib. 3. cap. 7. p. 538. he assigns as the reason of the wicked angels being turned out of heaven, that they had given themselves up to lusts and had consorted with women. For who can either eat or have illicit intercourse with women without possessing body? Clemens therefore either supposed the angels to be wholly corporeal, although he had no doubt of their being πνεύματα, or at least held them to be associated with body. Wherefore if learned men will take my advice on this question, they will cease to appeal to those passages in which angels are called πνεύματα and λεπτοὶ and ἄϋλοι.

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is a privilege properly belonging to the holy Trinity only; and consequently therefore, that human souls, when by death they are divested of these gross earthly bodies, they do not then live

II. Again, those who called the angels "incorporeal" and *ἀσώματοι*, can with still much less reason be said to have supposed them to be divested of all body. For as I have already shown above, it is manifest from innumerable passages of the ancients, that they call that *ἀσώματον* and "incorporeal," which is destitute of solid and concrete matter, nor are these names employed by them in an absolute but only in a comparative sense, unless the discourse be of God. [This is clearly inculcated by Origen, Præf. *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, sect. 8. p. 49. tom. 1. opp.] Which I shall again exemplify by a passage bearing upon the present question. Jo. Damascenus, the father of the Greek schoolmen, is ranked by most men among those who held angels to be without body. They are led to do so by the following passage, occurring in his De Orthodoxa Fide, lib. 2. cap. 3. p. 155. &c. tom. 1. opp. *Ἄγγελος τοίνυν ἐστὶν οὐσία νοερὰ, ἀεὶ κινητὸς——ἀσώματος*, "An angel is an intelligent substance, in perpetual motion——devoid of body." The erudite Mich. Lequienius, who has published an accurate and neat edition of Damascenus, in a note subjoined to this passage, considers it to be a clear evidence that the author entertained more correct views than those who hold angels to be either wholly corporeal or united to bodies. And I would willingly concur in this opinion myself, if Damascenus had left nothing else on record respecting the nature of angels besides these words. But I am restrained by what follows a little after: *Ἀσώματος δὲ λέγεται, καὶ ἄϋλος, ὅσον παρ' ἡμᾶς. Πᾶν γὰρ συγκρινόμενον πρὸς Θεὸν, τὸν μόνον ἀσύγκριτον, παχύ τε καὶ ὑλικὸν εὑρίσκεται, μόνον γὰρ ὄντως ἄϋλον τὸ Θεῖον ἐστὶ καὶ ἀσώματον*, "But it is called incorporeal and immaterial, in reference to ourselves. For in comparison with God, who alone is uncompounded, every thing is found to be compound, and gross, and material; the divine nature alone being immaterial and incorporeal." Who does not perceive from this that Damascenus by no means supposed the angels to be perfectly simple and divested of all body, but called them incorporeal comparatively only and in respect to mankind? But he declares his opinion more explicitly even below, cap. 12. p. 179. which passage of his I shall not scruple to transcribe, the more clearly to show that the words and phrases of ancient writers are not to be estimated according to our own notions, and that those who think proper to avail themselves of the authority of the fathers, ought first of all to make themselves acquainted with their phraseology. Damascenus distinguishes *ἀσώματα, ἀόρατα*, and *ἀσχημάτιστα*, "incorporeal, invisible, and formless things," into those which are such *κατ' οὐσίαν*, "by their own essence," and those *κατὰ χάριν*, "according to grace;" as also into those which are so called *φύσει*, "by their own nature," and those *πρὸς τὴν τῆς ὕλης παχύτητα*, "compared with the crassitude of matter." He then goes on as follows; *Ἐπὶ Θεοῦ μὲν οὖν φύσει· ἐπὶ δὲ ἀγγέλων καὶ δαιμόνων καὶ ψυχῶν χάριτι, καὶ ΩΣ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΗΝ ΤΗΣ ΥΛΗΣ ΠΑΧΥΤΗΤΑ, λέγεται ἀσώματον*, "To be incorporeal therefore belongs to God by nature; but to angels and demons and souls according to grace, and *in respect to the crassitude of matter*." Consequently, according to Damascenus' doctrine, the angels consist of matter, but of such as is far more subtle than this gross and palpable matter of ours.

III. Those ancient fathers seem to come nearest to the doctrine of angels being entirely without bodies, who term the angels *νόες*, "minds," and *νοεροὶ* and *νοητοὶ*: as is done by Dionysius the Areopagite and many others whose sayings are collected by Petavius. For my own part, however, I would not place much confidence even in these passages. Not to speak of other things, it ought to be seen first of all whether in calling the angels *νόες* they meant to express the whole of their nature or borrowed this word only from their better and more excellent part. For we can also call a man *νοῦς* or mind, from mind or reason being his nobler part, although nobody doubts that he is at the same time endowed with body. Gregorius Nazianzenus is among those who style the angels *νόες*. See Orat. 35. p. 560. and Carm. de Virginit. p. 43. tom. 1. opp. But in the former of the passages here alluded to he himself shows that he does not mean this word to be taken in a sense to signify a nature altogether devoid of body. For he openly acknowledges his ignorance, whether angels are incorporeal or not, although in a certain sense they may be called *νοεραὶ δυνάμεις*, and *νόες*: *πλὴν ἡμῖν γε ἀσώματος ἔστω, ἢ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα*, "but to us at least let them be incorporeal,

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and act completely, without the conjunction of any body, and so continue till the resurrection or day of judgment; this being a privilege, which not so much as the angels themselves, and

or as nearly so as possible." He repeats the same doctrine more clearly, Orat. 38. p. 617. Nay in another passage he very frankly declares it to be more probable in his opinion that nothing is simple and devoid of all body except God. Thus having said that men are compounded, Orat. 37. p. 601. he subjoins as follows: Οὔκ οἶδα δὲ, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἄγγελοι καὶ πᾶσα φύσις ἢ ἄνω καὶ μετὰ τὴν τριάδα· κἂν ἁπλοί τινες ὦσι καὶ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν παγιώτεροι, "But I do not know whether the same may not be said of the angels and every celestial nature except the Trinity: although in other respects they are endowed with a certain simple nature, and are more firmly constituted for good." In these words we may perceive Nazianzenus is disposed to concur with those who hold nothing to be simple and open but God, and nevertheless asserts the angels to be in a certain respect simple: which evidently shows, how very uncertain those ancient fathers who reckon simplicity among the properties of angels, are as evidences in this question. I come now to the words νοερὸς and νοητὸς, made use of by many of the ancients in describing the nature of angels, which they frequently term φύσεις or δυνάμεις νοεραὶ and νοηταί. The meanings of these words in the Platonists are various and uncertain: but the most common is that which Maximus in his Scholia ad cap. 9. Dionysii Areopagitæ De Divinis Nominibus, p. 818. tom. 1. opp. Dionysii, has expressed in these words: Ἴστέον, ὅτι νοητὸν μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ τῇ αἰσθήσει οὐχ ὑποπίπτον, οὔτε τὸ νοερὸν ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ——νοερὸν δὲ τὸ ἁπλᾶς καὶ ἀπολύτους ἔχον τὰς νοήσεις, ὡς ἄγγελοι, "Be it known, that the intelligible is that which does not fall under the senses, nor has intelligence in itself——but the intelligent, that which has simple and free intellections in itself, as the angels." Therefore when the angels are called νοητοὶ, it means that they are natures not falling under the senses, and perceptible to the mind alone; and when they are termed νοεροὶ, that they do not understand and know like ourselves, who perceive and comprehend objects by the help of the senses, but in a different manner, simply, freely, and without matter. But neither of these names seems to me to be such that he who calls angels either by one or the other of them is to be considered as having divested them of all body. That which does not fall under the senses and is cognizable only to the mind and thought is not necessarily on that account to be considered as devoid of body. And most of those who hold the angels to be either wholly corporeal or at least invested with body, at the same time suppose their bodies to be of such tenuity that they escape our senses by their very nature. I will admit it to follow from the other name, that those who applied it to angels, denied to them the possession of senses and members like our own: but I deny that it proves them to have deprived these celestial beings of all body also. For it is possible for that which is without the senses and members of grosser matter to be, as Cicero says, De Finib. Bonor. et Malor. lib. 4. cap. 14. p. 2483. tom. 8. opp. in aliquo tamen genere corporis, "in some kind of body nevertheless," and to consist of a certain sort of matter far different from that which we know. What man conversant with the things and opinions of antiquity is not aware that some of the most eminent of the ancient philosophers, although they discard from the soul the faculty of sensation and deny that it possesses any thing in common with our body, suppose it nevertheless to be compounded of a certain matter? These maintain that the soul when separated from the body is νοερὸς, that is, perceives and knows without the aid of the senses, and yet is in a certain measure corporeal. Besides the ancients themselves who call angels δυνάμεις νοεραὶ and νοητοὶ, speak of them in such terms as must convince every intelligent person that they did not regard them as perfectly simple natures. Damascenus, as we have already shown, declares the angel to be ἀὴ οὐσία νοερὰ, and yet does not hesitate to affirm that it is exempt from body, not in itself but in reference to men only. To him add Joannes Thessalonicensis, whose words are particularly explicit, Acta Concilii Nicæni, 2. tom. 4. Concilior. p. 293. 294. ΝΟΕΡΟΥΣ μὲν αὐτοὺς ἡ καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία γινώσκει, οὐ μὲν ἀσωμάτους πάντη καὶ ἀοράτους, "The catholic church acknowledges them to be intelligible, but yet not wholly incorporeal and invisible." It is unnecessary to add more authors. Wherefore without wishing to detract from the learning and erudition of those great and eminent men who suppose that a considerable number of the earliest Christian fathers held angels to be mere spirits, I cannot but frankly confess my conviction, that it is impos-

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therefore no created finite being, is capable of; the imperfection of whose nature necessarily requires the conjunction of some body with them, to make them up complete: without which, it

sible to produce a single one during the first four centuries, who openly professed this doctrine.

I come now to the second class of arguments, by which the erudite Loërsius fancied he would be able to prove to the satisfaction of every one, that angels are invested with body: this is the philosophic. As one of the principles of the entire demonstration he lays it down, sect. 7. p. 7. that soul and body are two things, totally distinct from and opposed to each other; that the nature of the soul is perfected by cogitation alone, but that of the body by extension; from which he afterwards concludes, "that there can be no communication between body and mind in themselves; that no body can be moved by finite mind through any power of its own; and that no mind, inasmuch as it has no surface, can be affected by body." This being established he proceeds, sect. 8. p. 9. to the end the Deity may have had in view in creating his works, which he supposes to have been simply "that he might manifest himself and all his perfections and glory in the most illustrious manner, that is, might show himself to be glorious and wonderful." Upon this end he discourses at much length and with great elegance and ingenuity, principally for the purpose of proving that such a motive, so far from being repugnant to the divine nature, is entirely in accordance with it; he next insists upon its being evident from this end, "that it behoved God to create not minds alone, but minds united to body:" which he undertakes to prove more clearly in the sequel. God, says the learned writer, is of such infinite power, that he could have displayed and made known his glory in minds alone, without all corporeal things. But this he was unwilling to do, as the thing itself declares. For he created this corporeal universe, and revealed his majesty and glory in it in the most wonderful manner. Therefore he wishes to be known from and praised for his works, sect. 9. p. 11—13. Hence to obtain this end it was necessary to create minds, "because bodies alone neither know nor comprehend what God wishes to be known; which minds should be adapted both by their own nature and by all the faculties they are endowed with for the contemplation and celebration of the glory of God," sect. 10. p. 13. But for the same reason those minds were necessarily to be united with body. For if they had existed alone without body, the whole theatre of divine glory which we behold would have been useless; since minds, alone and ununited to body, can neither see, nor feel, nor move things consisting of matter, nor be affected by them; also without body they are unable to enjoy the society and friendship of other minds. But who will deny it to be within the province of angels to know, celebrate, and proclaim the majesty of God? Whereas, if they had been destitute of body, "this vast and magnificent theatre of the divine glory would have been built in vain as regards the angels, who would have had no share in it, as they neither could have sustained the part of actors nor spectators," sect. 11. p. 15—17. This constitutes the first argument, as it were, of the learned writer; which, although stated somewhat differently and circuitously by himself, and adorned with much elegant colouring, may nevertheless be comprehended in a few words. The substance of the whole demonstration is as follows: Whatever natures were created to know and understand the glory and majesty of the supreme Being from his works, must necessarily be endowed with body; for mind alone neither feels, nor sees, nor knows any thing corporeal; but angels were created by God for the purpose of being witnesses and spectators of all his glory; therefore we are to suppose that angels partake of body.

It is evident from this argument, that the whole disputation is reduced to this one question: whether mind, alone and having no body associated with it, can neither perceive, nor feel, nor affect corporeal things. The learned writer who contends that angels are united with bodies, takes this for granted; and in doing so I am inclined to think he assumes more than he has a right to do. [The same was assumed by the Epicureans, according to Cicero, De Natura Deor. lib. 1. cap. 12. p. 2897. &c. and cap. 13. 2899.] He who maintains that minds alone are incapable of seeing, feeling, or affecting material things, ought to possess an accurate knowledge of minds, and to be thoroughly acquainted with their entire nature. For how will it be possible for us to determine what any thing can or cannot do, unless we perfectly comprehend its entire nature and character? But for my part I very much doubt whether any mortal

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is inconceivable, how they should either have sense or imagination. And thus doth Origen, consentaneously to his own principles, conclude:* Ἡ τῇ ἑαυτῆς φύσει ἀσώματος καὶ ἀόρατος

can with justice arrogate to himself any such knowledge. We know certain properties and affections of our own minds, but their interior nature has not been disclosed to us either by reason or divine revelation; which clearly shows us in what estimation we ought to hold this argument, so greatly relied upon by the learned writer. But conceding it to be the case, as he supposes, that mere spirit is altogether incapable of perceiving and knowing any thing corporeal, even then he will not be able to carry his point. He doubtless will admit that the glory and majesty of the Creator may be understood from the clear and perspicuous notions and forms of created things, as well as from the contemplation of the same by the eyes and senses. A man born blind is enabled, by the instruction of others in possession of their eyesight, to form in his mind clear and evident conceptions and images of this universe of things, and to draw from them matter of praise to God as solid as that which others derive from the contemplation of the objects themselves. Why therefore may we not say that God imprinted clear and distinct forms and images of his works upon the minds of his angels, so that although unable to see the world with eyes, they nevertheless have it ever present to their mind and thoughts? In that case will they be disqualified by their want of body for the comprehension of the majesty of their supreme Creator and Parent, and the contemplation of his perfection? No one, I imagine, will assert as much. But ceasing all disputation, let us come rather to what the illustrious Vitus brings forward in refutation of this argument. The purpose of this note does not require us to repeat all that he has said upon the point. I shall therefore omit his remarks upon the difference between mind and body, upon the end which the Deity proposed to himself in creating this world, and upon other matters connected therewith, as not altogether relevant to the present question; and shall confine myself to that portion more immediately bearing upon the argument itself. The whole controversy, says he, turns upon this, "Whether bodies can become known to angels, although they are themselves destitute of body." But my opponent founds the whole of his argumentation upon this principle: That owing to the great difference between mind and body, there can be no communication between them, and body cannot be moved by a finite mind by virtue of its own proper power; and on the other hand, mind cannot be affected by body. This is of itself sufficient to demolish the whole of his demonstration. For it follows thence, that it is utterly impossible either for mind to act upon body or body upon mind; and if this be true, it is also unquestionable, that minds cannot derive from body any knowledge of other bodies or any notions and images of things, and that all our knowledge of bodies is to be ascribed solely to God himself. The question therefore is, How does God impart a knowledge of bodies to souls and angels? sect. 14. p. 455—457. Four or five modes suggest themselves, which for the sake of brevity I now pass over. But my opponent denies this to be possible without the intervention of a body of their own. For my part, I consider this to be both absurd in itself and repugnant to his own principles. He himself perceives that bodies and minds are of such an opposite nature as to admit of no communication between them. Therefore all communication of the kind, according to his opinion, ought to be referred solely to the omnipotence of the divine will, and body of itself therefore contributes nothing towards our knowledge. But to the infinite power it will be as easy a task to produce in us the notions of bodies by some other means as by a certain proper body. Indeed I should prefer as more worthy of God, who always follows the most simple course, the doctrine of those who explain the communication between body and mind from the laws of a *preordained harmony*, and affirm that they are so linked together by the divine power, that on the body being moved or affected in a certain way certain corresponding notions arise also in the mind. But if such be the case, this conjunction of our mind with body seems to conduce to the variety and adornment of the world rather than to the knowledge of external bodies. Be this as it may, I consider it to be highly reprehensible in my adversary to suppose that God is unable to produce impressions on angels in any other

* Cont. Cels. lib. 7. p. 353.

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ψυχὴ, ἐν παντὶ σωματικῷ τόπῳ τυγχάνουσα, δέεται σώματος οἰκείου τῇ φύσει τοῦ τόπου ἐκείνου· ὅπερ ὅπου μὲν φορεῖ, ἀπεκδυσαμένη πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον μὲν, πέρισσον δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὰ

way than that in which they are produced in ourselves. It is also derogatory to the Deity to assert that the notions of our minds cannot be communicated to other minds, except through the medium of body. "This seems to me to be the same as supposing that bodies cannot move other bodies except by the intervention of certain finite minds. Bodies by their own nature are as incapable of moving other bodies, as pure minds are of acting upon other minds. By the same rule, therefore, that God has laid down laws by which one body can move another, so was he able to prescribe other laws by which pure minds can communicate their own ideas, and the determinations of the will to one another." This is a brief summary of the somewhat copious argumentation of Vitus, sect. 16. 17. p. 455—464. I have omitted nothing that is at all illustrative of the question at issue. Return we now to Loërsius.

He pursues his argument thus, sect. 12. p. 17. Angels are principal actors in this theatre of God which we call the world. They are his perpetual ambassadors, and execute all his behests, now scattering and discomfiting his enemies, now affording support and assistance to the good. And how can they perform all this if they be mere spirits entirely destitute of body, and unable to do any thing but think? The force of the argument is self-evident: Those who perform things that cannot be done without the intervention of body, must necessarily be partakers of body: the angels are often commissioned to perform and do perform such things: therefore, &c. To this argument Vitus replies, sect. 18. p. 464: "that it is possible for a certain connexion to have been established by God between angels and external bodies, *or such a preordained harmony as exists between soul and body*, that both angels can act upon bodies, and bodies upon angels." And such a connexion being admitted, the angels will not only be able to think, but to act and move also, and may as justly be said to be the causes of all the motions they seem to produce, as our minds are of those which they excite in our bodies. I am afraid this answer will appear to many to be somewhat too obscure; I shall therefore add a few words to it in explanation. The whole gist of the argument he is opposing, lies in this precept: That which is pure spirit and destitute of body, cannot excite, destroy, or in any other way affect other bodies. I should ask first of all how learned men ascertained the truth of this precept. If I am not altogether mistaken, before we can determine that spirit is incapable of exciting and affecting other bodies except through the medium of body, we ought to be thoroughly acquainted with the nature of spirit. For my part, I am by no means the man to suppose that I possess so accurate a knowledge of spirits; let others see whether they can say more of themselves. But I dismiss all this, and freely assert that pure spirit is capable of exciting other bodies even without the intervention of body, and that this is evidenced both in the case of God and of our own souls. No wise man will deny the Deity to be most simple minded, and yet it is beyond all controversy that all motion of bodies proceeds from him. But some will tell us, perhaps, that there is a great difference between God and an angel, and that what is applicable to the former, ought by no means to be ascribed to the latter. Certainly, the difference between God and the angels is as great as that between finite and infinite; but this has nothing to do with the present question. The point at issue is simply whether or not simple spirit can excite body. And how great soever may be the disparity between God and the angels, which I acknowledge to be infinite, still, it is always manifest from the example of the supreme Being, that this does not belong to the class of things which are incompatible and impossible. For if the proposition, "spirit moves body," were so self-repugnant that one notion did away with the other, not even the Deity himself would be able to move bodies, as almost all philosophers deny that he can perform what are termed *contradictories*. But if it be possible for naked spirit to move bodies, who is to decide positively that angels are unable to do the same? Perhaps some one not contented with this, will again appeal to the infinity of God and the finitude of angels; but I ask of him accurately to define to me the limits where the power of a finite spirit begins, and where it ends: what comes within the compass of its capabilities, and on the other hand, what surpasses them: and if he is unable to do this, he will pardon me if I consider all that he says to have little bearing upon the matter. The example borrowed from the human soul is of itself sufficient to determine this question. I am

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δεύτερα· ὅπου δὲ ἐπενδυσαμένη ᾧ πρότερον εἶχε, δεομένῳ κρείττονος ἐνδύματος εἰς τοὺς καθαρωτέρους καὶ αἰθερίους καὶ οὐρανίους τόπους, "Our soul, which in its own nature is incorporeal and

aware that philosophers are much divided in opinion when they come to discuss the connexion of body and soul, and attempt to explain how it happens that certain motions of the body are immediately consequent upon certain thoughts and motions of the soul. But as far as regards our present subject, I hold it not to be of the slightest moment which of these opinions is preferred to the others. For whatever may be the way in which body is caused to move at the will and pleasure of the soul, this one thing is at least clear from thence, that it is possible for bodies to be moved and turned at the impulse of incorporeal spirit. Should any one attempt to elude this argument by adopting the doctrine of the Platonists, who assert that souls are clothed in certain subtle vehicles or bodies, and are enabled by the intervention of these vehicles, to act upon the solid and concrete body we are invested with, he still will not get rid of the difficulty. For we shall merely ascend a little higher and again ask him, by what means a soul which is destitute of body can incite and move this vehicle as they call it. Whatever reply he may return to this question, it will admit of being made use of for the refutation of those who maintain that simple spirit is utterly incapable of affecting body. I might, if so disposed, go a little farther even, and concede what learned men assume, that no body can be affected except by body. For granting this, it still might become a matter of question whether it is altogether absurd to suppose that an angel, on being commissioned to perform certain actions which require a body, either assumes a certain body to himself, or receives one from God. But I think sufficient has been said to shake the confidence of those who accuse others of gross and childish error for holding angels to be devoid of bodies.

I now produce the third argument of Loërsius. If angels were minds destitute of all body, they would not be completely happy and perfect. For they would be deaf, blind, and dumb, and wholly incapable of being affected by other things: since without body, no one sees, hears, speaks, or feels. This he illustrates by the example of happy souls living in heaven, which, while they are without body, are supposed to be very far from perfection and felicity, sect. 13. p. 15—23. His opponent returns a twofold answer, sect. 19. p. 566. First: Those only are called blind, dumb, or deaf, to whom it is natural to see, speak, and hear; but this is not natural to angels; therefore they cannot properly be called blind, dumb, or deaf. Secondly: The less the angels require the aid of the senses, the more nearly they approach the perfection of divine knowledge: it is not a proof of infirmity but of supreme power in God, that they neither hear, nor see, nor speak. To this I shall add nothing, as I have not only touched upon the subject above, but also have treated of this question: whether souls divested of body are less happy. That the supreme Being, who is certainly devoid of all body, nevertheless perceives, hears, and sees, is a proof of its being possible for simple spirit to see, hear, and perceive without body. And this is sufficient for the overthrow of this argument.

After putting forth these arguments, the learned writer, sect. 14. p. 23. begins a long disputation against those who assert a certain bond of connexion between the mind of angels and external things, by virtue of which all those things are performed which cannot otherwise take place without body. He himself is satisfied that it is impossible to imagine any connexion of the kind, either *universal* or *particular*, without at the same time being involved in the most foolish and absurd opinions. But all this, ingenious though it be, and advanced with no little confidence, falls to the ground of itself, when the reasoning and arguments upon which his opinion rests are overthrown, and may also be easily confuted from what has already been brought forward on the subject. Wherefore, that I may not spin out this note to too great a length, I recommend the curious about these matters to consult the learned author himself, and to compare his remarks with the replies of Vitus, sect. 20. 21. p. 469—477.

III. There now remain the passages of sacred writ, which the erudite Loërsius considers to be in support and confirmation of his opinion. First of all he cites those passages, Psalm ciii. 20. 2 Thess. i. 7. wherein either the angels are described as powerful and mighty heroes, or their great achievements recorded, sect. 16. p. 33. He then appeals to the celebrated saying of our Saviour, in which he declares that those who rise again shall be like the angels, Luke xx. 34. &c. Compare Matt. xxii. 24.

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invisible, in whatsoever corporeal place it existeth, doth always stand in need of a body, suitable to the nature of that place respectively: which body it sometimes beareth, having put off that, which before was necessary, but is now superfluous for the following state; and sometimes again putting on something to what before it had, now standing in need of some better clothing, to fit it for those more pure, ethereal, and heavenly places." But, in what there follows, we conceive that Origen's sense having not been rightly understood, his words have been altered and perverted; and that the whole place ought to be read thus: Καὶ ἐνεδύσατο μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν τῇδε γένεσιν ἐρχομένη τὸ χρήσιμον πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ ὑστέρᾳ τῆς κυούσης, ἕως ἦν ἐν αὐτῇ· ἐνεδύσατο δὲ ὑπ' ἐκεῖνο, ὃ ἦν ἀναγκαῖον τῷ ἐπὶ γῆς μέλλοντι διαζῆν· εἶτα πάλιν

Mark xii. 24. He next quotes the words of Christ, Luke xxiv. 39. in which he denies that angels have flesh and bones. He also has recourse to St. Paul as favourable to his argument, who 1 Cor. xiii. 1. attributes a tongue to angels. Lastly, nothing he considers is more strongly corroborative of his opinion than the fact, that whenever the angels have exhibited themselves to the sight of mortals, they have always appeared endowed with bodies.

The last of these arguments is left altogether untouched by his opponent. Of the rest he gives a brief refutation. For my own part, I have already said in reference to these passages, Luke xx. 34. and xxiv. 39. what will be sufficient as an answer to those who consider them to prove that angels have their own bodies. The remaining three arguments, which I have not yet touched upon, may in very few words be stripped of all the weight they are supposed to possess. 1. Angels are called mighty and powerful in Scripture, and are said to have achieved great things. Can no one then be called strong and mighty, or be the author of great exploits, unless he be clothed in body? Who pray, is not aware, that God is destitute of all body, and yet is called most potent and mighty? 2. St. Paul seems to ascribe a tongue to angels, because he speaks of their discourse, 1 Cor. xiii. 1. The exceeding weakness of this argument I leave others to judge of from the following syllogism: He to whom a tongue and other members are attributed in sacred writ, must necessarily be endowed with these members: but a mouth, hands, feet, and other members, are assigned to God; therefore God is furnished with these members. For my part, I should consider the phrase made use of by St. Paul to be borrowed from the Jewish proverbs of that time, from which no one is ever accustomed to prove any doctrine. 3. When angels have been seen, they appear to be clothed in body: therefore they have body. Too rashly concluded, to say the least of it, most learned disputant! For God also has sometimes exhibited himself in the human form, and yet that has not led any man of sane mind to ascribe to him a body similar to our own. Are we gifted with sufficient sagacity to be able to decide with certainty that the body which angels have appeared clothed in, is natural and proper to them, and not an adventitious and merely temporary vestment?

Besides these, there are some other matters in Loërsius' Dissertation, upon which I might say a few words if I were disposed to carry this note to greater length. He discusses sect. 17. p. 38. the nature of the body which in his opinion angels possess, and supposes it to be composed of a most rare and subtle matter, and not to consist of all the members of our bodies, but of those only which "are required for a perfect stature." In particular he deprives them of belly, stomach, and the generative parts. Probably he held the same opinion in respect to the bodies of good men after the resurrection: and to me indeed he seems pretty plainly to hint as much. He then refutes, sect. 18. p. 41. what he supposes may be advanced in opposition to his opinion. Lastly, sect 19. p. 46. he contends that this doctrine is calculated to remove many difficulties, and to throw greater light upon several important truths. The whole of which is canvassed in detail by Steph. Vitus. For myself, I have bestowed more time than was requisite upon an argument, which certainly supplies most ample matter for disputation to the curious and sagacious, but contributes little to the promotion of piety, holiness, and true religion.

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ὄντος τινὸς σκήνους, καὶ ἐπιγείου οἰκίας ἀναγκαίας που τῷ σκήνει, καταλύεσθαι μέν φασιν οἱ λόγοι τὴν ἐπίγειον οἰκίαν τοῦ σκήνους, τὸ δὲ σκῆνος ἐπενδύσασθαι οἰκίαν ἀχειροποίητον, αἰώνιον ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς· λέγουσι δὲ οἱ τοῦ θεοῦ ἄνθρωποι, τὸ μὲν φθαρτὸν ἐνδύσασθαι αὐτὸ ἀφθαρσίαν. The sense whereof is this: "The soul descending hither into generation, put on first that body which was useful for it whilst to continue in the womb; and then again afterwards such a body as was necessary for it to live here upon the earth in. Again, it having here a two-fold kind of body, the one of which is called σκῆνος, by St. Paul (being a more subtle body, which it had before), the other the superinduced earthly house, necessarily subservient to this skenos here; the scripture oracles affirm that the earthly house of this skenos shall be corrupted or dissolved, but the skenos itself, superindue or put on a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens: the same declaring that the corruptible shall put on incorruption, and the mortal immortality."[6] Where it is

[6] Dr. Cudworth's exposition of this passage of Origen, which, like many others, has been very obscurely translated by Sigismundus Gelenius, is most correct, and his emendation a felicitous one. In the published edition the Greek words to which the learned Doctor has been the first to apply the hand of correction, read as follows: Εἶτα πάλιν ὄντως τινὸς σκήνους ἐπιγείου, οἰκίας ἀναγκαίας τοῦ τῷ σκήνει, being altogether confused and unintelligible. In the first place, it is clear that ἐπιγείου is improperly connected with the noun σκήνους and ought rather to be referred to the following word, οἰκίας. For almost immediately afterwards Origen again mentions ἐπίγειον οἰκίαν, and distinguishes it from that which he calls σκῆνος. Therefore Dr. Cudworth has rightly excluded the comma that separates the words ἐπιγείου and οἰκίας. Again, Origen is evidently speaking of two distinct things in these words, an *earthly house* and a *tabernacle*. Hence the learned Doctor has rightly placed the particle καὶ between σκήνους and ἐπιγείου, to show that the discourse is of two different things. This particle is extant in the Greek copy, but in an improper place, namely between the words σκήνει and καταλύεσθαι: from which it has been correctly transferred to the one more suitable for it. I am not aware whether El. Bouhier, the French translator, ever read this emendation and exposition of Dr. Cudworth's: and yet in the Notes and Conjectures on Origen's text, p. 401. subjoined to his version, he corrects the passage in the same way, and in the version itself expresses its sense as here given. But I do not equally approve of our author's substitution of the verb ἐνέδύσατο for ἀπεξεδύσατο, at the beginning of this passage. To a certain extent he had already the example of Gelenius, who thus renders it, in conformity neither with the words nor the sense: "The soul about to be born received a body suitable for it while inhabiting the womb." For my part I consider this emendation unnecessary, nor can I see any reason why the passage may not be translated as follows: "The soul on descending into generation, or on coming forth from the womb, puts off the body which was suitable and useful for it while it remained in the womb, and assumes another such as is necessary for the new life which it is entering upon among men." I am satisfied that the phrase εἰς γένεσιν ἔρχεσθαι, which is frequently made use of in the Platonic schools, induced the learned Doctor to attempt the emendation we are speaking of. He supposed, no doubt, that these words always signify with the Platonists the descent of the soul into the womb: and certainly if such were their sense in this place, the word ἀπεξεδύσατο would be altogether inadmissible. For what sort of sentence would this be: "The soul descending hither into the womb, puts off the body, which is necessary for it while in the womb?" But conversant as he is in other respects with Platonic matters, he did not recollect that although it often occurs in the sense in which he supposed Origen to have here used it, it nevertheless not infrequently signifies in the leading Platonic writers, "to be born, to begin to live among men, to issue from the womb."

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plain that Origen takes that σκῆνος, in St. Paul (1 Cor. v. 1), for a subtle body, which the soul had before its terrene nativity, and which continues with it after death; but in good men will, at last, superindue, or put on (without death) the clothing of immortality. Neither can there be a better commentary upon this place of Origen, than those Excerpta out of Methodius the Martyr, in Photius,[7] though seeming to be vitiated also; where, as we conceive, the sense of Origen and his followers is first contained in those words:[8] Ἕτερον τὸ σκῆνος, καὶ τοῦ σκήνους ἡ οἰκία, καὶ ἕτερον ἡμεῖς ὧν ἐστὶ τὸ σκῆνος, "That in St. Paul the τὸ σκῆνος is one thing, and the earthly house of this σκῆνος another thing; and we, that is our souls, a third thing, distinct from both." And then it is further declared in this that follows: Τῆς ζωῆς καταλυθείσης τῆς ὠκυμόρου τὴν πρὸ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἕξουσιν οἱ κησιν αἱ ψυχαὶ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, ἕως ἂν ἀνακαινοποιηθεῖσαν ἡμῖν ἄπτωτον ἀναλάβωμεν τὴν οἰκίαν· ὅθεν καὶ στενάζομεν μὴ θέλοντες τὸ σῶμα ἀπεκδύσασθαι ἀλλ' ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὴν λοιπὴν ἐπενδύσασθαι ζωήν· τὸ γὰρ οἰκητήριον τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, ὃ ἐπενδύσασθαι ἐπιθυμοῦμεν, ἡ ἀθανασία, "That this short life of our earthly body being destroyed, our soul shall then have, before the resurrection, a dwelling from God, until we shall at last receive it renewed, restored, and so made an incorruptible house. Wherefore in this we groan, desirous not to put off all body, but to put on life or immortality upon the body which we shall then have. For that house, which is from heaven, that we desire to put on, is immortality."[8] Moreover, that the soul is not altogether naked after death, the same Origen[9] endeavours to confirm further from that of our Saviour concerning the rich man and Lazarus: Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ κολαζόμενος πλούσιος, καὶ ὁ ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραὰμ πένης ἀναπαυόμενος, πρὸ τῆς παρουσίας τοῦ σωτῆρος, καὶ πρὸ τῆς συντελείας τοῦ αἰῶνος, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πρὸ τῆς ἀναστάσεως, διδάσκουσιν ὅτι καὶ νῦν ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ σώματι χρῆται ἡ ψυχή, "The rich man punished, and the poor man refreshed in Abraham's bosom, before the coming of our Saviour, and before the end of the world, and therefore before the resurrection, plainly teaches that even now also after death, the soul useth a

[7] Biblioth. Cod. 224. p. 919.

[8] Thus Origen plainly, in his fifth book (p. 244): that there is διαφορὰ ἐπιγείου οἰκίας ἐν ᾗ ἐστὶ τὸ Σκῆνος καταλυομένης, καὶ Σκήνους, ἐν ᾧ οἱ ὄντες δίκαιοι στενάζουσι βαρούμενοι, μὴ ἀπεκδύσασθαι, ἀλλὰ τῷ Σκήνει ἐπενδύσασθαι, "a difference betwixt the earthly house, in which the Σκῆνος is, that will be dissolved; and the Σκῆνος itself, wherein good men groan, being burdened, not that they would put it off, but put an immortality upon it."

[8] I can hardly believe these words to be explanatory and illustrative of the former ones. For in them souls are not said to dwell with God, clothed in a certain body, but merely to have a habitation with God: which would not be denied even by those who maintain that souls on being released from this earthly body are associated with no other body whatever.

[9] In Photius, Biblioth. cod. 224. p. 930.

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body." He thinketh the same also to be further proved from the visible apparition of Samuel's ghost: Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Σαμουὴλ φαινόμενος, ὡς δῆλόν ἐστιν ὁρατὸς ὢν, παρίστησιν ὅτι σῶμα περιέκειτο, "Samuel also visibly appearing after death, maketh it manifest that his soul was then clothed with a body." To which he adds in Photius: Τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἅμα τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ σχῆμα, ὁμοειδὲς τῷ παχεῖ καὶ γηΐνῳ σώματι, &c. "That the exterior form and figure of the soul's body after death doth resemble that of the gross terrestrial body here in this life; all the histories of apparitions making ghosts, or the souls of the dead, to appear in the same form which their bodies had before." This, therefore, as was observed, is that which Origen understands by τὸ σκῆνος in St. Paul; not this gross terrestrial body, but a certain middle body betwixt it and the heavenly, which the soul after death carries away with it.[10] Now, this opinion of the learned Origen's was never reckoned up by the ancient fathers, or his greatest adversaries, in the catalogue of his errors; nor does Methodius the martyr, who was so great an anti-Origenist, where he mentions this Origenic opinion in Photius, seem to tax it otherwise than as Platonical, implying the soul to be incorporeal. Methodius himself, on the contrary, contending, not that the soul hath a body conjoined with it after death, as a distinct thing from it, but that itself is a body: Ὁ θεὸς μόνος ἄδεται ἀσώματος ὢν, αἱ δὲ ψυχαὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ πατρὸς

[10] The learned Doctor is perfectly right in stating that Origen in his exposition of St. Paul's words, 2 Cor. v. 1. distinguishes the ἐπίγειος οἰκία from that which is called σκῆνος, and makes the latter signify the ethereal body of the soul, and the former the solid and mortal body, which were as if St. Paul meant to say, "We know that if this earthly house, or earthly body, in which the σκῆνος, or tabernacle, or vehicle of the soul is enclosed, were dissolved, we shall receive a celestial body." But this explication is so much at variance with the apostle's words, and so forced, and I may say unwarrantable, that it is surprising that any one could be found to approve of it. Let the *fourth verse* be compared with *the first*, and its fallacy will at once be apparent. St. Paul says, ver. 4. that while we are ἐκ τῷ σκήνει, "in this tabernacle," we groan, being burdened; not that we are desirous to put off this tabernacle, but rather to be clothed upon with the celestial body which is promised to us. From these words it is evident that what he calls σκῆνος, is a burden rather than a comfort to us, and will hereafter be assuredly put off and abandoned. But how can these words be understood of that body of the soul imagined by Origen and the Platonists, which the souls bring with them from heaven, and on being released from the earthly bodies again take away with them? Can this body cause the soul to groan and grieve? Can souls clothed with this vehicle or body in heaven be said to be burdened and pressed down as it were with a load and encumbrance? In short, can this vehicle be put off so that the soul should desire not to be *unclothed*, but to be *clothed upon*? All this is most true if we regard the word σκῆνος as implying this frail and miserable mortal body; which is unquestionably the case: but on the other hand is devoid of all appearance of truth, if we suppose it to signify a certain middle and ethereal body of the soul. Thus frequently the most powerful minds, if warped by a partiality for pre-conceived opinions, fall into such interpretations of scripture as could hardly be expected even from men of the humblest pretensions. I pass over the argument drawn by Origen from the example of Samuel's ghost. For every body knows that commentators are at issue with each other on the nature of this apparition, and I have already stated my own views respecting it in another place.

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τῶν ὅλων, σώματα νοερὰ ὑπάρχουσαι, εἰς λόγῳ θεωρητὰ μέλη διακεκόσμηνται, ταύτην λαβοῦσαι τὴν διατύπωσιν· ὅθεν καὶ ἐν τῷ Ἅϊδῃ, καὶ γλῶσσαν, καὶ δάκτυλον, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μέλη ἱστοροῦνται ἔχειν· οὐχ ὡς σώματος ἑτέρου συνυπάρχοντος αὐταῖς ἀειδοῦς· ἀλλ' ὅτι αὐταὶ φύσει αἱ ψυχαὶ παντὸς ἀπογυμνωθεῖσαι περιβλήματος τοιαῦται κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπάρχουσι, "God alone is praised as incorporeal and invisible;[1] but souls are made by him (who is the Father of all things) intellectual bodies, ornamentally branched out (as it were) into members distinguishable by reason, and having the same form and signature with the outward body. Whence it is, that in Hades (or hell) we read of a tongue, and a finger, and other members; not as if there then were another invisible body co-existing with these souls, but because the souls themselves are in their own nature (when stript naked of all clothing) according to their very essence such." We say therefore, if one of these two opinions must needs be entertained, that either the soul itself is a body, or else that it hath a body after death; the latter of them, which was Origen's, ought certainly much to be preferred before the former, whether held in Tertullian's sense, that all substance, and consequently God himself, is body; or else in that of Methodius, that all created substance is such, God alone being incorporeal.

But we have already showed, that Origen was not singular in this opinion, Irenæus before him having asserted the same thing, that souls after death are adapted to certain bodies (where the word in the Greek probably was προσάπτονται), which have the same character with these terrestrial ones;[2] and Philoponus after him, who was no Pagan, but a Christian philosopher, dogmatizing in like manner. We might here add, that Johannes Thessalonicensis, in that dialogue of his, read in the seventh Synod,[3] seemeth to have been of the same persuasion also, when he affirmeth of souls, as well as angels and demons, that they were ὁραθέντες παρὰ πλειόνων αἰσθητῶς πλεονάκις, τῷ εἴδει τῶν οἰκείων αὐτῶν σωμάτων, "often seen by many sensibly, in the

[1] [Archelaus in like manner asserts that God alone is invisible, Acta Desp. cum Manete, p. 54. 55. ed. Zaccagn.]

[2] We have already shown on sect. 27. that Dr. Cudworth is mistaken in respect to Irenæus. The passages of Philoponus are quoted above.

[3] See Concilior. Joann. Harduini. tom. 4. p. 293. 294. Joannes Thessalonicensis is again erroneously classed among those who held human minds and angels to consist of two parts, soul and body. His opinion was rather that they are both wholly corporeal, as is manifest from the following passage of his: Εἰ δὲ ποῦ εὕροις ἀσωμάτους καλουμένους τοὺς ἀγγέλους, ἢ ψυχάς, ὡς μὴ ὄντας ἐκ τῆς συμμίξεως τῶν ὑλικῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων καὶ τοιαῦτα σώματα παχία καὶ ἀντίτυπα, οἷα ἡμεῖς περικείμεθα, "Moreover if you any where find the angels or human souls called incorporeal, know that they are so called as not consisting of a commixture of the four material elements, or being gross bodies similar to those with which we are invested." He does not say that they are endowed with bodies, but that they are bodies, although not such as our own perishable ones. And he previously asserts this to be the opinion of the whole *catholic church*: an assertion in which the council found nothing to reprehend.

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form of their own bodies." However, it is a thing which Psellus took for granted, where, speaking of devils insinuating their temptations into men's souls, by affecting immediately the phantastic spirit, he writeth after this manner:* Ὁ λέγων, πόῤῥωθεν μὲν ὢν, ἰσχυροτέρας δεῖται κραυγῆς, ἀγχοῦ δὲ γενόμενος, εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀκούοντος οὖς ψιθυρίζων ὑποφωνεῖ· καὶ εἰ ἐνῆν αὐτῷ συνεγγίσαι πνεύματι τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐδενὸς ἂν ἐδεήθη ψόφου, ἀλλ' ἦν ὁ κατὰ βούλησιν λόγος ἀψόφῳ κελεύθῳ πρὸς τὸ δεχόμενον ἐγγινόμενος, ὃ φασι καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐξιούσαις τῶν σωμάτων εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ταύτας ἁπλήκτως ὁμιλεῖν ἀλλήλαις, "When one man speaks to another from afar off, he must (if he would be heard) make a loud cry or noise; whereas, if he stood near to him, he might softly whisper into his ear. But could he immediately approach to the spirit (or subtle body of the soul), he should not then need so much as to make a whisper, but might silently and without noise, communicate whatsoever thoughts of his own to him, by motions made thereupon. And this is said to be the way that souls, going out of these bodies, converse together; they communicating their thoughts to one another without any noise." For Psellus here plainly supposeth souls after death to have πνεῦμα, that is, a certain subtle body, adhering to them, by motions upon which they may silently converse with each other.[4] It is true indeed, that St. Austin,† in his twelfth book De Genesi ad Literam, does not himself close with this opinion, of the soul's having a body after death, but much less of its being a body: nevertheless does he seem to leave every man to his own liberty therein, in these words: "Si autem quæritur, dum anima de corpore exierit, utrum ad aliqua loca corporalia feratur, an ad incorporalia corporalibus similia; an verò nec ad ipsa, sed ad illud, quod et corporibus et similitudinibus corporum est excellentius; citò quidem responderim; ad corporalia loca

* Page 94. [Page 72.]

[4] The learned Doctor, I fancy, makes Psellus wiser than he really was; it being evident from the whole of the dialogue from which these words are taken, that he did not regard the soul as a simple nature clothed with a subtle body, but imagined it to be wholly corporeal, and consisting of a most subtle matter. Certainly the passage here quoted will never induce me to forego this opinion, which is in perfect accordance with his crude and clumsy philosophy. He attributes a certain πνεῦμα to the soul: but he does not understand a subtle body by this term, as the Platonists sometimes do. What his πνεῦμα means, is evident from the preceding, where he says of demons that they τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν φανταστικῷ ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙ συνεγγίσαι, "approach to the fantastic or imaginative *spirit* which is in us." Of this πνεῦμα Psellus is speaking when he afterwards adds, that he "who could approach to the spirit of the soul, might silently communicate his own thoughts to the mind." The meaning of which words is this: If any one could reach the imagination of another by his spirit, and as it were immediately approach it, he would be able to reveal his thoughts to him without language. To which he subjoins, that according to the vulgar belief spirits separated from body are endowed with that faculty of affecting one another in this way, and of exciting the imagination of other spirits without the intervention of any thing else. There is nothing in this passage therefore about the body of souls.

† De Genesi ad Literam, cap. 32. [Page 239. tom. 3. opp.]

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eam vel non ferri nisi cum aliquo corpore, vel non localiter ferri. Jam utrum habeat aliquod corpus, ostendat, qui potest; ego autem non puto. Spiritalem enim arbitror esse, non corporalem; ad spiritalia vero pro meritis fertur, aut ad loca pœnalia similia corporibus, "But if it be demanded, when the soul goes out of this body, whether it be carried into any corporal places, or to incorporals like to corporals, or else to neither, but to that which is more excellent than both bodies, and the likenesses of bodies? the answer is ready; that it cannot be carried to corporal places, or not locally carried any whither, without a body. Now whether the soul have some body, when it goes out of this body, let them, that can, show: but, for my part, I think otherwise. For I suppose the soul to be spiritual, and not corporal; and that, after death, it is either carried to spiritual things, or else to penal places, like to bodies, such as have been represented to some in extasies," &c. Where St. Austin himself seems to think the punishment of souls, after death, and before the resurrection, to be fantastical, or only in imagination: whereas there could not be then so much as fantastic punishments neither, nor any imagination at all in souls, without a body, if that doctrine of Aristotle's[5] be true, that fancy or imagination is nothing else but a weaker sense; that is, a thing which results from a complication of soul and body both together. But it is observable, that in the fore-cited place that, which St. Austin chiefly opposed, was the soul's being a body, as Tertullian, Methodius, and others had asserted; but as for its having a body, he saith only this, ostendat qui potest, "let him that can show it;" he granting, in the mean time, that the soul cannot be locally carried any whither at all after death, nor indeed be in any place without a body. However, the same St. Austin, as he elsewhere condemneth the opinion of those who would take the fire of hell metaphorically, acknowledging it to be real or corporeal; so does he somewhere think it not improbable, but after death, and before the resurrection, the souls of men may suffer from a certain fire, for the consuming and burning up of their dross:* Post istius sanè corporis mortem, donec ad illum veniatur, qui post resurrectionem corporum futurus est damnationis et remunerationis ultimus dies; si hoc temporis intervallo, ejusmodi ignem dicuntur perpeti, quem non sentiant illi, qui non habuerint tales mores et amores in hujus corporis vitâ, ut eorum ligna, et fœnum, et stipula consumantur; alii vero sentiunt, qui ejusmodi secum ædificia portaverunt, &c. non redarguo, quia forsitan verum est, "If in this interval of time, betwixt the death of the body and the resurrection or day of judgment, the souls of the dead be said to suffer such a fire as can do no execution upon

[5] De Anima, lib. 3. cap. 9. p. 53. &c. tom. 2. opp.
* De Civ. Dei. lib. 21. cap. 26 [Sect. 4. p. 490. tom. 7. opp.]

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those who have no wood, hay, nor stubble to burn up, but shall be felt by such as have made such buildings or superstructures, &c., I reprehend it not, because perhaps it is true." The opinion here mentioned is thus expressed by Origen,* in his fifth book against Celsus, which very place St. Austin[6] seems to have had respect to: Οὐ συνιδὼν ὅτι ὥσπερ Ἑλλήνων τισὶν ἔδοξε, τὸ πῦρ καθάρσιον ἐπάγεται τῷ κόσμῳ· εἰκὸς δ' ὅτι καὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν δεομένων τῆς διὰ τοῦ πυρὸς δίκης καίοντος μὲν καὶ οὐ κατακαίοντος τοὺς μὴ ἔχοντας ὕλην διομένην ἀναλύεσθαι ὑπ' ἐκείνου τοῦ πυρός· καίοντος δὲ καὶ κατακαίοντος τοὺς ἐν τῇ διὰ τῶν πράξεων καὶ λόγων καὶ νοημάτων τροπικῶς λεγομένῃ οἰκοδομῇ ξύλα, χόρτον, ἢ καλάμην οἰκοδομήσαντας, "Celsus did not understand that this fire, as well according to the Hebrews and Christians, as to some of the Greeks, will be purgatory to the world; as also to every one of those persons who stand in need of such punishment and remedy by fire: which fire can do no execution upon those who have no combustible matter in them, but will be felt by such as in the moral structure of their thoughts, words, and actions, have built up wood, hay, and stubble." Now since souls cannot suffer from fire, nor any thing else in way of sense and pain, without being vitally united to some body, we may conclude, that St. Austin, when he wrote this, was not altogether abhorrent from souls having bodies after death.[7]

Hitherto have we declared how the ancient assertors of incorporeal substance, as unextended, did repel the assaults of Athe-

* Contra Celsus, lib. 5. p. 240.

[6] I cannot agree with the learned Doctor, who here confounds two opinions totally remote and distinct from each other. Origen, in the passage quoted, is speaking of the fire which will consume this world, and every thing therein, at the last day, and tells us that this fire according to the opinion of some, will also serve as a purgatory to persons not yet sufficiently healed and purged from their vices, so that they may enter the heavenly mansion entirely pure and spotless. For most of the ancient Christian fathers believed that at the day of judgment all men will be destroyed by the fire that extinguishes the world, but that the good will be purified by the same fire, and freed from all remaining stains of former vices: which learned men have long since proved from numerous testimonies of theirs. See Joh. Dallæus, De Vero Usu Patrum, lib. 2. cap. 4. p. 292. and others. This opinion Origen is expressing in the words quoted. Consult Pet. Dan. Huet, in his Origeniana, lib. 2. quæst. 11. p. 139. &c. who discourses upon this dogma with great copiousness and erudition. Nor is Origen mistaken in saying that this opinion was entertained by some of the Greeks and Hebrews prior to the timeof our Saviour: for that the Platonists and Hebrews were not altogether opposed to it, has been shown not long ago by the erudite J. Elsner, Observat. in Novum Testam. tom. 2. p. 79. &c. But this dogma has scarcely any thing in common with the one that St. Augustine says he is not altogether disposed to reject; which brings us much nearer to the purgatorial fire as they call it, and maintains that souls are tormented and purified by a certain fire in the interval between death and the resurrection or day of judgment.

[7] Let us confess the truth rather, and say that in his precepts upon the nature of the soul and angels, and upon the punishments of hell and other doctrines connected therewith, as well as in many other matters, St. Augustine is any thing but consistent with himself, and being uncertain what course to follow sometimes inclines to one and sometimes to another opinion; nor does he always reflect upon the inferences deducible from the various dogmas he upholds.

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ists and Corporealists, made against it; but especially how they quitted themselves of that absurdity, of the illocality and immobility of finite created spirits, by supposing them always to be vitally united to some bodies, and consequently, by the locality of those their respective bodies, determined to here and there; according to that of Origen:* Ἡ ψυχὴ ἡμῶν δέεται σώματος διὰ τὰς τοπικὰς μεταβάσεις, "Our soul stands in need of a body in order to local motions." We shall in the next place declare what grounds of reason there were, which induced those ancients to assert and maintain a thing so repugnant to sense and imagination, and consequently to all vulgar apprehension, as a substance in itself unextended, indistant, and indivisible, or devoid of magnitude and parts, Wherein we shall only represent the sense of these ancient Incorporealists, so far as we can, to the best advantage, in order to their vindication against Atheists and Materialists; ourselves in the mean time not asserting any thing, but leaving every one, that can, to make his own judgment; and so either to close with this, or that other following hypothesis, of extended incorporeals.

Now it is here observable, that it was a thing formerly taken for granted on both sides, as well by the assertors as the deniers of incorporeal substance, that there is but one kind of extension only; and consequently, that whatsoever hath magnitude and parts, or one thing without another, is not only intellectually and logically, but also really and physically divisible or discerpible, as likewise antitypous and impenetrable; so that it cannot co-exist with a body in the same place: from whence it follows, that whatsoever arguments do evince that there is some other substance besides body, the same do therefore demonstrate, according to the sense of these ancients (as well Corporealists as Incorporealists), that there is something unextended, it being supposed by them, both alike, that whatsoever is extended, is body. Nevertheless we shall here principally propound such considerations of theirs as tend directly to prove that there is something unextendedly incorporeal; and that an unextended Deity is no impossible idea; to wit, from hence, because there is something unextended even in our very selves. Where, not to repeat the forementioned ratiocination of Simplicius, that whatsoever can act and reflect upon its whole self, cannot possibly be extended, nor have parts distant from one another;

* Contra Celsus, lib. 5. p. 244.

[a] In this Dr. Cudworth acts wisely. For at that time, as at the present day, philosophers of the highest eminence, both in England and other countries, were disputing with each other upon the subject. [Dr. Clarke defends the extension of the Deity, On the Being and Attributes of God, p. 247. 248. See also Beausobre Hist. du Manich. p. 484.]

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Plotinus first argues after this manner:* Τί τοίνυν φήσουσιν, οἱ τὴν ψυχὴν σῶμα εἶναι λέγοντες, πρῶτον μὲν περὶ ἑκάστου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ σώματι, πότερον ἕκαστον ψυχὴν, οἷα ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ὅλη; καὶ πάλιν τοῦ μέρους τὸ μέρος; οὐδὲν ἄρα τὸ μέγεθος συνεβάλλετο τῇ οὐσίᾳ αὐτῆς· καίτοι ἔδει γε ποσοῦ τινος ὄντος· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλον πολλαχῆ, ὅπερ σώμασι παρεῖναι ἀδύνατον, ἐν πλείοσι τὸ αὐτὸ ὅλον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μέρος ὅπερ τὸ ὅλον ὑπάρχειν· εἰ δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν, οὐ ψυχὴν φήσουσιν, ἐξ ἀψύχων ψυχὴ αὐτοῖς ὑπάρξει, "What then will they say, who contend that the soul is a body (or extended) whether or no will they grant concerning every part of the soul in the same body (as that of it which is in the foot, and that in the hand, and that in the brain, &c.), and again every part of those parts, that each of them is soul, such as the whole? If this be consented to, then it is plain that magnitude, or such a quantity, would confer nothing at all to the essence of the soul, as it would do were it an extended thing; but the whole would be in many parts or places, which is a thing that cannot possibly belong to body; that the same whole should be in more, and that a part should be what the whole is. But if they will not grant every part of their extended soul to be soul, then, according to them, must the soul be made up, and compounded of soulless things." Which argument is elsewhere thus propounded by him:† Εἰ δὲ ἕκαστον ζωὴν ἔχοι, καὶ ἓν ἀρκεῖ· εἰ δὲ μηδενὸς αὐτῶν ζωὴν ἔχοντος ἡ σύνοδος πεποίηκε ζωὴν, ἄτοπον· μᾶλλον δὲ ἀδύνατον συμφόρησιν σωμάτων ζωὴν ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ νοῦν γεννᾷν τὰ ἀνόητα, "If every one of the parts of this extended soul or mind have life in it, then would any one of them alone be sufficient. But to say, that though none of the parts alone have life in them, yet the conjunction of them altogether maketh life, is absurd; it being impossible that life and soul should result from a congeries of lifeless and soulless things, or that mindless things put together should beget mind." The sum of this argumentation is this, that either every part of an extended soul is soul, and of an extended mind, mind; or not. Now if no part of a soul, as supposed to be extended alone, be soul, or have life and mind in it, then is it certain that the whole, resulting from all the parts, could have no life or mind, because nothing can (causally) come from nothing. It is true indeed, that corporeal qualities and forms, according to the atomic physiology, result from a composition and contexture of atoms or parts, each of which, taken alone by themselves, have nothing of that quality or form in them:

* Page 460. [Ennead 4. lib. 7. cap. 5.]

† The learned Doctor slightly varies the order of Plotinus' words. For those which are here placed at the beginning: εἰ δὲ——ἀρκεῖ stand after ἄτοποι in Plotinus.

† Ennead 4. lib. 7. cap. 2. [Page 457.]

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Ne ex albis alba rearis;
Aut ea, quæ nigrant, nigro de semine nata,[10]

"You are not to think, that white things are made out of white principles, nor black things out of black;" but the reason of the difference here is plain, because these qualities and forms are not entities really distinct from the magnitude, figure, site, and motion of parts, but only such a composition of them as cause different fancies in us; but life and understanding, soul and mind, are entities really distant from magnitude, figure, site, and motion of parts; they are neither mere fancies, nor syllables of things, but simple and uncompounded realities. But if every supposed part of a soul be soul, and of a mind, mind, then would all the rest of it besides any one part be superfluous; or indeed every supposed part thereof would be the same with the whole: from whence it follows, that it could not be extended, or have any real parts at all, since no part of an extended thing can possibly be the same with the whole.

Again, the same philosopher endeavours further to prove, that the human soul itself is unextended and indivisible, from its energies and operations, and that as well those of sensation as of intellection. First, therefore, from external sensations, he reasons in this manner:* Ἔτι μέλλει αἰσθάνεσθαί τινος ἓν αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ παντὸς ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι· καὶ εἰ διὰ πολλῶν αἰσθητηρίων πλείω τὰ εἰσιόντα, ἢ πολλαὶ περὶ ἓν ποιότητες, κἂν δι' ἑνὸς ποικίλον, οἷον πρόσωπον· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο μὲν ῥινὸς ἄλλο δὲ ὀφθαλμῶν, ἀλλὰ ταυτὸν ὁμοῦ πάντων· καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν δι' ὀμμάτων τὸ δὲ δι' ἀκοῆς, ἕν τι δεῖ εἶναι εἰς ὃ ἄμφω· ἢ πῶς ἂν εἴποι ὅτι ἕτερα ταῦτα, μὴ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ὁμοῦ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐλθόντων, "That which perceiveth in us must of necessity be one thing, and by one and the same indivisible perceive all; and that, whether they be more things, entering through several organs of sense, as the many qualities of one substance, or one various and multiform thing, entering through the same organ, as the countenance or picture of a man. For it is not one thing in us that perceives the nose, another thing the eyes, and another thing the mouth; but it is one and the self-same thing that perceiveth all. And when one thing enters through the eye, another through the ear, these also must of necessity come all at last to one indivisible, or else they could not be compared together, nor one of them affirmed to be different from another; the several sentiments of them meeting nowhere together in one. He concludes therefore, that this one thing in us that sensibly perceives all things, may be resembled to the centre of a circle, and the several senses to lines drawn from the circumference, which all meet in that one

[10] Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, lib. 2. ver. 730. 732. p. 390.
* Page 461. [Cap. VI.]

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centre. Wherefore that which perceives and apprehends all things in us must needs be really one and the very same; that is, unextended and indivisible." Which argument is yet further pursued by him, more particularly thus: "If that which sensibly perceiveth in us be extended, so as to have distant parts one without another, then one of these three things must needs be affirmed, that either every part of this extended substance of the soul perceives a part of the object only, or every part of it the whole object, or else all comes to some one point, which alone perceives both the several parts of the object and the whole, all the other being but as circumferential lines leading to this centre." Now of the former of these three, Plotinus thus: Μεγέθει ὄντι τούτῳ, ζυμμερίζοιτο ἂν· ὥστε ἄλλο ἄλλου μέρος, καὶ μηδένα ἡμῶν ὅλου τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἀντιληψιν ἔχειν· ὥσπερ[1] ἂν εἰ ἐγὼ μὲν ἄλλου· σὺ δὲ ἄλλου αἴσθοιο, "If the soul be a magnitude, then must it be divided together with the sensible object, so that one part of the soul must perceive one part of the object, and another, another; and nothing in it, the whole sensible: just as if I should have the sense of one thing, and you of another." Whereas it is plain by our internal sense, that it is one and the self-same thing in us, which perceives both the parts and the whole. And of the second he writeth in this manner: Εἰ δὲ ὁτιοῦν παντὸς αἰσθήσεται· εἰς ἄπειρα διαιρεῖσθαι τοῦ μεγέθους πεφυκότος, ἀπείρους καὶ αἰσθήσεις καθ' ἕκαστον αἰσθητὸν συμβήσεται γίγνεσθαι ἑκάστῳ οἷον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀπείρους ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονοῦντι ἡμῶν εἰκόνας, "But if every part of the extended soul perceive the whole sensible object, since magnitude is infinitely divisible, there must be in every man infinite sensations and images of one and the same object." Whereas we are intimately conscious to ourselves, that we have but only one sensation of one object at the same time. And as for the third and last part of this disjunction, that what sensibly perceives in every one, is but one single point, either mathematical or physical; it is certain, first, that a mathematical point, having neither longitude, latitude, nor profundity, is no body nor substance, but only a notion of our own mind, or a mode of conceiving in us. And then, as for a physical point or minimum, a body so little that there cannot possibly be any less, Plotinus asserting the infinite divisibility of body, here explodes the thing itself. However he further intimates, that if there were any such physical minimum, or absolutely least body or extensum, this could not possibly receive upon it a distinct representation and delineation of all the several parts of a whole visible object at once, as of the eyes, nose, mouth, &c., in a man's face or picture, or of the particularities

[1] These words are not joined with the preceding ones in Plotinus, as here, but stand at some distance before them.

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of an edifice; nor could such a parvitude or atom as this be the cause of all animal motions. And this was one of Aristotle's[2] arguments, whereby he would prove unextended incorporeals: Πῶς τῷ ἀμερεῖ τὸ μεριστόν; "If the soul were indivisible as a point, how could it perceive that which is divisible?" that is, take notice of all the distinct parts of an extended object, and have a description of the whole of them at once upon itself? The sum of the whole argumentation is this, that if the soul be an extended substance, then must it of necessity be either a physical point or minimum, the least extensum, that can possibly be (if there be any such least, and body or extension be not infinitely divisible), or else it must consist of more such physical points, joined together. As for the former of these, it hath been already declared to be impossible, that one single atom, or smallest point of extension, should be able distinctly to perceive all the variety of things: to which might be added, that to suppose every soul to be but one physical minimum, or smallest extensum, is to imply such an essential difference in matter or extension, as that some of the points thereof should be naturally devoid of all life, sense, and understanding, and others again naturally sensitive and rational. Which absurdity, though it should be admitted, yet would it be utterly inconceivable, how there should come to be one such sensitive and rational atom in every man and no more, and how this should constantly remain the same, from infancy to old age, whilst other parts of matter transpire perpetually. But as for the latter, if souls be extended substances, consisting of more points, one without another, all concurring in every sensation; then must every one of those points either perceive a point and part of the object only, or else the whole. Now, if every point of the extended soul perceive only a point of the object, then is there no one thing in us that perceives the whole, or which can compare one part with another. But if every point of the extended soul perceive the whole object at once, consisting of many parts, then would there be innumerable perceptions of the same object in every sensation; as many as there are points in the extended soul. And from both those suppositions, it would alike follow, that no man is one single percipient or person, but that there are innumerable distinct percipients and persons in every man. Neither can there be any other supposition made, besides those three forementioned; as, that the whole extended soul should perceive both the whole sensible object, and all its several parts, no part of this soul in the mean time having any perception at all by itself; because the whole of an extended being is nothing but all the parts taken together; and if none of those parts have any life, sense, or

[2] De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 10. tom. 2. opp.

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perception in them, it is impossible that there should be any in the whole. But, in very truth, to say that the whole soul perceiveth all, and no part of it any thing, is to acknowledge it not to be extended, but to be indivisible, which is the thing that Plotinus contends for.

And that philosopher here further insists upon internal sensations also, and that *συμπάθεια*, or *ὁμοπάθεια*, that "sympathy," or "homopathy," which is in all animals, to the same purpose: it being one and the same thing in them, which perceives pain, in the most distant extremities of the body, as in the sole of the foot, and in the crown of the head; and which moves one part to succour and relieve another labouring under it, which could not possibly be by traduction of all to one physical point, as the centre, for divers reasons.* *Εἰ τοίνυν κατὰ διάδοσιν οὐχ οἱόντε τὴν αἴσθησιν τοῦ τοιούτου γίγνεσθαι, μὴ δὲ σώματος ὄγκου ὄντος, ἄλλου παθόντος, ἄλλο γνῶσιν ἔχειν (παντὸς γὰρ μεγέθους τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ἐστὶ) δεῖ τοιοῦτον τίθεσθαι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον, οἷον πανταχοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι· τοῦτο δὲ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τῶν ὄντων ἢ σώματι ποιεῖν προσήκει,* "Since therefore these sympathetic senses cannot possibly be made by traduction at last to one thing; and body being bulky or out-swelling extension, one part thereof suffering, another cannot perceive it (for in all magnitude, this is one thing, and that another), it followeth, that what perceives in us must be every where, and in all the parts of the body, one and the same thing with itself. Which therefore cannot be itself body, but must of necessity be some other entity or substance incorporeal." The conclusion is, that in men and animals there is one thing indivisibly the same, that comprehendeth the whole outside of them, perceiveth both the parts and the whole of sensible objects, and all transmitted through several senses, sympathizeth with all the distant parts of the body, and acteth entirely upon all. And this is properly called, "I myself," not the extended bulk of the body, which is not one but many substances, but an unextended and indivisible unity, wherein all lines meet and concentre, not as a mathematical point or least extensum, but as one self-active, living power, substantial or inside being, that containeth, holdeth, and connecteth all together.

Lastly, the forementioned philosopher endeavours yet further to prove the human soul to be unextended and devoid of magnitude, and indivisible, from its rational energies or operations, its *νοητῶν νοήσεις*, and *ἀμεγέθων ἀντιλήψεις*, "intellections of intelligibles," and "apprehensions of things devoid of magnitude:" *Πῶς γὰρ μέγεθος ὂν τὸ μὴ μέγεθος νοήσει; καὶ τῷ μεριστῷ τὸ μὴ μεριστὸν,* "For how could the soul (saith he) if it were a magni-

* Page 462.

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tude, understand that which hath no magnitude? and with that which is divisible conceive what is indivisible? Now it is certain, that we have notions of many things which are *ἀφάνταστα*, altogether unimaginable, and therefore have nothing of length, breadth, and thickness in them, as virtue, vice, &c.: *Ἀμεγεθὲς δὲ οἶμαι καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ ἡ τούτων ἄρα νοήσις· ὥστε καὶ προσιόντα καὶ τῷ ἀμερεῖ αὐτῆς ὑποδέξεται, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐν ἀμερεῖ κείσεται,*[*] "Justice and honesty, and the like, are things devoid of magnitude, and therefore must the intellections of them needs be such too. So that the soul must receive these by what is indivisible, and lodge them in that which is divisible." We have also a notion not only of mere latitude or breadth, indivisible as to thickness; and of longitude or a line, indivisible both as to breadth and thickness; but also of a mathematical point, that is every way indivisible, as to length, breadth, and thickness. We have a conception of the intention of powers and virtues, wherein there is nothing of extension or magnitude. And indeed all the abstract essences of things (or the *αὐτοέκαστα*) which are the first objects of intellection, are indivisible: *Εἰ δὲ τῶν ἐν ὕλῃ εἰδῶν τὰς νοήσεις φήσουσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ χωριζομένων γε γίγνονται τοῦ νοῦ χωρίζοντος, οὐ γὰρ μετὰ σαρκῶν,* &c., "And though we apprehend forms, that are in matter too, yet do we apprehend them as separated and abstracted from the same; there being nothing of flesh in our conception of a man," &c. Nay, the soul conceives extended things themselves, unextendedly and indivisibly; for as the distance of a whole hemisphere is contracted into a narrow compass in the pupil of the eye, so are all distances yet more contracted in the soul itself, and there understood indistantly; for the thought of a mile distance, or of ten thousand miles, or semidiameters of the earth, takes up no more room in the soul, nor stretches it any more, than does the thought of a foot, or inch, or indeed of a mathematical point. Were that which perceiveth in us a magnitude, then could it not be *ἴσον παντὶ αἰσθητῷ*, "equal to every sensible," and alike perceive both lesser and greater magnitudes than itself: but least of all could it perceive such things as have no magnitude at all. And this was the other part of Aristotle's argumentation, to prove the soul and mind to be unextended and indivisible:[3] *Πῶς γὰρ νοήσει τὸ ἄμερες μεριστῷ*, "For how could it perceive that which is indivisible by what is divisible?" He having before demanded, how it could apprehend things divisible, and of a great extension, by a mere point, or absolute parvitude. Where the soul, or that which perceives and understands, is, according to Aristotle, neither divisible, as a continued quantity, nor yet indivisible, either as a mathematical, or as a physical

[*] Plotinus, p. 463.

[3] De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 10. tom. 2. opp.

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point, and absolute parvitude; but as that which hath in itself no out-swelling distance, nor relation to any place, otherwise than as it is vitally united to a body, which (wherever it be) it always sympathizes with and acts upon.

Besides which, these ancient assertors of unextended incorporeals would, in all probability, confirm that opinion from hence, because we cannot only conceive extension without cogitation, and again cogitation without extension; from whence it may be inferred, that they are entities really distinct and separable from one another (we having no other rule to judge of the real distinction and separability of things than from our conceptions) but also are not able to conceive cogitation with extension. We cannot conceive a thought to be of such a certain length, breadth, and thickness, mensurable by inches and feet, and by solid measures. We cannot conceive half, or a third part, or a twentieth part of a thought, much less of the thought of an indivisible thing; neither can we conceive every thought to be of some certain determinate figure, either round or angular; spherical, cubical, or cylindrical, or the like. Whereas, if whatsoever is unextended be nothing, thoughts must either be mere nonentities, or else extended too into length, breadth, and thickness; divisible into parts, and mensurable; and also (where finite) of a certain figure. And consequently all verities in us (they being but complex axiomatical thoughts) must of necessity be long, broad, and thick, and either spherically or angularly figurate. And the same must be affirmed of volitions likewise, and appetites or passions, as fear and hope, love and hatred, grief and joy; and of all other things belonging to cogitative beings (souls and minds) as knowledge and ignorance, wisdom and folly, virtue and vice, justice and injustice, &c., that these are either all of them absolute non-entities, or else extended into three divisions of length, breadth, and profundity, and mensurable not only by inches and feet, but also by solid measures, as pints and quarts; and last of all (where they are finite as in men) figurate. But if this be absurd, and these things belonging to soul and mind (though doubtless as great realities at least as the things which belong to bodies) be unextended, then must the substances of souls and minds themselves be unextended also. Thus Plotinus of mind: Νοῦς οὐ διαστὰς ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ, "Mind is not distant from itself:" and indeed were it so, it could not be one thing (as it is) but many; every conceivable part of distant and unextended substance being a substance by itself. And the same is to be said of the human soul, though it act upon distant parts of that body, which it is united to, that itself, notwithstanding, is not scattered out into distance, nor dispersed into multiplicity, nor infinitely divisible; because then it would not be one single substance, or monad, but a heap of

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substances. Soul is no more divisible than life; of which the forementioned philosopher thus: Ἄραγε τὴν ζωὴν μεριεῖς; ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ πᾶν ἦν ζωή, τὸ μέρος ζωὴ οὐκ ἔσται, "Will you divide a life into two? then the whole of it being but a life, the half thereof cannot be a life." Lastly, if soul and mind, and the things belonging to them, as life and cogitation, understanding and wisdom, &c., be outspread into distance, having one part without another; then can there be no good reason given, why they should not be as well really and physically, as intellectually divisible; and one part of them separable from another: since, as Plotinus: Παντὸς μεγέθους τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο, "In all magnitude or extension, this is one thing, and that another." At least, no Theist ought to deny, but that the divine power could cleave or divide a thought, together with the soul, wherein it is, into many pieces; and remove them to the greatest distances from one another (forasmuch as this implies no manner of contradiction, and whatsoever is conceivable by us may be done by infinite power) in which case, neither of them alone would be soul or mind, life or thought, but all put together make up one entire mind, soul, life, and thought.

Wherefore, the sense of the ancient Incorporealists seems to have been as follows: That there are in nature two kinds of substances specifically differing from one another; the first, Ὄγκοι, "bulks," or "tumours," a mere passive thing; the second, Δυνάμεις, "self-active powers" or "virtues," or φύσις δραστήριος, the "energetic nature." The former of these is nothing else but magnitude or extension, not as an abstract notion of the mind, but as a thing really existing without it. For when it is called res extensa, the meaning is not, as if the res were one thing and the extension thereof another, but that it is extension, or distance, really existing, or the thing thereof (without the mind) and not the notion. Now, this in the nature of it is nothing but aliud extra aliud, "one thing without another," and therefore perfect alterity, disunity, and divisibility. So that no extensum whatsoever, of any sensible bigness, is truly and really one substance, but a multitude or heap of substances, as many as there are parts, into which it is divisible. Moreover, one part of this magnitude always standing without another, it is an essential property thereof to be antitypous or impenetrable; that is, to jostle or shoulder out all other extended substance from penetrating into it, and co-existing with it, so as to possess and take up the same room and space. One yard of distance, or of length, breadth, and thickness, cannot possibly be added to another, without making the whole extension double to what it was before, since one of them must of necessity stand without the other. One magnitude cannot imbibe or swallow up another, nor can there be any penetration of dimensions. Moreover,

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magnitude or extension, as such, is mere outside or outwardness; it hath nothing within, no self-active power or virtue; all its activity being either keeping out, or hindering, any other extended thing, from penetrating into it (which yet it doth merely by its being extended, and therefore not so much by any physical efficiency as a logical necessity): or else local motion, to which it is also but passive; no body, or extension, as such, being able to move itself or act upon itself.

Wherefore, were there no other substance in the world besides this magnitude or extension, there could be no motion or action at all in it; no life, cogitation, consciousness; no intellection, appetite, or volition (which things do yet make up the greatest part of the universe), but all would be a dead heap or lump; nor could any one substance penetrate another, and co-exist in the same place with it. From whence it follows of necessity, that besides this outside bulky extension, and tumourous magnitude, there must be another kind of entity, whose essential attribute or character is life, self-activity, or cogitation. Which first, that it is not a mere mode or accident of magnitude and extension, is plain from hence, because cogitation may be as well conceived without extension, as extension without cogitation; whereas no mode of any thing can be conceived without that, whereof it is a mode. And since there is unquestionably much more of entity in life and cogitation than there is in mere extension or magnitude, which is the lowest of all being, and next to nothing; it must needs be imputed to the mere delusion and imposture of imagination, that men are so prone to think this extension or magnitude to be only substance, and all other things besides the mere accidents thereof, generable out of it, and corruptible again into it. For though that secondary and participated life (as it is called) in the bodies of animals be indeed a mere accident, and such as may be present or absent without the destruction of its subject; yet can there be no reason given why the primary and original life itself should not be as well a substantial thing, as mere extension and magnitude. Again, that extension and life, or cogitation, are not two inadequate conceptions neither, of one and the self-same substance, considered brokenly and by piece-meal; as if either all extension had life and cogitation essentially belonging to it (as the Hylozoists conclude) or at least all life and cogitation had extension; and consequently all souls and minds, and even the Deity itself, were either extended life and cogitation, or living and thinking extension (there being nothing in nature unextended, but extension the only entity; so that whatsoever is devoid thereof, is, ipso facto, absolutely nothing): This, I say, will also appear from hence, because, as hath been already declared, we cannot conceive a life, or mind, or thought, nor any thing at all belonging to a

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cogitative being, as such (as wisdom, folly, virtue, vice, &c.), to be extended into length, breadth, and thickness, and to be mensurable by inches, feet, and yards. From whence it may be concluded, that extension, and life or cogitation, are no inadequate conceptions of one and the self-same thing, since they cannot be complicated together into one, but that they are distinct substances from each other. Lives and minds are such tight and compact things in themselves, and have such a self-unity in their nature, as that they cannot be lodged in that, which is wholly scattered out from itself into distance, and dispersed into infinite multiplicity; nor be spread all over the same, as co-extended with it. Nor is it conceivable how all the several parts of an extended magnitude, should jointly concur and contribute to the production of one and the same single and indivisible cogitation; or how that whole heap or bundle of things should be one thinker. A thinker is a monad, or one single substance, and not a heap of substances; whereas no body or extended thing is one but many substances; every conceivable or smallest part thereof being a real substance by itself.

But this will yet further appear, if we consider what kind of action cogitation is. The action of an extended thing, as such, is nothing but local motion, change of distance, or translation from place to place, a mere outside and superficial thing; but it is certain that cogitation (fancy, intellection, and volition) are no local motions; nor the mere fridging up and down of the parts of an extended substance, changing their place and distance; but it is unquestionably an internal energy; that is, such an energy as is within the very substance or essence of that which thinketh, or in the inside of it. From which two kinds of energies we may now conclude that there are also two kinds of entity or substance in nature; the one mere outside, and which hath nothing within it; the other such a kind of entity as hath an eternal energy; acteth from itself, and within itself, and upon itself; an inside thing, whose action is within the very essence or substance thereof; it being plain, that the cogitative or thinking nature is such a thing as hath an essential inside or profundity. Now, this inside of cogitative beings, wherein they thus act or think internally within themselves, cannot have any length, breadth, or thickness in it, because if it had it would be again a mere outside thing. Wherefore had all cogitative beings (souls and minds) extension and magnitude never so much belonging to them, as some suppose them to have, yet could this, for all that, be nothing but the mere outside of their being; besides which, they must of necessity have also an unextended inside, that hath no outswelling tumour, and is not scattered into distance, nor dispersed into multiplicity, which therefore could not possibly exist a part in a part of the supposed extension, as

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if one half of a mind or thought were in one half of that extension, and another in another; but must of necessity be all undividedly, both in the whole of it, and in every part. For had every twentieth or hundredth part of this extensum not the whole of a life or mind in it, but only the twentieth or hundredth part thereof, then could none of them have any true life or mind at all, nor consequently the whole have any. Nor indeed is it otherwise conceivable how a whole quantity of extended substance should be one thing, and have one personality, one *I myself* in it all, were there not one indivisible thing presiding over it, which held it altogether, and diffused itself through all. And thus do we see how this whole in the whole and in every part (do men what they can) will, like a ghost, still haunt them, and follow them every where. But now it is impossible that one and the self-same substance should be both extended and unextended. Wherefore in this hypothesis of extended understanding spirits, having one part without another, there is an undiscerned complication of two distinct substances, extended and unextended, or corporeal and incorporeal, both together; and a confusion of them into one. Where, notwithstanding, we must acknowledge that there is so much of truth aimed at, as that all finite incorporeal substances are always naturally united to some bodies; so that the whole of these created animals is completed and made up of both these together, an extended inside, and an unextended outside, both of them substances indeed really distinct, but yet vitally united each to other.

The sum of all is, that there are two kinds of substances in nature, the first extension or magnitude, really existing without the mind, which is a thing that hath no self-unity at all in it, but is infinite alterity and divisibility, as it is also mere outside and outwardness, it having nothing within, nor any other action belonging to it, but only locally to move when it is moved. The second, life and mind, or the self-active cogitative nature, an inside being, whose action is not local motion, but an internal energy, within the substance or essence of the thinker himself, or in the inside of him; which therefore, though unextended, yet hath a certain inward recess, Βάθος, or essential profundity. And this is a thing which can act all of it entirely upon either a greater or lesser quantity of extended substance or body, and its several parts, penetrating into it, and co-existing in the same place with it. Wherefore it is not to be looked upon either as a mathematical or as a physical point, as an absolute parvitude, or the least extensum possible, it having not only such an essential inside, bathos, or profundity in it, wherein it acteth and thinketh within itself, but also a certain amplitude of active power ad extra, or a sphere of activity upon body. Upon which account it was before affirmed by Plotinus, that an unextended incorporeal is a

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thing bigger than body, because body cannot exist otherwise than a point of it in a point of space; whereas this one and the same indivisible can at once both comprehend a whole extensum within it, and be all of it in every part thereof. And lastly, all finite incorporeals are always naturally to some body or other; from both which together is completed and made up in every created understanding being one entire animal, consisting of soul and body, and having something incorporeal, and something corporeal in it, an unextended inside, and an extended outside, by means whereof it is determined to *here* and *there*, and capable of moving locally, or changing place.

Thus have we represented the sense of the ancient unextended Incorporealists to the best advantage that we could, in way of answer to the premised atheistic argument against incorporeal substance, and in order to the vindication of them from the contempt of Atheists; and we do affirm, that the fore-mentioned argumentations of theirs do evince, that there is some other substance besides body, which therefore, according to the principles of these Atheists themselves, must be acknowledged to be unextended, it being concluded by them, that whatsoever is extended is body. But whether they do also absolutely prove that there is οὐσια ἀμεγεθὴς, ἀδιάστατος, ἀμερὴς, and ἀδιαίρετος, "a substance devoid of magnitude, indistant, without parts, and indivisible;" this we shall leave others to make a judgment of. However, it is certain that Atheists who maintain the contrary must needs assert, that every thought, and whatsoever belongeth to soul, mind (as knowledge, virtue, &c.), is not only mentally and mathematically divisible, so that there may be half, a third part, or a quarter of a thought, and the rest supposed; but also physically separable, or discerpible, together with the soul, wherein it is. They must also deny that there is an internal energy at all, or any other action besides that outside superficial action of local motion, and consequently make all cogitation nothing but local motion or translation. And lastly, they must maintain that no substance can co-exist with any other substance (as soul with body) otherwise than by juxta-position only, and by possessing the pores, or filling up the intervals thereof, as a net with the water.

And this is the first answer to the forementioned atheistic argument against incorporeal substance; that though whatsoever is extended be body, yet every thing is not extended; but that life, or mind and cogitation, are an unextended, indistant, and indivisible nature. But, as we have already intimated, there are other learned assertors of incorporeal substance, who, lest God and spirits, being thus made unextended, should quite vanish into nothing, answer that atheistic argumentation after a different manner, by granting to these Atheists that proposition, "that whatsoever is,

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is extended; and what is unextended, is nothing;" but then denying that other of theirs, "that whatsoever is extended, is body;" they asserting another extension, specifically differing from that of bodies: for, whereas corporeal extension is not only impenetrable, so as that no one part thereof can enter into another, but also both mentally and really divisible, one part being in its nature separable from another; they affirm, that there is another incorporeal extension, which is both penetrable, and also indiscerpible, so that no one part thereof can possibly be separated from another, or the whole; and that to such an incorporeal extension as this belongeth life, cogitation, and understanding, the Deity having such an infinite extension, but all created spirits a finite and limited one, which also is in them supposed to be contractible and dilatable.[4] Now it is not our part here to oppose Theists, but Atheists: wherefore we shall leave these two sorts of Incorporealists to dispute it out friendly amongst themselves; and indeed therefore with the more moderation, equanimity, and toleration of dissent mutually, because it seemeth that some are in a manner fatally inclined to think one way in this controversy, and some another. And whatever the truth of the case be, it must be acknowledged that this latter hypothesis may be very useful and serviceable to retain some in theism, who can by no means admit of a Deity, or any thing else, unextended; though, perhaps, there will not be wanting others also, who would go in a middle way betwixt these two, or compound them together, by supposing the Deity to be indeed altogether unextended, and all of it every where; but finite incorporeals, or created spirits, to have an unextended inside, a life or mind, diffusing itself into a certain amplitude of outward extension, whereby they are determined to a place, yet so as to be all in every part thereof; which outward extension is therefore not to be accounted body, because penetrable, contractible, and dilatable, and because no one part thereof is separable from the rest, by the rushing or incursion of any incorporeal thing upon them.[5] And thus is the Atheists' arguments against in-

[4] I have already shown in different places that not a few both of ancient and modern theologians and philosophers were devoted to this opinion.

[5] But I am afraid both parties will complain of this middle opinion being too obscure to be understood by those who consider that we ought to attend to the meanings of words rather than to the words themselves. I know not whether I possess intellect and perspicacity sufficient to comprehend matters so abstruse and intricate, but I freely confess myself at a loss to understand what the learned Doctor means when he tells us that "incorporeal natures have an unextended inside, a life or mind, diffusing itself into a certain amplitude of outward extension." The words are grand and magnificent enough; but I seek in vain for their meaning. To myself, indeed, any thing that possesses the power of expanding, dilating, and extending itself, seems to be in a certain measure corporeal, and to resemble those vehicles with which the Platonists are wont to invest the soul: but how that which is incorporeal, and nothing more than life or mind, can be the cause of its own extension, I am wholly at a loss to

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corporeal substance answered two manner of ways; first, that there is something unextended; and, secondly, that if there were none, yet must there of necessity be a substance otherwise extended than body is, so as to be neither antitypous nor discerpible. And ourselves would not be understood here dogmatically to assert any thing in this point, save only what all Incorporealists do agree in, to wit, that besides body, which is impenetrably and divisibly extended, there is in nature another substance that is both penetrable of body and indiscerpible, or which doth not consist of parts separable from one another. And that there is at least such a substance as this, is unquestionably manifest from what hath been already declared.

But the Atheist will, in the next place, give an account of the original of this error (as he calls it) of incorporeal substance, and undertake to show from what mistake it proceeded, which is yet another pretended confutation thereof; namely, that it sprung partly from the abuse of abstract names and notions, men making substances of them; and partly from the scholastic essences, distinct from the things themselves, and said to be eternal. From both which delusions and dotages together the Atheists conceive that men have been first of all much confirmed in the belief of ghosts and spirits, demons and devils, invisible beings called by several names. Which belief had also another original, men's mistaking their own fancies for realities. The chief of all which affrightful ghosts and spectres, according to these Atheists, is the Deity, the Oberon, or prince of fairies and fancies. But then, whereas men, by their natural reason, could not conceive otherwise of these ghosts and spirits, than that they were a kind of thin, aërial bodies, their understandings have been so enchanted by these abstract names (which are indeed the names of nothing), and those separate essences and quiddities of scholastics, as that they have made incorporeal substances of them; the atheistic conclusion is, that they, who assert an incorporeal Deity, do really but make a scholastic separate essence, or the mere abstract notion of an accident, a

conceive. Do incorporeal souls resemble the nature of spiders, which we know are able out of themselves to surround themselves with an extended web? But I leave this to those whose minds are accustomed to the investigation of subjects so far above the vulgar comprehension; and should they ridicule my ignorance and stupidity, I will patiently bear with it, provided they will show me how these things which seem to me so contradictory, can be reconciled with each other. I leave the same parties to handle and determine the whole of this question, whether or not God and simple souls are in a certain way extended. Each side of it is involved in difficulties which no mortal is capable of solving. But yet many of those who contend so fiercely upon these subjects seem to me to be much less opposed to each other than they imagine. For the generality of those who hold the Deity and spirits to be extensible, when they come to explain this doctrine, and to show what extension they attribute to spirits, fortify their opinion by so many distinctions as to make it plainly appear that they differ but little from their adversaries.

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substantial thing, and a ghost or spirit presiding over the whole world.[6]

To which our reply in general first of all is, that all this is nothing but idle romantic fiction; the belief of a Deity, and substance incorporeal, standing upon none of those imaginary foundations. And then, as for that impudent atheistic pretence, that the Deity is nothing but a figment or creature of men's fear and imagination, and therefore the prince of fairies and fancies; this hath been already sufficiently confuted in our answer to the first atheistic argumentation,* where we have also over and above showed, that there is not only a natural prolepsis or anticipation of a God in the minds of men, but also that the belief thereof is supported by the strongest and most substantial reason, his existence being indeed demonstrable, with mathematical evidence, to such as are capable, and not blinded with prejudice, nor enchanted with the witchcraft of vice and wickedness, to the debauching of their understandings. It hath been also showed that the opinion of other ghosts and spirits, besides the Deity, sprung not merely from fear and fancy neither, as children's bugbears, but from real phenomena; true sensible apparitions, with the histories of them in all ages, without which the belief of such things could never have held up so generally and constantly in the world. As likewise, that there is no repugnancy at all to reason, but that there may be as well aërial and ethereal, as there are terrestrial animals; and that the dull and earthy stupidity of men's minds is the only thing which makes them so prone to think that there is no understanding nature superior to mankind, but that in the world all is dead about us; and to disbelieve the existence of any thing, which themselves cannot either see or feel. Assuredly the Deity is no fancy, but the greatest reality in the world, and that, without which there could be nothing at all real, it being the only necessary existent; and consequently atheism is either mere sottishness, or else a strange kind of irreligious fanaticism.

We now further add, that the belief of ghosts and spirits incorporeal, and consequently of an incorporeal Deity, sprung neither from any ridiculous mistake of the abstract names and notions of mere accidents for substances, nor from the scholastic

[6] This is aimed at Hobbes, who, as I have already intimated elsewhere, seems to have been not very far from supposing that the doctrine of incorporeal ghosts and spirits sprung in a great measure from the use of abstract names and words, and the forms and notions of things. But yet this philosopher nowhere transfers this opinion to an attack upon the divine nature: nor if he were alive would he own to all the corollaries that are charged upon him. The man was an enemy to all religion and piety, and assailed both publicly and in private the ministers of religion, and all their acts and institutions: hence it naturally followed that they suspected him of every wickedness, and imagined his opinions to have more impiety and poison in them than the words in which they were conveyed would seem to indicate.

* From p. 608 to 615. vol. 2.

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essences, said to be eternal. For, as for the latter, none of those scholastics ever dreamed that there was any universal man, or universal horse, existing alone by itself, and separate from all singulars; nor that the abstract metaphysical essences of men, after they were dead, subsisting by themselves, did walk up and down amongst graves, in airy bodies: it being absolutely impossible that the real essence of any thing should be separable from the thing itself, or eternal, when that is not so. And were the essences of all things looked upon by these scholastics as substances incorporeal, then must they have made all things (even body itself) to be ghosts, and spirits, and incorporeal; and accidents also (they having their essences too) to be substantial. But in very truth, these scholastic essences, said to be eternal, are nothing but the intelligible essences of things, or their natures as conceivable, and objects of the mind. And in this sense it is an acknowledged truth, that the essences of things (as for example, of a sphere or triangle) are eternal, and such as were never made; because there could not otherwise be eternal verities concerning them. So that the true meaning of these eternal essences is indeed no other than this, that knowledge is eternal; or that there is an eternal mind that comprehendeth the intelligible natures and ideas of all things, whether actually existing or possible only, their necessary relations to one another, and all the immutable verities belonging to them. Wherefore, though these eternal essences themselves be no ghosts nor spirits, nor substances incorporeal, they being nothing but objective entities of the mind, or Noemata, and ideas; yet does it plainly follow from the necessary supposition of them (as was before declared), that there is one eternal unmade Mind and perfect incorporeal Deity, a real and substantial Ghost or Spirit, which comprehending itself, and all the extent of its own power, the possibility of things, and their intelligible natures, together with an exemplar or platform of the whole world, produced the same accordingly.[7]

But our atheistic argumentator yet further urges, that those scholastics and metaphysicians, who, because life or cogitation can be considered alone abstractedly, without the consideration of body, therefore conclude it not to be the accident or action of a body, but a substance by itself (and which also, after men are dead, can walk amongst the graves), that these (I say) do so far abuse those abstract names and notions of mere accidents, as plainly to make substances incorporeal of them. To which therefore we reply also, that were the abstract notions of acci-

[7] The subject of essences, as they are called, and of their stability and eternity, is discussed by Dr. Cudworth more copiously and eruditely in his Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, book 4. cap. 3. 4. 5.

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dents in general made incorporeal substances, by those philosophers aimed at, then must they have supposed all the qualities or affections of bodies, such as whiteness and blackness, heat and cold, and the like, to have been substances incorporeal also; a thing yet never heard, or thought of. But the case is far otherwise as to conscious life or cogitation, though it be an abstract also; because this is no accident of body, as the Atheist (serving his own hypothesis) securely takes it for granted, nor indeed of any thing else, but an essential attribute of another substance, distinct from body (or incorporeal), after the same manner as extension or magnitude is the essential attribute of body, and not a mere accident.

And now having so copiously confuted all the most considerable atheistic grounds, we are necessitated to dispatch those that follow, being of lesser moment, with all possible brevity and compendiousness. The four next, which are the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth atheistic argumentations, pretend to no more than only this, to disprove a corporeal Deity; or from the supposition that there is no other substance in the world besides body, to infer the impossibility of a God; that is, of an eternal unmade Mind, the maker and governor of the whole world: all which therefore signify nothing at all to the assertors of a Deity incorporeal, who are the only genuine Theists. Nevertheless, though none but Stoics, and such other Corporealists, as are notwithstanding Theists, be directly concerned in answer to them, yet shall we, first, so far consider the principles of the atheistic corporealism, contained in those two heads, the fifth and sixth, as from the absolute impossibility of these hypotheses to demonstrate a necessity of incorporeal substance, from whence a Deity will also follow.

Here, therefore, are these two atheistic hypotheses, founded upon the supposition that all is body: the first, in the way of qualities, generable and corruptible, which we call the Hylopathian; the second, in the way of unqualified atoms, which is the Atomic, Corporealism, and Atheism. The former of these was the most ancient, and the first sciography, or rude delineation of atheism. For Aristotle[8] tells us, that the most ancient Atheists were those who supposed matter or body, that is, bulky extension, to be the only substance, and unmade thing, that, out of which all things were made, and into which all things are again resolved; whatsoever is else in the world being nothing but the passions, qualities, and accidents thereof, generable and corruptible, or producible out of nothing, and reducible to nothing again. From whence the necessary consequence is, that there

[8] Metaphys. lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 264. tom. 4. opp. But on this and the following clause consult what we have remarked at great length on chap. 3. in reference to these matters.

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is no eternal unmade life or understanding, or that mind is no god, or principle in the universe, but essentially a creature.

And this Hylopathian atheism, which supposeth whatsoever is in the universe to be either the substance of matter and bulk, or else the qualities and accidents thereof, generable and corruptible, hath been called also by us Anaximandrian. Though we deny not but that there might be formerly some difference amongst the Atheists of this kind; nor are we ignorant that Simplicius and others conceive Anaximander to have asserted, besides matter, qualities also eternal and unmade, or an homæomery, and similar atomology, just in the same manner as Anaxagoras afterwards did, save only that he would not acknowledge any unmade mind or life; Anaximander supposing all life and understanding whatsoever, all soul and mind, to have risen up and been generated from a fortuitous commixture of those similar atoms, or the qualities of heat and cold, moist and dry, and the like, contempered together. And we confess, that there is some probability for this opinion. Notwithstanding which, because there is no absolute certainty thereof, and because all these ancient Atheists agreed in this, that life and understanding are either first and primary, or else secondary qualities of body, generable and corruptible; therefore did we not think fit to multiply forms of atheism, but rather to make but one kind of atheism of all this, calling it indifferently, Hylopathian or Anaximandrian.

The second atheistic hypothesis is that form of atheism described under the sixth head, which likewise supposing body to be the only substance; and the principles thereof devoid of life and understanding, does reject all real qualities, according to the vulgar notion of them, and generate all things whatsoever, besides matter, merely from the combinations of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, or the contextures of unqualified atoms, life and understanding not excepted: which therefore, according to them, being no simple primitive and primordial thing, but secondary, compounded, and derivative, the mere creature of matter and motion, could not possibly be a God or first principle in the universe. This is that atomic atheism called Democritical; Leucippus and Democritus being the first founders thereof. For though there was, before them, another atomology, which made unqualified atoms the principles of all bodies, it supposing, besides body, substance incorporeal; yet were these, as Laertius[9] declareth, the first that ever made ἀρχας τῶν ὅλων ἀτόμους, "senseless atoms the principles of all things whatsoever, even of life and understanding, soul and mind."

[9] Lib. 9. segm. 44. p. 573.

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Indeed it cannot be denied, but that from these two things granted, that all is body, and that the principles of body are devoid of all life and understanding, it will follow unavoidably, that there can be no corporeal Deity. Wherefore the Stoics, who professed to acknowledge no other substance besides body, and yet nevertheless had a strong persuasion of the existence of a God, or an eternal unmade Mind, the Maker of the whole world, denied that other proposition of the atheistic Corporealists, that the principles of all bodies were devoid of life and understanding, they asserting an intellectual fire, eternal and unmade, the Maker of the whole mundane system; which postulatum, of a living intellectual body eternal, were it granted to these Stoics, yet could not this their corporeal god, notwithstanding, be absolutely incorruptible, as Origen often inculcateth;* Ὁ Θεὸς τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς ἐστὶ σῶμα, οὐκ αἰδουμένοις λέγειν αὐτὸν τρεπτὸν, καὶ δι' ὅλων ἀλλοιωτὸν καὶ μεταβλητὸν καὶ ἁπαξαπλῶς δυνάμενον φθαρῆναι, παρὰ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι τὸ φθεῖρον αὐτὸν, "God to the Stoics is a body, and therefore mutable, alterable, and changeable; and he would indeed be perfectly corruptible were there any other body to act upon him. Wherefore he is only happy in this, that he wants a corrupter or destroyer." And thus much was therefore rightly urged by the atheistic argumentator, that no corporeal Deity could be absolutely in its own nature incorruptible, nor otherwise than by accident only immortal, because of its divisibility. For were there any other matter without this world, to make inroads and incursions upon it, or to disunite the parts thereof, the life and unity of the Stoical corporeal God must needs be scattered and destroyed. And therefore of this Stoical God does the same Origen thus further write:† Ὁ τῶν Στωϊκῶν Θεὸς, ἅτε σῶμα τυγχάνων, ὁτὲ μὲν ἡγεμονικὸν ἔχει τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν, ὅταν ἡ ἐκπύρωσις ᾖ· ὁτὲ δὲ ἐπὶ μέρους γίνεται αὐτῆς, ὅταν ᾖ διακόσμησις· οὐδὲ γὰρ δεδύνηνται οὗτοι τρανῶσαι τὴν φυσικὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἔννοιαν, ὡς πάντῃ ἀφθάρτου καὶ ἁπλοῦ, καὶ ἀσυνθέτου, καὶ ἀδιαιρέτου, "The God of the Stoics being a body, hath sometimes the whole for its hegemonic in the conflagration; and sometimes only a part of the mundane matter. For these men were not able to reach to a clear notion of the Deity, as a being every way incorruptible, simple, uncompounded, and indivisible." Notwithstanding which, these Stoics were not therefore to be ranked amongst the Atheists, but far to be preferred before them, and accounted only a kind of imperfect Theists.[10]

* Lib. 1. Contra Cels. p. 17. † Page 169.

[10] I recollect having already spoken upon this subject elsewhere. What Origen objects against the Stoics is very probable and seems to follow from the first principles of their discipline. In my opinion however this sect, which is well known to have contained many very acute and talented men, would have had an answer to give to

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But we shall now make it evident, that in both these atheistic corporealisms (agreeing in those two things, that body is the only substance, and that the principles of body are not vital) there is an absolute impossibility; not only because, as Aristotle[1] objecteth, they supposed no active principle; but also because their bringing of life and understanding (being real entities) out of dead and senseless matter is also the bringing of something out of nothing. And indeed the atomic Atheist is here of the two rather the more absurd and unreasonable, forasmuch as he, discarding all real qualities, and that for this very reason, because nothing can come out of nothing, doth himself notwithstanding, produce life, sense, and understanding (unquestionable realities) out of mere magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, that is, indeed out of nothing. Wherefore there being an absolute impossibility of both these atheistic hypotheses (neither of which is able to solve the phenomenon of life and understanding) from that confessed principle of theirs, that matter, as such, hath no life nor understanding belonging to it, it follows unavoidably, that there must be some other substance besides body or matter which is essentially vital and intellectual: Οὐ γὰρ πάντα χρῆται ἐπακτῷ ζωῇ,[2] "because all things cannot possibly have a peregrine, adventitious, and borrowed life," but something in the universe must needs have life naturally and originally. All life cannot be merely accidental, generable, and corruptible, producible out of nothing, and reducible to nothing again, but there must of necessity be some substantial life, which point (that all life is not a mere accident, but that there is life substantial) hath been of late, with much reason and judgment, insisted upon, and urged by the writer of "The Life of Nature." Neither must there be only such a substantial life, as is naturally immortal for the future, but only such as is eternal, and was never made; all other lives and minds whatsoever (none of which could possibly be generated out of matter) being derived from this eternal unmade fountain of life and understanding.

Which thing the hylozoic Atheists being well aware of, namely, that there must of necessity be both substantial and eternal unmade life, but supposing also matter to be the only substance, thought themselves necessitated to attribute to all matter as such, life and understanding, though not animalish and conscious, but natural only; they conceiving that, from the modification thereof alone by organization, all other animalish life,

Origen, especially at the time when many were in the habit of distributing matter into the dissoluble and indissoluble.

[1] Metaphys. lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 265. tom. 4. opp. and elsewhere. The subject here treated of has already been expounded and illustrated in different places before.

[2] These words I am aware are from Plotinus, but in what part of this philosopher's works they are to be found I have neither leisure nor is it of much consequence to ascertain.

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not only the sensitive in brutes, but also the rational in men, was derived. But this hylozoic atheism, thus bringing all conscious and reflexive life or animality, out of a supposed senseless, stupid, and inconscious life of nature in matter, and that merely from a different accidental modification thereof, or contexture of parts, does again plainly bring something out of nothing, which is an absolute impossibility. Moreover, this hylozoic atheism was long since, and in the first emersion thereof, solidly confuted by the atomic Atheists, after this manner: If matter, as such, had life, perception, and understanding belonging to it, then of necessity must every atom, or smallest particle thereof be a distinct percipient by itself; from whence it will follow, that there could not possibly be any such men and animals as now are, compounded out of them, but every man and animal would be a heap of innumerable percipients and have innumerable perceptions and intellections; whereas it is plain, that there is but one life and understanding, one soul or mind, one perceiver or thinker in every one. And to say, that these innumerable particles of matter do all confederate together; that is, to make every man and animal to be a multitude or commonwealth of percipients, and persons, as it were, clubbing together, is a thing so absurd and ridiculous, that one would wonder the hylozoists should not rather choose to recant that their fundamental error of the life of matter, than endeavour to seek shelter and sanctuary for the same, under such a pretence. For though voluntary agents and persons may many of them resign up their wills to one, and by that means have all but as it were one artificial will, yet can they not possibly resign up their sense and understanding too, so as to have all but one artificial life, sense, and understanding; much less could this be done by senseless atoms, or particles of matter supposed to be devoid of all consciousness or animality. Besides which, there have been other arguments already suggested, which do sufficiently evince, that sense and understanding cannot possibly belong to matter any way, either originally or secondarily, to which more may be added elsewhere.

And now from these two things, that life and understanding do not essentially belong to matter as such, and that they cannot be generated out of dead and senseless matter, it is demonstratively certain, that there must be some other substance, besides body or matter. However, the Anaxamandrian and Democritic Atheists taking it for granted, that the first principles of body are devoid of all life and understanding, must either acknowledge a necessity of some other substance besides body, or else deny the truth of that axiom, so much made use of by themselves, that "nothing can come out of nothing." And this was our second undertaking, to show, that from the very principles of

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the atheistic corporealism, represented in the fifth and sixth heads, incorporeal substance is against those Atheists themselves demonstrable.

Our third and last was this, that there being undeniably substance incorporeal, the two next following atheistic argumentations, built upon the contrary supposition, are therefore altogether insignificant also, and do no execution at all. The first of which (being the seventh) impugning only such a soul of the world, as is generated out of matter, is not properly directed against theism neither, but only such a form of atheism (sometime before mentioned) as indeed cometh nearest to theism. Which, though concluding all things to have sprung originally from senseless matter, Night and Chaos, yet supposes things from thence to have ascended gradually to higher and higher perfection; first, inanimate bodies, as the elements, then birds and other brute animals (according to the forementioned Aristophanic tradition, with which agreeth this of Lucretius,[3]

Principio genus alituum, variæque volucres),

afterward men, and in the last place gods; and that not only the animated stars, but Jupiter, or a soul of the world, generated also out of Night and Chaos, as well as all other things. We grant indeed, that the true and real Theists amongst the ancient Pagans also held the world's animation, and whosoever denied the same, were therefore accounted absolute Atheists. But the world's animation, in a larger sense, signifies no more than this, that all things are not dead about us, but that there is a living sentient and understanding nature eternal, that first framed the world, and still presideth over it: and it is certain, that in this sense all Theists whatsoever must hold the world's animation. But the generality of Pagan Theists held the world's animation also in a stricter sense; as if the world were truly and properly an animal, and therefore a god, completed and made up of soul and body together, as other animals are. Which soul of this great world-animal was to some of them the highest or supreme Deity, but to others only a secondary god, they supposing an abstract mind superior to it. But God's being the soul of the world in this latter Paganic sense, and the world's being an animal or a god, are things absolutely disclaimed and renounced by us. However, this seventh atheistic argument is not directed against the soul of the world in the sense of the Paganic Theists neither (this being, as they think, already confuted), but in the sense of the atheistic Theogonists; not an eternal unmade soul or mind, but a native or generated one only, such as resulted from the disposition of matter, and contexture of atoms, the off-

[3] De Rerum Natura, lib. 5. ver. 797. p. 333.

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spring of night and chaos: the Atheists here pretending, after their confutation of the true and genuine theism, to take away all shadows thereof also, and so to free men from all manner of fear of being obnoxious to any understanding being, superior to themselves. Wherefore we might here omit the confutation of this argument, without any detriment at all to the cause of theism: nevertheless, because this in general is an atheistic assertion, that there is no life and understanding presiding over the whole world, we shall briefly examine the supposed grounds thereof, which alone will be a sufficient confutation of it. The first of them therefore is this, that there is no other substance in the world besides body; the second, that the principles of bodies are devoid of all life and understanding; and the last, that life and understanding are but accidents of bodies resulting from such a composition or contexture of atoms, as produceth soft flesh, blood, and brains, in bodies organized, and of human form. From all which the conclusion is, that there can be no life and understanding in the whole, because it is not of human form, and organized, and hath no blood and brains. But neither is body the only substance, nor are life and understanding accidents resulting from any modification of dead and lifeless matter; nor is blood or brains that which understandeth in us, but an incorporeal soul or mind, vitally united to a terrestrial organized body; which will then understand with far greater advantage, when it comes to be clothed with a pure, spiritual, and heavenly one. But there is in the universe also a higher kind of intellectual animals, which, though consisting of soul and body likewise, yet have neither flesh, nor blood, nor brains, nor parts so organized as ours are.[4] And the most perfect mind and intellect of all is not the soul of any body, but complete in itself, without such vital union and sympathy with matter. We conclude therefore, that this passage of a modern writer:[5] "We worms cannot conceive, how God can understand without brains," is vox pecudis, the "language and philosophy" rather of worms or brute animals than of men.

The next, which is the eighth atheistic argument, is briefly this: that whereas the Deity by Theists is generally supposed to be a living Being perfectly happy, and immortal or incorruptible; there can be no such living being immortal, and consequently none perfectly happy. Because all living beings whatsoever are concretions of atoms, which as they were at first generated, so are they again liable to death and corruption; life being no simple primitive nature, nor substantial thing, but a mere accidental modification of compounded bodies only, which upon the

[4] He means the angels whom he before attempted to prove by many arguments to be corporeal or composed of body and soul.

[5] Hobbes. Consult our remarks above on chap. 5. sect. 6. § 26. p. 785.

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disunion of their parts, or the disordering of their contexture, vanisheth again into nothing. And there being no life immortal, happiness must needs be a mere insignificant word, and but a romantic fiction. Where first, this is well, that the Atheists will confess, that according to their principles there can be no such thing at all as happiness, because no security of future permanency; all life perpetually coming out of nothing, and whirling back into nothing again. But this atheistic argument is likewise founded upon the former error, that body is the only substance, the first principles whereof are devoid of all life and understanding; whereas it is certain, that life cannot possibly result from any composition of dead and lifeless things; and therefore must needs be a simple and primitive nature. It is true, indeed, that the participated life in the bodies of animals (which yet is but improperly called life, it being nothing but their being actuated by a living soul) is a mere accidental thing, generable and corruptible; since that body, which is now vitally united to a living soul, may be disunited again from it, and thereby become a dead and lifeless carcase; but the primary or original life itself is substantial, nor can there be any dead carcase of a human soul. That which hath life essentially belonging to the substance of it, must needs be naturally immortal, because no substance can of itself perish, or vanish into nothing. Besides which, there must be also some, not only substantial, but also eternal unmade Life, whose existence is necessary, and which is absolutely unannihilable by any thing else; which therefore must needs have perfect security of its own future happiness; and this is an incorporeal Deity. And this is a brief confutation of the eighth atheistic argument.

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CHAPTER V.

SECTION IV.

1. The Epicurean Atheists further endeavour to disprove a God, from the phenomena of motion and cogitation. From motion thus; that, "Nothing can move itself, but whatsoever is moved, is moved by another," it will follow, that there can be no first cause, and unmoved mover, but one thing moved another, from eternity infinitely; because nothing could move another, which was not itself first moved by something else. 2. Answer: The meaning of this axiom; not that nothing can act from itself, as the Atheist supposes; he taking it for granted, that every thing is body, and that all action is local motion; but that no body resting could ever locally move itself. A false supposition of the Atheists and some Cartesians, that were there but once motion in the matter, this would of itself continue to all eternity. True, that of Aristotle; that to make an infinite progress in the causes of motion, and no first mover, is all one as to say, that there is no cause at all thereof. Wherefore from this principle, that no body can move itself, it follows, that there is some other substance in the world besides body, that hath an active power of moving body. 3. Another corollary from the same principle; that there is another species of action, distinct from local motion, and which is not heterokinesy, but autokinesy. All local motion caused originally by cogitation. Thus the ninth atheistic argument from motion confuted; and from hence, that no body can move itself demonstrated, that there is something incorporeal the first cause of local motion, by cogitation. 4. But the Atheists further pretend to prove, that cogitation itself is heterokinesy, the passion of the thinker, and the action of some other external agent upon him; because nothing taketh beginning from itself; and no cogitation can rise of itself, without a cause. That therefore thinking beings themselves are machines, and cogitation local motion. And, no understanding being a first cause, nor perfectly happy; because dependent upon something else. 5. Answer. True, that no substance beginning from itself; as also, that no action causeth itself. But false, that no action taketh beginning from the immediate agent; or, that nothing can act otherwise than as acted upon by something else. 6. True also, that our human cogitations are frequently occasioned from external objects, and that the concatenations of thoughts and phantasms often depend upon mechanic causes. But false, that all cogitations are obtruded upon us from without; and that no transition in our thoughts, which was not before in sense. The human soul a principle of actions, and therefore also of cogitations. This a bubbling fountain of thoughts. 7. This a prodigious paradox, and falsity of Atheists; that cogitation, local motion; and thinking beings, machines. Here a change of our opinion of what we wrote before; that not only a modern writer, but also the ancient Atomists, did conclude cogitation to be really nothing else but local motion. Nevertheless, these men troubled with the fancy of cogitation; which because they cannot make local motion, they would persuade us to be no reality. Atheists aware, that if there be

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any action besides local motion, there must then be some other substance acknowledged besides body. They, who make cogitation local motion, and men machines, no more to be disputed with. 8. To affirm, that no understanding being can be happy, nor a God, because dependent upon something without it, all one as to affirm, that senseless matter is the most perfect of all things; and that knowledge, as such, speaking imperfection, is but a fantastic thing. Thus the tenth atheistic argument confuted. 9. Another atheistic argument, from the nature of knowledge and understanding. That the world could not be made by an understanding Being, because there was no knowledge before things, which are the objects of it; and the only things are sensibles, which knowledge a passion from. Therefore all mind, as such, a creature, and none a creator. 10. This already fully answered. Where proved, that singular bodies are not the only things, and objects of the mind, but that it containeth its intelligibles within itself. And that knowledge is archetypal to the world, and the maker of all. So the existence of a God demonstrable from the nature of knowledge and understanding. 11. That the Atheists can no more solve the phenomenon of cogitation, than that of local motion, evident from their many hallucinations concerning it. First, that all life and understanding a mere accidental thing, generable and corruptible, and no life nor mind substantial or essential. This before confuted. 12. Again, that life and mind no simple and primitive natures, but compounded syllables of things; and therefore none immortal nor incorruptible. Answer; that life and understanding are active powers, and could never result from mere passive bulk; nor can any composition of senseless matter possibly beget life. Though no necessity, that there should be any eternal unmade red or green; nor that there should be eternal motion; nor that there should be any eternal unmade matter: yet an absolute necessity of eternal unmade life and mind; because had there been once none, there could never have been any. 13. Another Atheistic hallucination, that there is nothing of self-activity in cogitation; nor any thing could act otherwise, than as it is made to act by something else. This to bring all action from nothing, or to suppose it without a cause. 14. Another madness of theirs already mentioned, that cogitation, local motion, and thinking beings, machines. 15. Another paradox of the Epicurean and Democritic Atheists, that mental cogitation, as well as sensation, the mere passions of the thinker, and the actions of bodies existing without him; some of them supposing thoughts to be caused by certain finer images than sensations; others, that they are the remainders of the motions of sense, formerly made. Answer; that sensation itself is not a mere corporeal passion, but the perception of a passion, in a way of fancy; much less mental cogitations such; and least of all volitions. 16. But consentaneously hereunto, these Atheists determine all knowledge and understanding to be really the same thing with sense. From whence follow two absurdities; first, That there can be no such thing as error, because all passion is true passion, and all sense, true sense. This absurdity owned by Protagoras. Epicurus endeavoured to avoid this, but contradictiously to his own principles. 17. A second absurdity consequent thereupon; that there is no absolute truth nor falsehood, but all knowledge private and relative, and nothing but opinion. This freely owned likewise by Protagoras. Sometimes also by Democritus. 18. Another atheistic error; that singular bodies are the only objects of mental conception as well as of sensation. This imputed by Aristotle to Democritus and Protagoras. But sufficiently before confuted. 19. The better to maintain

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this paradox, added by a modern Atheistic writer, as his own invention ; that universals are nothing else but names by which many singular bodies are called; axioms or propositions, the addition and substraction of names ; and syllogistic reasoning, the reckoning the consequences of them : and that we know nothing at all of any thing, but only the names by which it is called. 20. That the Atheists endeavour to depreciate knowledge and understanding, as that which speaks no higher perfection than is in senseless matter. Thus the Atheists in Plato make it but a ludicrous thing. Their design in this, to take away the scale of entities. 21. All the grounds of this again briefly confuted, and particularly that opinion that there is nothing in the understanding which was not before in sense, out of Boetius. Just and unjust greater realities in nature than hard and soft, &c. Unquestionably a scale of entities ; and therefore certain that the order of things must be in way of descent from higher perfection to lower, and not of ascent. The steps of this ladder not infinite ; the foot thereof inanimate matter ; the head, a perfect omnipotent being, comprehending in itself all possibilities of things. 22. The reason why we so much insist upon this ; because Atheists pretend not only to solve the phenomenon of cogitation without a God, but also from thence to demonstrate the impossibility of his existence. The controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists thus stated by Plato ; whether Soul and Mind junior to senseless matter, and the offspring thereof ; or else substantial things, and in order of nature before it. Accordingly Plato confuteth Atheism no otherwise than by proving Soul not to be junior to inanimate matter, and generated out of the same. Those professed Christians who generate rational souls out of senseless matter, plain betrayers of the cause of Theism. Nor is the case much different as to others ; who, though they professedly generate only sensitive souls, yet making the rational but mere blanks, and so knowledge in its own nature, junior to sense and sensibles ; highly gratifying the Atheists hereby. 23. If any life may be generated out of senseless matter, then can no good reason be given why all should not be. Life not partly accidental, party substantial ; but either all conscious life, generable and corruptible ; or else none at all. 24. The doctrine of real qualities generable and corruptible, favourable to Atheism also. And, though the Atomists explode all the other qualities, because *nothing can come from nothing* ; yet, contradicting themselves again, do they make life and understanding real qualities generated out of matter, or caused by nothing. 25. There being a scale of entities in nature, to produce a higher rank of beings out of a lower ; as life and cogitation out of matter and magnitude is to invert the order of this scale from downwards to upwards, and so to lay a foundation for atheism. 26. The grand objection against the substantiality of sensitive souls, from that consequence of their permanent subsistence after death. Cartesius so sensible thereof, that he would rather make brutes to be senseless machines, than allow them substantial souls ; which he granted they must have, if thinking beings. What clearly demonstrable by reason, not to be abandoned, because attended with some difficulties. 27. The Pythagoric hypothesis ; that souls all created by God, not in the generation of animals, but in the Cosmogonia. These therefore first clothed with subtle bodies, aerial or ethereal Ochemata, wherein they subsist, both before their ingress into terrestrial bodies, and after their egress out of them. Thus Boetius, Proclus, and Ammonius. Since the first creation, no new substantial thing made or destroyed, and therefore no life. That the Pythagoreans would endeavour to gain some countenance for this

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hypothesis from the scripture. 28. But if these aerial vehicles of brutish souls be exploded, and none but terrestrial bodies allowed to them; though after death they will not vanish into nothing, yet must they needs remain in a state of insensibility, till re-united to other terrestrial bodies. Wherefore these in one sense mortal, though in another immortal. Silkworms dying, and reviving in the form of butterflies, made an emblem of the resurrection by Christian theologers. 29. But no absolute necessity that the souls of brutes should have a permanent subsistence after death, because whatsoever created by God may possibly by him be annihilated. The substantiality only of the rational soul demonstrable by reason; or that it will not of itself vanish into nothing; but not that it is absolutely impossible for it to be annihilated. Porphyrius' assertion, that brutish souls are resolved into the life of the universe. The whole answer to this objection against the substantiality of brutish souls: that they may, notwithstanding, possibly be annihilated in the deaths of animals, as well as they were created in their generations: but if they do subsist, they must remain in a state of inactivity. 30. That this doctrine of the ancient Pagan theologers, that no life generated out of senseless matter; but all produced by the Deity, as well as matter, proved out of Virgil. 31. The Hylozoic Atheists themselves so sensible thereof, that there must be some substantial and unmade life, that they attribute the same to matter; and conclude that though the modificated lives of animals and men be accidental, generated, and corrupted, yet the fundamental life of them is incorruptible. 32. This Hylozoic Atheism again confuted. Absurd to suppose knowledge and understanding without consciousness; as also that the substantial life of men and other animals should never perish, and yet their souls vanish into nothing. That no organization can produce consciousness. These Atheists not able possibly to give an account whence the intelligible objects and ideas of this their knowledge of matter, should spring. This Hylozoic atheism nothing but the crumbling of the Deity into matter. 33. Concluded, that the phenomenon of mind and understanding can no way possibly be solved by Atheists without a God; but affordeth a solid demonstration of his existence.

But the Democritic Atheist proceeds, endeavouring further to disprove a God from the phenomena of motion and cogitation, in the three following argumentations. First therefore, whereas Theists commonly bring an argument from motion, to prove a God, or first unmoved mover, the Atheists contend, on the contrary, that, from the very nature of motion, the impossibility of any such first unmoved mover is clearly demonstrable. For, it being an axiom of undoubted truth concerning motion, that "whatsoever is moved, is moved by some other thing;" or, that "nothing can move itself;" it follows from thence unavoidably, that there is no æternum Immobile, no "eternal unmoved Mover;" but on the contrary, that there was æternum Motum, an "eternal Moved;" or, that one thing was moved by another, from eternity infinitely, without any first mover or cause, because as nothing could move itself, so could nothing ever move another, but what was itself before moved by something else.[1]

[1] Compare this with our remarks above on chap. 2. sect. 13. But if this argument

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To which we reply, That this axiom, "whatsoever is moved, is moved by another, and not by itself," was, by Aristotle, and those other philosophers, who made so much use thereof, restrained to the local motion of bodies only; that no body locally moved was ever moved originally from itself, but from something else. Now it will not at all follow from hence, that therefore nihil movetur nisi à moto, "that no body was ever moved, but by some other body," that was also before moved by something else; or, that of necessity one body was moved by another body, and that by another, and so backwards, infinitely, without any first unmoved or self-moving and self-active mover, as the Democritic Atheist fondly conceits; for the motion of bodies might proceed (as unquestionably it did) from something else, which is not body, and was not before moved. Moreover, the Democritic Atheist here also, without any ground, imagines that were there but one push once given to the world, and no more, this motion would from thenceforward always continue in it, one body still moving another to all eternity. For though this be indeed a part of the Cartesian hypothesis, that, according to the laws of nature, a body moving will as well continue in motion as a body resting in rest, until that motion be communicated and transferred to some other body; yet is the case different here, where it is supposed not only one push to have been given to the world at first, but also the same quantity of motion or agitation to be constantly conserved and maintained. But to let this pass, because it is something a subtle point, and not so rightly understood by many of the Cartesians themselves, we say, that it is a thing utterly impossible that one body should be moved by another infinitely, without any first cause or mover, which was self-active, and that not from the authority of Aristotle[2] only,

were as strong and powerful as it is weak and idle, still it would not disprove the being of a God, but merely tell against those who assert such a God as right reason and the scriptures teach us to believe in. In the first place, this argument is of no avail against those who hold the world to be eternal and at the same time acknowledge an immaterial God: an opinion formerly entertained it is well known by philosophers of no ordinary rank. Again it cannot touch those who erroneously suppose the Deity to be corporeal: to whose number belong many of the ancient Christian fathers. Lastly, to say nothing now of others, it has no weight against such as believe that God is a certain most subtle spirit diffused through the whole nature of things.

[2] Physicar. Auscult. lib. 8. cap. 5. p. 537. tom. 1. opp. With all due deference however to our worthy author, I would not venture to avail myself of the precepts of Aristotle on the beginning and causes of motion for the refutation of Atheists. For they seem to me to aid and support rather than refute this impious class of men, and to be much at variance with the opinion of Christian philosophers on the origin of motion. Aristotle, it must be owned, in the last book of his Metaphysics and in lib. 8. Physicar. Auscult. speaks in most magnificent terms of a first cause of motion, which is itself devoid of all external motion; and some have been led by these words of his to contend that the man entertained sentiments worthy of a Christian: but on examining the whole it will appear that what he gives with one hand he takes away again with the other. He asserts motion to have a beginning: but not in respect of time: for he endeavours to prove by many arguments, lib. 8. Physicar. cap. 1. 2. p. 576. &c. that

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pronouncing οὔτε δυνατὸν ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως ἰέναι εἰς ἄπειρον, &c. "that in the causes of motion there could not possibly be an infinite progress;" but from the reason there subjoined by Aristotle, because, εἴπερ μηδὲν ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ὅλως αἴτιον οὐδὲν ἐστὶ, "if there were no first unmoved mover, there could be no cause of motion at all." For were all the motion, that is in the world, a passion from something else, and no first unmoved active mover, then must it be a passion from no agent, or without an action, and consequently proceed from nothing, and either cause itself, or be made without a cause. Now the ground of the Atheist's error here is only from hence, because he taketh it for granted, that there is no other substance besides body, nor any other action but local motion; from whence it comes to pass, that to him this proposition, "No body can move itself," is one and the same with this, "Nothing can act from itself, or be self-active."

And thus is the atheistic pretended demonstration against a God, or first cause, from motion, abundantly confuted; we having made it manifest, that there is no consequence at all in this argument, that because no body can move itself, therefore there can be no first unmoved mover; as also having discovered the ground of the Atheist's error here, their taking it for granted, that there is nothing but body; and lastly, having plainly showed, that it implies a contradiction there should be action and motion in the world, and yet nothing self-moving or self-active: so that it is demonstratively certain from motion, that there is a first cause, or unmoved mover. We shall now further add, that from the principle acknowledged by the Democritic Atheists themselves, "That no body can move itself," it follows also undeniably, that there is some other substance besides body, something incorporeal, which is self-moving and self-active, and was the first unmoved mover of the heavens or world. For if no body from eternity was ever able to move itself, and yet there must of necessity be some active cause of that motion, which is in the world (since it could not cause itself) then is there unquestionably some other substance besides body, which having a power of moving matter, was the first cause of motion, itself being unmoved.

motion is eternal and without all beginning: therefore in respect of cause only. But this is sheer nonsense. For my part I consider this proposition: The motion of matter is eternal and yet produced by some cause, to be self-repugnant and absurd. For if the motion of matter is eternal and never had a beginning, it is also without a cause: but if it has a cause, in my opinion, it cannot properly be said to be eternal. I do not envy those who pretend that eternity of motion, coupled with an eternal cause, is a thing which they can easily comprehend: but I freely confess my own inability to understand it, and suppose that Aristotle by defending its eternity discards its cause, and by maintaining its cause and beginning, in reality does away with its eternity. I should say the same of the junior Platonists who follow in Aristotle's footsteps, and assert the world to be eternal and yet at the same time created by God.

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Moreover, it is certain from hence also, that there is another species of action, distinct from local motion, and such as is not heterokinesy, but autokinesy, or self-activity. For since the local motion of body is essentially heterokinesy, not caused by the substance itself moving, but by something else acting upon it, that action, by which local motion is first caused, cannot be itself local motion, but must be autokinesy, or "self-activity, that which is not a passion from any other agent," but springs from the immediate agent itself, which species of action is called "cogitation." All the local motion, that is in the world, was first caused by some cogitative or thinking being, which not acted upon by any thing without it, nor at all locally moved, but only mentally, is the immoveable mover of the heaven, or vortices. So that "cogitation" is, in order of nature, before "local motion," and "incorporeal" before "corporeal substance," the former having a natural imperium upon the latter. And now have we not only confuted the ninth atheistic argument from motion, but also demonstrated against the Democritic Atheists from their own principle, that there is an incorporeal and cogitative substance, the first immoveable mover of the heavens and vortices; that is, an incorporeal Deity.

But the Democritic Atheist will yet make a further attempt to prove, that there can be nothing self-moving or self-active, and that no thinking being could be a first cause; he laying his foundation in this principle, that "nothing taketh its beginning from itself," but from the action of some other agent without it. From whence he would infer, that cogitation itself is heterokinesy, the passion of the thinker, and the action of something without it, no cogitation ever rising up of itself without a cause; and that cogitation is indeed nothing but local motion or mechanism, and all living understanding beings machines, moved from without; and then make this conclusion, that therefore no understanding being could possibly be a first cause: he further adding also, that no understanding being as such, can be perfectly happy neither, as the Deity is supposed to be, because dependent upon something without it: and this is the tenth atheistic argumentation.

Where we shall first consider that, which the Democritic Atheist makes his fundamental principle, or common notion to disprove all autokinesy or self-activity by, that "Nothing taketh beginning from itself," but "from the action of some other thing without it." Which axiom, if it be understood of substantial things, then is it indeed acknowledged by us to be unquestionably true, it being the same with this, "That no substance, which once was not, could ever possibly cause itself, or bring itself into being; but must take its beginning from the action of something else:" but then it will make nothing at all against

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theism. As it is likewise true, that no action whatsoever (and therefore no cogitation) taketh beginning from itself, or causeth itself to be, but is always produced by some substantial agent; but this will no way advantage the Atheist neither. Wherefore, if he would direct his force against theism, he ought to understand this proposition thus, that no action whatsoever taketh beginning from the immediate agent (which is the subject of it), but from the action of some other thing without it; or, that nothing can move or act otherwise, than as it is moved and acted upon by something else. But this is only to beg the question, or to prove the thing in dispute, identically, that nothing is self-active, because nothing can act from itself. Whereas it is in the mean time undeniably certain, that there could not possibly be any motion or action at all in the universe, were there not something self-moving or self-active, for as much as otherwise all that motion or action would be a passion from nothing, and be made without a cause.

And whereas the Atheists would further prove, that no cogitation taketh its beginning from the thinker, but always from the action of some other thing without it, after this manner; because it is not conceivable why this cogitation, rather than that, should start up at any time, were there not some cause for it, without the thinker: here, in the first place, we freely grant, that our human cogitations are indeed commonly occasioned by the incursions of sensible objects upon us; as also, that the concatenations of those thoughts and phantasms in us, which are distinguished from sensations (whether we be asleep or awake) do many times depend upon corporeal and mechanical causes in the brain. Notwithstanding which, that all our cogitations are obtruded and imposed upon us from without; and that there is no transition in our thoughts at any time, but such as had been before in sense (which the Democritic Atheist avers); this is a thing which we absolutely deny. For, had we no mastery at all over our thoughts, but they were all like tennis-balls, bandied, and struck upon us, as it were, by rackets from without, then could we not steadily and constantly carry on any designs and purposes of life. But on the contrary, that of Aristotle[3] is most true (as will be elsewhere further proved), that man, and all rational beings, are in some sense, ἀρχὴ πράξεων, "a principle of actions," subordinate to the Deity; which they could not possibly be were they not also a principle of cogitations, and had some com-

[3] See lib. 3. Eth. ad Nicomachum, cap. 3. p. 37. tom. 3. and Magnor. Moral. lib. 1. cap. 12. p. 202. 204. Δῆλον οὖν, says he, ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν πράξεων ἐστὶ γεννητικὸς, "It is manifest that man is the cause of his own actions:" and a little afterwards: Ἀρχὴ δὲ ἐστὶ πράξεως καὶ σπουδαίας καὶ φαύλης, προαίρεσις καὶ βούλησις, καὶ τὸ κατὰ λόγον πᾶν, "The deliberate choice and will and every thing pertaining to reason are a principle of action both good and bad."

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mand over them; but these were all as much determined by causes without, as the motions of the weathercock are. The rational soul is itself an active and bubbling fountain of thoughts; that perpetual and restless desire, which is as natural and essential to us as our very life, continually raising up and protruding new and new ones in us, which are as it were offered to us. Besides which, we have also a further self-recollective power, and a power of determining and fixing our mind and intention upon some certain objects, and of ranging our thoughts accordingly. But the Atheist is here also to be taught yet a further lesson, that an absolutely perfect mind (such as the Deity is supposed to be), doth not (as Aristotle[4] writeth of it) ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖν, ὁτὲ δὲ οὐ νοεῖν, "sometimes understand, and sometime not understand:" it being ignorant of nothing, nor syllogizing about any thing but comprehending all intelligibles with their relations and verities at once within itself; and its essence and energy being the same. Which notion, if it be above the dull capacity of Atheists, who measure all perfection by their own scantling, this is a thing that we cannot help.

But as for that prodigious paradox of Atheists, that cogitation itself is nothing but local motion or mechanism, we could not have thought it possible that ever any man should have given entertainment to such a conceit, but that this was rather a mere slander raised upon Atheists; were it not certain from the records of antiquity, that whereas the old religious atomists did, upon good reason, reduce all corporeal action (as generation, augmentation, and alteration) to local motion, or translation from place to place (there being no other motion besides this conceivable in bodies); the ancient Atheizers of that philosophy (Leucippus and Democritus) not contented herewith, did really carry the business still on further, so as to make cogitation itself also nothing but local motion. As it is also certain that a modern atheistic pretender to wit[5] hath publicly owned this same conclusion, that "mind is nothing else but local motion in the organic parts of man's body." These men have been sometimes indeed a little troubled with the fancy, apparition, or seeming of cogitation that is, the consciousness of it, as knowing not well what to make thereof; but then they put it off again, and satisfy themselves worshipfully with this, that fancy is but fancy, but the reality of cogitation nothing but local motion; as if there were not as much reality in fancy and consciousness as there is in local motion. That which inclined these men so

[4] On the passage of Aristotle which contains the few words here adduced by the learned Doctor by way of illustration, I have already offered some remarks in the preceding.

[5] It is scarcely necessary to observe that he is alluding to Hobbes, whose passages in defence of this opinion I have already quoted on chap. 2.

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much to this opinion, was only because they were sensible and aware of this, that if there were any other action, besides local motion admitted, there must needs be some other substance acknowledged, besides body. Cartesius indeed undertook to defend brute animals to be nothing else but machines; but then he supposed that there was nothing at all of cogitation in them, and consequently nothing of true animality or life, no more than is in an artificial automaton, as a wooden eagle, or the like: nevertheless, this was justly thought to be paradox enough. But that cogitation itself should be local motion, and men nothing but machines, this is such a paradox, as none but either a stupid and besotted, or else an enthusiastic, bigotical, or fanatic Atheist could possibly give entertainment to. Nor are such men as these fit to be disputed with any more than a machine is.

But whereas the Atheistic objector adds also, over and above, in the last place, that no understanding Being can be perfectly happy neither, and therefore not a God, because essentially dependent upon something else without it; this is all one, as if he should say, that there is no such thing as happiness at all in nature; because it is certain, that without consciousness or understanding nothing can be happy (since it could not have any fruition of itself), and if no understanding Being can be happy neither, then must the conclusion needs be that of the Cyrenaics,[6] that *ἐνδαιμονία ἀνύπαρκτον*, "happiness is a mere chimera," a fantastic notion or fiction of men's minds; a thing which hath no existence in nature. These are the men who afterwards argue from interest also against a God and religion; notwithstanding that they confess their own principles to be so far from promising happiness to any, as that they absolutely cut off all hopes thereof. It may be further observed also in the last place, that there is another of the Atheists dark mysteries here likewise couched, that there is no scale or ladder of entity and perfection in nature, one above another; the whole universe, from top to bottom, being nothing but one and the same senseless matter, diversely modified. As also that understanding, as such, rather

[6] I am not aware of the source from which Dr. Cudworth obtained what he here states respecting the Cyrenaics: but I know that it is not strictly true. The sect of philosophers called Cyrenaic did not discard all *εὐδαιμονία*, or happiness, but ranked it among the pleasures of the body. Diogenes Laërtius, De Vita Philos. lib. 2. sect. 37. p. 131. says: *Εὐδαιμονίαν δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸ ἐκ τῶν μερικῶν ἡδονῶν σύστημα, αἷς συναριθμοῦνται καὶ παρῳχηκυῖαι καὶ μέλλουσαι.* "A happy life or felicity is supposed by them to consist of an aggregation of particular pleasures, comprising both those past and those to come." Sextus Empiricus, lib. 7. adv. Mathematicos, sect. 2. p. 372. tells us that the Cyrenaics despise the study of natural things and the art of reasoning, *ὡς μηδὲν πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμόνως βιοῦν συνεργοῦντα*, "as contributing nothing towards a happy life." Consequently they both acknowledged that there is such a thing as happiness, and supposed it to be the part of a wise man to try to obtain it. But the learned Doctor probably understood the word *εὐδαιμονία* here in a narrower sense as referring to the felicity of the mind, in which case he was right in saying that the Cyrenaics would not admit of the existence of felicity.

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speaks imperfection; it being but a mere whiffling, evanid, and fantastic thing; so that the most absolutely perfect of all things in the universe is grave, solid, and substantial senseless matter: of which more afterwards. And thus is the tenth atheistic argumentation also confuted.

But the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists will make yet a further assault from the nature of knowledge, understanding, after this manner; if the world were made by a God, or an antecedent mind and understanding, having in itself an exemplar or platform thereof, before it was made, then must there be actual knowledge both in order of nature and time, before things; whereas things, which are the objects of knowledge and understanding, are unquestionably in order of nature before knowledge; this being but the signature of them, and a passion from them. Now, the only things are singular sensibles or bodies. From whence it follows, that mind is the youngest and most creaturely thing in the world; or that the world was before knowledge, and the conception of any mind; and no knowledge or mind before the world as its cause. Which is the eleventh atheistic argumentation.

But we have prevented ourselves here in the answer to this argument (which would make all knowledge, mind, and understanding junior to the world, and the very creature of sensibles), having already fully confuted it; and clearly proved that singular bodies are not the only things and objects of the mind, but that it containeth its immediate intelligibles within itself; which intelligibles also are eternal, and that mind is no fantastic image of sensibles, nor the stamp and signature of them, but archetypal to them; the first mind being that of a perfect being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own omnipotence, or the possibilities of all things. So that knowledge is older than all sensible things; mind senior to the world, and the architect thereof. Wherefore we shall refer the reader for an answer to this argument, to vol. 3. page 59, and so onwards, where the existence of a God (that is, a mind before the world) is demonstrated also from this very topic, viz. the nature of knowledge and understanding.

We shall in this place only add, that as the Atheists can no way solve the phenomenon of motion, so can they much less that of cogitation, or life and understanding. To make which yet the more evident, we shall briefly represent a syllabus or catalogue of the many atheistic hallucinations or delirations concerning it. As first, that senseless matter being the only substance, and all things else but accidental modifications thereof; life and mind is all a mere accidental thing, generable and corruptible, producible out of nothing, and reducible to nothing again; and that there is no substantial life or mind any where. In opposition

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to which, we have before proved, that there must of necessity be some substantial life, and that human souls being lives substantial, and not mere accidental modifications of matter, they are consequently in their own nature immortal, since no substance of itself ever vanisheth into nothing.

Again, the Democritics, and other Atheists conclude, that life and mind are no simple and primitive natures, but secondary and compounded things; they resulting from certain concretions and contextures of matter, and either the commixtures and contemporations of qualities, or else the combinations of those simple elements of magnitude, figure, site, and motion; and so being made up of that which hath nothing of life or mind in it. For as flesh is not made out of fleshy particles, nor bone out of bony (as Anaxagoras of old dreamed), so may life, as they conceive, be as well made out of lifeless principles, and mind out of that which hath no mind or understanding at all in it: just as syllables pronounceable do result from combinations of letters, some of which are mutes, and cannot by themselves be pronounced at all, others but semi-vocal. And from hence do these Atheists infer, that there could be no eternal unmade life or mind, nor any that is immortal or incorruptible; since upon the dissolution of that compages or contexture of matter, from whence they result, they must needs vanish into nothing. Wherefore according to them, there hath probably sometime heretofore been no life nor understanding at all in the universe, and there may possibly be none again. From whence the conclusion is, that mind and understanding is no God, or principle in the universe; it being essentially factitious, native, and corruptible; or, as they express it in Plato,[7] θνητὸς ἐκ θνητῶν, "mortal from mortal things:" as also, that the souls of men cannot subsist separately after death, and walk up and down in airy bodies; no more than the form of a house or tree, after the dissolution thereof, can subsist by itself separately, or appear in some other body. But all this foolery of Atheists hath been already confuted, we having before showed that life and understanding are active powers, vigours, and perfections, that could never possibly result from mere passive bulk, or dead and senseless matter, however modified and compounded; because nothing can come effectively from nothing. Neither is there any consequence at all in this, that because flesh is not made out of fleshy principles, nor bone out of bony, red out of red things, nor green out of green; therefore life and understanding may as well be compounded of things dead and senseless: because these are no syllables or complexions, as the others are, nor can either the qualities of heat and cold, moist and dry; or else magnitudes,

[7] De Legibus, lib. 10. p. 666.

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figures, sites, and motions, however combined together, as letters spell them out, and make them up; but they are simple and primitive things. And accordingly it hath been proved, that there must of necessity be some eternal unmade life and mind. For though there be no necessity that there should be any eternal unmade red, or green, because red and green may be made out of things not red nor green, they, and all other corporeal qualities (so called) being but several contextures of matter, or combinations of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, causing those several fancies in us: and though there be no necessity that there should be eternal motion, because, if there were once no motion at all in matter, but all bodies rested, yet might motion have been produced by a self-moving or self-active principle: and lastly, though there be no necessity that there should be eternal unmade matter or body neither, because had there been once no body at all, yet might it be made or produced by a perfect omnipotent incorporeal being: nevertheless, is there an absolute necessity that there should be eternal unmade life, and mind, because were there once no life nor mind at all, these could never have been produced out of matter altogether lifeless and mindless. And though the form of a house cannot possibly exist separately from the matter and substance thereof, it being a mere accidental thing, resulting from such a compages of stone, timber, and mortar, yet are human souls and minds no such accidental forms of compounded matter, but active substantial things, that may therefore subsist separately from these bodies, and enliven other bodies of a different contexture. And however some, that are no Atheists, be over prone to conceive life, sense, cogitation, and consciousness in brutes, to be generated out of dead, senseless, and unthinking matter (they being disposed thereunto by certain mistaken principles and ill methods of philosophy), nevertheless is this unquestionably in itself a seed of atheism; because if any life, cogitation, and consciousness may be produced out of dead and senseless matter, then can no philosophy hinder, but that all might have been so.

But the Democritic Atheists will yet venture further to deny that there is any thing in nature self-moving or self-active, but that whatsoever moveth and acteth, was before moved by something else, and made to act thereby; and again, that from some other thing, and so backward infinitely; from whence it would follow, that there is no first in the order of causes, but an endless retro-infinity. But as this is all one as to affirm that there is no such thing at all as life in the world, but that the universe is a compages of dead and stupid matter, so has this infinity in the order of causes been already exploded for an absolute impossibility.

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Nevertheless, the Atheists will here advance yet an higher paradox; that all action whatsoever, and therefore cogitation, fancy, and consciousness itself, is really nothing else but local motion; and consequently not only brute animals, but also men themselves mere machines, which is an equal, either sottishness or impudence, as to assert a triangle to be a square, or a sphere, a cube, number to be figure, or any thing else to be any thing: and it is really all one as to affirm, that there is indeed no such thing in ourselves as cogitation; there being no other action in nature but local motion and mechanism.

Furthermore, the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists universally agree in this, that not only sensations, but also all the cogitations of the mind, as the mere passions of the thinker, and the actions of bodies existing without upon him; though they do not all declare themselves after the same manner herein. For first, the Democritics conclude that sense is caused by certain grosser corporeal effluvia, streaming from the surfaces of bodies continually, and entering through the nerves; but that all other cogitations of the mind, and men's either sleeping or waking imaginations, proceed from another sort of simulachra, idols, and images of a more fine and subtle contexture, coming into the brain, not through those open tubes or channels of the nerves, but immediately through all the smaller pores of the body: so that, as we never have sense of anything but by means of those grosser corporeal images, obtruding themselves upon the nerves, so have we not the least cogitation at any time in our mind neither, which was not caused by those finer corporeal images and exuvious membranes, or effluvia, rushing upon the brain or contexture of the soul.[8] Λεύκιππος καὶ Δημόκριτος τὴν Αἴσθησιν καὶ τὴν Νόησιν Εἰδώλων ἔξωθεν προϊόντων· μηδενὶ γὰρ ἐπιβάλλειν μηδετέραν χωρὶς τοῦ προσπίπτοντος, "Leucippus and Democritus determined, that as well Noesis as Aisthesis, mental cogitation as external sensation, was caused by certain corporeal idols coming from bodies without; since neither sensation nor cogitation could otherwise possibly be produced." And thus does Laërtius[9] also represent the sense of these atheistic philosophers, that the effluvia from bodies called idols were the only causes, τῶν κατὰ ψυχὴν κινημάτων καὶ βουλημάτων ἑκάστων καὶ ἠθῶν καὶ παθῶν, "of all the motions, passions, and affections, and even the very volitions of the soul." So that as we could not have the least

[8] These are Plutarch's words, De Placitis Philos. lib. 4. cap. 8. p. 899. tom. 2. opp. On the images or idols which Leucippus and Democritus believed in, I have already commented at some length.

[9] The learned Doctor's memory has here deceived him. Laërtius has recorded nothing of the kind with regard to Leucippus: but it is true that he attributes this opinion to Democritus, lib. 9. segm. 44. p. 573. Whether the Greek words which follow are Dr. Cudworth's own, he being frequently in the habit of explaining his own opinion in Greek, or taken from some ancient Greek writer, I am unable to say.

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sensation, imagination, nor conception of any thing otherwise than from those corporeal effluvia, rushing upon us from bodies without, and begetting the same in us, at such a time; so neither could we have any passion, appetite, or volition, which we were not in like manner corporeally passive to. And this was the ground of the Democritic fate or necessity of all human actions, maintained by them, in opposition to the τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, or "liberty of will," which cannot be conceived without self-activity and something of contingency; they supposing human volitions also, as well as all the other cogitations, to be mechanically caused and necessitated from those effluvious images of bodies coming in upon the willers. And, however Epicurus sometime pretended to assert liberty of will against Democritus, yet, forgetting himself, did he also here securely philosophize after the very same manner:*

> Nunc age, quæ moveant animum res, accipe paucis;
> Quæ veniunt, veniant in mentem, percipe paucis.
> Principiò hoc dico, rerum simulacra vagari, &c.

But others there are amongst the ancient Atomists, who could not conceive sensations themselves to be thus caused by corporeal effluvia, or exuvious membranes streaming from bodies continually, and that for divers reasons alleged by them; but only by a pressure from them upon the optic nerve, by reason of a tension of the intermedious air, or ether, (being that, which is called light;) whereby the distant object is touched and felt, οἷον διὰ βακτηρίας,[10] "as it were by a staff." Which hypothesis concerning the corporeal part of sense is indeed much more ingenious and agreeable to reason than the former. But the atheizers of this atomology, as they supposed sense to be nothing else but such a pressure from bodies without; so did they conclude imagination and mental cogitation to be but the relics and remainders of those motions of sense formerly made, and conserved afterwards in the brain, (like the tremulous vibrations of a clock or bell, after the striking of the hammer, or the rolling of the waves, after that the wind is ceased;) melting, fading, and decaying insensibly by degrees. So that, according to these, knowledge and understanding is nothing but failing and decaying sense, and all our volitions but mechanic motions, caused from the actions or trusions of bodies upon us. Now, though it be true that in sensation there is always a passion antecedent made upon the body of the sentient from without; yet is not sensation itself this very passion, but a perception of that passion: much

* Lucretius, lib. 4. p. 358. 360. [Verse 726.]

[10] See Plutarch, De Placitis Philos. lib. 4. cap. 15. p. 911. tom. 2. opp. and Diogenes Laërtius, De Vit. Philosoph. lib. 7. segm. 157. p. 466.

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less can mental conception be said to be the action of bodies without, and the mere passion of the thinker; and least of all volitions such, there being plainly here something ἐφ' ἡμῖν, "in our own power," (by means whereof we become a principle of actions, accordingly deserving commendation, or blame,) that is, something of self-activity.

Again, according to the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists, all knowledge and understanding is really the same thing with sense; the difference between these two, to some of them, being only this, that what is commonly called sense, is primary and original knowledge, and knowledge but secondary, or fading and decaying sense; but to others, that sense is caused by those more vigorous idols or effluvia from bodies, intromitted through the nerves; but understanding and knowledge by those more weak and thin, umbratile and evanid ones, that penetrate the other smaller pores of the body; so that both ways understanding and knowledge will be but a weaker sense. Now, from this doctrine of the atheistic Atomists, that all conception and cogitation of the mind whatsoever is nothing else but sense and passion from bodies without, this absurdity first of all follows unavoidably; that there cannot possibly be any error or false judgment, because it is certain that all passion is true passion, and all sense or seeming, and appearance, true seeming and appearance. Wherefore, though some sense and passion may be more obscure than other, yet can there be none false, itself being the very essence of truth. And thus Protagoras, one of these atheistic Atomists, having first asserted that, "knowledge is nothing else but sense," did thereupon admit this as a necessary consequence, that πᾶσα δόξα ἀληθὴς,[1] "every opinion is true;"

[1] See Plato, in Theæteto, p. 118. and Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 9. segm. 51. p. 576. where this opinion is attributed to Protagoras. He who wishes to know how the modern Atheists defend this doctrine, and accommodate it to their own principles, may consult Count Boulainvillier's exposition and interpretation of the doctrine of Spinoza, or as it is falsely entitled in the published work: Refutation des Erreurs de Spinoza, sect. 1. 90. Bruxell. 1730. 12. For my own part, on reading this book, I admired the author's ingenuity and skill in explaining and illustrating what appears scarcely to admit of explanation, much less of illustration: but at the same time I detested his audacity and utter want of principle. For although he wishes us to suppose in his preface that his only motive for giving us a clearer exposition of this doctrine than we have been favoured with by Spinoza himself, is to render it more easy of refutation to others; yet I never can think well of a man who employs the whole force of his wit and eloquence, in explaining, illustrating, and refining a discipline which he himself calls absurd. But still, in this instance, his attempt at undermining all religion will be utterly unavailing with the wise and intelligent. While his work was yet unpublished, and to be found only in manuscript among those who delight in such impious books as lend a sanction to their own vicious lusts and propensities, nothing, we were often told, could be more subtle, more pernicious, or more powerfully calculated to shake religion to its very foundations. And I for one believing this to be in some measure true, was anxious it should never be made public, as I knew from experience that minds already tainted, and to a certain extent estranged from religion, are capable of being thoroughly corrupted and depraved by even the very slightest

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because it is nothing but seeming and appearance, and every "seeming and appearance is truly such; and because it is not possible for any one to opine that which is not, or to think otherwise than he suffers." Wherefore Epicurus, being sensible of this inconvenience, endeavoured to solve this phenomenon of error and false opinion, or judgment, consistently with his own principles, after this manner: that though all knowledge be sense, and all sense true, yet may error arise notwithstanding, ex animi opinatu,[2] from "the opination of the mind, adding something of its own, over and above, to the passion and fancy of sense." But herein he shamefully contradicts himself; for if the mind in judging and opining, can superadd any thing of its own, over and above to what it suffers, then is it not a mere passive thing, but must needs have a self-active power of its own, and consequently will prove also incorporeal; because no body can act otherwise than it suffers, or is made to act by something

show of truth. But all my apprehension vanished as soon as I read the book myself. Nothing indeed can be more weak and contemptible than it is. We have no conclusive and connected reasoning: no explication of an infinity of things which ought nevertheless to be accounted for by one who discards God and religion: in short, nothing simple, clear, and probable, such as could recommend itself to the minds of wise and thinking men. I seemed to myself to be reading a fable, neither ingeniously devised, nor aptly and skilfully arranged, nor consistent and in keeping with itself. Whenever I looked into Spinoza's Ethics, the man always appeared to have something in him: for the geometrical laws which he affects in his book, conceal a no inconsiderable portion of its defects. But on reading his ingenious interpreter, who would fain appear to have divested his master's precepts of all their darkness, the low estimation in which I began to hold him is almost incredible. Thus frequently, things which to many persons seem great, sublime, and subtle, immediately lose all their dignity as soon as they are explained in popular language. I will add one more remark which I fancy will not be unprofitable to my readers. The partisans of Spinoza complain that his adversaries, and especially Bayle, who as is well known has attacked this man in his Dictionary, *voce* Spinoza, have either wilfully perverted or egregiously misunderstood his meaning. And his new expositor repeats this complaint in his preface: although his book will convince all those who possess any knowledge of such matters, that most of this Atheist's opponents had a tolerably accurate conception of his meaning. All the absurd and monstrous corollaries in particular which Bayle charges upon the Spinozian discipline, are deduced from them with admirable neatness in Boulainvillier's exposition. If I am not mistaken, Spinoza's friends were annoyed at finding his foul and flagitious doctrines expounded and set forth so lucidly and perspicuously: and therefore, to save the reputation of the man, deemed it prudent to accuse his interpreter of ignorance. But the present is not a fitting opportunity for enlarging upon this subject: and yet in a book written professedly to expose the folly of atheism, it will not appear altogether irrelevant that we should briefly glance at the deformity of one whom the Atheists of this day are accustomed to regard with such profound reverence. It is a pity that an acute and perspicacious man like Boulainvillier, who was capable of much better things, should have thrown away so much time and labour upon the elucidation and embellishment of a mass of intricate absurdities.

[2] Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, lib. 4. v. 464. &c. p. 74. 75. tom. 2.

> Cætera de genere hoc mirando multa videmus,
> Quæ violare fidem quasi sensibus omnia quærunt,
> Nequidquam: quoniam pars horum maxima fallit
> Propter opinatus animi, quos addimus ipsi,
> Pro visis ut sint, quæ non sunt sensibus visa.
> Nam nihil egregius, quam res secernere apertas
> A dubiis, animus quas ab se protinus addit.

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else without it. We conclude therefore, that since there is such a thing as error or false judgment, all cogitations of the mind cannot be mere passions; but there must be something of self-activity in the soul itself, by means whereof it can give its assent to things not clearly perceived, and so err.

Again, from this atheistic opinion, That all knowledge is nothing else but sense, either primary or secondary, it follows also, that there is no absolute truth nor falsehood, and that knowledge is of a private nature, relative and fantastical only, or mere seeming, that is, nothing but opinion; because sense is plainly seeming, phantasy, and appearance; a private thing, and relative to the sentient only. And here also did Protagoras, according to his wonted freedom, admit this consequence, that knowledge being sense, there was no absoluteness at all therein; and that nothing was true otherwise, than *τούτῳ καὶ τινὶ*, "to this and to that man so thinking;" that every man did but *τὰ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον δοξάζειν*, "opine only his own things," that *πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος*, "every man was the measure of things and truth to himself;" and lastly, *τὸ φαινόμενον ἑκάστῳ τούτῳ καὶ εἶναι ᾧ φαίνεται*, "that whatsoever seemed to every one, was true to him to whom it seemed."[3] Neither could Democritus himself, though a man of more discretion than Protagoras, dissemble this consequence from the same principle asserted by him, that understanding is fantastical, and knowledge but opinion; he owning it sometimes before he was aware, as in these words of his:[4] *Γιγνώσκειν χρὴ ἄνθρωπον τῷδε τῷ κανόνι, ὅτι αἰτίης ἀπήλλακται*, "We ought to know man according to this rule, that he is such a thing as hath nothing to do with absolute truth." And again, *αἰτίῃ* (or *ἐτεῇ*) *οὐδὲν ἴσμεν περὶ οὐδενὸς, ἀλλ' ἐπιρυσμίη ἑκάστοισιν ἡ δόξις*, "We know nothing absolutely concerning any thing; and all our knowledge is opinion." Agreeably to which, he determined that men's knowledge was diversified by the temper of their bodies, and the things without them.[5] And Aristotle judiciously observing both these doctrines, That there is no error or false

[3] All these phrases are taken from Plato's Theætetus, p. 116. 119. 122. 126. 129. in which dialogue the opinions of Protagoras are copiously expounded and ingeniously refuted by Socrates. From the same treatise the learned Doctor has borrowed much of what he here advances against the class of men who determine that all knowledge springs from sense, or is nothing else but sense.

[4] These and the following words of Democritus, are from his book, De Ideis, and have been preserved by Sextus Empiricus, lib. 7. advers. Mathematicos or 1. adv. Logicos, sect. 137. p. 399. 400. In the same place there are extant other sayings of Democritus, in which the same opinion is put forth more clearly than in these passages.

[5] He alludes, I have no doubt, to this maxim of his which occurs in the same Sextus, ibid. p. 399: *Ἡμεῖς δὲ τῷ μὲν ἐόντι, οὐδὲν ἀτρεκὲς συνίεμεν, μεταπίπτον δὲ κατά τε σώματος διαθήκην καὶ τῶν ἐπεισιόντων καὶ τῶν ἀντιστηριζόντων*, "But we ourselves in reality know nothing of truth, but what offers itself according to the affection of the body, and of the things which enter into or are opposed to it."

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judgment, but every opinion true; and again, That nothing is absolutely true, but relatively only; to be really and fundamentally one and the same, imputeth them both together to Democritus, in these words of his:[6] Οὐδὲν εἶναι ἀληθές· ὅλως δὲ διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν φρόνησιν μὲν τὴν αἴσθησιν, τὸ φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθὲς εἶναι, "Democritus held, that there was nothing absolutely true; but because he thought knowledge or understanding to be sense, therefore did he conclude that whatsoever seemed according to sense, must of necessity be true (not absolutely, but relatively) to whom it so seemed." These gross absurdities did the atheistic Atomists plunge themselves into, whilst they endeavoured to solve the phenomenon of cogitation, mind, or understanding, agreeably to their own hypothesis. And it is certain that all of them, Democritus himself not excepted, were but mere blunderers in that atomic physiology which they so much pretended to, and never rightly understood the same; forasmuch as that, with equal clearness, teaches these two things at once, that sense indeed is fantastical and relative to the sentient: but that there is a higher faculty of understanding and reason in us, which thus discovers the phantastry of sense, and reaches to the absoluteness of truth, or is the criterion thereof.

But the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists will further conclude that the only things or objects of the mind are singular sensibles, or bodies existing without it; which therefore must needs be, in order of nature, before all knowledge, mind, and understanding whatsoever, this being but a fantastic image or representation of them. From whence they infer, that the corporeal world, and these sensible things, could not possibly be made by any mind or understanding, because essentially junior to them, and the very image and creature of them. Thus does Aristotle observe,[7] concerning both Democritus and Protagoras, that they did ὑπολαμβάνειν τὰ ὄντα μόνον εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητά, "suppose the only things or objects of the mind to be sensibles; and that this was the reason why they made knowledge to be sense, and therefore relative and fantastical." But we have already proved that mind and understanding is not the fantastic image of sensibles or bodies, and that it is in its own nature not ectypal, but archetypal and architectonical of all; that it is senior to the world and all sensible things, it not looking abroad for its objects any where without, but containing them within itself; the first original mind being an absolutely

[6] Aristot. Metaphysicor. lib. 4. cap. 5. p. 312. tom. 4. opp. Dr. Cudworth, however, has here omitted some portion of Aristotle's words, considering them to have no bearing upon the matter in hand.

[7] Metaphysicor. lib. 4. cap. 5. p. 313. tom. 4. opp. But what Dr. Cudworth here gives in English as Aristotle's, is not all extant in that author, but only so much as corresponds to the Greek words quoted.

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perfect being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own omnipotence, or all possibilities of things, together with the best platform of the whole, and producing the same accordingly.

But it being plain that there are besides singulars, other objects of the mind universal, from whence it seems to follow that sensibles are not the only things; some modern atheistic wits[8] have therefore invented this further device to maintain the cause and carry the business on, that universals are nothing else but names or words by which singular bodies are called; and consequently that in all axioms and propositions, sententious affirmations and negations (in which the predicate at least is universal) we do but add or substract, affirm or deny, names of singular bodies; and that reason or syllogism is nothing but the reckoning or computing the consequences of these names or words. Neither do they want the impudence to affirm that besides those passions or fancies which we have from things by sense, we know nothing at all of any thing but only the names by which it is called; than which there cannot be a greater sottishness or madness: for if geometry were nothing but the knowledge of names, by which singular bodies are called, as itself could not deserve that name of a science, so neither could its truths be the same in Greek and in Latin; and geometricians, in all the several distant ages and places of the world, must be supposed to have had the same singular bodies before them, of which they affirmed and denied those universal names.

In the last place, the Epicurean and Anaximandrian Atheists, agreeably to the premised principles, and the tenor of their hypothesis, do both of them endeavour to depreciate and undervalue knowledge or understanding, as a thing which hath not any higher degree of perfection or entity in it than is in dead and senseless matter; it being, according to them, but a passion from singular bodies existing without, and therefore both junior and inferior to them; a tumult raised in the brain by motions made upon it from the objects of sense; that which essentially

[8] He means Hobbes principally, who, in part 1. chap. 2. p. 10. of his Logic, says: "A universal name, therefore, is the name, not of a thing existing in the nature of things, nor of an idea or phantasm formed in the mind of any one, but always of a word or name. And consequently, in order to understand the force of a universal, there is no need of any other faculty than the imaginative, by which we remember that such words excited sometimes one, sometimes another thing in the mind." The same writer, chap. 3. sect. 2. p. 17. thus defines a proposition: "A proposition is a speech consisting of two names copulated, by which he that speaks signifies he conceives the latter name to be the name of the same thing whereof the former is the name." On reasoning he writes as follows, cap. 1. p. 2. "To reason, therefore, is the same as to add and subtract; or if any one should join thereto, to multiply and divide, I shall not object, since multiplication is the same as the addition of equals, and division the same as the subtraction of equals, so often as it can be done. Therefore, all reasoning is reducible to two operations of the mind, addition and subtraction." A little afterwards he says: "Now, such things as we add and subtract, that is, which we put into an account, we are said to consider in Greek, λογίζεσθαι, in which language also συλλογίζεσθαι, signifies to compute, reckon, or reason."

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includeth in it dependence upon something else; at best but a thin and evanid image of sensibles, or rather an image of those images of sense, a mere whiffling and fantastic thing; upon which account they conclude it not fit to be attributed to that which is the first root and source of all things, which therefore is to them no other than grave and solid senseless matter, the only substantial, self-existent, independent thing, and consequently the most perfect and divine. Life and understanding, soul and mind, are to them no simple and primitive natures, but secondary and derivative, or syllables and complexions of things, which sprung up afterwards, from certain combinations of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, or contemperations of qualities, contextures either of similar or dissimilar atoms. And as themselves are juniors to senseless matter and motion, and to those inanimate elements, fire, water, air, and earth, the first and most real productions of nature and chance, so are their effects, and the things that belong to them, comparatively with those other real things of nature, but slight, ludicrous, and umbratile, as landscape in picture, compared with the real prospect of high mountains, and low valleys, winding or meandrous rivers, towering steeples, and the shady tops of trees and groves; as they are, accordingly, commonly disparaged under those names of notional and artificial.[9] And thus was the sense of the ancient Atheists represented by Plato:* *Φασὶ τὰ μὲν Μέγιστα καὶ Κάλλιστα ἀπεργάζεσθαι Φύσιν καὶ Τύχην, τὰ δὲ Σμικρότερα Τέχνην· ἣν δὴ παρὰ φύσεως λαμβάνουσαν, τὴν τῶν μεγάλων καὶ πρώτων γένεσιν ἔργων, πλάττειν καὶ τεκταίνεσθαι πάντα τὰ σμικρότερα, ἃ δὴ τεχνικὰ προσαγορεύομεν*, "They say, that the greatest and most excellent things of all were made by senseless nature and chance; but all the smaller and more inconsiderable, by art, mind, and understanding; which taking from nature those first and greater things as its ground-work to act upon, doth frame and fabricate all the other lesser things, which are therefore commonly called artificial." And the mind of these Atheists is there also further declared by that philosopher after this manner: "The first, most real, solid and substantial things in the whole world are those elements, fire, water, air, and earth, made by senseless nature and chance, without any art, mind, or understanding: and next to these the bodies of the sun, moon, and stars, and this terrestrial globe, produced out of the foresaid inanimate elements, by unknowing nature or chance likewise, without any art, mind, or God." The fortuitous concourse of similar or dissimilar atoms begetting this whole system and com-

[9] The opinions and dogmas here enumerated and exposed are chiefly Hobbes', of which we have already spoken in chap. 2. of this work. But the learned Doctor intersperses some things which it would be difficult to find in that author.

* De Leg. lib. 10. p. 889. [Page 665. 666.]

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pages of heaven and earth:[10] Τέχνην δὲ ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων ὑστέραν γενομένην, αὐτὴν ϑνητὴν ἐκ ϑνητων, ὕστερα γεγεννηκέναι παιδιὰς τινὰς ἀληϑείας οὐ σφόδρα μετεχούσας, ἀλλ' εἴδωλ' ἄττα ξυγγενῆ ἑαυτῶν, οἷον ἡ γραφικὴ, καὶ τὰ ἑζῆς, "But that afterwards art or mind, and understanding, being generated also in the last place out of those same senseless and inanimate bodies or elements (it rising up in certain smaller pieces of the universe, and particular concretions of matter called animals) mortal from mortal things, did produce certain other ludicrous things, which partake little of truth and reality, but are mere images, umbrages, and imitations, as picture and landscape," &c.[1] "but above all, those moral differences of just and unjust, honest and dishonest, the mere figments of political art, and slight umbratile things, compared with good and evil natural, that consist in nothing but agreement and disagreement with sense and appetite:" Τὰ γὰρ καλὰ φύσει μὲν ἄλλα νόμῳ δὲ ἕτερα, τὰ δὲ δίκαια οὐδὲ τὸ παράπαν φύσει, "For, as for things good and honest, those that are such by nature differ from those which are such by law; but as for just and unjust, there is by nature nc such thing at all." The upshot and conclusion of all is, that there is no such scale or ladder in nature as Theists and Metaphysicians suppose, no degrees of real perfection and entity one above another, as of life and sense above inanimate matter, of reason and understanding above sense; from whence it would be inferred, that the order of things in nature was in way of descent from higher and greater perfection, downward to lesser and lower, which is indeed to introduce a God. And that there is no such scale or ladder of perfection and entity, they endeavour further to prove from hence, because, according to that hypothesis, it would follow, that every the smallest and most contemptible animal, that could see the sun, had a higher degree of entity and perfection in it than the sun itself; a thing ridiculously absurd; or else, according to Cotta's[2] instance: Idcircò formicam anteponendam esse huic pulcherrimæ urbi, quòd in urbe sensus sit nullus, in formica non modo sensus, sed etiam mens, ratio, memoria, "That therefore every ant or pismire were far to be preferred before this most beautiful city of Rome, because in the city there is no sense; whereas an ant hath not only sense, but also mind, reason, and memory;" that is, a

[10] Such is Dr. Cudworth's interpretation of the opinion of those philosophers whose doctrines Plato is expounding: but for my part I have strong doubts of its correctness. For there is nothing in Plato to show that they agreed with Democritus and Epicurus in supposing the universe to have been produced by the fortuitous concourse of atoms. Plato has not explained the discipline of this sect so plainly and clearly as to enable us to decide with certainty in what way they imagined the nature of things to have been generated out of formless matter.

[1] In what follows Dr. Cudworth does not cite Plato's words, but merely expresses that philosopher's meaning in his own language.

[2] In Cicero, De Natura Deorum, lib. 3. cap. 9. p. 3061. tom. 9.

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certain sagacity superior to sense. Wherefore they conclude, that there is no such scale or ladder in nature, no such climbing stairs of entity and perfection, one above another, but that the whole universe is one flat and level, it being indeed all nothing but the same uniform matter, under several forms, dresses, and disguises; or variegated by diversity of accidental modifications; one of which is that of such beings as have fancy in them, commonly called animals; which are but some of sportful or wanton natures, more trimly artificial and finer Gamaieus or pretty toys; but by reason of this fancy they have no higher degree of entity and perfection in them, than is in senseless matter: as they will also be all of them quickly transformed again into other seemingly dull, unthinking, and inanimate shapes. Hitherto the sense of Atheists.

But the pretended grounds of this atheistic doctrine (or rather madness) have been already also confuted, over and over again. Knowledge and understanding is not a mere passion from the thing known, existing without the knower, because to know and understand, as Anaxagoras[3] of old determined, is κρατεῖν, to "master" and "conquer" the thing known, and consequently not merely to suffer from it, or passively to lie under it, this being κρατεῖσθαι, to be "mastered" and "conquered" by it. The knowledge of universal theorems in sciences is not from the force of the thing known existing without the knower, but from the active power and exerted vigour or strength of that which knows. Thus Severinus Boethius:* Videsne, ut in cognoscendo, cuncta suâ potius facultate, quàm eorum, quæ cognoscuntur, utantur? Neque id injuria, nam cum omne judicium judicantis actus existat, necesse est, ut suam quisque operam, non ex alienâ, sed ex propriâ potestate perficiat, "See you not how all things, in knowing, use their own power and faculty, rather than that of the thing known? For since judgment is the action of that which judgeth, every thing must of necessity perform its own action, by its own power, strength, and faculty, and not by that of another." Sense itself is not a mere passion, or reception of the motion from bodies without the sentient, for if it were so, then would a looking-glass and other dead things see; but it is a perception of a passion made upon the body of the sentient, and therefore hath something of the soul's own self-activity in it. But understanding, and the knowledge of abstract sciences is neither primary sense, nor yet the fading and decaying remainders of the motions thereof, but a perception of another kind, and more inward than that of sense; not sympathetical, but unpassionate, the Noemata of the mind being things distinct

[3] In Aristotle, De Anima, lib. 3. cap. 5. p. 48. tom. 2. opp.
* Cons. lib. 5. Pro. 4. [Lib. 5, p. 132.]

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from the phantasmata of sense and imagination; which are but a kind of confused cogitations. And though the objects of sense be only singular bodies, existing without the sentient, yet are not these sensibles therefore the only things and cogitables; but there are other objects of science, or intelligibles, which the mind containeth within itself. That dark philosophy of some, tending so directly to atheism, that there is nothing in the mind or understanding, which was not first in corporeal sense, and derived in way of passion from matter, was both elegantly and solidly confuted by Boethius' Philosophic Muse, after this manner:*

Quondam porticus attulit,
Qui sensus et imagines
Credant mentibus imprimi;
Mos est æquore paginæ
Pressas figere literas.
Nihil motibus explicat,
Notis subdita corporum,
Rerum reddit imagines,
Cernens omnia notio?
Aut quæ cognita dividit?
Alternumque legens iter,
Nunc decidit in infima;
Veris falsa redarguit?
Longe causa potentior
Impressas patitur notas.
Et vires animi movens,
Cum vel lux oculos ferit,
Tum mentis vigor excitus,
Ad motus similes vocans,
Obscuros nimium sense,
E corporibus extimis,
Ut quondam celeri stylo
Quæ nullas habeat notas,
Sed mens si propriis vigens
Sed tantum patiens jacet
Cassasque in speculi vicem
Unde hæc sic animis viget,
Quæ vis singula prospicit?
Quæ divisa recolligit?
Nunc summis caput inserit,
Tum sese referens sibi
Hæc est efficiens magis,
Quam quæ materiæ modo
Præcedit tamen excitans
Vivo in corpore passio.
Vel vox auribus instrepit:
Quas intus species tenet,
Notis applicat exteris.[4]

It is true indeed, that the Νοητὸν, or "thing understood," is, in order of nature, before the intellection and conception of it; and from hence was it, that the Pythagoreans and Platonists concluded, that Νοῦς, "Mind," or "Intellect," was not the very first and highest thing in the scale of the universe, but that there was another divine hypostasis, in order of nature before it, called by them, Ἓν and Τ' ἀγαθὸν, "One" and "the good," as the Νοητὸν or "Intelligible" thereof. But as those three archical hypostases of the Platonists and Pythagoreans are all of them really but one Θεῖον, or "divinity," and the first of those three (superior to that which is properly called by them, Mind or intellect) is not supposed therefore to be ignorant of itself; so is the first Mind or Understanding no other, than that of a perfect Being, infinitely good, fecund, and powerful, and virtually containing all things; comprehending itself and the extent of its own goodness, fecundity, virtue, and power; that is, all possibi-

* Boethius, Cons. lib. 5. m. 4. [Page 132.]

[4] On this passage of Boethius it will be worth while to consult Ren. Vallinus' Annotations, p. 92. The argument here briefly touched upon by the learned Doctor is handled much more copiously by him in his treatise On Eternal and Immutable Morality, book 4. chap. 2. 3. 4.

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lities of things, their relations to one another, and verities; a Mind before sense, and sensible things. An omnipotent understanding Being, which is itself its own intelligible, is the first original of all things. Again, that there must of necessity be some other substance besides body or matter, and which, in the scale of nature, is superior to it, is evident from hence, because otherwise there could be no motion at all therein, no body being ever able to move itself. There must be something self-active and hylarchical, something that can act both from itself and upon matter, as having a natural imperium, or command over it. Cogitation is, in order of nature, before local motion. Life and understanding, soul and mind, are no syllables or complexions of things, secondary and derivative, which might therefore be made out of things devoid of life and understanding; but simple, primitive, and uncompounded natures; there are no qualities or THE accidental modifications of matter, but substantial things. For which cause souls or minds can no more be generated out of matter, than matter itself can be generated out of something else: and therefore are they both alike (in some sense) principles, naturally ingenerable and incorruptible, though both matter, and all imperfect souls and minds, were at first created by one perfect, omnipotent, understanding Being. Moreover, nothing can be more evident than this, that mind and understanding hath a higher degree of entity or perfection in it, and is a greater reality in nature, than mere senseless matter or bulky extension. And consequently, the things, which belong to souls and minds, to rational and intellectual beings as such, must not have less, but more reality in them, than the things which belong to inanimate bodies. Wherefore, the differences of just and unjust, honest and dishonest, are greater realities in nature, than the differences of hard and soft, hot and cold, moist and dry. He that does not perceive any higher degree of perfection in a man than in an oyster, nay, than in a clod of earth or lump of ice, in a piece of paste or piecrust, hath not the reason or understanding of a man in him. There is unquestionably a scale or ladder of nature, and degrees of perfection and entity one above another, as of life, sense, and cogitation, above dead, senseless, and unthinking matter; of reason and understanding above sense, &c. And if the sun be nothing but a mass of fire, or inanimate subtle matter agitated, then hath the most contemptible animal, that can see the sun, and hath consciousness and self-enjoyment, a higher degree of entity and perfection in it than that whole fiery globe; as also than the materials (stone, timber, brick and mortar) of the most stately structure or city. Notwithstanding which, the sun in other regards, and as its vastly extended light and heat hath so great an influence upon the good of the whole world, plants and animals, may be said to be a far more noble

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and useful thing in the universe, than any one particular animal whatsoever. Wherefore there being plainly a scale or ladder of entity, the order of things was unquestionably, in way of descent, from higher perfection downward to lower; it being as impossible for a greater perfection to be produced from a lesser, as for something to be caused by nothing. Neither are the steps or degrees of this ladder (either upward or downward) infinite; but as the foot, bottom, or lowest round thereof is stupid and senseless matter, devoid of all life and understanding, so is the head, top, and summity of it a perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending itself, and all possibilities of things. A perfect understanding Being is the beginning and head of the scale of entity; from whence things gradually descend downward, lower and lower, till they end in senseless matter. Νοῦς πάντων προγενέστατος, "Mind is the oldest of all things," senior to the elements, and the whole corporeal world; and likewise, according to the same ancient Theists, it is Κύριος κατὰ φύσιν, "by nature lord over all," or hath a natural imperium and dominion over all, it being the most hegemonical thing. And thus was it also affirmed by Anaxagoras: Νοῦς βασιλεὺς οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ γῆς, "that mind is the sovereign king of heaven and earth."[δ]

We have now made it evident, that the Epicurean and Anaximandrian Atheists, who derive the original of all things from senseless matter, devoid of all manner of life, can no way solve the phenomenon of cogitation (life and understanding, soul and mind) no more than they can that of local motion. And the reason why we have insisted so much upon this point is, because these Atheists do not only pretend to solve this phenomenon of cogitation without a God, and so to take away the argument for a Deity from thence, but also to demonstrate the impossibility of its existence, from the very nature of knowledge, mind, and understanding. For if knowledge be, in its own nature, nothing but a passion from singular bodies existing without the knower; and if life and understanding, soul and mind, be junior to body, and generated out of senseless matter, then could no mind or understanding being possibly be a God, that is, a first principle, and the maker of all things. And though modern writers take little or no notice of this, yet did Plato anciently make the very state of the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists principally to consist of this very thing, viz. Whether life and understanding, soul and mind, were juniors to body, and sprung out of senseless matter, as accidental

[δ] See the sayings of the ancients collected by Ægidius Menagius on Diogenes Laërtius, p. 72. Add the following passage from Plato's Cratylus, p. 269 :. Ἀναξαγόρας λέγει νοῦν αὐτοκράτορα ὄντα αὐτὸν, καὶ οὐδενὶ μεμιγμένον πάντα κοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα διὰ πάντων ἰόντα, "Anaxagoras says that mind is by nature sovereign, and being without admixture orders and disposes all things, passing through all."

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modifications thereof, or elsewhere substantial things, and in order of nature before it. For after the passages before cited, he thus concludeth:* Κινδυνεύει ὁ λέγων ταῦτα, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα, πρῶτα ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν πάντων εἶναι, καὶ τὴν φύσιν ὀνομάζειν ταῦτα αὐτὰ, ψυχὴν δὲ ἐκ τούτων ὕστερον· ἔοικε δὲ οὐ κινδυνεύειν, ἀλλὰ ὄντως σημαίνειν ταῦτα ἡμῖν τῷ λόγῳ. Ἀρ' οὖν πρὸς Διὸς οἷον πηγὴν τινὰ ἀνοήτου δόξης ἀνευρήκαμεν ἀνθρώπων, ὁπόσοι τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἐφήψαντο ζητημάτων, "These men seem to suppose fire, water, air and earth, to be the very first things in the universe, and the principles of all, calling them only nature; but soul and mind to have sprung up afterwards out of them. Nay, they do not only seem to suppose this, but also in express words declare the same. And thus (by Jupiter) have we discovered the very fountain of that atheistic madness of the ancient physiologers, to wit, their making inanimate bodies senior to soul and mind." And accordingly that philosopher addresses himself, to the confutation of atheism, no otherwise than thus, by proving soul not to be junior to senseless body, or inanimate matter, and generated out of it: Ὃ πρῶτον γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς αἴτιον ἁπάντων, τοῦτο οὐ πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ ὕστερον ἀπεφήναντο εἶναι γεγονὸς, οἱ τὴν τῶν ἀσεβῶν ψυχὴν ἀπεργασάμενοι λόγοι· ὃ δὲ ὕστερον πρότερον· ὅθεν ἡμαρτήκασι περὶ θεῶν τῆς ὄντως οὐσίας ψυχὴν· ἠγνοηκέναι κινδυνεύουσι μὲν ὀλίγου ξύμπαντες, οἷόν τε δν τυγχάνει καὶ δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει· τῶν τε ἄλλων αὐτῆς περὶ καὶ δὴ καὶ γενέσεως, ὡς ἐν πρώτοις ἐστὶ, σωμάτων ἔμπροσθεν πάντων γενομένη, καὶ μεταβολῆς πάσης ἄρχει, "That which is the first cause of the generation and corruption of all things, the atheistic doctrine supposes not to have been first made; but what is indeed the last thing to be the first. And hence is it, that they err concerning the essence of the gods. For they are ignorant what kind of thing soul is, and what power it hath, as also especially concerning its generation and production, that it was first of all made before body, it being that which governs the motions, changes, and transformations thereof.[6] But if soul be first in order of nature before body, then must those things which are cognate to soul, be also before the things which appertain to body; and so mind and understanding, art and law, be before hard and soft, heavy and light; and that which these Atheists call nature (the motion of inanimate bodies) junior to art and mind, it being governed by the same." Now that soul is in order of nature before body, this philosopher demonstrates only from the topic or head of motion, because it is impossible that one body should move another infinitely, without any first cause or mover; but there must of

* Plato, lib. 10. De Leg. [Page 666.]

[6] The portion which follows as coming from Plato expresses his meaning rather than his very words.

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necessity be something self-moving and self-active, or which had a power of changing itself, that was the first cause of all local motion in bodies. And this being the very notion of soul, that it is such a thing as can move or change itself (in which also the essence of life consisteth) he thus inferreth: Ἱκανώτατα δέδεικται ψυχὴ τῶν πάντων πρεσβυτάτη γενομένη τε ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, "It is therefore sufficiently demonstrated from hence, that soul is the oldest of all things in the corporeal world, it being the principle of all the motion and generation in it." And his conclusion is: Ὀρθῶς ἄρα εἰρηκότες ἂν ἦμεν ψυχὴν μὲν προτέραν γεγονέναι σώματος ἡμῖν, σῶμα δὲ δεύτερόν τε καὶ ὕστερον, ψυχῆς ἀρχούσης, ἀρχόμενον κατὰ φύσιν, "It hath been therefore rightly affirmed by us, that soul is older than body, and was made before it, and body younger and junior to soul; soul being that which ruleth, and body that which is ruled.[7] From whence it follows, that the things of soul also are older than the things of body; and therefore cogitation, intellection, volition, and appetite, in order of nature before length, breadth, and profundity." Now it is evident, that Plato in all this understood, not only the mundane soul, or his third divine hypostasis, the original of that motion, that is in the heavens and the whole corporeal universe, but also all other particular lives and souls whatsoever, or that whole rank of beings called soul; he supposing it all to have been at first made before the corporeal system, or at least to have been in order of nature senior to it, as superior and more excellent (that which ruleth being superior to that which is ruled) and no soul or life whatsoever, to be generated out of senseless matter.

Wherefore we must needs here condemn that doctrine of some professed Theists and Christians of latter times, who generate all souls, not only the sensitive in brutes, but also the rational in men, out of matter; for as much as hereby, not only that argument for the existence of a God, from souls, is quite taken away, and nothing could hinder, but that senseless matter might be the original of all things, if life and understanding, soul and mind, sprung out of it; but also the Atheist will have an advantage to prove the impossibility of a God from hence; because if life and understanding, in their own nature, be factitious, and generable out of matter, then are they no substantial things, but accidental only; from whence it will plainly follow, that no mind could possibly be a God, or first cause of all things, it being not so much as able to subsist by itself. Moreover, if mind, as such, be generable, and educible out of nothing, then must it needs be in its own nature corruptible also, and reducible to nothing again; whereas the Deity is both an unmade and incorruptible being. So that there could not possibly be, ac-

[7] Here again we have the sense but not the very words of Plato.

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cording to this hypothesis, any other God, than such a Jupiter, or soul of the world, as the atheistic Theogonists acknowledged, that sprung out of Night, Chaos, and Nonentity, and may be again swallowed up into that dark abyss. Senseless matter therefore, being the only unmade and incorruptible thing, and the fountain of all things, even of life and understanding, it must needs be acknowledged to be the only real Numen.

Neither will the case be much different, as to some others, who, though indeed they do not professedly generate the rational, but only the sensitive soul, both in men and brutes, yet do nevertheless maintain the human soul itself to be but a mere blank, or white sheet of paper, that hath nothing at all in it, but what was scribbled upon it by the objects of sense; and knowledge, or understanding, to be nothing but the result of sense, and so a passion from sensible bodies existing without the knower. For hereby, as they plainly make knowledge and understanding to be, in its own nature, junior to sense, and the very creature of sensibles; so do they also imply the rational soul, and mind itself, to be as well generated as the sensitive, wherein it is virtually contained; or to be nothing but a higher modification of matter, agreeably to that Leviathan doctrine, that men differ no otherwise from brute animals, than only in their organization, and the use of speech or words.

In very truth, whoever maintaineth that any life or soul, any cogitation or consciousness, self-perception and self-activity, can spring out of dead, senseless and unactive matter, the same can never possibly have any rational assurance, but that his own soul had also a like original, and consequently is mortal and corruptible. For if any life and cogitation can be thus generated, then is there no reason, but that all lives may be so, they being but higher degrees in the same kind; and neither life, nor any thing else, can be in its own nature indifferent to be either substance or accident, and sometimes one and sometimes the other; but either all life, cogitation and consciousness, is accidental, generable and corruptible; or else none at all.[8]

[8] Dr. Cudworth is in my opinion a little too severe in his censures upon those who hold the soul to be by nature a mere blank sheet, but yet endowed with the faculty of acquiring certain fixed and permanent ideas by the contemplation of external things. I am not disposed to take part with this class of philosophers; nevertheless, as there are among them many grave and respectable men, who are well affected towards God and religion, I am sorry when I find them accused of a leaning to impiety and atheism. If my own judgment does not fail me there seems to be nothing to hinder a man from defending this opinion, and at the same time maintaining the soul to be self-existent incorporeal, and immortal. But, says the learned Doctor,

I. Those who think thus, make knowledge to be junior to sense. And it is as he says: they affirm this of human knowledge, but not also of the knowledge of God and of minds disconnected from body. This doctrine does not appear to me to be so very pernicious that no one can possibly entertain it without being disposed at the same time to discard God and the soul's immortality. For my part I should call a man mad

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That which hath inclined so many to think the sensitive life, at least, to be nothing but a quality, or accident of matter, generable out of it, and corruptible into it, is that strange Protean transformation of matter into so many seemingly unaccountable forms and shapes, together with the scholastic opinion thereupon of real qualities; that is, entities distinct from the substance of body, and its modifications, but yet generable out of it, and corruptible into it; they concluding, that as light and colours, heat and cold, &c. according to those fancies which we have of them, are real qualities of matter, distinct from its substance and modifications; so may life, sense and cogitation be in like manner qualities of matter also, generable and corruptible. But these real qualities of body, in the sense declared, are things that were long since justly exploded by the ancient Atomists, and expunged out of the catalogue of entities, of whom Laërtius[9] hath recorded, that they did ἐκβάλλειν τὰς ποιότητας, "quite cashier and banish qualities out of their philosophy:" they resolving all corporeal phenomena, and therefore those of heat and cold, light and colours, fire and flame, &c. intelligibly, into nothing but the different modifications of extended substance, viz. more or less magnitude of parts, figure, site, motion or rest (or the combinations of them), and those different fancies caused in us by them. Indeed there is no other entity, but substance and its modifications. Wherefore the Democritics and Epicureans did most shamefully contradict themselves, when, pretending to reject and explode all those entities of real qualities, themselves nevertheless made life and understanding such real qua-

who reasoned in this way: The ideas of the soul are adventitious, and proceed from sense; therefore the soul is by nature corporeal: therefore there is no God.

II. He considers it to follow from this dogma, that the soul is nothing more than a certain modification of matter. But I see nothing to warrant such an inference, neither can I perceive the force of this reasoning: The rational soul is nothing but a modification of matter: for all forms and ideas that are in the mind, come to it from without. We all know that a mirror in itself contains neither forms nor images, and that all the forms of things which are seen in it arise from external bodies. And yet what man would conclude from hence, that a mirror is not in its own nature distinct and different from those bodies, the forms of which are represented in it? In like manner I can never bring myself to regard those as so very wicked and atheistical who determine the sentient souls in beasts to be a certain modification of matter. The learned Doctor here assumes that life and sense differ from reason and mind only in degree; and if such were the case, there certainly would be some grounds for his accusation; but the advocates of the doctrine he is repudiating will never admit this. On the contrary, they will contend that reason and sense are altogether different from each other in their very nature, and consequently that although sense and life may be said to spring from a certain constitution of matter, still it does not thence follow that reason, mind, and cogitation belong to the same class, and are generated in the same manner. I would recommend those that dispute upon topics like these, which owing to the weakness of our own minds are involved in much obscurity, to be mutually more gentle and forbearing, and not to charge each other with heinous crimes except for the most weighty reasons. But I remember having already made several allusions to this subject.

[9] De Epicuro, lib. 10. segm. 44. p. 621. Compare the copious remarks on chap. 1.

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lities of matter, generable out of it, and corruptible again into it.[10]

There is nothing in body or matter, but magnitude, figure, site, and motion or rest: now it is mathematically certain, that these, however combined together, can never possibly compound, or make up life or cogitation; which therefore cannot be an accident of matter, but must of necessity be a substantial thing. We speak not here of that life (improperly so called) which is, in vulgar speech, attributed to the bodies of men and animals; for it is plainly accidental to a body to be vitally united to a soul, or not. Therefore is this life of the compound corruptible and destroyable, without the destruction of any real entity; there being nothing destroyed, nor lost to the universe, in the deaths of men and animals, as such, but only a disunion, or separation made of those two substances, soul and body, one from another. But we speak here of the original life of the soul itself, that this is substantial, neither generable nor corruptible, but only creatable and annihilable by the Deity. And it is strange, that any men should persuade themselves that that, which rules and commands in the bodies of animals, moving them up and down, and hath sense and perception in it, should not be as substantial, as that stupid and senseless matter, that is ruled by it. Neither can matter (which is also but a mere passive thing) efficiently produce soul, any more than soul matter; no finite, imperfect substance being able to produce another substance out of nothing. Much less can such a substance, as hath a lower degree of entity and perfection in it, create that which hath a higher. There is a scale, or ladder of entities and perfections in the universe, one above another, and the production of things cannot possibly be in way of ascent from lower to higher, but must of necessity be in way of descent from higher to lower. Now to produce any

[10] I. Probably it would be better to take a more simple view of the thing and to say, that the doctrine of life and sense being a certain modification of matter arose chiefly from the consideration of brute animals. For most men denied the existence of a soul, properly so called, in beasts, and yet they observed them to feel, move, and live. They therefore fell into the opinion that life and sense can be produced by a certain modification and disposition of matter.

II. When the learned Doctor charges the Democritics and Epicureans with making life and understanding to be qualities of matter, he must not be understood as saying that they asserted as much in express words. For a genuine follower of these philosophers, so far from ranking life and reason among the qualities of matter, imagines, on the contrary, that they result from atoms which are devoid of all quality but in a certain way connected and associated with each other. But Dr. Cudworth fights them with the law of logical inference, and simply means it to be deducible from the principles of these men that life and understanding are qualities of matter. That is, his argument, as is evident from his previous remarks, is as follows: Life and sense cannot spring from lifeless and senseless matter; for out of nothing comes nothing; therefore neither can atoms, which are destitute of life and sense, produce reason and cogitation; consequently the Democritics, who hold all things to be made from atoms, must either decide that reason and sense are produced from nothing, or that life, sense, and reason are inherent as qualities in matter.

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one higher rank of being from the lower, as cogitation from magnitude and body, is plainly to invert this order in the scale of the universe from downwards to upwards, and therefore is it atheistical; and by the same reason, that one higher rank or degree in this scale is thus unnaturally produced from a lower, may all the rest be so produced also. Wherefore we have great reason to stand upon our guard here, and to defend this post against the Atheists; that no life, or cogitation, can either materially or efficiently result from dead and senseless body; or that souls, being all substantial and immaterial things, can neither be generated out of matter, nor corrupted into the same, but only created or annihilated by the Deity.

The grand objection against this substantiality of souls sensitive, as well as rational, is from that consequence, which will be from thence inferred, of their permanent subsistence after death, their perpetuity, or immortality. This seeming very absurd, that the souls of brutes also should be immortal, or subsist after the deaths of the respective animals: but especially to two sorts of men; first, such as scarcely in good earnest believe their own soul's immortality; and secondly, such religionists as conclude that if irrational, or sensitive souls subsist after death, then must they needs go presently either into heaven or hell. And R. Cartesius was so sensible of the offensiveness of this opinion, that though he were fully convinced of the necessity of this disjunction, that either brutes have nothing of sense or cogitation at all, or else they must have some other substance in them, besides matter, he chose rather to make them mere senseless machines, than to allow them substantial souls. Wherein, avoiding a lesser absurdity or paradox, he plainly plunged himself into a greater; scarcely any thing being more generally received, than the sense of brutes. Though in truth all those who deny the substantiality of sensitive souls, and will have brutes to have nothing but matter in them, ought consequently, according to reason, to do as Cartesius did, deprive them of all sense. But, on the contrary, if it be evident from the phenomena, that brutes are not mere senseless machines or automata, and only like clocks or watches, then ought not popular opinion and vulgar prejudice so far to prevail with us, as to hinder our assent to that which sound reason and philosophy clearly dictates, that therefore they must have something more than matter in them. Neither ought we, when we clearly conceive any thing to be true, as this, that life and cogitation cannot possibly rise out of dead and senseless matter, to abandon it, or deny our assent thereunto, because we find it attended with some difficulty not easily extricable by us, or cannot free all the consequences thereof from some inconvenience or absurdity, such as seems to be in the permanent subsistence of brutish souls.

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For the giving an account of which, notwithstanding, Plato and the ancient Pythagoreans proposed this following hypothesis; that souls, as well sensitive as rational, being all substantial, but not self-existent (because there is but one fountain and principle of all things), were therefore produced or caused by the Deity. But this, not in the generations of the respective animals; it being indecorous that this divine, miraculous, creative power should constantly lackey by and attend upon natural generations; as also incongruous, that souls should be so much juniors to every atom of dust that is in the whole world;[1] but either all of them from eternity, according to those who denied the novity of the world; or rather, according to others,

[1] Both these arguments by which the Pythagoreans formerly proved, we are told, that souls existed before all bodies, admit of very easy refutation.

I. It is unworthy of God, say they, to attend and wait upon each natural generation for the purpose of creating a soul suitable for the body which is generated. But I am very much afraid that those who are satisfied with this argument have themselves not a sufficiently exalted opinion of God. For they fancy the Deity to be like a man presiding over a certain office and government, who anxiously looks about and watches till something shall take place which requires his presence and authority. But is this opinion worthy of an omnipotent God? He who sees and discerns all things at once, who is every where present, and who possesses infinite power, is too great to admit of the slightest portion of this doctrine being applied to him. If he produces souls at the time when bodies are generated, he neither attends upon nature nor watches and waits till a generation takes place, but at one and the same moment beholds every thing that occurs in any part of the world, and performs his operations without the least trouble or solicitude. But even if there were any difficulty here, it is not removed by those who suppose souls to have been created before all bodies. Granting that all souls existed from the beginning of this world, still it will be necessary that the Deity, according to the language of Dr. Cudworth and the Platonists, should lackey nature, and attend upon each generation: for it behoves him to unite and associate a soul with the generated body. Therefore with respect to what is considered to be derogatory to the divine Majesty, both parties in reality agree with each other: for those who suppose God to have formerly produced the whole choir of souls at once, and the others who maintain that each is created at the time of the generation of a new body, alike acknowledge that he is present at the respective generations; the former asserting that he then inserts a soul into the body, and the latter that he makes and creates it. Both also allow the two to be equally easy to the Deity. But they differ upon the question whether it is more suitable to the divine Majesty to create souls all at once or separately. And what mortal will undertake to determine this controversy? Are we qualified to decide what is and what is not becoming to the divine nature in such matters? Probably those who make souls to have existed from the beginning of the world will here reply that they are not united with bodies by God, but come to them of themselves, and are compelled by a certain law of nature to descend and glide down into bodies. Thus they will repeat to us the old Platonic fable, which they must excuse us for despising till it is fortified by the authority either of reason or divine revelation.

II. It is repugnant, they tell us, to the order of nature that souls, which are more excellent than all matter, should nevertheless be junior to all bodies. But let them take care that they are able to prove the truth of this proposition: "Whatever is prior in nature and dignity ought to be prior also in time." The body of our Saviour Christ was unquestionably far more noble and excellent than other bodies, and yet it was posterior in time to an infinity of others. God created Adam on the sixth day, after all the rest of created things. But as man unquestionably far excels beasts and all other things consisting of matter, he would have been created at once on the first day if the divine Wisdom had held this rule in the same estimation as the learned Doctor's friends, the Platonists.

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who asserted the cosmogonia, in the first beginning of the world's creation. Wherefore, it being also natural to souls, as such, to actuate and enliven some body, or to be, as it were, clothed therewith; these, as soon as created, were immediately invested with certain thin and subtle bodies, or put into light ethereal or aërial chariots and vehicles; wherein they subsist, both before their entrance into other gross terrestrial bodies, and after their egress out of them. So that the souls, not only of men, but also of other animals, have sometimes a thicker, and sometimes a thinner indument or clothing. And thus do we understand Boethius, not only of the rational, but also of the other inferior sensitive souls, in these verses of his:[2]

> Tu causis animas paribus vitasque minores
> Provehis, et levibus sublimes curribus aptans,
> In cœlum terramque seris.

Where his light chariots, which all lives or souls, at their very first creation by God, are placed in, and in which being wafted, they are both together, as it were, sowed into the gross terrestrial matter, are thin, aërial, and ethereal bodies. But this is plainly declared by Proclus upon the Timæus, after he had spoken of the souls of demons and men, in this manner:* Καὶ γὰρ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη πρὸ τῶν θνητῶν σωμάτων, ἀϊδίοις καὶ εὐκινήτοις τισὶ χρῆσθαι σώμασιν, ὡς κατ' οὐσίαν ἔχουσαν τὸ κινεῖν, "And every soul must of necessity have, before these mortal bodies, certain eternal and easily moveable bodies, it being essential to them to move." There is indeed mention made by the same Proclus, and others, of an opinion of ἄλογοι δαίμονες, "irrational" or "brutish demons," or "demoniac aërial" brutes; of which he sometimes speaks doubtfully, as† εἴπερ γάρ εἰσιν ἄλογοι δαίμονες, ὡς οἱ θεουργοὶ, "if there be any irrational

[2] De Consolatione Philosophiæ, lib. 3. cap. 69. But Dr. Cudworth seems to me to give a wrong interpretation of this passage of Boethius, in supposing that it treats of the souls not only of men but of brutes also. He evidently imagines the minores vitas, "minor lives," spoken of by Boethius to be the souls of beasts. But the meaning of this philosopher, who in other respects was a warm admirer of Plato, is much more correctly expounded by those who understand the word animæ of the minds of angels and demons, and vitas minores of the souls of men. For, as is manifest from Proclus and others, the Platonists are accustomed to make a great distinction between celestial souls, which are never smitten with the love of frail and earthly things, and the human which are subject to the desire of bodies. And this explication is admirably confirmed by the words which follow: In cœlum terramque seris, "thou sowest in heaven and earth:" which show that Boethius is speaking of minds which remain in heaven, or the more exalted portion of ether, and of souls that either through their own corruptness or by the command of God, descend to the lower parts of the universe. The former he calls souls, the latter minor lives. But the learned Doctor seems to have forgotten that he has already commented at great length before on these *vehicles* or subtle bodies of souls: from which it would appear that the portions of this volume or the sections of this chapter, were written at different times, and not in uninterrupted order.

* Lib. 5. p. 290. † Lib. 4. p. 288.

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demons, as the Theurgists affirm." But the dispute, doubt, or controversy here only was, whether there were any such irrational demons immortal, or no. For thus we learn from these words of Ammonius upon the Porphyrian Isagoge: Οἱ μὲν γάρ φασιν εἶναί τι δαιμονίων ἀλόγων γένος ἀθάνατον, οἱ δέ φασι καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον γένος θνητὸν εἶναι, "Some affirm, that there is a certain kind of irrational demons immortal;" but others, that all these "irrational, or brutish demons are mortal." Where, by "irrational demons immortal," seem to be understood such as never descend into terrestrial bodies (and these are there disclaimed by Ammonius), but the mortal ones, such as act also upon gross terrestrial bodies, obnoxious to death and corruption. As if Ammonius should have said, there are no other brutish, or irrational demons, than only the souls of such brute animals as are here amongst us, sometimes acting only aërial bodies.[3] Thus,

[3] I cannot conceive the reason why Dr. Cudworth here touches upon this controversy of the Platonists. In my opinion the disputation he has here entered into did not require any allusion to this subject. But his extensive knowledge of an infinite variety of subjects often causes him to wander from his purpose, and to mix up very learned but yet irrelevant matter, with topics immediately bearing upon the question. Be this as it may, he has neither given us Ammonius' meaning nor correctly stated the point at issue among the Platonists respecting irrational or brutish demons. In Ammonius' words he sees what probably no one besides himself will be able to discover; and attaches to the words ἀθάνατος and θνητὸς a singular and altogether unheard of signification. For he supposes ἀθάνατος to be said of that which never animates a mortal and earthly body, and θνητὸς of that which descends into a mortal body. But a cursory inspection of Ammonius will at once convince any one that this is wholly at variance with his opinion. Worn out myself with long and most toilsome labour, I am not disposed to enter into a new and tedious comment on this subject, or to give from the obscure volumes of the Platonists a detailed explication of their absurd notions respecting demons and their nature: but yet I cannot refrain from adducing with all possible brevity just so much as will be sufficient to explain what is here advanced by Dr. Cudworth. The most ancient of the Greek and oriental nations believed genii and demons to be corporeal, and supposed that there is no more difference between God and a demon, than between a solid and concrete and a simple and subtle body. But whatever is corporeal is liable to be dissolved. Therefore although others held a different opinion, there were many who conceived it to be possible for demons to die, and after the lapse of a long interval of time to perish and become extinct. On this doctrine Plutarch discourses at much length in his treatise De Oraculorum Defectu, and observes that Hesiod among others was devoted to it, p. 415. tom. 2. opp. Ὁ δὲ Ἡσίοδος οἴεται καὶ περιόδοις τισὶ χρόνων γινέσθαι τοῖς δαίμοσι τὰς τελευτάς, "But Hesiod imagines that death befalls demons after certain periods of time." He there quotes Hesiod's verses in proof of this, and also makes Æmilianus, whom he introduces as speaker, repeat some examples confirmatory of the same opinion: of which the one borrowed from the death of the great Pan has already been examined by us in another place. But this opinion found no favour with the Platonists, who philosophized much more subtly respecting demons, and held them to be portions or rays of the divine nature itself: although the whole of this sect were not bold enough to assert that this ancient opinion was altogether false. For, as I have frequently intimated, this school entertained a remarkable reverence for ancient opinions and popular doctrines. Therefore some of them adopted a middle opinion, that is, decided that demons neither all die nor have all an immortal life. And in supporting this opinion they were much assisted by those who boasted that they surpassed all others, both learned and unlearned, in their knowledge of the nature of demons, namely the Theurgists: a vain, deceitful, superstitious, and crafty class of men, who pretended to be armed with the power of evoking demons to a colloquy, and

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according to the ancient Pythagoric hypothesis, there is neither any new substantial thing now made, which was not before, nor yet any real entity destroyed into nothing; not only no matter, but also no soul nor life; God, after the first creation, neither making any new substance, nor yet annihilating any thing made. He then creating nothing, that was not fit to be conserved in being, and which could not be well used and placed in the universe; and afterwards never repenting him of what he had before done. And natural generations and corruptions being nothing but accidental mutations, concretions, and secretions, or anagrammatical transpositions of pre and post-existing things, the same souls and lives being sometimes united to one body, and sometimes to another; sometimes in thicker, and sometimes in thinner clothing; and sometimes in the visible, sometimes in the invisible (they having aërial, as well as terrestrial vehicles); and never any soul quite naked of all body. And thus does Proclus complain of some, as spurious Platonists: Οἱ φθείροντες τὸ ὄχημα ἀναγκάζονται πότε παντὸς σώματος ἔξω ποιεῖν τὴν ψυχήν,* "Who, destroying the thinner vehicles of souls, were therefore necessitated sometimes to leave them in a state of separation from all body, or without any corporeal indument." Which cabala, probably derived from the Egyptians by Pythagoras, was before fully represented by us out of Ovid; though that transmigration of human souls there, into serine bodies,

of making use of them in whatever matters they pleased. These triflers gave out that there were various kinds of demons, as there are of men, and that some of them are perfectly brutish, stupid, irrational, and wholly devoted to lusts. I will explain this in the words of Plutarch, De Oraculorum Defectu, p. 417. tom. 2. opp. on the remaining kinds of demons I refer the curious to Jamblichus, De Mysteriis Ægyptiorum, and other writers of that class: Εἰσὶ γὰρ, ὡς ἐν ἀνθρώποις, καὶ δαίμοσιν ἀρετῆς διαφοραὶ, καὶ τοῦ παθητικοῦ καὶ ἀλόγου, τοῖς μὲν ἀσθενὲς καὶ ἀμαυρὸν ἔτι λείψανον, ὥσπερ περίττωμα, τοῖς δὲ πολὺ καὶ δυσκατάσβεστον ἔνεστιν, "For as among men so among demons also there are grades and distinctions of virtue and of a nature subject to the passions and irrational; in some the remains are faint and weak, like excrement, in others copious and difficult of extinction." Those Platonists, therefore, who held it to be unsafe to repudiate the whole of the ancient discipline respecting these natures, maintained that this brutish and irrational class of demons are capable of and eventually subject to annihilation. For that which is destitute of reason and obeys the motions of the body alone, was considered by them to be likely to perish in the same way as the body. But the whole of the disciples of this sect did not fall into this opinion, and hence arose the controversy, whether or not some demons, particularly those which the Theurgists declared to be ἄλογοι, or irrational, could die. Porphyry, in his well known epistle to Anebo the Egyptian seer, fragments of whose works are extant in Eusebius, Præparat. Evangelica, and others, avows pretty clearly his own leaning to the opinion of such as subjected some demons to death: but these, to whose number Ammonius also belongs, are opposed by Jamblichus, De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. 3. cap. 22. p. 88. &c. Some, like Proclus, left the matter undecided, and allowed every one the liberty to come to what conclusion he pleased upon it. Questions indeed of this kind are calculated to afford fertile matter for endless strife and contention, especially if they be handled by men who follow the shadow and image of wisdom rather than true wisdom itself, and fearlessly obey the delusive vagaries of their own minds.

* In Timæus, p. 330.

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hath not been by all acknowledged as a genuine part thereof.[4] And the same was likewise insisted upon by Virgil, Georg. lib. 4. as also owned and confirmed by Macrobius for a great truth;* Constat secundum veræ rationis assertionem, quam nec Cicero nescit, nec Virgilius ignorat, dicendo,

Nec morti esse locum;[5]——

Constat, inquam, nihil intra vivum mundum perire, sed eorum, quæ interire videntur, solam mutari speciem, "It is manifest, according to reason and true philosophy, which neither Cicero nor Virgil were unacquainted with (the latter of these affirming that there is no place at all left for death), I say, it is manifest that none of those things, that to us seem to die, do absolutely perish within the living world, but only their forms are changed."

Now, how extravagant soever this hypothesis seem to be, yet is there no question but that a Pythagorean would endeavour to find some countenance and shelter for it in the scripture; especially that place which hath so puzzled and nonplused interpreters, Rom. viii. 19: "For the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestations of the sons of God. For the creature was made subject unto vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him who hath subjected the same in hope. Because the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption, into the glorious liberty of the children of God. For we know,

[4] On this subject it will be worth while to consult those who have professedly treated of the transmigration of souls into various bodies, the chief of whom are enumerated by J. Alb. Fabricius in his Delectus Argumentor. pro Veritate Religionis Christianæ, cap. 18. p. 447.

* Somn. Scip. lib. 2. cap. 12. [Page 161.]

[5] Georg. lib. 4. ver. 221.

Deum namque ire per omnes
Terrasque, tractusque maris, cœlumque profundum:
Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum,
Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas.
Scilicet huc reddi deinde ac resoluta referri
Omnia: nec morti esse locum, sed viva volare
Sideris in numerum atque alto succedere cœlo.

To me, however, these verses of Virgil seem not exactly to accord with the opinion which the learned Doctor tells us was entertained by the Pythagoreans. For there is no mention in them of corporeal things, or of the vehicles of souls, or their transmigrations through various bodies, or of some other opinions which are here attributed to these philosophers. The poet speaks of souls only: which, both in the case of men and brute animals, are derived, according to the doctrine of some, he says, from the divine nature itself diffused through the whole universe, and on the dissolution of the bodies return to it again, and consequently never perish, but live for ever in the highest region of ether. He seems to have incautiously followed Macrobius when he asserts that Virgil approved of the whole of this Pythagorean dogma as he calls it. But Macrobius being immoderately attached to Platonic precepts, every where adheres to the custom of his sect, and drags in as confirmatory of his own opinion many sayings of the ancients, which nevertheless bear a far different sense.

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that the whole creation groaneth, and travaileth in pain together until now. And not only they, but ourselves also, which have the first-fruits of the Spirit, groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, even the redemption of our bodies." Where it is first of all evident, that the κτίσις, "creature," or "creation," spoken of, is not the very same with the τέκνα or υἱοὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ, "the children or sons of God," but something distinct from them. Wherefore, in the next place, the Pythagorean will add, that it must of necessity be understood either of the inanimate creature only, or of the lower animal creation, or else of both these together. Now, though it be readily acknowledged that there is a prosopopœia here, yet cannot all those expressions, for all that, without difficulty and violence, be understood of the inanimate creation only, or senseless matter; viz. that this hath ἀποκαραδοκίαν, "an earnest expectation" of some future good to itself; that it is now made subject ματαιότητι, "to vanity," frustration, and disappointment of desire; and φθορᾷ, "to corruption" and death; and that οὐχ ἑκοῦσα, "not willingly," but reluctantly; and yet ἐπ' ἐλπίδι too, "in hope," notwithstanding, of some further good to follow afterward; and that it doth in the mean time συστενάζειν and συνωδίνειν, "groan" and "travail" in pain together, till it be at length delivered from the "bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God." Moreover, in the generations and corruptions of senseless bodies, as of minerals and vegetables, or when, for example, oil is turned into flame, flame into smoke, water into vapour, vapour into snow or hail, grass into milk, milk into blood and bones, and the like; there is, I say, in all this, no hurt done to any thing, nor any real entity destroyed, all the substance of matter still remaining entirely the same, without the least diminution, and only accidental transformations thereof made. All this is really nothing but local motion; and there is no more toil nor labour to an inanimate body in motion, than in rest; it being altogether as natural for a body to be moved by something else, as of itself to rest. It is all nothing but change of figure, distance, site, and magnitude of parts, causing several sensations, fancies, and apparitions in us. And they, who would have the meaning of this place to be, that all such like mutations, and alternate vicissitudes in inanimate bodies, shall at length quite cease; these groaning in the mean time, and travelling in pain, to be delivered from the toilsome labour of such restless motion, and to be at ease and quiet; by taking away all motion thus, out of a fond regard to the ease and quiet of senseless matter, they would thereby, ipso facto, petrify the whole corporeal universe, and consequently the bodies of good men also after the resurrection, and congeal all into rocky marble or adamant. And as vain is that other conceit of some, that the whole terrestrial

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globe shall at last be vitrified, or turned into transparent crystal, as if it also groaned in the mean time for this. For whatsoever change shall be made of the world in the new heaven and the new earth to come, it is reasonable to think that it will not be made for the sake of the senseless matter, or the inanimate bodies themselves, to which all is alike; but only for the sake of men and animals, the living spectators and inhabitants thereof, that it may be fitter, both for their use and delight. Neither indeed can those words, for the creature "itself shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God," be understood of any other than animals; forasmuch as this liberty of the children of God, here meant, is their being clothed, instead of mortal, with immortal bodies; of which no other creatures are capable, but only such as consist of soul and body. And that πᾶσα κτίσις, that "whole creation," which is said afterwards to groan and travail in pain together, may be well understood of all that of the creation, which can groan, or be sensible of evil or misery. Wherefore, the Pythagorean would interpret this place of the lower animal creation only, which is sensible of good and evil; that as this was unwillingly, or against its own inclination (after the fall of man, or lapse of souls) made subject to vanity, and the bondage of corruption, pain, misery, and death, in those gross terrestrial bodies; in the manifestation of the sons of God, when they, instead of these mortal bodies, shall be clothed with celestial and immortal ones, then shall this creature also have its certain share in the felicity of that glorious time, and partake in some measure of such a liberty, by being freed in like manner from these their gross terrestrial bodies, and now living only in thin aërial and immortal ones; and so a period put to all their miseries and calamities by him, who made not death, neither hath pleasure in the destruction of the living, but created whatsoever liveth to this end, that it might have its being, and enjoy itself. But however thus much is certain, that brute animals, in this place, cannot be quite excluded; because the πᾶσα κτίσις, "the whole creation," will not suffer that: and therefore a Pythagorist would conclude it a warrantable inference from this text of scripture, that that whole rank in the creation of irrational and brutish animals below men shall not be utterly annihilated in the consummation of things, or future renovation of the world, quite stript of all this furniture, men being then left alone in it; but that there shall be a continuation of this species or rank of being. And not only so neither; as if there should still be a constant succession of such alternate generations and corruptions, productions or births, and deaths of brute animals, to all eternity; but also, that the individuals themselves shall continue the same, forasmuch as otherwise there would be none at all delivered from

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the bondage of corruption. And lastly, that these very souls of brutes, which at this time groan and travail in pain, shall themselves be made partakers of that liberty of the children of God; since otherwise they should be with child, or parturient of nothing; groaning not for themselves, but others.[5] But enough

[5] This new Pythagorean interpreter of St. Paul is I confess a bold one, as Dr. Cudworth himself seems to admit: but he proves by his own example that fortune does not always favour the bold. For if this explication be stript of all the pomp and ornament of words, by which the learned Doctor recommends it to our favour, there will be nothing left that can sustain itself or withstand the first assault of any rational opponent. What this exposition assumes in the first place, that κτίσις differs from υἱοὶ or τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ, few will be found willing to grant. Neither is there any thing in this passage of the holy apostle that should compel us to do so: as has been proved long ago by those who suppose the word κτίσις to designate holy and regenerate men. The nineteenth verse may be most conveniently expounded thus: "The earnest expectation of the regenerate waiteth for that day in which it will be made manifest, who are the true and genuine sons of God:" and the twenty-first, in which κτίσις and τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ seem again to be distinguished, will admit of the following interpretation: "For holy men who embrace Christ by true faith will be delivered into that liberty which was promised to the sons of God or to those who become sons of God by faith in Christ." There is here no necessity therefore for supposing that υἱοὶ and τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ are the celestials or saints already placed in heaven: as some eminent men are of opinion: see Salom. Dreyling's Observat. Sacr. par. 1. observ. 37. sect. 10. p. 156. although I am not much disposed to contend with these either. But if our Pythagorean considered υἱοὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ to imply pious and holy men, which seems probable, not even his own exposition here put forth will admit of κτίσις and υἱοὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ being distinguished. For as will presently be made apparent, he takes κτίσις in so wide a sense as to make it denote the whole of mankind.

But I shall now touch upon the interpretation itself. Κτίσις, if I am not wholly mistaken, according to our Pythagorean, is the entire order of inferior souls, whether they be shut up in human bodies, or concealed in those of beasts: for he sufficiently clearly excepts the souls of angels. These souls, if we are to believe him, are said by St. Paul to be oppressed with gross terrestrial bodies, and to be earnestly desirous of liberty: and the apostle likewise declares that they shall hereafter be freed and having quitted their grosser bodies shall be clothed in thin and subtle ones. Now I ask of this man,

I. To show that the word κτίσις was ever used by any writer sacred or profane of the entire order of souls living on the earth. Common sense would dissuade us from receiving so new and unusual a signification of this word without authority: for we might prove any thing that we liked to be true and certain, if we were at liberty to give such meanings to words as we ourselves considered to be convenient for our own arguments and opinions. He will reply perhaps: that κτίσις is put for all the men that inhabit this world, Mark xvi. 15. but the preferable part of these men is the soul: therefore the whole is here put and the part understood; which kind of expressions are every where to be found in the best writers. I will grant there is some show of reason in this: but if we accept this interpretation, what will become of the souls of beasts, which he supposes to be implied by this name as well as those of men? Our Pythagorean will not escape out of this dilemma, till he can show us some passages, in which all animals whether men or beasts are expressly called κτίσις. For we shall not be content with those wherein this word denotes the whole universe of things.

II. But dismissing this grammatical difficulty, let us come to more important knots in the interpretation itself, which our Pythagorean, ingenious though he be, will never be able to untie. Grant that κτίσις denotes all souls: therefore all souls of the good as well as the wicked earnestly wait for the manifestation of the sons of God: therefore the minds of the wicked also were subject unto vanity contrary to their will and have the hope of being delivered from this state of bondage: therefore all souls, whether good or bad, shall be delivered into the glorious liberty of the sons of God: therefore no soul shall ever suffer torture and punishment; for all souls on quitting this grosser body shall be clothed in celestial vehicles and enjoy eternal felicity. I never can believe that any Pythagorean, however adverse he might be to the Christian

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of this Pythagoric hypothesis, which supposing all manner of souls, sensitive as well as rational, to be substantial things, and therefore to have a permanency after death, in their distinct natures, allows them certain thin aërial Ochemata, or vehicles, to subsist in, when these gross terrestrial ones shall fail them.

But let these aërial vehicles of the souls of brutes go for a whimsey or mere figment; nor let them be allowed to act or enliven any other than terrestrial bodies only, by means whereof they must needs be, immediately after death, quite destitute of all body; they subsisting nevertheless, and not vanishing into nothing, because they are not mere accidents, but substantial things: we say, that in this case, though the substances of them remain, yet must they needs continue in a state of insensibility and inactivity, unless perhaps they be again afterwards united to some other terrestrial bodies. Because though intellection be the energy of the rational soul alone, without the concurrence of body, yet is the energy of the sensitive always conjoined with it;

religion, would approve of all these absurd corollaries, which are nevertheless inseparable from this exposition of St. Paul's words. The greatest portion of souls shut up in mortal bodies fear rather than earnestly wait for that day, in which holy and pious minds shall be restored to their bodies; and not unwillingly but willingly obey their desires and the vanity of human things: nor, lastly, shall they be delivered into the liberty of the sons of God, but shall suffer the eternal punishments of divine justice. But even if any Pythagorean heathen were so foolish and inexperienced as to hold all this to be true, still the law of reason itself would require of this man not to attribute to the words of a Christian writer a meaning altogether repugnant to the first and fundamental principles of the Christian religion.

III. But this Pythagorean is altogether amusing when he also without any hesitation refers these words of the divine writer to the souls of beasts. He is induced to do so by the word *πᾶσα*. For as St. Paul says that *πᾶσα κτίσις* will be delivered into liberty, he excludes no souls from the glory of the sons of God: therefore the souls of beasts also will be partakers of this salvation. Very clever certainly! But the good man forgets that he here assumes what is a matter of dispute, namely, that there are souls in beasts. His reasoning is as follows: It is certain that beasts have souls endowed with reason: but St. Paul speaks of all souls: therefore he promises eternal glory and happiness to the souls of beasts also. The whole of this argumentation tumbles to the ground if you deny that beasts have souls. Indeed beasts ought to feel much obliged to this Pythagorean for so notable a discovery; for he has endeavoured to deserve well of them: from reasonable men he will reap little if any thanks. There was no reason why the learned Doctor should adorn so insane an opinion with his ingenuity and eloquence: except perhaps that he was unwilling to pass it over, lest he should be said to have omitted any thing which the advocates of the Pythagoric dogma consider to be favourable to their cause.

Of all the explications of these words of St. Paul, that one seems to me to be the best and most probable which supposes the word *κτίσις* to denote pious and holy men, or rather their souls. For although this also has certain difficulties connected with it, yet the others labour under much greater, and involve their advocates in inextricable perplexities. Hence this opinion was adopted also by the learned Th. Ittig, who defended it in a specific dissertation extant in his Enneas Exercitationum Theologicar. p. 440. &c. Sal. Dreyling, Observationum Sacrar. par. 1. observ. 37. p. 147. Frid. Adolp. Lampius, Comment. in Psalmum 45. p. 567—584. and very recently by the eminent Christ. Stock in his Observat. Philolog. ad N. T. p. 1023, as also by many others. In my judgment the following passage of St. James, chap. 1. ver. 18. is admirably confirmatory of this opinion: *Βουληθεὶς ἀπεκύησεν ἡμᾶς λόγῳ ἀληθείας εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἡμᾶς ἀπαρχήν τινα τῶν αὐτοῦ κτισμάτων*, which all will very easily understand who compare it carefully and impartially with these words of St. Paul.

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sense being, as Aristotle[6] hath rightly determined, a complication of soul and body together, as weaving is of the weaver and weaving instruments. Wherefore we say, that if the irrational and sensitive souls in brutes, being substantial things also, be after death quite destitute of all body, then can they neither have sense of any thing, nor act upon any thing, but must continue for so long a time in a state of insensibility and inactivity. Which is a thing therefore to be thought the less impossible, because no man can be certain that his own soul in sleep, lethargies, and apoplexies, &c. hath always an uninterrupted consciousness of itself; and that it was never without thoughts even in the mother's womb. However, there is little reason to doubt but that the sensitive souls of such animals as lie dead or asleep all the winter, and revive or awake again at the approaching warmth of summer, do for that time continue in a state of inactivity and insensibility. Upon which account, though these souls of brutes may be said in one sense to be immortal, because the substance of them, and the root of life in them, still remains; yet may they, in another sense, be said also to be mortal, as having the exercise of that life, for a time at least, quite suspended. From whence it appears that there is no reason at all for that fear and suspicion of some, that if the souls of brutes be substantial, and continue in being after death, they must therefore needs go either to heaven or hell. But as for that supposed possibility of their awakening again afterwards in some other terrestrial bodies, this seemeth to be no more than what is found by daily experience in the course of nature, when the silkworm and other worms, dying, are transformed into butterflies. For there is little reason to doubt but that the same soul which before acted the body of the silkworm, doth afterward act that of the butterfly; upon which account it is, that this hath been made by Christian theologers an emblem of the resurrection.

Hitherto have we declared two several opinions concerning the substantial souls of brutes, supposed therefore to have a permanent subsistence after death; one of Plato's and the Pythagoreans, that when they are divested of these gross terrestrial bodies, they live and have a sense of themselves, in thin aërial ones; the other of such, as exploding these aërial vehicles of brutes, and allowing them none but terrestrial bodies, affirm the substances of them, surviving death, to continue in a state of inactivity and insensibility, sleep, silence, or stupor. But now, to say the truth, there is no absolute necessity that these souls of brutes, because substantial, should therefore have a permanent subsistence after death to all eternity; because though it be

[6] De Anima, lib. 2. cap. 6. p. 27. tom. 2. opp.

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true that no substance once created by God will of itself ever vanish into nothing, yet is it true also, that whatsoever was created by God out of nothing, may possibly by him be annihilated and reduced to nothing again. Wherefore, when it is said, that the immortality of the human soul is demonstrable by natural reason, the meaning hereof is no more than this, that its substantiality is so demonstrable; from whence it follows, that it will naturally no more perish or vanish into nothing, than the substance of matter itself: and not that it is impossible either for it, or matter, by the divine power to be annihilated. Wherefore the assurance that we have of our own soul's immortality, must depend upon something else besides their substantiality, namely, a faith also in the divine goodness, that he will conserve in being, or not annihilate, all such substances created by him, whose permanent subsistence is neither inconsistent with his own attributes, nor the good of the universe, as this of rational souls unquestionably is not; they having both morality and liberty of will, and thereby being capable of rewards and punishments, and consequently fit objects for the divine justice to display itself upon. But, for aught we can be certain, the case may be otherwise as to the souls of brute animals, devoid both of morality and liberty of will, and therefore uncapable of reward and punishment; that though they will not naturally of themselves vanish into nothing, yet, having been created by God in the generations of the respective animals, and had some enjoyment of themselves for a time, they may by him again be as well annihilated in their deaths and corruptions; and if this be absolutely the best, then doubtless is it so. And to this seemeth agreeable the opinion of Porphyrius,[7] amongst the philosophers, when he

[7] See his Sententiæ ad Intelligibilia Ducentes, par. 1. sect. 22. p. 227. sect. 24. p. 228. and elsewhere. But Dr. Cudworth is wrong in transferring this dogma to the souls of brute animals, respecting which Porphyry's sentiments were very different from what they are here represented to be. For this philosopher throughout the whole of lib. 3. of his De Abstinentia a Carnibus labours strenuously to show that the souls of beasts are of the same nature as those of men, and endowed not only with the faculty of sense, but also with reason, judgment, and intelligence: from which it is evident, that he must have thought much the same of the state of ferine souls after death as of those of men, and ascribed immortality to both, although he does not expressly avow this doctrine. The whole of the opinions of ancient as well as modern philosophers on the souls of beasts have been most carefully collected and eruditely canvassed by the illustrious scholar Georg. Hen. Ribovius in his copious and able Dissertatio Historico-philosophica de Anima Brutorum, which he has subjoined to Hieron. Rorarius' two treatises, Quod Animalia Bruta sæpe Ratione melius utantur, quam Homines, edited by him, with his own observations, Helmstadii, 1728. And he also, cap. 15. sect. 120. 128. p. 642. gives us an accurate exposition of Porphyry's doctrine respecting the souls of beasts. This has always appeared to myself to be one of those questions which may afford very ample matter for discussion and conjecture to the ingenious, but can excite little interest in those who delight only in certainties. Let us be satisfied with the sure conviction that our own souls are immortal and will be rewarded or punished after the dissolution of the body: and let our discussions on the future fate of the souls of beasts or the amount of virtue they are endowed with, be conducted in a spirit of prudence, temper, and moderation.

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affirmed every irrational power or soul to be resolved into the life of the whole; that is, retracted and resumed into the Deity, and so annihilated as to its creaturely nature: though possibly there may be another interpretation of that philosopher's meaning here, viz., that all the sensitive souls of brutes are really but one and the same mundane soul, as it were, outflowing and variously displaying itself, and acting upon all the several parts of matter that are capable to receive it, but at their deaths retiring again back into itself. But we have sufficiently retunded the force of that objection against the ingenerability of all souls, and the substantiality of those of brutes also, from their consequent permanence after death; we having shown, that notwithstanding this their substantiality, their is no absolute necessity of their perpetuity after death, and permanency to all eternity, or else, that if they do continue to subsist, (God annihilating no substance) unless they have aërial vehicles to act, they must remain in a state of inactivity and insensibility, silence or sleep.

Now therefore, if no souls, no life, nor cogitation, could possibly be ever generated out of dead and senseless matter, they being not mere accidents but substantial things, which must in this case have come from nothing; then either all souls existed of themselves from eternity, or else there must of necessity be some eternal unmade life and mind, from whence all the other lives and minds were derived. And that this was the doctrine of the ancient Theists, That no soul or mind, no life or understanding, was ever generated out of matter, but all produced by the Deity, the sole fountain of life and understanding, might be here proved, were it needful, at large, by sundry testimonies; but it may sufficiently appear from those verses of Virgil, first in his sixth Æneid, where, after he had spoken of God, as a Spirit and Mind diffused throughout the world, he addeth,

Inde hominum pecudumque genus, vitæque volantum,
Et quæ marmoreo fert monstra sub æquore pontus,*

That "from thence are the lives of all men and beasts, birds flying in the air, and monsters swimming in the sea." And again in his Georgics, where, after these words:

Deum namque ire per omnes
Terrasque, tractusque maris, cœlumque profundum,†

That "God passeth through all tracts of the earth, seas, and heavens," he subjoineth:

Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum,
Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas,
Scilicet huc reddi deinde et resoluta referri
Omnia, nec morti esse locum.

* Verse 728. † Lib. 4. verse 221.

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"And from hence, not only men, but also all manner of brute animals and beasts, when produced into this world, do every one derive their lives or souls, as also at their deaths they render the same back again to him, in whose hand or custody they remain undestroyed; so that there is no place any where in the world left for death." This was therefore undoubtedly the genuine doctrine of the ancient Theists, however some of late have deviated and swerved from it; that no life was generated out of matter, but all created by the Deity, or derived from it, the sole fountain of lives and souls.

And it is a truth so evident, that life being substantial, and not a mere accidental thing generated and corrupted, there must therefore of necessity be some eternal unmade life and mind, from whence all other lives and minds are derived, that the Hylozoic Atheists themselves (in this far wiser than the Atomics) were fully convinced thereof; nevertheless, being strongly possessed with that atheistic prejudice, that there is no other substance besides body, they attribute this first original unmade life and understanding to all matter as such (but without animal consciousness) as an essential part thereof, or inadequate conception of it. From which fundamental life of nature in matter, modified by organization, they fancy the lives of all animals and men to have proceeded. So that though the modificated lives of animals and men, as such, according to them, be accidental things, generated and corrupted, produced out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again; yet this fundamental life of matter, which is the basis upon which they stand, being substantial, is also eternal and incorruptible. These Hylozoists therefore, to avoid a Deity, suppose every atom of senseless matter to have been, from all eternity, infallibly omniscient, that is, to know all things without either error or ignorance, and to have a knowledge before sense, and underived from sensibles (quite contrary to the doctrine of the atomic Atheists, who make all knowledge, sense, or the product thereof) though without any animal consciousness and self-perception.

But as nothing can be more prodigiously absurd than thus to attribute infallible omniscience to every atom of matter; so is it also directly contradictious to suppose perfect knowledge, wisdom, or understanding without any consciousness or self-perception, consciousness being essential to cogitation: as also, that the substantial and fundamental life in men and other animals should never perish, and yet notwithstanding their souls and personalities in death utterly vanish into nothing. Moreover, this hypothesis can never possibly solve the phenomenon of men and animals neither; not only because no organization or modification of matter whatsoever could ever produce consciousness and self-perception in what was before inconscious; but also because

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every smallest atom thereof being supposed to be a percipient by itself, and to have a perfect life and understanding of its own, there must be in every one man and animal, not one, but a heap, or commonwealth of innumerable percipients. Lastly, whereas these Hylozoic Atheists make every atom of matter omniscient, but nothing at all omnipotent, or assert perfect knowledge, without any perfect power, a knowledge without sense, and underived from sensibles; we demand of them where the intelligibles or objects of this knowledge are? and whence the ideas thereof are derived? For since they proceed not in a way of passion from sensibles existing without, nor could result from those atoms neither, as comprehending themselves, they must needs come from nothing, and many of them at least, be the conceptions of nothing. There cannot possibly be any other original, by the wit of man devised, of knowledge and understanding, than from an absolutely perfect and omnipotent being, comprehending itself and the extent of its own infinite power, or all possibilities of things, that is, all intelligibles. But there can be but one such omnipotent being, and therefore no more than one original and eternal unmade mind, from whence all the other minds are derived. Wherefore this hylozoic atheism is nothing but the breaking and crumbling of the simple Deity, one perfect understanding Being into matter, and all the several atoms of it.

And now have we made it manifest that these Atheists are so far from being able to disprove a God from this topic of cogitation, knowledge, or understanding, that they cannot possibly solve the phenomenon thereof, without a God; it indeed affording invincible arguments of his existence. For, first, if no life or cogitation, soul or mind, can possibly spring out of matter or body, devoid of life and understanding, and which is nothing but a thing extended into length, breadth, and thickness; then is it so far from being true that all life and understanding is junior to senseless matter, and the offspring thereof, that of necessity either all lives and souls were self-existent from eternity, or else there must be one perfect unmade life and mind, from whence all other imperfect ones were derived: there must be an eternal knowledge before sense and sensibles; which is that that hath printed the stamps and signatures of itself upon the matter of the whole world. Indeed nothing can be more certain than this, that all knowledge and understanding in ourselves is not a mere passion from singular sensibles or bodies existing without us, as the forementioned Atheists also conclude; (from whence they would again infer, that knowledge as such, is in its own nature junior to sensibles, and the mere creature of them, and consequently no creator;) there being nothing which comes to us from the objects of sense without, but only local motion and pressure, and there being other objects of

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the mind, besides singular sensibles; not only all universals, but also such intelligibles as never were nor can be in sense. Now, if our human knowledge and understanding be not a passion from things existing without us, then can it have no other original than in way of participation from a perfect mind, the mind of an infinitely fecund and powerful being, comprehending itself, and in itself all things; all the possibilities of things before they were made, their respects and the verities belonging to them. So that a perfect omnipotent being, together with the possibilities of things contained in it is the first Νοητὸν, "intelligible," or "object of mind and understanding," by which all other singulars are understood. And were there no such perfect, infinitely fecund, and powerful Being, there could have been no mind or understanding at all. As also, were there no perfect mind, viz., that of an omnipotent Being comprehending itself, and all possibilities of things virtually contained in it; all the knowledge and intelligible ideas of our imperfect minds, must needs have sprung from nothing. And thus is the existence of a God again demonstrated from that phenomenon of knowledge or understanding.

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CHAPTER V.

SECTION V.

1. THERE now remaining only the Atheistic objections against Providence, their queries and arguments from interests; their first objection, because things are ill made, that therefore not made by a God. This directed against the ancient theologers: that God being a perfect mind, therefore made the world after the best manner. Some modern theologers deviating from this. The controversy whether matter fortuitously moved, or a fortuitous will omnipotent, be the original of all things. God to Celsus the head or president of the righteous nature. This not only the sense of Origen, but of the ancient Christians. The Deity not servilely bound to do the best; but this the perfection of its nature. No Atheists able to prove, the world to be ill made. 2. Not to be concluded, that whatsoever we cannot find out the use of, is therefore ineptly made. For example; the intestinum cæcum, which the generality of anatomists give little account of. 3. The first atheistic instance of the faultiness of things; in the disposition of the equator and ecliptic intersecting each other in such an angle, whereby the terrestrial globe rendered not so habitable as it might have been. This objection founded upon a false supposition, that the torrid zone is uninhabitable. 4. Atheists would prove against some Theists, that all things not made for the sake of man. This at first but the doctrine of Stoics only; recommended afterwards by men's self-love. Whereas Plato's doctrine, that the whole not made for any part; but the parts for the whole. Nevertheless, things in the lower world made principally (though not only) for man. Atheists no judges of the well or ill-making of worlds. 5. Evils in general from the necessity of imperfect beings, and incompossibility of things. Men afflicted more from their own fancies, than reality of things. Pain often linked with pleasure. This not the evil of the whole man, but of the outside only. Serviceable, to free men from the greater evils of the mind. Death, according to the atheistic hypothesis, an absolute extinction of all life; but, according to genuine Theism, only a putting off the terrestrial clothing. The dead live to God. Christian faith gives assurance of a heavenly body hereafter. This the confutation of the twelfth atheistic argument. 6. The thirteenth; but second objection against Providence, as to human affairs; because all things fall alike to all; and sometimes irreligious persons most prosperous. Granted, that this consideration hath too much staggered weak minds. Some concluding from thence, that there is no God, but that blind chance steereth all. 7. Unreasonable to require, that God should miraculously interpose at every turn. That which steers the whole world, no fond and passionate, but an impartial nature. Yet, that there want not instances of an extraordinary providence. Good reasons for the slowness of divine vengeance. 8. The sometimes impunity of wicked persons so far from staggering good men, as to Providence, that it confirms them in their belief of a judgment after death. The evolution of human affairs a kind of dramatic poem. A geometrical distribution of rewards and punishments. 9. That there ought to be a cloudy state of things, for the exercise of faith, Had there been no monsters to subdue, there could have been no Hercules.

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Here we to live by faith, and not by sight. 10. Some few considerations to be propounded, not so much for the confutation of Atheists, as satisfaction of Theists, sometimes apt to call in question the divine goodness, though the very foundation of our Christian faith. First, that in judging of the works of God, we ought not to consider the parts of the world alone by themselves, but in order to the whole. Were nothing made but the best, there could have been no harmony, for want of variety. Secondly, that we ought not to confine God's creation to the narrowness of vulgar opinion, which extends the universe but little beyond the clouds. The world incapable of infinity of magnitude, as well as of time. Nevertheless, as the sun is much bigger than we can imagine it, so much more may the world be. Not reasonable to think, that all this immense vastness should be uninhabited. Thirdly, that we cannot make a right judgment of the ways of Providence, without looking both forwards upon what is future, and backwards upon what is past, as well as upon the present. The Platonists and Pythagoreans solved many phenomena, from the τὰ προβεβιωμένα, "things done in a pre-existent state." Christianity supposeth but a kind of imputative pre-existence, to solve the pravity of mankind, and the evils of this state. The different conditions of men in this life to be resolved into a just, though occult providence. 11. The third objection against Providence, or fourteenth atheistic argument; that it is impossible for any one being to order all things; and, if it were possible, that it would be distractious. Moreover, that an irresistibly powerful and happy being would not concern itself in the welfare of others; benevolence arising only from imbecility. 12. The reply; that because ourselves have but a narrow sphere of activity; to measure the Deity accordingly, is but an idol of the cave or den. Certain, that were there nothing, but what we could fully comprehend, there could be no God. Had the sun-life, equally co-extended with its rays, it would perceive every thing touched by them. Creatures but the rays of the Deity. Men able to manage affairs, in distant places without distraction. 13. But for the easing the minds of weak mortals, already suggested, that there is no necessity, God should himself immediately do all things; he having ministers under him, as, an artificial, plastic nature (for this reason, partly before insisted on); instincts also in animals, a part of that divine fate, which is the servant of Providence. Above which, other knowing ministers of the Deity, appointed to preside over human affairs. But all overlooked by the eye of God. 14. No need to confine Providence to a few greater things only. Small things not neglected by it. The chief employment of Providence by Plato reduced to this compendium; the translating of them into better or worse states, according to their demeanours. 15. But that all benevolence arises from imbecility, and that what is perfectly happy, would be troubled with no business; idols of the Atheists' den. 16. The atheistic queries next answered. The first query: If there were a God, who was perfectly happy in himself, why would he go about to make a world? Answer. The reason of God's making the world was from his overflowing goodness, that there might be other beings happy. This consistent with God's making the world, for his own glory. The reason why Plotinus would explode that. The Atheists further demand, What hurt would it have been for us, never to have been made? Answer. We never could have enjoyed good, nor been capable of happiness. If no hurt not to have been made, then none to be annihilated. 17. The second atheistic query: If God's goodness were the cause of his making the world, why then was it not made sooner? This question capable of a double sense: First, Why was not the world from eternity? The reply; This not from any defect in

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the divine goodness, but because there is an impossibility of the thing itself; the necessity and incapacity of such an imperfect being hindering it. No place left for atheistic cavils; as if God must have slept from eternity. Another sense of the question; Why, though the world could not be from eternity, yet was it not made sooner? Answer. The world could not possibly have so been made in time, as that it should not have been once but a day old; and also once, no more than five or six thousand years old. 18. The third atheistic query: How could God move the matter of the whole world, especially if incorporeal? Answer. That all things being derived from the Deity, and essentially depending on him, they must needs be commandable by him, and obsequious to him. And since no body can move itself, that, which first moved the matter, must be incorporeal, and not move it by machines and engines, but by cogitation or will only. 19. The last atheistic argumentation, from interest. First; that it is the interest of particular persons, there should be no being infinitely powerful, who hath no law but his own will. The first reply; wishing is no proving. Nor will any man's thinking make things otherwise than they are. 20. But secondly, this wish of Atheists founded upon a mistaken notion of God, that he is nothing but arbitrary will omnipotent. God's will not mere will, but law and equity. Nor does justice in God clash with goodness; but is a particular modification thereof. The interest of none, there should be no God, unless perhaps of such as are irreclaimably wicked. To be without God, to be without hope. No faith nor hope in senseless matter. To believe a God, to believe the existence of all good and perfection; and that things are all made and governed as they should be. Peccability from the necessity of imperfect free-willed beings. Infinite hopes from a being infinitely good and powerful. Democritus and Epicurus infatuated sophists. 21. The last atheistic argumentation, that theism or religion is inconsistent with the interest of civil sovereigns. Their first pretence for this, that the civil sovereign reigns only in fear; and therefore there must be no power nor fear greater than that of the Leviathan. In answer to this, the atheistic ethics and politics to be unravelled. Their foundation laid in the villanizing of human nature. That there is no natural justice, equity, nor charity. That every man by nature hath a right to every thing, even to other men's bodies and lives. That nature hath brought men into the world without any shackles of duty and obligation. Lastly, that nature absolutely dissociates men from one another, by reason of the inconsistency of appetites, and private good. 22. But in the next place, they add, that though this state of nature, which is lawless freedom to every thing, be in itself the best, yet by reason of men's imbecility, does it prove the worst. Wherefore, when men had been weary of hewing and slashing, they then bethought themselves at length of helping nature by art. 23. Where these Atheists first slander human nature, and then debase justice and civil authority; a lesser evil submitted to out of necessity, for the avoiding of a greater. According to which atheistic hypothesis, no man is willingly just. This no new invention of the writer De Cive, but the old atheistic generation of justice and of a body politic, civil society, and sovereignty (before Plato's time); it being fully described in his second book of a commonwealth. The same hypothesis also, concerning justice, as a factitious thing, that sprung only from fear and imbecility, and was chosen but as a lesser evil, insisted on by Epicurus. 24. The vain attempts of our modern atheistic politicians, to make justice by art, when there is none by nature. First, by renouncing and transferring men's right, by will and words. The ridiculous conceit of these atheistic politicians, that injustice,

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is nothing but *dati repetitio*, and such an absurdity in life, as is in disputation when a man denies a proposition he had before granted; no real evil in the man, but only a relative incongruity in him as a citizen. Again, these justice-makers and authority-makers pretend to derive their factitious justice from pacts and covenants. But pacts and covenants, without natural justice, nothing but words and breath; and therefore can have no force to oblige. They ridiculously dance round in a circle, when they derive the obligation of civil laws from covenants; of covenants from laws of nature; and of laws of nature again, from civil laws. Their vain attempt, by art to consociate what nature hath dissociated, like tying knots in the wind or water. 25. These artificial justice-makers therefore fly at last from art, to force and power; making their sovereign to reign only in fear. This the true meaning of that opinion, that all obligation is derived from law. If civil sovereigns reign only in fear, then is their authority nothing but force; and power would justify rebellion. Lastly, if civil right or authority nothing but force and violence, then could it not last long. 26. Wherefore since civil authority and bodies politic can neither be merely artificial, nor yet violent things, there must be some natural vinculum, to hold them together, such as will both oblige subjects to obey the commands of sovereigns, and sovereigns to seek the good of their subjects. Sovereignty no creature of the people, and of men's wills; but hath a stamp of divinity upon it. Had not God made a city, men neither by art, nor political enchantment, could have made any. The whole world one city, of God and rational beings. The civil sovereign no Leviathan; but a God. He reigns not in mere brutish force and fear, but in natural justice and conscience, and the authority of God himself. 27. The second atheistic pretence, to make religion inconsistent with civil sovereignty; because it limits that which ought to be infinite. The reply; That the Atheists' infinite right and authority of civil sovereigns is nothing but belluine liberty: but true right and authority is essentially founded in natural justice. The first original obligation not from will, but nature. The error of those Theists, who derive all obligation to moral things, from the will and positive command of God, as threatening punishments, and promising rewards. Justice a different species of good from that of private utility. Infinite injustice as absurd as an infinite rule or measure. God's own authority bounded by justice: his will ruled by justice, and not justice by his will. Atheists, under a pretence of giving civil sovereigns infinite right, really divest them of all right and authority. 28. The last atheistic pretence for the inconsistency of religion with civil power, because conscience is private judgment of good and evil. Answer. That not religion, but atheism, introduceth such private judgment, as is absolutely inconsistent with civil sovereignty, it acknowledging nothing in nature, that tends to public good, but making private appetite the only rule of good, and utility of justice. The desperate consequence from hence, that private utility may justify rebellion and parricide. The Atheists' professed assertion, that they, who have once rebelled, may justly defend themselves afterward by force. Though private persons must make a judgment in conscience for themselves, yet is the rule of conscience not private but public. Religion and conscience oblige subjects, in all lawful things, actively to obey the sovereign powers; in unlawful, not to resist. 29. The conclusion of the whole Book; That all the atheistic grounds being fully confuted, and the impossibility of atheism demonstrated; it is certain that the original of all things is no inconscious nature, but a perfect understanding being, who hath made all that was fit to be made, and after the best manner, and exerciseth a just providence over all.

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HAVING quite routed and vanquished the Atheists' main body, we shall now blow away the remainder of their weaker and scattered forces, viz., their objections against Providence, their queries, and their arguments from interest, with a breath or two. Their first objection is against providence, as to the fabric of the world, from the faultiness of the mundane system, intellectually considered, and in order to ends; Quia tantâ stat prædita culpâ,[1] That "because it is so ill-made," therefore it could not be made by a God. Where the Atheist takes it for granted that whosoever asserts a God, or a perfect mind, to be the original of all things, does therefore ipso facto, suppose all things to be well made, and as they should be. And this doubtless was the sense of all the ancient theologers, however some modern Theists deviate therefrom; these concluding the perfection of the Deity not at all to consist in goodness, but in power and arbitrary will only. As if to have a will determined by a rule or reason of good, were the virtue of weak, impotent, and obnoxious beings only, or of such as have a superior over them to give law to them, that is, of creatures; but the prerogative of a being irresistibly powerful, to have a will absolutely indifferent to all things, and undetermined by any thing but itself, or to will nothing because it is good, but to make its own arbitrary or contingent and fortuitous determination the sole reason of all its actions, nay, the very rule or measure of goodness, justice, and wisdom itself. And this is supposed by them to be the liberty, sovereignty, and dominion of the Deity. Wherefore, such Theists as these would think themselves altogether unconcerned in these atheistic objections against providence, or in defending the fabric of the world as faultless, they being as ready as the Atheists themselves to acknowledge that the world might really have been much better made than it now is; only that it must be said to be well, because so made, but pretending nevertheless that this is no impeachment at all of the existence of a God, Quià Deus non tenetur ad optimum, "because God is no way bound or obliged to the best;" he being indeed, according to them, nothing but arbitrary will omnipotent. But what do these Theists here else, than whilst they deny the fortuitous motion of senseless matter to be the first original of all things, themselves in the meantime enthrone fortuitousness and contingency in the will of an omnipotent Being, and there give it an absolute sovereignty and dominion over all? So that the controversy betwixt the Atheists and these Theists seem to be no other than this, whether senseless matter fortuitously moved, or a fortuitous will omnipotent, such as is altogether undetermined by goodness, justice, and wisdom, be the sovereign Numen, and original of all things. Certainly, we

[1] The words of Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, lib. 2. v. 183. p. 297.

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mortals could have little better ground for our faith and hope, in such an omnipotent arbitrary will as this, than we could have in the motions of senseless atoms furiously agitated, or of a rapid whirlwind. Nay, one would think, that of the two it should be more desirable to be under the empire of senseless atoms, fortuitously moved, than of a will altogether undetermined by goodness, justice, and wisdom, armed with omnipotence; because the former could harbour no hurtful or mischievous designs against any, as the latter might.[2] But this irrational will, altogether undetermined by goodness, justice, and wisdom, is so far from being the highest liberty, sovereignty, and dominion, the greatest perfection, and the divinest thing of all, that it is indeed nothing else but weakness and impotency itself, or brutish folly and madness. And therefore those ancients who affirmed that Mind was Lord over all, and the supreme King of heaven and earth, held at the same time, that Good was the sovereign monarch of the universe, Good reigning in Mind, and together with it, because Mind is that which orders all things for the sake of Good; and whatsoever doth otherwise, was, according to them, not Νοῦς, but Ἄνοια, not Mens, but Dementia, and consequently no God. And thus does Celsus, in Origen, declare the nature of God:* "Οὐ γὰρ τῆς πλημμελοῦς ὀρέξεως, οὐδὲ τῆς πεπλανημένης ἀκοσμίας, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὀρθῆς καὶ δικαίας φύσεως Θεὸς ἐστὶν ἀρχηγέτης, "God is not the president or head of irregular and irrational lust or appetite, and of loose erratic disorderliness, but of the just and righteous nature." And though this were there misapplied by him against the Christian doctrine of the resurrection (not understood) yet is the passage highly approved by Origen; he adding further, in confirmation thereof, and that as the general sense of Christians too:† Φαμὲν ὅτι οὐ δύναται αἰσχρὰ ὁ Θεὸς, ἐπεὶ ἔσται ὁ Θεὸς

[2] Dr. Cudworth's detestation of those who maintain that God can do whatever he wills and is guided by no goodness or justice, appears here to have carried him a little too far. For indivisible corpuscles, although devoid of sense and reason, might in a certain way cause many evils to mankind: from the fortuitous concourse of atoms, as well as from a fortuitous will omnipotent, infinite calamities and mischiefs might arise, which no mortals would be able to dissipate. In this respect, therefore, between a God destitute of all goodness and atoms there would seem to be no other difference than that the former purposely afflicts and harasses mortals, while the latter visits them with evils by mere chance, and without any deliberation or counsel: to men themselves the danger would be equal from both. Nevertheless, the learned doctor's conclusion, that it would be more desirable to be subject to the empire of senseless atoms, than to live under a God altogether undetermined by goodness, justice, and wisdom, is not entirely devoid of truth. For 1. Atoms could occasion to mortals only certain and definite kinds of evils, and such as afflict the body chiefly: but a God infinitely powerful, can torment them in an infinity of ways, and cause incalculable mischiefs and tortures both to body and mind. 2. The miseries arising from atoms are determined by life and sense; and on the body being deprived of these, the power of atoms would cease; but God can visit souls with eternal punishments even after the death of the body. This opinion, however, of those who separate from God all natural justice and goodness is more copiously discussed by Dr. Cudworth in his treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality.

* Page 240. † Page 246.

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δυνάμενος μὴ εἶναι Θεὸς, εἰ γὰρ αἰσχρόν τι δρᾷ ὁ Θεὸς, οὐκ ἔστι Θεὸς, "We Christians (who hold the resurrection) say as well as you, that God can do nothing which is in itself evil, inept, or absurd; no more than he is able not to be God. For if God do any evil, he is no God." And again,* Οὐδὲν μὴ πρέπον ἑαυτῷ ὁ Θεὸς βούλεται, ἀναιρετικὸν τυγχάνον τοῦ εἶναι αὐτὸν Θεὸν, "God willeth nothing unbecoming himself, or what is truly indecorous; forasmuch as this is inconsistent with his godship." And to the same purpose Plotinus:[3] Ποιεῖ τὸ Θεῖον ὡς πέφυκε, πέφυκε δὲ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ οὐσίαν, ἣ τὸ καλὸν ἐν ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον συνεκφέρει, εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐκεῖ ταῦτα, ποῦ ἂν εἴη, "The Deity acteth according to its own nature and essence; and its nature and essence displayeth goodness and justice: For if these things be not there, where should they else be found?" And again, elsewhere:[4] Θεὸς ὅπερ ἐχρῆ εἶναι, οὐ τοίνυν οὕτω συνέβη, ἀλλ' ἔδει οὕτω· τὸ δ' ἔδει τοῦτο, ἀρχὴ τῶν ὅσα ἔδει, "God is essentially that, which ought to be; and therefore he did not happen to be such as he is: and this first ought to be is the principle of all things whatsoever that ought to be." Wherefore the Deity is not to be conceived as mere arbitrariness, humour, or irrational will and appetite omnipotent, (which would indeed be but omnipotent chance) but as an overflowing fountain of love and goodness, justly and wisely dispensing itself, and omnipotently reaching all things. The will of God is goodness, justice, and wisdom; or decorousness, fitness, and ought itself, willing; so that the Τὸ Βέλτιστον, that, which is absolutely the best, is νόμος ἀπαράβατος "an indispensable law to it, because its very essence." God is μέτρον πάντων, an "impartial balance," lying even equal and indifferent to all things, and weighing out heaven and earth, and all the things therein, in the most just and exact proportions, and not a grain too much or too little of any thing. Nor is the Deity therefore bound or obliged to do the best, in any way of servility, (as men fondly imagine this to be con-

* So likewise p. 247. Ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ' ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν οἷός τε παράλογον οὔτε παρ' ἑαυτὸν ἐργάσασθαί ἐστιν ὁ Θεός, "According to us also, God can do nothing that is absurd, or besides reason."

[3] De Providentia Dei, ennead 3. lib. 2. cap. 13. p. 265.

[4] De Libertate et Voluntate Unius, ennead 6. lib. 8. cap. 9. p. 743. The word Θεὸς, with which Dr. Cudworth begins this passage, is not extant in Plotinus: nevertheless it may be inferred from the entire context that he is discoursing of God. Still I consider these words not to have the meaning our author attributes to them. For this philosopher does not say that the will of God is always governed by justice and goodness, or which is the same thing, that God can do nothing inconsistent with the eternal laws of holiness and justice, but undertakes to prove merely what Ficinus has expressed in the argument of the chapter: "That that which is now the principle of all things did not happen to be such by accident, as if it could have happened that there should be another and a differently affected principle." The meaning of the words here quoted therefore amounts to this, that God is such as he is by the very necessity of his own nature, and that it is impossible to imagine a God differently affected even in thought.

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trary to his liberty) much less by the law and command of any superior (which is a contradiction) but only by the perfection of its own nature, which it cannot possibly deviate from, no more than ungod itself. In conclusion, therefore, we acknowledge the Atheist's argument to be thus far good; that if there be a God, then of necessity must all things be well-made, and as they should be; et vice versâ. But no Atheist will ever be able to prove that either the whole system of the world, could have been better made, or that so much as any one thing therein is made ineptly.

There are indeed many things in the frame of nature, which we cannot reach to the reasons of, they being made by a knowledge far superior and transcendent to that of ours, and our experience and ratiocination, but slowly discovering the intrigues and contrivances of providence therein; witness the circulation of the blood, the milky and lymphatic vessels, and other things, (without which the mechanic structure of the bodies of animals cannot be understood) all but so lately brought to light; wherefore we must not conclude, that whatsoever we cannot find out the reason of, or the use, that it serveth to, is therefore ineptly made. We shall give one instance of this; the intestinum cœcum, in the bodies of men and other animals, seems, at first sight, to be but a mere botch or bungle of nature, and an odd impertinent appendix; neither do we know that any anatomist or physiologer hath given a rational account thereof, or discovered its use: and yet there being a valve at the entrance of it, these two both together are a most artificial contrivance of nature, and of great advantage for animals, to hinder the regurgitation of the fæces upward towards the ventricle.[5]

The first atheistic influence of the faultiness of things in the frame of nature, is from the constitution of the heavens, and the disposition of the equator and ecliptic, intersecting each other in an angle of three and twenty degrees and upwards; whereby, as they pretend, the terrestrial globe is rendered much more uninhabitable than otherwise it might be.[6] But this is built upon a

[5] Our author here speaks briefly and concisely, and does not express his meaning with sufficient clearness. He seems to mean that the great utility of the intestinum cœcum is apparent from its entrance and valve: the entrance showing the intestine to be aptly contrived for receiving matter sometimes discharged too copiously into it from the stomach; and the valve preventing the matter which this intestine has received from returning again into the stomach. On the thing itself let the anatomist and physiologer decide.

[6] So Lucretius formerly, De Rerum Natura, lib. 5. v. 201. p. 251:

> Principio quantum cœli tegit impetus ingens
> Inde avidam partem, montes sylvæque ferarum
> Possedere . . . . . .
> Inde duas porro prope partes fervidus ardor
> Assiduusque geli casus mortalibus aufert.

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false supposition of the ancients, that the torrid zone, or all between the tropics, was utterly uninhabitable by reason of the extremity of heat.[7] And it is certain that there is nothing which doth more demonstrate a Providence than this very thing, it being the most convenient site or disposition that could be devised, as will appear, if the conveniences of other dispositions be considered, especially these three; first, If the axes of those circles should be parallel, and their plains coincident; secondly, If they should intersect each other in right angles; and thirdly, (which is a middle betwixt both) If they should cut one another in an angle of forty-five degrees. For it is evident that each of these dispositions would be attended with far greater inconveniences to the terrestrial inhabitants, in respect of the length of days and nights, heat and cold. And that these two circles should continue thus to keep the same angular intersection, when physical and mechanic causes would bring them still nearer together; this is a farther eviction of a providence also.[8]

In the next place the Atheist supposes, that, according to the general persuasion of Theists, the world and all things therein were created only for the sake of man,[9] he thinking to make some advantage for his cause from hence. But this seemeth, at first, to have been an opinion only of some strait-laced Stoics, though afterward indeed recommended to others also, by their own self-love, their over-weening and puffy conceit of themselves.[10]

[7] This opinion of the ancient philosophers is elegantly expounded by Cicero in his Somnium Scipionis, cap. 6. p. 3983. tom. 10. opp. Cernis eamdem terram, quasi quibusdam redimitam et circumdatam cingulis; e quibus duos maxime inter se diversos et cœli verticibus ipsis ex utraque parte subnixos, obriguisse pruina vides: medium autem illum et maximum solis ardore torreri. Duo sunt habitabiles, quorum australis ille, in quo qui insistunt, adversa vobis urgent vestigia, nihil ad vestrum genus; Hic autem alter subjectus aquiloni, quem incolitis, cerne, quam tenui vos parte contingat, "You behold the same earth, bound and encompassed as it were with certain belts: of which two the most distant from each other, and lying respectively under the very poles of heaven, you perceive, are rigid with perpetual frost: and the middle and largest parched up by the heat of the sun. Two are habitable, whereof the one to the south, the inhabitants of which imprint footsteps opposite to you, has nothing to do with your race; but of this other, lying to the north and inhabited by you, see how small a portion is occupied by you." Compare Strabo, Geograph. lib. 2. p. 87. 88. 89.

[8] If Dr. Cudworth had seen what has been written since his time by eminent philosophers, especially of his own country, on the state and constitution of the heavens, he would have been able to dilate much more copiously upon this demonstration. A more full and complete answer was given to this atheistic exception by the most acute and learned Rich. Bentley, in his Folly of Atheism, par. 1. serm. 8. sect. 7. Compare W. Derham, Theological Astronomy, lib. 7. cap. 2. p. 200. &c., and others, a vast number of whom, as is well known, have demonstrated the existence of a supreme and all-ruling God from the structure of this world.

[9] So Lucretius, De Rerum Nat. lib. 2. v. 174. 175. p. 296.

[10] I. Although the Stoics were more industrious than all other philosophers in proving the dogma, "that this world and all things therein were created for the sake of man alone," as is evident even from those few passages collected by Justus Lipsius, in his Manuductio in Physiolog. Stoicor. lib. 2. cap. 8. p. 71. &c. to which many more might be added: still I would not undertake to assert that they were the first authors of this opinion. For as after their time many who followed the guidance of

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And so fleas and lice, had they understanding, might conclude the bodies of other greater animals, and men also, to have been made only for them. But the whole was not properly made for any part, but the parts for the whole, and the whole for the maker

reason alone, and had nothing in common with Stoicism in other respects, adopted this opinion, as it is quite possible for many to have fallen into it prior to the existence of this sect, who nevertheless were far from entertaining the other doctrines afterwards professed by the Stoics. And we every where find traces of this opinion before their time in Aristotle and other writers; which it is at present unnecessary to point out. Besides, the Stoics did not say absolutely that the world was created for the sake of men, but always associated gods with men. Cicero, lib. 2. De Natura Deor. cap. 62. p. 3043. tom. 9. opp. according to the Stoical sense. Principio ipse mundus Deorum hominumque causa factus. Est enim mundus quasi communis Deorum atque hominum domus, "In the beginning the world itself was made for the sake of gods and men. For the world is the common domicile as it were of gods and men." II. In like manner, I can hardly bring myself to believe that those who besides the Stoics asserted the world to have been created for the sake of men, were actuated by their own arrogance and over-weening self-conceit. For I know that this opinion was entertained by good and pious men, eminent for their support of Christian principles, both in ancient and modern times, against whom I should be afraid to bring so grave and serious an accusation. Lactantius, in his book, De Ira Dei, cap. 13. p. 936. defends it at great length, and begins his disputation with these words: "If any one considers the whole administration of the world, he will assuredly become convinced of the truth of the Stoical doctrine that the world was created for our sake." Add Gregorius Nyssenus, De Opificio Hominis, cap. 2. p. 50. tom. 1. opp. to say nothing now of others. The author of the Clementines Homil. 3. sect. 36. p. 648. tom. 1. Patr. Apostolic. espoused the same opinion: "Ὁμοίως ἐάν τις τὰ πᾶν ἀκριβῶς λογισμῷ συνείδῃ, εὑρήσει δι' ἄνθρωπον τὸν θεὸν πεποιηκότα, "Whoever accurately considers the universe will find that it was made by God for the sake of man." This opinion led the same ancient fathers to conclude that on the lapse of man into sin, created things also fell from the state in which they were first created by God, and became much deteriorated. See Theophilus Antioch. lib. 2. ad Autolychum, sect. 27. p. 156. 157. For it seemed to them to be unreasonable that man in his sinful state should have the use of the same things that he ought to have used, if he had remained good and guiltless. For they reasoned in this way: "All things were made by God for man's sake: therefore they ought always to be such as are suitable for him for whose sake they were created; for it is not right that sinful man should enjoy good things: wherefore, as man had become wicked by his own fault, it was requisite that the whole universe which was created on account of him, should be reduced to a worse state than that in which it had left the hands of the Creator. This opinion, it is unnecessary to observe, enabled those early theologians to account for the numerous misfortunes and evils which beset the life of mortals. This is obvious to all who are able to see what follows as a necessary consequence from a thing, or what is repugnant to and incompatible with it; neither is it my intention here to explain the ancient discipline concerning the creation and constitution of the world, although few at the present day seem to understand it. III. It behoves those who take part in this controversy: "whether or not God constructed this world for the sake of man only," to guard themselves against being so far deceived by the ambiguity of words as to fight about shadows, and charge their adversaries with sentiments that were altogether foreign to them. For, as everybody must be aware, "the world," and "to make a thing for the sake of any one," belong to a class of expressions which do not commonly bear one and the same meaning. For my own part, I am well nigh convinced that if this ambiguity of words be removed, and the matter discussed among good and considerate men, the controversy may be settled without much difficulty. Probably, the meaning of the theologians of the present day who maintain that this world was made for the sake of men, is nothing more than that here expressed by Dr. Cudworth, namely, that the things of this lower world were made principally for man. Mons. Bayle has already attempted to decide this dispute between theologians and philosophers, and has shown that both opinions are in a certain measure admissible, Continuation des Pensées diverses ecrites a l'occasion d'une Comete, tom. 1. sect. 56. p. 269. nor are his remarks undeserving of a very attentive perusal. IV. I cannot but avail myself of this occa-

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thereof. And yet may the things of this lower world be well said to have been made principally, (though not only) for man.* For we ought not to monopolize the divine goodness to ourselves, there being other animals superior to us, that are not altogether unconcerned neither in this visible creation; and it being reasonable to think that even the lower animals likewise, and whatsoever hath conscious life, was made partly also to enjoy itself. But Atheists can be no fit judges of worlds, being made well or ill, either in general, or respectively to mankind; they having no standing measure for well or ill, without a God and morality, nor any true knowledge of themselves, and what their own good or evil consisteth in. That was at first but a froward speech of some sullen discontented persons, when things falling not out agreeably to their own private, selfish, and partial appetites, they would revenge themselves by railing upon nature (that is, providence) and calling her a step-mother only to mankind, whilst she was a fond, partial, and indulgent mother to other animals;[11] and though this be

sion to observe that some of the ancient Christian fathers circumscribed this dogma within even narrower limits than the Stoics, and asserted the world to have been created for the sake of *the Church*, or the followers of our Saviour Jesus Christ. Hermas, a most ancient Christian writer, in his Pastor, lib. 1. vis. 2. sect. 4. p. 78. tom. 1. Patr. Apostolic. thus writes: "What is it then, Lord? And he said to me: It is the Church of God. And I said unto him: Why then is it old? It is old, said he, because it was created before all things: *and because of it the world was made.*" In which he was followed by others whose names and passages, to avoid digressing too far from my purpose, I now pass over. I confess this doctrine may be so explained as to render it less offensive than it appears at the first view: and yet from being imperfectly understood, it produced, in my opinion, that pernicious dogma which was afterwards maintained by St. Augustine and some other ancient Christian fathers: "That the saints or church by divine right, are the possessors of the whole of this world, and the wicked and impious are the unjust usurpers of the goods they make use of, and not the lawful possessors." For if all things were created simply and absolutely for the sake of the church and saints, it necessarily follows that all things belong to the saints, and that those who are out of the pale of the church, unjustly arrogate to themselves whatever they possess; consequently that the saints by dispossessing the wicked of these goods, will not violate the divine law. This doctrine of St. Augustine has been copiously expounded, and its turpitude at the same time exposed by the great and most erudite J. Berbeyrac, Traité de la Morale des Peres, cap. 16. sect. 14. &c. p. 291. &c. But he has not pointed out the source it emanated from, nor shown that other ancient fathers besides St. Augustine, were also infected with it. In our times, N. Malebranche has not hesitated to maintain that all things were made by God for men, and especially for the church, Traité de la Nature et de la Grace, par. 1. sect. 3. p. 8. 9. &c. "Everything," says he, "was made for man, man for Jesus Christ, and Jesus Christ for God," and p. 10. amongst other things: "God," says he, "made the world solely for the elect." But the sense in which he intended this dogma to be understood, is evident from the very commencement of his work, p. 3. "God being unable to act except for his own glory, and being unable to find it except in himself, can have had no other design in the creation than the establishment of the church."

* Thus Plato, Μέρος μὴν ἕνεκα ὅλου, κἀι οὐχ ὅλον μέρους ἕνεκα, De Leg. p. 903.

[11] In writing this our worthy author no doubt had in his mind the following words of Pliny, which appear in his Procemium to lib. 7. Hist. Naturalis: Cujus (hominis) caussa videtur cuncta alia genuisse natura, magna et sæva mercede contra tanta sua munera; ut non sit satis æstimare, parens melior homini, an tristior noverca fuerit. Ante omnia unum animantium cunctorum alienis velat opibus: ceteris varie tegumenta tribuit, testas, cortices, coria, spinas, villos, setas, pilos, plumam, pennas, squamas,

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elegantly set off by Lucretius,[1] yet is there nothing but poetic flourish in it all, without any philosophic truth; the advantages of mankind being so notoriously conspicuous above those of brutes.

But as for evils in general, from whence the Atheist would conclude the God of the Theist to be either impotent or envious;[2] it hath been already declared, that the true original of them is from the necessity of imperfect beings, and the incompossibility of things; but that the divine art and skill most of all appeareth in bonifying these evils, and making them, like discords in music, to contribute to the harmony of the whole, and the good of particular persons.

Moreover, a great part of those evils, which men are afflicted with, is not from the reality of things, but only from their own fancy and opinions, according to that of the moralist:[3] Ταράσσει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐ τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλὰ τὰ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων δόγματα, "It is not things themselves that disturb men, but only their own opinions concerning things." And therefore it being much in our own power to be freed from these, Providence is not to be blamed upon the account of them. Pain is many times nearly linked with pleasure, according to that Socratic fable,[4] That when God could not reconcile their contrary natures (as he would) he tied them head and tail together. And good men know, that pain is not the evil of the man, but only of the

vellera. Truncos etiam arboresque cortice, interdum gemino, a frigoribus et calore tutata est. Hominem tantum nudum et in nuda humo natali die abjicit, ad vagitus statim et ploratum, nullumque tot animalium aliud ad lacrymas et has protinus vitæ principio, "For whose (man's) sake nature appears to have generated all other things, exacting a great and cruel price for such important benefits: so that it is hard to judge whether she has been a kind and indulgent parent, or a severe stepmother. First of all, he alone of all animals is clothed by her with the riches of others: on the rest she bestows various integuments, shells, hides, skins, prickles, quills, fur, bristles, hairs, feathers, wings, scales, fleeces. The very trunks and stems of trees also are protected from cold and heat by bark, and that sometimes double. Man alone she casts forth naked on the bare ground at the day of his birth, at once to wailing and weeping, and of so many animals no other but him to tears, and these too at the very commencement of life." But this complaint has long ago been admirably repressed by Gregorius Nyssenus of the Christians, De Opificio Hominis, cap. 7. p. 56. tom. 1. opp. and of the Stoics, by Seneca, De Beneficiis, lib. 2. cap. 29. p. 389. tom. 1. opp. not to speak now of later authors, who have thought proper to do the same.

[1] De Rerum Natura, lib. 5. v. 223. p. 254. The verses themselves are quoted above, chap. 2. sect. 16. p. 169.

[2] Herewith compare cap. 2. sect. 17. p. 171. &c. where the argument itself, conveyed in these words, is discussed and expounded.

[3] Namely, Epictetus in his Enchiridion, cap. 5. p. 10. Compare M. Antoninus, lib. 4. Ad Seipsum, sec. 3. p. 97. and lib. 5. sect. 19. p. 159. All the Stoics display great subtlety in the inculcation of this doctrine, as do also the Christian writers. Consult in particular Pet. Molinæus, De la paix de l'ame, lib. 2. throughout, p. 167. tom. 1. ed. nov. Genev.

[4] In Plato's Phædo, p. 376. where, however, Socrates does not relate a fable, as the learned Doctor seems to insinuate, but merely says that if Æsop had observed this he would have embodied it in some fable or other.

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part so affected (as Socrates also):[5] Τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἐν τῷ σκέλει μένει, "It goes no further than the leg where it is." But this is many times very serviceable to free us from the greater evils of the mind, upon which all our happiness dependeth. To the Atheists, who acknowledge no malum culpæ, "no evil of fault" (turpitude, or dishonesty), death is the greatest and most tragical of all evils. But though this, according to their forlorn hypothesis, be nothing less than an absolute extinction of life; yet, according to the doctrine of the genuine Theists, which makes all souls substantial, no life of itself (without divine annihilation) will ever quite vanish into nothing, any more than the substance of matter doth. And the ancient Pythagoreans and Platonists have been here so kind, even to the souls of brutes also, as that they might not be left in a state of inactivity and insensibility after death, as to bestow upon them certain subtle bodies, which they may then continue to act in. Nor can we think otherwise, but that Aristotle, from this fountain, derived that doctrine of his in his second book, De Gen. Ann. c. 3.[6] where, after he had declared the sensitive soul to be inseparable from body, he addeth, Πάσης οὖν ψυχῆς δύναμις ἑτέρου σώματος ἔοικε κεκοινωνηκέναι καὶ θειοτέρου τῶν καλουμένων στοιχείων· ὡς δὲ διαφέρουσι τιμιότητι αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίᾳ ἀλλήλων, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη διαφέρει φύσις, "All souls therefore seem to have another body, and diviner than that of the elements; and as themselves differ in dignity and nobility, so do these bodies of theirs differ from one another." And afterwards calling this subtle body πνεῦμα, or a spirit, he affirmeth it to be, ἀνάλογον τῷ τῶν ἄστρων στοιχείῳ, "analogous to the element of the stars." Only as Galen, and St. Austin, and others, have conceived, Aristotle deviated here from the Pythagoreans in this, that he supposed the sensitive soul itself to be really nothing else, but this very subtle and star-like body, and not a distinct substance from it, using it only as a vehicle. Nevertheless, he there plainly affirmeth the mind or rational soul to be really distinct from the body, and to come into it from without pre-existing; and consequently should acknowledge

[5] Dr. Cudworth seems to have written this from memory; for it is neither expressed in the same words by Socrates, nor with the design of deriving any support from it against pain. Socrates is not philosophizing, but merely relating what happened to himself on being released from his fetters. Behold his very words from Plato's Phædo, p. 376. After having said that pleasure is nearly allied to pain, he thus proceeds: Ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἔοικεν, ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἦν ἐν τῷ σκέλει τὸ ἀλγεῖν, ἐκείνῳ δὴ φαίνεται ἐπακολουθεῖν τὸ ἡδύ, "So indeed it appears also to myself; since just now there was pain in the leg from the chain, and now pleasure seems to follow this."

[6] I see nothing strange and wonderful in this doctrine of the Pythagoreans and Platonista. For most of them held the souls of beasts and men in the same rank, and supposed them to pass by a perpetual migration from men into the bodies of beasts, and from beasts again into those of men. Wherefore, as they assigned a certain body to the souls of men, it was necessary for them to entertain the same idea respecting those of beasts.

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also its after-immortality.[7] But whatsoever Aristotle's judgment were (which is not very material) it is certain, that dying to the rational or human soul is nothing but a withdrawing into the

[7] If there were no other passage extant in Aristotle, except this one, to prove that he held souls to be altogether incapable of perishing, there certainly would be an end of the matter. See what we have remarked above, chap. 1. p. 68. on the question: Whether or not the founder of the Peripatetics assigned immortality to souls. This passage, which is supposed by Dr. Cudworth to contain the Platonic and Pythagorean dogma of the perpetual body of souls, is involved in great obscurity, and in consequence is expounded by all of them in the same manner. In the first place, Aristotle acknowledges νοῦς, or "mind," to come to the body *from without*, and to be alone divine; from which he concludes that the δύναμις ψυχῆς, "power of the soul," partakes of some body; but adds, that souls differ from one another. These words are quoted by Dr. Cudworth. He goes on and declares, that there is in seed a certain vital principle, ζωτικὴ ἀρχή, which is neither fire nor any thing else like fire, but πνεῦμα, "spirit;" that in this spirit there is another nature analogous to the stars: Καὶ ἡ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι φύσις, ἀναλόγως οὖσα τῷ τῶν ἄστρων στοιχείῳ. Now there is nothing plain and clear in all this; on the contrary, it seems to be altogether obscure, confused and mystified. The philosopher names four things, νοῦς, "mind," ψυχὴ, "soul," πνεῦμα, "spirit," and lastly, φύσις, or "nature," residing in the spirit. But he neither tells us in what manner these four things differ from each other, nor what is their nature and character; but, on the contrary, according to his peculiar wont, discourses as though all men were related to the Pythian priestess, and possessed the faculty of divination. Hence he has opened a wide field for controversy to those who make it their business to investigate the opinions and doctrines of a man who was sometimes unwilling to be understood. Although there are various points of difference among those who have attempted to explain this passage of Aristotle, and at the same time to expound his doctrine concerning the soul; nevertheless, interpreters are chiefly divided into two opinions. Some suppose the body which Aristotle attributes to the soul to be different from the soul or mind itself: among these rank Dr. Cudworth, as also Galen and others, who fancy that this body is the sentient soul. But others maintain that what this philosopher here calls body, and more divine than all the elements, constitutes the rational soul itself. To myself, indeed, the latter opinion seems to be the more correct of the two; nor have I any doubt that it will be so considered by all who examine Aristotle with attention and impartiality. I will try whether I can make this plain and evident; for it will not be altogether a fruitless labour, as it will serve to confirm what we have remarked above, cap. 1. p. 68. First of all it is manifest that Aristotle distinguishes between νοῦς and ψυχὴ in this passage. Νοῦς, he tells us, comes to the body of man from without; but he educes ψυχὴ from the seed itself, in which resides a certain θερμὸν, "warmth," and ζωτικὴ ἀρχὴ, "vital principle," that is, the origin and source of life. Unquestionably νοῦς is the rational soul, and ψυχὴ the life of the body, or that soul which possesses the faculty of sensation and animates the body. After saying that mind or νοῦς comes to man from without, he infers from thence: πάσης μὲν οὖν ψυχῆς κ. τ. λ. which words ought to be rendered so as to make it appear that Aristotle is deducing something from what goes before. The philosopher is speaking of ψυχὴ, not of νοῦς, or "mind;" and having laid down the position that mind comes into the body from without, he demonstrates from this that the sentient soul or life has a certain other body united to it, more divine and excellent than all the elements; which of itself is a proof that this body which is united to the sentient soul is the mind, or νοῦς itself, which he tells us consists of body more excellent than the rest of the elements. This is made still more apparent from what follows; since he moreover declares that this body, or νοῦς, consisting of a celestial body, is not the same in all men, which daily experience sufficiently confirms. For all mortals are not equally gifted with the faculty of reason and perception. The reason of this difference, he tells us, lies in the ψυχὴ, or "sentient soul," which is better in some than in others; and hence it happens that the νοῦς also, which he here and elsewhere calls φύσις, as consisting of a certain peculiar nature, is different in different individuals. His object being to show what this difference in souls arises from, he goes on and adds, although in somewhat obscure terms, that they differ because their virtue lies concealed in the seed which notoriously varies according to the different habit and

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tyring-house, and putting off the clothing of this terrestrial body. So that it will still continue after death to live to God, whether in a body or without it. Though according to Plato's

constitution of bodies. In the seed he tells us there is a certain generative power or vital principle, ζωτικὴ ἀρχή, a certain θερμόν, from which springs the sentient soul, or ψυχή, and yet is not such heat as we detect in fire, but of a peculiar nature; and finding no better word for expressing this nature, he calls it πνεῦμα, or "spirit." With this πνεῦμα, he proceeds, the φύσις or νοῦς, that is mind consisting of that celestial φύσις, is associated, or the rational mind is lodged and domiciled in the ψυχὴ that springs from seed on the sentient soul; whence it comes to pass that the rational minds are of various kinds, since this πνεῦμα or spirit in which they are clothed differs exceedingly according to the state and constitution of men. In Aristotle, therefore, the expressions, νοῦς, φύσις, and σῶμα ἀνάλογον τῷ τῶν ἄστρων στοιχείῳ, signify one and the same thing, namely, the rational soul; and, on the other hand, ψυχή, θερμόν, and πνεῦμα, are here synonymous terms, and imply the sentient soul or life. Such being the case, we have here clear evidence of the truth of what was remarked above on chap. 1. p. 68. that the rational soul with Aristotle is nothing more than a portion of a certain celestial and ethereal nature, diffused through the entire universe, which is received in the seed of every man, and on the dissolution of the body returns to its own element. Nor on the whole do those of the ancients, who carefully investigated the Stagirite's doctrines, seem to have interpreted his words and opinion differently, since they expressly declare the soul of Aristotle to be a *fifth element*, or a body consisting of that celestial nature which he adds to the four elements. Cicero, Tusculanar. Disput. lib. 1. cap. 10, p. 2573. tom. 8. opp. Aristotelis longe omnibus præstans et ingenio et diligentia, quum quatuor nota illa genera principiorum esset complexus, equibus omnia orirentur, quintam quamdam naturam censet esse, e qua fit mens. Cogitare enim et providere in horum quatuor generum nullo inesse putat. Quintum genus adlibet, vacans nomine, "Aristotle, who far surpasses them all in intellect and diligence, having adopted those well-known four kinds of principles from which all things are deduced, supposes there is a certain fifth nature, from which comes mind. For cogitation and forethought, he thinks, cannot exist in any one of these four kinds. Hence he adds a fifth kind without giving it a name." St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, lib. 22. cap. 11. sect. 2. p. 809. tom. 7. opp, "Aristotle asserted the soul to be a *fifth body*, and Plato not body at all. If it were a fifth body it certainly would be superior to the rest; but since it is not body at all it surpasses them all so much the more." But to relieve those who are desirous of becoming acquainted with Aristotle's doctrines and opinions of all labour and trouble, I shall transcribe the entire passage itself, which has puzzled so many interpreters, and give a paraphrastic interpretation of its meaning. This will make it plain and clear to every one that we have not done violence to his words, but that if our exposition be adopted they are all perfectly consistent and in keeping with each other: Λείπεται δὲ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι, καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια· πάσης μὲν οὖν ψυχῆς δύναμις, ἑτέρου σώματος ἔοικε κεκοινωνηκέναι, καὶ θειοτέρου τῶν καλουμένων στοιχείων, ὡς δὲ διαφέρουσι τιμιότητι αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίᾳ ἀλλήλων, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη διαφέρει φύσις· πάντων μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ σπέρματι ἐνυπάρχει, ὅπερ ποιεῖ γόνιμα εἶναι τὰ σπέρματα, τὸ καλούμενον θερμόν· τοῦτο δὲ οὐ πῦρ, οὐδὲ τοιαύτη δύναμίς ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐμπεριλαμβανόμενον ἐν τῷ σπέρματι, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀφρῷδει πνεῦμα, καὶ ἡ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι φύσις, ἀνάλογος οὖσα τῷ τῶν ἄστρων στοιχείῳ. Let us see whether we can render the words so as to make their meaning intelligible to every one: "These things being so, it remains for us to decide that the rational soul is not produced from the four elements of which the human body consists, and generated in the body itself, but comes to and enters the human body from elsewhere, and therefore is more closely allied to the divine nature, than are the elements of things, or the human body which is compounded of them. For not one of the soul's faculties needs the assistance of the body for its operation. It cogitates, forecasts, reasons, deliberates, determines by its own innate power, nor requires the aid of a body for the performance of these functions. Wherefore undoubtedly our other soul, the seat of the vital and sensitive power, is associated and conjoined, not only with this gross body which is composed of the four elements, but also with a much more excellent and subtle one, namely, that

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express doctrine,[8] the soul is never quite naked of all body, he writing thus: Ἀεὶ ψυχὴ ἐπιτεταγμένη σώματι, τοτὲ μὲν ἄλλῳ,

from which the rational soul was taken, and which surpasses all the elements and is more akin to the divine nature than any other thing. The condition of the mind or rational soul, however, is not the same in all men; but in some its perception is more clear and acute, while in others it meets with greater restraints and impediments in the exercise of its power. This difference in the state of the rational soul arises from the different nature of the sentient soul it is allied with, which in some is more noble, active, and excellent, in others more debased and ignoble, and consequently can variously affect the rational soul. Now if it be asked what causes the sentient souls to be so diversified in their kind and nature, I answer that it is owing to their being produced from seed and transfused by seed into the man who is generated; which seed, as every one knows, is various and not of the same excellence in all. For there is innate in all seed a certain animating and vivifying power, which may be called heat, as it approaches more closely to the nature of fire than to any thing else. Still it must not be supposed that this fiery virtue which we ascribe to seed can be compared to our natural fire, or to any thing of the kind, for properly speaking it is not fire, but much more subtle than fire. For my own part, indeed, I should consider spirit to be a more suitable appellation for this power of animating and of producing life and the sentient soul, which resides in seed and its frothy body. And this spirit, this life and soul, that springs from seed and is latent in seed prior to generation, as soon as a man is begotten and has a sentient soul, becomes the seat and abode of the mind or rational soul, which as I have before stated is plucked and detached from a body more divine than all the elements and analogous to the stars." From this interpretation of a most obscure passage of Aristotle, which few I apprehend will deny to be in strict accordance with his words, my readers may learn in the first place the sentiments entertained by this philosopher respecting the two souls, sentient and rational, and secondly, the value that is to be attached to the remarks here put forth by the learned Doctor.

I. This opinion of Aristotle, so far from agreeing with the Platonic and Pythagorean doctrine of a celestial body of the soul, is on the contrary wholly at variance with it. For what the Stagirite here calls body is the rational soul itself, which is supposed to be sprung from the fifth body.

II. Neither the soul nor the body of the soul is here called πνεῦμα, "a spirit," by Aristotle, as he applies this name to the animating and vivifying power which he asserts to be in all seed, and of which the sentient soul is either a portion or an effect. I am aware that the Platonists and Pythagoreans are accustomed to designate the body of the soul, which it assumes to itself from the elements, by the name πνεῦμα, but they have nothing in common with Aristotle.

III. Whether Galen and St. Augustine have censured Aristotle for deviating from the Pythagoreans, as Dr. Cudworth here states, I am unable to say; as I could not prevail upon myself to encounter the task of again looking through the bulky volumes of these writers, being already wearied with the immense labour occasioned me by the learned Doctor's habit of quoting ancient authors without indicating the passages. I should be inclined to deny that St. Augustine has left on record any thing of the kind, having more than once very carefully perused all that he has written in relation to the ancient philosophers; still I will not speak positively. If any such thing did escape Galen and St. Augustine, they certainly were in error and misapprehended the meaning of Aristotle.

IV. Those who rank Aristotle among the assertors of the soul's immortality can look for no support whatever from this passage. I should say rather that it proves their opinion to be fallacious.

[8] Dr. Cudworth is wrong in supposing it to be evident from these words of Plato, that this philosopher held the soul to be clothed in another more subtle body on quitting this gross and earthly one. For in the place from which these words are extracted Plato seems to be speaking merely of the μετεμψύχωσις, or transmigration of souls into new bodies, a doctrine which he is well known to have inculcated. The meaning therefore of this passage is as follows: The soul as long as it remains in this world passes from one body into another, and has sometimes a better and sometimes a worse domicile. "The better morals," he immediately subjoins, "are transferred by God εἰς βελτίω τόπον, into a better place, χεῖρον δὲ, εἰς τὸν χείρωνα, but the worse into a worse."

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τοτὲ δὲ ἄλλῳ,* "The soul is always conjoined with a body, but sometimes of one kind, and sometimes of another;" which many Christian doctors also, as is before declared, have thought highly probable. However, our Christian faith assures us, that the souls of good men shall at length be clothed with spiritual and heavenly bodies, such as are, in Aristotle's language, ἀνάλογα τῷ τῶν ἄστρων στοιχείῳ, "analogous to the element of the stars." Which Christian resurrection therefore, to life and immortality, is far from being, as Celsus[9] reproached it, σκωλήκων ἐλπὶς, "the mere hope of worms." And thus much shall suffice, in way of confutation, of the first atheistic objection against Providence, which is the twelfth argumentation propounded in the second chapter.

The thirteenth atheistic argument, or second objection against Providence, is from the seeming confusion of human affairs; that all things fall alike to all; the innocent and the nocent, the pious and the impious, the religious and the profane: nay, that many times the worser causes and men prevail against the better, as is intimated in that passage of the poet,[10] though in the person of a Theist,

Victrix causa Deo placuit, sed victa Catoni;

And that the unjust and ungodly often flow in all kind of prosperity, whilst the innocent and devout worshippers of the Deity, all their lives long, conflict with adversity. Whereas, were there a God and Providence, as they conceive, profane and irreligious persons would be presently thunder-struck from heaven, or otherwise made remarkable objects of divine vengeance, as also the pious miraculously protected and rescued from evil and harms.

Now we grant indeed, that this consideration hath too much puzzled and staggered weak minds in all ages. Because "sentence against an evil work is not executed speedily, therefore the heart of the sons of men is fully set in them to do evil."[1] And the Psalmist himself[2] was sometimes much perplexed with this

* De Leg. 10. p. 903. [Page 672.]

[9] In Origen, Adv. Celsum, lib. 5. p. 240. Dr. Cudworth justly insinuates that Celsus did not even understand the meaning of our doctrine of the resurrection of bodies. For he assumes it to be the Christian belief that the putrid and worm-eaten body will hereafter be restored to the soul; and upon the strength of this error he most foolishly exclaims that the hope of Christians is more worthy of worms than of men. For worms delight in putrid flesh which men abhor. Hence he adds: Ποῖα γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ποθήσειε ἔτι σῶμα σεσηπός, "For what man's soul would be desirous of a body already putrid? Ridiculous enough certainly. As if the very meanest Christian ever supposed that the soul will be conjoined with flesh reduced by dissolution into its primitive elements.

[10] Lucan, Pharsal. lib. 1. v. 131.

[1] These are the words of Solomon, Eccles. viii. 11.

[2] David or Asaph in Psalm lxxiii.

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phenomenon, the prosperity of the ungodly, who "set their mouths against heaven, and whose tongue walketh through the earth;[3] so that he was tempted to think, "he had cleansed his heart in vain, and washed his hands in innocency[4] (till at length, entering into the sanctuary of God, his mind became illuminated, and his soul fixed in a firm trust and confidence upon divine providence; "Whom have I in heaven but thee," &c. "My flesh and my heart faileth, but God is the strength of my heart, and my portion for ever").[5] For as some will from hence be apt to infer, That there is no God at all, but that blind chance and fortune steer all (the fool hath said in his heart there is no God[6]); so will others conclude, That though there be a God, yet he either does not know things done here below (how does God know? and is there knowledge in the Most High?[7]*) or else will not so far humble himself, or disturb his own ease and quiet, as to concern himself in our low human affairs.

First of all therefore, we here say, that it is altogether unreasonable to require, that divine Providence should miraculously interpose upon every turn in punishing the ungodly, and preserving the pious, and thus perpetually interrupt the course of nature (which would look but like a botch or bungle, and a violent business), but rather carry things on ἀψόφῳ κελεύθῳ, in a still and silent path, and show his art and skill in making things of themselves fairly unwind, and clear up at last into a satisfactory close. Passion and self-interest is blind, or short-sighted; but that which steers the whole world is no fond, pettish, impatient and passionate thing, but an impartial, disinterested and uncaptivated nature. Nevertheless, it is certain, that sometimes we have not wanted instances, in cases extraordinary, of a Θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς, "God appearing, as it were, miraculously upon the stage," and manifesting himself in taking immediate vengeance upon notorious malefactors, or delivering his faithful servants from imminent dangers or evils threatened; as the same is often done also by a secret and undiscerned overruling of the things of nature. But it must be granted, that it is not always thus, but the periods of divine Providence here in this world are commonly longer, and the evolutions thereof slower; according to that of Euripides,[8] which yet has a tang of profaneness in the expression,

Μέλλει· τὸ θεῖον δ' ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον φόσει,

[3] Psalm lxxiii. 9. [4] Verse 13. [5] Verse 25.
[6] Psalm xiv. 1. [7] Psalm lxxiii. 11.

* Thus did some in Plato from hence conclude, Εἶναι μὲν Θεοὺς, τῶν δὲ ἀνθρωπίνων ἀμελεῖν πραγμάτων, De Leg. 10. [Page 664.]

[8] In Oreste, v. 420. p. 258. Where Menelaus asks Orestes whether Apollo afforded him any assistance in his calamities. To which he replies that "the Deity is slow and dilatory; for such is his nature." But I cannot see why the learned Doctor should

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"The Deity is slow or dilatory, and this is the nature of it." For it is not from slackness and remissness in the Deity, but either from his patience and long-suffering, he willing, that men should repent, or else to teach us patience by his example (as Plutarch[9] suggesteth) or that all things may be carried on with more pomp and solemnity; or lastly, for other particular reasons, as Plutarch[10] ventures to assign one, why it might not be expedient for Dionysius the tyrant, though so profane and irreligious a

accuse this saying of Euripides of a certain profane tendency. The poet is speaking according to the popular opinion of his own times, which ascribed to the gods delay and tardiness both in their rewards and punishments. There are certainly many more aphorisms of this kind to be found in ancient authors, whom no one would think of charging with impiety towards the gods; from which it would appear that this opinion concerning the gods was current among the people. Valerius Maximus, Dictor. et Factor. Memorabil. lib. 1. cap. 3. Lento gradu ad vindictam sui divina procedit ira, "Divine anger proceeds to vengeance with slow step." Juvenal, Satyr. 13. v. 100.

Ut sit magna, tamen certe lenta ira Deorum est.

Plutarch especially ought to be consulted in his specific and elegant treatise: Περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θείου βραδίως τιμωρουμένων, "On those who are tardily punished by the Deity," p. 548. tom. 2. opp. in which he professedly discusses this subject, and according to his custom brings forward certain sayings and examples of the ancients by way of illustration. For the ancient Epicureans assailed divine Providence by this very argument, that according to the confession of the Theists themselves their gods were very slow in punishing crimes. It is this sect, therefore, that Plutarch is confuting in his treatise, and that too by arguments which every wise and sensible man will acknowledge to be sound and powerful. Indeed he has reached as far by mere dint of reason in this matter as a man can reach who is destitute of the light of the gospel and divine revelation. To return to Euripides, that he meant nothing profane or impious when he declared Apollo to be slow and dilatory, agreeably to the custom of the gods, is sufficiently shown by another passage of his, wherein he devoutly worships Jupiter, and yet at the same time confesses that he is slow to bring succour, Heraclid. v. 869. 870. p. 514.

Ὦ Ζεῦ, χρόνῳ μὲν τάμ' ἐπεσκέψω κακά,
Χάριν δὲ ὅμως σοι τῶν πεπραγμένων ἔχω,

"O Jupiter, thou hast been long in regarding my wrongs; nevertheless, I give thee thanks for the things that are done." Dr. Cudworth seems to have been one of those who suspect this celebrated tragedian of being unfavourably disposed towards God and religion. But the fallacy of such a supposition has, I consider, been satisfactorily exposed by that great ornament of the university of Cambridge, Joshua Barnes, in the Life of Euripides, prefixed to his edition, Cantabr. 1694. fol. If I have any judgment in these matters, a much more favourable opinion would be formed of Euripides and some others of the ancients, if their sayings respecting God and religion were judged of by reference to the opinions and phraseology of the times in which they lived. [See Zimmermann, De Theolog. Euripidis, in the Mus. Helvet. tom. 4. p. 1.] But I know not how it happens that some men, eminent for their learning and intelligence in other respects, estimate the piety of the ancients according to our own notions and forms of expression; as if their conceptions and views of things had been the same as ours, and the inferences deducible from certain opinions had been equally evident to them as they are to us at this day.

[9] De Sera Numinis Vindicta, tom. 2. opp. 550. Διὸ καὶ τοῖς πονηροῖς ἐν χρόνῳ καὶ σχολαίως τὴν δικὴν ἐπιτίθησιν . . . ἵνα ἡμῶν τὸ περὶ τὰς τιμωρίας θηριῶδες, καὶ λαβρὸν ἀφαίρων, κ. τ. λ. "God inflicts punishment upon the wicked tardily, and after long delay . . . . that by his example he may divest us of all ferocity and violence in our revenge."

[10] Ibid. p. 557.

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person, to have been cut off suddenly. But wicked and ungodly persons oftentimes fail not to be met withal at last, and at the long-run, here in this life, and either in themselves or posterity, to be notoriously branded with the marks of divine displeasure; according to that of the poet:[1] Rarò antecedentem scelestum, &c. "It is seldom that wickedness altogether scapes punishment, though it come slowly after, limping with a lame foot; and those proverbial speeches amongst the Pagans,[2]

Ὀψὲ θεῶν ἀλεοῦσι μύλοι, ἀλεοῦσι δὲ λεπτά,

Mills of the gods do slowly wind,
But they at length to powder grind.

and, "Divine justice steals on softly with woollen feet, but strikes at last with iron hands."

Nevertheless we cannot say, that it is always thus neither, but that wicked persons may possibly sometimes have an uninterrupted prosperity here in this life, and no visible marks of divine displeasure upon them; but as the generously virtuous will not envy them upon this account, nor repine at their own condition, they knowing, that[3] οὐδὲν κακὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐδ' αὖ τῷ φαύλῳ ἀγαθὸν, "There is neither any thing truly evil to the good, nor good to the evil;" so are they so far from being staggered herewith in their belief of a God and Providence, that they are rather the more confirmed in their persuasions of a future immortality and judgment after death, when all things shall be set straight and right, and rewards and punishments impartially dispensed. That of Plutarch[4] therefore is most true here: Εἰς οὖν ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἅμα καὶ τὴν διαμονὴν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς βεβαιῶν, καὶ θάτερον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπολιπεῖν ἀναιροῦντα θάτερον, "That there is a necessary connexion betwixt those two things, divine Providence, and the permanence or immortality of human souls, one and the same reason confirming them both; neither can one of these be taken alone without the other." But they, who, because judgment is not presently executed upon the ungodly, blame the management of things as faulty, and Providence as defective, are like such spectators of a dramatic poem, as when wicked and injurious persons are brought upon the stage, for a while swaggering and triumphing, impatiently cry out against the dramatist, and presently condemn the plot; whereas, if they would but expect the winding up of

[1] Horace, Od. lib. 3. od. 2.

[2] These are cursorily touched upon by Plutarch, De Sera Numinis Vindicta, tom. 2. p. 548.

[3] Read the admirable discourse of Socrates in Plato's Apologia Socratis, p. 369. and Plato, De Republica, lib 10. p. 518. to say nothing of the Stoics and others, who inculcated the same doctrine.

[4] De Sera Numinis Vindicta, p. 560. tom. 2.

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things, and stay till the last close, they should then see them come off with shame and sufficient punishment.[5] The evolution of the world, as Plotinus calls it,[6] is ἀληθέστερον ποίημα, a "truer poem;" and we men histrionical actors upon the stage, who, notwithstanding, insert something of our own into the poem too; but God Almighty is that skilful dramatist, who always connecteth that of ours, which went before, with what of his follows after, into good coherent sense, and will at last make it appear, that a thread of exact justice did run through all, and that rewards and punishments are measured out in geometrical proportion.

Lastly, it is in itself fit, that there should be somewhere a doubtful and cloudy state of things, for the better exercise of virtue and faith. For as there could have been no Hercules, had there not been monsters to subdue; so were there no such difficulties to encounter with, no puzzles and entanglements of things, no temptations and trials to assault us, virtue would grow languid, and that excellent grace of faith want due occasions and objects to exercise itself upon. Here have we therefore such a state of things, and this world is, as it were, a stage erected for the more difficult part of virtue to act upon, and where we are to live by "faith," and not by "sight;" that faith, which is "the substance of things to be hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen;"[7] a belief in the goodness, power, and wisdom of God, when all things are dark and cloudy round about us. "The just shall live by his faith."

We have now sufficiently confuted the second atheistic objection also, against Providence, as to the conduct and economy of human affairs. Nevertheless this is a large field, and much more might be said in defence of Providence, both as to these and other instances, had we room here to expatiate in. Wherefore, for a supplement of what remains, we shall refer the reader to the writings of others, who have professedly undertaken apologies for Providence, both as to the fabric and economy of the world; but especially the learned and ingenious author[8] of the Divine Dialogues. Only we shall here add some few considerations, not so much for the confutation of Atheists, as for the better satisfaction of such Religionists, who, too easily concluding, that all things might have been much better than they are, are thereupon apt to call in question the divine attribute of

[5] The learned Doctor borrows this comparison from Plutarch, ibid. p. 554. to whom he is indebted for most of what he here brings forward.

[6] Ennead. 3. lib. 2. cap. 16. p. 267. opp.

[7] Heb. xi. 1.

[8] The eminent theologian and philosopher, Dr. Henry More, whose Divine Dialogues are appended to the first volume of his philosophical works, published at London, 1679. fol. To him, besides others enumerated by J. Alb. Fabricius in his Delectus Argumentorum pro Veritate Religionis Christianæ, cap. 17. p. 409. add in particular Dr. Sherlock in his ingenious and admirable work on Providence.

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goodness in its full extent, which yet is the only foundation of our Christian faith.

First therefore we say, that in judging of the works of God, we ought not to consider the parts of the world alone by themselves; and then, because we could fancy much finer things, thereupon blame the Maker of the whole. As if one should attend only to this earth, which is but the lowest and most dreggy part of the universe; or blame plants, because they have not sense; brutes, because they have not reason; men, because they are not demons or angels; and angels, because they are not gods, or want divine perfection. Upon which account, God should either have made nothing at all, since there can be nothing besides himself absolutely perfect, or else nothing but the higher rank of angelic beings, free from mortality, and all those other evils that attend mankind, or such fine things as Epicurus' gods were feigned to be, living in certain delicious regions,[9] where there was neither blustering winds, nor any lowering clouds, nor nipping frosts, nor scorching heat, nor night, nor shadow, but the calm and unclouded ether, always smiling with gentle serenity, whereas were there but one kind of thing (the best) thus made, there could have been no music nor harmony at all, in the world, for want of variety. But we ought, in the first place, to consider the whole, whether that be not the best that could be made, having all that belongeth to it; and then the parts in reference to the whole, whether they be not, in their several degrees and ranks, congruous and agreeable thereunto. But this is a thing which hath been so well insisted upon by Plotinus,* that we cannot speak better to it than in his words: "Ὅλον γὰρ τὶ ἐποίησε πάγκαλον, καὶ αὔταρκες, καὶ φίλον ἀυτῷ, καὶ τοῖς μέρεσι τοῖς αὐτοῦ, τοῖς τε κυριωτέροις καὶ τοῖς ἐλάττοσιν ὡσάυτως προσφόροις· ὁ τοίνυν ἐκ τῶν μερῶν τὸ ὅλον αἰτιώμενος, ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη τῆς αἰτίας· τά τε γὰρ μέρη πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον δεῖ σκοπεῖν εἰ σύμφωνα καὶ ἁρμόττοντα ἐκείνῳ, καὶ τὸ ὅλον σκοπούμενον, μὴ πρὸς μέρη ἄττα μικρὰ βλέπειν· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τὸν κόσμον αἰτιωμένου ἀλλά τινα τῶν αὐτοῦ χωρὶς λαβόντα, οἷον εἰ, καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς, "God made the whole most beautiful, entire, complete, and sufficient; all agreeing friendly with itself and its parts; both the nobler and the meaner of them being alike congruous thereunto. Whosoever therefore, from the parts thereof, will blame the whole, is an absurd and unjust censurer. For we ought to

[9] Dr. Cudworth here gives the substance of the following verses of Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, lib. 3. v. 19. &c.

Quas neque concutiunt venti, neque nubila nimbis
Adspergunt, neque nix acri concreta pruina
Cana cadens violat, semperque innubilus æther
Integit et large diffuso lumine ridet.

* Page 256. [Lib. 2. de Providentiâ, Ennead. 3. lib. 2. cap. 3.]

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consider the parts, not alone by themselves, but in reference to the whole, whether they be harmonious and agreeable to the same. Otherwise we shall not blame the universe, but some of its parts only taken by themselves; as if one should blame the hair or toes of a man, taking no notice at all of his divine visage and countenance; or omitting all other animals, one should attend only to the most contemptible of them; or, lastly, overlooking all other men, consider only the most deformed Thersites. But that which God made was the whole as one thing; which he that attends to, may hear it speaking to him after this manner: God Almighty hath made me, and from thence came I, perfect and complete, and standing in need of nothing, because in me are contained all things; plants, and animals, and good souls, and men happy with virtue, and innumerable demons, and many gods. Nor is the earth alone in me adorned with all manner of plants and variety of animals; or does the power of soul extend at most no further than to the seas; as if the whole air and ether, and heaven, in the meantime, were quite devoid of soul, and altogether unadorned with living inhabitants. Moreover, all things in me desire good, and every thing reaches to it, according to its power and nature. For the whole depends upon that first and highest good, the gods themselves, who reign in my several parts, and all animals, and plants, and whatsoever seems to be inanimate in me. For some things in me partake only of being, some of life also, some of sense, some of reason, and some of intellect above reason. But no man ought to require equal things from unequal; nor that the finger should see, but the eye; it being enough for the finger to be a finger, and to perform its own office." And again, afterwards: "Ὥσπερ τεχνίτης οὐ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ ζώῳ ὀφθαλμοὺς ποιεῖ, οὕτως οὐδ' ὁ λόγος πάντα θεοὺς εἰργάζεται· ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν θεοὺς, τὰ δὲ δαίμονας δευτέραν φύσιν, εἶτα ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ζῶα ἐφεξῆς, οὐ φθόνῳ, ἀλλὰ λογῳ ποικιλίαν νοερὰν ἔχοντι· ἡμεῖς δὲ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄπειροι γραφικῆς τέχνης αἰτιῶνται, ὡς οὐ καλὰ τὰ χρώματα πανταχοῦ, ὁ δ' ἄρα τὰ πρασήκοντα ἀπέδωκεν ἑκάστῳ τόπῳ, ἢ εἴτις δρᾶμα μέμφοιτο, ὅτι μὴ πάντες ἥρωες ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς. "As an artificer would not make all things in an animal to be eyes, so neither has the divine λόγος, or spermatic reason of the world, made all things gods; but some gods, and some demons, and some men, and some lower animals; not out of envy, but to display its own variety and fecundity. But we are like unskilful spectators of a picture, who condemn the limner, because he hath not put bright colours every where; whereas he had suited his colours to every part respectively, giving to each such as belonged to it. Or else are we like those who would blame a comedy or tragedy, because they were not all kings or heroes that acted in it, but some servants and rustic clowns introduced also, talking after their rude fashion. Whereas

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the dramatic poem would neither be complete, nor elegant and delightful, were all those worser parts taken out of it."

Again, we cannot certainly conclude that the works of God and his creation do not transcend those narrow limits which vulgar opinion and imagination sets them, that commonly terminates the universe, but a little above the clouds, or at most supposes the fixed stars, being all fastened in one solid sphere, to be the utmost wall, or arched roof, and rolling circumference thereof. Much less ought we, upon such groundless suppositions, to infer, that the world might therefore have been made much better than it is, because it might have been much more roomy and capacious. We explode the atheistic infinity of distant worlds; nor can we admit that Cartesian, seemingly more modest, indefinite extension of one corporeal universe, which yet really, according to that philosopher's meaning, hath nullos fines, "no bounds nor limits at all." For we persuade ourselves that the corporeal world is as uncapable of a positive infinity of magnitude, as it is of time: there being no magnitude so great, but that more still might be added to it.[10] Nevertheless, as we cannot possibly imagine the sun to be a quarter, or an hundredth part so big as we know it to be; so much more may the whole corporeal universe far transcend those narrow bounds which our imagination would circumscribe it in. The new celestial phenomena, and the late improvements of astronomy and philosophy made thereupon, render it so probable, that even this dull earth of ours is a planet, and the sun a fixed star in the centre of that vortex, wherein it moves, that many have shrewdly suspected, that there are other habitable globes besides this earth of ours, (which may be sailed round about in a year or two) as also more suns, with their respective planets, than one. However, the distance of all the fixed stars from us being so vast that the diameter of the great orb makes no discernible parallax in the site of them; from whence it is also probable that the other fixed stars are likewise vastly distant from one another:[1] this, I say, widens the corporeal universe to us, and makes those flammantia mœnia mundi, as Lucretius[2] calls them,

[10] These subjects are copiously treated of above, where the learned Doctor is professedly discussing the nature of infinity.

[1] Those who are desirous of obtaining a more accurate knowledge of these matters, which are here glanced at rather than explained, may consult the more recent astronomers, especially of England, Sir Isaac Newton, David Gregory, and others, as also W. Derham, in his Astronomical Theology, a work which will be of great service to such as are not initiated in these mysteries.

[2] He thus sings of Epicurus, De Rerum Natura, lib. 1. verse 73. 74. p. 30.

> Ergo vivida vis animi pervicit, et extra
> Processit longe flammantia mœnia mundi.

Where it is clear that these "flaming walls of the world" are heaven adorned with shining stars and fiery orbs. The poet's meaning is, that Epicurus, whom he followed as his

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"those flaming walls of the world," to fly away before us. Now, it is not reasonable to think that all this immense vastness should lie waste, desert, or uninhabited, and have nothing in it that could praise the Creator thereof, save only this one small spot of earth. "In my Father's house," (saith our Saviour) "are many mansions."[3] And Baruch, (chap. iii. appointed by our

only guide in philosophizing, carried himself in thought beyond this visible universe, and well knew that there are innumerable other worlds besides the one we inhabit, and that heaven does not, as the vulgar erroneously suppose, form the extreme boundary of the whole nature of things.

[3] If, as appears to be the case, Dr. Cudworth understood this passage of St. John, chap. xiv. 2. as though our Saviour meant to say that there are more and probably better worlds than this of ours, I for one cannot agree with him, although I am aware that this opinion has not been without its advocates in ancient as well as in modern times. Our blessed Lord is comforting the minds of his disciples against the tribulation that overwhelms them at the thought of his approaching departure. But how, I ask, can the knowledge that there are many worlds, and that some of them are better and more excellent than ours, contribute towards dispelling this tribulation? [This interpretation is disputed by Christ. Wollius, Hermeneutica, N. T. p. 172.] It is not my intention either to enumerate or refute the opinions of other interpreters on the meaning of this passage. They are to be found in Fr. Adolph. Lamp's Comm. in Johannem. tom. 3. p. 100. &c. And Jo. Christoph. Wolf's Curæ Philologicæ in quatuor Evangelica et Actus Apostolor. p. 441. Most of them, to confess the truth, seem to display more ingenuity than simplicity and clearness. I will avail myself of this opportunity of declaring my own sentiments respecting this somewhat obscure passage. I consider our Saviour's words to contain the simple meaning: "My father is a great and most powerful King, who will receive you all as his servants into the place where he himself dwells, full of all felicity." And that this meaning does not at once occur to the mind of every one, is owing to the fact that our Saviour has clothed it in a certain proverb, which seems to have been current at the time among the Jews and other oriental nations. The power and magnificence of kings in the ages of antiquity, was estimated principally from the size, beauty, and dignity of their palaces. Hence, Homer, when he wishes to show the wealth and importance of Alcinous, the king of the Phæacians, gives a copious and elegant description of the splendour, excellence, and structure of the mansion which he inhabited, Odyss. lib. 7. verse 86. &c. Now, in these mansions of the ancient kings, there was a necessity for many habitations. For it was the custom of that age that the nobles of the land, together with all the king's servants and ministers, and in short, all his family, should be lodged in the same house as himself. In Homer, we find that not only Alcinous' sons, ibid. v. 4. &c. but the Phæacian princes also, v. 88. &c. dwell together in the royal mansion. In Priam's gorgeous palace, as the same poet informs us, Iliad, lib. 7. verse 244. there were fifty bed-chambers occupied by his sons and their wives, and the same number appropriated to his daughters and their husbands: from which it is manifest that this palace must have been most spacious, and provided with many apartments and domiciles. It is unnecessary to adduce other passages of ancient authors testifying the same thing. Consequently, the greater and more powerful a king was, the more μονὰι or habitations were required to afford accommodation to his whole family and household. And hence I suspect arose the custom, of describing the power, splendour, and greatness of a sovereign, by saying that he possessed a most spacious mansion, divided into numerous habitations, or in other words, maintained a great number of servants and ministers. Wherefore, when Christ declares that in his father's house there are many mansions, he seems to me to mean this: "Be not afraid: but put all your trust in God and me: for although you may be exposed to calamities in this life, my Father, whose ministers and servants you are, is the Lord, who has a most spacious and splendid house, that is, possesses infinite riches and power, and therefore, in that house will amply recompense his servants for what they lose here. For as the kings of this world receive those whose labour and counsels they make use of into their magnificent palaces, and there supply them with a commodious and honourable habitation, so you also shall hereafter enter into that everlasting abode of my father. And I now go thither to prepare a place for you."

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church to be read publicly) "O Israel, how great is the house of God, and how large is the place of his possession? Great and hath no end, high and unmeasurable." Which yet we understand not of an absolute infinity, but only such an immense vastness as far transcends vulgar opinion and imagination.

We shall add but one thing more, that, to make a right judgment of the ways of providence, and the justice thereof, as to the economy of mankind, we must look both forwards and backwards, or besides the present, not only upon the future, but also the past time. Which rule is likewise thus set down by Plotinus:* Οὐδ' ἐκεῖνον ἀποβλητέον τὸν λόγον, ὃς οὐ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἑκάστοτε φησὶ βλέπειν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς πρόσθεν περιόδους, καὶ αὖ τὸ μέλλον, "Neither is that doctrine of the ancients to be neglected, that, to give an account of providence, we ought to look back upon former periods, as well as forward to what is future." Indeed he, and those other philosophers, who were religious, understood this so as to conclude a pre-existent state of all particular souls, wherein they were first created by God pure, but by the abuse of their own liberty degenerated, to be a necessary hypothesis, for the solving that phenomenon of the depraved state of mankind in general here in this life. And not only so, but they endeavoured in like manner to give an account also of those different conditions of particular persons as to morality, from their infancy, and their other different fates here, deriving them all, ἐκ τῶν προβεβιωμένων, "from their several demeanours heretofore in a pre-existent state."[4] And there have not wanted Christian doctors, who have complied with these philosophers in both.[4] But our common Christianity only agrees thus far, as to suppose a kind of imputative pre-existence in Adam, in whom all were created pure, and so consequently involved in his after miscarriage, to solve the pravity of human nature; upon which account we are all said to be, φύσει τέκνα ὀργῆς,[5] "by nature children of wrath." But as for the different

In some other passages, let it be observed in passing, in our Saviour's last discourses to his disciples, he openly alludes to this practice common to Eastern kings of appropriating μοναὶ, or abodes, to their ministers in their own houses, John xii. 26. Καὶ ὅπου εἰμὶ ἐγὼ, ἐκεῖ καὶ ὁ διάκονος ὁ ἐμὸς ἔσται, "and where I am, there shall also my servant be:" and a little after the words which we have here attempted to interpret, John xiv. 3. Παραλήψομαι ὑμᾶς πρὸς ἐμαυτόν· ἵνα ὅπου εἰμὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ὑμεῖς ἦτε, "I will receive you unto myself, that where I am, there ye may be also;" which I consider to be somewhat confirmatory of our exposition. In like manner, the passage of Baruch, chap. iii. verse 24. 25. also quoted here by Dr. Cudworth, ought by no means to be understood of a multitude of worlds: for it is manifest from what follows that the poet is speaking solely of the world which we now inhabit.

* Page 264. [Ennead. 3. lib. 2. cap. 13.]

[4] The principal ancient Christian fathers, who besides Origen approved of this doctrine of the existence of souls before bodies, are named by Pet. Dan. Huet in his Origeniana, lib. 2. quæst. 6. sect. 10. p. 97.

[5] Ephes. ii. 3.

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conditions of persons, and their several fates, more disadvantageous to some than others, this indeed the generality of Christian doctors have been content to resolve only into an occult, but just providence.* And thus does Origen himself sometimes modestly pass it over, as in his third book against Celsus:† Πολλοῖς καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀνατροφῆς τοιούτως γεγένηται, ὡς μηδὲ φαντασίαν ἐπιτραπῆναι τῶν κρειττόνων λαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ἀεὶ καὶ ἐκ πρώτης ἡλικίας ἤτοι ἐν παιδικοῖς εἶναι ἀκολάστων ἀνδρῶν, ἢ δεσποτῶν, ἢ ἐν ἄλλῃ τινὶ κωλυούσῃ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀναβλέπειν κακοδαιμονίᾳ· τὰς δὲ περὶ τούτων αἰτίας πάντως μὲν εἰκὸς εἶναι, ἐν τοῖς τῆς προνοίας λόγοις· πίπτειν δὲ αὐτὰς εἰς ἀνθρώπους οὐκ εὐχερές, "It happeneth to many, so to have been brought up from their very childhood, as that, by one means or other, they could have no opportunity at all of thinking of the better things, &c. And it is very probable, that there are causes of these things in the reasons of providence, though they do not easily fall under human notice."

But there is yet a third atheistic objection against providence behind, That "it is impossible any one Being should animadvert and order all things in the distant places of the world at once; and, were this possible, yet would such infinite negotiosity be very uneasy and distractious to it, and altogether inconsistent with happiness. Nor would a being irresistibly powerful, concern itself in the good or welfare of any thing else, it standing in need of nothing, and all benevolence and good will arising from indigency and imbecility. Wherefore, such a being would wholly be taken up in the enjoyment of itself and its own happiness, utterly regardless of all other things."

To which the reply is, first, That though ourselves and all created beings have but a finite animadversion and narrow sphere of activity; yet does it not therefore follow, that the case must be the same with the Deity, supposed to be a Being infinitely perfect, ἀπειροδύναμος, "that hath no manner of defect," either of knowledge or power in it. But this is a mere idolum specus, "an idol of the cave or den;" men measuring the Deity by their own scantling and narrowness. And indeed, were there nothing at all but what we ourselves could fully comprehend, there could be no God. Were the sun an animal, and had life co-extended with its rays and light, it would see and perceive every atom of matter that its outstretched beams reached to and touched. Now all created beings are themselves, in some sense, but the rays of the Deity, which therefore cannot but feel and sensibly perceive all these its own effluxes and emanations. Men themselves can order and manage affairs in several distant places at once, without any disturbance; and we have innumerable

* Thus Hierocles: Οὐκ ἀμελεῖται ὁ ἀγαθὸς νῦν γινόμενος, κἂν παλαιῶν μηνιμάτων ἐφέλκηται στίγματα, p. 157. † Page 134.

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notions of things in our own mind, that lie there easily together, without crowding one another, or causing any distraction to us.[6]

Nevertheless, the minds of weak mortals may here be somewhat eased and helped by considering what hath been before suggested; that there is no necessity God Almighty should *αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα*, "do all things himself immediately and drudgingly;" but he may have his inferior ministers and executioners under him, to discharge him of that supposed encumberment. As first of all, an artificial plastic nature, which, without knowledge and animal consciousness, disposes the matter of the universe according to the platform or idea of a perfect mind, and forms the bodies of all animals. And this was one reason why we did before insist so much upon this artificial, regular, and methodical nature, namely, that divine providence might neither be excluded from having an influence upon all things in this lower world, as resulting only from the fortuitous motions of senseless matter, unguided by any mind; nor yet the Deity be supposed to do every thing itself immediately and miraculously, without the subservient ministry of any natural causes, which would seem to us mortals, to be not only a violent, but also an operose, cumbersome, and moliminous business.[7] And thus did Plato[8] acknowledge that there were, *ἔμφρονος φύσεως αἰτίαι αἷς ὑπηρετούσαις χρῆται ὁ Θεός*, "certain causes of a prudent, that is, artificial and orderly nature, which God makes use of as subservient to himself in the mundane economy." Besides which, those instincts also impressed upon animals, and which they are passive to, directing them to act for ends either not understood, or not attended to by them, in order to their own good and the good of the universe, are another part of that divine fate which inserted into things themselves, is the servant and execu-

[6] Socrates philosophizes in a somewhat similar manner in Xenophon, De Dictis et Factis Socratis Memorabil. lib. 1. p. 575. where he admirably defends divine providence and religion against a certain Aristodemus: *Κατάμαθε ὅτι καὶ ὁ σὸς νοῦς ἐνὼν τὸ σὸν σῶμα ὅπως βουλέται μεταχειρίζεται· οἴεσθαι οὖν χρὴ καὶ τὴν ἐν παντὶ φρόνησιν τὰ πάντα ὅπως ἂν αὐτῇ ἡδὺ ᾖ οὕτω τίθεσθαι· καὶ μὴ τὸ σὸν μὲν ὄμμα δύνασθαι ἐπὶ πολλὰ στάδια ἐξικνεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὀφθαλμὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾶν· μηδὲ τὴν σὴν μὲν ψυχὴν, καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐνθάδε καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καὶ ἐν Σικελίᾳ δύνασθαι φροντίζειν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ Θεοῦ φρόνησιν μὴ ἱκανὴν εἶναι ἅμα πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι*, "Observe that thy mind, while it is in thy body, governs it at will. Wherefore, we must suppose also that that wisdom which is in the universe, rules all things in such a way as seems good to it; neither must it be imagined that thy eye is able to reach to a distance of many stadia, and that the eye of God is unable to see all things at once, or that thy mind can meditate upon matters both here, and in Egypt and in Sicily, and that the wisdom of God cannot at one and the same time attend to and overlook all things."

[7] I have already explicitly declared my own opinion upon all these subjects above, in my remarks on a *plastic nature*.

[8] This passage occurs in the Timæus, sect. 36. p. 256. But it is not written by Plato in the same words as those here quoted, neither does it relate to a plastic nature. See the remarks above on the Digression concerning a plastic nature, sect. 6. note 5. p. 227. 228.

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tioner of providence. Above all which, there are yet other knowing and understanding ministers of the Deity, as its eyes and hands, demoniac or angelic beings, appointed to preside over mankind, all mundane affairs, and the things of nature; they having their several distinct offices and provinces assigned them. Of which also Plato thus:[9] *Τούτοις εἰσὶν ἄρχοντες προστεταγμένοι ἑκάστοις, ἐπὶ τὸ σμικρώτατον ἀεὶ πάθης καὶ πράξεως.* "There are certain rulers or presidents appointed by the supreme God who governs the whole world, over all the several things and parts therein, even to the smallest distribution of them." All which inferior causes are constantly overlooked and supervised by the watchful eye of God Almighty himself, who may also sometimes extraordinarily interpose.

We need not, therefore, restrain and confine divine Providence to a few greater things only, as some do, that we may thereby consult the ease of the Deity, and its freedom from distraction; but may and ought to extend it to all things whatsoever, small as well as great. And indeed, the great things of the world cannot well be ordered neither, without some regard to the small and little:[10] *Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνευ σμικρῶν τοὺς μεγάλους φασὶν οἱ λιθολόγοι λίθους εὖ κεῖσθαι,* "as architects affirm that great stones cannot be well placed together in a building without little." Neither can generals of armies, nor governors of families, nor masters of ships, nor mechanic artificers, discharge their several functions, and do their works respectively as they ought, did they not mind small things also, as well the great. *Μὴ τοίνυν* (saith the forementioned philosopher,[1]) *τόνγε Θεὸν ἀξιώσομέν ποτε θνητῶν δημιουργῶν φαυλότερον, οἳ τὰ προσήκοντα αὐτοῖς ἔργα, ὅσῳπερ ἂν ἀμείνους ὦσι, τόσῳ ἀκριβέστερα καὶ τελεώτερα μιᾷ τέχνῃ σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἀπεργάζονται.* "Let us not therefore make God Almighty inferior to mortal opificers, who, by one and the same art, can order small things as well as great; and so suppose him to be supine and negligent." Nevertheless, the chief concernment and employment of divine Providence in the world is the economy of souls, or government of rational beings, which is by Plato contracted into this compendium:[2] *Οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἔργον τῷ πεττευτῇ λείπεται πλὴν μετατιθέναι τὸ μὲν ἄμεινον γινόμενον ἦθος εἰς βελτίω τόπον χεῖρον δὲ εἰς τὸν χείρονα,* &c. "There is no other work left for the supreme Governor of all than only to translate better souls into better places and conditions, and worser into worser;" or, as he after addeth, to dispose of every one in the world in such a manner as might best render *νικῶσαν*

[9] De Legibus, lib. 10. p. 671.

[10] The words of Plato, ibid. p. 671. from whom the most of what is here brought forward is borrowed. For Plato is arguing against those who suppose that God concerns himself about great things only, and neglects the small.

[1] Ibid. p. 671. [2] Ibid. p. 672.

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ἀρετὴν, ἡττωμένην δὲ κακίαν, "virtue victorious and triumphant over vice." And thus may the slow and imperfect wits of mortals be satisfied, that Providence to the Deity is no moliminous, laborious, and distractious thing.

But that there is no higher spring of life in rational animals than contracted self-love, and that all good will and benevolence arises only from indigency and imbecility, and that no being whatsoever is concerned in the welfare of any other thing, but only what itself stands in need of; and lastly therefore, that what is irresistibly powerful, and needs nothing, would have no manner of benevolence, nor concern itself in the good and welfare of any thing whatsoever; this is but another idol of the Atheists' den, and only argues their bad nature, low-sunk minds, and gross immorality. And the same is to be said also of that other maxim of theirs:[3] That what is perfectly happy would have nothing at all to do, but only enjoy its own ease and quiet; whereas there is nothing more troublesome to ourselves than this ἀπραξία, "this having nothing to do;" and the activity of the Deity, or a perfect Being, is altogether as easy to it as its essence.

The atheistic queries come next to be answered; which, being but three, are naturally to be disposed in this order: First, "If there were a God, or perfect Being, who therefore was sufficiently happy in the enjoyment of himself, why would he go about to make a world? Secondly, if he must needs make a world, why did he not make it sooner? this late production therefore looking as if he had but newly awaked out of a long sleep throughout infinite past ages, or else had in length of time contracted a satiety of his solitude. Thirdly and lastly, What tools or instruments? what machines or engines had he? Or how could he move the matter of the whole world, especially if incorporeal? because then he would run through all things, and could not lay hold, nor fasten upon any thing."

To the first therefore we say, That the reason why God made the world, was from his own overflowing and communicative goodness, that there might be other beings also happy besides him, and enjoy themselves. Nor does this at all clash with God's making of the world for his own glory and honour; though Plotinus[4] were so shy of that: Γελοῖον, ἵνα τιμῶται, καὶ μεταφερόντων ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν τῶν ἐνταῦθα, "It is ridiculous to say, that God made the world that he might be honoured; this being to transfer the affections of human artificers and statuaries upon him." But the chief reason of his saying so was,

[3] In the Κυρίαι Δόξαι of Epicurus, the following, as is well known, is laid down as a fundamental principle: "That which is happy has neither any employment or business of its own, nor causes any to others." See Diog. Laërtius, lib. 10. segm. 139. p. 661.

[4] Contra Gnosticos, ennead. 2. lib. 9. cap. 4. p. 202.

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because that philosopher conceived the world to have proceeded, not so much from the will of the Deity, as the necessity of its nature. Though this be true also, that God did not make the world merely to ostentate his skill and power, but to communicate his goodness, which is chiefly and properly his glory, as the light and splendour of the sun is the glory of it.[5] But the Atheist

[5] As to the question here touched upon by Dr. Cudworth: "Whether or not God can be truly said to have created this world for his own glory and honour," has again been mooted among theologians and philosophers even in our own times, it may be worth while to offer a few remarks upon it, in the way of elucidation.

I. Almost all the Platonists formerly inculcated that God made the world and its inhabitants for the sake of having other beings to whom he might impart his own goodness and supreme felicity. This opinion they had derived from Plato himself, who, discoursing in his Timæus, sect. 14. p. 237. on the Deity's motive for creating the world, thus expresses himself: Ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδένος οὐδέποτε ἐγγίνεται φθόνος, "He was good, and the good never feels envy towards any one: therefore he created all things like unto himself." Plato borrowed this, as well as most of his opinions concerning the creation, from Timæus Locrus, an ancient Pythagorean, whose book, De Anima Mundi, p. 545. ed. Th. Gale, my readers will do well to consult. There is, however, no inconsiderable discrepancy between the opinion of Plato himself and that of his junior disciples on this subject, although they make use of the same words. For Plato supposed the Deity to have proceeded voluntarily to the arrangement and disposition of matter, heretofore rude and unformed; and therefore, could truly and properly determine that he was led by his native goodness to undertake the fabrication of the universe. But his later disciples held the world to have existed along with God from all eternity, and to have been a necessary emanation and efflux of the divine nature itself. Wherefore, when they say that God was moved by his goodness to create the world, they mean simply that he communicated his goodness to others from all eternity. Nor was this doctrine unpalatable to the ancient Christian doctors. Zacharius Mitylenæus, a Christian philosopher, in his Dialogue, De Opificio Mundi contra Platonicos, p. 182. says: Ἢ οὐκ οἴεσθαι ὅτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη, ἀλλὰ μόνη ἀγαθότης τῆς δημιουργίας καὶ ποιήσεως τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς καθηγήσατο, καὶ προστατεῖ καὶ ἡγεμονεύει, καὶ εἰ βούλει ἄκουε, καὶ τοῦ ὑμετέρου Πλάτωνος ταύτην καὶ μόνην αἰτίαν εἶναι λέγοντος τῆς τῶν ὅλων συστάσεως, ὡς τὸν Τίμαιον συντιθεὶς, ὧδε φησί, κ. τ. λ., "Dost thou not know that it is not necessity, but his goodness alone that first originated the fabrication and production of this universe, and presides over and rules it; and hear, if thou wilt, your Plato himself asserting this to be the only cause of the construction of all things, as in his Timæus he thus speaks, &c." See also Athenagoras, De Resurrectione, cap. 11. p. 174. where he discourses of the causes for which God made men, and among other things, p. 178. says: Εὔδηλον ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὸν πρῶτον καὶ κοινότερον λόγον δι' ἑαυτὸν, καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ πάσης τῆς δημιουργίας θεωρουμένην ΑΓΑΘΟΤΗΤΑ καὶ σοφίαν ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, "It is very manifest that God made man according to first and universal reason, on account of himself and his own goodness and wisdom, which are seen in the whole workmanship." Add St. Augustine, Confessiones, lib. 13. cap. 2. &c. p. 170. tom. 1. opp. and De Civitate Dei, lib. 11. cap. 22. p. 219. tom. 7.

II. But in course of time theologians fell gradually into the habit of saying that God created the world for his own glory: which doctrine, if rightly understood and explained, has neither any thing offensive in it, as we shall see by and by, nor for a considerable time gave any offence. It was only in the last century that objections began to be entertained against it, and in the present one it has been openly opposed and repudiated. Dr. W. King, in his ingenious work, on the Origin of Evil, cap. 1. sect. 3. p. 44. thus writes: "I know 'tis commonly said that the world was made for the glory of God: but this after the manner of men. For desire of glory is attributed to God in the same way as anger, love, revenge, eyes and hands. When therefore the Scripture teaches us that the world was created for the glory of God, 'tis to be understood that the divine attributes, namely, power, goodness and wisdom shine forth as clearly in his works as if he had no other intent in making them beside the ostentation of these attributes, nor could they have answered that end more fully if they had been designed

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demands, What hurt "had it been for us never to have been made?" and the answer is easy, We should then never have enjoyed any good, or been capable of happiness; and had there

for glory." This is a tolerably fair explication of the common and received opinion, and yet it does not exhaust the whole sense of the dogma that God framed this world for his own glory: neither does Dr. Cudworth's interpretation leave nothing to be added. But Mons. Bayle, who was mightily fond of novel subjects and doctrines, when he took upon himself to digest, correct, and illustrate this book of King's and the opinions contained in it, eagerly embraced this opportunity of assailing the received tenets of theologians, and contended that God cannot on any account be said to have had regard to his own glory in the fabrication of this world: although, he subjoins, if the Scriptures say this, we ought not to listen to the voice of reason, but obey rather the divine authority, Response aux Questions d'un Provincial, tom. 2. cap. 74. p. 71—84. He argues that God is in want of nothing whatever, neither is his happiness capable of being increased or diminished; but that he that undertakes a thing for the sake of his own glory, desires either the increase or preservation of his felicity and glory: that the desire of glory is wicked even in men, and therefore, much more unbecoming the supreme Deity: consequently, that we ought to abandon this doctrine altogether, lest we offend against the majesty and perfection of God. And as this opinion of his seemed to tend to the establishment of God's glory amongst men, it found its way into the minds even of those who were otherwise no great admirers of the rest of his principles. The theologians, on the other hand, ceased not to defend the received doctrine in their schools, and maintained it to be strictly in accordance with reason no less than with truth, to suppose that God created this universe for the sake of his own glory. But yet, in doing so they did not all follow the same course as will at once be apparent on comparing the arguments brought forward upon this subject by the eminent scholars, J. Christoph. Wolf, Manichæismus ante Manichæos, sect. 3. sect. 12. p. 348. &c. Christ. Eberh. Weismann, Diss. secunda de Providentia Dei circa Malum, sect. 12. p. 49. and Fr. Simon Lœfler, Explanatio Parabolæ de Operariis in Vinea, sect. 111. p. 284. I shall now pass over what has already been observed by others, and confine myself to a brief exposition of my own opinion on this question.

III. Those who assert that God created the world for his own glory, are in no lack either of authority or arguments. The chief authority, as others have already remarked, is supplied to them by St. Paul, who Ephes. i. 12. 14. and elsewhere declares that men were long ago predestined by God to salvation, *εἰς ἔπαινον δόξης τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ*. Why may it not be said also in imitation of this saying: that the world was made *εἰς ἔπαινον δόξης τοῦ Θεοῦ*, "to the praise of the glory of God?" That arguments are not wanting to those who speak of the end of creation in this manner, will immediately be made apparent, by pointing out the force and meaning which the Christian fathers attached to their own words. The advocates of the doctrine, that God created the world for his own glory, are not so vain and foolish as to imagine that the Deity is actuated by the mere love of praise and glory, and that such was the motive which impelled him to the performance of this work. Bayle indeed understood this to be their meaning, but he did so in opposition to all wise men, into whose minds nothing of the kind ever entered. That man would deserve to be banished for ever from the Christian community who could entertain so abject a conception of God as to suppose him to be capable of doing anything solely for the purpose of gaining a host of encomiasts and admirers. Most of the theologians, on the contrary, explain the dogma in question in these words: "God made the world for his own glory, that is, for the sake of revealing his own wisdom, goodness, and power." See Gerh. Joh. Vossius, Theses Theolog. et Hist. diss. 1. de Creatione, p. 12. From which it is evident that the word *glory* implies those perfections of God from which his glory arises, and consequently that in this proposition, agreeably to the usage of all languages, the *effect* is *put* for the *cause*. For the necessary effect of a knowledge of the divine virtues, is the honour and glory of the supreme Being. Those therefore, that are unwilling to admit this precept, ought to show that God did not create the universe for the sake of implanting in men's minds notions of his own supreme perfections, and not to raise idle disputes about the word glory and enter into useless squabbles about terms. But that the received doctrine of theologians respecting the end or object of the creation of this world, is capable of a sense altogether unobjectionable and eminently worthy of the supreme Being, will perhaps be more clearly understood from what we are now about to offer.

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been no rational creatures at all made, it must have been either from impotent sterility in the Deity, or else from an invidious, narrow, and contracted selfishness, or want of benignity, and

IV. God created men and rational beings chiefly for the purpose of having those to whom he might impart the treasures of his own goodness, and whom he might render happy both in this life and hereafter. But rational beings, as it would require little labour to show, cannot become partakers of true felicity either in this or in a future life unless they know their author and creator, and worship and reverence him in such a way as is consistent with his perfections. Subjects are only then called happy when they are fully cognizant of the wisdom and glory of their sovereign, and obey the laws which he has wisely and justly enacted; so neither is the salvation and happiness of mankind complete, till they both see the perfections of God and are led by them to pay him reverence and honour. Wherefore, when God designed the salvation of mankind, he necessarily demanded and exacted of them that they should strive to know and duly worship him; consequently he is rightly and truly said to have made men for his own glory, that is, to have created them for the sake of receiving their worship and homage. For from his exceeding love towards them he cannot but will them to be imbued with a right knowledge of himself and to pay to him due worship and honours: from which results the true salvation of mankind. And the same may be justly asserted of the final object of the creation. God formed the world that men might live happily in it and prepare themselves for a better life after the dissolution of the body. But without a right knowledge of God no one can either live happily here nor be assured of his future felicity. And again, no one can truly know God without at the same time praising and honouring him in mind, word, and deed. It therefore behoved the supreme Being so to frame and construct the world that its inhabitants on beholding it might be able at once to understand the majesty and perfections of the Creator: by doing which he at the same time made the world for his own glory, which is inseparably connected with a knowledge of himself. This explication is admirably confirmed by St. Paul, Rom. i. 19. &c. God, says he, made known his perfections to the nations: for, ver. 20. from the contemplation of this visible world his δύναμις καὶ θειότης, "power and godhead," or "wisdom," as I think the latter word ought to be rendered, could be clearly understood by them. This knowledge, he immediately subjoins, ought to have led to the praise and glorification of God: but the people were unmindful of their duty, ver. 21. διότι γνόντες τὸν θεὸν, οὐκ ὡς θεὸν ἐδόξασαν, ἢ εὐχαρίστησαν· ἀλλ' ἐματαιώθησαν, "because that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations." A just and wise king who perceives it to be greatly to the interest of the commonwealth that his subjects should entertain a high opinion of himself and his affairs ought to do the utmost in his power in order to instil this opinion into their minds. In like manner, it behoved the Divine Creator, who knew the salvation of men to be always conjoined with his own glory, so to frame and dispose the universe that his virtue and majesty might be made manifest to all. He desires not glory amongst men on his own account, nor does he need or covet our praises and worship: but for the sake of our salvation, guided solely by his own goodness and love, he so rules and governs all things that his glory cannot but be displayed. Such being the case, the two propositions, that "God created the world for the sake of communicating the fruits of his goodness to others," and that "he created it for his own glory," so far from being repugnant, are in perfect accordance with and mutually support each other. God in creating men and the world for the sake of having those whom he might benefit, at the same time established his own glory; and in displaying and manifesting his glory in the world, he at the same time provided for the salvation of mankind.

V. This if I mistake not does not differ much from the view adopted by J. Le Clerc in his explanation of the present passage of Dr. Cudworth, Biblioth. Choisie, tom. 9. p. 69. "Strictly and properly speaking," says he, "God created other natures solely that he might act agreeably to his own nature, which is most perfect. This is the principle to which all the acts of God ought to be referred. For as nothing can compel him to do any thing contrary to his own perfections, so neither can any thing prevent him from operating agreeably to those perfections. Nevertheless the scripture tells us, that God sometimes acts and has acted for his own glory: which is not to be

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communicative goodness; both which are inconsistent with a perfect Being. But the argument may be thus retorted upon these Atheists: What hurt would it be for us to cease to be, or become nothing? And why then are these Atheists, as well as others, so unwilling to die?

But then in the next place they urge; Why was not the world made sooner, since this goodness of God was without date, and from everlasting? But this question may be taken in two different senses; either, "Why was not the world from eternity, as God and his goodness are eternal?" or else, secondly, "If the world could not be from eternity, yet, notwithstanding, why was it not sooner, but so lately made?" In both which queries the atomic Atheists take it for granted, that the system of the world was not from eternity, but had a beginning. Now we say, that the reason why the world was not made from eternity, was not from any defect of goodness in the divine will, but because there is an absolute impossibility in the thing itself; or because the necessity and incapacity of such an imperfect being hindered. For we must confess that, for our parts, we are prone to believe, that could the world have been from eternity, it should certainly have been so.* [6] And just thus does Philoponus, in his confutation of Proclus' arguments for the world's eternity, declare himself, and no otherwise: Καὶ ἡμεῖς ἄρα μὴ

understood as though the acquisition of the praise and admiration of created things were his primary motive: for this is what they call the glory of God among men: but the meaning of scripture is, that when he has his own end in view, or which is the same thing, acts agreeably to his own perfections, he necessarily gains the praise and admiration of all intelligent beings that make a right use of their reason. Moreover, God exacts from men his own glorification and praise as a necessary duty: not as though he needed their praises or his happiness could be increased by the praises of others, but in order that men may do what the reason he has endowed them with requires, and by that means be made happy themselves. For, as might easily be proved if necessary, no man or community of men can attain to true felicity unless they render to God the honours that are due to him. Consequently, to act for his own glory and to act in order that others may become partakers of the divine goodness, are two ends, which are not at all in contradiction with each other." Those who think fit to censure the doctrines of theologians ought first of all to inquire into their meaning, and to accustom themselves to their phraseology. But now-a-days none are more bold and violent in their attacks upon received opinions than those who are ignorant even of the true signification of the words which we employ.

* Page 4. [Edit. Trincavell.]

[6] The learned Doctor, I conceive, does not express his opinion sufficiently clearly: I shall therefore give a brief explication of it. He seems to me to reason thus: "Whatever is eternal and without beginning must at the same time be most perfect. For it is impossible to conceive any cause why that which existed from all eternity should not partake of all perfections. That which is most perfect, must necessarily be without bounds, and in every respect infinite. For whatever is circumscribed within certain bounds is confined by a greater and more powerful cause, and is not absolutely perfect. But the world cannot be infinite, its very nature being against such a supposition: for no magnitude can become so great as not to admit of something being added to it. Therefore neither can the world be eternal. For if it were eternal it would also be infinite, which is repugnant to its nature, and at the same time most perfect, which is manifestly false."

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εἶναι τὸν κόσμον ἀΐδιον ὑποτιθέμενοι, οὔτε τὸ εἶναι τὸν Θεὸν ἀεὶ ἀγαθὸν ἀφαιρούμεθα, οὔτε ἀσθένειαν τῆς δημιουργικῆς αὐτοῦ κατηγοροῦμεν δυνάμεως· ἀλλὰ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀεὶ εἶναι τὸν κόσμιον δι' αὐτὴν τὴν τοῦ γινομένου φύσιν ὑποτιθέμεθα, "Ourselves also supposing the world not to have been eternal, do neither ascribe this to any defect either of goodness or of power in the Deity, but only to the impossibility of the thing itself." Where, in the following words, he gives a twofold account of this impossibility of the world's eternity: Ὅτι τε τὸ ἄπειρον κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὑποστῆναι, ἢ διεξίτητον εἶναι, ἀδύνατον ἦν· καὶ ὅτι συναΐδιον εἶναι τῷ ποιοῦντι τὸ γινόμενον φύσιν οὐκ ἔχει, "First, because there can be nothing actually infinite, and yet run through, as all the past duration of the world hath been; and secondly, because that which is made, or brought into being by another, as a distinct thing from it, cannot be co-eternal with its maker." Where it is probable that Philoponus, being a Christian, designed not to oppose the eternal generation of the Son of God, but only to assert that nothing, which was properly made or created by God, and nothing, which was not itself God, could be from eternity, or without beginning. And now we see, how those atheistic exceptions against the novity of the divine creation, as if God must therefore either have slept from eternity, or else have at length contracted a satiety of his former solitude, and the like, do of themselves quite vanish into nothing. But then, as to the second sense of the question, "Why the world, though it could not possibly be from eternity, yet was no sooner, but so lately made? We say, that this is an absurd question; both because time was made together with the world, and there was no "sooner" or "later" before time; and also because whatsoever had a beginning, must of necessity be once but a day old. Wherefore the world could not possibly have been so made by God in time, as not to be once but five or six thousand years old, and no more; as now it is.[7]

[7] This answer is based upon the doctrine, which has already been defended by the learned Doctor and supported also by ourselves, that eternity is devoid of all succession, and fixed, stable and immoveable. Most assuredly, if an atheist were to admit this to be the nature of eternity and yet should go on and ask, why God did not make the world sooner, he would manifestly betray his own ignorance and show that he did not rightly comprehend the dogma we are speaking of. For since there is no order of time in eternity, it is silly and foolish to inquire why the universe was not constructed at one time rather than another. For he that asks for such an explanation, properly speaking, is desirous of being told the reason, why time was not before it was: which is evidently absurd and ridiculous. This question has been answered in nearly the same way in our own times by the illustrious G. Wil. Leibnitz, in his Responsions to Dr. Samuel Clarke, Recueil de Diverses Pieces sur la Philosophie, par Leibnitz, Clark, Newton, tom. 1. p. 115. But since, as we have shown above, there are many friends as well as enemies of God who do not approve of this doctrine of eternity, although in my opinion it is most true, and moreover since none of us is so constituted in mind that he can divest the notion of eternity of all succession, I have no doubt that not a few will regard this answer as not removing the whole of the difficulty. The

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And as for the third and last query; "How God could move and command the matter of the whole world, especially if incorporeal?" we reply; first, that all other things being derived from God, as their only fountain and original, and essentially depending on him, who, by his absolute power also, could annihilate whatsoever he created; he must needs have a despotic power over all; and every thing whatsoever be naturally subject and obsequious to him. And since no body can possibly move itself, that, which first moved matter must of necessity be incorporeal; nor could it move it by local motion, as one body moves another, or as engines and machines move by trusion or pulsion, they being before moved, but must do it by another kind of

weakness of the generality of men is surprising, when things removed from the senses are treated of: and therefore popular answers are oftentimes held by them in higher estimation than philosophic reasons, however sound and well-founded. Hence J. Le Clerc, who disapproved of this doctrine of an eternity without succession, which was repudiated by the founders of the Arminian sect, struck out another method of solving this question, Biblioth. Choisie, tom. 9. p. 72. &c. He supposes it may be assumed in this controversy that innumerable worlds already existed before this world: at least that no atheist can show the contrary: and that this being assumed, the mind will be overwhelmed as it were with the notion of infinity, and will cease to inquire the cause, why God did not create this world sooner. To myself, however, this reason does not appear to be sufficiently solid or adapted to meet all the atheistic exceptions. I should therefore hold it to be the best course to return this simple answer to any man who raises a controversy upon this subject, that this question is wholly absurd and altogether unworthy the character of a wise man, such as the atheist always wishes to be considered. For it is either certain that this world was created by God, or uncertain, or positively false. Whichever of these three the atheist chooses to adopt, he may in a few words be convicted of folly. If he maintains the falsehood of our doctrine, that the world was created by God, he ought to prove his opinion by reason and argument; since it is foolish and ridiculous for him to contend with others about the causes of a thing, which he himself holds to be false. If he supposes the creation of the world to be uncertain, it will be proper that we dispute about the thing itself before we come to its causes. For what man is so insane as to inquire into the virtues of a thing, and to ask why it is endowed with these instead of other properties, before he knows whether this thing really exists or is fictitious and imaginary. Fancy to yourself a man propounding certain subtle questions respecting the nature of demons, and inquiring for example why they are devoid of all body, who confesses notwithstanding that he does not know whether demons exist. Will such a man appear to obey reason or to be merely trifling. But if a disputant of the kind entertains no doubt in regard to the creation of the world and yet is anxious to know why God did not undertake this work sooner, I should pity him for his want of sagacity. For, for a man indeed to acknowledge a God, that is an infinitely wise Being, and at the same time to suppose that he himself, a mere weak mortal, is capable of investigating the causes why infinite wisdom did not make the world either sooner or later, is certainly a symptom of no very refined or intelligent mind. Every body must be aware that this is one of those things that no mortal ever could know without an especial divine revelation. But God is silent and vouchsafes not to make us privy to his counsels in this matter. Why therefore are we not content to know that the whole visible world is the work of divine power; and to remain in ignorance of other matters, probably above our comprehension, till it shall please God to dispel the darkness which here besets our minds? The words of St. Augustine in which he represses such importunate querists seem to me to be apt and pertinent, De Diversis Quæstionibus, tom. 6. opp. p. 6. quæst. 28. "He who asks why God willed to create the world, asks the cause of the will of God. But every cause is efficient. And every thing which effects is greater than that which is effected. But nothing is greater than the will of God. Therefore its cause ought not to be inquired after."

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action, such as is not local motion, nor heterokinesy, but autokinesy; that is, by cogitation. Wherefore, that conceit of the Atheists, that an incorporeal Deity could not possibly move the matter of the world, because it would run through it, and could not fasten or lay hold thereupon, is absurd, because this moves matter not mechanically, but vitally, and by cogitation only. And that a cogitative being, as such, hath a natural imperium over matter, and power of moving it, without any engines or machines, is unquestionably certain, even from our own souls; which move our bodies, and command them every way, merely by will and thought. And a perfect mind, presiding over the matter of the whole world, could much more irresistibly, and with infinitely more ease, move the whole corporeal universe, merely by will and cogitation, than we can our bodies.[8]

The last head of atheistic argumentation is from interest. And first, the Atheists would persuade, that it is the "interest of mankind in general, and of every particular person, that there should be no God, that is, no Being infinitely powerful, that hath no law, but its own will; and therefore may punish whom he pleases eternally after death."

To which our first reply is, that if there be a God, and souls be immortal, then is it not any man's thinking otherwise that will alter the case, nor afford the Atheists any relief against those two imagined evils of theirs. For things are sullen, and will be as they are, whatever we think them, or wish them to be; and men will at last discover their error, when perhaps it may be too late. Wishing is no proving; and therefore this

[8] All this goes to show that the thing itself cannot be called in question by any sensible man, but that the way and manner of it surpass all mortal comprehension and capacity. And such is really the case. Though we tax our intellect to the utmost in order to comprehend how God educed matter out of nothing, still we shall always find that we are mentally unequal to the task. As is beautifully and excellently observed by our worthy author: God excites matter and impels and leads it where he pleases by thought alone, just as our mind bends and excites the body at its will and pleasure. But if we go on and inquire in what way this is done, or what is the bond of connexion between thought and matter, so that one can move the other, then human knowledge and experience entirely fail us. The ancient philosophers who asserted the simultaneous existence of God and matter from all eternity were able to enter into some sort of explanation of this. For not to speak of those who dreamt about a certain undefined connexion between God and eternal matter, an opinion which many entertained, most of them supposed God to be light or a nature resembling the brightest and purest light. Therefore as the sun excites the necessary motions in matter by its rays: so the Deity, they could say, by his incomparable splendour and divine light, far more subtle and efficacious than the rays of the sun, conquered the inertness of matter and reduced it into a certain form. Although this answer was not one that could entirely satisfy those who look deeper into things than others; still it was accommodated to the capacity of most men. But to us who rightly hold God to be altogether devoid of body and to have produced matter out of nothing, a similar course is not open. Let us therefore confess, that the manner in which God excites, compels, and moves matter, will be unknown and incomprehensible to us, so long as we shall be ignorant of the way in which the infinite power of the Deity called into sudden existence things which did not exist before.

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atheistic argument from interest is no argument at all against the existence of a God, it being nothing but the ignorant wish and vain desire of besotted Atheists.

In the next place, this wish of Atheists is altogether founded upon a mistaken notion of God Almighty too, that he is nothing but arbitrary will omnipotent; which indeed is not the most desirable thing. But as it hath been often declared, the will of God is the will of goodness, justice, and wisdom itself omnipotent. His will is not mere will, such as hath no other reason besides itself; but it is law, equity, and chancery; it is the τὸ δέον, or "Ought itself," decreeing, willing, and acting. Neither does God punish any, out of a delight in punishment, or in the evil and suffering of the persons punished; but to those who are not ἀνίατοι, "altogether incurable," δίκη ἰατρεία, "his punishment is physic," in order to their recovery and amendment; so that the source and fountain thereof is goodness to the persons themselves punished. But to such as are incurable, the punishment inflicted on them is intended for the good of the whole. So that this attribute of justice in God doth not at all clash with the attribute of goodness, it being but a branch thereof, or particular modification of the same. Goodness and justice in God are always complicated together; neither his goodness being fondness, nor his justice cruelty; but he being both good in punishing, and just, in rewarding and dispensing benefits. Wherefore, it can be the interest of none, that there should be no God nor immortality, unless perhaps of such desperately and incurably wicked persons who, abandoning their true interest of being good, have thereupon no other interest now left them, than not to be, or become nothing.

To be without a God is to be without hope in the world; for Atheists can have neither faith nor hope in senseless matter, and the fortuitous motions thereof. And though an understanding being have never so much enjoyment of itself for the present, yet could it not possibly be happy without immortality, and security of the future continuance thereof. But the Atheists conclude, that there is nothing immortal, and that all life perishes and vanishes into nothing; and consequently also, that εὐδαιμονία ἀνύπαρκτον, happiness is a thing that hath no existence in nature, a mere figment and chimera, or idle wish and vain dream of mortals. Wherefore it cannot be the interest of mankind, that this hypothesis should be true, which thus plainly cuts off all hope from men, and leaves them in an utter impossibility of being ever happy.

God is such a being, as if he could be supposed not to be, there is nothing, which any, who are not desperately engaged in wickedness, no not Atheists themselves, could possibly more wish for or desire. To believe a God, is to believe the existence

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of all possible good and perfection in the universe; it is to believe, that things are as they should be, and that the world is so well framed and governed, as that the whole system thereof could not possibly have been better. For peccability arises from the necessity of imperfect free-willed beings, left to themselves, and therefore could not by omnipotence itself have been excluded; and though sin actual might perhaps have been kept out by force and violence, yet, all things computed, it was doubtless most for the good of the whole that it should not be thus forcibly hindered. There is nothing which cannot be hoped for, by a good man, from the Deity; whatsoever happiness his being is capable of, "and such things, as eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor can now enter into the heart of man to conceive." Infinite hopes lie before us, from the existence of a Being infinitely good and powerful, and our own souls' immortality; and nothing can hinder or obstruct these hopes, but our own wickedness of life. To believe a God, and do well, are two the most hopeful, cheerful, and comfortable things that possibly can be. And to this purpose is that of Linus,[9]

Ἔλπεσθαι χρὴ παντ', ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐστ' οὐδὲν Ἄελπτον·
Ῥᾴδια πάντα θεῷ τελέσαι, καὶ ἀνήνυτον οὐδέν.

Wherefore, as for Democritus and Epicurus, whose encomiums the Atheists here so loudly sing forth, we say, that however they have made so great a noise in the world, and have been so much cried up of late, yet were they really no better than a couple of infatuated sophists, or witty fools, and debauchers of mankind.

And now come we to the last atheistic argumentation, wherein they endeavour to recommend their doctrine to civil sovereigns, and to persuade them, that theism or religion is absolutely inconsistent with their interest; their reasons for which are these three following. First, because the civil sovereign reigns only in fear; and therefore, if there be any power and fear greater than the power and fear of the Leviathan, civil authority can signify little. Secondly, because sovereignty is in its own nature absolutely indivisible, and must be either infinite, or none at all; so that divine laws (natural and revealed) superior to it, circumscribing it, would consequently destroy it. Wherefore religion and theism must of necessity be displaced, and removed out of the way, to make room for the Leviathan to roll and tumble in.

[9] These verses are found in Jamblichus, De Vita Pythagoræ, cap. 27. p. 117. 118. who tells us that they are the commencement of a heroic poem ascribed by the Pythagoreans to Linus, but of which he considers it to be more probable that the Pythagoreans themselves were the authors. In the ancient edition of Jamblichus, published by Jo. Arcerius, the reading of these verses was very corrupt and mutilated. But they are here exhibited in a corrected form by Dr. Cudworth, whose emendation has been adopted by J. Alb. Fabricius, Biblioth. Græc. lib. 1. cap. 14. p. 97. 98. and by the recent editor L. Kuster.

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Thirdly and lastly, private judgment of good and evil, just and unjust, is also contradictious to the very being of a body politic; which is one artificial man, made up of many natural men united under one head, having one common reason, judgment and will, ruling over the whole. But conscience, which religion introduceth, is private judgment of good and evil, just and unjust, and therefore altogether inconsistent with true politics; that can admit of no private consciences, but only one public conscience of the law.[10]

In way of answer to the first of which, we must here briefly unravel the atheistic ethics and politics. The foundation whereof is first laid in the villanizing of human nature; as that, which has not so much as any the least seeds, either of politicalness or ethicalness at all in it; nothing of equity and philanthropy (there being no other charity or benevolence any where, according to them, save what resulteth from fear, imbecility, and indigency); nothing of public and common concern, but all private and selfish; appetite and utility, or the desires of sensual pleasure, and honour, dominion, and precellency before others, being the only measures of good in nature. So that there can be nothing naturally just or unjust, nothing in itself sinful or unlawful, but every man by nature hath jus ad omnia, "a right to every thing," whatsoever his appetite inclineth him unto, or himself judgeth profitable; even to other men's bodies and lives. Si occidere cupis, jus habes, "if thou desirest to kill, thou hast then naturally a right thereunto;" that is, a liberty to kill without any sin or injustice. For jus and lex, or justitia, "right" and "law," or "justice," in the language of these atheistic politicians, are directly contrary to one another; their right being a belluine liberty, not made, or left by justice, but such as is founded in a supposition of its absolute non-existence. Should therefore a son not only murder his own parents, who had tenderly brought him up, but also exquisitely torture them, taking pleasure in beholding their rueful looks, and hearing their lamentable shrieks and outcries, there would be nothing of sin or injustice at all in this, nor in any thing else; because justice is no nature, but a mere factitious and artificial thing, made only by men and civil laws. And, according to these men's apprehensions, nature has been very kind and indulgent to mankind herein, that it hath thus brought us into the world, without any fetters or shackles upon us, free from all duty and obligation, justice and morality, these being to them nothing but restraints and hindrances of true liberty. From all which it follows, that nature absolutely dissociates and segregates men from one another, by reason of the inconsistency of those appetites of

[10] Compare our remarks above on chap. 2. sect. 21. p. 136.

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theirs, that are all carried out only to private good, and consequently, that every man is, by nature, in a state of war and hostility against every man.

In the next place, therefore, these atheistic politicians further add, that though this their state of nature, which is a liberty from all justice and obligation, and a lawless, loose, or belluine right to every thing, be in itself absolutely the best; yet nevertheless by reason of men's imbecility, and the equality of their strengths, and inconsistency of their appetites, it proves by accident the worst; this war with every one making men's right or liberty to every thing indeed a right or liberty to nothing; they having no security of their lives, much less of the comfortable enjoyment of them. For as it is not possible that all men should have dominion (which were indeed the most desirable thing, according to these principles), so the generality must needs be sensible of more evil in such a state of liberty with an universal war against all, than of good. Wherefore, when men had been a good while hewing, and slashing, and justling against one another, they became at length all weary hereof, and conceived it necessary by art to help the defect of their own power here, and to choose a lesser evil, for the avoiding of a greater; that is, to make a voluntary abatement of this their infinite right, and to submit to terms of equality with one another, in order to a sociable and peaceable cohabitation: and not only so, but also for the security of all, that others should observe such rules as well as themselves, to put their necks under the yoke of a common coercive power, whose will being the will of them all, should be the very rule, and law, and measure of justice to them.

Here therefore these atheistic politicians, as they first of all slander human nature, and make a villain of it; so do they, in the next place, reproach justice and civil sovereignty also, making it to be nothing but an ignoble and bastardly brat of fear; or else a lesser evil, submitted to merely out of necessity, for the avoiding of a greater evil, that of war with every one, by reason of men's natural imbecility. So that according to this hypothesis, justice and civil government are plainly things not good in themselves, nor desirable (they being a hindrance of liberty, and nothing but shackles and fetters), but by accident only, as necessary evils: and thus do these politicians themselves sometimes distinguish betwixt good and just, that bonum amatur per se, justum per accidens, "good is that, which is loved for itself, but just by accident." From whence it follows unavoidably, that all men must of necessity be ἄκοντες δίκαιοι, "unwillingly just," or not with a full and perfect, but mixed will only; just being a thing, that is not sincerely good, but such as hath a great dash or dose of evil blended with it. And this was

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the old atheistic generation of justice, and of a body politic, civil society, and sovereignty. For though a modern writer affirm this hypothesis (which he looks upon as the only true scheme of politics) to be a new invention, as the circulation of the blood, and no older than the book de Cive,[1] yet is it certain, that it was the commonly received doctrine of the atheistic politicians and philosophers before Plato's time; who represents their sense concerning the original of justice and civil society in this manner:* Ὁ πρῶτον ἔφην περὶ τούτου ἄκουε, τί τε ὂν τυγχάνει καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη· πεφυκέναι γὰρ δή φασι τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἀγαθὸν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖσθαι κακόν. πλέονι δὲ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλειν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἢ ἀγαθῷ τὸ ἀδικεῖν· ὥστε ἐπειδὰν ἀλλήλους ἀδικῶσί τε καὶ ἀδικῶνται, καὶ ἀμφοτέρων γεύωνται, τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις τὸ μὲν ἐκφεύγειν, τὸ δὲ αἱρεῖν, δοκεῖ λυσιτελεῖν ξυνθέσθαι ἀλλήλοις, μήτ' ἀδικεῖν, μήτ' ἀδικεῖσθαι· καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἄρξασθαι νόμους τίθεσθαι, καὶ ὀνομάσαι τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἐπίταγμα νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον, "I am to declare first what justice is, according to the sense of these philosophers, and from whence it was generated. They say therefore, that by nature, lawless liberty, and to do that which is now called injustice, and injury to other men, is good; but to suffer it from others, is evil. But of the two, there is more of evil in suffering it, than of good in doing it: whereupon when men had clashed a good while, doing and suffering injury, the greater part, who by reason of their imbecility were not able to take the former without the latter, at length compounded the business amongst themselves, and agreed together by pacts and covenants, neither to do nor suffer injury, but to submit to rules of equality, and make laws by compact, in order to their peaceable cohabitation, they calling that, which was required in those laws, by the name of just." And then is it added: Καὶ εἶναι ταύτην γένεσίν τε καὶ οὐσίαν δικαιοσύνης, μεταξὺ οὖσαν τοῦ μὲν ἀρίστου ὄντος, ἐὰν ἀδικῶν μὴ διδῷ δίκην, τοῦ δὲ κακίστου, ἐὰν ἀδικούμενος τιμωρεῖσθαι ἀδύνατος ᾖ· τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἐν μέσῳ ὂν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων, ἀγαπᾶσθαι οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθὸν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀρρωστία τοῦ ἀδικειν τιμώμενον, "And this is, according to these philosophers, the generation and essence of justice, as a certain middle thing betwixt the best and the worst. The best, to exercise a lawless liberty of doing whatsoever one please to other men without suffering any inconvenience from it; and the worst to suffer evil from others, without being able to revenge it. Justice therefore, being a middle thing betwixt both these, is loved, not as that which is good in itself, but only by reason of men's imbecility, and their inability to do injustice. Forasmuch as he, that had sufficient power, would never enter

[1] A well-known work written by Thom. Hobbes.

* De Rep. lib. 2. p. 358. 359. [Page 442. Edit. Ficini.]

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into such compacts, and submit to equality and subjection. As for example, if a man had Gyges' magical ring, that he could do whatsoever he listed, and not be seen or taken notice of by any, such a one would certainly never enter into covenants, nor submit to laws of equality and subjection." Agreeably whereunto, it hath been concluded also by some of the old atheistic philosophers, that justice was ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν, "Not properly and directly one's own good, the good of him, that is just, but another man's good, partly of the fellow-citizens, but chiefly of the ruler, whose vassal he is." And it is well known, that after Plato's time, this hypothesis concerning justice, that it was a mere factitious thing, and sprung only from men's fear and imbecility, as a lesser evil, was much insisted on by Epicurus also.

But let us in the next place see, how our modern atheistic philosophers and politicians, will manage and carry on this hypothesis, so as to consociate men by art into a body politic, that are naturally dissociated from one another, as also make justice and obligation artificial, when there is none in nature. First of all therefore, these artificial justice-makers, city-makers, and authority-makers, tell us that though men have an infinite right by nature, yet may they alienate this right, or part thereof, from themselves, and either simply renounce it, or transfer the same upon some other person; by means whereof it will become unlawful for themselves afterwards to make use thereof. Thus a late writer,[2] men "may by signs declare," Velle se non licitum sibi amplius fore, certum aliquid facere, quod jure anteà fecisse poterant, "That it is their will, it shall no longer be lawful for them to do something, which before they had a right to do;" and this is called by him, a simple renunciation of right. And further, saith he, they "may declare again," Velle se non licitum sibi amplius fore alicui resistere, &c. "That it is their will, it shall be no longer lawful for them to resist this or that particular person, whom before they might lawfully have resisted;" and this is called a translation of right. But if there be nothing in its own nature unlawful, then cannot this be unlawful for a man afterwards, to make use of such liberty, as he had before in words renounced or abandoned. Nor can any man, by his mere will, make any thing unlawful to him, which was not so in itself; but

[2] Hobbes, Element. de Cive, cap. 2. sect. 4. p. 10. I shall quote his words entire, so that a clearer judgment may be formed of his opinion. After saying that a man offends against the right of nature who does not cede his own right which he has to every thing, he thus proceeds: "But he is said to part with his right, who either absolutely renounceth it, or conveys it to another. He absolutely renounceth it who by some sufficient sign or meet tokens declares, that he is willing that it shall never be lawful for him to do that again which before by right he might have done; but he conveys it to another who, by some sufficient sign or meet tokens, declares to that other, that he is willing it should be unlawful for him to resist him in going about to do somewhat, in the performance whereof he might before, with right, have resisted him."

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only suspend the exercise of so much of his liberty as he thought good. But however, could a man by his will oblige himself, or make any thing unlawful to him, there would be nothing got by this, because then might he, by his will, disoblige himself again, and make the same lawful as before. For what is made merely by will, may be destroyed by will. Wherefore, these politicians will yet urge the business further, and tell us, that no man can be obliged but by his own act, and that the essence of injustice is nothing else but dati repetitio,[3] the "taking away of that which one had before given." To which we again reply, that were a man naturally unobliged to any thing, then could he no way be obliged to stand to his own act, so that it should be really unjust and unlawful for him, at any time, upon second thoughts, voluntarily to undo what he had before voluntarily done. But the Atheists here plainly render injustice a mere ludicrous thing, when they tell us,[4] that it is nothing but such an absurdity in life, as it is in disputation, when a man denies a proposition that he had before granted; which is no real evil in him as a man, but only a thing called an absurdity, as a disputant. That is, injustice is no absolute evil of the man; but only a relative incongruity in him as a citizen. As when a man speaking Latin observes not the laws of grammar, this is a kind of injustice in him as a Latinist or grammarian; so when one, who lives in civil society, observes not the laws and conditions thereof, this is, as it were, the false Latin of a citizen, and nothing else. According to which notion of injustice, there is no such real evil or hurt in it, as can any way withstand the force of appetite and private utility, and oblige men to civil obedience, when it is contrary to the same. But these political jugglers and enchanters will here cast yet a further mist before men's eyes with their pacts and covenants. For men by their covenants, say they, may unquestionably oblige themselves, and make things unjust and unlawful to them that were not so before. Wherefore, injustice is again defined by them, and that with

[3] Hobbes, Element. de Cive, cap. 3. sect. 3. p. 17. "The breaking of a bargain, as also the *taking back of a gift* (which ever consists in some action or omission) is called an *injury*: But that action or omission, is called unjust, insomuch as an injury, and an unjust action or omission, signify the same thing, and both are the same with a breach of trust."

[4] This is an admirable refutation of the words of Hobbes, which occur ibid. cap. 3. sect. 3. p. 17. "And there is some likeness between that which in the common course of life we call injury, and that which in the schools is usually called absurd. For even as he who by arguments is driven to deny the assertion which he first maintained, is said to be brought to an absurdity; in like manner he who through weakness of mind does or omits that which before he had by contract promised not to do or omit, commits an injury, and falls into no less contradiction than he who in the schools is reduced to an absurdity. For by contracting for some future action, he wills it done; by not doing it, he wills it not done, which is to will a thing done and not done at the same time, which is a contradiction. An injury therefore is a kind of absurdity in conversation, as absurdity is a kind of injury in disputation."

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more speciousness, to be the breach of covenants.[5] But though it be true, that if there be natural justice, covenants will oblige; yet, upon the contrary supposition, that there is nothing naturally unjust, this cannot be unjust neither, to break covenants. Covenants, without natural justice, are nothing but mere words and breath, (as indeed these atheistic politicians themselves, agreeably to their own hypothesis, call them); and therefore can they have no force to oblige. Wherefore, these justice-makers are themselves at last necessitated to fly to laws of nature, and to pretend this to be a law of nature, that men should stand to their pacts and covenants.[6] Which is plainly to contradict their main fundamental principle, that by nature nothing is unjust or unlawful; for if it be so, then can there be no laws of nature; and if there be laws of nature, then must there be something naturally unjust and unlawful. So that this is not to make justice, but clearly to unmake their own hypothesis, and to suppose justice to have been already made by nature, or to be in nature; which is a gross absurdity in disputation, to affirm what one had before denied. But these their laws of nature are indeed nothing but juggling equivocation, and a mere mockery; themselves again acknowledging them to be no laws, because law is nothing but the word of him who hath command over others; but only conclusions or theorems concerning what conduces to the conservation and defence of themselves, upon the principle of fear; that is, indeed the laws of their own timorous and cowardly complexion; for they, who have courage and generosity in them, according to this hypothesis, would never submit to such sneaking terms of equality and subjection, but venture for dominion; and resolve either to win the saddle or lose the horse. Here, therefore, do our atheistic politicians plainly dance round in a circle; they first deriving the obligation of civil laws, from that of covenants, and then that of covenants from the laws of nature; and lastly,

[5] The words in which Hobbes gives this definition of injustice, have been already quoted a little above. I shall add another saying of this philosopher upon the same subject, from his Element. de Cive, cap. 3. sect. 4. p. 18. "From these grounds it follows, that an injury can be done to no man but him with whom we entet into covenant, or to whom somewhat is made over by deed of gift, or to whom somewhat is promised by way of a bargain, and therefore damaging and injuring are often disjoined; for if a master command his servant, who hath promised to obey him, to pay a sum of money, or carry some present to a third man, the servant, if he do it not, hath indeed damaged this third party, but he injured his master only. So also in a civil government, if any man offend another, with whom he hath made no contract, he damages him to whom the evil is done, but he injures none but him to whom the power of government belongs; for if he who receives the hurt should expostulate the mischief, and he that did it should answer thus, What art thou to me? Why should I rather do according to yours than mine own will, since I do not hinder but you may do your own and not my mind? In which speech, when there hath no manner of precontract passed, I see not, I confess, what is reprehensible."

[6] Ibid. cap. 3. sect. 1. p. 17. He has left this on record: "Another law of nature is to perform contracts or to keep trusts."

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the obligation both of these laws of nature, and of covenants themselves, again, from the law, command, and sanction of the civil sovereign; without which neither of them would at all oblige.[7] And thus is it manifest, how vain the attempts of these

[7] These remarks of Dr. Cudworth are just and excellent. Indeed the whole of Hobbes' discipline, the moral and civil especially, is on the one hand so foul and hideous in itself, and so calculated to sow the seeds of endless controversies, and to sap the very foundations of religion, and on the other so replete with contradictory opinions, which destroy and overthrow each other, that I often wonder how it happens that men who arrogate to themselves the character, I will not say of piety, but of a pre-eminent attachment to sound reason and argument, can sometimes venture to recommend it to us on the score of its ingenuity and consistency. As the learned Doctor has consulted brevity by abstaining from quoting the passages which make it manifest that this philosopher is altogether at variance with himself in the very elements of his philosophy, and that he overthrows his own fundamental principles, and is perpetually carried round as it were in a circle, I fancy I shall perform a not unprofitable labour if I show that all that is here advanced against him is just and well founded, and that nothing is said at random, or for the mere purpose of bringing him into contempt and odium. Probably this will have some effect towards checking the forwardness of those who even at the present day confidently accuse theologians of an incapacity to comprehend the whole of this man's acuteness and recondite subtlety. In the first place there can be no question of the following being one of the primary elements of Hobbes' philosophy: "That nothing is just or unjust, honest or dishonest by nature, but that all justice and injustice are derived from compacts and from the judgment and will of the civil magistrate." This is evident from some of the passages already quoted, as well as from many others. Element. de Cive, lib. 1. sect. 10. "Nature has given to every one a right to all (that is, it was lawful for every man in the bare state of nature, or before such time as men had engaged themselves by any covenants or bonds, to do what he would and against whom he thought fit, and to possess, use, and enjoy all that he would or could get. . . . . Nature hath given all to all." Leviathan, cap. 13. p. 65. "The desires and other passions of man are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions that proceed from these passions, till they know a law that forbids them; which till laws be made they cannot know; nor can any law be made till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it." And a little lower down: "Justice and injustice are none of the faculties, neither of the body or mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world as well as his senses and passions. They are qualities that relate to men in society, not in solitude." Elementa de Cive, cap. 12. sect. 1. "It hath been shown that the civil laws are the rules of good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest; that therefore what the legislator commands must be held for good, and what he forbids for evil." And a little afterwards: "Before there was any government, just and unjust had no being, their nature only being relative to some command, and every action in its own nature is indifferent; that it becomes just or unjust proceeds from the right of the magistrate. Legitimate kings, therefore, make the things they command just by commanding them, and those which they forbid unjust by forbidding them." Hence he inculcates that it is not by nature unjust to seize hold of others' goods, to commit adultery, to pay no respect to parents, but that all these become just and right only by the will of the magistrates. Ibid. cap. 17. sect. 10. p. 145. "It follows, therefore, that by those terms, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not steal, Honour thy father and mother, nothing else was commanded by our Saviour, but that subjects and citizens should absolutely obey their princes in all questions concerning meum and tuum, 'their own and others' right.'" To quote more sayings of the same kind from the man would be superfluous. If these things are true, therefore, there is no such thing as right and justice, no law of nature, neither is a man bound to the performance of any action till he has subjected himself to the authority of a civil sovereign, but can do or neglect to do whatever he pleases. It was necessary for Hobbes to inculcate this doctrine in order to establish that which was the leading object of his new philosophy: "That the power of chief magistrates is circumscribed by no laws, either human or divine, but is altogether absolute and infinite." For if he had conceded the existence of a certain law of nature, inscribed in the minds of all by the founder of the human race, he would have been compelled to admit that the power of

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politicians are, to make justice artificially, when there is no such thing naturally (which is indeed no less than to make something out of nothing); and by art to consociate into bodies politic

sovereigns is defined and limited by this law of nature, and that they cannot make laws in opposition to the divine law.

If Hobbes had lived among men who were destitute of all religion, and had had any other object than the one he proposed to himself, he would never have departed from this primary precept of his own discipline, but in accordance therewith would have openly maintained that all the right and authority of the civil power is to be derived from superior might, and that that man is the king and prince of a people who so far excels the others in power that he can reduce them to subjection, and bind them down by his laws. Certain it is that there are extant throughout his writings sufficiently clear traces of such having been the man's real opinion, and whatever he says in opposition to it was invented for the sole purpose of mystifying others, and at the will and dictation of the court to which he had attached himself. For he was not so senseless as not to know, in the first place, that men imbued with Christian precepts, among which number he wished himself to be ranked, would hold the doctrine, that there is no such thing as natural right to be wicked, scandalous, and abominable; for the necessary conclusion from this is, that there is no natural religion and reverence towards God, and that no one is bound by nature to succour his parents, and the like, but that all these things are established by the civil law alone. Therefore in order not entirely to forfeit the good will of sane and thinking men he every where departs from the first rule of his discipline, and affirms that certain things are enjoined by the law of nature itself, apart from all civil laws. See his book De Homine, cap. 14. p. 78. &c. where he craftily declares that there is a certain natural piety, which depends upon private individuals themselves, and not upon the civil sovereign. He says among other things: "Whether God is to be honoured, loved, feared, worshipped, cannot be made matter of dispute; for these are common to the religions of all nations," Element. de Cive, cap. 6. sect. 13. p. 45. "In like manner if the chief ruler command any man to kill himself, he is not tied to do it because it cannot be conceived that he made any such covenant; nor if he command to execute a parent, whether he be innocent or guilty, and condemned by the law. . . . . There are many other cases in which, since the commands are shameful to be done by some and not by others, obedience may by right be performed by these, and refused by others." A little afterwards he openly declares that magistrates who kill such as refuse to execute wicked and unjust things, sin against the law of nature and God. "But they who thus kill men, although by right given them from him that hath it, yet if they use that right otherwise than right reason requires, they sin against the laws of nature, that is, against God." Consequently there is a certain reason and law of nature, prior and superior to all compact and civil power. Let the friends of Hobbes, then, exercise their ingenuity, and oblige me by reconciling these two propositions with each other: "Every man is by nature at liberty to do whatever he pleases, and all justice and injustice arises from compacts and covenants;" and, "We are commanded by the law of nature and right reason to love, fear, and honour God, and are forbidden to kill a magistrate or parent, or to inflict punishment upon men who refuse to do unjust things." For my own part I see a manifest discordance between them.

Secondly, if in conformity with the fundamental principles of his own discipline he had derived the supreme power from superior might, he would have injured the interests of those whom he was doing all in his power to uphold. His books on the civil power were written in the first instance in support of the cause of Charles I. and II. but afterwards in subserviency to the times he accommodated it to the defence of the power of the English people, or rather of Cromwell: see G. Burnet's History of his own Times, 1661. p. 187. But by these precepts he would have consulted the interests of neither party; for he neither would have shown that Cromwell had acted unjustly by dethroning the legitimate kings and usurping the sovereignty by force, nor would have fortified the power of Cromwell against all future seditions and popular outbreaks. Wherefore he saw the necessity of deriving all civil power from compact, and of teaching the English that nations are obliged by nature herself to enter into covenants with kings, and that when the compact is once made, whatever may be the acts of the king, no nation is at liberty to depart from it and to resist the sovereign power. But how was this to be done consistently with that primary precept of his

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those, whom nature had dissociated from one another; a thing as impossible as to tie knots in the wind or water; or to build up a stately palace or castle out of sand. Indeed the ligaments,

philosophy: "Man in his natural state has a right to every thing and can do whatever he pleases?" For if a man is born free from every law of nature and perfectly unfettered, what should compel him to enter into a compact with another against his own will, or strictly to keep and adhere to a compact which he may happen to have made, provided he sees that the violation of it will be useful to himself? Take away natural justice and injustice, and whence, I ask, will flow the law of compacts? Therefore, Hobbes, lest he should fail in his purpose, again departs from his own principles, and flies for refuge to the laws of nature, which he elsewhere tramples upon and despises. Although even in this part of the argument he is again so variable and inconsistent as to make it clear and evident that the man was not aware he was contradicting himself and overthrowing the very positions which he had previously laid down. "Therefore true reason is a certain law, which (since it is no less a part of human nature than any other faculty or affection of the mind) is also termed natural. Therefore the law of nature, that I may define it, is the dictate of right reason conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of life and members as much as in us lies." From this law of nature he afterwards derives other laws; of which the first is, "that peace is to be sought after where it may be found:" the second, "that the right of all men to all things ought not to be retained, but that some rights ought to be transferred and relinquished." If all this be true, therefore, there is a certain eternal and immutable law which is antecedent and superior to all compacts and all civil power, and consequently the precept put forth by this philosopher at the outset, that every man by nature has a right to do as he pleases, must be acknowledged to be false. For if men are bound to preserve themselves, to make covenants in order to this self-preservation, and lastly to adhere to the covenants they have made, they certainly are not at liberty to do as they like in their natural state, nor has every one a right to every thing. But after enumerating what he considers to be the laws of nature, he seems to entertain misgivings that this doctrine will not materially aid his own arguments; and therefore tells us that these laws of nature are not properly speaking laws but conclusions only such as those of logicians, De Cive, chap. 3. sect. 33. p. 27. "But those which we call the laws of nature (since they are nothing else but certain conclusions understood by reason of things to be done and omitted; but a law to speak properly and accurately is the speech of him who by right commands somewhat to others to be done or omitted) are not (in propriety of speech) laws, as they proceed from nature." Beautiful and ingenious truly! Therefore not being laws they will have no obligatory force; nor will any one be compelled by them to renounce his own right and subject himself to the power of the civil sovereign. Hobbes does not deny this; but replies that they are made laws by sacred writ: "Yet as they are delivered by God in the holy scriptures they are most properly called by the name of laws: for the sacred scripture is the speech of God commanding over all things by greatest right." Consequently the entire law of nature is again abrogated. For all obligation to form civil societies and to keep the covenants entered into with magistrates arises from scripture. What necessity then was there to give so copious an explication of the laws of nature and to inculcate the social duties that flow out of them? And what is to become of those who have no knowledge of scripture? Is it incumbent upon Christians alone to renounce the right which they have by nature to all things? By no means. A little afterwards Hobbes again turns round upon himself, and does not hesitate to assert that reason is the true law laid down by God to men, chap. 4. sect. 1. p. 28. "The same law which is natural and moral is also wont to be called divine, nor undeservedly; as well because reason which is the law of nature is given by God to every man for the rule of his actions; as because the precepts of living which are thence derived, are the same with those which have been delivered from the divine majesty, for the laws of his heavenly kingdom, by our Lord Jesus Christ and his holy prophets and apostles." Whoever saw a man more inconsistent than this? At one time he positively denies the existence of natural justice; at another, when he finds it suitable to his purpose, he praises and extols it. Now he tells us that the laws of nature are destitute of all obligatory power, and now again contends that reason is the true law given by God to the human race. When his object is to show that the power of sovereigns is bounded and circumscribed by no laws either divine or human, he

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by which these politicians would tie the members of their huge Leviathan, or artificial man together, are not so good as cobwebs; they being really nothing but mere will and words: for if

rejects all natural justice and maintains that in a state of nature all men have a right to every thing: and sovereigns according to his account are in a state of nature. But on the other hand when he is labouring to confirm men in their obedience and to fortify the sovereign authority against all onslaughts, he derives his whole support from the laws of nature. But yet it seems excellent and pious in him to appeal to scripture and to declare that this ought to be the rule of life to all men. So indeed it does, but let no man trust to appearances. For in other places he boldly and shamelessly asserts that all the authority of scripture depends upon the will and decision of the civil magistrate, and possesses no force without his will. Read his Leviathan, chap. 22. p. 242. &c. "The apostles themselves could not cause their doctrine to have the force of laws without the will of those who possessed the supreme power in their several states. Therefore the New Testament is a law in those places only where it is made so by the supreme civil power." I omit other sayings of the same kind, more atrocious and detestable even than these. We are merely mocked by this flagitious man, who is nowhere consistent but is perpetually contradicting himself, the more easily to elude the attacks of his adversaries. If you ask him: Whence springs the right of magistrates? He replies, from compact. And whence the right of compact? From the law of nature. What is the law of nature? Right reason. But is this obligatory of itself? By no means. From whence therefore does the law of nature derive its authority? From scripture. And whence does scripture receive the force of law? From the civil magistrate. The clear and evident meaning of which is; that civil magistrates derive all their power from themselves. O pious and subtle philosopher! worthy to be held up as a pattern to those who defend the rights of magistrates; rights that this sagacious reasoner, by taking away all natural and divine right, entirely undermines and destroys.

If I were disposed to amplify what is here briefly put forward by the learned Doctor against the civil and moral discipline of Hobbes, I should have little difficulty in showing that the entire frame-work of his system hangs exceedingly loosely together, and is too weak and frail to be relied upon for support by any sensible ruler. But as this has already been done by others, far superior to me in intellectual ability and erudition, I shall content myself with a few observations which I hope will convince every one that the precepts of Hobbes tend to the destruction of public tranquillity and to the total subversion of the rights of sovereigns. According to his doctrine, the first precept of the law of nature, out of which all the rest flow and to which all duties ought to be referred, is this: Every man ought to do all in his power to preserve himself, his life and limbs. But no man can preserve himself unless he be at peace with other men who have the power of endangering his safety. Therefore another immutable law of nature is: that "Peace is to be sought for where it can be had; and if it cannot be had, war is to be resorted to." But peace will never be obtained, as long as men are in a state of nature, and the natural right of all men to every thing remains entire and inviolate. For this right must necessarily give rise to perpetual wars; which will hinder this self-preservation and bring destruction upon an infinite multitude. Consequently the law of nature requires of all that in order to preserve themselves and their own lives they renounce this right and transfer it to certain men by compact, and that they never rescind these compacts when once made, but implicitly obey the sovereigns to whom they have entrusted their rights in every thing that they decree and decide upon; see Leviathan, chap. 14. p. 66. &c. I am not inclined to exceed my proposed limits by going on any farther in the exposition of this doctrine. Turn which way you will, there are wounds and ulcers, which bid defiance to all attempts at a cure. But these have already been touched upon by others: for myself it will be sufficient to show that the primary elements of the whole of Hobbes' civil philosophy, greatly as it is admired by many persons, are vain and futile.

In the first place, then, I hold that no discipline is more calculated than this to excite and foster seditions and civil wars. For every man is commanded by nature to do every thing that he can for the preservation of himself and his own life: and on account of this law alone civil societies were and ought to be founded. Wherefore wicked and flagitious men will act most justly and agreeably to the prescript of reason and of the law of nature, if when they see themselves threatened with capital

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authority and sovereignty be made only by will and words, then is it plain, that by will and words they may be unmade again at pleasure.

punishment by the sovereign, they throw the whole state into confusion and anarchy for the sake of insuring their own safety. Theirs also will be a right and justifiable course, who kill or banish a tyrant, in order to render themselves safe and free from his arbitrary power. The ancient Christians also, whom the emperors commanded to be put to death by the most exquisite tortures, would have done nobly and excellently if they had taken up arms, and fought for the preservation of their fortunes and lives: for "the aid of war is to be resorted to, if peace cannot be had and life preserved." Nay, if the men we have been speaking of were to act otherwise, and to neglect their own preservation, they would sin against God and the law of nature. But these men, Hobbes perhaps will here tell us, renounced their own right, and having entered in a compact with civil rulers, confided to them all their own natural power: but no one is allowed to violate a compact: therefore they ought to endure every thing even to loss of life rather than offer resistance. I will grant all this to be the case, and still it will avail him nothing. The only cause that led men to form civil communities, and to subject their desires to the will of one man, was this, that they might obey as far as possible that first law of nature respecting self-preservation. For when they saw that while they exercised all their own right it would be difficult for them to preserve their life and safety, which nature nevertheless requires, they determined to give up a portion of this right rather than be involved in perpetual dangers. Consequently, in conferring their own right upon the civil sovereign, they did not renounce that first natural law of self-preservation: neither could they have done so if they had wished, for no one can free himself from an obligation imposed upon him by right reason: but on the contrary they submitted themselves to the dominion of other men in order to satisfy that primary law. From which it is manifest that agreeably to this discipline a man is bound to pay obedience to a magistrate only so far as can be done consistently with that eternal precept of nature respecting self-preservation. No one in his senses will deny that a primary law ought always to be preferred to all the secondary ones that have been made on account of it; and indeed a man would be a fool and a simpleton to say, that for the sake of these secondary laws the principal and primary one from which they all flowed ought to be violated. Now according to Hobbes, the primary law of nature is as follows: "Do all that thou canst for thy own preservation." This primary law required another secondary one: "Since thou canst not preserve thyself, as long as thou remittest nothing of thy own natural right, transfer that right to others and obey them." Of necessity, therefore, this secondary law must be sacred so long as it supports and upholds the primary law. But should it oppose the primary law, and destroy its force, and should obedience to the civil ruler be incompatible with the conservation of the people, what sane man, I ask, would assert that the minor and subordinate law notwithstanding is to be observed, and the primary one, which is the parent and cause of it, is to be disregarded? Most assuredly he would determine just as wisely as if he were to say that in order to preserve the force and authority of a certain corollary, the principle from which it flowed is to be abrogated and divested of all truth. Every body knows that if you take away the end, you take away the thing itself. If therefore the sole end and object for which any one has subjected himself to the dominion of others is the preservation of his own life and fortunes, it is evident that as soon as he perceive this end to be done away with, he is at once discharged of the obligation.

In the next place, I affirm it to be a manifest consequence from this discipline of Hobbes, that all rulers of the present day rule unjustly, and are bound by the law of nature to relinquish the power they possess, and submit themselves to the power of one man. All kings and princes that have the right of giving laws to others, according to Hobbes' doctrine are yet in a state of nature, and every state and commonwealth ought to be looked upon no otherwise than as one artificial man, who has been deprived of none of those rights which all men enjoy in so far as they are men. He has openly avowed this in several places, nor could he arrive at any other conclusion: see Leviath. chap. 1. p. 1. &c. chap. 13. p. 65. &c. Therefore every king and people possesses that right to all things, which our philosopher tells us nature has bestowed upon every one, and which every one ought to renounce for the preservation of himself, his life, and

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Neither indeed are these atheistic politicians themselves altogether unaware hereof, that this their artificial justice and obligation can be no firm vinculum of a body politic, to consociate those together, and unite them into one, who are naturally dissociated and divided from one another; they acknowledging that "covenants without the sword, being but words and breath, are of no strength to hold the members of their Leviathan, or body politic together." Wherefore, they plainly betake themselves at length from art to force and power, and make their civil sovereign really to reign only in fear.[8]

felicity. But as individuals, according to the dictates of right reason and of the law of nature, ought to make it their chief care to secure their own life and preservation; so also beyond all question it is the duty of kings and princes, on whom the entire community has conferred its own rights from motives of self-preservation, to obey the law of nature by doing all in their power to protect and preserve the body of which they are the head, and to secure the state from all evils. Hobbes, De Cive, chap. 13. sect. 2. p. 91. "Now all the duties of rulers are contained in this one sentence, 'The safety of the people is the supreme law:' for although they who among men obtain the chiefest dominion cannot be subject to laws properly so called, that is to say, to the will of men, because to be chief and subject are contradictious; yet is it their duty in all things, as much as possibly they can, to yield obedience unto right reason, which is the natural, moral, and divine law. But because dominions were constituted for peace's sake, and peace was sought after for safety's sake, he who being placed in authority shall use his power otherwise than to the safety of the people, will act against the reasons of peace, that is to say, against the laws of nature," sect. 4. "But by safety must be understood not the sole preservation of life in what condition soever, but in order to its happiness. For to this end did men freely assemble themselves, and institute a government, that they might, as much as their human condition would afford, live delightfully." Add Leviathan, chap. 3. p. 157. But nothing is more fatal to public tranquillity and to the conservation both of individuals and of states, which according to Hobbes ought to be regarded as one man, than that right possessed by supreme rulers to all things; neither will there ever be a firm and stable peace among nations, or an end put to war, so long as they exercise that right. For example, the kings of France, England, Spain, Sweden, and Denmark, being in a state of nature, have the right of doing as they please; and, according to this writer, while this right is retained, it must of necessity give rise to endless wars and the most violent animosities, altogether subversive of the welfare and happiness of the nations of which those kings are protectors and guardians. Consequently, the law of nature, agreeably to the doctrine of Hobbes, requires that all kings for the preservation and safety of themselves and their people, should renounce the right which they hold, and transfer it to one man. For while the empire of the world is divided even between two, contentions and wars will never cease, and the welfare and happiness of the people will always be subject to risk and peril. It will be necessary therefore for the entire world to become one state, and for the several kings to transfer their rights to one man, who shall rule over the whole human race; and till they do so, they are offending most gravely against reason, and resisting Hobbes' law of nature, which commands every one to give up his own right for the conservation of all. Now let the advocates of the rights of the civil power consider whether it is to the advantage of supreme rulers that this philosophy should be universally introduced and instilled into the minds of men.

[8] Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. 17. p. 83. "The final cause, end, or design of men (who naturally love liberty and dominion over others) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves (in which we see them live in commonwealths), is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby: that is to say of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of war, which is necessarily consequent to the natural passions of men, when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants and observation of those laws of nature. For the laws of nature (as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and, in sum, doing to others as we would be done to) of themselves,

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And this must needs be their meaning, when they so constantly declare all obligation, just and unjust, to be derived only from law; they by law there understanding "a command directed to such as by reason of their imbecility are not able to resist:[9] so that the will and command of the more powerful obliges by the fear of punishment threatened.[10] Now, if the only real obligation to obey civil laws be from the fear of punishment, then could no man be obliged to hazard his life for the safety of his prince and country; and they, who could reasonably promise themselves impunity, would be altogether disobliged, and consequently might justly break any laws, for their own advantage. An assertion so extravagant, that these confounded politicians themselves are ashamed plainly to own it, and therefore disguise it, what they can, by equivocation; themselves sometimes also

without the terror of some power to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions; that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. And covenants without the sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore, notwithstanding the laws of nature (which every one hath then kept when he hath not the will to break them, though he can do it safely), if there be no power erected or not great enough for our security; every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art for caution against all other men."

[9] This definition of law is not put forth by Hobbes in these identical words, but is elicited from his other tenets and principles. The way in which he himself defines law will be evident from the following passages. De Cive, chap. 14. sect. 1. p. 100. "Law is the command of that person (whether man or court) whose precept contains in it the reason of obedience." Obscure enough certainly; but he immediately adds what renders his meaning more intelligible: "as the precepts of God in regard of men, of magistrates in respect of their subjects, and universally of all the powerful in respect of them who cannot resist, may be termed their laws." I suspect Dr. Cudworth had these words in his mind, when he attributed the definition of law which is here given to Hobbes. A little otherwise respecting law, Leviathan, chap. 26. p. 129. "Which considered, I define civil law in this manner: civil law is to every subject those rules which the commonwealth hath commanded him by word, writing, or other sufficient sign of the will, to make use of for the distinction of right and wrong; that is to say, of what is contrary and what is not contrary to the rule."

[10] Read and attentively examine the following words of this man, De Cive, chap. 15. sect. 5. p. 113. "Now if any man had so far exceeded the rest in power, that all of them with joint forces could not have resisted him, there had been no cause why he should part with that right which nature had given him; the right, therefore, of domination over all the rest, would have remained with him by reason of that excess of power whereby he could have preserved both himself and them. They, therefore, whose power cannot be resisted, and by consequence God Almighty derives his right of sovereignty from the power itself." He therefore rules rightfully who has power sufficient to compel the subjection of others. This doctrine is admirably convenient to turbulent and aggressive tyrants, who are always striving to extend the limits of their empire, and to reduce all nations, if possible, under their own sway. For according to it, if they only possess the power, they have the most unquestionable right to invade neighbouring nations, nor will it be proper to resist them, since they hold the title to dominion, and the mandates of those who cannot be resisted are laws. Let those who feel even a slight interest in human affairs be judges how much peace and tranquillity mankind could expect from this decree: whoever is more powerful than others is justified in attacking the weaker, and having vanquished, has a right to rule them. I pass over what is here said about the right of God being derived solely from his power: which opinion will be adopted by none but those who suppose the supreme Deity to be like Hobbes' kings, to whom nothing is just except what they themselves will to be so. Add what he has left on record, De Cive, chap. 6. sect. 4. p. 41. "We must therefore provide for our security not by compacts but by punishments."

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confessing so much of truth, that Pœna non obligat, sed obligatum tenet,[1] "punishment does not oblige, but only hold those to their duty who were before obliged." Furthermore, what is made by power and force only, may be unmade by power and force again. If civil sovereigns reign only in the fear of their own sword, then is that right of theirs so much talked of, indeed nothing else but might, and their authority, force; and consequently successful and prosperous rebellion, and whatsoever can be done by power, will be ipso facto thereby justified. Lastly, were civil sovereigns, and bodies politic, mere violent and contra-natural things, then would they all quickly vanish into nothing, because nature will prevail against force and violence; whereas men constantly every where fall into political order, and the corruption of one form of government is but the generation of another.

Wherefore, since it is plain that sovereignty and bodies politic can neither be merely artificial nor yet violent things, there must of necessity be some natural bond or vinculum to hold them together, such as may both really oblige subjects to obey the lawful commands of sovereigns, and sovereigns in commanding to seek the good and welfare of their subjects; whom these atheistic politicians, (by their infinite and belluine right) quite discharge from any such thing. Which bond or vinculum can be no other than natural justice; and something of a common and public, of a cementing and conglutinating nature, in all rational beings; the original of both which is from the Deity. The right and authority of God himself is founded in justice; and of this is the civil sovereignty also a certain participation.[2]

[1] Hobbes, De Cive, chap. 14. sect. 2. p. 101. after saying that "Contracts oblige us; laws tie us fast, being obliged;" adds the following annotation: "*To be obliged*, and *to be tied being obliged*, seem to some men to be one and the same thing, and that therefore here seems to be some distinction in words but none in deed. More clearly therefore I say thus, That a man is obliged by his contracts, that is, that he ought to perform for his promise sake; but that the law ties him, being obliged, that is to say, it compels him to make good his promise, for fear of the punishment appointed by the law."

[2] But this very thing is altogether denied by Hobbes, who maintains that all the right and authority possessed by God himself over men and animals, is founded upon his power alone, and not upon his justice or wisdom. I have adduced a passage a little above, in which this is openly professed, and to remove all ground for doubt I shall now add others, De Cive, cap. 15. sect. 5. p. 112. "God, in his natural kingdom hath a right to rule and to punish those who break his laws, from his sole irresistible power," sect. 7. p. 114. "Now, if God have the right of sovereignty from his power, it is manifest that the obligation of yielding him obedience, lies on men by reason of their weakness; for that obligation which rises from contract, of which we have spoken in the second chapter, can have no place here. From this second kind of obligation, that is to say, from fear, or the consciousness of one's own weakness, (in respect to the divine power) it arises that in the natural kingdom of God, we are bound to obey him; reason declaring to all who acknowledge the power and providence of God, that we ought not to kick against the pricks." To illustrate these words, he adds the following comment: "Should this seem hard to any one, I ask him to consider in his silent thoughts, if there were two omnipotents, which would be obliged to obey the other.

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It is not the mere creature of the people, and of men's wills, and therefore annihilable again by their wills at pleasure; but hath a stamp of divinity upon it, as may partly appear from

He will confess, I imagine, that neither would be bound to the other. If this be true, that is also true which I have laid down, that men are subject to God, because they are not omnipotent. For our Saviour, admonishing Paul, (who at that time was an enemy to the church) not to kick against the pricks, seems to have exacted obedience from him on the ground that he had not power enough to resist." Leviathan, cap. 31. p. 167. "The right of nature whereby God reigneth over men, and punisheth those that break his laws, is to be derived, not from his creating them, as if he required obedience, as of gratitude for his benefits, but from his irresistible power." Every one imbued even with the first elements of the Christian religion, must be aware of the futility of all this, and of its being most clearly at variance with sacred writ, which so often declares that God is holy, just, wise, and as a parent to the human race, and that his kingdom is founded upon goodness and justice. His interpretation of our Saviour's words to St. Paul, Acts ix. 5. "It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks," is especially ridiculous, and unworthy of so acute a philosopher. He supposes their meaning to be as follows: "Thou wilt gain nothing by opposition: therefore give way to a greater power." For my part, if by this warning our Saviour meant to induce St. Paul to embrace the Christian religion, I should not at all wonder why men like Hobbes entertained a mean opinion of his wisdom and holiness. But even a child may see that our blessed Lord meant this: "Thou wilt incur the most grievous punishments both here and hereafter, if thou dost not abandon the course thou hast entered upon." But the crafty man whose object it was to subvert every thing just and virtuous, in order to strengthen the power and authority of the supreme rulers, clearly foresaw that if any justice and holiness were left, sensible men would begin to say that the power of potentates also was restrained and circumscribed by a certain right, and that it is not lawful for them to imitate any other than God, whose representatives they are. He therefore eagerly adopted the severer doctrines of absolute decrees, which were at that time maintained by certain reformers in England, and having divested God of all justice and holiness, converted him into an absolute Lord, who governs all things by the irresistible force of fate. This has already been observed by the most erudite and discreet Bishop Burnet, in his History of his own Times, An. 1661. p. 187. who says: "Hobbes' main principles were, that all men acted under an absolute necessity, in which he seemed protected by the received doctrine of absolute decrees." And this is the reason why Dr. Cudworth every where inveighs so bitterly against those who suppose that God decrees all things absolutely, and that his whole nature is comprised in power: and his example was afterwards imitated by all the most learned English writers, who from the time of Hobbes became much more inveterate in their hostility to the above-mentioned doctrine of certain Reformers. I know not whether Spinoza ever read Hobbes, but he certainly follows most closely in his footsteps, so that they appear to re-echo each other's opinions: see the Tractatus Theol. Politicus, cap. 16. p. 176. where he writes thus: "Among men as long as they are considered to be living under the empire of nature alone, both he who knows nothing yet of reason, or who does not yet possess the habit of virtue, and he who regulates his life according to the laws of reason, are perfectly justified in living solely according to the laws of the appetite.———The natural right of each man is determined not by sound reason, but by desire and power." A little afterwards he declares that all divine right arises out of the compact which God entered into with mankind. "Wherefore, it must be simply taken for granted that divine right commenced from that time, when men by an express compact promised to obey God in all things, by which they, as it were, surrendered their natural liberty, and transferred their own right to God." This seems to be at variance with the precepts of Hobbes; but that it was said merely to save appearances is evident from his Tractatus Politicus, extant among his posthumous works, in which, cap. 2. p. 270. he transgresses all bounds of modesty. For after having asserted, sect. 2. that "the power of physical things, as far as they exist, and consequently as far as they operate, can be nothing else than the eternal power of God himself," which manifestly flows out of his infamous doctrine respecting the divine nature, he thus proceeds, sect. 3. "Since God has a right to all things, and

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hence, because that jus vitæ et necis, that "power of life and death," which civil sovereigns have, was never lodged in singulars, before civil society; and therefore could not be conferred by them. Had not God and nature made a city, were there not a natural conciliation of all rational creatures, and subjection of them to the Deity, as their head (which is Cicero's,[3] Una civitas deorum atque hominum, "one city of gods and men,") had not God made ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, "ruling and being ruled," superiority and subjection, with their respective duty and obligation; men could neither by art, or political enchantment, nor yet by force, have made any firm cities or polities. The civil sovereign is no Leviathan, no beast, but a God, ("I have said ye are gods:"[4]) he reigns not in mere brutish force and fear, but in natural justice and conscience, and in the right and authority of God himself. Nevertheless, we deny not but that there is need of force and fear too, to constrain those to obedience to whom the conscience of duty proveth ineffectual. Nor is the fear of the civil sovereign's own sword alone sufficient for this neither, unassisted by religion, and the fear of an invisible Being omnipotent, who seeth all things, and can punish secret, as well as open transgressors, both in this life, and after death; which is a thing so confessedly true, that Atheists have therefore pretended religion to have been at first a mere political figment. We conclude therefore, that the civil sovereign reigneth not merely in the fear of his own power and sword; but first in the justice and authority, and then in the power and fear also of God Almighty. And thus much for the first Atheistic pretence, from the interests of civil sovereigns.

To their second, that sovereignty is essentially infinite, and therefore altogether inconsistent with religion, that would limit and confine it, we reply, that the right and authority of civil sovereigns is not, as these our atheistic politicians ignorantly suppose, a mere belluine liberty, but it is a right essentially founded in the being of natural justice, as hath been declared. For authority of commanding is such a right, as supposes obligation in others to obey, without which it could be nothing but mere will and force. But none can be obliged in duty to obey but by natural justice; commands, as such, not creating obligation, but presupposing it. For, if persons were not before obliged to obey, no commands would signify any thing to them.

the right of God is nothing more than the power of God, in so far as this is considered absolutely free, it follows that every physical thing has so much right by nature, as it has power to exist and operate."

[3] De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 62. p. 3043. tom. 9. opp. according to the opinion of the Stoics: "For the world is a common house or city, as it were, of gods and men."

[4] Psalm lxxxii. 6. on which passage consult the remarks of J. Le Clerc, Comm. in Psalmos, p. 408. 409.

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Wherefore, the first original obligation is not from will, but nature. Did obligation to the things of natural justice, as many suppose, arise from the will and positive command of God, only by reason of punishments threatened, and rewards promised; the consequence of this would be, that no man was good and just, but only by accident, and for the sake of something else; whereas the goodness of justice or righteousness is intrinsical to the thing itself, and this is that which obligeth, (and not any thing foreign to it) it being a different species of good from that of appetite and private utility, which every man may dispense withal. Now, there can be no more infinite justice than there can be an infinite rule, or an infinite measure. Justice is essentially a determinate thing; and therefore can there not be an infinite jus, "right or authority." If there be any thing in its own nature just and obliging, or such as ought to be done; then must there of necessity be something unjust or unlawful, which therefore cannot be obligingly commanded by any authority whatsoever. Neither ought this to be thought any impeachment of civil authority, it extending universally to all, even to that of the Deity itself. The right and authority of God himself, who is the supreme sovereign of the universe, is also in like manner bounded and circumscribed by justice. God's will is ruled by his justice, and not his justice ruled by his will; and therefore, God himself cannot command what is in its own nature unjust. And thus have we made it evident, that infinite right and authority of doing and commanding any thing without exception, so that the arbitrary will of the commander should be the very rule of justice itself to others, and consequently might oblige to any thing, is an absolute contradiction, and a non-entity; it supposing nothing to be in its own nature just or unjust; which, if there were not, there could be no obligation nor authority at all. Wherefore, the Atheists, who would flatter civil sovereigns with this infinite right, as if their will ought to be the very rule of justice and conscience, and, upon that pretence, prejudice them against religion, do as ill deserve of them, as of religion hereby; they indeed, absolutely divesting them of all right and authority, and leaving them nothing but mere brutish force and belluine liberty. And could civil sovereigns utterly demolish and destroy conscience and religion in the minds of men, (which yet is an absolute impossibility) they thinking thereby to make elbow-room for themselves, they would certainly bury themselves also in the ruins of them. Nevertheless, thus much is true; That they in whom the sovereign legislative power of every polity is lodged, (whether single persons or assemblies;) they who make civil laws, and can reverse them at pleasure, though they may unquestionably sin against God, in making unjust laws, yet can they not sin politically or civilly, as violators or transgressors of

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those laws cancelled and reversed by them, they being superior to them. Nor is this all; but these sovereign legislative powers may be said to be absolute also in another sense, as being ἀνυπεύθυνοι, "unjudicable," or uncensurable by any human court; because, if they were so obnoxious, then would that court or power which had a right to judge and censure them, be superior to them; which is contrary to the hypothesis. And then, if this power were again judicable by some other, there must either be an infinite progress, or endless circulation, (a thing not only absurd, but also utterly inconsistent with government and property; because, there being no ultimate judgment unappealable from, there could never be any final determination of controversies;) or else at last, all must be devolved to the multitude of singulars, which would be a dissolution of the body politic, and a state of anarchy. And thus have we fully confuted the second atheistic pretence also, for the "inconsistency of religion with civil sovereignty."

Their third and last follows: "That private judgment of good and evil is contradictious to civil sovereignty, and a body politic, this being one artificial man, that must be all governed by one reason and will." But conscience is private judgment of good and evil, lawful and unlawful, &c.[5] To which we reply that it is not religion, but, on the contrary, the principles of these atheistic politicians, that unavoidably introduce private judgment of good and evil, such as is absolutely inconsistent with civil sovereignty, there being, according to them, nothing in nature of a public or common good, nothing of duty or obligation, but all private appetite and utility, of which also every man is judge for himself. For if this were so, then, whenever any man judged it most for his private utility to disobey laws, rebel against sovereigns, nay, to poison or stab them, he would be unquestionably bound by nature and the reason of his own good, as the highest law, to do the same. Neither can these atheistic politicians be ever able to bring men out of this state of private good, judgment and will, which is natural to them, by any artificial tricks and devices, or mere enchantments of words, as "artificial justice," and an "artificial man," and a "common person" and "will," and a "public conscience," and the like. Nay, it is observable, that themselves are necessitated by the tenor of these their principles, casuistically to allow such private judgment and will as is altogether inconsistent with civil sovereignty; as, that any man may lawfully resist in defence of his own life; and that they, who have once rebelled, may afterwards justly defend themselves by force. Nor indeed can this

[5] The passages of Hobbes in which this doctrine is professed, have already been brought forward by us.

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private judgment of men, according to their appetite and utility, be possibly otherwise taken away, than by natural justice, which is a thing not of a private, but of a public and common nature; and by conscience, that obligeth to obey all the lawful commands of civil sovereigns, though contrary to men's appetites and private interest. Wherefore conscience also is, in itself, not of a private and partial, but of a public and common nature; it respecting divine laws, impartial justice and equity, and the good of the whole, when clashing with our own selfish, good, and private utility. This is the only thing that can naturally consociate mankind together, lay a foundation for bodies politic, and take away that private will and judgment, according to men's appetite and utility, which is inconsistent with the same; agreeably to that of Plato's:[6] Τὸ κοινὸν συνδεῖ, τὸ ἴδιον διασπᾷ, That "which is of a common and public nature, unites; but that, which is of a private, segregates and dissociates." It is true, indeed, that particular persons must make a judgment in conscience for themselves, (a public conscience being nonsense and ridiculous,) and that they may also err therein; yet is not the rule neither by which conscience judgeth, private; nor itself unaccountable, unless in such mistaken fanatics as professedly follow private impulses; but either the natural and eternal laws of God, or else his revealed will, things more public than the civil laws of any country, and of which others also may judge. Nevertheless, we deny not but that evil persons may and do sometimes make a pretence of conscience and religion, in order to sedition and rebellion, as the best things may be abused: but this is not the fault of religion, but only of the men; conscience obliging, though first to obey God, yet, in subordination to him, the laws of civil sovereigns also. To conclude, conscience and religion oblige subjects actively to obey all the lawful commands of civil sovereigns, or legislative powers, though contrary to their own private appetite, interest, and utility; but, when these same sovereign legislative powers command unlawful things, conscience, though it here obliges to "obey God, rather than man," yet does it, notwithstanding, oblige not to resist. Rom. xiii. "Whosoever resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God, and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation." And Matthew xxvi. "All they that take the sword, shall perish with the sword." Here is "the patience and the faith of the saints." And thus does religion "give unto Cæsar, the things that are Cæsar's, as well as unto God the things that are God's.[7]

[6] De Legibus, lib. 9. p. 660.

[7] In recommending this dogma of the abrogation of men's private judgments respecting their own actions, Hobbes was influenced no doubt by the civil wars and seditions which at that time miserably harassed Great Britain. For those who had resisted

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And now, having fully confuted all the atheistic grounds, we confidently conclude, That the first original of all things was neither stupid and senseless matter fortuitously moved, nor a blind and nescient, but orderly and methodical plastic nature; nor a living matter, having perception or understanding natural, without animal sense or consciousness; nor yet did every thing exist of itself necessarily from eternity, without a cause. But

Charles I. and brought this unfortunate monarch to the scaffold, justified their conduct upon the plea of conscience, and asserted that the king had issued certain behests which the inward monitor residing in their own breasts forbade them to obey. While on the other hand, the parties who were favourable to the restoration of the royal power, in their turn declared that they were impelled by conscience again to commit the destinies of the commonwealth to the care of the offspring of the murdered monarch. Hence this philosopher, whose only object was to conciliate the favour of those in power, by his profane doctrines, was the foe of all conscience. This dogma of his, however, is altogether foul and deformed, and clearly shows that none can be citizens in Hobbes' Commonwealth, unless they are changed into beasts, and deprived of all reason. In the first place, it takes away all dignity and authority from the sacred volumes, they being the rule by which the judgment of the conscience is formed. For what necessity can there be for any rule of the kind in a state, if no one is allowed to pay attention to it, or to regulate his life by its precepts. Indeed, Hobbes has left some place for religion in his commonwealth, merely for the sake of escaping popular odium: but in reality he scouts and despises it. For if the supreme magistrate, as he undisguisedly avows, is its only interpreter, and if it has not the force of law, except the magistrate wills—in short, if nothing is to be believed except what he commands to be believed, and nothing to be regarded as good, or just, or right, except he declares it to be such, it would be better I imagine to banish it altogether, than to give it a place in a community where no one can be benefited by it. The same precept requires citizens to renounce the use of their own reason, and to cease to be men. For conscience is nothing but right reason judging of our actions by the guidance of the law of nature and of scripture. Wherefore, if all conscience is to be banished from a state, to prevent disturbance, it behoves all citizens to confine the whole of their care, like flocks and herds, to their food, and in all other matters to do as they are commanded. Undoubtedly, reason is a great evil, and ought by all means to be got rid of, if its use is pernicious to the welfare of the commonwealth, in which that of all the citizens is comprised. Lastly, if this doctrine is admitted, human life will be a compound of injustice wickedness, and iniquity. For if no one in any undertaking is allowed to consult his own conscience, in order to learn what is conformable and what is repugnant to right, he will be at liberty to follow his own inclinations, and to do whatever he conceives to make for his own interests, provided he commits no act that is interdicted by the civil laws. Supposing that those who are engaged in commerce, or who enter into compact with others, pay no heed to conscience, nay, are commanded to disregard it, an infinity of wrongs will take place, and will admit of taking place with impunity. In short the whole of this doctrine of Hobbes' is childish and nugatory. Let the man argue as he likes, it is clearly impossible for any state to subsist, unless each individual exercises a private judgment upon his own actions. Let us imagine to ourselves a community such as this philosopher had in view, in which the chief magistrate has all the power, and no law but the civil is in force, all the laws of nature and revelation being disregarded. Still, I suppose, in this commonwealth every man ought to decide whether or not anything he wishes to perform is conformable to the laws laid down by the sovereign. A supporter of Hobbes would be insane were he to deny this. For if it be incumbent upon citizens to obey the laws, and to live according to their rule, the very necessity of the thing requires also that they should compare their own actions with these laws, and see whether they are in accordance or at variance with them. Consequently, wherever law is, there of necessity must be the private judgment of the citizens, or conscience; and those who, to prevent any evil to a commonwealth, advocate the abrogation of conscience, at the same time advocate the abolition of law and the commonwealth.

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there is one only necessary existent, the cause of all other things; and this an absolutely perfect Being, infinitely good, wise, and powerful; who hath made all that was fit to be made, and according to the best wisdom, and exerciseth an exact providence over all: whose name ought to be hallowed, and separated from all other things: "To whom be all honour, and glory, and worship, for ever and ever. Amen."

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A TREATISE

CONCERNING

ETERNAL AND IMMUTABLE MORALITY.

BY RALPH CUDWORTH, D.D.

With a Preface,

BY THE

RIGHT REV. FATHER IN GOD, EDWARD, LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM.

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PREFACE.

THE Author of the following treatise was the very learned Dr. Ralph Cudworth, whose name is so well known to them that are acquainted with the best authors, as to render it needless to say more in behalf of this piece, than that it was composed by the same person that wrote the "True Intellectual System of the Universe." This Author, being early prepared with a nice skill in most of the learned languages, and having joined to a clear and solid judgment an indefatigable application to study, began soon to form vast designs for the service of religion: and in subserviency thereto to reduce his large treasure of learning to proper heads or subjects, which he purposed one time or other to improve into complete discourses.

He lived in an age when the disputes concerning liberty and necessity, mingling with the political schemes of the leaders of opposite parties, helped to cause strong convulsions in the state, and to spread no less fatal an influence upon the principles and manners of the generality of people. For debauchery, scepticism, and infidelity, as he complains,* flourished in his time, and grew up, in his opinion, from the doctrine of the fatal necessity of all actions and events, as from its proper root.† Such a belief, upon whatsoever grounds or principles maintained, as he conceived, did serve the design of atheism and undermine Christianity and all religion; as taking away all guilt and blame, punishments and rewards: and plainly rendered a day of judgment ridiculous. And he thought it evident, that some in those days pursued those notions in order to that end.

These sentiments disposed him to bend much of his study this way, and to read over all the ancient philosophers and moralists, which he did with great accuracy. He then set himself to gather and answer all the ancient and modern arguments, for the necessity of all actions, which had been maintained by several persons, upon very different grounds.

* Epistle Dedicatory before his Intellectual System.

† Preface to the Intellectual System.

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And many of his collections of this kind still remain, as so many monuments of his copious reading, judgment, and industry.

He accordingly distinguished three sorts of fatality, that he might treat of each apart. First, natural or material, which excluding God out of the scheme, and supposing senseless matter necessarily moved, to be the first principle and cause of all things, is truly and properly the atheistical fate. This he found defended by Epicurus of old, and to refute him and the other assertors of the atomic material necessity, he published his learned and unanswerable book, which he entitled "The Intellectual System of the Universe."

Secondly, theologic or divine fate, which indeed allows in words the existence of that perfect Intellectual Being, distinct from matter, whom we call God: yet affirming that God irrespectively decrees and determines all things, evil as well as good, doth in effect make all actions alike necessary to us. In consequence whereof, God's will is not regulated by his essential and immutable goodness and justice: God is a mere arbitrary will omnipotent: and in respect to us, moral good and evil are positive things, and not so in their own nature, that is, things are good or bad because they are commanded or forbidden, and that which is now good might have been bad, and bad good, if the pure will of God at first had not determined them to be what they are at present.

Thirdly, the Stoical Fate, which constrains also the natural and moral actions of the Universe, and makes necessity to be so intrinsical to the nature of every thing, as that no being or action could possibly be otherwise than it is. For all things, according to this notion, depend in a chain of causes, all in themselves necessary, from the first principle of Being, who pre-ordered every event before it fell out, so as to leave no room to liberty or contingency any where in the world.

These two last hypotheses of fatalism were but lightly touched in his "Intellectual System," because he intended to give them a more particular and more ample consideration: however, ill health, a short life, or other reasons we know not, hindered him from finishing what the world earnestly expected, and no one that survived him was able to supply.

It is probable, that foreseeing the length of the work, and some of the hindrances that afterwards fell out to retard and defeat it, he thought it best to contract his undertaking, and to treat in smaller volumes of those points that he judged to be most material and principal in this controversy.

In this view he drew up the book with which the world is now presented, wherein he proves the falseness of the consequences with respect to natural justice and morality in God, which are deducible from the principles of those that maintain the second sort of fate, denominated

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by him theologic. And thus it may be reckoned to be a sequel in part of his first book against material fate. Had it come abroad as early as it was written, it had served for a proper antidote to the poison in some of Mr. Hobbes' and other writings, who revived in that age the exploded opinions of Protagoras and other ancient Greeks, and took away the essential and eternal discrimination of moral good and evil, of just and unjust, and made them all arbitrary productions of divine or human will.

Against the ancient and modern patrons of this doctrine no one hath written better than Dr. Cudworth. His book is indeed a demonstration of the truth of the contrary opinion; and is drawn up with that beauty, clearness and strength, as must delight as well as convince the reader, if I may judge of the affection of others, from the effect it had on me. It will certainly give a just idea of the writer's good sense, as well as vast learning.

We are not certain that this treatise is quite so perfect as the author designed it: but it appears from the MS. that he transcribed the best part of it with his own hand, as if it was speedily to have been sent to the press.

His death following not long after, this, with several other manuscripts, was locked up from the sight of the world for many years, and at last came into the hands of his grandson Francis Cudworth Masham, Esq., one of the masters in Chancery, whose temper is too beneficent and communicative to deprive the public any longer of a work that promises much benefit to it.

It is well known, that the loose principles, with regard to morality, that are opposed in this book, are defended by too many in our time. It is hoped also that the new controversies springing up, that have some relation to this subject, may be cleared and shortened by the reasons herein proposed. However that be, a book of sound sense and true learning is at all times in fashion: and if any the least good shall follow, as there may much good from the publication of it; or if even the memory of so great a man in all parts of learning, divine and human, who was an honour to Emanuel College, where he was educated, and to Christ's College, where he afterwards presided, and indeed to the whole University of Cambridge, which he adorned, shall by these means be revived and perpetuated, it cannot be said to be published unseasonably.

E. Duresme.

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A TREATISE

CONCERNING

ETERNAL AND IMMUTABLE MORALITY.

BOOK I.—CHAPTER I.

As the vulgar generally look no higher for the original of moral good and evil, just and unjust, than the codes and pandects, the tables and laws of their country and religion, so there have not wanted pretended philosophers in all ages who have asserted nothing to be good and evil, just and unjust, *φύσει καὶ ἀκινήτως*, "naturally and immutably;" but that all these things were *θετικὰ, νομιμὰ, ψηφισματώδη*, "positive, arbitrary, and factitious only." Such Plato mentions in his tenth book de Legibus, who maintained, *Τὰ δίκαια οὐδ' εἶναι τὸ παράπαν φύσει, ἀλλ' ἀμφισβητοῦντας διατελεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ μετατιθεμένους ἀεὶ ταῦτα· ἃ δ' ἂν μετάθωνται καὶ ὅταν, τότε κύρια ἕκαστα εἶναι γιγνόμενα τέχνῃ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, ἀλλ' οὐ δή τινι φύσει*, "That nothing at all was naturally just, but men changing their opinions concerning them perpetually, sometimes made one thing just, sometimes another; but whatsoever is decreed and constituted, that for the time is valid, being made so by arts and laws, but not by any nature of its own." And again in his Theætetus, *Ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἀδίκοις, καὶ ὁσίοις καὶ ἀνοσίοις, ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἐστὶ φύσει αὐτῶν οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ δόξαν τοῦτο γίνεται ἀληθὲς τότε ὅταν δόξῃ καὶ ὅσον ἂν δοκῇ χρόνον· καὶ ὅσοι δὲ μὴ παντάπασι τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον λέγουσιν ὧδε πῶς τὴν σοφίαν ἄγουσι*, "As to things just and unjust, holy and unholy, not only the Protagoreans (of whom we shall treat afterward), but many other philosophers also confidently affirm, that none of these things have in nature any essence of their own, but whatsoever is decreed by the authority of the city, that is truly such when it is so decreed, and for so

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long time, viz. just or unjust, holy or unholy." And Aristotle more than once takes notice of this opinion in his Ethics: *Τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια περὶ ὧν ἡ Πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, τοσαύτην ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή,** "Things honest and just, which politics are conversant about, have so great a variety and uncertainty in them, that they seem to be only by law, and not by nature." And afterwards, lib. 5. cap. 10. after he had divided *τὸ δίκαιον πολιτικὸν*, "that which is politically just," into *φυσικὸν*, i. e. "natural," *τὸ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν*, "which has every where the same force," and *νομιμὸν*, i. e. "legal," *ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὐδὲν διαφέρει οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως· ὅταν δὲ τιθῶνται, διαφέρει*, "which before there be a law made, is indifferent, but when once the law is made, is determined to be just or unjust:" which legal just and unjust (as he afterward expresses it) are *ὅμοια τοῖς μέτροις οἰνηροῖς καὶ σιτηροῖς*, "like to wine and wheat measures, as pints and bushels," which are not every where of an equal bigness, being commonly lesser with those that sell and greater with those that buy: then he adds, *Δοκεῖ δὲ ἐνίοις πάντα εἶναι τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις καίει. Τὰ δὲ δίκαια κινούμενα ὁρῶσι*, "Some there are that think that there is no other just or unjust, but what is made by law and men, because that which is natural is immutable, and hath every where the same force, as fire burns alike here and in Persia; but they see that jura and justa, rights and just things are every where different."

2. The philosophers particularly noted for this opinion in Plato, are Protagoras in his Theætetus, Polus and Callicles in his Gorgias, Thrasymachus, and Glauco in his Politics; but Diogenes Laërtius† tells us of some others, as of Archelaus, Socrates' master, that held *τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ*, "that just and dishonest are not so by nature but by law;" and (as I conceive)‡ Democritus; for after he had set down his opinion concerning happiness, or the chief end, he adds this as part of the Democritical philosophy, *ποιητὰ νομιμὰ εἶναι*, which I understand thus, that things accounted just or unjust, are all factitious or artificial things, not natural; nothing being real or natural but atoms and vacuum, as the following words are, *φύσει δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν*. The same is noted by Diogenes§ also concerning Aristippus, Plato's contemporary, that he asserted *μηδὲν εἶναι φύσει δίκαιον ἢ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ καὶ ἔθει*, "that nothing was good or evil otherwise than by law or custom." And Plutarch, in the Life of Alexander, tells us of Anaxarchus, that was Aristotle's equal, that when Alexander repenting, sadly lamented the death of Clitus, whom

* Arist. Eth. Nicom. lib. 1. cap. 1.
† Lib. 2. segm. 16.
‡ Lib. 9. segm. 45.
§ Lib. 2. sect. 193.

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he had rashly slain, he read this lecture of philosophy to him to comfort him, *πᾶν τὸ πραχθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ κρατοῦντος, δίκαιον εἶναι,** "that whatsoever is done by the supreme power, is ipso facto just." And Pyrrho, the Eliensic philosopher, and father of the Sceptics, that was Anaxarchus' scholar, seems to have been dogmatical in nothing else but this, *οὔτε καλὸν οὔτε αἰσχρὸν, οὔτε ἄδικον, καὶ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πάντων μηδὲν εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, νόμῳ δὲ καὶ ἔθει πάντα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πράττειν,*† "that there is nothing good or shameful, just or unjust, and so likewise as to all things, that there is nothing so in truth, but that men do all things according to law and custom."

3. After these succeeded Epicurus, the reviver of the Democritical philosophy, the frame of whose principles must needs lead him to deny justice and injustice to be natural things; and therefore he determines that they arise wholly from mutual pacts and covenants of men made for their own convenience and utility, and laws resulting from thence. *Ὅσα τῶν ζώων μὴ ἠδύνατο συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι, πρὸς ταῦτα οὐθέν ἐστι οὐδὲ δίκαιον οὐδὲ ἄδικον. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὅσα μὴ ἠδύνατο ἢ ἐβούλετο τὰς συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι· οὐκ ἦν τι καθ' ἑαυτὸ δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλὰ ἐν ταῖς μετὰ ἀλλήλων συντροφαῖς, καθ' ὁπηλίκους δήποτε ἀεὶ τόπους συνθήκη τις ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἢ βλάπτεσθαι,*‡ "Those living creatures that could not make mutual covenants together not to hurt, nor to be hurt by one another, could not for this cause have any such thing as just or unjust amongst them. And there is the same reason for those nations that either will not, or cannot make such mutual compacts not to hurt one another. For there is no such thing as justice by itself, but only in the mutual congresses of men, wheresoever they have entered together into covenant not to hurt one another." The late compiler of the Epicurean system expresses this philosopher's meaning after this manner: Sunt quidam qui existimant ea quæ justa sunt, esse secundum propriam invariatamque naturam justa, et leges non ista justa facere, sed duntaxat præscribere juxta eam quam habent naturam; verum res non ita se habet,§ "There are some that think that those things that are just, are just according to their proper, unvaried nature, and that the laws do not make them just, but only prescribe according to that nature which they have. But the thing is not so."

After Epicurus, Carneades the author of the New Academy, as Lactantius‖ testifieth, was also a zealous assertor of the same doctrine.

* Page 695. tom. 1. opp.
† Diog. Laërtius, lib. 9. segm. 61.
‡ The words of Epicurus in his *Κυρίαι Δόξαι*, sect. 35. 36. in Laërt. lib. 10. sect. 150.
§ Gassendus Syntagm. par. 3. cap. 25.
‖ Instit. Divin. lib. 5. cap. 14.

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4. And since in this latter age the physiological hypotheses of Democritus and Epicurus have been revived, and successfully applied to the solving of some of the phenomena of the visible world, there have not wanted those that have endeavoured to vent also those other paradoxes of the same philosophers, viz. "That there is no incorporeal substance, nor any natural difference of good and evil, just and unjust;" and to recommend the same under a show of wisdom, as the deep and profound mysteries of the atomical or corpuscular philosophy. As if senseless matter and atoms were the original of all things, according to that song of old Silenus in the poet:

> Namque canebat uti magnum per inane coacta
> Semina terrarumque animæque marisque fuissent,
> Et liquidi simul ignis; ut his exordia primis
> Omnia, et ipse tener mundi concreverit orbis.*

> "He sung the secret seeds of nature's frame;
> How seas, and earth, and air, and active flame,
> Fell through the mighty void, and in their fall
> Were blindly gathered in this goodly ball."

Of this sort is that late writer of ethics and politics, who asserts, doctrinas de justo et injusto, bono et malo, præter leges in unaquaque civitate constitutas, authenticas esse nullas; et utrum aliqua actio justa vel injusta, bona vel mala futura sit, a nemine inquirendum esse, præterquam ab iis, ad quos legum suarum interpretationem civitas demandaverit, "that there are no authentic doctrines concerning just and unjust, good and evil, except the laws which are established in every city: and that it concerns none to inquire whether an action shall be reputed just or unjust, good or evil, except such only whom the community have appointed to be the interpreters of their laws."

And again: Ad civitatem pertinet etiam Christianam, quid sit justitia, quid injustitia, sive peccatum contra justitiam, determinare,† "Even a Christian government hath power to determine what is righteous, and what is the transgression of it."

And he gives us the same over again in English: "In the state of nature nothing can be unjust; the notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place; where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no transgression."‡ "No law can be unjust."§ Nay, temperance is no more φύσει, "naturally" according to this civil (or rather uncivil) philosopher, than justice. "Sensuality in that sense in which it is condemned, hath no place till there be laws."‖

5. But whatsoever was the true meaning of these philosophers, that affirm justice and injustice to be only by law, and not by

* Virg. Eclog. 6. † Hobbes, De Cive, p. 343.
‡ Leviathan, p. 63. § Ib. p. 182. ‖ Ib. p. 25.

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nature (of which I shall discourse afterwards), certain it is that divers modern theologers do not only seriously, but zealously contend in like manner, that there is nothing absolutely, intrinsically, and naturally good and evil, just and unjust, antecedently to any positive command or prohibition of God; but that the arbitrary will and pleasure of God (that is, an omnipotent Being devoid of all essential and natural justice), by its commands and prohibitions, is the first and only rule and measure thereof. Whence it follows unavoidably, that nothing can be imagined so grossly wicked, or so foully unjust or dishonest, but if it were supposed to be commanded by this omnipotent Deity, must needs upon that hypothesis forthwith become holy, just, and righteous. For though the ancient fathers of the Christian church were very abhorrent from this doctrine (as shall be showed hereafter), yet it crept up afterward in the scholastic age, Ockham being among the first that maintained nullum actum malum esse nisi quatenus a Deo prohibitum, et qui non possit fieri bonus si a Deo præcipiatur; et e converso, "that there is no act evil but as it is prohibited by God, and which cannot be made good if it be commanded by God. And so on the other hand as to good." And herein Petrus Alliacus and Andreas de Novo Castro, with others, quickly followed him.

But this doctrine hath been since chiefly promoted and advanced by such as think nothing so essential to the Deity as uncontrollable power and arbitrary will, and therefore that God could not be God if there should be any thing evil in its own nature which he could not do; and who impute such dark counsels and dismal actions unto God, as cannot be justified otherwise than by saying that whatsoever God can be supposed to do or will, will be for that reason good or just, because he wills it.

Now the necessary and unavoidable consequences of this opinion are such as these: Amare Deum φύσει esse ἀδιάφορον, et moraliter bonum solummodo, quia a Deo jubetur: prohibere Dei amorem vel præcipere Dei odium, non pugnare cum Dei naturâ, sed tantum cum voluntate liberâ. Non repugnare juri divino naturali præcipere peccata. Deum posse imperare blasphemiam, perjurium, mendacium, &c. Deum posse præcipere contrarium, ut omnibus præceptis decalogi, ita potissimum primo, secundo, tertio. Sanctitatem non esse conformitatem cum natura Dei; Deum posse hominem obligare ad impossibile; Deum nullam habere naturalem inclinationem in bonum creaturarum; Deum jure posse creaturam insontem æternis cruciatibus damnare, "That to love God is by nature an indifferent thing, and is morally good only, because it is commanded by God; that to prohibit the love of God, or command the hatred of God, is not inconsistent with the nature of God, but only with his free will;

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that it is not inconsistent with the natural equity of God to command blasphemy, perjury, lying, &c. That God may command what is contrary, as to all the precepts of the Decalogue, so especially to the first, second, third; that holiness is not a conformity with the nature of God; that God may oblige man to what is impossible; that God hath no natural inclination to the good of the creatures; that God can justly doom an innocent creature to eternal torment." All which propositions, with others of like kind, are word for word asserted by some late authors. Though I think not fit to mention the name of any of them in this place, excepting only one, Joannes Szydlovius,* who in a book published at Franeker, hath professedly avowed and maintained the grossest of them. And yet neither he, nor the rest, are to be thought any more blameworthy herein than many others, that holding the same premises have either dissembled or disowned those conclusions which unavoidably follow therefrom: but rather to be commended for their openness, simplicity, and ingenuity, in representing their opinion nakedly to the world, such as indeed it is, without any veil or mask.

Wherefore since there are so many, both philosophers and theologers, that seemingly and verbally acknowledge such things as moral good and evil, just and unjust, that contend notwithstanding that these are not φύσει "by nature," but θέσει, "institution," and that there is nothing naturally or immutably just or unjust; I shall from hence fetch the rise of this ethical discourse or inquiry περὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, καλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν, "concerning things good and evil, just and unjust, laudable and shameful (for so I find these words frequently used as synonymous in Plato and other ancient authors): demonstrating in the first place, that if there be any thing at all good or evil, just or unjust, there must of necessity be δίκαιον φυσικὸν καὶ ἀκίνητον, "something naturally and immutably good and just." And from thence I shall proceed afterward to show what this δίκαιον φυσικὸν, ἀκίνητον, καὶ ἀιώνιον, "natural, immutable, and eternal justice is," with the branches and species of it.

CHAPTER II.

1. Wherefore in the first place, it is a thing which we shall very easily demonstrate, That moral good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest (if they be not mere names without any signification, or names for nothing else, but willed and commanded, but have a reality in respect of the persons obliged to

* Vindiciæ quæstionum aliquot difficilium.

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do and avoid them), cannot possibly be arbitrary things, made by will without nature; because it is universally true, that things are what they are, not by will but by nature. As for example, things are white by whiteness, and black by blackness, triangular by triangularity, and round by rotundity, like by likeness, and equal by equality, that is, by such certain natures of their own. Neither can Omnipotence itself (to speak with reverence) by mere will make a thing white or black without whiteness or blackness; that is, without such certain natures, whether we consider them as qualities in the objects without us according to the Peripatetical philosophy, or as certain dispositions of parts in respect of magnitude, figure, site, and motion, which beget those sensations or phantasms of white and black in us. Or, to instance in geometrical figures, Omnipotence itself cannot by mere will make a body triangular, without having the nature and properties of a triangle in it; that is, without having three angles equal to two right ones, nor circular without the nature of a circle; that is, without having a circumference equidistant every where from the centre or middle point. Or lastly, to instance in things relative only; omnipotent will cannot make things like or equal one to another, without the natures of likeness and equality. The reason whereof is plain, because all these things imply a manifest contradiction; that things should be what they are not. And this is a truth fundamentally necessary to all knowledge, that contradictories cannot be true; for otherwise, nothing would be certainly true or false. Now things may as well be made white or black by mere will, without whiteness or blackness, equal and unequal, without equality and inequality, as morally good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest, debita and illicita, by mere will, without any nature of goodness, justice, honesty. For though the will of God be the supreme efficient cause of all things, and can produce into being or existence, or reduce into nothing what it pleaseth, yet it is not the formal cause of any thing besides itself, as the schoolmen have determined, in these words, Deum ipsum non posse supplere locum causæ formalis, "That God himself cannot supply the place of a formal cause;" and therefore it cannot supply the formal cause, or nature of justice or injustice, honesty or dishonesty. Now all that we have hitherto said amounts to no more than this, that it is impossible any thing should be by will only, that is, without a nature or entity, or that the nature and essence of any thing should be arbitrary.

2. And since a thing cannot be made any thing by mere will without a being or nature, every thing must be necessarily and immutably determined by its own nature, and the nature of things be that which it is, and nothing else. For though the will and power of God have an absolute, infinite and unlimited

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command upon the existences of all created things to make them to be, or not to be at pleasure; yet when things exist, they are what they are, this or that, absolutely or relatively, not by will or arbitrary command, but by the necessity of their own nature. There is no such thing as an arbitrarious essence, mode or relation, that may be made indifferently any thing at pleasure; for an arbitrarious essence is a being without a nature, a contradiction, and therefore a nonentity. Wherefore the natures of justice and injustice cannot be arbitrarious things, that may be applicable by will indifferently to any actions or dispositions whatsoever. For the modes of all subsistent beings, and the relations of things to one another, are immutably and necessarily what they are, and not arbitrary, being not by will but by nature.

3. Now the necessary consequence of that which we have hitherto said is this, That it is so far from being true, that all moral good and evil, just and unjust are mere arbitrary and factitious things, that are created wholly by will; that (if we would speak properly) we must needs say that nothing is morally good or evil, just or unjust by mere will without nature, because every thing is what it is by nature, and not by will. For though it will be objected here, that when God, or civil powers command a thing to be done, that was not before debitum or illicitum, "obligatory or unlawful," the thing willed or commanded doth forthwith become Δέον or debitum, "obligatory," that which ought to be done by creatures and subjects respectively; in which the nature of moral good or evil is commonly conceived to consist. And therefore if all good and evil, just and unjust be not the creatures of mere will (as many assert) yet at least positive things must needs owe all their morality, their good and evil to mere will without nature; yet notwithstanding, if we well consider it, we shall find that even in positive commands themselves, mere will doth not make the thing commanded just or debitum, "obligatory," or beget and create any obligation to obedience; but that it is natural justice or equity, which gives to one the right or authority of commanding, and begets in another duty and obligation to obedience. Therefore it is observable, that laws and commands do not run thus, to will that this or that thing shall become justum or injustum, debitum or illicitum, "just or unjust, obligatory or unlawful;" or that men shall be obliged or bound to obey; but only to require that something be done or not done, or otherwise to menace punishment to the transgressors thereof. For it was never heard of, that any one founded all his authority of commanding others, and others obligation or duty to obey his commands, in a law of his own making, that men should be required, obliged, or bound to obey him. Wherefore since the thing willed in all laws is not that men should be bound or

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obliged to obey; this thing cannot be the product of the mere will of the commander, but it must proceed from something else; namely, the right or authority of the commander, which is founded in natural justice and equity, and an antecedent obligation to obedience in the subjects; which things are not made by laws, but presupposed before all laws to make them valid. And if it should be imagined, that any one should make a positive law to require that others should be obliged, or bound to obey him, every one would think such a law ridiculous and absurd; for if they were obliged before, then this law would be in vain, and to no purpose; and if they were not before obliged, then they could not be obliged by any positive law, because they were not previously bound to obey such a person's commands; so that obligation to obey all positive laws is older than all laws, and previous or antecedent to them. Neither is it a thing that is arbitrarily made by will, or can be the object of command, but that which either is or is not by nature. And if this were not morally good and just in its own nature before any positive command of God, that God should be obeyed by his creatures, the bare will of God himself could not beget an obligation upon any to do what he willed and commanded, because the nature of things do not depend upon will, being not γιγνόμενα but ὄντα, "things that are arbitrarily made," but "things that are." To conclude therefore, even in positive laws and commands it is not mere will that obligeth, but the natures of good and evil, just and unjust, really existing in the world.

4. Wherefore that common distinction betwixt things, φύσει and θέσει, "things naturally and positively good and evil," or (as others express it) betwixt things that are therefore commanded because they are good and just, and things that are therefore good and just, because they are commanded, stands in need of a right explication, that we be not led into a mistake thereby, as if the obligation to do those thetical and positive things did arise wholly from will without nature; whereas it is not the mere will and pleasure of him that commandeth, that obligeth to do positive things commanded, but the intellectual nature of him that is commanded. Wherefore the difference of these things lies wholly in this, That there are some things which the intellectual nature obligeth to per se, "of itself," and directly, absolutely and perpetually, and these things are called φύσει. "naturally good and evil;" other things there are which the same intellectual nature obligeth to by accident only, and hypothetically, upon condition of some voluntary action either of our own or some other person's, by means whereof those things which were in their own nature indifferent, falling under something that is absolutely good or evil, and thereby acquiring a new relation to the intellectual nature, do for the time become debita

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or illicita, "such things as ought to be done or omitted," being made such not by will but by nature. As for example, to keep faith and perform covenants, is that which natural justice obligeth to absolutely; therefore, ex hypothesi, "upon the supposition" that any one maketh a promise, which is a voluntary act of his own, to do something which he was not before obliged to by natural justice, upon the intervention of this voluntary act of his own, that indifferent thing promised falling now under something absolutely good, and becoming the matter of promise and covenant, standeth for the present in a new relation to the rational nature of the promiser, and becometh for the time a thing which ought to be done by him, or which he is obliged to do. Not as if the mere will or words and breath of him that covenanteth had any power to change the moral natures of things, or any ethical virtue of obliging; but because natural justice and equity obligeth to keep faith and perform covenants. In like manner natural justice, that is, the rational or intellectual nature, obligeth not only to obey God, but also civil powers, that have lawful authority of commanding, and to observe political order amongst men; and therefore if God or civil powers command any thing to be done that is not unlawful in itself, upon the intervention of this voluntary act of theirs, those things that were before indifferent, become by accident for the time debita, "obligatory," such things as ought to be done by us, not for their own sakes, but for the sake of that which natural justice absolutely obligeth to.

And these are the things that are commonly called θέσει, "positively" good and evil, just or unjust, such as though they are adiaphorous or indifferent in themselves, yet natural justice obligeth to accidentally, ex hypothesi, "on supposition" of the voluntary action of some other person rightly qualified in commanding, whereby they fall into something absolutely good. Which things are not made good or debita, "due" by the mere will or pleasure of the commander, but by that natural justice which gives him right and authority of commanding, and obligeth others to obey him; without which natural justice, neither covenants nor commands could possibly oblige any one. For the will of another doth no more oblige in commands than our own will in promises and covenants. To conclude therefore, things called naturally good and debita, "due," are such things as the intellectual nature obliges to immediately, absolutely, and perpetually, and upon no condition of any voluntary action that may be done or omitted intervening; but those things that are called positively good and debita, "due," are such as natural justice or the intellectual nature obligeth to accidentally and hypothetically, upon condition of some voluntary act of another person invested with lawful authority in commanding.

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And that it is not the mere will of the commander that makes these positive things to oblige or become debita "due," but the nature of things; appears evidently from hence, because it is not the volition of every one that obligeth, but of a person rightly qualified and invested with lawful authority; and because the liberty of commanding is circumscribed within certain bounds and limits, so that if any commander go beyond the sphere and bounds that nature sets him, which are indifferent things, his commands will not at all oblige.

5. But if we would speak yet more accurately and precisely, we might rather say, that no positive commands whatsoever do make any thing morally good and evil, just and unjust, which nature had not made such before. For indifferent things commanded, considered materially in themselves, remain still what they were before in their own nature, that is, indifferent, because, as Aristotle speaks, τὸ φύσει ἀκίνητον, "will cannot change nature." And those things that are φύσει ἀδιάφορα, "by nature indifferent," must needs be as immutably so, as those things that are φύσει δίκαια or ἄδικα, καλὰ or αἰσχρὰ, "by nature just or unjust, honest or shameful." But all the moral goodness, justice, and virtue, that is exercised in obeying positive commands, and doing such things as are θέσει, "positive" only, and to be done for no other cause but because they are commanded, or in respect to political order, consisteth not in the materiality of the actions themselves, but in that formality of yielding obedience to the commands of lawful authority in them. Just as when a man covenanteth or promiseth to do an indifferent thing which by natural justice he was not bound to do, the virtue of doing it consisteth not in the materiality of the action promised, but in the formality of keeping faith and performing covenants. Wherefore, in positive commands, the will of the commander doth not create any new moral entity, but only diversely modifies and determines that general duty or obligation of natural justice to obey lawful authority and keep oaths and covenants, as our own will in promising doth but produce several modifications of keeping faith. And therefore there are no new δίκαια, justa or debita, "things just or due" made by either of them, besides what was alway φύσει, "by nature" such, to keep our own promises, and obey the lawful commands of others.

6. We see then that it is so far from being true, that all moral good and evil, just and unjust (if they be any thing) are made by mere will and arbitrary commands (as many conceive) that it is not possible that any command of God or man should oblige otherwise than by virtue of that which is φύσει δίκαιον, "naturally just." And though particular promises and commands be made by will, yet it is not will but nature that obligeth to the doing of things promised and commanded, or makes them

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debita, "such things as ought to be done." For mere will cannot change the moral nature of actions, nor the nature of intellectual beings. And therefore, if there were no natural justice, that is, if the rational or intellectual nature in itself were indetermined and unobliged to any thing, and so, destitute of all morality, it were not possible that any thing should be made morally good or evil, debitum or illicitum, "obligatory or unlawful," or that any moral obligation should be begotten by any will or command whatsoever.

CHAPTER III.

1. But some there are that will still contend, that though it should be granted that moral good and evil, just and unjust, do not depend upon any created will, yet notwithstanding they must needs depend upon the arbitrary will of God, because the nature and essences of all things, and consequently all verities and falsities depend upon the same. For if the natures and essences of things should not depend upon the will of God, it would follow from hence that something that was not God was independent upon God.

2. And this is plainly asserted by that ingenious philosopher, Renatus Des Cartes, who in his answer to the Sixth Objector against his Metaphysical Meditations, writes thus: Repugnat Dei voluntatem non fuisse ab æterno indifferentem ad omnia, quæ facta sunt aut unquam fient, quia nullum bonum vel malum, nullum credendum vel faciendum vel omittendum fingi potest, cujus idea in intellectu divino prius fuerit, quam ejus voluntas se determinarit ad efficiendum, ut id tale esset. Neque id loquor de prioritate temporis, sed ne quidem prius fuit ordine, vel natura, vel ratione ratiocinata, ut vocant, ita scilicet ut ista boni idea impulerit Deum ad unum potius quam aliud eligendum. Nempe exempli causa, non ideo voluit creare mundum in tempore, quia vidit sic melius fore, quam si creasset ab æterno, nec voluit tres angulos trianguli æquales esse duobus rectis, quia cognovit aliter fieri non posse, &c. Sed contra, quia voluit mundum creare in tempore, ideo sic melius est, quam si creatus fuisset ab æterno; et quia voluit tres angulos trianguli necessario æquales esse duobus rectis, idcirco jam hoc verum est, et fieri aliter non potest; atque ita de reliquis. Et ita summa indifferentia in Deo summum est ejus omnipotentiæ argumentum. "It is a contradiction to say that the will of God was not from eternity indifferent to all things which are or ever shall be done; because no good or evil, nothing to be believed, or done, or

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omitted, can be fixed upon, the idea whereof was in the divine intellect before that his will determined itself to effect that such a thing should be. Neither do I speak this concerning priority of time, but even there was nothing prior in order or by nature, or reason as they call it, so as that that idea of good inclined God to choose one thing rather than another. As for example sake, he would therefore create the world in time, because that he saw that it would be better so than if he had created it from eternity; neither willed he that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two right angles, because he knew that it could not be otherwise. But on the contrary, because he would create the world in time, therefore it is better than if he had created it from eternity; and because he would that the three angles of a triangle should necessarily be equal to two right angles, therefore this is true and can be no otherwise; and so of other things. And thus the greatest indifference in God is the greatest argument of his omnipotence."

And again afterward, p. 162, "Attendenti ad Dei immensitatem manifestum est, nihil omnino esse posse, quod ab ipso non pendeat, non modo nihil subsistens, sed etiam nullum ordinem, nullam legem, nullamve rationem veri et boni, "To him that considers the immensity of God it is manifest that there can be nothing at all which doth not depend upon him, not only nothing subsisting, but also no order, no law, no reason of truth and goodness."

And when he was again urged by the Sixth Objector, Nunquid Deus potuerit efficere, ut natura trianguli non fuerit? et qua ratione, amabo, potuisset ab æterno facere, ut non fuisset verum bis quatuor esse octo? "Could not God cause that the nature of a triangle should not be such? and how, I pray thee, could he from eternity cause that it should not be true, that twice four are eight?" He confesseth ingenuously that those things were not intelligible to us; but yet notwithstanding they must be so, because, Nihil in ullo genere entis esse potest, quod a Deo non pendeat, "Nothing in any sort of being can be, which doth not depend upon God." Which doctrine of Cartesius is greedily swallowed down by some servile followers of his that have lately written de prima philosophia, "of the old philosophy."

3. Perhaps some may make a question for all this, whether Cartesius were any more in earnest in this, than when he elsewhere goes about to defend the doctrine of transubstantiation by the principles of his new philosophy, because, in his meditations upon the old philosophy (where it is probable he would set down the genuine sense of his own mind more undisguisedly, before he was assaulted by these objectors, and thereby forced to turn himself into several shapes) he affirmeth that the essences of things were eternal and immutable; but being afterward urged

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by Gassendus with this inconvenience, that then something would be eternal and immutable besides God, and so independent upon God, he doth in a manner unsay it again, and betakes himself to this pitiful evasion, "Quemadmodum poetæ fingunt a Jove quidem fata fuisse condita, sed postquam condita fuere, ipsum se iis servandis obstrinxisse; ita ego non puto essentias rerum, mathematicasque ullas veritates, quæ de ipsis cognosci possunt, esse independentes a Deo; sed puto nihilominus, quia Deus sic voluit, quia sic disposuit, ipsas esse immutabiles et æternas, "As the poets feign that the fates were indeed fixed by Jupiter, but that when they were fixed, he had obliged himself to the preserving of them; so I do not think that the essences of things, and those mathematical truths which can be known of them, are independent on God; but I think nevertheless, that because God so willed and so ordered, therefore they are immutable and eternal;" which is plainly to make them in their own nature mutable. But whether Cartesius were in jest or earnest in this business, it matters not, for his bare authority ought to be no more valued by us than the authority of Aristotle and other ancient philosophers was by him, whom he so freely dissents from.

4. For though the names of things may be changed by any one at pleasure, as that a square may be called a circle, or a cube a sphere; yet that the nature of a square should not be necessarily what it is, but be arbitrarily convertible into the nature of a circle, and so the essence of a circle into the essence of a sphere, or that the self same body, which is perfectly cubical, without any physical alteration made in it, should by this metaphysical way of transformation of essences, by mere will and command be made spherical or cylindrical; this doth most plainly imply a contradiction, and the compossibility of contradictions destroys all knowledge and the definite natures, rationes, or "notions" of things. Nay, that which implies a contradiction is a nonentity, and therefore cannot be the object of divine power. And the reason is the same for all other things, as just and unjust; for every thing is what it is immutably by the necessity of its own nature; neither is it any derogation at all from the power of God to say, that he cannot make a thing to be that which it is not. Then there might be no such thing as knowledge in God himself. God might will that there should be no such thing as knowledge.

5. And as to the being or not being of particular essences, as that God might, if he pleased, have willed that there should be no such thing as a triangle or circle, and therefore nothing demonstrable or knowable of either of them; which is likewise asserted by Cartesius, and those that make the essences of things dependent upon an arbitrary will in God: this is all one as if one should

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say that God could have willed, if he had pleased, that neither his own power nor knowledge should be infinite.

6. Now it is certain, that if the natures and essences of all things, as to their being such or such, do depend upon a will of God that is essentially arbitrary, there can be no such thing as science or demonstration, nor the truth of any mathematical or metaphysical proposition be known any otherwise, than by some revelation of the will of God concerning it, and by a certain enthusiastic or fanatic faith and persuasion thereupon, that God would have such a thing to be true or false at such a time, or for so long. And so nothing would be true or false φύσει but θέσει, "naturally" but "positively" only, all truth and science being mere arbitrarious things. Truth and falsehood would be only names. Neither would there be any more certainty in the knowledge of God himself, since it must wholly depend upon the mutability of a will in him essentially indifferent and undetermined; and if we would speak properly according to this hypothesis, God himself would not know or be wise by knowledge or by wisdom, but by will.

7. Wherefore as for that argument, that unless the essences of things and all verities and falsities depend upon the arbitrary will of God, there would be something that was not God, independent upon God; if it be well considered, it will prove a mere mormo, "bugbear," and nothing so terrible and formidable as Cartesius seemed to think it. For there is no other genuine consequence deducible from this assertion, that the essences and verities of things are independent upon the will of God, but that there is an eternal and immutable wisdom in the mind of God, and thence participated by created beings independent upon the will of God. Now the wisdom of God is as much God as the will of God; and whether of these two things in God, that is, will or wisdom, should depend upon the other, will be best determined from the several natures of them. For wisdom in itself hath the nature of a rule and measure, it being a most determinate and inflexible thing; but will being not only a blind and dark thing, as considered in itself, but also indefinite and indeterminate, hath therefore the nature of a thing regulable and measurable. Wherefore it is the perfection of will, as such, to be guided and determined by wisdom and truth; but to make wisdom, knowledge, and truth, to be arbitrarily determined by will, and to be regulated by such a κανὼν μολύβδινος, "plumbean and flexible rule" as that is, is quite to destroy the nature of it; for science or knowledge is κατάληψις τοῦ ὄντος, "the comprehension of that which necessarily is," and there can be nothing more contradictious than truth and falsehood arbitrary. Now all the knowledge and wisdom that is in creatures, whether angels or men, is nothing else but a participation of that one eternal, immutable, and

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increated wisdom of God, or several signatures of that one archetypal seal, or like so many multiplied reflections of one and the same face, made in several glasses, whereof some are clearer, some obscurer, some standing nearer, some further off.

8. Moreover, it was the opinion of the wisest of the philosophers (as we shall show afterward), that there is also in the scale of being a nature of goodness superior to wisdom, which therefore measures and determines the wisdom of God, as his wisdom measures and determines his will, and which the ancient cabalists were wont to call כתר, a "crown," as being the top or crown of the Deity, of which more afterward. Wherefore although some novelists make a contracted idea of God, consisting of nothing else but will and power, yet his nature is better expressed by some in this mystical or enigmatical representation of an infinite circle, whose inmost centre is simple goodness, the radii, "rays" and expanded area, "plat" thereof, all comprehending and immutable wisdom, the exterior periphery or interminate circumference, omnipotent will or activity, by which every thing without God is brought forth into existence. Wherefore the will and power of God have no imperium ad intra, "command inwardly" either upon the wisdom and knowledge of God, or upon the ethical and moral disposition of his nature, which is his essential goodness; but the sphere of its activity is extra Deum, "without God," where it hath an absolute command upon the existences of things; and is always free, though not always indifferent, since it is its greatest perfection to be determined by infinite wisdom and infinite goodness. But this is to anticipate what according to the laws of method should follow afterward in another place.

BOOK II.—CHAPTER I.

1. Now the demonstrative strength of our cause lying plainly in this, that it is not possible that any thing should be without a nature, and the natures or essences of all things being immutable, therefore upon supposition that there is any thing really just or unjust, debitum or illicitum, "due or unlawful," there must of necessity be something so both naturally and immutably, which no law, decree, will, nor custom can alter. There have not wanted some among the old philosophers, that rather than they would acknowledge any thing immutably just or unjust, would not stick to shake the very foundations of all things, and to deny that there was any immutable nature or essence of any thing, and by consequence any absolute certainty of truth or knowledge;

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maintaining this strange paradox, that both all being and knowledge was fantastical and relative only, and therefore that nothing was good or evil, just or unjust, true or false, white or black, absolutely and immutably, but relatively to every private person's humour or opinion.

2. The principal assertor of this extravagant opinion was Protagoras the Abderite, who, as Plato instructs us in his Theætetus,* held *οὐδὲν εἶναι ἓν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλὰ τινὶ ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι· τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον*, "that nothing was any thing in itself absolutely, but was always made so to something else, and essence or being was to be removed from every thing." In which position of his there seems to be these two things asserted: first, that all things were in perpetual motion, and nothing had any esse, but fieri, "being, but a possibility to be," which the said Protagoras thus expressed: *Ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται, ἃ δὴ φαμὲν εἶναι οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορέυοντες*,† "All things are made by motion and mixture of things together, and therefore are not rightly said to be; for nothing is, but every thing is always made." Secondly, that nothing is made absolutely, but only relatively to something else. *Εἴτε τις εἶναί τι ὀνομάζει, τινὶ εἶναι, ἢ τινὸς, ἢ πρὸς τι, ῥητέον αὐτῷ, εἴτε γίγνεσθαι· αὐτὸ δὲ ἐφ' αὑτοῦ τι ἢ ὂν ἢ γιγνόμενον, οὔτε αὐτῷ λεκτέον οὔτ' ἄλλου λέγοντος ἀποδεκτέον*, "If any one say that any thing either is or is made, he must say that it is so to something, or in respect of some body, for we cannot affirm that any thing either is or is made absolutely in itself, but relatively to something else."

Now from hence proceeded those known aphorisms of his, recorded both in Plato and Aristotle, *τὰ φαινόμενα ἑκάστῳ τᾶυτα καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ᾧ φάινεται*, "that those things which appear to every one, are to him to whom they appear." And again, *πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθὴς*, "that every fancy or opinion of every body was true." And again, *πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν*, "that man is the measure of all things whether existing or not existing." Which sentence seemed so pretty and argute to him, that he placed it in the very front of his book, as Plato tells us; and indeed it comprises in it all the singularity of his philosophy, the true meaning thereof being this; not only that man taken generally is the measure of all things (which in some sense might be affirmed that our own humane faculties are the measure of all things unto us), but also that *πᾶς ἄνθρωπος*, "every individual man is the measure of all being and truth" respectively to himself; for so the following words in Plato explain it: *Οὐκοῦν οὕτως πῶς λέγεις, ὡς οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἐστὶν ἐμοί· οἷα δὲ σοὶ, τοιαῦτα ἂν σοί· ἄνθρωπος δὲ σύ τε κἀγώ,*

* Page 118. † Ibid.

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"Your meaning (saith Socrates) is this, that as every thing appears to me, such it is to me; and as it appears to you, such it is to you, both of us being alike men." Wherefore it is elsewhere expressed after this manner, *μέτρον ἕκαστον ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ μή*, "that every man is the measure of what is and is not, that is, to himself," and *μέτρον εἶναι αὐτῷ ἕκαστον αὐτοῦ σοφίας*, "that every one is the measure of his own wisdom to himself." Sextus Empiricus gives a short account of this Protagorean philosophy in a few words thus:* *Τίθησι τὰ φαινόμενα ἑκάστῳ, καὶ οὕτως εἰσάγει τὸ πρός τί*, "He asserts that, which seems, to every one to be, and so makes all things relative." Now this was an higher strain of madness than the Pyrrhonian scepticism, which was not so extravagant as to affirm that all things were fantastical and relative only; but that we could not affirm what things absolutely were in their own nature, but only what they seemed to us.

3. But that all this was chiefly intended as a battery or assault against morality, and principally levelled by Protagoras against the absolute and immutable natures of good and evil, just and unjust, appeareth also from sundry passages of that learned dialogue called Theætetus. *Λέγε τοίνυν πάλιν, εἰ σοὶ ἀρέσκει τὸ μήτι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι αἰεὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν*,† "Tell me therefore, dost thou in good earnest think that nothing is good or honest, but is always made so?" And afterwards Protagoras affirms, *οἷά γ' ἂν ἑκάστη πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῇ, ἕως ἂν αὐτὰ νομίζῃ*,‡ "that whatsoever things seem to be good and just to every city or commonwealth, the same are so to that city or commonwealth so long as they seem so." Again: *Καλὰ μὲν καὶ αἰσχρὰ, δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα, καὶ ὅσια καὶ μὴ, οἷα ἂν ἑκάστη πόλις οἰηθεῖσα θῆται νόμιμα ἑαυτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἑκάστῃ καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν οὐδὲν σοφώτερον οὔτε ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτου, οὔτε πόλιν πόλεως εἶναι*,§ "Whatsoever things any city thinking doth decree to be honest or dishonest, just or unjust, holy or unholy, those things are really or truly such to that city; and in such things as these no one private person or city is wiser than another, because *οὐκ ἔστι φύσει αὐτῶν οὐδὲν, οὐσίαν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον*, "none of these things have any nature or essence of their own, being merely fantastical and relative." Lastly, to name no more places, *Οὐκοῦν ἐνταῦθά που ἦμεν τοῦ λόγου ἐν ᾧ ἔφαμεν τοὺς τὴν φερομένην οὐσίαν λέγοντας, καὶ τὸ αἰεὶ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ, τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ᾧ δοκεῖ, ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐθέλειν δὴ διϊσχυρίζεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα περὶ τὰ δίκαια ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον, ἃ ἂν θῆται πόλις δόξαντα αὐτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ἔστι δίκαια τιθεμένῃ ἕωσπερ ἂν κέηται*,‖ "The thing that we were about to show was this, that they which made the natures

* Pyrrhon. Hypotypos. lib. 1. cap. 32. p. 55. † Ed. Serrani, p. 157.
‡ P. 167. § P. 177. ‖ P. 172.

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and essences of all things, flowing and mutable, and which held that what seemed to every body, was that to whom it so seemed, as they do maintain this concerning all other things, so concerning nothing more than just and unjust, as being unquestionably true of these, that whatsoever any city thinks to be good and just, and decrees them such, these things are so to that city, so long as they are so decreed."

CHAPTER II.

1. WHEREFORE, since in order to the taking away of the immutable natures of good and evil, just and unjust, and the moral differences of humane actions, there was so strange an attempt made by these philosophers to overthrow the absolute essences and truths of all things; let us in the next place consider what pretences or grounds they could possibly have for maintaining so wild a paradox as this is.

First, therefore, it is evident from Plato's writings that Protagoras laid his foundation in the Heraclitical philosophy, at that time in great vogue and request in the world, which did φερομένην οὐσίαν εἰσάγειν,* as that philosopher writes, "bring in a floating and moveable essence," and maintained οὐδὲν ἑστάναι, πάντα δὲ κινεῖσθαι, "that nothing stood, but all things moved and flowed." An opinion which most of the ancients were inclining to, as appears from the poets, who made πάντα ἔκγονα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως,† "all things to be the offspring of flux and motion:" insomuch that Homer himself (as Plato observes) deriving the pedigree of the gods, made the ocean their father, and Tethys their mother. Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν, καὶ μητέρα Τήθυν.

And there were not any philosophers of note, besides Parmenides and Melissus, that opposed it, who also ran into another extreme: and therefore the former of these Plato facetiously calls τοὺς ῥέοντας, "the flowing philosophers," the latter στασιώτας, the "standers." Now the true meaning of this Heraclitical philosophy was plainly this, that there is no other being in the world besides individual body or matter, and no such thing as εἴδη, "standing intelligible forms," that is, no intellectual being; which matter or corporeal being as it is liable to motion and mutation because of its divisibility, every part of it being separable from another; so by the mutation that we find in all corporeal things, we may reasonably conclude that it is throughout perpetually moved and agitated by streams and subtle matter

* In Theæteto, p. 118. † Ibid.

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passing the pores of all bodies; whence it was that they affirmed *οἷον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα*, "that all things flowed like a stream;" and that there was no stability either of essence or knowledge any where to be found. For that Cratylus and Heraclitus endeavoured to destroy the certainty of all science from this principle, is evident in that they maintained that contradictories might be true concerning the same thing, and at the same time. And indeed if there were no other being in the world but individual matter, and all knowledge proceeded from the impresses of that matter, that being always agitated, it is not conceivable how there could be any stability of knowledge any more than of essence found in this rapid whirlpool of corporeal things; nay, nor how there should be any such thing as knowledge at all. Wherefore according to this Heraclitical philosophy, Protagoras in the first place concluded *ὅτι ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἐστὶν ἢ αἴσθησις*, "that knowledge is nothing else but sense;" for as Plato writes, *εἰς ταυτὸν συμπέπτωκε οἷον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα, καὶ αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι*, "these two assertions come all to one, that all things flow like a stream, and that knowledge and sense are one and the selfsame thing."

2. But Protagoras went further, and made a superstructure upon this Heraclitical philosophy out of the old atomical or Phenician philosophy, which clearly asserted, that all those sensible qualities, as they are called, of heat and cold, light and colours, sounds, odours and vapours, formally considered, are not things really and absolutely existing without us, but only passions, sensations and phantasms in us, occasioned by certain local motions made upon the organs of sense from the objects without us, and so indeed but relative and phantastical things. And thus Protagoras made up his business complete from this mixture of the heraclitical and atomical philosophy together; for taking it for granted according to Heraclitus' doctrine, that knowledge is nothing else but sense, and according to the Phenician or atomical philosophy, that the sensible qualities are not things really and absolutely existing without us, but appearances or sensations in us, he concluded *πάντα τὰ νοητὰ καὶ αἰσθητά*, "all sensible and intelligible things" not to be absolute essences, but things merely relative, fantastical and imaginary.

CHAPTER III.

1. Now that this atomical, corpuscular or mechanical philosophy, that solves all the phenomena of the corporeal world by those intelligible principles of magnitude, figure, site and motion, and thereby makes sensible things intelligible, banishing away

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those unintelligible corporeal forms and sensible qualities, was known to Protagoras, who lived not only before Plato and Aristotle, but also before Democritus himself, as Plutarch testifies (though he abused it in grounding so strange a paradox upon it), I shall make it undeniably evident from several testimonies out of Plato's Theætetus; for besides that passage aforementioned, p. 152; Ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα, "That all things are made by local motion and mixture with one another," and what follows after: Τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι κίνησις παρέχει, "That motion is that which makes every thing to seem to be, or to be generated," p. 153, he plainly describes the nature of colours according to this very hypothesis: ΣΩ. ὑπόλαβε τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὑτωσὶ κατὰ τὰ ὄμματα πρῶτον· δ δὴ καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκὸν, μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἕτερόν τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν ὀμμάτων, μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι· μηδέ τιν' αὐτῷ χώραν ἀποτάξῃς· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν μένοι, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐν τῇ γενέσει γίγνοιτο. Θέαιτ. Ἀλλὰ πῶς; Σω. Ἐπώμεθα τῷ ἄρτι λόγῳ, μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ἓν ὂν τιθέντες, καὶ ἡμῖν οὕτω μέλαντε καὶ λευκὸν καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο χρῶμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς τῶν ὀμμάτων πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φορὰν φανεῖται γεγεννημένον. καὶ δὴ ἕκαστον εἶναι φαμὲν χρῶμα, οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον, οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενόν ἐστι, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἑκάστῳ ἴδιον γεγονός,* the sense whereof is this, "Let us begin first with the eyes or sight: That which is called a white colour, is not any real quality existing either without the eyes or in the eyes; for then it would not consist only in motion and generation; but taking it for granted that no sensible thing is such absolutely in itself, we must say that a white and black colour, and every other colour is generated by certain motions made and impressed upon the eye, and every colour is neither that which makes the impression, nor that which receiveth it (that is, neither any thing in the eye nor in the object absolutely), but a certain middle thing between them both," which can be nothing else but a passion or sensation in us. Elsewhere in that dialogue he proves this assertion, that colours and the like sensible things are no real and absolute qualities either in the sentient or in the object, because the same object seems to have different qualities to different persons, as Πνέοντος ἀνέμου τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν ῥιγοῖ, ὁ δ' οὔ· καὶ ὁ μὲν ἠρέμα, ὁ δὲ σφόδρα, "The same wind blowing seems cold to one and warm to another; and the same wine which to one in health seems sweet, will to the same person appear bitter and distasteful if he be sick."† Whence he concluded that heat and cold, sweet and bitter, were not things really and absolutely existing in the objects without, but relative things, being passions or sensations

* Page 158. † Page 118. 121.

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that may be diversified by the different tempers and complexions of the body.

2. Afterward, p. 156, we have the sum of this atomical or mechanical philosophy, more copiously and fully set down after this manner: Ἀρχὴ δὲ ἐξ ἧς καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα ἤρτηται, ἥδε αὐτῶν. Ὡς τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν, καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο οὐδέν. Ἐστὶ δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἴδη, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρον ἑκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν. Ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα, γίγνεται ἔκγονα, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρα, δίδυμα δέ. τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν, τὸ δὲ αἴσθησις, ἀεὶ συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. Αἱ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεις τὰ τοιάδε ἡμῖν ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ὄψεις τε καὶ ἀκοαὶ καὶ ὀσφρήσεις, καὶ ψυξεις τε καὶ καύσεις, καὶ ἡδοναί γε δὴ καὶ λυπαὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι κεκλημέναι. Καὶ ἄλλαι ἀπέραντοι μὲν αἱ ἀνώνυμαι, πεπληθεῖς δὲ αἱ ὠνομασμέναι. Τὸ δὲ αὖ αἰσθητὸν γένος τούτων ἑκάστοις ὁμόγονον. Ὄψεσι μὲν παντοδαπαῖς χρώματα παντοδαπά· ἀκοαῖς δὲ ὡσαύτως φωναὶ, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητὰ ξυγγενῆ γιγνόμενα. . . . ἐν φορᾷ αὐτῶν ἡ κίνησις πέφυκεν. Ἐπειδὰν οὖν ὄμμα καὶ ἄλλό τι τῶν τούτῳ συμμέτρων πλησιάσαν γεννήσῃ τὴν λευκότητά τε καὶ αἴσθησιν αὐτῷ ξύμφυτον, ἃ οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ ἐγένετο, ἑκατέρου ἐκείνων πρὸς ἄλλο ἰλθόντος, τότε δὴ μεταξὺ φερομένων [τῆς μὲν ὄψεως πρὸς τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν, τῆς δὲ λευκότητος πρὸς τοῦ συναποτίκτοντος τὸ χρῶμα] ὁ μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα ὄψεως ἔμπλεως ἐγένετο, καὶ ὁρᾷ δὴ τότε, καὶ ἐγένετο οὔτι ὄψις, ἀλλὰ ὀφθαλμὸς ὁρῶν. τὸ δὲ συγγεννῆσαν τὸ χρῶμα, λευκότητος περιεπλήσθη, καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ λευκότης αὖ, ἀλλὰ λευκὸν, εἴτε ξύλον εἴτε λίθος εἴτε ὁτιοῦν συνέβη χρῶμα χρωσθῆναι τῷ τοιούτῳ χρώματι. Καὶ τἆλλα δὴ οὕτω σκληρὸν καὶ θερμὸν, καὶ πάντα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑπολητέον, αὐτὸ μὲν καθ' αὑτὸ μηδὲν εἶναι, ὃ δὴ καὶ τότε ἐλέγομεν, ἐν δὲ τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα ὁμιλίᾳ πάντα γίγνεσθαι καὶ παντοῖα ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως, "The beginning upon which all things depend is this; that the whole world is motion, and nothing else besides. Now of motion there are two kinds, each of which containeth innumerable branches under it; but the power of one is action, of the other passion. From the mutual congress and contrition of both which together, are begotten innumerable offsprings, which may all be reduced to these two general heads, whereof the one the sensible, the other sense, which is always joined together with the sensible. The senses have such names as these, sight, hearing, tasting, touching, pleasures, pains, desires, fears, and others innumerable without names, but many that have names. The sensible kind doth answer and correspond to every one of these; to the sight all manner of colours, to the hearing sounds, and to the other senses other sensibles, that are of kin to them. . . . . When therefore the eye, and some other thing analogous to it, meet together, they beget whiteness, and a certain sense proportionable there-

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unto, neither of which would have been made, if either of these had not met with the other. Then these things being carried respectively, sight to the eyes, and whiteness to the object, which did actively beget it, the eye becomes full of sight, and sees, and is not made sight in the abstract, but an eye seeing; and that which did congenerate the colour, is fitted with whiteness, and is made, not whiteness in the abstract, but a thing white, whether wood or stone. The same is to be conceived of all other sensible things, as hard and hot, and the like, that nothing is by itself absolutely any of these things, but they are all made from a mutual congress of the outward object and the sense, by means of motion."

3. Here we see it plainly asserted, that the whole world is made by nothing else but the motion of particles, by means of which all things are generated and corrupted; neither did Protagoras acknowledge any other motion but local, as is plainly intimated; and that all these sensible qualities which we take notice of by the several senses, as colours, sounds, sapors, odours, and the like, are not things really existing without us, but passions or sensations in us, caused by several local motions upon the organs of sense. Which, if that be not sufficient that I have already alleged, is yet more plainly expressed after this manner, p. 182: *Μέμνησαι γὰρ ὅτι οὕτως ἐλέγομεν, ἓν μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ εἶναι, μηδ' αὐτὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πρὸς ἄλληλα συγγιγνομένων ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀποτικτόντων, τὰ μὲν ποῖα ἅττα γίγνέσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα*, "Nothing is absolutely any one thing by itself, neither the agent nor the patient, but from both of these meeting together, are generated at once both the senses and the sensible things."

4. These passages which I have cited are so clear and evident, that they cannot possibly be capable of any other sense than what I have expressed; and therefore those two Latin interpreters Ficinus and Serranus, that lived before the restitution of this mechanical philosophy, and therefore understood it not, yet expound them after the same manner. The first thus: Color neque oculorum aspectus est, neque corporum motus, sed ex aspectu motuque medium quiddam resultans: id est, talis circa oculos passio, "Colour is neither the sight of the eyes, nor the motion of bodies, but a certain middle thing resulting from the sight and motion, that is, such a passion about the eyes." The other in this manner: Ex varia aspicientis *διαθέσει*, variaque adeo intermedii sensilis schesi, colores varios et videri et fieri, ita tamen ut omnia sint *φανταστικὰ*, nec nisi in animo subsistant, vario autem motus congressu varientur; quod de omnibus sensibus constituendum est, "That from the different disposition of the beholder, and so the different affection of the intermediate sensible organ, the various colours are both made

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and seen, but so as that they are all fantastical, nor have any subsistence but in the mind, are varied by the different congress of motion, which is to be concluded concerning all the senses." Only Protagoras, in order to his sceptical design, made these sensible things not only relative to animals in general, but also to individuals, because it is impossible to demonstrate, as he urges, that all brute beasts, nay, that any two men have the very same phantasms or ideas of red or green, these being idiopathies, and because experience shows, that not only the gratefulness and ungratefulness of tastes and smells, but also that heat and cold are relative to individuals.

CHAPTER IV.

1. Wherefore we have made it evident, that that very mechanical or atomical philosophy, that hath been lately restored by Cartesius and Gassendus, as to the main substance of it, was not only elder than Epicurus, but also than Plato and Aristotle, nay, than Democritus and Leucippus also, the commonly reputed fathers of it. And therefore we have no reason to discredit the report of Posidonius the Stoic, who, as Strabo tells us, affirmed this atomical philosophy to have been ancienter than the times of the Trojan war, and first to have been brought into Greece out of Phœnicia: Εἰ δεῖ πιστεῦσαι τῷ Ποσειδωνίῳ, τὸ περὶ τῶν ἀτόμων δόγμα παλαιὸν ἐστὶν, ἀνδρὸς Σιδονίου Μόσχου πρὸ τῶν Τροϊκῶν χρόνων γεγονότος,* "If we may believe Posidonius the Stoic, the doctrine of atoms is ancienter than the times of the Trojan war, and was first invented and delivered by one Moschus a Sidonian," or rather a Phœnician, as Sextus Empiricus cites the testimony of Posidonius: "Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἀτόμους, εἰ μήτι ἀρχαιοτέραν ταύτην ϑητέον τὴν δόξαν, καὶ ὡς ἔλεγεν ὁ Στωϊκὸς Ποσειδώνιος, ἀπὸ Μόσχον τινὸς ἀνδρὸς Φοίνικος καταγομένην,† "Democritus and Epicurus invented the doctrine of atoms, unless we make that physiology to be ancienter, and derive it, as Posidonius the Stoic doth, from one Moschus, a Phœnician." And since it is certain from what we have shown, that neither Epicurus nor yet Democritus were the first inventors of this physiology, this testimony of Posidonius the Stoic ought in reason to be admitted by us.

2. Now what can be more probable than that this Moschus the Phœnician, that Posidonius speaks of, is the very same person with that Moschus the physiologer, that Jamblichus men-

* Lib. 16. edit. Casaub. p. 757. † Advers. Mathemat. p. 367.

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tions in the Life of Pythagoras,* where he affirms, that Pythagoras, living some time at Sidon in Phœnicia, conversed with the prophets that were the successors of Mochus the physiologer, and was instructed by them: Τοῖς τε Μώχου τοῦ φυσιολόγου προφήταις ἀπογόνοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ Φοινικικοῖς ἱεροφάνταις, "He conversed with the prophets that were the successors of Mochus and other Phœnician priests. And what can be more certain than that both Mochus and Moschus, the Phœnician and philosopher, was no other than Moses, the Jewish lawgiver, as Arverius rightly guesses: Μόσχου legendum videtur, nisi quis Μώχου vel Μωσέως legere malit, "It seems that it ought to be read Moschus, unless any had rather read it Mochus or Moses." Wherefore according to the ancient tradition, Moschus or Moses the Phœnician being the first author of the atomical philosophy, it ought to be called neither Epicurean nor Democritical, but Moschical or Mosaical.

3. It must be acknowledged, that neither of these two famous and renowned philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, had the good hap to be rightly and thoroughly instructed in this ancient Phœnician and Moschical or Mosaical philosophy; Protagoras so much abusing it to scepticism, and the taking away of the natural discrimination of good and evil, might probably beget a prejudice in Plato against it, though he doth not confute the physiological part of it in all his Theætetus, where good occasion was offered him; and yet in his Timæus he hath a little smattering of it, where he endeavours to resolve the differences of the four elements, fire, air, water, earth, into the different geometrical figures of their insensible parts, making the small particles of the earth to be cubical, by reason of their solidity and immobility, but of the fire, pyramidal:† Τὸ ἔχον ὀλιγίστας βάσεις εὐκινητότατον ἀνάγκη πεφυκέναι, τμητικώτατόν τε ὀξύτατον ὂν πάντῃ πάντων, "It is reasonable that that figure which hath the smallest basis, should be attributed to that body which is most moving, cutting, and piercing." And that he doth not mean mystically in this, but physically, appears from his own explication of it concerning the insensible parts, p. 56: Πάντα οὖν δεῖ ταῦτα διανοεῖσθαι σμικρὰ οὕτως ὡς καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον μὲν τοῦ γένους ἑκάστου διὰ σμικρότητα οὐδὲν ὁρώμενον ὑφ' ἡμῶν, συναθροισθέντων δὲ πολλῶν τοὺς ὄγκους αὐτῶν ὁρᾶσθαι, "These cubes and pyramids in the earth and the fire can only be perceived by the mind and understanding, since the single particles alone are not sensible, but only the aggregation of many of them together.

4. But Aristotle plainly rejects it. Jacobus Carpentarius, in his notes upon Alcinous, treating of the nature of universals, writes thus: Quidam universalia non omnino quidem tollunt,

* Cap. 3. p. 10. † Page 55. Ser. edit.

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sed ea tantum esse volunt, quando intelliguntur, nihil vero haberi in natura quod mentis notioni respondeat: quod mihi sane perinde est, ac si dicerent colores nihil actu esse, sed tales effici, quando reipsa videntur. Quæ etiam opinio suos habuit assertores, sed ab Aristotele est damnata, "Some do not altogether deny universals, but will have it that they only are when they are understood, but that there is nothing in nature which answers to the notion of the mind. Which to me indeed is the same thing as if they should say that colours are not in their nature actually any thing, but are made such when they are in very deed seen. Which opinion also hath had its assertors, but is condemned by Aristotle. This opinion, that colours are not actually existent according to those very ideas that we have of them before vision, is the arcanum, "mystery," of the old atomical or Mosaical philosophy, which Carpentarius understood not; which makes them not qualities absolutely existing without us, but passions and sensations in us. And indeed this philosophy is condemned by Aristotle, in his third book De Anima, "Of the Soul," cap. 2. and that as the received doctrine of the ancient Physiologists before his time: Οἱ *πρότεροι φυσιολόγοι τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ἔλεγον, οὐδὲν οἰόμενοι οὔτε λευκὸν οὔτε μέλαν ἄνευ ὄψεως, οὔδε χυμὸν ἄνευ γεύσεως*, "The former Physiologists," saith he, "were (generally) mistaken in this, in that they thought blackness and whiteness were no absolute qualities without the sight, nor sweet and sour without the taste." Again, he endeavours to confute the same philosophy which resolves those sensible qualities into figures, site, and motion of particles; not only attributing it to Democritus, but also making it the most generally received physiology before his time: *Δημόκριτος καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀποπώτατόν τι ποιοῦσι· πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἁπτὰ ποιοῦσι. Καίτοι εἰ καὶ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων ἑκάστη ἁφή τίς ἐστι· τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι ἔστι ἀδύνατον, οὐ χαλεπὸν συνιδεῖν· Ἔτι δὲ τοῖς κοινοῖς τῶν αἰσθήσεων πασῶν χρῶνται ὡς ἰδίοις. Μέγεθος γὰρ καὶ σχῆμα, καὶ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ τὸ λεῖον, ἔτι δὲ τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ ἀμβλὺ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὄγκοις κοινὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐστὶ, εἰ δὲ μὴ πασῶν, ἀλλὰ ὄψεώς γε καὶ ἁφῆς. οἱ δὲ τὰ ἴδια ἐνταῦθα ἀνάγουσιν ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος. Τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, τὸ μὲν τραχὺ φησὶν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λεῖον. Εἰς δὲ τὰ σχήματα ἀνάγει τοὺς χυμούς, καίτοι ἢ οὐδεμιᾶς ἢ μᾶλλον τῆς ὄψεως τὰ κοινὰ γνωρίζειν*, "Democritus and most of the Physiologers commit a great absurdity in this, in that they make all sense to be touch; which is a thing at first sight plainly impossible. Moreover, they do not distinguish betwixt the objects common to all the senses, and those which are proper and peculiar to the several senses apart. For magnitude and figure, roughness and smoothness, sharpness and bluntness, which belong to bulk, are common to all the senses; or if not to all, yet

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to sight and touch. Whereas our sense is deceived concerning these common objects, but it is never deceived concerning the proper objects of the several senses, as the sight is not deceived about colours, nor the hearing about sounds. But most of the ancient physiologists refer these proper objects to the common sensilia; as Democritus, who, as for white and black, makes one of them to consist in scabrities, 'roughness' and 'ruggedness,' the other in smoothness and evenness of parts. He also reduceth sapors to figures, though it belong chiefly to sight to take cognizance of figures and magnitude, and the like; whereas according to this philosophy, the sense of touch would be the most critical of them." Aristotle there concludes this discourse, with two general arguments against that philosophy (that made the sensible qualities to be properly sensations in us, and nothing else in the objects without us but magnitude, figure, site of parts and motion) in this manner: Ἔτι τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ πάντα ἔχει ἐναντίωσιν, οἷον ἐν χρώματι τῷ μέλανι τὸ λευκὸν, καὶ ἐν χυμοῖς τὸ γλυκὺ τῷ πικρῷ, σχῆμα δὲ σχήματι οὐ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐναντίον. τίνι γὰρ τῶν πολυγώνων τὸ περιφερὲς ἐναντίον; Ἔτι ἀπείρων ὄντων τῶν σχημάτων, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τοὺς χυμοὺς εἶναι ἀπείρους, "That there is contrariety in qualities, but not in figures; and that the variety of figures being infinite, tastes, colours, and the rest would be so likewise." Which arguments, though they be handsome and ingenious (that is, Aristotelical) to prove that there are such entities as qualities visible, tangible, tasteable, and the like, really existing in the objects without us; yet as they will not counterbalance the weight of those other arguments that militate on the contrary side, so they will without any difficulty be answered by the assertors of this Novantique philosophy.

5. But after Plato's and Aristotle's time, this old physiology was again revived by Epicurus, but so blended with immorality and impiety, as that it soon sunk again, there being nothing left of all those voluminous treatises of Epicurus concerning it, saving what is preserved in Diogenes Laërtius, nor no other system thereof transmitted to posterity but what is comprised in the poem of Lucretius Carus. So that the world was generally seized with a deep and profound oblivion of this physiology, there being only some obscure footsteps and dark intimations of it now and then found in the writings of some learned authors. As when Sextus tells us that some of the Stoics held τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἶναι πρός τι, "that sensitive things were relative to animals, and depended upon our sensation;" and τὰ πάθη μόνα καταλαμβάνεσθαι, "that not the things themselves were comprehended by sense, but only our passions from them: and when the Pyrrhonian Sceptics themselves affirmed, πάντα εἶναι πρός τι, τουτέστι πρὸς τὸ κρῖνον, ὅτι πρὸς τόδε τὸ ζῶον καὶ τόνδε τὸν ἄνθρωπον,

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καὶ τήνδε τὴν αἴσθησιν ἕκαστον φαίνεται, "that all things are relative, that is, to that which judges of them, and every thing appears to be according to sense."

And when Plotinus makes a doubt whether sensible things did really exist in the objects without us, or were only passions within us: Ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἃ δὲ δοκεῖ πίστιν ἔχειν ἐναργεστάτην, ἀπιστεῖται μήποτε οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκρινομένοις, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἔχῃ τὴν δοκοῦσαν ὑπόστασιν, καὶ νοῦ δεῖ ἢ διανόιας τῶν κρινόντων,* "It may be well doubted concerning sensible things themselves, that we seem to have the greatest assurance of, whether they really exist in the objects without us, or whether they be passions in us."

6. But in this last age it hath been so successfully restored by the writings of some learned authors, and the truth thereof so convincingly evidenced by many other experiments besides that of the glassy prisme and rainbow, that there is little doubt left concerning it. And indeed unless this philosophy be acknowledged to be true, we must of necessity affirm, that the sensible and corporeal world is altogether unintelligible. For as Timæus Locrus long ago observed, that τὰ αἰσθητά, sensible things could not be apprehended any otherwise than αἰσθήσει καὶ νόθῳ λογισμῷ, "by sense and a certain kind of spurious reason," so it is most certainly true that we cannot possibly have any clear and intelligible ideas of heat and cold, light and colours," as such qualities really existing in the objects of sense without us, but as passions and sensations in ourselves we may. Wherefore unless we will assert that these lower sensible things are ἀκατάληπτα, utterly "incomprehensible" to our understanding, whilst it is able clearly to comprehend things of a higher nature, we must conclude this old atomical, Moschical or Mosaical philosophy to be true.

CHAPTER V.

1. But though this old atomical philosophy be most solidly and substantially true, the paradoxes that Protagoras and others endeavoured to ground upon it, are not only ridiculously absurd and contradictious in themselves, but also altogether inconsequent from the same.

For as for those assertions, that whatever seems is, and that every fancy is true; though they seem ridiculously absurd, yet those two learned philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, vouchsafe them a serious confutation. Plato from hence, in his Theætetus,

* Enn. 5. lib. 5.

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because that the fancies of them that dream would be as true and real as the sensations of those that are awake; and that all men would be alike wise, and the opinions of the most illiterate idiots in geometry as true as any geometrical theorems, and all predictions of future things alike true: and that in the actions of human life, it would be indifferent what any man did in order to any end, and so all deliberation and consultation cease.

But Aristotle, in his metaphysics, with some mixture of facetiousness also writes after this manner:* Τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν ὑποβάλλουσι τὸν δάκτυλον καὶ ποιοῦσιν ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς φαίνεσθαι δύο, δύο εἶναι διὰ τὸ φαίνεσθαι ταῦτα, καὶ πάλιν ἕν· τοῖς γὰρ μὴ κινοῦσι τὴν ὄψιν ἓν φαίνεται τὸ ἕν, "To those that put their finger under their sight or between their eyes, it will be both two and one." But Sextus Empiricus bestows more subtlety upon it than either of them:† Εἰ πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθὴς, καὶ τὸ μὴ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν εἶναι ἀληθῆ, κατὰ φαντασίαν ὑφιστάμενον ἔσται ἀληθές· καὶ οὕτω τὸ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν εἶναι ἀληθῆ γενήσεται ψεῦδος, "If every fancy be true, then when one fancies that every fancy is not true, that must be true also, and so then this proposition that every fancy is true, will be false."

2. Whereas the meaning of these assertions, that whatever seems is, and every fancy is true, was no other than this, that nothing was absolutely true at all, but that all truth and knowledge were but seeming, fantastical and relative things. And because one seeming or appearance is as true as another, therefore they were all equally true, that is to say, none of them true at all. This Aristotle elsewhere rightly apprehended:‡ Ὁ λέγων ἅπαντα τὰ φαινόμενα εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ἅπαντα ποιεῖ τὰ ὄντα πρός τι, "He that saith that all things that appear are true, makes all beings to be relative."

But if nothing be absolutely true, but only relatively to him that thinks so, then this very opinion of Protagoras, that nothing was absolutely true, and that man was the measure of all things, was not itself absolutely true, but only seemingly and relatively to Protagoras; whereas this is asserted for an absolute truth by him, that nothing is absolutely true.

And what a ridiculous folly was this in one that would be accounted a philosopher, to take a great deal of pains in writing a large volume, and to endeavour industriously to convince the world, that nothing was absolutely, but only relatively and fantastically true; since it must needs follow from thence, that this very thing itself was not absolutely true, but only relatively to those that thought so; and the contrary altogether as true to those that thought otherwise. For it would no more concern the world to know that this was relatively and fantastically true to Protagoras that nothing was absolutely true, than to know

* Metaphys. lib. 13. cap. 6. † Advers. Logicos, lib. 1. sect. 390.
‡ Metaphys. lib. 4. cap. 6.

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what Protagoras dreamt of the last night. For since according to him, *αὐτὸς τὰ αὑτοῦ ἕκαστος μόνα δοξάζει*, "that every man does but think" his own truths, it cannot concern any man to know another's opinions any more than his dreams. And therefore Protagoras had done more wisely if he had spared his pains, and kept those private relative truths of his own, that is, his dream or imagination wholly to himself.

But by his industrious endeavouring to convince the world of this, that nothing was absolutely true, but only relatively, he plainly confuted his own doctrine, in asserting that this was absolutely true, that nothing was absolutely true, which is a manifest contradiction. There need be the less pains taken in confuting scepticism and fantasticism, since it always so easily confutes itself.

3. For if nothing be absolutely true, then not so much as this could be absolutely true, that it seemed to Protagoras that nothing was absolutely true. And it could only seem to seem to be true. Nay, it could not be absolutely true, that Protagoras, to whom all truth seemed to be relative, had any real existence, much less that there are any objects without, from whence the impressions or motions are made upon our senses; or that there is any such thing as magnitude, motion, figure and site of parts, or *τὴν ὕλην ῥευστὴν εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς λόγους τῶν φαινομένων πάντων ἐν αὐτῇ ὑποκεῖσθαι*, "that matter is floating, and that the reasons of all appearances are founded therein;" which things, as Plato and Sextus tell us, were dogmatically affirmed by Protagoras.

CHAPTER VI.

1. Again, as this scepticism or fantasticism of Protagoras is most absurd and contradictious in itself, so there is not any foundation for it at all in the old atomical philosophy, but contrariwise, nothing doth more effectually and demonstratively overthrow both these assertions, that knowledge is sense, and that all truth and knowledge is but fantastical and relative, than this atomical philosophy doth.

For first, since no sense can judge of itself, or its own appearances, much less make any judgment of the appearances belonging to another sense for *ἃ δι' ἑτέρας δυνάμεως αἰσθάνῃ, ἀδύνατον δι' ἄλλης τούτων αἰσθέσθαι, οἷον ἃ δι' ἀκοῆς, δι' ὄψεως· ἢ ἃ δι' ὄψεως, δι' ἀκοῆς*,* "those things which are perceived by one of our powers, it is impossible to perceive them by another, as the objects of hearing by sight, or the objects of sight by hearing, and the like."

* Plato in Theætet. p. 132.

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The sight cannot judge of sounds which belong to the hearing, nor the hearing of light and colours; wherefore that which judges of all the senses and their several objects, cannot be itself any sense, but something of a superior nature.

2. Moreover, that which judges that the appearances of all the senses have something fantastical in them, cannot possibly be itself fantastical, but it must be something which hath a power of judging what really and absolutely is or is not. This being not a relative, but an absolute truth, that sensible appearances have something fantastical in them. Neither could Protagoras ever have arrived to the knowledge of this truth, if he had not had some faculty in him superior to sense, that judgeth of what is and is not absolutely.

Now this same rational faculty, that discovers, according to the atomical philosophy, that there is something in our sensations that is merely fantastical and relative, doth assure us also not only that there are absolutely and really such passions, affections and seemings in us, but that they that do sentire, "perceive," have an absolute and real entity. For though it should be supposed that our senses did deceive us in all their representations, and that there were no sun, no moon, no earth, that we had no hands, no feet, no body, as by sense we seem to have, yet reason tells us that of necessity that must be something, to whom these things seem to be, because nothing can seem to that that is not; this being an absolute and immutable truth, nihili nullam esse neque actionem neque passionem, "that of nothing there is not any either action or passion whatsoever;" but also that when we are awake and use our senses, there are corporeal objects really existing without us, which make those sensible impressions upon us, and that those corporeal objects have absolutely and really as many correspondent varieties in them in respect of magnitude, figure, site and motion, as there are varieties of sensible ideas and phantasms that we take notice of by them. For Protagoras himself, according to the old atomical philosophy, acknowledges that local motion, magnitude, figure, and site of parts, absolutely are in corporeal things themselves; only that colour and such other things are relative. Therefore all being and truth, according to Protagoras himself, is not fantastical and relative, but there is some absolute.

3. Wherefore, the proper and genuine result of this old atomical philosophy, which is the triumph of reason over sense, is nothing else but this, that sense alone is not the criterion or judge of what does really and absolutely exist without us, but that there is a higher and superior intellectual faculty in us that judges of our senses, which discovers what is fallacious and fantastical in them, and pronounces what absolutely is and is not. And Democritus, who did more thoroughly and perfectly under-

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stand this atomical philosophy than Protagoras, makes this to be the proper result and consequence of it, the invalidating the judgment of sense concerning bodies themselves, and the asserting a higher faculty of reason in us to determine what is absolutely true and false; which is worth the noting. For so Sextus, the philosopher, writes concerning Democritus:* Δημόκριτος δὲ ἀναιρεῖ τὰ φαινόμενα ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, καὶ τούτων λέγει μηδὲν φαίνεσθαι κατὰ ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ μόνον κατὰ δόξαν· ἀληθὲς δὲ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἀτόμους εἶναι καὶ κενόν, "Democritus doth discredit sense, attributing not truth to it, but only appearance, and that really nothing exists in the corporeal world but atoms and vacuum." And Democritus's own words concerning it are these: Νόμῳ γλυκὺ καὶ νόμῳ πικρὸν, νόμῳ θερμὸν καὶ νόμῳ ψυχρὸν, νόμῳ χροιά· ἐτεῇ δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν, "Sweet and bitter, hot and cold, colours and the like, are by law and opinion, atoms and vacuum really: That which is supposed and fancied to be are sensibles; but these are not according to truth, only atoms and vacuum." Sextus Empiricus likewise in another place writes thus concerning Democritus:† Ἐν δὲ τοῖς κανόσι δύο φησὶν εἶναι γνώσεις, τὴν μὲν διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῆς διανοίας, ὧν τὴν μὲν διὰ τῆς διανοίας γνῶσιν κατάγει προσμαρτυρῶν αὐτῇ τὸ πιστὸν εἰς ἀληθείας κρίσιν, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων σκοτίην ὀνομάζει, ἀφαιρούμενος αὐτῆς τὸ πρὸς διάγνωσιν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἁπλανές· λέγει δὲ κατὰ λέξιν. Γνώμης δὲ δύο εἰσὶν Ἰδέαι, ἡ μὲν γνησίη, ἡ δὲ σκοτίη. Καὶ σκοτίης μὲν τὰ δὲ σύμπαντα Ὄψις, Ἀκοὴ, Ὀδμὴ, Γεῦσις, Ψαῦσις· ἡ δὲ γνησίη ἀποκεκρυμμένη δὲ ταῦτης, "Democritus in his canons saith, that there are two kinds of knowledge, the one by the senses, the other by the mind; of which that by the mind he calls knowledge, accounting it that which may be trusted for the judgment of truth; that by the senses he calleth dark and obscure, denying it to have any certainty as to the knowledge of truth. His own words are these: Of knowledge there are two kinds, the one genuine, the other dark and obscure; to the dark kind of knowledge are referred seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching; but the genuine knowledge is more hidden and recondite than this."

Now, this concerning Democritus I note the rather more carefully, because Epicurus afterward dotingly fumbling about the same philosophy, made sense to be the only criterion of truth and falsehood, and consequently abused this old atomical philosophy to atheism and immorality; whereas, if rightly understood, it is the most impregnable bulwark against both; for this philosophy discovering that the ideas of sense are fantastical, must needs suppose another principle in us superior to sense, which judges what is absolutely and not fantastically or relatively only true or false.

* Advers. Logicos, lib. 1. sect. 135. † Ibid. sect. 138.

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BOOK III.—CHAPTER I.

1. Now, although what I have already said may possibly seem a sufficient confutation of Protagoras' objection against the immutable and absolute natures or essences of all things, from that very atomical physiology which he appeals to, which, if rightly understood, is the most compliable with true metaphysics, and the most subservient to it of any; yet notwithstanding, I think it very proper to the business which I have in hand, to launch out farther into this argument, to show the different natures of sense and intellection, or knowledge, not only that I may thereby the more fully confute this scepticism, or rather fantasticism of Protagoras, and also assert the immutable natures or essences of things, but also for other purposes, which I shall give an account of in the close of this discourse, and I hope then to make it appear that this was no impertinent digression.

2. I shall begin with sense, to show what it is, and that it is not knowledge.

First, therefore it is acknowledged by all, that sense is passion. And there is in all sensation, without dispute, first, a passion in the body of the sentient, which bodily passion is nothing else but local motion impressed upon the nerves from the objects without, and thence propagated and communicated to the brain, where all sensation is made. For there is no other action of one body upon another, nor other change or mutation of bodies conceivable or intelligible besides local motion; which motion in that body which moves another, is called action, in that which is moved by another, passion. And therefore, when a corporeal object very remotely distant is perceived by us, since it is by some passion made upon our body, there must of necessity be a continued propagation of some local motion or pressure from thence unto the organs of our sense, or nerves, and so unto the brain. As when we see many fixed stars sparkling in a clear night, though they be all of them so many thousand semidiameters of the earth distant from us, yet it must of necessity be granted, that there are local motions or pressures from them, which we call the light of them, propagated continuedly or uninterruptedly through the fluid heavens unto our optic nerves, or else we could not see them. And that motion or pressure by which we see all other opaque bodies, is nothing but the Ἀντέρεισμα, "pushing against each other of the etherial globula, "globulous particles," striving to move outward from the centre of the vortex resisted or rejected from the solid superficies of them; in the same manner as we feel things at a distance in the

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dark, by the resistancy which they make upon the further end of the staff that we hold in our hands. And when we hear the sound of a bell or cannon a great way off, the tremulous vibrations of the air, like the circlings of the water when a stone is flung into it, are from thence continually propagated to our ears or acoustic nerves, the undulations still growing the wider and weaker, the further they go.

3. But, forasmuch as sense is not mere local motion impressed from one body upon another, or a body's bare reaction or resistance to that motion of another body, as some have fondly conceited, but a cogitation, recognition, or vital perception and consciousness of these motions or passions of the body, therefore, there must of necessity be another kind of passion also in the soul or principle of life, which is vitally united to the body, to make up sensation. Which passion notwithstanding is of a different kind or species from the former; for the soul, that is a cogitative being, is supposed to be such a thing as can penetrate a body, and therefore cannot be conceived to be locally moved by the local motion of the body. For we see that light which pervades the air, though it be a corporeal motion, yet it is not moved or shaken by the agitations of the air, because it is in a body far more subtle than the air, that runs through the spongy pores of it. Wherefore the soul, though it be conceived to be an extended substance, yet being penetrative of body, not by filling up the pores of it, but by coexisting in the same space with it, cannot be locally moved by the motions of it.

Neither is this passion of the soul in sensation a mere naked passion or suffering; because it is a cogitation or perception which hath something of active vigour in it. For those ideas of heat, light, and colours, and other sensible things, being not qualities really existing in the bodies without us, as the atomical philosophy instructs us, and therefore not passively stamped or imprinted upon the soul from without in the same manner that a signature is upon a piece of wax, must needs arise partly from some inward vital energy of the soul itself, being phantasms of the soul, or several modes of cogitation or perception in it. For which cause some of the Platonists would not allow sensations to be passions in the soul, but only Παθῶν γνώσεις, "active knowledges of the passions of the body."

4. But, as I said before, sense is a passion in the soul also, viz., such a passion as a vital and cogitative being is capable of, because we find by experience that it is not elicited from the soul itself, but obtruded upon it from without; so that the soul cannot choose but have such sensations, cogitations, or affections in it, when such or such external objects are presented to the outward senses. The soul receiving its information from without by sympathizing with the passions of its own body concerning what

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individual bodies exist round about it, and the general modes of them; which no innate reason of its own could possibly discover to it. And therefore the soul being necessarily determined to exert such cogitations within itself, when such local motions are impressed upon the body which she is vitally united to, these sensations are certain kinds of passive energies of the soul. For the soul and body by reason of that vital union which is betwixt them, making up one compositum, "compound" or "animal," do of necessity mutually suffer from each other, the body being variously moved by the soul, and the soul again variously affected from the body, or the motions which are made upon it. Neither doth the soul suffer indifferently from any body, but all sense arises from that natural sympathy or compassion which the soul hath with that individual body with which it is vitally united. And had not the soul such a passive principle in it, it could not possibly be vitally united to any body, neither could there be any such thing as an animal or living creature.

Moreover, these sensitive cogitations, as we shall show afterward, do plainly differ, in the mode of them, from those pure cogitations that are the actions of the soul itself; there being a vast difference between the senses of hunger and thirst, and mere volitions in the soul to eat and drink, as likewise betwixt that grief and sadness that arises from some ill tidings told and understood by the mind (though there be something of corporeal passion consequent or concomitant here also) and betwixt a sense of pain when the body is hurt. And in like manner in those other sensations of light and colours, heat and cold, the soul doth not merely know or understand the figure and motions of those corporeal particles, but hath certain confused affections and phantasms within itself by reason of them. From whence it is evident, that these sensitive cogitations are not pure actions springing from the soul itself, but compassions with the body. And therefore that opinion of the Platonists is no way to be admitted, that "sensations are not passions," but παθῶν γνώσεις, "knowledges of the passions," as if they were free and sincere actions of the soul, or released and unpassionate knowledges in it of the passions of the body.

5. Wherefore sensations formally considered are certain passions or affections in the soul fatally connected with some local motions in the body, whereby the soul perceiveth something else besides those immediate corporeal motions in the nerves, spirits, or brain. For though the soul do only sympathize with the motions of its own body, yet by sense it doth not take immediate cognizance of those very motions themselves, in the brain, spirits, and nerves, perceiving them as they are in themselves, but it is secretly instructed by nature to take notice of some other things thereby that may concern the body.

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For, first, the soul is sometimes so affected by reason of those local motions of the blood and heart communicated by the nerves unto the brain, as that it perceives something within itself, viz., certain pathemata, "passions," of joy or pleasantness, dulness and sadness, or contristation, irascible and concupiscible inclinations, when we know no rational cause for them within ourselves, and therefore they could not spring from the soul itself.

Again, the soul is sometimes so affected by motions communicated from the nerves that belong to the stomach and œsophagus, "windpipe," as that it perceives or takes notice of hunger or thirst in those parts of the body, and the like may be said of the other pains or pleasures, pruriences and titillations of the body, which the soul perceives as things existing in some certain parts of the body itself; when the nerves are in a certain way moved.

Lastly, the soul is frequently so affected by the motions of those five other conjugations of nerves, as that by natural instinct it takes notice of some corporeal things existing without our bodies, whence that motion upon the nerves comes, as light, colours, sounds, heat and cold, hardness, softness, gravity, levity, odours, sapors. The objects being many times remotely distant from us; though it does not perceive them in the same manner as they absolutely exist without us.

Now though all these three kinds mentioned be equally passions and sensations in the soul, yet the use of speech hath appropriated the denomination of passions only to the former, and styled the two latter by the name of sensations, the first of them being commonly called internal corporeal senses, the second external. Wherefore corporeal senses in general may be thus defined, to be "affections in the soul caused by certain local motions made upon some parts of the body, by reason of the vital sympathy betwixt the soul and body, whereby the soul seems to perceive corporeal things existing without itself, either in its own body, or else at a distance from it."

CHAPTER II.

1. Wherefore, sense being a passion in the soul, or a compassion with its own body, which it is vitally united to, that is, diversified according to the difference both of local motions and of bodily organs through which those motions are conveyed; there being a necessary and fatal connexion between certain motions in some parts of the enlivened body, and certain affections or sympathies in the soul, which Democritus seems to intimate in those words: Νόμῳ ψυχρὸν, νόμῳ θερμὸν, "By law a thing is cold, or by law hot," that hot and cold, and the like,

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were passions or phantasms fatally connected with certain local motions in the body. Sense is a kind of dull, confused, and stupid perception obtruded upon the soul from without, whereby it perceives the alterations and motions within its own body, and takes cognizance of individual bodies existing round about it, but doth not clearly comprehend what they are, nor penetrate into the nature of them, it being intended by nature, πρὸς χρείαν, οὐ πρὸς γνῶσιν, as Plotinus speaks, not so properly "for knowledge," as for the "use of the body." For the soul suffering under that which it perceives by way of passion, cannot master or conquer it, that is to say, know or understand it. For so Anaxagoras in Aristotle very fitly expresses the nature of knowledge and intellection under the notion of κρατεῖν, "conquering:" Ἀνάγκη ἄρα, ἐπεὶ πάντα νοεῖ, ἀμιγῆ εἶναι τὸν νοῦν, ὥσπερ φησὶν Ἀναξαγόρας, ἵνα κρατῇ, τοῦτο δ' ἐστιν ἵνα γνωρίζῃ,* "Wherefore it is necessary, since the mind understands all things, that it should be free from mixture and passion, for this end, as Anaxagoras speaks, that it may be able to master and conquer its objects, that is to say, to know or understand them." In like manner Plotinus, in his book of Sense and Memory,† makes πάσχειν, "to suffer," and κρατεῖσθαι, "to be conquered," all one, as also γινώσκειν καὶ κρατεῖν, "to know and to conquer;" for which cause he concludes that that which suffers doth not know: Πάσχειν ἀλλ' οὐ γινώσκειν τὸ ἐγγὺς ποιοῦμεν, ὅτι κρατεῖν δέδοται, ἀλλ' οὐ κρατεῖσθαι, "That which we make to suffer," eo nomine, "in saying so," "we make it not to know, because to know is to conquer, and not to be mastered or conquered." Sense, that suffers from external objects, lies as it were prostrate under them, and is overcome by them: wherefore no sense judges either of its own passion, or of the passion of any other sense, but judgment or knowledge is the active energy of an unpassionate power in the soul.

2. And for this cause Aristotle himself tells us, that the soul is a heterogeneous thing, and hath μόρια, several "parts," in it of a very different nature from one another. First, a higher and active part, which he calls τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ ἀπαθὲς, that which acts separately from the matter, and is impassible, and this is τὸ νοητικὸν, "that which knows and understands;" the other a lower, passive, or sympathetical part which suffers from without, and acts in conjunction with the body, and this is τὸ αἰσθητικὸν, "that to which sensation belongs." So that knowledge and intellection are the clear, serene, and unpassionate perceptions of that higher part of the soul which acts alone, by and from itself. Sensations are the energies of that lower, passive, and sympathetical part, whereby the soul is vitally united to the body, and

* Arist. de Anima, lib. 3. cap. 4.
† Plotinus de Sensu et Memoria, cap. 2.

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cleaving to it, makes up one animal with it. Or else they may be said to be the cogitations of the whole compositum "compound," or "animal," which is the reason that they are so cloudy and confounded, because they arise from the very crasis, "mixture" and confusion of the soul and body as it were blended together.

3. For though the soul be a distinct substance, and of a different nature from the body, yet notwithstanding in every animal it is intimately conjoined with the body, and cleaves to it in such a manner, as that both together compound and make up one thing. And therefore it is not present with it only as a mariner with a ship, that is, merely locally, or knowingly and unpassionately present, they still continuing two distinct things; but it is vitally united to it, and passionately present with it. And therefore when the body is hurt, the soul doth not unpassionately know or understand it, as when a mariner knows that a ship hath sprung a leak, or when a man is informed that his neighbour's house is set on fire; but it feels a strong and vehement pain, and hath a dolorous sense or perception of it, as being one thing with it. So in like manner when the body wants either meat or drink, the soul doth not unpassionately know this as an indifferent by-stander, and therefore rationally only will or desire meat and drink for it, but it feels a passionate sense of hunger and thirst in itself, as being intimately concerned in the business. Now the same is true also in those other sensations in which the animal seems to be less concerned, as of light and colour, heat and cold, sounds and odours, that they are not simple knowledges or intellections of that part of the soul which acts alone by itself, but they are the perceptions of that which is vitally united with the body, and sympathizing with the motions and passions of it, makes up compositum, one "compound" with it. Wherefore though all cogitations be formally in the soul, and not in the body, yet these sensitive cogitations being in the soul no otherwise than as vitally united to the body, they are not so properly the cogitations of the soul, as of τὸ μικτὸν, "the mixed," or συναμφότερον, "both together," as Plotinus calls it, the compound of soul and body, or, as that philosopher will have it, of the "body and a certain vivificating light, imparted from the soul to it." And therefore, as he observeth out of Aristotle, Ὥσπερ ἄτοπον τὴν ψυχὴν ὑφαίνειν, "As it is absurd to say the soul weaves," (or indeed the body either, weaving being a mixed action of the man and weaving instruments) so it is absurd to say that the soul alone doth concupiscere, dolere, or sentire, "covet," "grieve," or "perceive:" these things proceeding from the "compound," or the coalescence of soul and body together; being not pure mental, but corporeal cogitations of the soul, as it vitally informs the body, and is passionately united to it.

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4. Sense therefore is a certain kind of drowsy and somnolent perception of that passive part of the soul, which is as it were asleep in the body, and acts concretely with it. So Plotinus expresses it: Τὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ψυχῆς ἐστιν εὐδούσης· ὅσον γὰρ ἐνσώματι ψυχῆς, τοῦτο εὕδει,* "Sense is of that part of the soul that sleeps, for that of the soul that is immersed into the body, is as it were asleep." It is an energy arising from the body, and a certain kind of drowsy or sleeping life of the soul blended together with it. The perceptions of which, compositum, or animæ semisomnis, "compound," or "of the soul as it were half asleep and half awake," are confused, indistinct, turbid and encumbered cogitations, very different from the energies of the "noetical" part, that acts alone, without sympathy with the body, which are free, clear, serene, satisfactory and awakened cogitations, that is to say, knowledges.

And that these cogitations of the passive part of the soul called sensations, are not knowledges or intellections, is evident by experience also, not only in the senses of hunger and thirst, pain and corporeal titillation, but also in all those other perceptions of light and colours, heat and cold, sounds, odours and sapors. For if they were knowledges or intellections, then all men would rest satisfied in the sensible ideas or phantasms of them, and never inquire any further, at least when the stroke or impression made upon sense were strong and vigorous, as when we see the clear light of the meridian sun, or hear the loud noise of thunder, whereas the one doth but dazzle our eyes, the other deafens our ears, but neither enlighten nor inform our understandings. Whereas, on the contrary, the minds of men are restlessly inquisitive after some further intellectual comprehension of all these things that we perceive by our several senses. Neither is this true of the vulgar only, but it is very observable, that the most acute philosophers in all ages have complained of their ignorance of these things; and indeed have confessed themselves more puzzled and at a loss about these sensible things, than those abstract immaterial things which are remote from bodily sense. Luminis et colorum essentiæ sunt intellectui tam obscuræ, quam sunt ipsa visui manifesta, "The essences of light and colours (saith Scaliger) are as dark to the understanding, as they themselves are open to the sight." Nay, undoubtedly so long as we consider these things no otherwise than sense represents them, that is, as really existing in the objects without us, they are and must needs be eternally unintelligible. Now when all men naturally inquire what these things are, what is light, and what are colours, the meaning hereof is nothing else but this, that men would fain know or comprehend them by something of their own which is native and domestic,

* Enn. 3. lib. 6.

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not foreign to them, some active exertion or anticipation of their own minds, as I shall show afterwards.

Wherefore though sense be adequate and sufficient for that end which nature hath designed it to, viz. to give advertisement of corporeal things existing without us, and their motions for the use and concernment of the body, and such general intimations of the modes of them, as may give the understanding sufficient hints by its own sagacity to find out their natures, and invent intelligible hypotheses to solve those appearances by, (for otherwise reason alone without sense could not acquaint us with individual existent things without us, or assure us of the existence of any thing besides God, who is the only necessarily existent being); yet notwithstanding sense, as sense, is not knowledge or intellection; which I shall still make further appear by these following more particular considerations.

CHAPTER III.

1. For, first, sense only suffering and receiving from without, and having no active principle of its own, to take acquaintance with what it receives, it must needs be a stranger to that which is altogether adventitious to it, and therefore cannot know or understand it. For to know or understand a thing, is nothing else but by some inward anticipation of the mind, that is native and domestic, and so familiar to it, to take acquaintance with it; of which I shall speak more afterward.

2. Sense is but the offering or presenting of some object to the mind, to give it an occasion to exercise its own inward activity upon. Which two things being many times nearly conjoined together in time, though they be very different in nature from one another, yet they are vulgarly mistaken for one and the same thing, as if it were all nothing but mere sensation or passion from the body. Whereas sense itself is but the passive perception of some individual material forms, but to know or understand, is actively to comprehend a thing by some abstract, free and universal ratios, "reasonings," from whence the mind quasi desuper spectans concepta forma quæ subsunt dijudicat, "as it were looking down (as Boethius expresseth it) upon the individuals below it, views and understands them." But sense which lies flat and grovelling in the individuals, and is stupidly fixed in the material form, is not able to rise up or ascend to an abstract universal notion; for which cause it never affirms or denies any thing of its object, because (as Aristotle observes) in all affirmation, and negation at least, the predicate is always universal. The eye which is placed in a level with the

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sea, and touches the surface of it, cannot take any large prospect upon the sea, much less see the whole amplitude of it. But an eye elevated to a higher station, and from thence looking down, may comprehensively view the whole sea at once, or at least so much of it as is within our horizon. The abstract universal rationes, "reasons," are that higher station of the mind, from whence looking down upon individual things, it hath a commanding view of them, and as it were a priori comprehends or knows them.

But sense, which either lies in the same level with that particular material object which it perceives, or rather under it and beneath it, cannot emerge to any knowledge or truth concerning it.

3. Sense is but a slight and superficial perception of the outside and accidentals of a corporeal substance, it doth not penetrate into the profundity or inward essence of it. For a body may be changed as to all the several senses, and remain really the same that it was before. Wherefore, though men are commonly said to know things when they see and feel them, yet in truth by their bodily senses they perceive nothing but their outsides and external induments. Just as when a man looking down out of a window into the streets, is said to see men walking in the streets, when indeed he perceives nothing but hats and clothes, under which, for aught he knows, there may be Dædalean statues moving up and down. Neither is this spoken only in respect of that defect of sight (to omit the other senses) which is a little relieved by microscopical glasses, yet it cannot perceive the figures and contextures of those minute particles out of which bodies are compounded, nor penetrate beyond the superficies into their corporeal profundity; for though our sight were so much more than Lyncean, that it could discover the very pores in glass through which the light passes, as Aristotle complains it cannot; nay, though it could discern the particular globuli, "globulous particles," in the motion of which light consisteth, and the triangular spaces between them through which the smallest and most subtle striated matter passes; yet notwithstanding it would not reach to the essential profundity either of body or sphericalness, or triangularity, which nothing but the subtle acies, "sharpness," of the mind can penetrate into; so as to comprehend the immutable ratio, "reason" of any of them. And therefore it is rightly pronounced by that excellent restorer of the old atomical and Moschical philosophy, Ipsamet corpora non propriè à sensibus vel ab imaginandi facultate, sed solo intellectu percipi, nec ex eo percipi, quòd tangantur aut videantur, sed tantùm ex eo, quòd intelligantur, "That even bodies themselves are not properly perceived by the senses, or by the imagination, but by the understanding alone; nor are

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therefore perceived because they are touched or seen, but only because they are understood.

4. The essence of nothing is reached unto by the senses looking outward, but by the mind's looking inward into itself. That which wholly looks abroad outward upon its object, is not one with that which it perceives, but is at a distance from it, and therefore cannot know and comprehend it; but knowledge and intellection doth not merely prospicere, look out upon a thing at a distance, but makes an inward reflection upon the thing it knows, and according to the etymon of the word, intellectus, "the intellect," doth in interioribus legere, "read inward characters written within itself," and intellectually comprehend its object within itself, and is the same with it. For though this may be conceived to be true of individual things known (although the mind understands them also under abstract notions of its own) yet, at least in Aristotle's sense, it is unquestionably true,* Ἐπὶ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον, "In abstract things themselves," which are the primary objects of science, "the intellect and the thing known are really one and the same." For those ideas or objects of intellection are nothing else but modifications of the mind itself. But αἴσθησις τοῦ ἔξω, "sense is of that which is without," sense wholly gazes and gads abroad, and therefore doth not know and comprehend its object, because it is different from it. Αἴσθησις γραμμὴ, νοῦς κύκλος, "Sense is a line, the mind is a circle." Sense is like a line which is the flux of a point running out from itself, but intellect like a circle that keeps within itself.

5. Sense apprehends individual bodies without, by something derived from them, and so à posteriori, Ὕστεραι οὖσαι αἰσθήσεις εἰκόνες εἰσι, "The senses being last, are the images of the things." The sensible ideas of things are but umbratile and evanid images of the sensible things, like shadows projected from them; but knowledge is a comprehension of a thing proleptically, and as it were, a priori. But now, to lay aside metaphysics, and speak plainly, all that which comes from the individual object of sense from without, (as we have already declared) is nothing at all but local motion or pressure, when an enlivened body is jogged or thrust upon by some other body without. But to receive or feel a jog, knock, or thrust from without made upon the body which the soul is united to, this is not to know, no not so much as what local motion is, much less to know all other things. For knowledge is not a knock or thrust from without, but it consisteth in the awakening and exciting of the inward active powers of the mind.

6. This point which I have hitherto insisted upon concerning the shallowness, dullness, and bluntness of sense, in that it

* De Anima, lib. 2. cap. 50.

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cannot penetrate to the essences of things, is very ingeniously and philosophically handled by Plato, in his Theætetus; where he demonstrates against Protagoras, that science is not sense, but that there is another power in the soul besides that of sense or passion, to which science, knowledge, and intellection is to be referred after this manner. First, Socrates obtains this from Theætetus, that sense is when the soul, by or through several organs of the body, takes cognizance of several corporeal things without. And secondly, that one sense or organical perception cannot take cognizance of the object of another; as sight cannot see sounds, nor the hearing hear light and colours: And therefore, where we think of the objects of several senses comparing them together, and considering of some things common to them all, this cannot be sense or organical perception; because one sense cannot consider the object of another sense. Εἴ τι ἄρα περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοῇ, οὐκ ἂν διά γε τοῦ ἑτέροῦ ὀργάνου αἰσθάνοι ἄν, "If any thing concerns both, it cannot perceive it by either organ." As when we consider sound and colour together at once, and attribute several things to them in common; as first of all essence; and then that in each of them is identity with itself, and diversity to the other, that both of them are two, and each of them one; That they are not like but unlike to one another; what sense or organ is there by which the soul perceives all these things, viz. essence and non-essence, identity, diversity, unity, duality, similitude, dissimilitude, things common both to sound and colour? Surely, it cannot be neither by the senses of sight or of hearing, because these cannot consider one another's objects. Neither can we find any other organ in the body by which the soul may passively take cognizance of all these things, and consider the objects of both those other senses of sight and hearing. Whereby he makes Theætetus confess that these things the soul doth not organically perceive by any sense, but by itself alone without any bodily organ. And therefore, Τὰ μὲν αὐτὴν δι' αὑτῆς ψυχὴν ἐπισκοπεῖν, τὰ δὲ διὰ τῶν τοῦ σώματος δυνάμεων, "Some things the soul perceives by itself, or by its own active power," as essence, similitude, dissimilitude, identity, alterity, good and evil, honest and dishonest. Other things it perceives by and through the organs of the body: as for example, by the sense of touch the soul perceives nothing but the hardness of that which is hard, and the softness of that which is soft, and the like. But essence, and what hardness and softness is, and their contrariety to one another; and again, the essence of contrariety itself, the soul alone by itself discoursing endeavours to judge of. Wherefore, there is this difference between those things that come into the soul by the passions of the body, and those things that arise from the ratiocinative power of the soul itself: Τὰ μὲν εὐθὺ γενομένοις πάρεστι φύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ

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θηρίοις, ὅσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει· τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρός τε οὐσίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν μόγις καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ παιδείας παραγίγνεται, οἷς ἂν καὶ παραγίγνηται, "That both men and beasts do naturally perceive as soon as they be born those things that come into the soul by the passions of the body. But ratiocinations concerning these things as to the natures and essences of them, and their utilities, are slowly by labour and help of institution attained unto." Now, that which doth not reach to the essence of any thing, cannot reach to truth or knowledge. Wherefore, he concludes, Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ· οὐσίας γὰρ καὶ ἀληθείας ἐνταῦθα μὲν ὡς ἔοικε δυνατὸν ἅψασθαι, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἀδύνατον, "That there is no knowledge or science in passions, but in the discourse of the mind upon them; for in this latter way it is possible to reach to the essence and truth of things, but impossible in the former." And that we ought not, Ζητεῖν ἐπιστήμην ἐν αἰσθήσει τὸ παράπαν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὀνόματι ὅτι ποτ' ἔχει ἡ ψυχὴ, ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα, "to seek knowledge any more in sense, but in that of the soul, whatsoever it be called, which doth alone by itself contemplate things that are.

CHAPTER IV.

1. But I have still something more to add concerning this argument before I dismiss it; wherefore, in the next place, I shall make it further appear, that sense is not science or intellection, because the soul by sense doth not perceive the things themselves, or the absolute natures of them, but only her own passions from them. This, Sextus the philosopher took notice of: Αἱ αἰσθήσεις τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα οὐ καταλαμβάνουσι, μόνα δὲ εἰ ἄρα τὰ ἑαυτῶν πάθη, "The senses do not reach to the objects that are placed without, but to their own passions alone." And this is that which Protagoras so much insisted on, that τὰ αἰσθητὰ, all our "sensible ideas" of light and colours, sounds, odours, sapors, heat and cold, and the like, are not absolute but relative things. For neither is αἴσθησις, "sensation" any thing of the soul considered absolutely in itself, it being no pure and sincere cogitation of the soul alone, neither is τὸ αἰσθητὸν, "the sensible idea" any absolute quality of the object without, but both these (viz., αἴσθησις and αἰσθητὸν, "sense and sensible") are certain middle things begotten betwixt the agent and the patient, and resulting from the activity of the object without,

* Pyrr. Hyp. lib. 2. cap. 7.

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and the passion of the mind within, and severally respecting each of them. Or, as he expressed it, Ἐκ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καί τρίψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν, ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις, ἀεί συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, "From the congress or collision of these two together are generated at once both sense and the sensible; for the sensible (formally considered, according to that idea that we have of it) hath no existence before sensation, but is begotten with it." And therefore, Ὁ δὴ ἕκαστον εἶναι φαμὲν χρῶμα οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενόν ἐστι, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι, "Colour and the rest is neither any thing really existing in the object without, nor yet any thing in the soul itself, but a middle thing betwixt both," that is, a passion. Which is the very same with that which Aristotle imputes to the ancient physiologers as a paradox, that black and white were not without the sight.

The truth of which is so evident in some instances, that none can possibly gainsay it. For when the body is either pricked with a needle or wounded with a sword, no man can imagine that those pains that result from thence were such real and absolute qualities existing in the needle or sword before our sensation, but that they are our own passions, and so relative things to us, or perceptions of the motions of the needle or sword relatively to the enlivened body, and as they are hurtful to it. And the same is vulgarly acknowledged in those colours that are therefore called fantastical, as in the iris "rainbow," and the prism, whereas in reality all colours are as fantastical as the colours of the rainbow, and the colours of the rainbow as real as any other. And it is likewise true of the other proper objects of the several senses. For as Sextus the philosopher observes, Οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔστι τὸ μέλι τῷ γλυκάζεσθαί με, καὶ τὸ ἀψίνθιον τῷ πικράζεσθαι, "Honey is not the same thing with my being sweetened, nor wormwood the same with my having sense of bitterness." That which we know by sense concerning honey and wormwood, is only that our taste is so affected from them; but what absolute mode or disposition of parts in them causes these different sensations in us, belongs to some other faculty of the soul to discover. And hence it comes to pass, that though the natures or essences of things be simple, yet one and the same thing perceived by our several senses begets several passions and phantasms in us. Flame, which is nothing but a violent agitation of the small particles of a body by the rapid subtle matter; the same motion communicated to the eye or optic nerves begets one kind of sensible idea or phantasm called light, but to the nerves of touch another quite different from it called heat; therefore neither light nor heat, according to those sensible ideas that we have of them, are really and absolutely in the flame without, which is but one kind of motion or agitation of matter, but only fantastically

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and relatively, the one to our sight, the other to our touch. And hence it proceeds also that sensations are diversified from the same thing to several individuals of the same kind, and to the same individual at several times, by reason of some difference in the idiosyncrasy or proper temperament of the body, as (to omit the instance of those that are icterical) appears plainly in the degrees of heat and cold, the gratefulness or ungratefulness of several tastes and odours to several individuals, or to the same considered both in sickness and in health; which things could not be, if all sensible ideas were absolute qualities in the thing itself, and so taken notice of by sense. And it is worth the while to see how Protagoras philosophized about this latter instance, improving it to this purpose:* "Ὅταν οἶνον πίνω ὑγιαίνων, ἡδὺς μοὶ καὶ γλυκὺς. Ἐγέννησε γὰρ δὴ τό τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον γλυκύτητά τε καὶ αἴσθησιν ἅμα φερόμενα ἀμφότερα. Καὶ ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις πρὸς τοῦ πάσχοντος οὖσα αἰσθανομένην τὴν γλῶσσαν ἀπειργάσατο. Ἡ δὲ γλυκύτης πρὸς τοῦ οἴνου περὶ αὐτὸν φερομένη γλυκὺν τὸν οἶνον τῇ ὑγιαινούσῃ γλώσσῃ καὶ εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι. Ὅταν δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα ἀλλότι ἢ πρῶτον μὲν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν, ἀνομοίῳ γὰρ δὴ προσῆλθε. Ἕτερα δὴ αὖ ἐγεννησάτην ὅ τε τοιοῦτος καὶ ἡ τοῦ οἴνου πόσις περὶ μὲν τὴν γλῶτταν αἴσθησιν πικρότατος, περὶ δὲ τὸν οἶνον γιγνομένην καὶ φερομένην πικρότητα, "When I drink wine, being in health, it appears pleasant and sweet. For the agent and the patient betwixt them beget both sense and sweetness, severally respecting the agent and the patient. For sense respecting the patient, makes and denominates the tongue sentient, and sweetness respecting the agent (that is, the wine) makes and denominates that sweet, not absolutely but respectively to the tongue of one that is in health. But when the patient is altered by sickness, and becomes different from what it was, then it receives quite another taste than formerly, for it comes to a very different patient. Quite different things are produced by the person and the drinking of the wine; respecting the tongue a sense of bitterness, and as to the wine its being made and denominated bitter."

Wherefore since by sense the soul doth not perceive corporeal objects, as they are truly, really and absolutely in themselves, but under some fantastical representations and disguises, sense cannot be knowledge, which comprehends a thing as it is. And indeed if the soul had no other power in it but only this of passion or sensation (as Protagoras supposed), then there could be no such thing at all as any absolute truth or knowledge. But that hypothesis of his, as we have already showed, plainly contradicts and confutes itself. For that which pronounces that our sensible ideas of things are fantastical and relative, must needs be

* The words not of Protagoras but of Socrates in Plato's Theætet. p. 121.

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something in us superior to sense, that is, not relative or fantastical, but that judges what really and absolutely is and is not.

2. But to strike this business home, I shall in the last place further observe, that sense cannot be knowledge, nor the certainty of all things ultimately resolvable into sense, as many men beside Protagoras conceive, for this reason, because the nature of sense consists in nothing else but mere seeming or appearance. This was intimated before in that definition that we gave of sense, that it is ἐν τῷ δοκεῖν, or ἐν τῷ φάινεσθαι, "a passion or affection in the soul, whereby it seems to perceive some corporeal things existing." That is, sense is when the soul is so affected, as if there were such a corporeal thing existing. So that all the reality that is necessarily required to sense, is only this, that there be really a passion in the soul, or that the soul be really so affected as if there were such a thing; that is, that it have really such a seeming or appearance, but not that the thing really be, as it appears. For as to a thing's being such or such, its having such a mode or quality, we have already demonstrated by reason, that in this respect most of our sensible ideas are fantastical things. And the same may be evinced and made evident also by sense itself; for it is as true and real a sensation, when a man looking upon a staff that is partly in the air, and partly in the water, sees it crooked (though it be really straight), as when he looks upon it all in the air, and sees it straight as really it is; for we are as really affected, and there is as much a seeming in one as in the other. And innumerable instances might be given in this kind, to prove that as to things being such or such, there is no other truth or reality necessarily required in sensation, but only that of appearance.

But this is not all, for I shall observe in the next place that there is not so much as the reality of being or existence of the object necessarily required to sensation; but there may be a true sensation, though there be no object at all really existing without the soul. A known and approved instance whereof we have in those that, after they had their arms and legs cut off, have been sensible, when they were awake, of a strong and violent pain in their fingers and toes, though really they had no such members. And we have all constant experience of the same in our dreams, which are as true sensations, as those which we have when we are awake, and when the objects are really existent without us. Because the soul is as really affected, and hath as lively images, ideas, and phantasms of sensible things as existent then, as when we are awake, and many times is really sensible of violent and exquisite pain, which is a real sense, though it be but a fantastical thing; and immediately vanishes away upon our awakening. Because there was nothing really in the body, that by the motions of the nerves could beget a real pain.

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3. Now the reason of this, that the soul may be passively affected in this manner, when there is no object at all really existing without it, is from hence: because by sense the soul doth not suffer immediately from the objects themselves, but only from its own body, by reason of that natural and vital sympathy which it hath with it, neither doth it suffer from its own body in every part of it, or from the outward organs of sense immediately; as from the eye when we see, the tongue when we taste, or the exterior parts of the body when we feel, but only in the brain, or from the motions of the spirits there. But so as that it doth not take immediate cognizance of those very motions immediately as they are in themselves, but by the secret instinct of nature doth by means of them take cognizance of those corporeal things existing without us, from whence the original of the motion comes: as for example, of the stars that are so vastly distant when we look upon the heavens. Whence it comes to pass that if that body from which the soul immediately suffers, and that is the spirits in the brain, be so moved as it would be moved by the nerves when any outward objects present make their several impressions upon the organs of sense, the soul must needs have the same passions, affections, and sensations in it, as if the objects were really existing without. Now this may come to pass either by the fortuitous motions or agitations of the spirits themselves, casually falling into the same figurations, that the motions of the nerves would impress upon them from some outward objects; or else by the spirits rushing against certain prints, traces, or marks in the brain, made by former sensations when we were awake, whereby their motions are determined. Or, lastly, by the fantastical power of the soul itself, which as it suffers from the body, so it can likewise act upon it; and according to our customary actions, or inward affections, inclinations, or desires, may move the spirits variously, and beget divers phantasms in us.

And that dreams are many times thus begotten or excited by the fantastical power of the soul itself, is evident from the orderly connexion and coherence of imaginations, which many times are continued in a long chain or series; with the fiction of interlocutory discourses and dialogues, consisting of apt answers and replies made interchangeably to one another, and contain such things as never were before printed upon the brain in such a series or order; which therefore could not proceed either from the fortuitous dancings or subsultations of the spirits, or from the determination of their motion, by antecedent prints or traces made by former sensations in the substance of the brain.

4. And the dreams that we have in our sleep, are really the same kind of things with those imaginations that we have many times when we are awake, when the fancy, being not

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commanded or determined by the will, roves, and wanders, and runs at random; and spins out a long thread or concatenated series of imaginations or phantasms of corporeal things, quite different from those things which our outward senses at the same time take notice of. And some persons there are to whom these waking dreams are very ordinary and familiar.

And there is little doubt to be made but if a man should suddenly fall asleep in the midst of one of these waking dreams, when his fancy is roving and spinning out such a long series of imaginations, those very imaginations and phantasms would ipso facto, "of course," become dreams, and run on, and appear not as phantasms or imaginations only of things feigned or non-existent, but as perceptions of things really existent, that is, as sensations.

Whereas these imaginations that we have of individual corporeal things when we are awake, and our outward senses employed upon their several objects, do not seem to be sensations of things really existing and present, as our dreams do, but to be certain faint, evanid, shadowy and umbratile things in comparison of those sensations which we have at the same time with them when we are awake, that is, not as things existent without us, but as our own cogitations. The reason whereof is, because though they be both of the same kind, yet those motions of the spirits which are caused by the nerves, from the objects without when we are awake, being more vigorous, durable, constant and prevalent, do naturally obscure or extinguish those other weaker phantasms or imaginations which we have at the same time; and reason interposing, brings in its verdict for those stronger phantasms also whose objects are durable and permanent, by means whereof the latter only seem to be real sensations, the former counterfeit and fictitious imaginations; or mere picture and landscape in the soul. And this Aristotle long ago observed in this manner:* Μεθ' ἡμέραν ἐκκρούονται, ἐνεργουσῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῆς διανοίας, καὶ ἀφανίζονται ὥσπερ παρὰ πολὺ πῦρ ἔλαττον, καὶ λύπαι καὶ ἡδοναὶ μικραὶ παρὰ μεγάλας, πανσαμένων δὲ ἐπιπολάζει καὶ τὰ μικρά, "In the day they are shut out and disappear, the senses and understanding working, as the lesser fire is made to disappear by the greater; and small griefs and pleasures by great ones. But when we are at rest in our beds, the least phantasms make impressions upon us." In the day-time, and when we are awake, those more fleeting fancies and imaginations, which proceed not from the motions of the nerves, caused by the objects without, must needs yield and give place, as being baffled and confuted by those stronger, more durable and lasting motions that come from the nerves, caused by permanent objects, reason also carrying it clearly for the latter, by means

* Libro de Insomniis, cap. 4.

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whereof the former cannot appear as real things or sensations. But when we are asleep, the same phantasms and imaginations are more strong, vivid and lively; because the nerves are relaxated, there are often no motions transmitted by them from the outward objects into the brain, to confound those motions of the spirits within, and distract the soul's attention to them; just as the same loudness of a voice in a still evening will be heard a great deal further and clearer, than in the day-time when the air is agitated with many contrary motions crossing and confounding one another. But now there are no other motions of the spirits, besides these which cause dreams to compare with them; and disgrace them, or put them out of countenance; and as it were, by their louder noise and clamours, so to possess the animadversive part of the soul, that the weaker murmurs of the other cannot obtain to be heard, as it is when we are awake, or in the day-time. And therefore in sleep the mind naturally admits these phantasms as sensations, there appearing none other to contradict that verdict.

5. Wherefore, phantasms and sensible ideas are really or materially the same thing, which Aristotle intimates, affirming that,* *φαντασία* is *αἴσθησίς τις ἀσθενής*, "fancy is a weak kind of sense," and that † *φαντάσματα* are *οἷον αἰσθήματα*, "phantasms are as sensations;" for both phantasms and sensations are passions or sufferings in the soul from the body. And yet notwithstanding every phantasm doth not seem to be a corporeal thing really existing without the soul, as a *αἴσθημα*, "sensation" doth. Wherefore there are two cases in which a phantasm doth not seem to be *αἴσθημα*, "a sensation." First, when a phantasm is raised or excited purposely and voluntarily, by the mere imperium, command or empire of our own will; as by experience we find it often is. For it is in our power to fancy what corporeal thing or person (formerly known to us) we please, though it be absent from us. Nay, and to compound such things as we never saw before; as a golden mountain, a centaur, a chimera. Now in this case, when the soul is conscious to itself, that these phantasms are arbitrarily raised by it, or by its own activity, it cannot look upon them as sensations, or things really existing without itself, but only as evanid images, pictures and adumbrations of things within itself. And such phantasms as these do usually accompany most of our other cogitations. Wherefore phantasmata, "phantasms," do not seem to be *αἰσθήματα*, "sensations" or perceptions of things as really existing without the soul, when they are voluntary, or when the soul is inwardly conscious that they are raised up by its own activity.

Secondly, neither doth every involuntary phantasm, or such as the soul is not conscious to itself to have purposely excited or

* De Anima, lib. 3. cap. 4. † Ibid. cap. 9.

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raised up within itself, seem to be αἴσθημα, "a sensation" or perception of a thing, as existing without us; for there may be straggling phantasms, which come into the mind we know not how; and bubble up of themselves, which yet the soul may distinguish from αἰσθήματα, "sensations" or perceptions of things, as existing really without it; because of some other phantasms at the same time in the soul, whose vigours and lustre do cloud and eclipse them. For when there are phantasms of several kinds at the same time in the soul, or such as arise from different motions of the spirits, the soul silently comparing both together, naturally looks upon the more vigorous, strong, and permanent of those phantasms only as real existences; but the more faint, flitting, and transitory, as imaginary things. Now there are two kinds of involuntary phantasms, as I have already intimated, in the soul, when we are awake. One that proceeds from such motions of the spirits as are caused by the nerves moved from the objects without: another that proceeds from the spirits of the brain, otherwise moved than by the nerves: and therefore in vigiliâ, "when we are awake," and have phantasms of both these kinds together in the soul, those phantasms that arise from the motions of the nerves caused by the objects without, appearing very different from those other phantasms that arise from the spirits otherwise moved than by the nerves, both in respect of their vigour and constancy, do therefore to all such persons, as are not distempered either in body or in mind, naturally seem to be real, or things existing without the soul, but the latter imaginary. Whereas in sleep, when the nerves being relaxated, communicate no motion to the spirits, the very same phantasms (there being now no other and stronger to compare with them and discredit or disgrace them) do naturally appear to the soul as sensations of things really existing without the soul.

6. Now the truth of this matter doth evidently appear from hence, in that by reason of some disease either of body or mind, men's spirits may be so furiously, violently, and strongly agitated, that those phantoms which do not arise from the motion of the nerves, being most prevalent and predominant, even when they are awake, may become αἰσθήματα, "sensations" and appearances of things as really existing without the soul; that men may confidently believe they hear, see, and feel those things that are not, and be imposed upon in all their senses. Which is a thing that frequently happens, not only in phrenetical, maniac, and hypochondriacal persons, of which there are many instances recorded, but also in others possessed with strong passions of fear, love, and the like. Wherefore as sense, that is, the phantasms that arise from the motion communicated to the spirits of the brain by the nerves, do ordinarily baffle and confute imaginations and fancy; that is, those phantasms that arise from the

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spirits, otherwise moved than by the nerves, so likewise imaginations growing wild, rampant, and exorbitant, may in the same manner baffle and confute all our senses.

7. Which exorbitancy of fancy or imagination prevailing over sense, or those phantasms which arise from the motion communicated to the brain from the objects without by the nerves, may either proceed originally from some disease in the body, whereby the animal spirits being furiously heated and agitated, may be carried with so great a force and career, as that the motions caused from the objects by the nerves being weakened, may yield and give place to them, and their phantasms be in a manner silent, vanquished and obliterated by them; those stronger phantasms that arise from the agitation of the spirits themselves, possessing the place of them, the affection or animadversion of the soul being always won by those phantasms that make the loudest noise, or have the greatest vigour. Or else the same thing may proceed originally from some disease or distemper in the soul itself. When the lower, irrational, and passive part of the soul (in which the concupiscible and irascible affections are seated), and so by consequence, the fantastic power of the soul (the same power that begets in us those waking dreams before-mentioned) grows excessively and exorbitantly predominant, insomuch that it doth not only weaken and extinguish the noetical powers, which are always proportionably debilitated as this is invigorated, but also prevent the power of sense itself, the immoderate activity of the fancy not permitting the soul to suffer from, or be passive to, the action of the objects upon it, nor quietly to receive the impressions of them, without ruffling and confounding them. And this is that sad and lamentable condition that the soul of man is liable and obnoxious to, by its overmuch indulgence to that passive, and irrational, and corporeal part in which the affections, appetites, and desires are seated; a condition which, if it continue always, is worse than death itself, or perfect annihilation. To have not only reason degraded and dethroned, but even sense itself perverted or extinguished, and in the room thereof boisterous phantasms protruded from the irrational appetites, passions, and affections (now grown monstrous and enormous) to become the very sensations of it, by means whereof it is easy to conceive that the divine nemesis, "vengeance," may make the soul its own tormentor, though there were no other hell without it, not only by representing most loathsome and affrightful, dismal and tragical scenes of things to itself, but also by cruciating itself with exquisite and sensible pains. And the serious consideration hereof should make us very careful how we let the reins loose to that passive irrational part of our soul which knows no bounds nor measures, lest thereby we unawares precipitate and plunge our-

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selves headlong into the most sad and deplorable condition that is imaginable.

8. I shall not discourse here, of that power also which evil genii, "spirits" may possibly have upon those that have either mancipated themselves unto them, or otherwise forfeited that ordinary protection which divine providence commonly affordeth to all, by acting immediately upon the spirits of the brain, and thereby endeavour to give an account of those phenomena of wizards and witches vulgarly talked of, their seeming transportations in the air, nocturnal conventicles and junkettings, and other such like things, as seem plainly contradictious and unreconcilable to philosophy: but we have already said enough to prove that sense is nothing but seeming and appearance. And therefore we can have no certainty by sense alone either concerning the absolute natures of individual corporeal things without us, nor indeed of their existence; but all the assurance that we have thereof arises from reason and intellect judging of the phantasms or appearances of sense, and determining in which of them there is an absolute reality, and which of them are but merely relative or fantastical.

BOOK IV.—CHAPTER I.

1. Having hitherto showed that sense or passion from corporeal things existent without the soul, is not intellection or knowledge, so that bodies themselves are not known or understood by sense; it must needs follow from hence, that knowledge is an inward and active energy of the mind itself, and the displaying of its own innate vigour from within, whereby it doth conquer, Κρατεῖν, master and command its objects, and so begets a clear, serene, victorious, and satisfactory sense within itself.

Wherefore though it be vulgarly conceived that knowledge arises from the force of the thing known, acting upon that which knows from without; yet contrariwise it is most certain, to use Boethius' expression,* Id quod scitur, non ex suâ vi, sed ex comprehendentis vi et facultate sciri vel cognosci, "That intellection and knowledge do not arise from the force and activity of the thing known from without, upon that which knows, but from the inward power, vigour and activity of the mind that knows actively, comprehending the object within itself, and subduing and prevailing over it." So that knowledge is not a passion from any thing without the mind, but an active exertion of the inward strength, vigour and power of the mind, displaying itself

* De Consolat. Philos. lib. 5. p. 131.

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from within; and the intelligible forms by which things are understood or known, are not stamps or impressions passively printed upon the soul from without, but ideas vitally protended or actively exerted from within itself.

2. A thing which is merely passive from without, and doth only receive foreign and adventitious forms, cannot possibly know, understand or judge of that which it receives, but must needs be a stranger to it, having nothing within itself to know it by. The mind cannot know any thing, but by something of its own, that is native, domestic and familiar to it. When in a great throng or crowd of people, a man looking round about, meets with innumerable strange faces, that he never saw before in all his life, and at last chances to espy the face of one old friend or acquaintance, which he had not seen or thought of many years before; he would be said in this case to have known that one, and only that one face in all that company, because he had no inward, previous or anticipated form of any other face, that he looked upon, in his mind; but as soon as ever he beheld that one face, immediately there revived and started forth a former anticipated form or idea of it treasured up in his mind, that, as it were taking acquaintance with that newly received form, made him know it or remember it. So when foreign, strange and adventitious forms are exhibited to the mind by sense, the soul cannot otherwise know or understand them, but by something domestic of its own, some active anticipation or prolepsis within itself, that occasionally reviving and meeting with it, makes it know it, or take acquaintance with it. And this is the only true and allowable sense of that old assertion, that knowledge is reminiscence, not that it is the remembrance of something which the soul had sometime before actually known in a pre-existent state; but because it is the mind's comprehending of things by some inward anticipations of its own, something native and domestic to it, or something actively exerted from within itself.

And thus Plotinus argues, when he endeavours to prove that the immediate *τὰ νοητά*, objects of knowledge and intellection, are not things without the mind acting upon it at a distance, but contained and comprehended within the mind itself:* *Πῶς δὲ καὶ γνώσεται ὅτι ἀντελάβετο ὄντως, πῶς δὲ ὅτι ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο ἢ ὅτι καλὸν ἢ δίκαιον; Ἕκαστον γὰρ τούτων ἄλλο αὐτοῦ, καὶ οὐκ ἐν αὐτῷ αἱ τῆς κρίσεως ἀρχαὶ αἷς πιστεύσει, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐταὶ ἔξω καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἐκεῖ,* "Otherwise how should the mind know or judge when it had really apprehended any thing, that this is good, that honest or just, these things being all strangers to the mind, and coming into it from without. So that the mind could not have any principles of judgment within itself in this case, but these would be without it, and then the truth must needs be without it also."

* Enn. 5. lib. 5. cap. 1.

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3. If intellection and knowledge were mere passion from without, or the bare reception of extraneous and adventitious forms, then no reason could be given at all why a mirror or looking-glass should not understand; whereas it cannot so much as sensibly perceive those images which it receives and reflects to us. And therefore sense of itself, as was before intimated, is not a mere passion, but a passive perception of the soul, which hath something of vital energy in it, because it is a cogitation; to which vital energy of the soul those sensible ideas of light, colours, heat, and the like, owe all their entity. Much less therefore can intellection be a pure passion. But if intellection and knowledge were a mere passive perception of the soul from without, and nothing but sense, or the result of it, then what reason could be given, why brute animals, that have all the same senses that men have, and some of them more acute, should not have intellection also, and be as capable of logic, mathematics, and metaphysics, and have the same notions of morality, of a Deity and religion that men have? Wherefore it must of necessity be granted, that besides passion from corporeal things, or the passive perception of sense, there is in the souls of men another more active principle or vis cognoscendarum rerum innata, an "innate cognoscitive power," whereby they are enabled to understand or judge of what is received from without by sense. And some, that would otherwise make the soul as naked a thing as is possible, are forced to acknowledge thus much. And hereby they grant all that we contend for and they deny, though considering not in the mean time what they say. For this innate cognoscitive power in the soul, can be nothing else but a power of raising intelligible ideas and conceptions of things from within itself. For it is not possible that any knowledge should be without an objective idea or conception of something known included in it, or that *νόησις*, "the intellection," should be in one faculty, and *νόημα*, "the conception," in another, one in the intellect, and the other in the fancy. That knowledge should be actively produced from within, and the conception or objective idea passively received from without, that the mind should exert an act of knowledge or intellection without an object, or upon an object without itself, and not comprehended by it, that the idea of the thing known should not be comprehended in the knowledge of it. Whereas, as Aristotle himself hath observed, Τὸ *αὐτὸ ἔστιν ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι*, "Actual knowledge is in reality the same with the thing known, or the idea of it," and therefore inseparable from it. It being nothing but the mind's being conscious of some intelligible idea within itself.

4. And therefore, whereas the only objects of sense are indi-

* De Anima, lib. 3. cap. 6.

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vidual corporeal things existing without the mind, which the soul perceives by looking out from itself upon that from which it suffers, not actively comprehended within itself; the primary and immediate objects of intellection and knowledge, are not things existing without the mind, but the ideas of the mind itself actively exerted, that is, the intelligible rationes, "reasons," of things. Νόησις οὐ τοῦ ἔξω, ὥσπερ ἡ αἴσθησις, "The intellection is not of what is without, as sense is." And ὅτι οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ νοῦ τὰ νοητὰ, "the immediate objects of intellection are not without the mind that understands." They are assertions that Plotinus* at large demonstrates. And Aristotle frequently asserts the same:† Ἐπὶ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον· ἡ γαρ ἐπιστήμη ἡ θεωρητικὴ καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστι, "In abstracted things that which understands and that which is understood are the same; for the theoretical science and the scibile, 'knowable,'" or object of knowledge are all one. And ὅλως ὁ νοῦς ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν τὰ πράγματα νοῶν, "the mind altogether is that which understands things." These being all but several modifications of intellect. For as hard and soft, hot and cold, and the like corporeal qualities, are but several modifications of matter, so the several objective ideas of the mind in scientifical speculation, are but several modifications of the mind knowing. Wherefore individual things existing without the soul, are but the secondary objects of knowledge and intellection, which the mind understands not by looking out from itself as sense doth, but by reflecting inwardly upon itself, and comprehending them under those intelligible ideas or rationes, "reasonings," of its own, which it protrudes from within itself; so that the mind or intellect may well be called (though in another sense than Protagoras meant it) τὸ μέτρον πάντων, "the measure of all things."

5. For the soul having an innate cognoscitive power universally (which is nothing else but a power of raising objective ideas within itself, and intelligible rationes, "reasons," of any thing), it must needs be granted that it hath a potential omniformity in it. Which is not only asserted by the Platonists, that the soul is πάντα νοερῶς, "all things intellectually," but also by Aristotle himself, τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τὰ ὄντα πῶς πάντα, "that the soul is in a manner all things." The mind being a kind of notional or representative world, as it were a diaphanous and crystalline sphere, in which the ideas and images of all things existing in the real universe may be reflected or represented. For as the mind of God, which is the archetypal intellect, is that whereby he always actually comprehends himself, and his own fecundity, or the extent of his own infinite

* Enn. 5. lib. 5. cap. 1. 2.

† De Anima, lib. 3. cap. 6.

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goodness and power; that is, the possibility of all things; so all created intellects being certain ectypal models, or derivative compendiums of the same; although they have not the actual ideas of all things, much less are the images or sculptures of all the several species of existent things fixed and engraven in a dead manner upon them; yet they have them all virtually and potentially comprehended in that one vis cognitrix, "cognoscitive power," of the soul, which is a potential omniformity, whereby it is enabled as occasion serves and outward objects invite, gradually and successively to unfold and display itself in a vital manner, by framing intelligible ideas or conceptions within itself of whatsoever hath any entity or cogitability. As the spermatic or plastic power doth virtually contain within itself the forms of all the several organical parts of animals, and displays them gradually and successively, framing an eye here and an ear there.

6. Now because intellection and knowledge are not passion from without, but an active exertion of the mind from within itself, hence it comes to pass, as Aristotle hath observed, that the mind by knowing that which is *σφόδρα νοητὸν*, "exceedingly intelligible," the most radiant and illustrious truths, is not debilitated thereby or overpowered, as sense is in perceiving that which is *σφόδρα αἰσθητὸν*, "exceedingly sensible," as the brightness of the sun; but contrariwise the more invigorated thereby, and the better enabled to comprehend lesser and smaller truths; because though sense is passive and organical, yet knowledge is inorganical and an active power and strength of the mind, which the more it is exerted, is the more thereby invigorated and enlarged.

From hence likewise it is, as the same Aristotle hath observed,* *ἀκριβεστέραν ἐπιστήμην τῆς ἐπιστήμης, τὴν μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου τῆς καθ' ὑποκειμένου, οἷον ἀριθμητικὴν τῆς ἁρμονικῆς*, "that those knowledges which are more abstract and remote from matter, are more accurate," intelligible and demonstrable, than those which are conversant about concrete and material things, as arithmetic than harmonics, which are numbers concrete with sounds; and so likewise geometry than astronomy, or the mixed mathematics; whereas if all knowledge did arise from corporeal things by way of sense and passion, it must needs be contrariwise true, that the more concrete and sensible things were, the more knowable they would be. Moreover, from hence it is also, as experience tells us, that scientifical knowledge is best acquired by the soul's abstraction from the outward objects of sense, and retiring into itself, that so it may the better attend to its own inward notions and ideas. And therefore it is many times observed, that overmuch reading and hearing of other

* Analyt. Posterior. lib. 1. cap. 27.

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men's discourses, though learned and elaborate, doth not only distract the mind, but also debilitates the intellectual powers, and makes the mind passive and sluggish, by calling it too much outwards. For which cause that wise philosopher Socrates altogether shunned that dictating and dogmatical way of teaching used by the sophisters of that age, and chose rather an aporetical and obstetricious method; because knowledge was not to be poured into the soul like liquor, but rather to be invited and gently drawn forth from it; nor the mind so much to be filled therewith from without, like a vessel, as to be kindled and awakened. Lastly, from hence is that strange parturiency that is often observed in the mind, when it is solicitously set upon the investigation of some truth, whereby it doth endeavour, by ruminating and revolving within itself as it were to conceive it within itself, parturire, "to bring it forth out of its own womb;" by which it is evident, that the mind is naturally conscious of its own active fecundity, and also that it hath a criterion within itself, which will enable it to know when it hath found that which it sought.

7. Wherefore it is evident from what we have declared, that there are two kinds of perceptive cogitations in the soul: the one passive, when the soul perceives by suffering from its body, and the objects without; the other active, when it perceives by exerting its own native vigour from within itself. The passive perceptions of the soul have two several names given unto them; for when the soul, by sympathizing with the body, seems to perceive corporeal things, as present and really existing without it, then they are called *αἰσθήματα*, "sensations." But when the passive affections of the soul are looked upon not as things really existing without the mind, but only as pictures of sensible things in the mind, or more crass or corporeal cogitations, then they are called *φαντάσματα*, "phantasms," or imaginations. But these *φαντάσματα* and *αἰσθήματα*, "phantasms" and "sensations," being really the same things, as we said before, both of them being passions or affections in the soul, caused by some local motions in the body, and the difference between them being only accidental, insomuch that *φαντάσματα*, "phantasms," may be changed into *αἰσθήματα*, "sensations," and sometimes also *αἰσθήματα*, "sensations," into *φαντάσματα*, "phantasms," therefore all these passive perceptions of the soul may be called in general *φαντάσματα*, "phantasms." But the active perceptions which rise from the mind itself without the body, are commonly called *νοήματα*, "conceptions of the mind;" and so we have the two species of perceptive cogitations; the one *φαντάσματα*, "phantasms," and the other *νοήματα*, "conceptions of the mind."

8. Now that all our perceptive cogitations are not *φαντάσματα*, "phantasms," as many contend, but that there is another species

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of perceptive cogitations distinct from them, arising from the active vigour of the mind itself, which we therefore call *νοήματα*, "conceptions of the mind," is demonstrably evident from hence; because phantasms are nothing else but sensible ideas, images, or pictures of outward objects, such as are caused in the soul by sense; whence it follows, that nothing is *φανταστὸν*, "the object of fancy," but what is also *αἰσθητὸν*, "the object of sense," nothing can be fancied by the soul, but what is perceptible by sense. But there are many objects of our mind, which we can neither see, hear, feel, smell, nor taste, and which did never enter into it by any sense; and therefore we can have no sensible pictures or ideas of them, drawn by the pencil of that inward limner or painter which borrows all his colours from sense, which we call fancy; and if we reflect on our own cogitations of these things, we shall sensibly perceive that they are not fantastical, but noematical. As for example, justice, equity, duty and obligation, cogitation, opinion, intellection, volition, memory, verity, falsity, cause, effect, genus, species, nullity, contingency, possibility, impossibility, and innumerable more such there are that will occur to any one that shall turn over the vocabularies of any language, none of which can have any sensible picture drawn by the pencil of the fancy. And there are many whole propositions likewise, in which there is not any one word or notion that we can have any genuine phantasm of, much less can fancy reach to an apprehension of the necessity of the connexion of the terms. As for example: Nihil potest esse et non esse eodem tempore, "Nothing can be and not be at the same time." What proper and genuine phantasms can any perceive in his mind either of nihil, "nothing," or potest, "can," or esse, "be," or et, "and," or non esse, "not be," or eodem, "at the same," or tempore, "time."

9. Neither was it asserted by Aristotle, as some have taken for granted, that all our perceptive cogitations are phantasms, but contrariwise, that there are *νοήματα*, "conceptions of the mind" which are distinct things from *φαντάσματα*, "phantasms," only that the latter were always individual companions of the former. This appears from those words of his: *Νοήματα τινὶ διοίσει τοῦ μὴ φαντάσματα εἶναι, ἢ οὐδὲ ταῦτα φαντασμάτα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασμάτων,** "The conceptions of the mind somewhat differ from phantasms, they are not phantasms, but neither are they without phantasms. Where he inclines to this, that the *νοήματα*, "conceptions of the mind," are not *φαντάσματα*, "phantasms," but that they have phantasms always joined with them. So again afterwards he asks: *Εἰ τὸ νοεῖν φαντασία, ἢ μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας*, "Whether intellection be fancy, or rather a different thing from fancy, but such as never goes without it." Which indeed he

* De Anima, lib. 3. cap. 9.

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affirms in other places, that the mind doth never νοεῖν, "conceive" without a phantasm. Now, this is true of sensible and corporeal things, that we never understand them, but we have also some confused phantasms or other of them in our mind, and yet besides the φαντάσματα, "phantasms," the mind exerts νοήματα, "conceptions" also upon them, or else it could not understand them, phantasms being but imperfect, incomplete, and superficial cogitations, which sometimes go before, and invite or call in the meanwhile the perceptions of the mind, and sometimes follow and attend upon the νοήματα, "conceptions of the mind," as the shadow upon the substance, but never comprehend the thing. And indeed, as we ourselves consist of soul and body naturally united together, so are the cogitations that we have of corporeal things usually both noematical and phantasmatical together, the one being as it were the soul, and the other the body of them. For when a geometrician considers a triangle, being about to demonstrate that it hath three angles equal to two right angles, no doubt but he will have the phatasmatical picture of some triangle in his mind; and yet notwithstanding he hath also a noematical perception or intellectual idea of it too, as appears from hence, because every express picture of a triangle must of necessity be either obtusangular or rectangular, or acutangular, but that which in his mind is the subject of this proposition thought on, is the ratio, "reason," of a triangle undetermined to any of these species. And the like might be observed also of the word angles in the same proposition. In like manner, whenever we think of a phantasmatical, universal, or universalized phantasm, or a thing which we have no clear intellection of; as for example, of the nature of a rose in general, there is a complication of something noematical, and something phantasmatical together; for φαντάσματα, "phantasms," in themselves alone, as well as αἰσθήματα, "sensations," are always individual things. And by a rose considered thus universally and phantasmatically, we mean a thing which so affects our sense in respect of figure and colour.

10. But as for those other objects of cogitation, which we affirmed before to be in themselves neither αἰσθητὰ, "the objects of sense," nor φανταστὰ, "the objects of fancy," but only νοητὰ, "things understood," and therefore can have no natural and genuine phantasms properly belonging to them; yet it is true, notwithstanding that the fantastic power of the soul, which would never willingly be altogether idle or quite excluded, will busily intend itself here also. And therefore many times, when the intellect or mind above is exercised in abstracted intellections and contemplations, the fancy will at the same time busily employ itself below, in making some kind of apish imitations, counterfeit iconisms, symbolical adumbrations and resemblances

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of those intellectual cogitations of sensible and corporeal things. And hence it comes to pass, that in speech, metaphors and allegories do so exceedingly please, because they highly gratify this fantastical power of passive and corporeal cogitation in the soul, and seem thereby also something to raise and refresh the mind itself, otherwise lazy and ready to faint and be tired by overlong abstracted cogitations, by taking its old companion the body to go along with it, as it were to rest upon, and by affording to it certain crass, palpable, and corporeal images, to incorporate those abstracted cogitations in, that it may be able thereby to see those still more silent and subtle notions of its own, sensibly reflected to itself from the corporeal glass of the fancy.

Sometimes also there are other spurious phantasms that do little or nothing symbolize with the noetical cogitations, that yet are arbitrarily or customarily annected to them, merely because the fantastic power would not stand wholly idle and unemployed; so that when the mind thinks of such an intelligible idea, the fancy will presently hold forth such a customary phantasm before it, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶ εἰδωλοποιοῦντες, "as those that use artificial memory, make certain phantasms at pleasure" to signify certain cogitations.

But lastly, rather than the fancy shall quite stand out and do just nothing at all, it will sometimes exercise itself (especially in speech) in raising phantasms of the very sounds and names, by which the notions of the mind are signified respectively. So that it is very true both that there are active νοήματα, "cogitations of the mind" distinct from φαντάσματα, "phantasms;" and such of which there can be no natural and genuine phantasms or sensible pictures; and yet according to Aristotle's opinion, that frequently those νοήματα, "conceptions of the mind" (at least in the vulgar, that are little accustomed to abstracted cogitation) have some kind of spurious and counterfeit, or verbal and nominal phantasms joined with and accompanying of them.

11. As for that opinion, that the νοήματα, "conceptions of the mind," and intelligible ideas or rationes, "reasons," of the mind should be raised out of the φαντάσματα, "phantasms," by the strange chemistry of intellectus agens, "an agent intelligence;" this as it is founded on a mistake of Aristotle's meaning, who never dreamed of any such a chimerical intellectus agens, "agent intelligence," as appears from the Greek interpreters that best understood him; so it is very like to that other opinion called Peripatetical, that asserts the eduction of immaterial forms out of the power of matter; and as both of them arise from the same sottishness of mind that would make stupid and senseless matter the original source of all things; so there is the same impossibility in both, that perfection should be raised out

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of imperfection, and that vigour, activity and awakened energy, should ascend and emerge out of dull, sluggish and drowsy passion. But indeed this opinion attributes as much activity to the mind, if at least the agent intelligence be a part of it, as ours doth; as he would attribute as much activity to the sun, that should say the sun had a power of educing light out of night or the dark air, as he that should say the sun had a power of exerting light out of his own body. The former being but an improper way of expressing the same thing, which is properly signified in the latter way.

But that other opinion, that asserts that the abstract and universal rationes, "reasons," of things, as distinct from phantasms, are nothing else but mere names without any signification, is so ridiculously false, that it deserves no confutation at all.

CHAPTER II.

1. That there are some ideas of the mind which were not stamped or imprinted upon it from the sensible objects without, and therefore must needs arise from the innate vigour and activity of the mind itself, is evident, in that there are, first, ideas of such things as neither are affections of bodies, nor could be imprinted or conveyed by any local motions, nor can be pictured at all by the fancy in any sensible colours; such as are the ideas of wisdom, folly, prudence, imprudence, knowledge, ignorance, verity, falsity, virtue, vice, honesty, dishonesty, justice, injustice, volition, cogitation, nay, of sense itself, which is a species of cogitation, and which is not perceptible by any sense; and many other suchlike notions as include something of cogitation in them, or refer to cogitative beings only; which ideas must needs spring from the active power and innate fecundity of the mind itself, because the corporeal objects of sense can imprint no such things upon it. Secondly, in that there are many relative notions and ideas, attributed as well to corporeal as incorporeal things that proceed wholly from the activity of the mind comparing one thing with another. Such as are cause, effect, means, end, order, proportion, similitude, dissimilitude, equality, inequality, aptitude, inaptitude, symmetry, asymmetry, whole and part, genus and species, and the like.

2. But that which imposes upon men's judgments here, so as to make them think, that these are all passive impressions made upon the soul by the objects of sense, is nothing else but this; because the notions both of those relative ideas, and also of those other immaterial things (as virtue, wisdom, the soul, God) are

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most commonly excited and awakened occasionally from the appulse of outward objects knocking at the doors of our senses. And these men not distinguishing betwixt the outward occasion or invitation of those cogitations, and the immediate active or productive cause of them, impute them therefore all alike, as well these intelligible, as the other sensible ideas, or phantasms, to the efficiency or activity of the outward objects upon us. Wherefore that we may the better understand how far the passion of sense reaches, and where the activity of the mind begins, we will compare these three things together: First, a mirror, looking-glass or crystal globe; secondly, a living eye, that is, a seeing or perceptive mirror or looking-glass; thirdly, a mind or intellect superadded to this living eye or seeing mirror.

3. First, therefore, when the same objects are equally exposed or held before a crystal globe or looking-glass, and a living eye; there are all the same impressions made upon the crystal globe that there are upon the living eye; which appears from hence, because the eye looking upon the crystal globe or mirror, will see all the same images reflected to itself from thence, that it perceived before immediately from the objects themselves. The motion and pressure of the ethereal globuli, "globulous particles," in which the nature of light is conceived to consist, from every opaque object, bearing alike every way upon that which resists, and therefore as much upon the mirror as the eye; so that there is every jot as much corporeal passion in the mirror or crystal globe, as in the glassy part of the living eye; for, as we said before, the corporeal part of the eye is indeed nothing else but a mirror or looking-glass. And yet notwithstanding, the mirror or crystal globe doth not see or perceive any thing as the eye doth; from whence we learn, first, that things are never perceived merely by their own force and activity upon the percipient, but by the innate force, power and ability of that which perceives. And therefore, secondly, that sense itself is not a mere corporeal passion, but a perception of the bodily passions proceeding from some power and ability supposed to reside in a sensitive soul, vitally united to that respective body. Which perception, though it have something of energy in it, as being a cogitation; yet it is rightly called a passion of the soul, because it is not a clear intellective or cognoscitive perception of the motions of the body, but a passive or sympathetical perception only. Whereby, according to nature's instinct, it hath several seemings or appearances begotten in it of those resisting objects without it at a distance, in respect of colour, magnitude, figure and local motion; by reason of the difference of those rectilinear motions communicated from them by the intermediate globuli, "globulous particles," and impressed upon the optic nerves.

Wherefore the living eye immediately perceives nothing but

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these corporeal passions which are made equally upon it, and the mirror or crystal globe alike, by the motion of that intermediate or subtle body which causeth light; which corporeal passions being also passively perceived by that vital principle called the sensitive power residing in the eye, all passion from the outward object there ceaseth, and goes no further; but that power of the soul that next followeth, which is the third thing that we mentioned before, the intellect, begins immediately to exert and display its activity upon the object passively perceived by sense.

4. But the better to illustrate the business in hand, let us again suppose some ingenious piece of mechanism, or artificial automaton; as for example, an horologe or watch, at once held before the mirror or crystal globe, and also exposed to the particular view of the living or sentient eye, both in the outside and interior fabric of it; so that as every part in it is reflected from the mirror, so it may be consciously perceived also by the sentient eye, in a particular successive view. Now the sentient eye will be conscious or perceptive of nothing in all this, but only its being variously affected, from different colours, figures, protuberancies, cavities, sculptures, local motions, one after another, all the same things which were impressed on the crystal globe or mirror, and reflected from it, there being no difference at all betwixt the one and the other, but that the eye was conscious or perceptive of what it suffered, but the mirror not. But now the mind or intellect being superadded to this sentient eye, and exerting its active and more comprehensive power upon all that which was reflected from the mirror, and passively perceived by the sentient eye, as it doth actually and intellectually comprehend the same things over again, which sense had perceived before in another manner (of which we must speak afterward), so it proceeds further, and compares all the several parts of this ingenious machine or self-mover one with another, taking notice first, of the spring, as the original and cause of all the motion in it; of the chain or string, by the mediation of which that motion is communicated to the fusee; of the balance that reciprocating moderates the motion of the several wheels, some greater, some lesser, propagating the motion from one to another; of the horary circle divided into equal parts; and, lastly, of the index, moving round about the circle, through equal space in equal time, all these in their several scheses, "relations" to one another and the whole. Whereupon the intellect, besides figure, colour, magnitude and motions, raises and excites within itself the intelligible ideas of cause, effect, means, end, priority and posteriority, equality and inequality, order and proportion, symmetry and asymmetry, aptitude and inaptitude, sign and thing signified, whole and part, in a manner, all the logical and relative notions that are. Whereas the sentient eye, by which this whole me-

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chanism was represented to the intellect, perceived none of all these things; neither cause nor effect, nor equality nor irregularity, nor order nor proportions, nor symmetry nor asymmetry, nor sign nor thing signified, nor whole nor part; since there is no colour nor figure in any of these things. And if the sentient eye could dispute with the mind or intellect, it would confidently avow and maintain, that there were no such entities as those in this automaton "self-moving machine," and that the understanding was abused and deceived in those apprehensions; since all that was impressed from the object was, by the sentient eye, faithfully transmitted to it, and the intellect received all its intelligence or information from it. And to make its cause good, sense would appeal to the mirror or crystal globe standing by, in which there were no images of any of those invisible ideas or logical notions reflected. Wherefore since sense doth freely conceive and ingenuously own, that none of these ideas are passively and phantasmatically stamped upon it from the objects without; be they what they will, real or not real, certain it is that they are the objects of the intellect, and they must of necessity be raised in it by its own innate vigour and activity.

5. Indeed though it should be granted, that the scheses, "relations," of cause and effect, whole and parts, and the like, were mere notions of the mind and modes of conceiving in us, that only signify what things are relatively to intellect; yet it would not follow from hence, that they had no reality at all, but were absolute nonentities; because intellect being a real thing, and that which indeed hath more of entity in it than matter or body, the modifications of intellect must needs be as real things as the modifications of matter; and therefore cause and effect, whole and part, symmetry and asymmetry, and all the other logical notions would have as much reality in them as hard and soft, moist and dry, hot and cold, which, though but modifications of matter, are looked upon as very real things; and such intellectuals as were relative to intellect be as real, as those sensible phantasms which are relative to sense. But this must not be granted, that the modes of conception in the understanding (where all truth is), are disagreeable to the reality of the things conceived by them; and so being unconformable, are therefore false. Wherefore that these scheses, "relations," are not (though sense doth not perceive them) mere notions or figments of the mind, without any fundamental reality in the things themselves without us, corresponding to them, appears from hence, because art and wisdom are most real things, which beget real effects of the greatest moment and consequence in nature and human life of any thing; and yet are conversant about nothing else but only the relations, proportions, aptitudes of things to one another, and to certain ends. Now if these were all mere figments, and

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nothing but logical notions or entia rationis, "beings of reason," then there could be no such realities produced out of them. Nay, then art and wisdom themselves must needs be figments and fancies, and likewise it would be indifferent whatever a man did in order to any end or effect; and all men (as Protagoras held) would be really alike wise and skilful. Then there would be no other extrinsical causality of any effect but that of efficiency, force, or power; which, in corporeal things, is nothing else but local motion. And no such thing as the causality of skill and art (that is commonly called the exemplary cause), distinct from force, power, and blind impetuosity. Nay, then virtue, justice, honesty, must of necessity be figments also, because moral good and evil are schetical and relative things; and which is more yet, external convenience and inconvenience, utility and inutility themselves, be nothing else but fancies also.

6. But though the verdict and testimony of sense ought to be admitted as authentic in this particular, as to what is or is not passively impressed upon us from without, because it is not possible that any thing should be impressed upon the intellect from sensible things, but it must needs pass through the medium of sense, and so be transmitted thereby unto the understanding, which cannot be, unless sense be conscious thereof; yet notwithstanding, sense is not at all to be heard, as to the reality or nonreality of these relative ideas, it being no competent judge in that controversy. Because since the knowledge of things doth not arise from the activity, energy, and radiation of the objects without upon us, passively received by sense, but from the active and comprehensive energy or activity of the mind itself, as we have already observed: In cognoscendo cuncta, suâ potiùs facultate quàm rerum quæ cognoscuntur uti. Cum enim omne judicium judicantis actus existat, necesse est, ut suam quisque operam non ex alienâ, sed ex propriâ facultate perficiat, "That in knowing all things, it rather useth its own power than that of the things which are known. For since all judgment is the act of him that judgeth, it must needs be that every one perform his own work, not by the power of another, but by his own faculty," as the afore-commended Boethius expresseth it.* We ought not to conclude that those relative ideas are therefore mere figments or modes of conceiving in us, because sense is not conscious of any such things passively impressed upon it from without, and because that lower and narrow faculty comprehends them not; but rather acquiesce in the sentiment of that larger and more comprehensive faculty the intellect, that judges of things by exerting its own active power upon them.

7. Wherefore, if we well consider it, we shall find that not only the beauty and pulchritude, but also the strength and ability

* De Consolat. Philos. lib. 5. p. 132.

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of natural and corporeal things themselves, depend upon these relations and proportions of one thing to another. For what is pulchritude in visible objects, or harmony in sounds, but the proportion, symmetry, and commensuration of figures and sounds to one another, whereby infinity is measured and determined, and multiplicity and variety vanquished and triumphed over by unity, and by that means they become grateful and pleasing objects to the ear and eye of intellectual auditors and spectators, there being as it were certain ludicrous irritations and symbolical resemblances of art and wisdom, nay, and virtue too (as we shall show afterward), that is, of intellectuality in general appearing in them, whereby the mind beholds as it were its own face and image reflected to itself from a corporeal glass.

But because many will be ready to say here, that beauty is nothing but a fancy neither, and therefore cannot argue any reality in these schetical things; I add that even the strength and ability of corporeal things themselves depends upon the mutual scheses, "relations" and proportions of one thing to another. And this all men will be sensible of as something. And the truth hereof evidently appears from the mechanical powers. Nay, the health and strength of the body of animals arises from the configuration of the organical parts, and the fit contemperation of humours and the insensible parts with one another; so that if this harmonical crasis, "temperature" of the whole body be disturbed and put out of tune, weakness and languor, "languishing" will immediately seize upon it. Nay, doth not all the strength, as well as the comeliness and beauty of an army, consist in order? And therefore, if we should suppose some subtle sophister, and popular orator, sent from the quarters of an enemy, into a vast, numerous, and puissant army, that should insinuate into the common soldiers so far, as generally to persuade them, that order was nothing but a mere fancy or logical notion; a thing craftily devised by their commanders, merely to keep them in subjection, that they might the better tyrannize over them, and rule them as they please; insomuch that they should all at length altogether neglect their ranks and files, and put themselves wholly into disorder and confusion, and in this fashion prepare themselves to encounter their approaching enemy, would they not hereby be betrayed to certain ruin, though the enemy should be but a small handful of men, but well ordered and well commanded? For order is that which makes things, junctis viribus "with united forces," to conspire all to one end, whereby the whole hath the force and ability of all the several particular strengths conjoined and united into one.

8. Therefore I say, in the next place, returning to our former instance of an automaton or horologe, that though those several

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relative ideas of cause, effect, symmetry, proportion, order, whole, and part, and the like, considered formally as νοήματα, "conceptions of the mind," be only in the intellect itself (as the ideas and conceptions of all other things likewise are;) yet notwithstanding the intellect doth not forge or falsify any thing in apprehending of them, in that material automaton "self-mover," represented to it by sense, because all the several scheses, "relations" are fundamentally and really in the same, though they could not be stamped upon sense materially, and received passively from it. And therefore, that the true nature, formal ratio "reason," essence and idea of this automaton, "self-mover," watch or horologe, is really compounded and made up of those several scheses, "relations," as ingredients into it, so that it cannot possibly be understood without them; though sense could not reach to the comprehension of any one of them, much less of this whole logical system or compages, "collection" of them. It being impossible that the nature of automaton, "a self-mover," horologe, or watch, should be otherwise understood than by the comprehension of these relative ideas; and by such a logical, unitive, comprehensive power and activity, as can frame out of them one idea of the whole. For an horologe or watch is not mere silver or gold, brass and steel, any way jumbled, mingled, or confounded together, but it is such an apt and proportionable disposition of certain quantities of those several materials into several parts of such certain figures, contemperated together, as may harmoniously conspire to make up one equal and uniform motion, which running as it were parallel with the motion of time, and passing round the horary circle, and being measured in that horary circle, may also measure out and distinguish the quantity of that silent and successive flux, which, like a still and deep river, carries down all things along with it indiscernibly, and without any noise; and which, in its progressive motion, treads so lightly and softly, that it leaves no traces, prints, or footsteps at all behind it.

9. Wherefore the eye of sense, though it be fixed never so much upon the material outside of this automaton, "self-mover," yet it never comprehends the formal nature of it within itself, as it is, totum, "a whole" made up of several parts, united not so much by corporeal contact or continuity, as by their relative conspiration to one certain end. Sense being like one of those narrow telescopes, by which the eye looking upon the moon, can never view it all at once, and see the site and configuration of all the several mountains and valleys, and seas in it, and have one comprehensive idea of the whole; but taking it in the piecemeal, part after part, leaves the intelligent spectator afterwards to compile and make up one entire draught or map of stenography out of all those several particular or partial views.

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So that if we will speak properly, we cannot say that the eye sees any machina, "machine" or automaton, "self-mover," for it is but variously affected from the material part of it, perceiving several passions in itself from the several colours and figures of it, it being so far from comprehending the formal ratio, "reason" of it, as it is a totum, "whole" made up of several parts, according to several scheses, "relations" and proportions contributing thereto, that it cannot reach to any one relative idea, neither doth bare fancy go any further than sense. Or else the difference between intellect and sense may be resembled by the difference betwixt the sense of sight and touch. For touch groping, perceives but as it were a point at once, the eye comprehends the whole superficies. Sense sees particular things absolutely, intellect compares them according to those relations they have to one another, has a comprehensive idea of a totum, "whole" made up of several parts as one thing. And therefore the form, ratio, "reason," or intelligible idea of an automaton, "self-mover" or horologe, was never stamped or impressed upon the soul from without, but upon occasion of the sensible idea excited and exerted from the inward active and comprehensive power of the intellect itself.

10. There are many other such ideas of the mind, of certain totums, "wholes" made up of several corporeal parts, which, though sometimes locally discontinued, yet are joined together by scheses, "relations," and habitudes to one another (founded in some actions of them, as they are cogitative beings) and by order all conspiring into one thing: which, though they are altogether imperceptible by sense, and therefore were never stamped or impressed upon the mind from the objects without; yet, notwithstanding, are not mere figments or entia rationis, "beings of reason," but things of the greatest reality, founded in certain actions of thinking and cogitative beings; which are altogether imperceptible by sense, and therefore could not possibly be outwardly stamped upon the mind; as for example, a polity or commonwealth, called an artificial man, which is a company of many united together by consent or contract under one government, to be regulated by some certain laws as it were by one will for the good of the whole; where, though the eye may see the particular persons, (or at least their outsides) that are the respective members thereof, yet it can neither see the bond which unites them together, which is nothing but relation, nor comprehend the totum, "whole" that is made up of them, that is, a polity or commonwealth, according to the formal nature of it, which is an idea that proceeds merely from the unitive power and activity of the mind itself.

In a word, all the ideas of things called artificial or mechanical, contain something in them that never came from sense, nor was

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ever stamped upon the soul from the objects without, whic
though it be not merely notional or imaginary, but really belon
to the nature of that thing, yet is no otherwise than intellectuall
comprehended. As for example, a house or palace is not onl
stone, brick, mortar, timber, iron, glass, heaped together; bu
the very essence and formal ratio, "reason" of it is made u
of relative or schetical notions, it being a certain disposition o
those several materials into a totum, "whole" or compages
"collection," consisting of several parts, rooms, stairs, passages
doors, chimneys, windows, convenient for habitation, and fit fo
the several uses of men; in which there is the logic of whole an
parts, order, proportion, symmetry, aptitude, concinnity, all
complicated with wood, stone, iron, and glass, as it were inform-
ing and adorning the rude and confused mass of matter, and
making it both beautiful and serviceable. And therefore for
this cause, no man that is in his wits will say, that a stately
and royal palace hath therefore less reality, entity, and sub-
stantiality in it, than a heap of rubbish confusedly cast
together; because, forsooth, the idea of it partly consists of
logical notions, which are thought to be mere imaginary things;
whereas the totum, "whole" is all solid matter without this
notional form. For this logical form which is the passive stamp
or print of intellectuality in it, the first archetypes contained in
the idea or skill of the architect, and thence introduced into the
rude matter, successively with much pains and labour, is the only
thing that distinguishes it from mere dirt and rubbish, and gives
it the essence of a house or palace. And it hath therefore *the*
more of entity in it, because it partakes of art or intellectuality.
But the eye or sense of a brute, though it have as much
passively impressed upon it from without, as the soul of a man
hath, when it looks upon the most royal and magnificent palace,
if it should see all the inside also as well as the outside, could not
comprehend from thence the formal idea and nature of a house
or palace, which nothing but an active intellectual principle can
reach unto.

II. Neither is this true of such things only as are commonly
called artificial, but also of natural compounded things, such as
plants and animals are. And indeed, if we consider things
philosophically, we shall not find any such essential difference as
is commonly supposed, betwixt things called artificial and natural.
For there is a nature in all artificial things, and again, an artifice
in all compounded natural things. Plants and animals being
nothing else but artificial mechanisms, the latter of which espe-
cially are contrived with infinitely more wit, variety, and cu-
riosity than any mechanisms or automata, "self-movers" that
were ever yet produced by human art. Wherefore the true form
of an animal, if we attend only to the mechanism of the body

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(for we must acknowledge something else not only in men but also in brutes, if they have any cogitation besides mechanism, which is a substance of another nature, or a cogitative being united to the body) is an idea that includes many relative and logical notions in it, and therefore could never be stamped upon the soul by sense; for sense only takes notice of several colours and figures either in the outside or the inside of any animals, but doth not sum them up into one totum, "whole." But the idea of it, as collected into one mechanical automaton, "self-mover," consisting of many organical parts fitly proportioned together, and all harmoniously conspiring to one end, to make it every way a fit habitation for a cogitative substance to reside in, in respect of nutrition, local motion, sense, and all other functions of life; such an idea, I say, that hath something of logic in it, is only conceivable by the unitive, active and comprehensive power of the intellect.

The same is to be affirmed of that huge and vast automaton, which some will have to be an animal likewise, the visible world or material universe, commonly called Κόσμος or mundus, cosmos or mundus, "the world," from the beauty of it: whether we mean thereby that one single vortex, to which our planetary earth belongs, or a system of as many vortices as we see fixed stars in the heavens, their central suns and circumferential planets moving round about them respectively. Now sense looking round about, and making many particular views, sees now one fixed star, and then another; now the moon, then the sun; here a mountain, there a valley; at one time a river, at another a sea, particular vegetables and animals one after another. But it cannot sum up or unite all together, nor rise to any comprehensive idea of the whole at once, as it is one or many mechanical automatons, "self-movers," most curiously and artificially framed of innumerable parts; in which there are all manner of logical scheses, "relations," possible offered to the mind, but all so fitly proportioned with such admirable symmetries and correspondencies in respect of one another and the whole, that they perfectly conspire into one most orderly and harmonious form.

Hitherto therefore we have seen, that the relative ideas that we have in our mind, are not passions impressed upon the soul from the objects without, but arise from the innate activity of the mind itself; and therefore because the essences or ideas of all compounded corporeal things themselves, whether artificial or natural; that is, whether made by the artifice of men or nature, always necessarily include these logical scheses, "relations," in them, we have demonstratively proved from thence, that no corporeal compounded thing whatsoever is understood by sense, nor the idea of it passively stamped upon the mind, from the objects

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without, but comprehended only by the large unitive power of the intellect, and exerted from the innate activity thereof.

12. But the case is still clearer concerning those other ideas before-mentioned, of the several modes of cogitative beings, or such as involve or include some relation to them; that these are not by the passive impresses from the outward objects by sense; although they are often occasionally invited and drawn forth by them. Which we shall illustrate by the former instance of an artificial automaton, "self-mover," exhibited first to the view of sense, and afterward actively comprehended by the understanding. After the mind hath framed a clear idea of this automaton, "self-mover," within itself, the end or design whereof is to measure the equal motion either of the sun and heavens, or earth (according to different astronomical hypotheses) by the equal motion of this automaton, "self-mover," and so to distinguish or mark out to us the quantities of that silent and undiscerned flux of time; and when it hath considered how aptly conducible every part of this mechanism is to that design, and how there is neither the least redundancy nor deficiency in any thing in order thereunto, and of the beauty and elegancy of the fabric, making a further and a more inward reflection upon the same, it plainly perceives this accurate contrivance to be but a passive print or stamp of some active and living art or skill upon it: wherefore the ideas of art and skill are upon this occasion naturally exerted from it; neither doth it rest in considering of art and skill abstractedly, but because these are modes of an existent cogitative being, it thinks presently of some particular intelligent being, the artificer or author of this curious fabric, and looking further into it finds his name also engraven in legible characters upon the same, whereupon he forthwith pronounces the sound of it. Whereas the living eye, that is, sense alone in its antecedent view, as it could not espy any logical scheses, "relations," or notions there, so neither can it perceive any ideas of art or skill in it, they having neither figure nor colour in them, nor of author and artificer, any more than it could see the sound of the artificer's name in the engraven sculptures or characters of it; for the eye could see no more than was represented in or reflected from the crystal globe or mirror. Wherefore the ideas of art and skill, author and artificer were not passively imprinted upon the intellect from the material automaton, "self-mover," but only occasionally invited from the mind itself, as the figures of the engraven letters did not passively impress the sound of the artificer's name upon him, but only occasion him to exert it from his own activity.

13. Just in the same manner it happens many times in the contemplation of that great automaton, "self-mover," of the material universe, which is the Θεοῦ τέχνασμα, "artifice of God,"

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the artifice of the best mechanist, though there be no more passively impressed upon us from it, than there is upon the diaphanous air, or liquid ether contiguous to all solid bodies by local motion, of which only sensitive beings have a conscious perception; yet there is a wonderful scene of various thoughts and motions raised in the mind thereupon, which are only occasionally invited by those stamps and impressions made from the material fabric, and its various furniture without, but owe their true original and efficiency to nothing else but the innate vigour and activity of the mind itself. Some of which we have already instanced in the ideas of those relative scheses, "considerations," of corporeal things themselves and their parts to one another; by means of which the intellect rises up to that comprehensive view of the natures of particular corporeal things, and the universal mundane system within itself all at once; which sense perceiving only by little and little, and taking in as it were point after point, cannot sum up its partial perceptions into the entire idea of any one totum "whole." But the intellect doth not rest here, but upon occasion of those corporeal things thus comprehended in themselves, naturally rises higher to the framing and exciting of certain ideas from within itself, of other things not existing in those sensible objects, but absolutely incorporeal. For being ravished with the contemplation of this admirable mechanism and artificial contrivance of the material universe, forthwith it naturally conceives it to be nothing else but the passive stamp, print and signature of some living art and wisdom; as the pattern, archetype and seal of it, and so excites from within itself an idea of that divine art and wisdom. Nay, considering further, how all things in this great mundane machine or animal (as the ancients would have it) are contrived, not only for the beauty of the whole, but also for the good of every part in it, that is endued with life and sense, it exerts another idea, viz. of goodness and benignity from within itself, besides that of art and wisdom, as the queen regent and empress of art, whereby art is employed, regulated and determined; now both these things, whereof the first is art, wisdom and knowledge; the second, goodness, benignity and morality, being looked upon as modes of some intellectual being or mind in which they exist, it from hence presently makes up an idea of God, as the author or architect of this great and boundless machine; a mind infinitely good and wise; and so as it were resounds and re-echoes back the great Creator's name, which from those visible characters impressed upon the material universe, had pierced loudly into its ears, but in such an indiscernible manner, that sense listening never so attentively, could not perceive the least murmur or whisper of it. And this is the most natural scale by which the intellectual mind in the con-

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templation of corporeal things ascends to God; from the passive prints and signatures of that one art and wisdom that appears in the universe, by taking notice from thence of the exemplary or archetypal cause, one infinite and eternal mind setting his seal upon all. For as he that hears a consort of musicians playing a lesson, consisting of six or eight several parts, all conspiring to make up one harmony; will immediately conclude, that there was some other cause of that harmony besides those several particular efficients, that struck the several instruments; for every one of them could be but a cause of his own part which he played; but the unity of the whole harmony, into which all the several parts conspire, must needs proceed from the art and musical skill of some one mind, the exemplary and archetypal cause of that vocal harmony, which was but a passive print or stamp of it; so though the Atheist might possibly persuade himself, that every particular creature was the first author or efficient of that part which it played in the universe, by a certain innate power of its own; yet all the parts of the mundane system conspiring into one perfect harmony, there must of necessity be some one universal mind, the archetypal and exemplary cause thereof, containing the plot of the whole mundane music, as one entire thing made up of so many several parts within himself.

14. But that oftentimes there is more taken notice of and perceived by the mind, both in the sensible objects themselves, and by occasion of them, than was impressed from them, or passively received by sense; which therefore must needs proceed from some inward active principle in that which perceives, I shall make it further appear by some other instances.

For, first, let a brute and a man at the same time be made spectators of one and the same artificial statue, picture, or landscape; here the brute will passively receive all that is impressed from the outward object upon sense by local motion, as well as the man, all the several colours and figures of it; and yet the man will presently perceive something in this statue or picture, which the brute takes no notice of at all, viz. beauty and pulchritude, and symmetry, besides the liveliness of the effigies and portraiture. The eye of the brute being every jot as good a glass or mirror, and perhaps endued with a more perspicacious sense or power of passive perception, than that of a man.

Or again, let both a man and a brute at the same time hear the same musical airs, the brute will only be sensible of noise and sounds, but the man will also perceive harmony in them, and be very much delighted with it; nay, even enthusiastically transported by it. Wherefore the brute perceiving all the sounds, as well as the man, but nothing of the harmony, the

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difference must needs arise from some inward active principle or anticipation in the man, which the brute hath not.

And indeed the reason is the same both in visibles and audibles; for the sense of a man, by reason of its vicinity and neighbourhood to reason and intellectuality, lodged in the same soul with it, must needs be coloured with some tincture of it; or have some passive impresses of the same upon it; and therefore when it finds or meets with insensible objects any footsteps or resemblances thereof, any thing that hath cognation with intellectuality; as proportion, symmetry and order have, being the passive stamps and impresses of art and skill (which are intellectual things) upon matter, it must needs be highly gratified with the same. But the soul of a brute having no intellectual anticipations in it, but barely suffering from the corporeal objects without, can have no sense of any thing but what their activity impresseth upon it.

Nay further, the man will also espy some symbolical resemblances of morality, of virtue and vice in the variously proportioned sounds and airs; for there are ἠθικαὶ, "ethical" (as Aristotle hath observed) as well as ἐνθουσιαστικαὶ ἁρμονίαι, "enthusiastical harmonies," as the physiognomists in like manner observe signatures of morality in the countenances of men and their pictures, which it is yet less possible that a brute should be sensible of; these differences arising, not from the absolute nature of the objects without, or their bare impression which they make; but the different analogy which they have to some inward and active anticipations which they meet withal in the percipient. For the man hath certain moral anticipations and signatures stamped inwardly upon his soul, which makes him presently take notice of whatsoever symbolizes with it in corporeal things; but the brute hath none.

15. And this will still further appear, if we again compare the judgment of some excellent artists in painting and music with that of an ordinary vulgar person, that hath not any acquired skill in either faculty. For the skilful and expert limner will observe many elegancies and curiosities of art, and be highly pleased with several strokes and shadows in a picture, where a common eye can discern nothing at all; and a musical artist hearing a concert of exact musicians playing some excellent composure of many parts, will be exceedingly ravished with many harmonical airs and touches, that a vulgar ear will be utterly insensible of. Nay, such an one perhaps would be more pleased with the streperous noise of a single fiddle, or the rustical music of the country bagpipes, or the dull humming of a Jew's trump, than the fullest and most exquisitely composed harmony.

And the reason is the same with what was before suggested, because the artists of either kind have many inward anticipations

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of skill and art in their minds; which being awakened by those passive impressions of the same skill or art in the outward objects that strike upon their senses, there arises immediately an inward grateful sense and sympathy from the correspondence and analogy that is betwixt them; art and skill in the mind of the musical hearer, finding συγγενές τι, "something akin," to itself in those harmonious airs, some footsteps and resemblances of itself gratefully closing with them. Of which vital sympathy, there is vulgarly thought to be some resemblance in nature; when, upon the striking of a string in one viol, another string, that is an unison to it in a distant viol, will dance and leap; and that not from any mechanical cause (as some conceive) passively only, but from a vital and active principle in nature, which is affected with concord and harmony. Now there is yet a pulchritude of another kind; a more interior symmetry and harmony in the relations, proportions, aptitudes and correspondencies of things to one another in the great mundane system, or vital machine of the universe, which is all musically and harmonically composed; for which cause the ancients made Pan, that is, nature to play upon an harp; but sense, which only passively perceives particular outward objects, doth here, like the brute, hear nothing but mere noise and sound and clatter, but no music or harmony at all; having no active principle and anticipation within itself to comprehend it by, and correspond or vitally sympathize with it; whereas the mind of a rational and intellectual being will be ravished and enthusiastically transported in the contemplation of it; and, of its own accord, dance to this pipe of Pan, nature's intellectual music and harmony.

16. But I shall yet further illustrate this business, that the mind may actively comprehend more in the outward objects of sense, and by occasion of them, than is passively received and impressed from them, by another instance. Suppose a learned written or printed volume, held before the eye of a brute creature or illiterate person; either of them will passively receive all that is impressed upon sense from those delineations; to whom there will be nothing but several scrawls or lines of ink drawn upon white paper. But if a man that hath inward anticipations of learning in him, look upon them, he will immediately have another comprehension of them than that of sense, and a strange scene of thoughts presently represented to his mind from them; he will see heaven, earth, sun, moon and stars, comets, meteors, elements, in those inky delineations; he will read profound theorems of philosophy, geometry, astronomy in them; learn a great deal of new knowledge from them that he never understood before, and thereby justly admire the wisdom of the composer of them. Not that all this was passively stamped upon his soul by sense from those characters; for sense,

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as I said before, can perceive nothing here but inky scrawls, and the intelligent reader will many times correct his copy, finding erratas in it; but because his mind was before furnished with certain inward anticipations, that such characters signify the elements of certain sounds, those sounds, certain notions or cogitations of the mind; and because he hath an active power of exciting any such cogitations within himself, he reads in those sensible delineations, the passive stamps or prints of another man's wisdom or knowledge upon them, and also learns knowledge and instruction from them, not as infused into his mind from those sensible characters, but by reason of those hints and significations thereby proposed to it, accidentally kindled, awakened and excited in it. For all but the phantasms of black inky strokes and figures, arises from the inward activity of his own mind. Wherefore this instance in itself shows how the activity of the mind may comprehend more in and from sensible objects, than is passively imprinted by them upon sense.

But now, in the room of this artificial book in volumes, let us substitute the book of nature, the whole visible and material universe, printed all over with the passive characters and impressions of divine wisdom and goodness, but legible only to an intellectual eye; for to the sense both of man and brute, there appears nothing else in it but as in the other, so many inky scrawls, i. e. nothing but figures and colours; but the mind or intellect, which hath an inward and active participation of the same divine wisdom that made it; and being printed all over with the same archetypal seal, upon occasion of those sensible delineations represented to it, and taking notice of whatsoever is cognate to it, exerting its own inward activity from thence, will not have only a wonderful scene and large prospect of other thoughts laid open before it, and variety of knowledge, logical, mathematical, metaphysical, moral displayed; but also clearly read the divine wisdom and goodness, in every page of this great volume, as it were written in large and legible characters.

CHAPTER III.

1. We have hitherto showed, that there are many ideas of the mind, which, though the cogitations of them be often occasionally invited from the motion or appulse of sensible objects without made upon our bodies; yet notwithstanding the ideas themselves could not possibly be stamped or impressed upon the soul from them, because sense takes no cognizance at all of any such things in those corporeal objects, and therefore they must needs arise from the innate vigour and activity of the mind

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itself. Such as are, first, the relative ideas of the several scheses or respects which are betwixt corporeal things themselves compared with one another. Which relative ideas being not comprehended by sense, and yet notwithstanding, the natures of all compounded corporeal things, whether artificial or natural, that is, whether made by the artifice of men or nature, consisting of them, we have demonstratively proved from thence, that the natures of no compounded corporeal things can possibly be known or comprehended by sense. And again, the ideas of cogitative beings, and the several modes of them, together with all such notions as involve some respect or relation to them. For although these also be often occasionally invited and elicited by the objects of sense, when the mind, in the contemplation of them by its own active strength, perceives the signatures of art, counsels, contrivance, wisdom, nay, and goodness also (all which are modes of cogitative beings) printed upon them; yet they cannot owe their being or efficiency to the activity of those outward objects, but merely to the activity of the mind itself.

I should now proceed to show, that even those simple corporeal things themselves, which by sense we have a passive perception of, in individual bodies without us, are also known and understood by the active power of the mind exerting its own intelligible ideas upon them.

2. That sensation is not knowledge of those corporeal things that we sensibly perceive, we have before largely showed; and indeed it sufficiently appears from hence, because upon the seeing of light and colours, though never so clearly, the feeling of heat and cold smartly, the hearing of loud sounds and noises, we naturally inquire further, what this light and colours, heat and cold, and sounds are, which is an undoubted acknowledgment that we have not a clear and satisfactory comprehension of those things which make so strong a stroke and impression upon our senses; and therefore the mind desires to master and conquer them by its own active strength and power, and to comprehend them by some ideas of its own, which are not foreign, but native, domestic, and intrinsical to it.

Now if sense itself be not knowledge, much less can any secondary or derivative result from sense be knowledge; for this would be a more obscure, shadowy and evanid thing than sense itself is. As when the image of a man's face, received in a mirror or looking-glass, is reflected from thence into a second mirror, and so forward into a third; still the further it goes, the more obscure, confused and imperfect it grows, till at last it becomes altogether imperceptible. Or as in the circlings and undulations of water, caused by the falling of a stone into it, that are successively propagated from one to another; the further and wider they go, the waves are still the less, slower and

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weaker, till at length they become quite undiscernible. Or as a secondary echo, that is, the echo of an echo, falls as much short of the primary echo in proportion, as that doth of the original voice. Or, lastly, if we could suppose a shadow to cast a shadow, this secondary shadow, or projection of a shadow, would fall as much short of the primary shadow as that did of the substance itself. So if the knowledge of corporeal things were but a secondary and derivative result from sense (though it cannot be conceived that the passion of sense should ray upon the intellect, so as to beget a secondary passion there, any more than one shadow should cast another) then knowledge would be much a weaker perception of them than sense itself is, and nothing but as it were the secondary reflection of an image, or the remote circlings and undulations of the fluid water, or the mere echo of the echo of an original voice. Or, lastly, nothing but the shadow of the shadow of a substance. Whereas it is a far more real, substantial and satisfactory, more penetrative and comprehensive perception than sense is, reaching to the very inward essence of the things perceived. And therefore it must of necessity proceed from the active power of the mind itself, exerting its own intelligible ideas upon that which is passively perceived, and so comprehending it by something of its own that is native and domestic to it. So that besides the *αἰσθήματα*, "sensations," or *φαντάσματα*, "phantasms," the sensible ideas of corporeal things passively impressed upon us from without, there must be also *νοήματα*, "conceptions," or intelligible ideas of them actively exerted from the mind itself, or otherwise they could never be understood.

3. Wherefore, that we may the better illustrate this business, let us suppose some individual body; as for example, a white or black triangular superficies, or a solid tetrahedrum, "four-square" included all within a triangular superficies, exposed first to the view of sense or a living eye; and then afterward considered by the intellect, that we may see the difference betwixt the passive perception of it by sense, and the active comprehension of it by the understanding. Now sense, that is a living eye or mirror, as soon as ever it is converted toward this object, will here passively perceive an appearance of an individual thing, as existing without it, white and triangular, without any distinction concretely and confusedly together; and it will perceive no more than this, though it dwell never so long upon this object; for it perceives no more than is impressed upon it; and here the passion of sense ends and goes no further. But the mind or intellect residing in the same soul that hath a power of sensation also, then beginning to make a judgment upon that which is thus passively perceived, exerts its own innate vigour and activity, and displays itself gradually after this manner.

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For, first, with its subtle divisive power, it will analyze and resolve this concrete phantasmatical totum, "whole," and take notice of several distinct intellectual objects in it. For considering that every white or black thing is not necessarily triangular, nor every triangular thing white or black, it finds here two distinct intellectual objects; the one white, the other triangular. And then again, because that which is nothing can have no affections, it concludes, that here is something as a common substratum, "subject," to both these affections or modifications, which it calls a corporeal substance; which being one and the same thing, is here both white and triangular. Wherefore it finds at least three distinct objects of intellectual cogitation, corporeal substance, white, and triangular, all individual. But then reflecting again upon these several objects, and that it may further inquire into the natures and essences of them, it now bids adieu to sense and singularity; and taking a higher flight, considers them all universally and abstractly from individuating circumstances and matter. That is, it no more seeks the knowledge and comprehension of these things without itself, from whence it hath already passively perceived them by sense; but revolving within itself upon its own inward notions and active anticipations (which must needs be universal) it looks for some domestic ideas of its own to understand these general natures by, that so from thence with a descending view it may comprehend under them those individuals that now affect the sense.

4. First therefore, for corporeal substance in general, which is the substratum, "subject," both of colour and figure, not to pursue any long and tedious processes, it quickly concludes the essence of it to be this; a thing extended impenetrably, or which hath impenetrable longitude, latitude and profundity. And because it is not here considered merely as a notion or objective cogitation, but as a thing actually existing without the mind, therefore it exerts another ratio "notion," of existence or singularity also; which added to the former, makes it up a thing that hath impenetrable extension existing. Now none of these ideas, neither of essence nor existence, nor thing, nor substance, nor something, nor nothing; nor impenetrability, nor extension, nor longitude, latitude and profundity, were impressed or stamped upon the mind, either from this individual, or any other sensible object; for they can be neither seen nor perceived by any corporeal sense; but are merely excited from the innate activity of the mind itself, that same power by which the mind is enabled to conceive of nihil, "nothing," as well as aliquid, "something;" and certain it is that the idea of nothing was never impressed from any thing. And if the essence of body, or corporeal substance itself, be only comprehended and understood by the active ideas of the mind (for sense here perceived no such thing, but

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only was affected from the exterior induments thereof, colour and figure), then the several modes of it, such as whiteness and triangularity, which are but certain modes of an extended substance, must needs be understood in like manner, not by passive ideas and phantasms, but the noematical or intelligible ideas of the mind.

5. Wherefore in the next place, as for white colour or whiteness, here is a plain and palpable difference betwixt sense and intellection; betwixt the φάντασμα, "phantasm," and νόημα, "conception," betwixt a sensible and intelligible idea; for the sense or phantasm of white, that we have from the individual object, is no clear comprehension of any essence or intelligible ratio, "notion;" but only a passion or affection in the soul, caused by some local motions communicated to the brain from the object without, that is, a drowsy, confused and imperfect perceptive cogitation; but now the awakened mind or intellect revolving its own inward ideas, and being not able to comprehend any such mode or quality in extended substance, as this sensible idea of white is, formally considered; for this very reason, boldly and confidently concludes that this is no real quality in that body itself absolutely considered, because no such thing is intelligible by it; in which opinion, it is confirmed by sense itself, in that the lower ends of the rainbow that reach to the earth do not stain or dye any thing with the several colours of it; and that the same drops of dew or rain to eyes at several distances, have all those several colours of the rainbow in them, and none at all. And by other experiments it appears that these things are only passions or affections in the sentient itself, caused by some peculiar modification of the superficies of that material object in respect of the figure, site and disposition of its insensible parts, whereby the light or intermediate globuli, "globulous particles," are in a peculiar manner reflected upon the eye, and that probably the difference betwixt a white and a black object consists in this, that in one the small particles are polite and solid, and therefore vividly reflect the lighter globuli, "globulous particles;" but in the other being differently disposed, the light, as a ball flung against a heap of sand, is not so smartly reflected from it, but as it were sinks into it, and its motion is stifled and smothered in the caverns of it. Wherefore the intelligible idea of a white colour is this, that it is a certain passion or sense in the soul, caused by a peculiar modification of the object without, in respect of the disposition of its insensible parts, whereby the light or globuli, "globulous particles," are more smartly and vividly reflected upon the eye; which is another kind of comprehension of it, than the sensible idea or phantasm of white is, which is no intelligible idea, but a cogitative passion; that is, another species of cogitation, or an half-

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awakened perception. Neither are these intelligible ideas of passion and sense impressed upon the soul from the sensible objects without; for the eye sees neither passion nor sense, but they are actively exerted from the mind itself, and therefore mastered and conquered, and comprehended by it.

6. I now proceed to the last intellectual object comprehended in this individual body, which is triangularity, or some one particular species of a triangle; as for example, an equilateral, or a rectangular triangle; for there can be no individual triangle but must be of one determinate species or another.

Now because the phantasm of such a triangle doth not only bear a resemblance of the outward material object, which the phantasms of colours and the like do not, but also of the true intelligible idea of a triangle itself; and because when men think never so abstractedly and mathematically of a triangle, they have commonly some rude phantasm or picture of it before them in their imagination, therefore many confidently persuade themselves that there is no other idea of a triangle or other figure, beside the bare phantasm or sensible idea impressed upon the soul from some individual object without; that is, no active noematical idea inwardly exerted from the mind itself. Which indeed is all one as to say, that there is no intellection or knowledge of a triangle at all; forasmuch as neither sense nor fancy, which are but superficial, imperfect, and incomplete perceptive cogitations, reach to the comprehension of the ratio, "notion" or essence of any thing. Wherefore now to make the contrary appear, we will again view this material triangle, or tetrahedrum, or "four-square" before our eyes, making a nearer approach to it, and upon this second contemplation of it we plainly observe much inequality in the superficies, unevenness and inequality in the lines, and bluntness in the angles. From whence it evidently appears that that idea that we had in our minds of a perfect triangle, as a plain superficies terminated by three straight lines joined together in three angles, ending in so many points, was not impressed upon our soul from this individual object, it being different from it, and far more exact and perfect than that is. And therefore it must needs be granted that it was but occasionally or accidentally invited and drawn forth from the mind, upon the sight of it, just in the same manner as when a man looks upon certain lines drawn with ink upon a piece of paper something resembling the face of a man, his mind doth not fix and stay itself in the consideration of those inky lines; but presently upon this occasion excites within itself the idea of a man's face. Or when a man walking in a gallery where there are divers pictures hung upon the wall, chances amongst them to espy the picture of a friend or acquaintance of his, which, though perhaps far from an exact resemblance, yet

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notwithstanding makes him presently to excite the idea of his friend in his imagination. Neither of which things could possibly be, if there had not been a previous and pre-existent idea of a man's face, or such a certain friend in his mind before; for otherwise a man in this case could think of nothing but just that that was impressed upon him by sense, the figures of those inky delineations, and those several strokes and shadows of the pictures. In like manner, when we look upon the rude, imperfect, and irregular figures of some corporeal things, the mind upon this occasion excites from within itself the ideas of a perfect triangle, square, circle, pyramid, cube, sphere, and the like, whose essences are so indivisible that they are not capable of the least additions, detraction, or variation without the destruction of them, because there was some rude and bungling resemblance of these regular figures in those material objects that we look upon, of which probably the maker had the ideas in his mind. And the mind naturally delights more to think of simple and regular, than of compounded and irregular figures.

7. But if any one should here object and say, that it doth not follow from hence, that that more perfect idea which now I have of a triangle in my mind, the accuracy whereof this present visible idea before my eyes doth not reach unto, was actively excited from the mind itself; because it might be some time formerly impressed, from some other individual triangle which I had elsewhere seen; just in the same manner as when I looked upon a picture, that idea of a man's face in general, or of that particular friend, that was occasionally excited thereby, was not any innate idea, or an idea that sprung wholly from the activity of the mind, but was formerly impressed upon the soul, from individual sensible objects now remembered or called to mind: I say, that this cannot possibly be true, because there never was any material or sensible straight line, triangle, circle, that we saw in all our lives, that was mathematically exact, but even sense itself, at least by the help of microscopes, might plainly discover much unevenness, ruggedness, flexuosity, angulosity, irregularity, and deformity in them, as will appear to any one that shall make a triangle upon the most accurate lines that the wit or art of man can make; and therefore no material line could stamp or impress upon the soul in a mere passive way those exact ideas that we now have of a triangle or of a straight line, which is the shortest possible between two points, or a circle that is every where equidistant from an individual centre, &c. And if it should be again replied, that notwithstanding there being many such lines and circles as common sense cannot discern the least irregularity in them, howsoever they would be in the mean time really irregular to a perfect and lyncean sight; yet, according to their appearance, might impress those ideas

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that we have of a straight line or circle; I answer, that this cannot be neither, there being a vast difference betwixt the confused indistinction of sense and fancy, by reason of their bluntness and imperfection, and the express accuracy, preciseness, and indivisibility of those intelligible ideas that we have of a straight line, circle, triangle, tetrahedrum, "four-square," and other geometrical figures; and therefore that imperfect, confused indistinction of sense could never impress any such accurate ideas upon the mind, but only occasion the mind actively to exert them from within itself.

8. Nay, though it should be granted that there were material lines mathematically exact, perfect triangles, squares, pyramids, cubes, spheres, and the like, such as geometry supposes, as no doubt but the divine power can make such in fitting matter; yet sense could not at all reach to the discerning of the mathematical accuracy of these things, no more than it doth to the absolute equality of any quantities; as of lines, superficies, bodies, angles, which is found and determined only by the understanding, in that materia intelligibilis, "intelligible matter" which geometry is conversant about. So that sense could not be able to determine what triangle and what tetrahedrum, "four-square" was mathematically exact, and what not. From whence it is demonstrably evident that neither the ratio, "notion" of perfect equality, nor the perfect mathematical ideas of figures, triangle, square, circle, pyramid, cube, sphere, &c., were impressed upon the soul from without by sense; sense not at all reaching to the discernment of them.

9. But, lastly, if there were material lines, triangles, pyramids, perfectly and mechanically exact; yet that which made them such, and thereby to differ from other irregular lines, imperfect triangles and cubes, could be nothing else but a conformity to an antecedent intellectual idea in the mind, as the rule and exemplar of them; for otherwise an irregular line and an imperfect triangle, pyramid, cube, are as perfectly that that they are, as the other is; only they are not agreeable to those anticipated and pre-conceived ideas of regular lines and figures actively exerted in the mind or intellect, which the mind naturally formeth to itself, and delighteth to exercise itself upon them, as the proper object of art and science, which the other irregular figures are not. Wherefore whenever a man looking upon material objects judges of the figures of them, and says this is a straight line, this is a perfect triangle, that a perfect circle, but those are neither perfect triangles nor circles; it is plain that here are two several ideas of these lines and figures; the one outwardly impressed from those individual material objects from without upon the sense of the beholder; the other actively exerted from his inward mind or intellect. Which latter busy

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anticipation of it is the rule, pattern, and exemplar whereby he judges of those sensible ideas or phantasms. For otherwise, if there were no inward anticipations or mental ideas, the spectator would not judge at all, but only suffer; and every irregular and imperfect triangle being as perfectly that which it is, as the most perfect triangle, the mind now having no inward pattern of its own before it, to distinguish and put a difference, would not say one of them was more imperfect than another; but only comparing them with one another, would say that this individual figure was not perfectly like to that; upon which account the perfect triangle would be as imperfectly the imperfect triangle, as the imperfect was the perfect.

10. Wherefore, as I said before, this is just in the same manner as when a man looks upon the picture of an absent friend or familiar acquaintance, and presently judges of it, he hath plainly two several ideas in his mind at the same time; one outwardly impressed from the present picture, the other pre-existent in his mind before; by one of which, as the pattern or exemplar, he makes a judgment upon the other, and finds many faults in it; saving, that here both the ideas were foreign and adventitious, the pre-existent idea having been some time formerly impressed from an outward material object, and thence retained in the memory or fancy; but in the other case, when a man looking upon a material triangle, square, circle, cube, sphere, in which there are some palpable irregularities; which he judges of by comparing them with some inward pre-existent ideas that he hath in his mind of a perfect individual triangle, square, circle, cube; and also conceives some dislike and displeasure at the disconformity of the one to the other: the pre-existent ideas here were no foreign or adventitious things, but native and domestic to him, nor at any time formerly passively received from any material objects without, but actively exerted from the mind itself. And I think there is no doubt to be made but if a perfect adult man, that was immediately framed out of the earth, having a newly created soul infused, as the protoplast had, should look upon two several kinds of objects at the same time, whereof one was a perfect circle or sphere, equilateral triangle, tetrahedrum, "four-square," square, or cube; the other having some resemblances of the same, had notwithstanding apparent irregularity in some parts of them; but that at first sight, he would be more pleased with the one than with the other; which could not be, unless he had some native or active idea of his own within himself, to compare them both with, to which one was more conformable than the other. For there could be no such thing as pulchritude and deformity in material objects, if there were no active power in the soul of framing ideas of regular, proportionate, and symmetrical figures

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within itself, by which it might put a difference between outward objects, and make a judgment of them; but that it only received stamps and impressions from without, for then it must needs be equally or indifferently affected with all alike, and not more pleased or displeased with one than with another. Now the judgment that men have of pulchritude and deformity in sensible things, is not merely artificial, from institution or instruction, or of taught things, but such as springs originally from nature itself.

11. But that there is an intelligible idea of a triangle inwardly exerted from the mind itself, distinct from the phantasm or sensible idea that is outwardly impressed from the material object, will yet further appear from that which follows; for the mind reflecting further upon that idea which it hath of a triangle, considers first the generical nature of it, that it is a plain figure, and that a plain figure is the termination of a plain superficies; which superficies is nothing else but mere latitude without profundity: for plain figures are no otherwise conceived by geometricians. Now, it is certain that this idea of a superficies, which geometricians have, was never imprinted upon their minds by sense from any material objects; there being no such thing any where existing without the mind, as latitude without profundity. And therefore it must needs arise from the activity of the mind itself. And the idea of a plain superficies, that is, such a superficies as to all whose parts a straight line may be accommodated, as well as the idea of a straight line, must needs be actively excited from the mind also. Again, it considers the difference betwixt a triangle and other plain figures, that it is included in and terminated by three straight lines joined together in three points; which straight lines being the extremities of a superficies, are mere longitude without either profundity or latitude; and which points being the extremities of those lines, have neither longitude, latitude, nor profundity in them. Which mathematical ideas, in like manner, of a line without latitude and profundity, and a point without longitude, latitude, and profundity, were never impressed upon Euclid, or any other geometrician from without, as is evident without further proof. Moreover, this intelligible idea of a triangle, as it includes some numerical considerations in it, which sense hath no idea of, perceiving only one and one and one; so therein sides and angles are relatively considered also to one another; nay, the very notion of an angle, and the quantity thereof, is a relative thing, as Proclus hath observed, and therefore not impressed by sense.

Again, the mind considering the idea of its own, as it can find out the several properties of a triangle by mere cogitation, without any thing of sense; as that the greater side always subtends the greater angle, nay, and that the three angles are

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always equal to two right angles (as we shall show afterwards) so it also, by its own strength, is able to find out all the species that are possible in a plain triangle, in respect of the differences both of sides and angles. As in respect of the sides, that it is either equilateral or isosceles, "even-legged," or scalenum, "having unequal sides;" of the angles, that it is a rectangulum, "straight cornered," or amblygonium, "blunt cornered," or Ὀξυγώνιον, "sharp-cornered" triangle, and that there can be no individual triangle but must of necessity belong to one of the three species of either sort. So that this is not gathered from sense, but exerted from the active power of the mind.

12. The mind can clearly understand a triangle in general, without determining its thought to any particular species, and yet there can be no distinct phantasm of any such thing; for every distinct phantasm or sensible picture of a triangle must of necessity be either equilateral or equicrural or inequilateral, scalenum, "uneven-legged." And so as we can in like manner clearly understand in our minds, chiliogonum, "a thing with a thousand corners," or myriogonum, "one with ten thousand corners," though we cannot possibly have a distinct phantasm of either of them. But for those particular species of triangles which we may have distinct phantasms of, this doth not at all hinder but that we have, notwithstanding, intelligible ideas of the same besides, actively exerted from the mind itself. And so there is a *φάντασμα*, "phantasm," and a *νόημα*, "conception" at the same time concurring together, an active and a passive cogitation. The *νοήμα*, "conception," or intelligible idea being as it were embodied in the phantasm, which alone in itself is but an incomplete perceptive cogitation of the soul half awakened, and doth not comprehend the indivisible and immutable ratio "notiὅa" or essence of any thing.

Which thing to those that cannot better understand it by what we have already declared, might be illustrated in this manner: when an astronomer, thinking of the sun, demonstrates that it is a hundred and sixty times bigger than the globe of the earth, he hath all the while a phantasm or imagination of the sun in his mind, but as *ὥσπερ πεδιαίον*, "a circle of a foot diameter;" nay, he cannot for his life have a true phantasm of any such magnitude which contains the bigness of the earth so many times, nor indeed fancy the earth a hundredth part so big as it is. Now, as the astronomer hath an intelligible idea of the magnitude of the sun very different from the phantasm of the same, so in like manner have we intelligible ideas of corporeal things, when we understand them, besides the phantasms of them. The phantasm being as it were involucrum, "the crasser indument," or corporeal vehicle of the *νόημα*, "intelligible idea," of the mind.

13. Hitherto, by the instance of an individual and material

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triangle, we have shown how the soul, in understanding corporeal things, doth not merely suffer from without from the body, but actively exert intelligible ideas of its own, and from within itself. Now, I observe that it is so far from being true, that all our objective cogitations or ideas are corporeal effluxes or radiations from corporeal things without, or impressed upon the soul from them in a gross corporeal manner, as a signature or stamp is imprinted by a seal upon a piece of wax or clay; that (as I have before hinted) this is not true sometimes of the sensible ideas themselves. For all perception whatsoever is a vital energy, and not a mere dead passion; and as the atomical philosophy instructs us, there is nothing communicated in sensation from the material objects without, but only certain local motions, that are propagated from them by the nerves into the brain; which motions cannot propagate themselves corporeally upon the soul also, because it penetrates and runs through all the parts of its own body. But the soul, by reason of that vital and magical union which is between it and the body, sympathizing with the several motions of it in the brain, doth thereupon exert sensible ideas or phantasms within itself, whereby it perceives or takes notice of objects distant from the brain, either within or without the body. Many of which sentiments and phantasms have no similitude at all, either with those local motions made in the brain, or with the objects without; such as are the sentiments of pain, pleasure, and titillation, hunger, thirst, heat, and cold, sweet and bitter, light and colours, &c. Wherefore the truth is, that sense, if we well consider it, is but a kind of loquela, "speech," (if I may so call it) nature as it were talking to us in the sensible objects without, by certain motions as signs from thence communicated to the brain. For, as in speech, when men talk to one another, they do but make certain motions upon the air, which cannot impress their thoughts upon one another in a passive manner; but it being first consented to and agreed upon, that such certain sounds shall signify such ideas and cogitations, he that hears those sounds in discourse, doth not fix his thoughts upon the sounds themselves, but presently exerts from within himself such ideas and cogitations as those sounds by consent signify, though there be no similitude at all betwixt those sounds and thoughts. Just in the same manner nature doth as it were talk to us in the outward objects of sense, and import various sentiments, ideas, phantasms, and cogitations, not by stamping or impressing them passively upon the soul from without, but only by certain local motions from them, as it were dumb signs made in the brain; it having been first constituted and appointed by nature's law, that such local motions shall signify such sensible ideas and phantasms, though there be no similitude at all betwixt them; for what similitude can there

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be betwixt any local motions and the senses of pain or hunger, and the like, as there is no similitude betwixt many words and sounds, and the thoughts which they signify. But the soul, as by a certain secret instinct, et tanquam ex compacto, "and as it were by compact," understanding nature's language, as soon as these local motions are made in the brain, doth not fix its attention immediately upon those motions themselves, as we do not use to do in discourse upon mere sounds, but presently exerts such sensible ideas, phantasms, and cogitations as nature hath made them to be signs of, whereby it perceives and takes cognizance of many other things both in its own body, and without it, at a distance from it, in order to the good and conservation of it. Wherefore there are two kinds of perceptive powers in the soul, one below another; the first is that which belongs to the inferior part of the soul, whereby it sympathizes with the body, which is determined by the several motions and pressures that are made upon that from corporeal things without to several sensitive and fantastical energies, whereby it hath a slight and superficial perception of individual corporeal things, and as it were of the outsides of them, but doth not reach to the comprehension of the essence or indivisible and immutable ratio, "notion" of any thing. The second perceptive power is that of the soul itself, or that superior, interior noetical part of it which is ἀπαθὴς, ἀσυμπαθὴς, "free from passion or sympathy," free and disentangled from all that magical sympathy with the body. Which acting alone by itself, exerts from within the intelligible ideas of things, virtually contained in its own cognoscitive power, that are universal and abstract rationes, "notions," from which tanquam desuper spectans, "as it were looking downward" it comprehends individual things. Now, because these latter, which are pure active energies of the soul, are many times exerted upon occasion of those other passive or sympathetical perceptions of individual things anteceding; it is therefore conceived by many that they are nothing else but thin and evanid images of those sensible ideas, and therefore that all intellection and knowledge ascends from sense, and intellection is nothing but the improvement or result of sense. Yet, notwithstanding it is most certainly true, that they proceed from a quite different power of the soul, whereby it actively protrudes its own immediate objects from within itself, and comprehends individuals without it, not passively or consequentially, but as it were proleptically, and not with an ascending, but with a descending perception; whereby the mind first reflecting upon itself, and its own ideas, virtually contained in its own omniform cognoscitive power, and thence descending downward, comprehends individual things under them. So that knowledge doth not begin in individuals, but end in them. And therefore they are but the

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secondary objects of intellection, the soul taking its first rise from within itself, and so by its own inward cognoscitive power comprehending things without it. Else how should God have knowledge? And if we know as God knows, then do we know or gain knowledge by universals. In which sense, (though not in that other of Protagoras) the soul may be truly said to be the measure of all things.

Now I say, if the very sensible ideas and phantasms themselves, be not mere stamps or impressions from individual things without in a corporeal manner impressed upon the soul, but active, though sympathetical energies of the soul itself: it is much more impossible that the universal and abstract intelligible ideas of the mind, or essences of things, should be mere stamps or signatures impressed upon the soul, as upon a dead thing in a gross corporeal manner.

14. Wherefore here is a double error committed by vulgar philosophers; first, that they make the sensible ideas and phantasms to be totally impressed from without in a gross corporeal manner upon the soul, as it were upon a dead thing; and, secondly, that then they suppose the intelligible ideas, the abstract and universal notions of the mind, to be made out of these sensible ideas and phantasms thus impressed from without in a corporeal manner likewise by abstraction or separation of the individuating circumstances, as it were by the hewing off certain chips from them, or by hammering, beating or anvelling of them out into thin intelligible ideas; as if solid and massy gold should be beaten out into thin leaf-gold. To which purpose they have ingeniously contrived and set up an intellectus agens, "active understanding," like a smith or carpenter, with his shop or forge in the brain, furnished with all necessary tools and instruments for such a work. Where I would only demand of these philosophers, whether this their so expert faber, "smith," or architect, intellectus agens, "the active understanding," when he goes about his work, doth know what he is to do with these phantasms beforehand, what he is to make of them, and unto what shape to bring them? If he do not, he must needs be a bungling workman; but if he do, he is prevented in his design and undertaking, his work being done already to his hand; for he must needs have the intelligible idea of that which he knows or understands already within himself; and therefore now to what purpose should he use his tools, and go about to hew and hammer and anvil out these phantasms into thin and subtle intelligible ideas, merely to make that which he hath already, and which was native and domestic to him?

But this opinion is founded in no less a mistake of Aristotle's text concerning the intellectus agens, "active understanding," who never dreamed of any such as these men imagine, if we

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may believe the Greek scholiasts, that best understood him; than it is of the text of nature; as if not only those phantasms, but also the intelligible ideas themselves, were gross and corporeal things impressed from matter; whereas even the first of these are passive energies of the soul itself, fatally united to some local motions in the body, and concurrently produced with them, by reason of that magical union betwixt the soul and body; but the other are the pure active energies of the mind itself, as free from corporeal sympathy. Neither can these latter be made out of the former by any abstraction or separation, no nor by any depinxation or chymical distillation or sublimation neither; for it is a thing utterly impossible that vigour, activity and awakened energy, as intellections are, should be raised out of dull, sluggish and drowsy passion or sympathy. And this opinion is but like that other of the same philosopher's, concerning the eduction or raising of substantial and immaterial forms out of the passive matter, both of them proceeding from one and the same sottishness of mind that induces them to think that dull, stupid and senseless matter, is the first original source of all activity and perfection, all form and pulchritude, all wisdom and knowledge in the world.

And things being rightly considered, this opinion doth in truth and reality, attribute as much activity to the soul, that saith it hath a power of raising or educing of intelligible ideas or universal and abstract rationes, "notions," out of phantasms, as that other that affirms it hath a power of exerting them from itself; as it would attribute as much activity to the sun to say that he had a power of raising or educing light or the day out of night and darkness, as to say that he had a power of exerting it out of his own body.

15. Wherefore others of this kind of philosophers, that will not acknowledge any immaterial substance, that hath any active power of its own in it, or any thing in the soul besides impression from corporeal objects without, have found out another device, and that is this, plainly to deny that there are any universal notions, ideas or rationes, "reasons," in the mind at all; but that those things which are called universal, are nothing else but names applied to several individuals. Which opinion, as it was formerly held by those that were therefore called nominales, "nominalists;" so it hath been lately revived and taken up by some of these strenuous impugners of immaterial and incorporeal substances. There is nothing in the world (saith a late author) universal, but names; for the things named are every one of them individual and singular. Now indeed this is true, and nobody denies it, of things existing without the mind; but this author's meaning herein is to deny all universal conceptus, "conceptions," and rationes, "reasonings," of the mind, as

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appears by his larger explication of the same opinion elsewhere. Est nomen hoc universale non rei alicujus existentis in rerum naturâ, neque ideæ sive phantasmatis alicujus in animo formati, sed alicujus semper vocis sive nominis nomen, ita ut cum dicatur animal, vel saxum, vel spectrum, vel aliud quicquam esse universale, intelligendum sit tantum voces eas animal, saxum, esse nomina universalia, id est nomina pluribus rebus communia, et respondentes ipsis in animo conceptus sunt singularium animalium vel aliarum rerum imagines et phantasmata. Ideoque non est opus ad vim universalis intelligendam aliâ facultate quàm imaginativâ, quâ recordamur voces ejusmodi modo unam rem, modo aliam in animo excitâsse,* "This universal is the name, not of any thing existing in the nature of things, nor of any idea or phantasm formed in the mind, but always the name of some word or name; so that when an animal or a stone, or a spectre, or any thing else is said to be universal, it is to be understood only that those words animal, stone, are universal names, that is, names common to more things; and the conceptions answering to them in the mind, are the images and phantasms of singular animals or other things. And therefore to understand the meaning of an universal, there is no need of any other faculty than that of the imagination, whereby we are minded that words of that sort have sometimes excited one thing sometimes another in our mind." That is, there are no other ideas in the mind but only phantasms of individual corporeal things; only there are universal names, which are applied in common to more individuals than one; but there is no other object of the mind or cogitation but only singular and individual things existing without the soul. Wherefore this author consentaneously hereunto defines understanding to be nothing else but conception caused by speech; and therefore if speech be peculiar to man, then is understanding peculiar to him also. This mysterious notion is insisted upon and explained likewise by the third objector against Cartesius's metaphysics, after this manner: Quid jam dicimus, si forte ratiocinatio nihil aliud sit, quam copulatio et concatenatio nominum sive appellationum per verbum hoc, Est. Unde colligimus ratione nihil omnino de naturâ rerum, sed de eorum appellationibus, nimirum utrum copulemus rerum nomina secundum pacta, vel non. Si hoc sit, sicut esse potest, ratiocinatio dependebit à nominibus, nomina ab imaginatione, et imaginatio ab organorum corporeorum motu, et sic mens nihil aliud erit, præterquam motus in partibus quibusdam corporis organici. "Now what do we say, if perhaps reasoning be nothing else but the coupling and chaining together of names or appellations, by these words, it is. Whence we gather

* Elect. Philos.

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nothing at all by reason concerning the nature of things, but concerning their appellations; to wit, whether we join the names of things according to agreements or not. If this be so, as it may be, reasoning will depend upon names, names upon the imagination, and the imagination upon the motion of the bodily organs; and so the mind will be nothing else but a motion in some parts of the body." According to which philosophy, reason and science do not superadd any thing to sense, or reach any further in the knowledge of the nature of things, but only in making use of common names to express several individuals by at once.

16. Wherefore, although there be already enough said to prove, that in the understanding of individual corporeal things, beside sense and the sensible phantasms from them, there are also intelligible ideas and universal rationes, "notions," exerted from the mind itself, by which alone they are comprehended; yet still to make this business clearer, and also to demonstrate, that the knowledge of universal axiomatical truth, and scientifical theorems is a thing which doth not passively result from sense, but from the actual strength and vigour of the intellect itself comprehending its own intelligible ideas, we will here propose that one geometrical theorem concerning a triangle; that it hath three angles equal to two right angles; and consider what the subject of it is, ἐπιστημονικῶς, "scientifically," comprehended.

First therefore, if there be no other object of the mind in knowledge but sensible individuals existing without us, then the subject of this theorem, when Euclid wrought it, was only some individual bodies by him compared together. Nay, Euclid himself did not carry this knowledge about with him in his mind, neither was he master of it any longer than he held those individual bodies in his hands, or looked upon them with his eyes; and if so, it could not signify any thing at all, to any other person which either then or now had not the same individual bodies to compare, that Euclid had. Whereas it is plain that the subject of this theorem, whatsoever it be, is such a thing as every geometrician, though in never such distant places and times, hath the very same always ready at his hand, without the least imaginable difference. And they all pronounce concerning the same thing. Which could not possibly otherwise be, unless it were some universal ratio, "notion," and intelligible idea of the mind.

17. Again, secondly, no individual or material thing is the subject of this theorem, as sense takes cognizance of it, that is, the matter, and colour, and figure, and magnitude, all concretely together. For the same individual matter may presently be made quadrangular or circular, but only precisely in respect of

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the figure; and of that also no otherwise than as it is conformable to the indivisible and immutable ratio, "notion" or idea of a triangle, comprehended in the mind as the exemplar of it. Now as we have showed already, there is no material triangle any where to be found that is mathematically exact and accurate, neither is the individual form of a material triangle immutable. And if there were any mathematically exact, our sense could be no *κριτήριον*, "criterion" or "rule to judge," of it, nor discern when any thing were indivisibly such, nor judge of the absolute and mathematical equality of the three material angles of it, with two other angular superficies. Wherefore the subjects of this geometrical theorem are no sensible individual bodies, but the rationes, "notions," and ideæ, "ideas," of the mind itself, in which alone mathematical accuracy is to be found, and the exact equality of one thing, to another certainly and infallibly known.

18. Nay, if we should suppose that there were some individual material triangles and angles, absolutely and mathematically exact; and that our sense did infallibly perceive the indivisible points of them; or that we had an infallible pair of compasses, whose cuspides, "tops," were mathematical points, whereby we could measure the several angles of the triangle and right angle in a perfect circle, accurately divided into infinite parts; or else cutting off those several angles of the triangle, and laying them together upon an absolute plane, we should thus mechanically find them equal to the two material right angles; this would not amount to the knowledge of this truth, that a triangle, as such, hath of necessity three angles equal to two right angles; we thus considering them only as material individuals, and things existing without the mind by corporeal sense. For though we had now found that these individual material triangles were equal to those two individual material right angles; yet looking no further than sense determined to individuals, we could not tell certainly that it was so with all individual triangles, much less understand any necessity of its being so, or attain to any thing of the *διότι*, "reason," of it, in which alone true science consisteth. And this Aristotle hath observed very pertinently to our purpose, Post. Anal. lib. 1. cap. 31, *Οὐδὲ δι' αἰσθήσεώς ἐστιν ἐπίστασθαι, ἀλλ' αἰσθάνεσθαί γε ἀναγκαῖον· τὸ δὲ τί καὶ ποῦ καὶ νῦν· τὸ δὲ καθόλου καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἀδύνατον αἰσθάνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ τόδε, οὐδε νῦν, οὐ γὰρ ἦν καθόλου. Τὸ γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ καθόλου φαμὲν εἶναι. Ἐπεὶ οὖν αἱ μὲν ἀποδείξεις καθόλου, ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶν αἰσθάνεσθαι, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐπίστασθαι δι' αἰσθήσεώς ἐστιν. Ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ εἰ ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει τὰς γωνίας, ἐζητοῦμεν ἂν ἀπόδειξιν, καὶ οὐχ (ὡς φασί τινες) ἠπιστάμεθα. Αἰσθάνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη καθ' ἕκαστον, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη τὰ τοῦ καθόλου γνωρίζειν ἐστί,* "Neither is it necessary to understand

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by sense, but to perceive; but this regards a particular thing and manner, and the present time. But it is impossible to perceive by sense what relates to every thing, and in all respects: for this and now relate not to an universal; for of an universal we say, that it is always and every where. Since then demonstrations are of an universal, it is plain that there is no knowledge of the universal theorems of geometry by sense. For it is manifest, that if we could perceive by sense that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two right angles, yet should we not rest satisfied in this, as having therefore a sufficient knowledge of it (as some say), but would seek further after a demonstration hereof: sense reaching only to singulars, but knowledge to universals." The mind would not be satisfied herewith, but would still further require a demonstration of it; which demonstrations are not of individuals perceived by sense, but only of the universal rationes, "notions," comprehended in the mind; knowledge, as I said before, being a descending comprehension of a thing from the universal ideas of the mind, and not an ascending perception of them from individuals by sense.

19. Wherefore the apodictical knowledge of this truth is no otherwise to be attained than by the mind's ascending above sense, and elevating itself from individuals to the comprehension of the universal rationes, "notions," and ideas of things within itself, making the object of its inquiry and contemplation, not this nor that material individual triangle without itself, but the indivisible and immutable notion of a triangle. And thus it finds several ways that a triangle, as such, must of necessity have its three angles equal to two right angles.

For, first, if one will consider any triangle, as made out of a parallelogram (though this be the more compounded figure) divided by a diagonal line into two equal triangles, it is plain in every parallelogram there are four angles equal to four right angles, because when a straight line cuts two parallel lines, the two interior angles must of necessity be equivalent to two right angles, one of them being the complement of the other to a semicircle. But when the parallelogram is divided into two equal triangles by a diagonal line, the quantity of the three angles in each must of necessity be half the quantity of the four angles in the parallelogram.



Or, if a man will consider the genesis, "formation," of a plain triangle in this manner; first, by a straight line cutting two parallel lines, and then one of these parallels moving upon its centre in the straight line out of its parallelism, and inclining towards the other line, if it move never so little out of its

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

parallelism towards the other parallel, the continuation of it must needs cut the other line, and make a triangle. And so much as the interior angle, which with the other opposite, made up two right angles, so much is the third angle; and therefore all three make up two right angles.

20. Now here is a gross error of the vulgar to imagine, because geometricians demonstrating such theorems, commonly make use of such sensible schemes or diagrams, that therefore the knowledge of this truth doth result from sense, or that the geometricians themselves have no other ideas in their minds of straight lines, parallels, right, acute, and obtuse angles, triangles, equality of angles, than what are impressed upon their fancy from these schemes. Whereas these are only made use of to entertain the fancy in the mean time, whilst the mind being intent upon the demonstration, actively exerts other intelligible ideas of these things from within itself, and from thence comprehends the apodictical necessity of the theorem. Neither is the true and proper knowledge of one theorem or universal and necessary truth, either in geometry or metaphysics, passively impressed upon the soul from individuals existing without, or the result of mere sense, but it proceeds from the active strength and vigour of the mind, comprehending the intelligible ideas and universal rationes, "notions," of things within itself.

21. Wherefore we conclude, that the immediate objects of geometrical science, properly so called, are not individual bodies or superficies, but the intelligible and universal ideas of a triangle, square, circle, pyramid, cube, sphere, actively exerted from the mind, and comprehended in it. For the mind doth not seek its objects of knowledge abroad without itself, but must needs actively comprehend them within itself: which also, as we shall show in the following chapter, are immutable things, and always the same.

CHAPTER IV.

1. No individual material thing is always necessarily the same with itself, but mutable and changeable. And our sensible perceptions of them are nothing but passions or affections in the soul from some local motions in our body caused by them; which passions also are a kind of motions in the soul, whereby we do not comprehend the immutable ratio or essence of any thing.

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But intellection and knowledge are the active comprehension of something that is mixed and immutable, and hath always a necessary identity with itself. For that which is not one steady and immutable thing, cannot as such, be an object of intellection or knowledge, neither can the mind fix itself upon it; for it must needs mock and delude the understanding, perpetually gliding and rolling away from it, when it endeavours to grasp or comprehend it. Neither can it be the basis or subject of any scientifical theorem or proposition; for how can any thing be certainly, constantly, and immutably affirmed of that which is no one certain thing, nor always immutably the same with itself. Whence it plainly follows, that the immediate objects of intellection and knowledge, cannot be these individual material things as such, which our senses are passively affected from, but must of necessity be something else.

2. For which cause those flowing philosophers before mentioned, Heraclitus, Cratylus, and Protagoras, that maintained that there were no other beings that could be the objects of cogitation besides these individual material things, which they supposed always to flow, and never to stand still; did consentaneously to this hypothesis of theirs assert; that there was no knowledge but sense, and no certain or immutable comprehension of any thing. For that this assertion of theirs was grounded merely upon this hypothesis, that there was no other being or object of the mind, besides individual material things, as such; which they signified after this manner, by saying that all things flowed, for these material things do so; Aristotle plainly instructs us in his Metaphysics: *Αἴτιον τῆς δόξης τούτοις ὅτι περὶ τῶν ὄντων μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐσκόπουν· τὰ δ' ὄντα ὑπέλαβον εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητὰ μόνον· ἐν δὲ τούτοις πολλὴ ἡ τοῦ ἀορίστου φύσις ἐνυπάρχει. . . . Ἔτι δὲ πᾶσαν ὁρῶντες ταύτην κινουμένην τὴν φύσιν, κατὰ δὲ τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος οὐδὲν ἀληθευόμενον, περίγε τὸ πάντος πάντη μεταβάλλον, οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀληθεύειν. Ἐκ γὰρ ταύτης τῆς ὑπολήψεως ἐξήνθησεν ἡ ἀκροτάτη δόξα τῶν εἰρημένων ἡ τῶν φασκόντων Ἡρακλειτίζειν, καὶ οἵαν Κρατύλος εἶχεν, ὃς τὸ τελευταῖον οὐδὲν ὤετο δεῖν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκίνει μόνον, καὶ Ἡρακλείτῳ ἐπετίμα εἰπόντι δὶς τῷ αὐτῷ ποταμῷ οὐκ ἐμβῆναι. αὐτὸς γὰρ ὤετο οὐδ' ἅπαξ,** "The ground of this opinion, which denied all certain and immutable knowledge, was from hence; because truth and knowledge refer to beings or entities, and they supposed that there were no other beings besides these individual sensibles only. In which there is very much of undeterminateness . . . And which they perceived to be liable to perpetual motion or mutation. Now concerning that which always changes, nothing can be affirmed as constantly and immutably true. And from this supposition sprung the highest

* Arist. Metaph. lib. 4. cap. 5.

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sect of those which are called Heraclitical philosophers, and those that follow Cratylus, who at last came to this, that he only moved his finger, but thought that nothing at all ought to be affirmed; and reprehended Heraclitus for saying that one cannot twice enter into the same river, because he thought that one could not so much as once do it;" that is, that no material thing remained one moment the same.

3. Wherefore if there be any such thing as intellection, science, and knowledge, distinct from external sense, and any immutable truths, then there must of necessity be some other kind of beings or entities, besides these individual material things, as the immediate objects or subjects of them, such things as do not flow, but *ἀεὶ ταῦτα καί ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα*, "always remain immutably the same," or *μόνιμα καὶ μίαν ἀεὶ φύσιν ἔχοντα*, "permanent, and having always the same nature," as Plato expresseth these immediate objects of knowledge; or else, in Aristotle's language, *ἀκίνητος οὐσία*, "an immutable essence." Who therefore confutes both these sects of philosophers, whereof one was extremely metaphysical, that made all things to stand still; whom, I confess, I understand not; the other too grossly material, and addicted to sense, that made nothing to stand still, but all things to flow, after this manner:* *Φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδ' οἱ πάντα ἠρεμεῖν λέγοντες ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν, οὐδ' οἱ πάντα κινεῖσθαι. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἠρεμεῖ πάντα, ἀεὶ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ ἔσται· φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο μεταβάλλον· ὁ γὰρ λέγων πότε αὐτὸς οὐκ ἦν, καὶ πάλιν οὐκ ἔσται, εἰ δὲ πάντα κινεῖται, οὐδὲν ἔσται ἀληθὲς, πάντα ἄρα ψευδῆ*, "It is manifest, that neither they speak truly who affirm all things to rest, nor they that affirm all things to move. For if all things rest, then the same things would always be true and false; which is not so, because he that affirms this, once was not, and again will not be. But if all things move, then nothing can be true, and therefore all things will be false." And both he and Plato compounded that controversy thus; by acknowledging two sorts of entities, the one mutable, or subject to flux and motion, such as are especially individual corporeal things; the other immutable, that always rest or stand still, which are the proper objects of certain, constant, and immutable knowledge, that therefore cannot be mere nothings, non-entities.

Which latter kind of being, that is, the *ἀκίνητος οὐσία*, "immutable essence," as a distinct thing from individual sensibles, Aristotle plainly asserts against Heraclitus, and those other flowing philosophers, in these words:† *Ἔτι δὲ ἀξιώσομεν αὐτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ἄλλην οὐσίαν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων, ἣ οὔτε κίνησις ὑπάρχει, οὔτε φθορὰ, οὔτε γένεσις τὸ παράπαν*, "We would have these philosophers to know, that besides sensible things," that are always mutable, "there is another kind of being or entity of

* Metaphys. lib. 4. cap. 8. † Ibid. lib. 4. cap. 5.

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such things as are neither subject to motion, corruption, nor generation." And elsewhere he tells us, that this ἀκίνητος οὐσία, "immoveable essence," is the object of theoretical knowledge, of the first philosophy, and of the pure mathematics.

4. Now these immutable entities are the universal rationes, or intelligible natures and essences of all things, which some compare to unities, but Aristotle to numbers; which formally considered, are indivisible: saith he, εἰσί πως ἀριθμοὶ αἱ οὐσίαι, "the essences of things are like to numbers;" because if but the least thing be added to any number, or subtracted from it, the number is destroyed.

And these are the objects of all certain knowledge. As, for example, the objects of geometry are not any individual material triangles, squares, circles, pyramids, cubes, spheres, and the like; which because they are always mutable, nothing can be immutably affirmed of them; but they are those indivisible and unchangeable rationes of a triangle, square, circle; which are ever the same to all geometricians, in all ages and places, of which such immutable theorems as these are demonstrated, as that a triangle has necessarily three angles equal to two right angles.

But if any one demand here, where this ἀκίνητος οὐσία, these immutable entities do exist? I answer, first, that as they are considered formally, they do not properly exist in the individuals without us, as if they were from them imprinted upon the understanding, which some have taken to be Aristotle's opinion; because no individual material thing is either universal or immutable. And if these things were only lodged in the individual sensibles, then they would be unavoidably obnoxious to the fluctuating waves of the same reciprocating Euripus, in which all individual material things are perpetually whirled. But because they perish not together with them, it is a certain argument that they exist independently upon them. Neither, in the next place, do they exist somewhere else apart from the individual sensibles, and without the mind, which is that opinion that Aristotle justly condemns, but either unjustly or unskilfully attributes to Plato. For if the mind looked abroad for its objects wholly without itself, then all its knowledge would be nothing but sense and passion. For to know a thing is nothing else but to comprehend it by some inward ideas that are domestic to the mind, and actively exerted from it. Wherefore these intelligible ideas or essences of things, those forms by which we understand all things, exist nowhere but in the mind itself; for it was very well determined long ago by Socrates, in Plato's Parmenides, that these things are nothing else but noemata: Τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον τούτων νόημα, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ αὐτῷ προσήκει ἐγγίνεσθαι ἄλλοτι ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ, "These species or ideas are all of them nothing but noemata, or notions that exist nowhere but in

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the soul itself." Wherefore to say that there are immutable natures and essences, and rationes of things, distinct from the individuals that exist without us, is all one as if one should say, that there is in the universe above the orb of matter and body, another superior orb of intellectual being, that comprehends its own immediate objects, that is, the immutable rationes and ideas of things within itself, by which it understands and knows all things without itself.

And yet, notwithstanding, though these things exist only in the mind, they are not therefore mere figments of the understanding: for if the subjects of all scientifical theorems were nothing but figments, then all truth and knowledge that is built upon them would be a mere fictitious thing; and if truth itself and the intellectual nature be fictitious things, then what can be real or solid in the world? But it is evident, that though the mind thinks of these things at pleasure, yet they are not arbitrarily framed by the mind, but have certain, determinate, and immutable natures of their own, which are independent upon the mind, and which are blown away into nothing at the pleasure of the same Being that arbitrarily made them.

But we all naturally conceive that those things have not only an eternal, but also a necessary existence, so that they could not ever but be, such, and so many as they are, and can never possibly perish or cease to be, but are absolutely undestroyable.

5 Which is a thing frequently acknowledged in the writings of both those famous philosophers, Plato and Aristotle. The former of them calling those things:* Τὰ μὴ γιγνόμενα, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ὄντα, "Things that were never made, but always are," and μήτε γιγνόμενα μήτε ἀπολλύμενα, "things that were never made, nor can be destroyed." Τὰ ἀγέννητα καὶ ἀνώλεθρα, "things ingenerable and unperishable;" quæ Plato negat gigni, sed semper esse (as Tully expresseth it†) et ratione et intelligentia contineri. And Philo, the Platonical Jew, calls the τὰ νοητὰ, which are the same things we speak of, ἀναγκαιόταται οὐσίαι, "the most necessary essences," that is, such things as could not but be, and cannot possibly not be. And Aristotle himself calls the rationes of things in his metaphysics, not only χωριστὰ and ἀκίνητα, "things separate from matter and immutable," but also ἀΐδια, or "eternal; and in his ethics likewise, he calls geometrical truths ἀΐδια, eternal things, lib. 3. cap. 5: Περὶ τῶν ἀϊδίων οὐδεὶς βουλέυεται, οἷον περὶ τοῦ διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς, ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι, "where he makes the geometrical truth concerning the incommensurability betwixt the diameter and the side of a square, to be an eternal thing." Elsewhere he tells us, that, οὐ τῶν φθαρτῶν εἶναι ἐπιστήμην, "science, properly so called, is not of things corruptible and contingent," but of things necessary, incorruptible,

* In Theæteto et Parmenide. † Oratore, cap. 3.

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and eternal. Which immutable and eternal objects of science, in the place before quoted, he described thus: Οὐσίαν τῶν ὄντων ἥ οὔτε κίνησις ὑπάρχει, οὔτε φθορὰ, οὔτε γένεσις τὸ παράπαν, "Such a kind of entity of things as has neither motion, nor generation, nor corruption," that is, such things as were never made, and can never be destroyed. To which, he saith, the mind is necessarily determined. For science or knowledge has nothing either of fiction or of arbitrariness in it, but is κατάληψις τοῦ ὄντος, "the comprehension of that which immutably *is*."

6 Moreover, these things have a constant being, when our particular created minds do not actually think of them, and therefore they are immutable in another sense likewise, not only because they are indivisibly the same when we think of them, but also because they have a constant and never-failing entity; and always are, whether our particular minds think of them or not. For the intelligible natures and essences of a triangle, square, circle, pyramid, cube, sphere, &c., and all the necessary geometrical verities belonging to these several figures, were not the creatures of Archimedes, Euclid, or Pythagoras, or any other inventors of geometry; nor did then first begin to be; but all these rationes and verities had a real and actual entity before, and would continue still, though all the geometricians in the world were quite extinct, and no man knew them or thought of them. Nay, though all the material world were quite swept away, and also all particular created minds annihilated together with it; yet there is no doubt but the intelligible natures or essences of all geometrical figures, and the necessary verities belonging to them, would notwithstanding remain safe and sound. Wherefore these things had a being also before the material world and all particular intellects were created. For it is not at all conceivable, that ever there was a time when there was no intelligible nature of a triangle, nor any such thing cogitable at all, and when it was not yet actually true that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, but that these things were afterward arbitrarily made and brought into being out of an antecedent nothing or non-entity; so that the being of them bore some certain date, and had a youngness in them, and so by the same reason might wax old, and decay again; which notion he often harps upon, when he speaks of the εἴδη, or forms of things, as when he says: Τοῦ σφαῖραν εἶναι οὐκ ἔστι γένεσις, "There is no generation of the essence of a sphere," that is, it is a thing that is not made; but always is. And elsewhere he pronounces universally of the εἴδη: Ἄνευ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς ὅλως εἶναι τὰ εἴδη, "The forms of material things are without generation and corruption," and: Τὸ εἶδος οὐδεὶς ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ γεννᾶται, "That none makes the form of any thing, for it is never generated." Divers have censured Aristotle in some

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of such passages too much to confound physics and metaphysics together; for indeed these things are not true in a physical, but only in a metaphysical sense. That is, τὰ νοητὰ, the immediate objects of intellection and science, are eternal, necessarily existent, and incorruptible.

7. Now the plain meaning of all this is nothing else, but that there is an eternal wisdom and knowledge in the world, necessarily existing, which was never made, and can never cease to be or be destroyed; or, which is all one, that there is an infinite eternal mind necessarily existing, that actually comprehends himself, the possibility of all things, and the verities clinging to them. In a word, that there is a God, or an omnipotent and omniscient Being, necessarily existing, who therefore cannot destroy his own being or nature, that is, his infinite power and wisdom.

For since the rationes, "intelligible essences," and verities of things, as we observed before out of Plato, are nothing but noemata, that is, objective notions or knowledges, which are things that cannot exist alone, but together with that actual knowledge in which they are comprehended, they are the modifications of some mind or intellect. It is all one to affirm, that there are eternal rationes, essences of things, and verities necessarily existing, and to say that there is an infinite, omnipotent, and eternal Mind, necessarily existing, that always actually comprehendeth himself, the essences of all things, and their verities; or, rather, which is the rationes, essences, and verities of all things; for the rationes and essences of things are not dead things, like so many statues, images, or pictures hung up somewhere by themselves alone in a world: neither are truths mere sentences and propositions written down with ink upon a book, but they are living things, and nothing but modifications of mind or intellect; and therefore the first intellect is essentially and archetypally all rationes and verities, and all particular created intellects are but derivative participations of it, that are printed by it with the same ectypal signatures upon them.

And we may undoubtedly conclude, that it is a thing altogether as certain, that there is an infinite and eternal Mind (that is, a God) necessarily existing in the world, as that there ever was the ratio or intelligible essence of a triangle, or circle, of unity and duality; and that it was ever actually true, that a triangle hath three angles equal to two right angles; or that æqualia addita æqualibus efficiunt æqualia: or the like.

8. Neither does this hinder or contradict the truth of this assertion, that many that doubt concerning the existence of a God, yet notwithstanding confidently believe the necessary eternity of these things; and persuade themselves, that though there were no mind nor intellect, and so no God in the world;

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nay, though there was no matter neither, and no substantial entity at all, yet, notwithstanding, these rationes and verities of things would necessarily be as they are.

9. For there is an absolute impossibility in this assertion, that these essences of things and verities should be, though there were no substantial entity or no mind existing. For these things themselves must of necessity be either substances, or modifications of substance: for what is neither substance nor modification of a substance, is a pure non-entity; and, if they be modifications of substance, they cannot possibly exist without that substance whose modifications they are; which must either be matter or mind; but they are not the modifications of matter as such, because they are universal and immutable; therefore they are the modifications of some mind or intellect; so that these cannot be eternal without an eternal Mind.

And these men do but deceive themselves in the hypothetical assertion, that there would have been these rationes and universal verities, though there had never been a God or intellect; neither considering what the nature of God is, whose existence they would question or doubt of, nor what those rationes and verities are, which they would make so necessarily existent, by means whereof they do at once assert and question the same thing. For that which begets so strong a persuasion in their minds, that the rationes of things and universal verities are so necessarily eternal, though they do not perceive it, is nothing else but an inward invincible prepossession of the necessary existence of God, or an infinite eternal omnipotent and omniscient mind (that always actually comprehends himself, and the extent of his own power, or the ideas of all possible things), so deeply radicated and infixed in their minds, as that they cannot possibly quit themselves of it, though they endeavour it never so much, but it will unawares adhere to them, even when they force themselves to suppose the non-existence of God as a person, whose idea they do not clearly comprehend: that is, the force of nature is so strong in them as to make them acknowledge the thing when they deny the word. So that the true meaning of this phenomenon is nothing else but this, that God is a being so necessarily existent, that though men will suppose the non-existence of him, and deny the name, yet notwithstanding they cannot but confute themselves, and confess the thing.

10. Nay, it is clearly and mathematically demonstrable from what we have already proved, that there is some eternal mind; for as it is unquestionably certain, that something in the world was eternal, merely from hence, because there is being, which could not spring out of nothing; and therefore if there were no God, matter of necessity must be eternal. So because there is mind and understanding, and actual knowledge in the world,

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and these things could not spring out of matter, wisdom and knowledge must needs be eternal things, and there must be of necessity some eternal mind.

For, ex hypothesi, that once there had been no knowledge, no intelligible rationes or essences of things, no mind or intellect in the world, it would have been absolutely impossible that ever there should have been any such thing, because it could neither spring out of nothing, nor, which is all one, out of senseless and unknowing matter.

11. Now because every thing that is imperfect must needs depend upon something that is perfect in the same kind, our particular imperfect understandings, which do not always actually contain the rationes of things and their verities in them, which are many times ignorant, doubting, erring, and slowly proceed by discourse and ratiocination from one thing to another, must needs be derivative participations of a perfect, infinite and eternal intellect, in which is the rationes of all things, and all universal verities are always actually comprehended. Which consideration is so obvious and unavoidable, that Aristotle himself could not miss of it; for he tells us, that since our understandings are but δυνάμει πάντα, "potentially all things," that is, have not an actual but potential omniformity only, there must of necessity be in rerum natura, another intellect that is actually all knowledge, and is the same to our understandings, οἷον ἡ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὕλην, "that active art is to passive matter," and οἷον τὸ φῶς, "that the light is to our eyes," and which does not ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖν, ὁτὲ δὲ οὐ νοεῖν, "sometimes understand, and sometimes not understand,"* but is always eternal, Κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη, "actual knowledge." A sun that never sets, an eye that never winks. Wherefore though all our knowledges be not stamped or impressed upon our souls from the matter; they are all, as it were, ἐσφραγίσματα, "ectypal prints," and ἐκμάγματα, "derivative signatures," from one archetypal intellect, that is essentially the rationes of all things and all verities.

12. And from hence it comes to pass, that all understandings are not only constantly furnished with forms and ideas to conceive all things by, and thereby enabled to understand all the clear conceptions of one another, being printed all over at once with the seeds of universal knowledge, but also have exactly the same ideas of the same things; whereas if these things were impressed upon our souls from the matter without, all men would not be readily furnished with ideas to conceive all things by at every time, it being merely casual and contingent what things occur to men's several senses; neither could their ideas be exactly alike to one another, because no individual objects are

* As it were sometimes awake and sometimes asleep.

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so; and therefore when one spoke of one thing, another would mean another. Much less could men so promptly and expeditely exert them upon all occasions, if they were dead forms passively received only, and not all virtually contained in some one active and vital principle that had a potential omniformity in it.

Wherefore, as Themistius observes, men could not possibly confer and discourse together in that manner as they do, presently perceiving one another's meaning, and having the very same conceptions of things in their minds, εἰ μή τις ἦν εἷς νοῦς οὗ πάντες ἐκοινωνοῦμεν, "if all did not partake of one and the same intellect." Neither could one so readily teach, and another learn, εἰ μὴ ταυτὸν ἦν τὸ νόημα τοῦ διδάσκοντος καὶ τοῦ μανθάνοντος, "if there were not the same ectypal stamps of things in the mind both of the teacher and the learner."

13. Moreover, from hence also it comes to pass that truths, though they be in never so many several and distant minds apprehending them, yet they are not broken, multiplied, or diversified thereby; but they are one and the same individual truths in them all. So that it is but one truth and knowledge that is in all the understandings in the world. Just as when a thousand eyes look upon the sun at once, they all see the same individual object. Or as when a great crowd or throng of people hear one and the same orator speaking to them all, it is one and the same voice that is in the several ears of all those several auditors; so in like manner, when innumerable created understandings direct themselves to the contemplation of the same universal and immutable truths, they do all of them but as it were listen to one and the same original voice of the eternal wisdom that is never silent; and the several conceptions of those truths in their minds, are but like several echos of the same verba mentis of the divine intellect resounding in them.

14. From what we have already declared, it is evident, that wisdom, knowledge, and understanding, are eternal and self-subsistent things, superior to matter and all sensible beings, and independent upon them. Which mystery is thus acknowledged both in Christianity and Platonism, in that wisdom and intellect are made the eternal and first-begotten offspring of the first original goodness, the fountain of all things. "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way, before his works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was," &c. Prov. viii. 22, 23.

And indeed that opinion, that knowledge, wisdom and understanding, is in its own nature posterior to sensible and material things, and doth result out of them, or proceed only from the radiation and activity of the matter on that which understands, is nothing else but downright atheism. For if this were true,

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that wisdom, knowledge, and intellection were in its own nature posterior to sensible and corporeal things, as being nothing but the stamp or impress of them, then it must needs follow that this corporeal world was not made or framed by any antecedent wisdom or knowledge, but that it sprang up of itself from the blind, fortuitous, and giddy motions of eternal atoms; from whence all that knowledge that is in the world did afterward result. Which is all one as to say that there is no God at all.

But if any will here pretend, that there is indeed a knowledge in God antecedent to all corporeal being, and therefore no passion but a thing independent upon matter and self-originated; but yet, notwithstanding, the knowledge of all created understandings is not a thing immediately derived from thence, but only taken up at the rebound or second-hand from sensible and corporeal things. This is just as if one should say, that there is indeed a brightness or lucidity in the sun, but yet notwithstanding the light which is in the air, is not derived from that light which is in the body of the sun, but springs immediately out of the power of the dark air; which being a thing apparently absurd, it may be presumed that this assertion is nothing but a verbal and pretended acknowledgment of a God, that has an antecedent and an independent knowledge, made by such as really deny the same; for otherwise, to what purpose should they so violently and distortedly pervert the natural order and dependency of things in the universe, and cut off that cognation and connexion which is betwixt things imperfect and things perfect of the same kind, betwixt created minds and the increated mind, which is the intellectual scale or ladder by which we climb up to God, if they did really believe and acknowledge any such thing. But he that can believe that all human knowledge, wisdom, and prudence, has no other source and original than the radiations and impresses of the dark matter, and the fortuitous and tumultuous jumblings thereof; it is justly to be suspected, that he is too near akin to those ancient theologues that Aristotle speaks of, οἱ ἐν νυκτὸς πάντα γεννῶντες, "that fetched the original of God and all things out of night," or the dark chaos of matter; that held there is no God at all, or that blind and senseless matter and chance are the only original of all things.

CHAPTER V.

1. We formerly showed that the perception of external sense, as such, is a mere relative and fantastical thing: there being nothing absolutely true and real in it, but only this, that the soul hath such a passion, affection, phantasm, appearance, or

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seeming in it. But sense being but an idiopathy, we cannot be absolutely certain by it, that every other person or animal has the same passion or affection or phantasm in it from the same corporeal object that we ourselves have. Ἦ σὺ διϊσχυρίσαιο ἄν ὡς οἷόν σοι φαίνεται ἕκαστον χρῶμα τοιοῦτον καὶ ὁτῳοῦν ζώῳ; Θεαιτ. μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε· Σωκ· τί δ' ἄλλῳ ανθρώπῳ ἆρ' ὅμοιον καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται ὅτι οὖν ἔχεις τοῦτο ἰσχυρῶς ἢ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅτι οὐδέ σοι αὐτῷ ταυτὸν, διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίως αὐτὸν σεαυτῷ ἔχειν, "Are you certain that every other animal has the same sense or phantasm of every colour that you have (saith Socrates, according to Protagoras' sense) nay, that every other man has the same. Or, lastly, can you be so much as sure that yourself shall always have the same phantasm from the same object, when you are not always the same with yourself?" and passions are diversified by the ἰδιοσυγκρασία of the patient ——. Wherefore we cannot be sure merely by the passions of sense, what the absolute nature of a corporeal object is without us, our perception being only relative to ourselves, and our several organs and bodily crasis.

Nay, we cannot be sure that there is any object at all before us, when we have a phantasm of sensation of something. Forasmuch as not only in our dreams, but also when we are awake, we have phantasms and sensations in us of things that have no reality.

The reason of all which is, because by external sense we do but suffer from corporeal things existing without, and so do not comprehend the nature of the thing as it is absolutely in itself, but only our own passion from it. Neither is our sense a passion immediately from the thing itself that is perceived, for then it would not be altogether so uncertain as it is, but only from certain local motions in that body which the soul is vitally united to, by the mediation whereof it perceives other things at a distance, which local motions and passions may be produced when there are no such objects.

So that if there were no other perceptive power or faculty distinct from external sense, all our perceptions would be merely relative, seeming, and fantastical, and not reach to the absolute and certain truth of any thing; and every one would but, as Protagoras expounds it, τὰ ἴδια μόνον δοξάζειν, "think his own private and relative thoughts truths," and all our cogitations being nothing but appearances, would be indifferently alike true phantasms and one as another.

2. But we have since also demonstrated that there is another perceptive power in the soul superior to outward sense, and of a distinct nature from it, which is the power of knowing or understanding, that is, an active exertion from the mind itself. And therefore has this grand pre-eminence above sense, that it is no idiopathy, not a mere private, a relative, seeming, and

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fantastical thing; but the comprehension of that which absolutely IS and IS NOT.

For whereas the τὰ αἰσθητὰ, "objects of external sense," are nothing but individual corporeal things existing without us, from which by sense we receive only idols, images, and passions; by reason of which, as Plotinus observes, τὸ γιγνωσκόμενον δι' αἰσθησεως, τοῦ πράγματος εἴδωλόν ἐστι, καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἡ αἴσθησις λαμβάνει· μένει γὰρ ἐκεῖνο ἔξω, "that which is known by sense, is but an image of that individual body existing without, which sense suffers from; but the object of sense is a being not inwardly comprehended, but remaining without:" and διὰ τοῦτο ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια ἀλλὰ δόξα, ὅτι παραδεχομένη καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δόξα οὖσα ἄλλο παραδέχεται, ἄλλου ὄντος ἐκείνου ἐξ οὗ τοῦτο ὃ παραδέχεται ἔχει, "for this cause, the truth of the thing is not in sense, but only opinion."

Yet the τὰ νοητὰ, the proper and immediate objects of science, rightly so called, and intellection, being the intelligible essences of things and their necessary verities, that exist nowhere but in the mind itself; the understanding by its active power is fully master of them, and comprehends αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, καὶ οὐκ εἴδωλα μόνον, "not idols or images of them, but the very things themselves," within itself; ὁ νοῦς τὰ νοητὰ γινώσκων οὐκ ἕτερα ὄντα γινώσκει, "knowledge is not the perception of things abroad without the mind," but is the mind's comprehending itself. Otherwise, as the same philosopher adds: Θεωρήσει αὐτὰ οὐκ ἔχων αὐτὰ, εἴδωλα δι' αὐτῶν . . . τὸ τοίνυν ἀληθινὸν οὐκ ἔχων, εἴδωλα δὲ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς παρ' αὐτῷ λαβὼν, τὰ ψευδῆ ἕξει, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθές, "the mind, in considering things, will not apprehend the things themselves, but only their images," &c.

Wherefore it is most true, as Aristotle often observeth, ὁ νοῦς ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν τὰ πράγματα νοῶν, "that the knowledge of any scientifical theorem is one and the self-same thing with the thing known; τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ νοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον, "that which knows, and that which is known, are really the same thing." Ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἡ θεωρητικὴ καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστι, "The knowledge of any metaphysical or mathematical truth is the very thing," τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι, "or truth itself known," and not any passion from it, or image and picture of it. And though the same philosopher writes elsewhere, that αἴσθησις is τὰ αἰσθητὰ, and νόησις τὰ νοητὰ, sense is the same with sensible things, and understanding the same with the things understood; yet the difference betwixt those two is very great, for the τὰ αἰσθητὰ, "sensible things," really exist without, and sense has only a passive and phantasmatical representation of them; but the τὰ νοητὰ, "intellectual conceptions," properly so called, the primary objects of science and intellection, that is, the τὰ χωριστὰ ἀΐδια καὶ ἀκίνητα, "sepa-

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rate eternal and immutable rationes of things," exist nowhere but in the mind itself, being its own ideas: for the soul is, as Aristotle speaks, τόπος εἰδῶν, "the place of forms and ideas," and they have no other entity at all but only in being known or understood. And by and through these inward ideas of the mind itself, which are its primary objects, does it know and understand all external individual things, which are the secondary objects of knowledge only.

3. Moreover, that the intellection and knowing perception of the soul is not relative and fantastical as the sensitive, is evident from hence, because it is liable to falsehood, which it could not be, if it had not a power of comprehending absolute truth.

For external sense, for this very reason, is not capable of falsehood, because as such it does not comprehend the absolute truth of any thing; being only φαντασία, "a phantasm," or appearance, and all appearances as such are alike true.

So in like manner, if the noetical perceptions of the soul were only fantastical, and did not extend to the comprehension of the absolute truth of things, then every opinion would of necessity be alike true, neither could there be any absolute falsehood in any, because πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθὴς, "every fancy is true," that is, every fancy is a fancy or an appearance, and nothing more is required to it; for absolute truth belongs not to the nature of it. But it is evident to all that are not sunk and degenerated below men into brutish sottishness, that there are false opinions: whence it follows undeniably, that the noetical knowing and intellective power extends to the absolute truth of things. So that whatever theoretical universal proposition in geometry or metaphysics is true to one mind, the same is absolutely true in itself, and therefore true to all minds whatsoever throughout the whole world, that clearly understand it.

4. Wherefore, though the immediate objects of knowledge, which are the intelligible essences of things, and their relations to one another or verities, exist nowhere but in minds; yet notwithstanding they are not figments of the mind, because then every opinion or cogitation would be alike true, that is, a true figment, having no other truth but relative to that particular mind whose figment it is. But these things have an absolute and immutable nature in themselves, and their mutual respects to one another are alike immutable. And therefore those opinions and cogitations of the mind, which are not conformable to the immutable reality of those objective ideas, have an absolute falsehood in them. As for example, the nature of a triangle is an immutable thing, and this is demonstrable of it, as immutably and necessarily true, that it hath three angles equal to two right ones: neither can any man's opinion or thinking make it otherwise: for it is a false opinion, unless it be agreeable to the

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immutable nature of a triangle. So likewise the plain regular geometrical solids, as such, have an immutable nature or essence: and it is demonstrable of them, that there are five such bodies, and that there can be no more: and any opinion to the contrary will be an absolute falsehood. Wherefore every opinion or thinking is not knowledge, but only a right opinion: and therefore knowledge is not relative, *πρὸς τὸ κρίνον*, as sense is. Truth is the most unbending and uncompliable, the most necessary, firm, immutable, and adamantine thing in the world.

4. Moreover, because these intelligible essences of things, as before was observed, are like unities indivisible; so that if the least be added to them, or detracted from them, they are not the same, but something else; whenever the same things are rightly understood by any minds, they must of necessity have all the same truths belonging to them every where. Nay, these truths are not at all multiplied, as we observed before, by the multiplicity of minds that apprehend them; but are one and the same individual truths in those several minds: forasmuch as wisdom, truth, and knowledge, are but one and the same eternal original light shining in all created understandings.

To conclude therefore, whenever any theoretical proposition is rightly understood by any one particular mind whatsoever, and wheresoever it be, the truth of it is no private thing, nor relative to that particular mind only, but it is *ἀληθὲς καθολικὸν*, "a catholic and universal truth," as the Stoics speak, throughout the whole world; nay, it would not fail to be a truth throughout infinite worlds, if there were so many, to all such minds as should rightly understand it.

5. But probably it may be here demanded, how a man shall know when his conceptions are conformed to the absolute and immutable natures or essences of things, and their unchangeable relations to one another? Since the immediate objects of intellection exist in the mind itself, we must not go about to look for the criterion of truth without ourselves, by consulting individual sensibles, as the exemplars of our ideas, and measuring our conceptions by them. And how is it possible to know by measuring of sensible squares, that the diameter of every square is incommensurable with the sides? Nay, as was observed before, the necessary truth of no geometrical theorem can ever be examined, proved, or determined by sensible things mechanically. And though the eternal divine intellect be the archetypal rule of truth, we cannot consult that neither, to see whether our conceptions be commensurate with it. I answer therefore, that the criterion of true knowledge is not to be looked for any where abroad without our own minds, neither in the height above, nor in the depth beneath, but only in our knowledge and conceptions themselves. For the entity of all theoretical truth is nothing

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else but clear intelligibility, and whatever is clearly conceived is an entity and a truth; but that which is false, divine power itself cannot make it to be clearly and distinctly understood, because falsehood is a nonentity, and a clear conception is an entity: and omnipotence itself cannot make a nonentity to be an entity.

Wherefore no man ever was or can be deceived in taking that for an epistemonical truth which he clearly and distinctly apprehends, but only in assenting to things not clearly apprehended by him, which is the only true original of all error.

6. But there is another opinion that seems to have gained the countenance of some very learned philosophers, which differs but a little from the Protagorean doctrine; though for my part I conceive it not to be an opinion, but only a certain scheme of modesty and humility, which they thought decorous to take upon themselves, that they might not seem to arrogate too much either to themselves, or to their excellent performances, by not so much as pretending to demonstrate any thing to be absolutely true, but only hypothetically, or upon supposition that our faculties are rightly made.

For if we cannot otherwise possibly be certain of the truth of any thing, but only ex hypothesi, that our faculties are rightly made, of which none can have any certain assurance but only he that made them, then all created minds whatsoever must of necessity be condemned to an eternal scepsis. Neither ought they ever to assent to any thing as certainly true, since all their truth and knowledge as such, is but relative to their faculties arbitrarily made, that may possibly be false, and their clearest constant apprehensions nothing but perpetual delusions.

Wherefore according to this doctrine, we having no absolute certainty of the first principles of all our knowledge, as that, Quod cogitat, est. Æqualia addita æqualibus efficiunt æqualia. Omnis numerus est vel par vel impar. We can neither be sure of any mathematical or metaphysical truth, nor of the existence of God, nor of ourselves.

For whereas some would endeavour to prove the truth of their intellectual faculties from hence, because there is a God, whose nature also is such, as that he cannot deceive: it is plain that this is nothing but a circle, and makes no progress at all, forasmuch as all the certainty which they have of the existence of God, and of his nature, depends wholly upon the arbitrary make of their faculties; which, for aught they know, may be false. Nay, according to this doctrine, no man can certainly know that there is any absolute truth in the world at all; because it is nothing but his faculties which makes him think there is, which possibly may be false. Wherefore upon this supposition, all created knowledge, as such, is a mere fantastical thing.

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Now, this is very strange to assert, that God cannot make a creature which shall be able certainly to know either the existence of God, or of himself; or whether there be any absolute truth or no.

7. It is evident that this opinion plainly supposes that intellectual faculties may be so made, as clearly and distinctly to understand that to be true which is absolutely false and impossible (for unless they did acknowledge that we do clearly understand some things, they could not undertake so much as hypothetically to demonstrate any thing) as for example, that the whole is not greater than one of its parts, or that the three angles of a triangle are never equal to two right angles.

Now, we have already demonstrated, that a falsehood can never be clearly conceived or apprehended to be true, because a falsehood is a mere non-entity; and whatsoever is clearly conceived or understood, is an entity; but a non-entity can never become an entity. Nay, the true knowledge or science which exists nowhere but in the mind itself, has no other entity at all besides intelligibility; and therefore, whatsoever is clearly intelligible, is absolutely true. Hence, it comes to pass that both philosophers and divines have without scruple measured the divine omnipotence itself, and the possibility of things, by their own clear intellections concerning them; and so pronounce that God himself cannot make contradictions to be true at the same time; whereas it were a high and unpardonable presumption thus to venture to measure the divine omnipotence, if there were not an absolute certainty of the truth of clear intellections, as being nothing else but the immutable wisdom of God participated and imparted to us. And if it be absolutely impossible even to omnipotence, that contradictories should be true together, then omnipotence itself cannot make any such faculties as shall clearly understand that which is false to be true, since the essence of falsehood consists in nothing else but non-intelligibility.

But if they will say that it is not impossible that contradictions should be true, because our faculties, which make us think so, may be false and deceive us in every thing, the necessary consequence from hence will be, that it is possible that there may be no certain knowledge at all, because if contradictories may be true, then nothing can be certainly affirmed or denied of any thing.

8. Wherefore, be our faculties what they will, and let them be supposed to be made how you will, yet notwithstanding whatsoever is clearly understood and conceived, has an objective entity in it, and must of necessity be true. For a clear conception cannot be nothing. And though intellectual faculties may be made obscure more or less, yet it is not possible that

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they should ever be made false, so as clearly to apprehend whatsoever is true to be false, and what is false to be true.

So that if there were a world of men created either in the moon or elsewhere, that should affirm the contradictories to all the theorems in geometry; forasmuch as we certainly know that we clearly understand them to be true, and that falsehood can never be clearly understood, we ought not in the least to question from hence whether our faculties or theirs were made true, or to suspect that truth and knowledge were such whiffling things, as that they merely depended upon an arbitrary make of faculties; but conclude without any controversy that this was but a bedlam world of mad, frantic, and distracted souls, that had no clear apprehensions of any thing, and either by mere chance or humour happened to assent to every thing that was false as true.

9. But yet if any one will still pertinaciously urge, that it is nothing but our faculties which instruct us thus, that every clear conception is an entity, and that the entity of truth is nothing but clear intelligibility; that contradictions cannot be true, or if they could, then there were no possibility of any certain knowledge; that all this is from our faculties, but that still our faculties themselves may be false; nay, it is not reasonable to think that the intellectual faculties of any creatures should be absolutely infallible in any thing, because this seems to be the peculiar privilege and sole prerogative of the Deity.

I answer, that this is the thing we contend for, that the ultimate resolution of theoretical truth, and the only Κριτήριον, "criterion" of it, is in the clearness of the apprehensions themselves, and not in any supposed blind and unaccountable make of faculties. So that the certainty of clear apprehensions is not to be derived from the contingent truth of faculties, but the goodness of faculties is only to be tried by the clearness and distinctness of apprehensions. For be these faculties what they will, clear intellectual conceptions must of necessity be truths, because they are real entities. And to suppose that faculties may be so made, as to beget clear apprehensions of things that are not, as if knowledge were an arbitrary fictitious thing, is much like that opinion of some, that all the new celestial phenomena, as of the jovial planets, and the mountains in the moon, and the like, are no real things; but that the clear diaphanous crystal of the telescopes may be so artificially cut, ground, and polished, as to make all those, and any other phenomena, clearly to appear to sense, when there is no such thing: nay, it is more absurd and ridiculous to imagine, that that more than crystalline pellucid intellectual faculty, by which we perceive the truth of things, can be arbitrarily so made

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or polished, as to represent any non-entities whatsoever, as clear and real objects of intellection.

10. Nay, to make the certainty of all truth and knowledge, not to be determined by the clearness of apprehensions themselves, but a supposed unaccountable truth and rectitude of faculties, and so by the uncertainty thereof, quite to baffle all our clearest intellections, is quite to pervert the nature of knowledge, which is κατάληψις τοῦ ὄντος, "the comprehension of that which absolutely is;" which is not terminated in the τὸ φαινόμενον, appearance only, as sense is, but in that τὸ ὄν, "which is," "and whose evidence and certainty is no extrinsical, adventitious, and borrowed thing, but native and intrinsical to itself."

For if knowledge have no inward κριτήριον of its own, but the certainty of all truth and knowledge depend upon an arbitrary peculiar make of faculties, which is not a thing knowable in itself, neither can there be any assurance of it given but what is extrinsical by testimony and revelation, (inartificial arguments), there will be no such thing as knowledge, but all will be mere credulity and belief.

11. It is a fond imagination for any to suppose that it is derogatory to the glory of God to bestow or import any such gift upon his creatures as knowledge is, which hath an intrinsical evidence within itself, or that creatures should have a certainty of the first principles which all men are conscious that they do so clearly understand, that they cannot doubt of them, as that nihili nulla est affectio. Æqualia addita æqualibus efficient æqualia; without which they can know nothing at all; though they be notwithstanding ignorant, doubting, and erring in many things, and slowly proceed in their ratiocinations from one thing to another; whereas, on the contrary, it is plainly derogatory to it to suppose that God cannot make any creature that can possibly have any certain knowledge of God's own existence, or any thing more than a bare credulity of the same.

12. Wherefore since it cannot be denied but every clear apprehension is an entity, and the essence of truth is nothing but clear intelligibility, those philosophers must lay the stress of their cause here, that intellectual faculties may be so made, as that men can never certainly tell when they have clear apprehensions, but may think they have them, when they have not.

And it cannot be denied but that men are oftentimes deceived, and think they clearly comprehend what they do not: but it does not follow from hence, because men sometimes think that they clearly comprehend what they do not, that therefore they can never be certain that they do clearly comprehend any thing; which is just as if we should argue, that because in our dreams

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we think we have clear sensations, we cannot therefore be ever sure, when we are awake, that we see things that really are.

I shall conclude this discourse with that of Origen against Celsus: Μόνον τῶν ὄντων βέβαιον ἐπίστημα, "Science and knowledge is the only firm thing in the world," without a participation of which communicated to them from God, all creatures would be mere ludibria and vanity.

CHAPTER VI.

1. We have now abundantly confuted the Protagorean philosophy, which, that it might be sure to destroy the immutable natures of just and unjust, would destroy all science or knowledge, and make it relative and fantastical. Having shown that this tenet is not only most absurd and contradictious in itself, but also manifestly repugnant to that very atomical physiology on which Protagoras endeavoured to found it, and, than which nothing can more effectually confute and destroy it: and also largely demonstrated, that though sense be indeed a mere relative and fantastical perception, as Protagoras thus far rightly supposed; yet notwithstanding there is a superior power of intellection and knowledge of a different nature from sense, which is not terminated ἐν τῷ φαινομένῳ, "in mere seeming and appearance only," but ἐν τῷ ὄντι, "in the truth and reality of things," and reaches to the comprehension of that which really and absolutely is, whose objects are the eternal and immutable essences and natures of things, and their unchangeable relations to one another.

2. To prevent all mistake, I shall again remember what I have before intimated, that where it is affirmed that the essences of all things are eternal and immutable; which doctrine the theological schools have constantly avouched, this is only to be understood of the intelligible essences and rationes of things, as they are the objects of the mind: And that there neither is nor can be any other meaning of it, than this, that there is an eternal knowledge and wisdom, or an eternal mind or intellect, which comprehends within itself the steady and immutable rationes of all things and their verities, from which all particular intellects are derived, and on which they do depend. But not that the constitutive essences of all individual created things were eternal and uncreated, as if God in creating of the world, did nothing else, but as some sarcastically express it, Sartoris instar rerum essentias vestire existentia, only clothed the eternal, increated, and antecedent essences of things with a new outside garment of existence, and not created the whole of them: and as if the

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constitutive essences of things could exist apart separately from the things themselves, which absurd conceit Aristotle frequently, and no less deservedly chastises.

3. Wherefore the result of all that we have hitherto said is this, that the intelligible natures and essences of things are neither arbitrary nor fantastical, that is, neither alterable by any will whatsoever, nor changeable by opinion; and therefore every thing is necessarily and immutably to science and knowledge what it is, whether absolutely or relatively, to all minds and intellects in the world. So that if moral good and evil, just and unjust, signify any reality, either absolute or relative, in the things so denominated, as they must have some certain natures, which are the actions or souls of men, they are neither alterable by mere will nor opinion.

Upon which ground that wise philosopher Plato, in his Minos, determines that νόμος, "a law," is not δόγμα πόλεως, "any arbitrary decree of a city or supreme governors;" because there may be unjust decrees, which therefore are no laws, but τοῦ ὄντος ἐξεύρεσις, "the invention of that which IS," or what is absolutely or immutably just, in its own nature. Though it be very true also, that the arbitrary constitutions of those that have lawful authority of commanding, when they are not materially unjust, are laws also in a secondary sense, by virtue of that natural and immutable justice or law that requires political order to be observed.

4. But I have not taken all this pains only to confute scepticism or fantasticism, or merely to defend and corroborate our argument for the immutable natures of just and unjust; but also for some other weighty purposes that are very much conducing to the business that we have in hand. And first of all, that the soul is not a mere rasa tabula, a naked and passive thing, which has no innate furniture or activity of its own, nor any thing at all in it, but what was impressed upon it without; for if it were so, then there could not possibly be any such thing as moral good and evil, just and unjust; forasmuch as these differences do not arise merely from the outward objects, or from the impresses which they make upon us by sense, there being no such thing in them; in which sense it is truly affirmed by the author of the Leviathan, page 24, "That there is no common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves," that is, either considered absolutely in themselves, or relatively to external sense only, but according to some other interior analogy which things have to a certain inward determination in the soul itself, from whence the foundation of all this difference must needs arise, as I shall show afterwards; not that the anticipations of morality spring merely from intellectual forms and notional ideas of the mind, or from certain rules or propositions, arbitrarily printed upon the soul as upon a book,

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but from some other more inward and vital principle, in intellectual beings, as such, whereby they have a natural determination in them to do some things, and to avoid others, which could not be, if they were mere naked passive things. Wherefore since the nature of morality cannot be understood, without some knowledge of the nature of the soul, I thought it seasonable and requisite here to take this occasion offered, and to prepare the way to our following discourse, by showing in general, that the soul is not a mere passive and receptive thing, which hath no innate active principle of its own, because upon this hypothesis there could be no such thing as morality.

5. Again, I have the rather insisted upon this argument also, because that which makes men so inclinable to think that justice, honesty and morality are but thin, airy and fantastical things, that have little or no entity or reality in them besides sensuality, is a certain opinion in philosophy which doth usually accompany it, that matter and body are the first original and source of all things; that there is no incorporeal substance superior to matter, and independent upon it; and therefore that sensible things are the only real and substantial things in nature; but souls and minds springing secondarily out of body, that intellectuality and morality which belong unto them, are but thin and evanid shadows of sensible and corporeal things, and not natural, but artificial and factitious things that do as it were border upon the confines of nonentity.

6. This is a thing excellently well observed by Plato, and therefore I shall set down his words at large concerning it: *Λέγουσί που τινὲς ὡς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα τὰ μὲν φύσει, τὰ δὲ τέχνῃ, τὰ δὲ διὰ τύχην. Ἔοικε δὲ φασὶ, τὰ μὲν μέγιστα αὐτῶν καὶ κάλλιστα ἀπεργάζεσθαι φύσιν καὶ τύχην, τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα τέχνην· ἣν δὲ παρὰ φύσεως λαμβάνουσαν τὴν τῶν μεγάλων καὶ πρώτων γένεσιν ἔργων πλάττειν καὶ τεκταίνεσθαι πάντα τὰ σμικρότερα, ἃ δὴ τεχνικὰ πάντες προσαγορεύομεν. Ὧδ' ἔτι σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. Πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα φύσει πάντα εἶναι καὶ τύχῃ φασὶ, τέχνῃ δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων· καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα αὖ σώματα γῆς τε καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης ἄστρων τε πέρι, διὰ τούτων γεγονέναι παντελῶς ὄντων ἀψύχων. Τύχῃ δὲ φερόμενα τῇ τῆς δυνάμεως ἕκαστα ἑκάστων, ᾗ ξυμπέπτωκεν ἁρμύττοντα οἰκείως πῶς θερμὰ ψυχροῖς, ἢ ξηρὰ πρὸς ὑγρὰ, καὶ μαλακὰ πρὸς σκληρά· καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κράσει κατὰ τύχην ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεκεράσθη. Ταύτῃ καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτω γεγεννηκέναι τόν τε οὐρανὸν ὅλον καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα κατ' οὐρανόν· καὶ ζῶα αὖ καὶ φυτὰ ξύμπαντα ὡρῶν πασῶν ἐν τούτων γενομένων· οὐ διὰ νοῦν φασὶν, οὐδὲ διά τινα θεὸν, οὐδὲ δια τέχνην, ἀλλὰ ὃ λέγομεν φύσει καὶ τύχῃ. Τέχνην δὲ ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων ὑστέραν γενομένην αὐτὴν θνητὴν ἐκ θνητῶν, ὕστερα γεγεννηκέναι παιδείας τινὰς, ἀληθείας οὐ σφόδρα μετεχούσας, ἀλλ' εἴδωλα ἄττα συγγενῆ ἑαυτῶν· οἷα ἡ γραφὴ γεννᾷ, καὶ Μουσικὴ, καὶ*

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ὅσαι ταύταις εἰσὶ συνέριθοι τέχναι· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν πᾶσαν οὐ φύσει, τέχνῃ δὲ, ἧς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς· εἶναι τὰς θέσεις, "These men making this distribution of things, that all things that are, are either by nature, or art, or chance, they imagine that the greatest and most excellent things that are in the world, are to be attributed to nature and chance; which working upon those greater things which are made by nature, does form and fabricate certain smaller things afterward, which we commonly call artificial things. To speak more plainly, fire, water, air and earth, they attribute wholly to nature and chance, but not to any art or wisdom; in like manner those bodies of the earth, the sun, moon and stars, they will have to be made out of them fortuitously agitated; and so by chance causing both divers systems and compages of things; thus they would have the whole heavens made, and all the earth and animals, and all the seasons of the year, not by any mind, intellect, or God, not by any art or wisdom, but all by blind nature and chance. But art and mind afterwards springing up out of these, to have begotten certain ludicrous things, which have little truth and reality in them, but are like images in a glass, such as picture and music produces. Wherefore these men attribute all ethics, politics, morality and laws, not to nature, but to art, whose productions are not real and substantial."

7. Now this philosopher, that he may evince that ethics, politics and morality are as real and substantial things, and as truly natural as those things which belong to matter, he endeavours to show that souls and minds do not spring secondarily out of matter and body, but that they are real things in nature, superior and antecedent to body and matter. His words are these: Ψυχὴν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἠγνοηκέναι κινδυνεύουσι μὲν ὀλίγου ξύμπαντες, οἷόν τε ὂν τυγχάνει καὶ δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει, τῶν τε ἄλλων αὐτῆς πέρι, καὶ δὴ καὶ γενέσεως ὡς ἐν πρώτοις ἐστὶ σωμάτων ἔμπροσθεν πάντων γενομένη, καὶ μεταβολῆς τε αὐτῶν καὶ μετακοσμήσεως ἀπάσης ἄρχη παντὸς μᾶλλον, "These men are all ignorant concerning the nature of mind and soul, as in other regards, so especially in respect of its original, as it is in order of nature before matter and body, and does not result out of it; but does command it, govern it, and rule it."

And I have in like manner in this antecedent discourse, endeavoured to show that wisdom, knowledge, mind and intellect, are no thin shadows or images of corporeal and sensible things, nor do result secondarily out of matter and body, and from the activity and impressions thereof; but have an independent and self-subsistent being, which in order of nature is before body; all particular created minds being but derivative participations of one infinite eternal mind, which is antecedent to all corporeal things.

8. Now from hence it naturally follows, that those things

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which belong to mind and intellect, such as morality, ethics, politics and laws are, which Plato calls, *νοῦ γεννήματα οὐχ ἧττον φύσει εἶναι ἢ φύσεως*, "The offspring and productions of mind, are no less to be accounted natural things, or real and substantial, than those things which belong to stupid and senseless matter;" for since mind and intellect are first in order of nature before matter and body, those things which belong to the mind must needs be in order of nature before those things which belong to the body. *Ἆρα οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ ψυχῆς συγγενῆ πρότερα ἂν εἴη γεγονότα τῶν σώματι προσηκόντων, οὔσης ταύτης πρεσβυτέρας ἢ σώματος, νοῦς καὶ τέχνη καὶ νόμος καὶ τρόπος καὶ ἤθη σκληρῶν καὶ μαλακῶν, βαρέων καὶ κούφων, μήκους σωμάτων καὶ πλάτους πρότερα*, "Wherefore mind and intellect, art and law, ethics and morality are first in order of nature, before hard and soft, light and heavy, long and broad, which belong to body;" and therefore more real and substantial things. For since mind and intellect are a higher, more real and substantial thing than senseless body and matter, and what hath far the more vigour, activity and entity in it, modifications of mind and intellect, such as justice and morality, must of necessity be more real and substantial things, than the modifications of mere senseless matter, such as hard and soft, thick and thin, hot and cold, and the like are. And therefore that grave philosopher excellently well concludes: *Τὰ μεγάλα καὶ πρῶτα ἔργα καὶ πράξεις τέχνης ἂν γίγνοιτο ὄντα ἐν πρώτοις, τὰ δὲ φύσει καὶ φύσις (ἣν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐπονομάζουσιν) αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὕστερα καὶ ἀρχόμενα ἂν ἐκ τέχνης εἴη καὶ νοῦ*, that "the greatest and first works and actions are of art or of mind, which were before body; but those things which are said to be by nature (in which they abuse the word nature, appropriating it only to senseless and inanimate matter) are afterwards, being governed by mind and art."

9. Wherefore I thought our former discourse seasonable to confute the dulness and grossness of those philosophasters that make corporeal things existing without the soul, to be the only solid and substantial things, and make their grossest external senses the only judges of reality of things, *οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο οἰόμενοι εἶναι ἢ οὗ ἂν δύνωνται ἅπριξ ταῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι*, "and so conclude nothing is or has any reality but what they can grasp in their hands, or have some gross or palpable sense of."

Whereas notwithstanding it is most true that those corporeal qualities, which they think to be such real things existing in bodies without them, are for the most part fantastic and imaginary things, and have no more reality than the colours of the rainbow; and, as Plotinus expresseth it, *καὶ οὐκ ἐν ὑποκειμένοις, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἔχει τὴν ὑπόστασιν*, "have no reality at all in the objects without us, but only a seeming kind of entity in our own fancies;" and therefore are not absolutely any thing in

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themselves, but only relative to animals. So that they do in a manner mock us, when we conceive of them as things really existing without us, being nothing but our own shadows, and the vital passive energies of our own souls.

Though it was not the intention of God or nature to abuse us herein, but a most wise contrivance thus to beautify and adorn the visible and material world, to add lustre or embellishment to it, that it might have charms, relishes, and allurements in it, to gratify our appetites; whereas otherwise really in itself, the whole corporeal world in its naked hue, is nothing else but a heap of dust or atoms, of several figures and magnitudes, variously agitated up and down; so that these things, which we look upon as such real things without us, are not properly the modifications of bodies themselves, but several modifications, passions, and affections of our own souls.

10. Neither are these passive and sympathetical energies of the soul, when it acts confusedly with the body and the pleasures resulting from them, such real and substantial things as those that arise from the pure noetical energies of the soul itself intellectually and morally; for since the mind and intellect is in itself a more real and substantial thing, and fuller of entity than matter and body, those things which are *νοῦ γεννήματα*, "the pure offspring of the mind," and sprout from the soul itself, must needs be more real and substantial than those things which blossom from the body, or from the soul enfeebled by it, and slumbering in it.

11. Wherefore that philosopher professing and understanding to confute Atheists, and to show, *τοὺς λόγων ἁπτομένους ἀσεβῶν μηδὲ εὖ τοῖς λόγοις ἀλλ' ἐξημαρτημένως χρᾶσθαι*, "that all Atheists, though they pretend to wit never so much, are but bunglers at reason, and sorry philosophers," he, not without cause, fetches his discourse from hence, that *ὅτι ὃ πρῶτον γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς αἴτιον ἁπάντων, τοῦτο οὐ πρῶτον ἀλλ' ὕστερον ἀπεφήναντο εἶναι γεγονὸς οἱ τὴν τῶν ἀσεβῶν ψυχὴν ἀπεργασάμενοι λόγοι, ὃ δὲ ὕστερον πρότερον, ὅθεν ἡμαρτήκασι περὶ θεῶν τῆς ὄντως οὐσίας*, "They that thus infect men's minds with impiety and atheism, make that which is the first cause of all generation and corruption, to be the last thing in the universe, and that which is the last to be the first: from hence proceeds their error concerning the being of God;" that is, they make mind and soul to be the last thing, and body and matter to be the first.

This therefore is the only course and method which this philosopher proceeds in to confute the Atheists; to show, *ψυχὴν μὲν προτέραν γεγονέναι σώματος, σῶμα δὲ δεύτερόν τε καὶ ὕστερον, ψυχῆς ἀρχούσης ἀρχόμενον κατὰ φύσιν*, "that mind and soul, in the order of the universe, are before body, and not posterior to it; mind and soul being that which rules in the universe, and body that which is ruled and ordered by it." And there is no

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phenomenon in the world but may be solved from this hypothesis.

Now this he demonstrates, even from local motion, because body and matter has no self-moving power, and therefore it is moved and determined in its motion by a higher principle, a soul or mind; which argument is further improved by the author of that excellent philosophical treatise, book ii. chap. 2.

12. Now, for the self-same cause, I have endeavoured to demonstrate in the foregoing discourse, that knowledge and intellection cannot possibly spring from sense, nor the radiation or impresses of matter and body upon that which knows, but from an active power of the mind, as a thing antecedent to matter, and independent upon it, whereby it is enabled from within itself to exert intelligible ideas of all things.

13. Lastly, I have insisted the rather so largely upon this argument, for this further reason also, because it is not possible that there should be any such thing as morality, unless there be a God, that is, an infinite eternal mind that is the first original and source of all things, whose nature is the first rule and exemplar of morality; for otherwise it is not conceivable, whence any such thing should be derived to particular intellectual beings. Now there can be no such thing as God, if stupid and senseless matter be the first original of all things; and if all being and perfection that is found in the world, may spring up and arise out of the dark womb of unthinking matter; but if knowledge and understanding, if soul, mind, and wisdom may result and emerge out of it, then doubtless every thing that appears in the world may; and so night, matter, and chaos, must needs be the first and only original of all things.

14. Wherefore Plato, as I have already intimated, taking notice of the opinion of divers pretenders to philosophy, *πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα πρῶτα ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν πάντων εἶναι καὶ τὴν φύσιν ὀνομάζειν ταῦτα αὐτά, ψυχὴν δὲ ἐκ τούτων ὕστερον*, "that fire, water, air, and earth, are the first beings of all, to which senseless and inanimate things they appropriate the title of nature: but that soul did spring up afterward out of these as a secondary thing," and as a mere shadow of them, he immediately adds concerning it: *Οἷον πήγην τινὰ ἀνοήτου δόξης ἀνευρήκαμεν ἀνθρώπων ὁπόσοι πώποτε τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἐφήψαντο ζητημάτων*, "We have here found and discovered the true fountain of all that atheistical madness that possesses most of those that deal in physiology or questions of natural philosophy," viz. that they are all possessed with this sottishness, that matter and body is the first original of all things; and therefore it is observed by the same author, that the same persons that held all things were derived from body, blind nature, and chance, did both deny the existence of God, and which is consentaneous thereunto, asserted that justice and morality have no nature or entity at all, saying,

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they were nothing but passion from corporeal things, without the sentient or the renitence, or the reaction made upon local motion in a body duly mixed and tempered: that is, if soul and mind, knowledge and wisdom may thus arise from the contemplation of mere senseless matter, and radiation or impression that is the mere local motion of corporeal objects without, then, as we said before, there cannot possibly be the least shadow of argument left to prove a Deity by; since not only the souls of men, but also all that wisdom, counsel, and contrivance that appears in the frame of the whole visible world, might first arise in like manner from the mere casual concourse and contemperation of the whole matter; either in those particular bodies of the sun and stars, or else in the whole system and compages of the material world itself.

15. Wherefore we have not only showed that all intellection and knowledge does not emerge or emane out of sense, but also that sense itself is not a mere passion or reception of corporeal impresses without, but that it is an active energy and vigour, though sympathetical in the sentient. And it is no more possible that this should arise out of senseless matter and atoms, by reason of any peculiar contemperation or contexture of them in respect of figure, site, and motion, than that which all Atheists stoutly deny, that something should arise out of nothing.

And here we can never sufficiently applaud that ancient atomical philosophy, so successfully revived of late by Cartesius, in that it shows distinctly what matter is, and what it can amount unto, namely, nothing else but what may be produced from mere magnitude, figure, site, local motion, and rest; from whence it is demonstrably evident and mathematically certain, that no cogitation can possibly arise out of the power of matter; whereas that other philosophy which brings in a dark unintelligible matter that is nothing and every thing, out of whose potentiality not only innumerable qualities, but also substantial forms and sensitive souls (and therefore why not rational also, since all reason emerges out of sense) may be educed, must of necessity perpetually brood and hatch Atheism. Whereas we cannot but extremely admire that monstrous dotage and sottishness of Epicurus, and some other spurious pretenders to this atomical philosophy, that notwithstanding they acknowledge nothing else in matter besides magnitude, figure, site, and motion, yet would make not only the power of sensation, but also of intellection and ratiocination, and therefore all human souls, to arise from the mere contexture of corporeal atoms, and utterly explode all incorporeal substances; than which two assertions nothing can be more contradictious. And this is far more absurd, to make reason and intellection to arise from magnitude, figure and motion, than to attribute those unintelligible qualities to matter which they explode.

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